1968 1 71

Has 'God' a Meaning?

People are often tempted to thlnk of questions about meaning as though
they were ali on the levei of the most trivial disagreements about the use
of a particular word, the sort of disagreements that are rightly calied
'merely verbal': exemplified, for instance, in the fact that Americans use
the word 'suspenders' to refer to what we cali 'braces'. Obviously, no
sane person wouid waste rime arguing about which was the right word
to use, or what the word 'suspenders' really meant. But most questions
about meaning are not nearly as superficial as this, and in issues of metaphysics or religion we cannot proceed in this way.
Philosophers have become extremely conscious of the fact that it is
possible to use language in an impressive and profound-seeming way,
without what one says having any meaning at ali, or at least and this
is an important pointwithout its having the sort of meaning that the
speaker wouId like it to have.
Some speaker may think that he is making an important statement
about the nature of the universe, or of history, or something, and it may
turn cut, when he is pressed, that no meaning has been given to his sayings which is determinate enough for him to be making any recognizable claim at ali. In particular, this will be so if there is nothing definite
to distinguish what is involved in this man's claim from what wouId be
involved in denying that claim. There has to be a difference between what
things are like if it is true and what things are like if it isn't. If there is really no difference between what things are like if a certain claim is true,
and what they are like if it is not true, we can say that that claim has no
content at ali.
One very simple example, from the field of religious belief: and I
shouid say at once that I don't think that to criticize the sort of view I
am going to mention is, in itself, to criticize any serious form of religious
belief, since few serious religious believers.wouId believe anything as
simple as this. But there have been people who have thought that God's
purposes were positively manifested in naturai disasters such as eruptions and earthquakes; for instance, by the punishment of wicked persons
overwhelmed by these catastrophes. It is pointed out that the same catastrophes tend rather indiscriminately to involve also innocent persons,

such as small children; or presumably virtuous persons, such as members

of religious orders. The simple believer then replies that this manifests
God's purpose in another way, since it is good that the innocent and virtuous shouid go to Heaven.
He is then asked, presumably, why other innocent and virtuous persons are not given this benefit to go to Heaven quickly, but left to suffer
on earth to a hearty old age; and many of the wicked, indeed, seem to do
quite well and are not despatched. Something is then said to the effect
that it is also good that the virtuous shouid have life on earth, and that the
punishment of the wicked be delayed for a while, and so on. And after
ali this we see that absolutely anything that happened to the virtuous,
the wicked, or the in-between will count equally well; naturai calamities
directed by God turn out to be utterly indistinguishable in principle from
naturai calamities not directed by anyone; and the content of the claim
that the happening of such incidents reveals any sort of Divine purpose
dissolves in thin air.
As I said before, I don't think the very naVve view l've just mentioned
would be held by serious religious believers; in fact, I believe it wouId
be condemned by them, as superstitious. The fact that this superstitlous
view turned out to be vacuous and have no content would be held by
many sceptical philosophers to be the case, in a more sophisticated way,
as regards the centrai tenets of a religion such as Christianity. One form
of this more general sort of philosophical criticism was advanced by the
'logicai positivists'.
Logicai positivism started in the early years of this century, and was
developed principally in Vienna in the 'twenties. It became known in
this country through a very remarkable hook by Professor A. J. Ayer,
calied Language, Truth, and Logic, which was published in 1936. The
positivists held that there were only two sorts of statements that genuinely have meaning. One sort were statements which were true merely
because of the definitions of the terms used in them: a boring example is
'ali bachelors are unmarried'. These need not bother us. The other sort of
meanlngful statement consisted of those that could be shown to be true
or shown to be false by some possible sense-experience: for instance, by
some possible scientific experiment or obser\'ation. A l i other remarks not
of these two types were considered by the positivists to be meaningless.
This doctrine obviously dealt pretty hard with statements of religion,
which certainly d.bn't seem to be typically verifiable by science.
Many philosophers now would agree that a principal criticism of logicai positivism was the very narrow view it took of something's being
meaningful. It is obviously wrong just to lump together as meaningless everything that fails the positivist test; pieces of poetry, commands,
expressions of wishes, and lots of other pieces of ordlnary meaningful

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I Essays and Reviews

72

l a n g u a g e f a l l t h e test anci y e t h a v c m c a n i n g . T h e p o s l t i v i s t c h a l l e n g e

has

helped to make philosophers m o r e conscioiis of d i f f c r e n t sorts of inean-

s t a t e m e n t s o f h i s r e l i g i o n are n o t m e a n i n g l e s s :

I 73

t h e y have just this m e a n -

i n g , t h a t the s p e a k e r d e c l a r e s s u c h an a t t i t u d e t o l i f e . '
T h i s m o d e m t h e o l o g i a n I have m a d e u p is a t b e s t a c o m p o s i t e

i n g . W h i l e t h i s is so, ! d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e p o s i t i v i s t p o s i t i o n , i n a n es-

figure;

s e n t i a ! r e s p e c t , is j u s t t o b e d i s m i s s e d . F o r e v e n i f i t o v e r l o o k e d a l o t o f

he is p r o b a b l y a c a r i c a t u r e . B u t t h e i o n e is f a m i l i a r . A n d m y r e p l y t o

k i n d s o f n i e a n i n g , i t s e e m s t o m e a t least r o u g h l y t i g h t a b o u t o n e c e n t r a i

him

s o r t o f m e a n i n g : tlie s o r t o f m c a n i n g w h i c h b e l o n g s t o s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h

p e o p l e s h o u i d s t o p m a k i n g t h e m . T h e C h r i s t i a n v o c a b u l a r y is u n n e c e s -

o n e c a n c l a i m t o be t r u e o r f a l s e . T h i s p o i n t can b e m a d e i n t e r m s o f behef:

sary; i f y o u w a n t t o say " I care a b o u t p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s " , w e

t h a t t o b e l i e v e is t o b e l i e v e something,

a n d i f t h e r e is a n y t h i n g t h a t o n e

a very g o o d E n g l i s h sentence for saying t h a t , w h i c h does n o t m e n t i o n

b e h e v e s , o n e o u g h t t o be a b l e t o say i n some w a y i f n o t i n t h e v e r y nar-

G o d n a m e l y t h e s e n t e n c e , " I care a b o u t p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s " . W h a t

row

is w o r s e , t h e C h r i s t i a n v o c a b u l a r y is, f o r t h e p u r p o s e y o u g i v e i t , a c t i v e l y

t e r m s o f s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e w h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e is b e t w e e n w h a t o n e

is t h i s . T f t h a t is w h a t C h r i s t i a n r e m a r k s m e a n , a n d o n l y t h a t , t h e n
have

b c l i c v e s b e i n g t r u e a n d w h a t o n e b e h e v e s n o t b e i n g t r u e . I n t h e case o f

m i s l e a d i n g . F o r i t is q u i t e o b v i o u s t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y t h e c l a i m s o f C h r i s t i -

r e l i g i o u s statements,

a n i t y have n o t j u s t l^ecn w a y s o f expressing c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s to t h e w o r l d

in p a r t i c u i a r statements about G o d , the i m p o r t a n t

q u e s t i o n , t o m y m i n d , is n o t w h e t h e r t h e y b a v e a m e a n i n g , o r n o m e a n -

and

i n g : t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n is, w h a t s o r t o f m e a n i n g t h e y

t r t i t h s w h i c h give

And

have.

t h i s is a q u e s t i o n w h i c h a f f e c t s w h e t h e r o n e w a n t s t o g o o n m a k -

ing such statements or n o t .

T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t s o m e p e o p l e at s o m e t i m e s h a v e g i v e n a m e a n -

to o t h e r p e o p l e : t h e y have been t a k e n t o be, i f t r u e , very i m p o r t a n t

reasons

for having those attitudes towards personal re-

l a t i o n s h i p s a n d s o o n . T o r e p r e s e n t t h e w o r d s o f C h r i s t i a n i t y as m e r e l y
e x p r e s s i n g t h e s e e s s e n t i a l l y s e c u l a r a t t i t u d e s is i n f a c t t o have g i v e n t h e
t h i n g u p , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g the vocabulary.'

i n g t o the statement that G o d exists, and to other s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t G o d ,

I t m a y be o b j e c t e d t h a t I a m e n g g e d i n t h e o l d s c e p t i c s ' g a m e o f i n s i s t -

w h i c h came v e r y near to m a k i n g those statements i a t o a s o r t o f supple-

ing that C h r i s t i a n i t y be represented in the m o s t conservative and i m p l a u -

m e n t t o s c i e n c e : G o d c a m e i n w h e r e Science l e f t o f f . T h i s is t i i e G o d w h i c h

s i b l e f o r m s s o t h a t l g o o n d i s b e l i e v i n g i t . 1 h o p e t h a t t h a t is n o t w h a t I

t h e B i s h o p o f W o o i w i c h c a l l e d i n h i s h o o k Honest

' t h e G o d o f the

a m d o i n g . W h a t 1 a m r a t h e r t r y i n g t o d o is t o i n s i s t t h a t i f C h r i s t i a n i t y is

g a p s ' t h e gaps, t h a t is t o say, i n s c i e n c e . l ' a k e n i n t h i s w a y , s t a t e m e n t s

t o b e C h r i s t i a n i t y a t a l i t h e r e has t o b e s o m e t h i n g t o b e b e l i e v e d o r d i s -

a b o u t G o d w e r e c e r t a i n l y n o t e m p t y o r v a c u o u s i n t h e s o r t o f w a y I have

b e l i e v e d , a n d t h a t t h i s has t o be s o m e t h i n g o v e r a n d a b o v e a m e r e

been t a l k i n g about before. T h e y m a d e a fairly d e f i n i t e c l a i m : that certain

a b o u t the secular o r d e r .

to God

p h e n o m e n a , s u c h as t h e a d a p t a t i o n o f a n i n i a i s t o t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , o r ,

Christianity

is a r e l i g i o n w h i c h

belief

is v e r y h i s t o r i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e ;

one

a g a i n , the existcnce o f l i v i n g t h i n g s , d i d n o t a d m i t o f a scientific expla-

k n o w s a g o o d d e a l a b o u t w h a t has b e e n b e h e v e d at d i f f e r e n t stages o f i t s

n a t i o n . These negative claims t h a t certain sorts o f s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n

d e v e l o p m e n t . I t is a l s o a r e l i g i o n w h i c h is t i e d t o c e r t a i n t e x t s , i n p a r t i c u -

w e r e i m p o s s i b l e w e r e c e r t a i n l y n o t e m p t y ; t h e t r o u b l e w a s t h a t t h e y have

iar, o f c o u r s e , t h e B i b l e a n d o f c o u r s e t o a p a r t i c u i a r figure, C h r i s t , a b o u t

t u r n e d o u t t o be false, s i n c e s u c h s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e f o r t h c o m i n g

w h o m o n e is t o l d s o m e t h i n g i n t h o s e t e x t s . G i v e n t h i s , i t s e e m s t o

and

p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y c e r t a i n b c l i e f s w h i c h m u s t b e h e l d i f i t is C h r i s t i a n i t y

t h e r e is e v e r y s i g n t h a t t h e y w i l l g o o n b e i n g f o r t h c o m i n g . So i f t h a t

w a s the sort of t h i n g meant b y religious statements,

i f t h a t was the sort

me

t h a t is b e i n g b e l i e v e d at a l i . 1 w i l l s u g g e s t j u s t o n e v e r y u n a m b i t i o u s l y

o f m e a n i n g t h e y h a d , t h e y w o u i d h a v e t o be w r i t t e n o f f as a h o p e f u l b e t

and,

against science, w h i c h s c i e n c e w o n .

t o h u m a n a f f a i r s a n d t o h u m a n a t t i t u d e s i n a s e n s e w h i c h has t h e f o l l o w -

A t t h i s p o i n t , s o m e m o d e m t h e o l o g i a n m a y c o m e a l o n g , a n d say s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s : '1 a g r e e t h a t t h e a t t e m p t s t o m a k e G o d

fili

i n holes i n sci-

e n c e is h o p e l e s s : t h e e x i s t e n c e o f G o d is n o t a h y p o t h e s i s , s u p p l e m e n t a r y
t o s c i e n c e , and n e v e r s h o u i d h a v e b e e n r e g a r d e d as s u c h . ' 1 a l s o t h i n k t h e
t h e o l o g i a n m a y j u s t l y a d d t h a t these sorts o f a r g u m e n t s d o a disservice
to religion by m a k i n g G o d

i m o an abstract o r s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t , instead

of something of living concern

transcendent

i n g c o n s e q u e n c e ( t h o u g h i t is s u p p o s e d t o m e a n m o r e as w e l l ) : t h a t G o d
w o u l d exist w h e t h e r h u m a n beings a n d t h e i r attitudes existed o r n o t
even if t h e r e w e r e n o h u m a n beings o r h u m a n aspirations, t h e r e

would

stili be a G o d .
T o believe

t h i s is c e r t a i n l y n o t e n o u g h

t o c o n s t i t u t e one's b e i n g

C h r i s t i a n , as 1 u n d e r s t a n d i t . A C h r i s t i a n h a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o g o o n

a
to

people

say s o m e t h i n g v e r y s p e c i a l a b o u t C h r i s t ( a n d n o t j u s t t h a t C h r i s t w a s a

i n v o l v e s t a k i n g a serious a t t i t u d e t o the w o r l d , to

b e t t e r m o r a l l e a c h e r t h a n S o c r a t e s ) . B u t I s h a l l l e a v e t h e rest, a n d c o n c e n -

p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t o s o c i e t y . W h e n s o m e o n e s a y s h e is a C h r i s t i a n ,

trate o n t h i s o n c p o i n t : that to believe w h a t 1 j u s t v e r y r o u g h l y s p e l l e d

and

o u t is a t l e a s t necessary

c a r i n g ; i t essentially

t o p e o p l e . ' C h r i s t i a n i t y is a b o u t

o n e w o u l d h o p e , p l a t i t u d i n o u s l y . T h i s is t h a t G o d is

t h a t he b e l i e v e s i n G o d , i t is s u c h a n a t t i t u d e t h a t h e d e c l a r e s . H i s

t o h a v i n g C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s . A n d I t h i n k i t is w o r t h

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I Essays and Reviews

asking oneself very carefiiUy when confronted wich some reinterpretat i o n of Christian doctrine w h e t h c r it passes this test: that it represents
G o d as a being w h o w o u l d be there even if no human beings, or indeed
other finite conscious beings, were there. I f it does noe, ihen 1 suspect
y o u no longer bave any Form of Christianity, but p r o b a b l y some form of
rehgious Humanism.
A l i this is stili about meaning. I said the p r o b l e m was about what
Christian and other religious statements are said t o mean. There is a iimit
to w h a t they can be made to mean; when their meaning has changed
too much, in pariicular w h e n it is identified eoo closely w i t h a meaning w h i c h refers only to h u m a n life, there is no pont in going on making them in the religious f o r m . Sometinies of coursc perhaps one must
say, very often i t is not at ali easy to discover whether this has happened or not: clouds of a m b i g u i t y stand in the way. I n this connection
I think we should look extremely closely at a famous passage f r o m Paul
Tilhch's The Shaking of the Foimdaons
(pp 63 f) q u o t e d in Honesl to
God, which seems to suggest that to deny that G o d exists is to deny that
life has depth. T i l l i c h w r o t e : 'The Name of this i n f i n i t e and inexhaustible
depth and ground of ali being is God. That depth is w h a t the w o r d God
means. A n d if that w o r d has n o t much meaning for y o u , translate it, and
speak of the depths of y o u r life, of the source of y o u r being, of your u l timate concern, of w h a t y o u take serlously w i t h o u t any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, y o u must forget everything traditional that you
bave learned about G o d , perhaps even the w o r d itself. F o r if you k n o w
that G o d means depth, y o u k n o w much about h i m . Y o u cannot then cali
yourself an atheist or unbeliever, for you cannot t h i n k o r say: Life has not
depth. Life is shallow. Being itself is surface only. I f y o u couid say this
i n complete seriousness, y o u w o u l d be an atheist; b u t otherwise you are
not. He who knows about depth knows about G o d . ' T h i s raises many
qucstlons. I n the sanse in w h i c h 'life has depth' is a statement which only
superficial people are g o i n g to rejectcan it really be enough to represent
what *God exists' is supposed to mean? When people said that God exists
were they really saying just that life has depth?
Ts Tillich really saying that believing i n G o d is just the same as not
being superficial? I f not, w h a t more? What sort o f t h i n g does bis pervasive phrase, 'the ground of o u r being', mean? Is the ' g r o u n d of our being'
something that w o u l d be there even if we were not? O r is the 'ground of
o u r being' something more like our deepest aspiratons, w h i c h presumably w o i d d not be there if we were not?
I do not think that ' G o d ' , or statements containing that w o r d , have no
meaning. I think they can have ali sorts of meanings. O n some, they are
very difficult to interpret indeed. O n others, they seem to me to make
claims which can be at least well enough identified to be seen to be sub-

1971

'

75

stantial; in those meanings, which are various, the claims seem to me personally, I must say, to be false. But at Icast there s something to be false,
and something to be disbelieved. I n yet other meanings that are given to
them, they say n o i h i n g , or too little, or something of the w r o n g sort
representing, f o r instance, merely some human aspiration. Then there is
nothing to be false, nothing to disbelieve. B u t when chat is so, there is
nothing to be true, n o t h i n g co believe, either.

16
Russeii and Moore: The Analyticai

Herltage,

byA. J. Ayer
In the annais of twentieth-centur)' philosophy, the early alliance of Bertrand Russell and G . E. Moore is famous, as the principal contribution to
the undermlning of the temporary and untypical influence of Idealism o n
British thought. M o o r e , at that time, influenced Russell; at v a r i o u s times
Russell's w o r k provided Moore, who was always disposed to start f r o m
other philosophers' sayings, with material to criticise. They each greatly i n fluenced analyticai philosophy. But they were very different philosophers,
w i t h extremely different temperaments and types of achievement. Ayer i n deed treats cheni separatcly in this hook ( w h i c h is derived from bis W i l l i a m
James lectures at Harvard), dealing first w i t h Russell and then w i t h M o o r e . '
Bloomsbury, famously, favoured M o o r e , mainly (it seems) because o f
the intensity and p u r i t y of his personality, and on the strengch of ' P r i n cipia Ethica,' w h i c h found intrinsic good n o t a b l y in aesthetic experience
and personal relations; Russell it seems to have regarded w i t h the same
suspicion as Keynes he gave signs of being busy, w o r l d l y and liable co
contribute co some posicive science. Ayer's h o o k , however, does not deal
w i t h any of that: i t sticks sternly to the philosophers' arguments o n l o g i cai questions and topics in the cheory of knowledge, intellectual and c u l tural hiscory left firmly on one side.
It does, however, deal w i t h the more recent and professional reasons
for favouring M o o r e , w h i c h have had some currency among British p h i -