Sino-Korean Relations

Goguryeo (Koguryo in old romanization) is the name of an ancient kingdom that existed from 37 bce to 668 ce in present-day North Korea and Northeast China (also known as Manchuria), as well as small portions of South Korea and the Russian Far East. In succession, its capitals were in the present-day Chinese county of Huanren (34 bce-3 ce), the Chinese city of Ji'an (3-427 ce) and North Korea's capital city of Pyongyang (427-668 ce). Historical relics, particularly tombs and city walls, abound in these places and their environs. During the seventh century, Goguryeo resisted numerous invasions from successive dynasties in the Chinese hinterland, particularly the Sui Dynasty (581-618 ce) and the Tang Dynasty (618-907 ce), and experienced continuous warfare with other regimes on the Korean Peninsula, such as Silla (57 bce-935 ce) and Baekje (18 bce-660 ce). The period during which Goguryeo existed is termed the era

T he usual way to describe Ming relations with Korea is through the notion of the "tributary system." The Ming emperor, with the moral and cultural authority as a universal ruler of "all-under-heaven," enforces a China-centered world order by investing foreign rulers as vassal-kings, with the expectation that they render obeisance through regular tribute missions. This formula for understanding pre-nineteenth-century diplomacy in East Asia has received its fair share of criticism since its influential scholarly articulation in the work of John King Fairbank. 1 But for being overly general, anachronistic, Sinocentric, reductively functionalist, and culturally essentialist, its hold on Ming-Korea relations nevertheless remains tenacious. Its tenacity reflects in part the utility of the "tributary system" as an analytical framework for scholars and the malleability of tributary practices and institutions, which were used in flexible ways by both parties for domestic legitimation and foreign relations. 2 Korean embassies were also notable for the frequency, regularity, and intensity of participation in Ming tributary practices. They arrived in the Ming capital at least three times a year. Unlike most other groups along the Ming's maritime and land frontier, the Korean court also professed (at least in the context of these embassies) shared cultural values and an ideological commitment to Ming claims of universal sovereignty. Both countries were administered by a Confucian elite who could communicate with one another through literary Chinese (also referred to as classical Chinese or literary Sinitic). In other words, whatever the faults of the "tribu-tary system" as a descriptor in general, the Ming-Korea case seems to fit the bill as a "paradigmatic", if one-of-a-kind, example of tributary relations, with Korea stereotyped as imperial China's most loyal vassal. 3 This stereotype has its origins in historical Chinese perceptions of what Korea meant for the imperial project. The primary narrative of Ming relations with Korea that could be gleaned from official imperial historiography concerns precisely matters of imperial legitimacy. When Korea appears in the laconic entries of the Ming Veritable Records, it is usually in the context of routine tribute embassies, especially those who arrived to participate in the New Year's rituals. On the other hand,

The surrender of the Koryŏ crown prince to Khubilai Khan in 1259 heralded a century of Mongol domination in Korea. According to the Koryŏ sa, the official Korean dynastic history, Khubilai saw the timely Korean capitulation as demonstrating his superiority over the Tang emperor Taizong, who had failed to subjugate Korea by force. Although the account certainly embellished certain details, notably the voluntary nature of the surrender, this paper argues that it nonetheless captures an important dynamic between Korean diplomatic strategy and the political and ideological goals of Khubilai and his advisers. The Koryŏ court, hoping to ensure the kingship’s institutional survival, portrayed Korea as representing the cultural and political legacies of the imperial past to make common cause with Khubilai’s officials who sought to recast the Mongol empire in the image of China’s past imperial dynasties. The convergence of Korean diplomatic missives, accounts in Chinese and Korean historiography, and writings by Khubilai’s closest Chinese advisers on the themes of imperial restoration and cultural revival result in part from these interactions. Moreover, these interactions helped interpolate Korea into the repertoire of political legitimation, in which Korea’s role was redefined from an object of irredentist desire, to a component in the construction of imperial authority.

The conflict between the two Koreas is deeply rooted in the results of the WWII, namely, 1945, when postcolonial Korea was divided into North (Soviet occupation zone) and South (U.S. occupation zone). As an aftermath of global bipolar standoff and Korean war (1950-1953) followed by Korean Armistice Agreement, a demilitarised zone was established along the 38th parallel, between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea. The latter signed Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S. in 1953. South Korea's rapid economic development was enabled by its modernisation and industrialisation. North Korea, on the other hand, has been relying on the aid from the Soviet Union and its allies, having created what is referred to as totalitarian society, ideologically based on the ideas of Juche.
North Korea, actively developing its nuclear and missile programmes since 1980s, unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003. In 2006, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear weapons test. In 2012, it was declared a nuclear-armed nation in its constitution.
Currently, the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula can be described as a regional conflict with potential implications for the whole globe. The existence of external actors trying to make the most of the situation represents one more aggravating factor.
The crisis has reached one of its peaks in 2016, with two nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, one of them being allegedly thermonuclear.

The meaning of the traditional relationship between
Qing and Joseon in the 19th century

The South Korean academia generally views the Qing Dynasty’s policy toward the Joseon Dynasty, ranging from the Sino-Korean Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade to The Treaty of Shimonoseki, as an imperialization or “suzerainty” policy, which deviates from the traditional relationship of not interfering with the subordinate country’s internal affairs and diplomacy of the subordinate country. On the other hand, Chinese academia understands it as strengthening traditional sovereignty, and argues that it is based on a traditional tributary subordinate relationship, which is different from imperialism without denying the Qing Dynasty’s involvement in Joseon's internal affairs and diplomacy unlike before. If the Qing Dynasty’s Joseon policy is seen as “suzerainty”, the Qing Dynasty becomes the “perpetrator” who hindered Joseon's modernization. If it is understood as “strengthening of a traditional tributary state,” the status of the “victim” who did not have much choice but to improvise under the thrall of the imperialistic powers will be maintained.
Interestingly, the conflicting views of “suzerainty” and the reinforcement of traditional “tributary state” are all centered around the modern phenomena that appear differently in traditional relations as regards the Qing Dynasty’s dealing with the Joseon policy of the late 19th century. In order to figure out whether the Qing Dynasty’s policy toward Joseon is “traditional” or “modern,” it is necessary to examine the “traditional” part maintained until 1894, which focuses only on the “modern” phenomenon. Earlier, a chinese historian Quan He-xiu pointed out the importance of unchanging relationships in the era of change, and Sun Yan-shu tried to present the continued relationship through evidence-based demonstration in a paper titled a Detailed Review of Tributary Relations in the Mid-term of the Dynasties of Qing and Ming. Through the consideration of Joseon's regular and irregular envoy dispatch patterns, tributes, and the Qing Dynasty’s responsive trades and favors in return, his paper revealed that there was no significant difference from the previous period from the first opium war to the demolition of traditional relations, and it explained that citing reasons such as implementing stricter regulations on the number of Joseon’ envoys and its trade activities and increasing the Qing Dynasty’s envoy dispatches to Joseon, the Qing Dynasty placed all the more ceremonial emphasis on the Qing-Joseon relationship and strengthened their traditional relationship of visiting each other, so that their tributary framework rather seemed to temporarily get strengthened.
However, as seen in the evidence that Qing Dynasty’s imperial guest banquets that was expanded to the envoys of tributary countries in year Qianlong 46 started to dwindle each year and fizzled out after the 2nd opium war, the explanation maintaining that the tributary framework was maintained as before and even strengthened does not conform to actual history. Sun Yan-shu analyzes only public records such as the Royal Records of the Qing Dynasty, Daqing Huidian (collected statutes of the great Qing), Dongmunhwigo, etc., and yet it was recorded in Yeonhangrok (a record written by Joseon envoys who visit the Qing Dynasty) that there are many loose appearances in ritual activities, which are the basis for forming the tributary framework. There is a significant gap between the public records and actual operation regarding the tributary framework, and the loosening of the framework is not something caused by the imperialistic powers, but what had been started from the late 18 century, and the implementation of the tributary relationship through ceremonies continued to weaken.

Pendant la seule année 2016, Pyongyang a procédé à deux essais nucléaires et à un nombre record de tests de missiles balistiques. La question se pose, avec peut-être plus d’acuité que jamais, de savoir comment faire face à cette crise coréenne qui n’en finit pas. Les sanctions internationales n’ont pas amené Pyongyang à amender sa position. Pas plus que les pressions diplomatiques et démonstrations de force. Alors que l’objectif d’une dénucléarisation « totale, vérifiable et irrémédiable » de la Corée du Nord apparaît de moins en moins crédible, ses voisins investissent de plus en plus dans les moyens de se défendre contre ses missiles.
La défense anti-missile apparaît dès lors comme une nouvelle variable clé de cette crise nucléaire coréenne. Elle consacre et répond à l’incertitude stratégique suivante : comment assurer la stabilité d’une région qui assure le plus gros de la croissance économique mondiale lorsqu’en son coeur, Pyongyang « joue » avec le feu nucléaire ? Moscou et Pékin craignent que le déploiement d’un système anti-missile américain « THAAD » en Corée ne porte atteinte à la crédibilité de leur propre outil de dissuasion. Pour la Corée du Nord, le déploiement de ce système « équivaut à risquer un désastre nucléaire ».
Ce rapport cherche à fournir au lecteur l’essentiel des références et éléments de contexte nécessaires à la compréhension de la crise nord-coréenne. Une première partie se penche sur les fondamentaux de la production et de la vectorisation d’armes nucléaires ; une deuxième sur les capacités nucléaires et balistiques nord-coréennes ; la troisième sur l’historique de la problématique atomique en Corée ; la dernière enfin sur la réponse internationale au défi que pose le régime de Pyongyang. Ce rapport compile de la sorte les deux analyses publiées par le GRIP en novembre 2016, avec une introduction et conclusion nouvelles.

Targeting the North Korean state-organized illicit trade the  presentation discusses the approach of transforming the state´s elite families into businesspeople. This approach is based on the rational choice theory and on interviews with former North Korean security staff. Moreover, the approach proposes border partnership missions with China and Russia as well as an UN security council draft resolution to target the possible scenario of a North Korean system breakdown with a customs approach to prevent the proliferation of WMD across the state´s insecure borders by all kind of supply chains.                                                                                                                        Disclaimer:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            1. This presentation was a result of my research in the year 2014. It does nor reflect my then and my current critical political opinion regarding the politics of The Peoples Republic of China, which I understand as brutal and repressive, and those of the Russian Federation, which I understand as similarly criminal. 2. Moreover,  I hereby declare that I understand the state crime committed against the Uighurs by Chinese authorities and the Communist Party as - at minimum - a crime against humanity and that I stand for a military defense support of Taiwan by Western states, including the US. Moreovrer, in my opinion, the Russian attack on Ukraine is a criminal war that should trigger a criminal prosecution of those responsible for it and of the war crimes commitred by the Russian occupationists. Finally, I understand communist China as a brutal and repressive dictatorship that is based on a comprehensive system of virtual surveillance and formal social control.

The deterioration of Sino–South Korean relations following the attacks on the Cheonan and on Yonpyong Island in 2010 has again raised the question of Chinese intentions in the Korean peninsula. In this article, I explore Chinese netizen views of the two Koreas. Qualitative and quantitative evidence (in the form of a large-scale national Internet survey)
provide convergent evidence that while Chinese netizens feel
coolly toward both Koreas, they think and feel about them in very different ways. Chinese netizens appear to be profoundly disillusioned with a North Korea that refuses to adopt Chinese-style “reform and opening,” which only reminds them of their poor and authoritarian past. However, recent high-profile historical and cultural disputes appear to have led to widespread Chinese dismay and even anger toward South Korea as well, which is perceived to be poaching on China’s proud cultural heritage. These attitudes toward Korea are reflective of evolving Chinese understandings of what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-first century.

The paper will analyse building and stumbling blocks of possible formation of the Northeast Asian Community in the foreseeable future. Analysis will be primarily based on system-theory, but only transnational and international levels (understood as inter-state level) will be taken into account. Supranational level, being at a very early stage of development in Northeast Asia, will be mentioned in a model, however, not fully analysed in this paper. The hypothesis of presented paper is as follows: building blocks of NE Asia Community exist at the transnational level (especially economic cooperation) and stumbling blocks at international (inter-state) level, especially in the political sphere.

This presentation results from side-research of my doctoral thesis. My doctoral thesis covered the policing of the North Korean Ministry of State Security. The side-research identified illicit phenomena which create security risks and dangers by the flow of North Korean state-organized trade to China. Particularly, I underline, what Chinese authorities ignore, how harmful that trade is to China s public security and to its society. Moveoer, it could even lead to a proliferation of ballistic missile technology to the Middle East which creates security risks for the State of Israel. Disclaimer: 1. This presentation was a result of my research in the year 2015. It does nor reflect my then and my current critical political opinion regarding the politics of The Peoples Republic of China. 2. Moreover, I hereby declare that I understand the state crime committed against the Uighurs by Chinese authorities and the Communist Party as - at minimum - a crime against humanity and that I stand for a military defense support of Taiwan by Western states, including the US. Finally, I understand communist China as a brutal and repressive dictatorship that is based on an comprehensive system of virtual surveillance and formal social control.

A JOURNEY OF TEN THOUSAND MILES -VIETNAMESE AND KOREAN ENVOYS' TRAVEL WRITINGS TO CHINA IN COMPARISON
2021年越南朝鮮使節燕行錄論壇
Co-organized by Harvard Yenching Institute, Chinese Culture University, Soutwest Jiaotong University, and Hochiminh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU-HCM
21/05/2021

Scholarship on Chosŏn gratitude to the Ming in the wake of the Imjin Wars stresses Chosŏn loyalism and nostalgia for a lost civilizational order then only remnant as a final human outpost on the Korean peninsula standing firm before the tides of northern savagery. There was a very different undercurrent, however, in which the Chosŏn officialdom of the capital saw the Ming as irrational and even culturally alien, if not barbarous, violators of propriety. This paper examines these tensions and contradictions through the construction of Chosŏn state temples to Guan Yu, known in his deified form as Kwan Wang, at the close of the sixteenth century and the roles the cult and its temples played as a discursive space in which the Ming and Chosŏn governments negotiated the nature and dynamics of their relationship.

In his 1968 edited volume, The Chinese World Order, John K. Fairbank famously presents his “preliminary framework” for a Ming–Qing tributary system. The recent rehabilitation of the tributary system in International Relations scholarship is surprising because debates over the concept ultimately judged a tributary-system model deeply problematic. I therefore ask: (1) Can we speak of states as ontologically stable entities over centuries? (2) How might we distinguish a totalizing tributary system from tributary practice in order to allow for a diversity of context? (3) If we return to the tributary system as the lens through which we understand “China,” what elisions must we thus tolerate? Ultimately, the current manifestation of the tributary system is not an innovation but rather a return to an older school of nineteenth-century China-watching.

Multiple layers of historical mediations are at work in Chaoxian fengyun 朝鮮風雲 (Storms over Choson), a thirteen-act play written in 1948 and published in 1950 in Shanghai by the Leftist playwright Tian Han 田漢. Centered on events taken place in the early to mid-1880s leading to the Frist Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), Storms over Choson reads like a detective story written from the perspectives of all involved, instead of only favoring one voice or one perspective. Reading the play today, we are compelled to reflect on the convergences and divergences in sensibilities and visions among the mid 19th (Taiping Rebellion), the late 19th (Frist Sino-Japanese War), the mid 20th (Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War), and the early 21st centuries’ global contexts.

Born in Changsha in the late 1890s and came of age in Post-WWI Tokyo, Tian Han, like others in his generation, had been shaped by the defining wars in the region and throughout the world, among them the First Sino-Japanese War seemed to have had the most profound impact on his generation. Subtitled as “The first in a trilogy on the First Sino-Japanese War,” Storms over Choson featured events taken place in the imperial palace, the Japanese consulate, and the suburbs of Hanseong (漢城, now Seoul), in the official residence of Li Hongzhang in Tianjin, in the imperial court in Beijing, and in a village in the French Indochina (now Vietnam) from the early to mid 1880s at the time of the Sino-French conflict, and was crafted as a prologue to another two future plays on the First Sino-Japanese War fought over Choson Dynasty Korea (now divided into North and South Korea). Intriguingly, in his fictional account written in 1948 on the diplomatic dramas and political intrigues among Qing China, Meiji Japan, Choson Dynasty Korea, Imperial Russia, the French Third Republic, and French Indochina, Tian Han quotes Chen Gonglu’s 陳恭祿 Zhongguo jindaishi 中國近代史, a well-researched and well-written account of Chinese history from the mid-19th century onward, as an important source. Written and published in the mid-1930s, Chen’s history has largely been forgotten in the Marxist historiography of Mainland China throughout the latter half of the 20th century.

Tian Han, in his play written at the founding of the PRC and from inside the Communist Party, quite remarkably echoed Chen’s liberal philosophy, global vision, and extraordinary sensibility towards disparate local conditions. The result is an impressively nuanced, well-balanced, multi-dimensional portrayal of the key players in Korea, China, Japan, Vietnam, France, and Russia, though still from a distinctively Chinese perspective. Such an important historical play, like the historical account that inspired it, has long been forgotten in the historiography of modern Chinese theatre. Its excavation and possible (re)staging in today’s increasingly interconnected world reveal important historical precedents of intra-Asian border-crossing in the “East Asian Cultural Sphere,” and could inspire readers and audiences to further reflect on the multiple and intertwined paths of cultural flows among China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and beyond, both historically and in contemporary times.