Sino-Indian border dispute

This book is the first to comprehensively explore the origins and reasons behind the Sino-Indian border dispute’s intractability. Utilising an array of accurate maps, tables, archival and scholarly research, this book shows how an ambiguous frontier became a contested border and how it has become relatively pacified yet remaining unresolved. Unlike previous examinations, however, this book also provides a theoretically based explanation as to why it is so difficult for an interstate border dispute to be resolved. By examining a wide range of salient actors, from state leaders to the individual governing organisations to the State itself, it is shown that it is usually in their interest to maintain the status quo rather than seek some form of resolution, thereby ensuring that the border dispute remains intractable. With both China and India shaping up to be major powers throughout the twenty-first century, a detailed examination of the major issue of contention between them is more pertinent now than ever.

India has embarked upon an ambitious project of becoming a great power. India’s International standing improved significantly in post 9/11 global order because of greater convergence of its interests with the US. India boasts that it possesses the requisite characteristics of a great power for being largest functional secular democracy with stable economy and increasing military power. However, there are some fundamental impediments in India’s way of realising its aspiring dreams: the unresolved and dangerous border disputes with China and Pakistan (world’s largest border disputes); range of complex and active insurgencies that are going on in India; and the rise of Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) are a few prominent stumbling blocks in India’s bumpy road to excellence.
    This paper will examine these three major reasons in the way of India’s projected rise and its inherent vulnerabilities thereof, which might help important stakeholders in the regional peace, especially Pakistan, to revisit their respective policies/ strategies for the purpose of achieving ultimate peace in this region.

Why have India and China failed to resolve their border disputes? This paper argues that the current public discourse on the Sino-Indian border dispute, based on legal and historical analysis, has paved way for an inconclusive and unending saga of conflicted claims and accusations. The said discourse is strictly limited to analysing the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, and examining either country’s responsibility for the war and their border transgressions before and during the war. The primary purpose of the paper is to showcase the futility of any such analysis that blames either India or China for the continuing border crisis. For India and China to foster friendly ties, the dominant discourses need to veer away from the regular ‘blame game’ approach. This paper suggests a rather holistic approach to view the border dispute, where the emphasis would essentially be on the external international factors at play. Understanding these factors, as the paper aims to, could lead to a de-escalated security situation between India and China, and can possibly make way for a healthy competition.

Calling 1962 as China’s ‘Forgotten war’, John Garver pointedly notes that very little was published in China regarding the process through which China decided for war—unlike the cases such as the korean war, the Indochina wars, the conflicts over the Offshore Islands in the 1950s, and the 1974 Paracel Island campaign.14 This reflects the gap in terms of understanding the Chinese motivation behind the war.
In this perspective, the present paper aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by taking a departure from recounting incidents and outcomes to assess China’s decision to the 1962 war. In doing so, the paper seeks to understand ‘how the war was played out’ on the Chinese side, more specifically, what motivated Mao Zedong’s choice of the 1962 war.

In 2020, the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) witnessed several violent clashes between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian military that resulted in a tense stand-off between the two highly mobilised armies and plunged Sino-Indian bilateral relations to its lowest point since the 1962 border war. Whilst confrontations between Chinese and Indian border forces are relatively commonplace, this recent crisis has proven remarkable due to the ferocity of the clashes and the alarming pace and degree to which established rules of engagement on the LAC have broken down. With both sides seemingly locked in a stalemate, it is prudent to reflect on the causes and significance of the current stand-off. This article argues that the crisis was largely precipitated by China's calculation that India's recent border infrastructure building activities and assertive domestic and foreign policy in the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir could threaten the PLA's tactical advantage along the border, and eventually undermine China's hold over the disputed Aksai Chin region. Acting on these perceptions and sensing that a 'window of opportunity' could be rapidly closing, the Chinese government authorised the PLA to initiate actions to consolidate its advantageous position on the LAC. Although both militaries are fully mobilised and in close proximity across the LAC, both sides clearly recognise the decision to go to war would not benefit either side. Hence, both sides will need to engage in some deft diplomacy going forward to resolve the current crisis and to reset bilateral ties.

The Sino-Indian border dispute has proven notoriously difficult to resolve and has been the cause of several military skirmishes and diplomatic standoffs in the past. Yet curiously there have been no theoretical examination as to why it remains unresolved, with only a handful of studies investigating what causes interstate border dispute (IBD) intractability more generally. In this article, I argue that the three existing explanations behind IBD behaviour only sheds light onto part of the problem of intractability. Instead, I posit that the key to understanding why the Sino-Indian border dispute specifically and IBDs generally become intractable and enduring lies in a state's 'sense of national prestige'. Prestige is effectively the 'invisible hand' which motivates actors in international affairs and is pivotal in establishing an unofficial hierarchy within the international system. Hence, all state officials covet and cherish their state's prestige and actively avoid 'losing face'. When a state involved in an IBD believes that making concessions towards the rival claimant would lead to a serious loss of prestige, its officials obstinately maintain their maximum claim or an otherwise incompatible stance. As state leaders and officials in both China and India have repeatedly indicated that national prestige is a strong concern when devising policies, I argue that prestige is a key factor behind their negotiations becoming deadlocked and intractable.

India and China are the only two of the world’s nations which contain over a billion people. As their economies grow, while those of Western countries stagnate or decline, India and China’s role in Asian and global affairs is obviously going to increase further. Thus, their territorial disputes take on a much greater significance than mere regional rivalry. For better or worse, China and India are standard bearers for the whole of the developing world. Others look to them with respect, for guidance, or in fear. By any measure, they are significant regional and global powers which need to take their responsibilities seriously.

Given the continued tensions in the East and South China Seas, and the constant speculation on whether Beijing may choose to escalate, it can be useful to have a look at how the PRC has traditionally resorted to force, and in particular the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

China-India boundary dispute continues to exist from last 60 years. Following the 1962 Sino-Indian war on the boundary question, fresh attempts to resolve this dispute began in the year 1988. By 2005 Beijing and New Delhi agreed on the political parameters to resolve the boundary dispute. Now locating the LAC (Line of Actual Control) is the immediate task of the leaders from both the countries. China is however taking a delaying strategy in this regard and using the boundary issue as a bargain chip in increasing the chances of final boundary settlement in its favor. Divergent interpretation of the boundary question by the two countries, the role of media and nationalism, and the Chinese CPEC project passing through POK is further complicating the dispute. Since negotiations have helped China-India in building better understanding on this question through time, it is the only way out in untangling the boundary puzzle.

55 years to the 1962 War, but the shadow still looms large in the current discourse of Sino-Indian relations. The consequence of this was strongly testified by the 2017 Doklam stand-off that brought the two countries at loggerhead, wherein 1962 became the key point of reference to the current dilemma. This very factor exemplifies the relevance of understanding the 1962 war in the current context, and more importantly, from a Chinese perspective. What makes it so is the lack of understanding of China's motivation behind the 1962 war. This critical gap calls for significant deliberation on certain key questions, such as: what enforced Chinese leadership to opt for war in 1962 after being passive for years without any armed aggression against India? Was the war a tactical response to India's "Forward Policy" or was it a mentally calculated measure to wait for the right time? Did the war have direct links to China's domestic and international confrontations? Was th...

No bullets were fired! So far, Chinese and Indian troops exchanged brickbats and hurled bullies.
Normally, India and Pakistan skirmishes trade thunderous artillery fire and weapons drawn on each other -- often inflicting civilian casualties.
Presently, both China and India claim transgression of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) over Galwan Valley in Ladakh. The valley was once a flashpoint in the 1962 Sino-India war.
An earlier Sino-India border dispute in 2017 or Doklam stand-off refers to the faceoff between the Indian Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the construction of a road in Doklam near a tri-junction border area.
Why are the two Asian giants hurtling down the path of war at the Himalayan frontiers?
When the military of the two countries are in a face-off, Xi Jinping tells PLA to “prepare for war” to thwart the coronavirus impact on national security.
There are several theories to why this border tension exists when the world is trying to control the coronavirus that came from China.
Meanwhile, China is in no mood for dialogue. Beijing is blaming India, and China’s newspaper the Global Times has been publishing aggressive and anti-India rhetoric. It claims that India has “illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory.”

For the last half a century, the Sino-Indian discourse has been viewed primarily through the prism of China’s 1962 aggression. One may baffle as to why should a territorial spat of the 19th century rankle relations between the two rising Asian powers in the 21st century? While introspecting on this theme, one needs to enquire the circumstances that led to the conflict and what political or military objective China achieved by initiating the aggression? There are differing perceptions and perspectives. The oft-advanced argument is, China set out to teach India a “lesson”, but did India learn? The war has certainly embittered their bilateral relations forever. Did the Chinese leaders not envisage the repercussions of such a step?