11 Torts and Damages (Type Text)

11
TORTS AND DAMAGES
G.R. No. L-39172 May 31, 1982
[Type text]
while his wife who was found on the
road, severely injured but was still
alive, died soon after in the hospital.
SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FLORANTE, PACIFICO, LEO, ANGELES,
CHRISTOPHER, JEAN, LAURA, HANNIBAL and
ROMULUS minors and all surnamed CERVANTES
ELIZALDE, respondents.
The left end of the truck's fender was

bent while the portion of its left hood
just below the front headlight and its
edge just above the left front wheel
were slightly dented. The jeep which
was enveloped in flames from the
incident was badly damaged. The
road where the two vehicles collided
is a straight one and judging from
the sketch made by the police
investigator (Exh. "A") both drivers
could have noticed each other even
when they were yet far from each
other. The same sketch also shows
that the jeep had already passed the
boulders and the destroyed portion
of the road and was way beyond
such hazards when the collision took
place.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was one of the defendants in this suit for
damages filed by private respondent in the Court of
First Instance of Davao resulting from a vehicular
accident. The other defendants, Hermanos de Yap
and the City of Davao, did not appeal on the decision
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Davao holding all
defendants, including petitioner herein, liable jointly
and severally in the total sum of P61,395.00, by way
of damages in favor of private respondents.
By reason of this incident, the

plaintiffs as heirs of both deceased
sued the Hermanos de Yap but the
suit was dismissed for failure of
plaintiffs to prosecute. However,
same plaintiffs filed the present
complaint on May 16, 1966, which,
aside from the original defendant,
now includes the City of Davao and
City Engineer Samuel Dumlao
alleging that while Hermanos de Yap
was negligent not only because its
driver operated their truck carelessly,
recklessly, and negligently, but also
because it was itself negligent in the
selection and supervision of its
employees, the City of Davao and
City Engineer Samuel Dumlao were
also negligent in not repairing the
road where the accident took place
and in not taking the necessary
precautions to warn the public of the
hazards on said road, thereby
causing the collision which resulted
in the destruction of the jeep and
also in the death of its occupants. 1
The relevant facts as found by the respondent court

are recited in its decision as follows:
On February 28, 1964, about 11:30
in the night, Isauro Elizalde
accompanied by his wife Hanidena
Elizalde, while driving s jeep
southwards from Davao City, thru
Talomo Bridge, suddenly and
unexpectedly came upon a hole on
the south end of said bridge right on
his way, about 1 meter in diameter
and 8 ft. deep, surrounded by
boulders, thus blocking his lane. To
avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly
to the left side of the road where he
was confronted by a steep
embankment. He swerved his jeep
back to the right to get into his lane
after passing the boulders and the
destroyed portion of the road (sketch
Exh. "A") but he collided with the
truck of defendant Hermanos de Yap
driven by Dulcesimo Dacoy who
came from the opposite direction. As
a result of the collision, Isauro
Elizalde died on the spot in his jeep
11
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Petitioner seeks to be relieved from liability on

grounds he has indicated in the following issues
which he raised in the present petition:
[Type text]
Davao, which does not include that of any of city

officials. This proposition is quite clear from the
language of the cited provision and needs no further
elaboration to show its validity. The aforecited
provision reads:
1. The allegations in the complaint

being to the effect that petitioner
Samuel Dumlao was sued in his
official capacity for being the City
Engineer, may respondent court
correctly hold that he was sued in his
personal capacity?;
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and

municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by any person by reason of
the defective condition of the roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and
other public works under their control
or supervision.
2. No evidence having been

adduced or found that petitioner
acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence in connection with
his official duties, may respondent
court hold him personally liable in
this action?; and
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that

a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, 4 or
beyond
the
scope
of
his
authority
or
jurisdiction. 5 The question, therefore, is whether
petitioner did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
3. Republic Act 4354 having no

provision for retroactivity, may the
said law be applied to deprive
petitioner of his property by giving
said statute retroactive effect? 2
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of

the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not sued in
his personal capacity, but in his official capacity.
Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him
in the complaint, much less proven by the evidence,
as the respondent court made no such finding of
malice or bad faith.
His assignment of errors are as follows:

1. Respondent court erred in holding
that private respondents, as set forth
in their complaint, sued petitioner in
his personal capacity because the
allegations therein clearly state that
he was sued in his official capacity
as City Engineer;
Examining the allegations of the complaint and

reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to
say that petitioner was sued in his official capacity,
and that the most that was imputed to him is act of
culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference
in the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is
not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is
more was not convincingly proven.
2. The law is clear that in the

absence of bad faith or gross
negligence, a public official may not
be held personally liable for any act
or omission in connection with the
discharge of his duties, therefore,
respondent court gravely erred on
this point;
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that from the

complaint itself, no sufficient cause of action was
alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to provide a
basis for imposing on petitioner the liability as has
been declared against him jointly with his codefendants, the City of Davao and Hermanos de
Yap, by the trial court. The latter defendants must
have already satisfied the judgment against them, for
they no longer took appeal from the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals, and the private
respondents did not bother to file their brief in this
instant proceedings, for they did not even ask for
3. Respondent court erred in

applying
Republic
Act
4354
retroactively against the petitioner. 3
In discussing the above assignment of errors, he first
cites the provision of Article 2189 of the Civil Code as
properly serving the basis of the liability of the City of
11
TORTS AND DAMAGES
extension of time to do so if they had any desire to

file the appellees' brief.
[Type text]
infirm is the appealed decision of the Court of

Appeals insofar as petitioner, who incidentally has
long retired, is concerned.
There remains the only question of whether Section

5 of R. A. No. 4354 under which the respondent
Court of Appeals found petitioner properly included
as a defendant whom it considered sued in his
private capacity, was properly applied by said Court.
In its own words, the Court of Appeals (Second
Division) said that "the Revised Charter of the City of
Davao (Act 4354) which took effect on June 19,
1965, cannot retroact to effect (sic) a case that
occurred on February 28, 1964." But surprisingly, the
same Court went on to say: "Moreover, in the case of
defendant City Engineer Samuel Dumlao, his
inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3
thereof is in his private capacity and conforms with
the provision of Section 5 of Act 4354." This very
patent inconsistency may well be said to reflect how
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and

the decision appealed from is reversed insofar as
petitioner Samuel Dumlao is concerned, who is
accordingly declared without liability for damages as
sought in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5042 of the
Court of First Instance of Davao (Annex D to
Petition). No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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11

TORTS AND DAMAGES

G.R. No. L-39172 May 31, 1982

SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner,

The left end of the truck's fender was

By reason of this incident, the

The relevant facts as found by the respondent court

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Petitioner seeks to be relieved from liability on

Davao, which does not include that of any of city

1. The allegations in the complaint

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and

2. No evidence having been

Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that

3. Republic Act 4354 having no

Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of

His assignment of errors are as follows:

Examining the allegations of the complaint and

2. The law is clear that in the

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that from the

3. Respondent court erred in

TORTS AND DAMAGES

extension of time to do so if they had any desire to

infirm is the appealed decision of the Court of

There remains the only question of whether Section

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and

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