The first principle of Rawls's conception of justice secures a set of 'basic liberties' equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The 'worth' of citizens' liberties, however, may vary depending upon their... more
The first principle of Rawls's conception of justice secures a set of 'basic liberties' equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The 'worth' of citizens' liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, G.A. Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens' freedom, and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen's argument – if modified to apply to citizens' 'moral powers' rather than 'negative liberty' – threatens a core feature of Rawls's conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the 'original position' would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the 'difference principle' (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens' freedom. I concede Cohen's point regarding the relation between freedom and money, but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls's conception of justice if the 'basic needs principle' is understood to enjoy lexical priority over the first principle, and is modified to include a right to adequate discretionary time. Nonetheless, Cohen's argument helpfully highlights the infelicitous nature of Rawls's terminology with respect to liberty: the basic needs principle, the first principle, and the difference principle all should be understood as shaping citizens' freedom to exercise their moral powers.
G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been... more
G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been raised to have them, this discovery does not modify what we believe. This seems to be irrational—but acknowledging that fact would entail that irrationality is much more widespread than we are, in principle, willing to accept. In this article we will focus on the solution proposed by Federico Penelas (2007), according to which the paradox can be dissolved by appealing to Rorty’s “ethnocentrism”. We will try to argue that this solution can work insofar as what supports our choice to retain our “convictions” is not theoretical in character, but practical. The reason why we can continue to support certain positions that lack neutral evidence in their favour is that it would be too costly not to do it—a condition which does not, nonetheless, make it any more probable that the positions in question are theoretically acceptable.