Richard Titmuss

I offer consequentialist and deontological arguments for a competitive market in human organs, from live as well as dead donors. I consider the objections that a market in organs will frustrate altruism, coerce the desperate, expose under-informed agents to unacceptable risks, exacerbate inequality, degrade those who participate in it, involve a kind of slavery, impose invidious costs, and impair third-party choice sets. I show that each of these objections is without merit and that, in consequence, the opposition to markets in organs is an untenable endorsement of death, suffering and the suppression of freedom.

This study focuses on the conceptual and empirical development of severance pay (SP)/redundancy pay schemes established through centralized collective agreements (in Nordic countries) and legislation for unemployment compensation. It argues that these "mandatory" occupational welfare benefits have been neglected in social policy debates due to the ambiguity in their conceptualization, overemphasis on their cost implications, and the nonrecognition of their redis-tributive effects. The study offers quantitative indicators to analyse SPs' redistributive structure (coverage, generosity, and benefit equality) during the Global Recession in Canada,