coup d'etat
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In May 1904 Max Weber published a short article in the Frankfurter Zeitung. It has gone unnoticed in the extensive Weber literature and it appears here in English translation for the first time. It is an important statement of Weber’s political views after his withdrawal from his active political engagement in the 1890s. He defends the Reich Constitution from attack and a possible coup d’état. He demands that the German Parliament (Reichstag) stand up to autocratic plans, closely linked to Emperor William II, to suppress democracy and voting rights. A constitutional conflict would require not a great statesman but an ‘unscrupulous idiot or a political adventurer’ who would undermine ‘all our institutions and the security of law for many generations’. The article marks the start (earlier than previously assumed in the literature) of Weber’s consistent championing of Parliament and democratic institutions.

In this thesis, the researcher focuses on discussing the coup in The Lion King film directed by John Favreau in 2019. This research is based on the model proposed by Antonio Gramsci's hegemony of power, this theory covers the causes of the normal practice of overthrowing power and the relationship of consent using the power structure. The purpose of this research is to find out and understand the relationship between the conflict between the main characters causing the coup d'etat represented in film literature; especially in examining the similarities in the causes of the coup d'etat from the perspective of the Hegemony of Power, the three aspects that caused the coup d'etat; Obsession, Discrimination, and Betrayal. To find out the truth, the researcher focuses on examining the hegemony of power that is applied in The Lion King Film. Hegemony is applied in the form of driving bad opinions to achieve the desired result, namely becoming a king. The results of this study indicate that there are 3 reasons for the application of the hegemony of power contained in The Lion King Film, obsession, driving bad opinion, cunning.

В статье анализируются нюансы изменений в советско-литовских отношениях после государственного переворота, осуществленного в декабре 1926 г. Приход к власти лидеров Союза литовских националистов (таутининков) А. Сметоны и А. Вольдемараса изначально способствовал возникновению ситуации неопределенности в двусторонних отношениях. В Москве были крайне озабочены стремлением Вольдемараса добиться обострения польско-советских противоречий с целью выгодного для Литвы решения проблемы Вильнюса. Советская сторона испытывала опасения, что Вольдемарас способен спровоцировать вооруженный конфликт с Польшей и что в этот конфликт неизбежно окажется втянут Советский Союз. С другой стороны, советская дипломатия была заинтересована в сохранении как в сохранении независимости Литвы, так и в поддержании некоторой напряженности в отношениях Польши и Литвы, поскольку такая ситуация создавала препятствия для распространения влияния Польши на весь восток Балтики. К концу 1920-х гг. для Москвы стало очевидным, что недовольство политикой Вольдемараса в Литве достигло своего апогея и что следует ждать в ближайшем будущем вытеснение Вольдемараса из политической жизни Литвы. В результате за несколько месяцев до отставки Вольдемараса политическое руководство СССР категорически высказалось против контактов с ним руководства Народного комиссариата по иностранным делам. The article analyzes the nuances of changes in Soviet-Lithuanian relations after the coup d'etat carried out in December 1926. The coming to power of the leaders of the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists (tautininkai) A. Smetona and A. Voldemaras initially contributed to the situation of uncertainty in bilateral relations. Moscow was extremely concerned about Voldemaras' desire to exacerbate the Polish-Soviet contradictions in order to solve the Vilnius problem in Polish-Lithuanian relations. The Soviet diplomats feared that Voldemaras could provoke an armed conflict with Poland and that the Soviet Union would inevitably be involved in the conflict. On the other hand, Soviet diplomacy was interested in maintaining both the Independence of Lithuania and the maintenance of some tension between Poland and Lithuania, as this situation created obstacles to Poland's spread of influence throughout the Baltic East. By the end of the 1920s, it became apparent to Moscow that dissatisfaction with Voldemaras' policy in Lithuania had reached its climax and that Voldemaras should be forced out of Lithuanian political life in the near future. As a result, a few months before Voldemaras' resignation, the political leadership of the USSR categorically opposed contacts with him by the leadership of the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

This article argues that present day expansion of capital in Chile is based on the horrendous human rights violations that took place particularly after the 9/11/73 coup d’état. The coup in Chile demonstrates the owners of capital (national or international) have not and will not hesitate to use extreme violence to impose a model of development designed to meet capital needs: maximum profits. In the same manner that capital is indifferent to the consequences of the physical and psychological trauma it brings to humans, it is also indifferent to the environmental destruction it leaves in its path. This article illustrates how the system established by the dictatorship facilitates the exploitation of the labour force and the pillage of Chile's natural resources by national and multinational corporations, today. This also explains the increasing concentration of economic power and wealth in areas such as banking, insurance and the forest industry to name a few. In the case of the forest industry, the state subsidies to this sector, and the resistance of the Mapuche people, are noted. Most of the forest land is in Mapuche territory. The roots of the Mapuche struggle are the same to that of many indigenous peoples around the world: the defense of their territory and culture. As well, other social sectors in Chile are increasingly resisting capital attacks on their physical and social well being. For example, like the Mapuche, students, artisan fishermen are increasingly resisting capital. They are facing the same response from the current government.  

Abstract This article examines how atrocity prevention efforts have had a limited effect on the violence and atrocities being committed in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, remain free to commit atrocities against vulnerable populations in the country, particularly against the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state. These efforts have been stymied at both the international and regional levels, especially now that the Tatmadaw rule the country following a coup d’etat in February 2021. UN efforts have fallen short as the Tatmadaw refuse to cooperate with the international community due to a lack of trust in UN processes and a subsequent siege mentality over heightened international outrage over the treatment of both the Rohingyas and protesters against the coup. Prevention efforts through asean, of which Myanmar is a member, have also fallen short. This is due primarily to a lack of accountability for erring members, and a long-standing principle of non-interference in members’ domestic affairs. Currently, there are no incentives for the Tatmadaw to negotiate and stop the violence committed against their own people. Indeed, the failure of these prevention efforts and the increased notions of nationalism they foster may be used by the Tatmadaw to continue their current policies of isolation and maintain power.

Abstract The 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar establishes the framework for a ‘discipline-flourishing’ constitutional democracy in which the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, retains a significant degree of power. Under this Constitution, the Union Election Commission (UEC) is vested with significant authority to supervise elections, regulate political parties and electoral campaigns, register voters, suspend elections, and to make conclusive determinations in electoral disputes. Between 2010 and 2020, the UEC oversaw three consecutive general elections and three by-elections. Following a term under the former military leadership, the country's major democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a resounding victory in the 2015 elections. In the years that followed, civilian-military relations were a source of tension, as the NLD attempted to reform the executive and legislative roles for the military guaranteed by the Constitution. These tensions became in particular tangible during the 2020 elections, which the NLD again won in a landslide victory. The military alleged the election was marred by fraud while the UEC rejected this allegation. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new parliament was to convene, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état. This article reviews the UEC in its constitutional and political context. It identifies its institutional features, significant points in its brief history, and the impact of UEC leadership as a contributing factor in fostering confidence in the electoral process.

Based on unpublished documents from the recently declassified archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry, this article aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the facts that transpired during the presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–1965) in Algeria, from the Italian point of view. From the story and the point of view of Italian diplomatic representations in North Africa, three critical moments for the young independent state in the 3 years following the ceasefire of 19 March 1962 are analysed: the crisis of the summer of 1962, the Sands War of October 1963 and the coup d’état of Boumedienne of 19 June 1965. This article argues that Italian diplomats in Algeria were all intent on their mission, seeking with their analyses to understand when a certain stability in the country could be glimpsed, such as to allow the government of Rome to launch important investments and lasting technical and commercial collaboration agreements.

Evo Morales rose to power on the shoulders of Bolivia’s most powerful social movements, ostracizing the neoliberal elite with a progressive-left populist discourse that swept through Latin America. After nearly 14 years in power, Morales’s caudillo-style leadership shifted toward authoritarianism and a politics of division that ultimately led to his ouster as president. While many have been quick to adopt the narrative of a coup d’état, this perspective plays directly into the oversimplified binary politics used by the Morales administration, overlooking the complexity and fluidity of social forces and the changing state-society dynamics over time. Evo Morales suffered a crisis of legitimacy that was years in the making. His authoritarian tendencies, alliances with classes of capital, and reliance on the extractive economy ultimately led to his downfall as he lost support from his social bases and was unwilling to give up state power. The electoral scandal in October 2019 and the subsequent departure of Evo Morales into political exile were only the tip of the iceberg. Evo Morales accedió al poder gracias a los movimientos sociales más poderosos de Bolivia, en conflicto con la élite neoliberal y utilizando un discurso populista de izquierda progresista que se extendió por América Latina. Después de casi 14 años en el poder, el liderazgo caudillista de Morales viró hacia el autoritarismo y una política divisoria que finalmente llevó a su destitución como presidente. Si bien muchos se han apresurado a adoptar la narrativa de un golpe de Estado, esta perspectiva se enfila directamente con la política binaria simplista utilizada por la administración misma de Morales, pasando por alto la complejidad y fluidez de las fuerzas sociales, así como la dinámica cambiante estado-sociedad a través del tiempo. Morales sufrió una crisis de legitimidad que se gestó durante años. Sus tendencias autoritarias, sus alianzas con las clases capitalistas y su dependencia de la economía extractiva finalmente llevaron a su caída: perdió el apoyo de sus bases sociales sin estar dispuesto a renunciar al poder estatal. El escándalo electoral de octubre de 2019 y su posterior exilio político fueron tan solo la punta del iceberg.