Jurisdiction

ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late NORBERTO
B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC,
Rosario, Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George T. Tiglao & Clarizza T.
Tiglao and/or @ Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera. Leticia M. Esguera, Joel M.
Esguera, Ricardo M. Esguera, Voltaire E. Tayag, Benito I. Tayag, Merlie Malig, Alberto T.
Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag. Leticia E. Lulu and the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Batangas, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a
complaint for reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009. [1] Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B.
Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on
December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of
her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;[2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 [3] their answer with motion to dismiss[4] alleging among
others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioners demand had already been paid.
[5]
On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled motion to dismiss invoking,
this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their
argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance.
In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment
as administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the
opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time
of his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in
accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of
Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed
without prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary
civil action and a special proceeding are different. Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary to
discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. [6] Upon denial of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave
due course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)...
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate ....
Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate... (italics
ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its
jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for
an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73 [7]) impliedly recognizes
the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand,
probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending
on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix
ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue.
Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 [8] provides that actions involving title to property shall be
tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners
deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.[9]
Second, the cases cited[10] by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of
estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties. In the
present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise
of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which
must be stated in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with
the reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or
title to property[11] is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the
RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction,
is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. [12] Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. [13] Considering that the RTC
has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it
was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before them,
just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of
their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of
Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the
disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1]

Annex C, Rollo, p. 73.

[2]

Rollo, p. 74.

[3]

The RTC Resolution dated June 14, 1995 initially stated that the Answer was filed on January 27, 1995,
but in the body of the Resolution, the said pleading was filed on January 21, 1995; Rollo, p. 54.

[4]

Annex D, Rollo, p. 165.

[5]

Rollo, p. 170.

[6]

Rollo, p. 65.

[7]

Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at
the time of death, x x x.

[8]

Sec. 2, Rule 4 Venue in RTC. - (a) Actions affecting title to, x x x, real property, shall be commenced
and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies. The Revised Circular which
took effect on August 1, 1995 states: Actions afecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

[9]

Rodriguez vs. Borja, 17 SCRA 418 (1976).

[10]

Private respondents invoked before the lower court the cases of Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 61 (1917),
Ongsingco v. Tan, 97 Phil. 330 (1955), Tagle v. Manalo, 105 Phil. 1124 (unrep. 1959). These
cases, however, involved settlement of an estate and not appointment of an administrator nor
does it involved actions for reconveyance. The cases of Buermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386 (1908)
cited in their comment involves liquidation of business. The other cases cited are Manalo v.
Manalo, 65 Phil. 534 (1938), Recto v. Dela Rosa, 75 SCRA 226 (1977) and Morales v. CFI of
Cavite, 146 SCRA 373 (1986) which pertains to settlement of estates. The case of Ferraris v.
Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938) pertains to the power of an administrator to lease estate properties.

[11]

Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942); Alvarez vs. Espiritu, 14 SCRA 892 and 122 Phil. 229, 236
(1965); Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232 (1948); Lachenal vs. Salas, 71 SCRA 262, 266
(1966).

[12]

Coca vs. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278, 283 (1978).

[13]

See Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, 36 SCRA 462 (1970); Register of Deeds of Pampanga vs. PNB, 84
Phil. 600, 607 (1949).

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY: LETICIA ENCISOGADINGAN, EMILIO ENCISO, AURORA ENCISO, AND NORBERTO ENCISO,
REPRESENTED BY LETICIA ENCISO-GADINGAN, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners, vs.
HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE; THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR TRECE MARTIRES CITY, GEORGE T. CHUA, SPS. ALFONSO
NG AND ANNABELLE CHUA, SPS. ROSENDO L. DY AND DIANA DY, SPS. ALEXANDER NG
AND CRISTINA NG, SPS. SAMUEL MADRID AND BELEN MADRID, SPS. JOSE MADRID
AND BERNARDA MADRID, SPS. DAVID MADRID AND VIOLETA MADRID, JONATHAN NG,
SPS. VICTORIANO CHAN, JR. AND CARMELITA CHAN, SPS. MARIE TES C. LEE AND
GREGORIE W.C. LEE, JACINTO C. NG, JR., SPS. ADELAIDO S. DE GUZMAN AND ROSITA
C. DE GUZMAN, SPS. RICARDO G. ONG AND JULIE LIM-IT, SPS. MISAEL ADELAIDA P.
SOLIMAN AND FERDINAND SOLIMAN, SPS. MYLENE T. LIM AND ARTHUR LIM, EVELYN K.
CHUA, GOLDEN BAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders
dated October 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in
Imus, Cavite (RTC).
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the ownersclaimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square
meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were
titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (TCT) 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened to
subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative
Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or
RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with
the RTC an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be
annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion
was granted by the RTC in an Order [1] dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to
file a Second Amended Complaint,[2] which they promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss [3] on the grounds that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have
not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the defendants,
and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent
court in its Order[4] dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration [5] but to no avail. The same was denied by the
RTC in its Order[6] of February 23, 1996.

Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent courts Orders
under attack.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners
submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved
the issue of heirship in the same case.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
To begin with, petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their
proper remedy should have been an appeal. An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order,
which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari[7]. Where appeal is available as a
remedy, certiorari will not lie[8].
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order
dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance (Elena C. Monzon, et. al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R No. 33355,
August 12, 1992).
In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera [9], this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v.
Court of Appeals[10] where the court held:
"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action
in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that such declarations (that
Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue,
and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint, which stated no cause of action. In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[11], it was ruled that:
xxx If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may
be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, (Chairman), and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
Panganiban, J., on leave.

[1]

Rollo, Annex J, p. 105.

[2]

Ibid., Annex B, pp. 16-72.

[3]

Ibid., Annex "K", pp. 107-124.

[4]

Ibid., Annex A, p. 14.

[5]

Ibid., Annex D, pp. 75-76.

[6]

Ibid., Annex C, p. 73.

[7]

American Home Assurance, Company v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 343.

[8]

Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 703.

[9]

100 Phil. 364.

[10]

182 SCRA 119, 128.

[11]

199 SCRA 205.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS

PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.

PORTUGAL

JR., petitioners, vs.

LEONILA

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24,
2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties
which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. [3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. [4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, [6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal,
herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2,
1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m.
parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz
C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 [13] in
Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 [14]was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila PortugalBeltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent
of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July

23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her
and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she
made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be
declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents
name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among
other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. [16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, [17] after giving an account of the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the
issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that
petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate ( sic) court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and
testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a
status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special
proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The
operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right
as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action.

The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish
their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in
relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,
[20]
viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14,
2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case
in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of
contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario)
both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with
said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly
celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the
question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is
that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffsappellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary
civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of
heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary
civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this
axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, [22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of
the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred
when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and
contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision
be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint
based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements
in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of
which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading
of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the
appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed
on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a
portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty
and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents.
The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved

to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove
their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse,
found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et
al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of
letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that
he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated
in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa
Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and
issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the
addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special
proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent
whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether
they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the
trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et
al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father
[and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in
the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is]
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.

This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the
decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in
the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the
special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents
maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal auntsister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness.
Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the
same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to
Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether
Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still
pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly
procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court
should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but
nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared
as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner
Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court
directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on
the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her
the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequentlyfiled a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend
action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two
lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that
in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of
the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She
thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there
was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her
of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.

Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be
sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been
legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not
final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed
of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24,
1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for
hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to
Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to
the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in
the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil
action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals
estate, executed on February 15, 1988 [35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. [36] Said rule is an exception to the general
rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. [37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, [38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs
is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration

proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could
be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, [39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. [40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the
above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION G.R. No. 162956

REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR.,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
*AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself
and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter Promulgated:
DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and
SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and
CATALINA FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. April 10, 2008
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled
Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents
herein.[1]
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an
aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico,
Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto
Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996,
petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra
Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners
and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
(the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT
No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of
Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of
petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino
Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-98579 coveringLot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No.

T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581
covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the
name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah
Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand,
alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera
(collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq.
m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who died single
and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann who
succeeded their parents rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of
land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole
owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed
on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19,
1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to
Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at
bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land. [4]
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that
certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957
stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by
Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m.
belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino
Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated
April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia
Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. [5] They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision of the subject property.[6]
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the
respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
since they can not demand the partition of the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and
such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding
specifically instituted for the purpose.[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed
with the hearing of the case. [8] The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly
denied.[9]
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil
action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with
the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of
Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the
new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. [10] A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. [11]
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an
action in court.[12] A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. [13] Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must
be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former.[15] The purpose of the rule is to protect persons
against undue and unnecessary litigation. [16] It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of
having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. [17] Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute
an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to
recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for
reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto,[19] this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary
civil action since the matter is within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20] In
the recent case ofPortugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the
issue at hand, to wit:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties
are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file
one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to
have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for
its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order
to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. [22]
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the Declaration of NonExistency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of the allegations
therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in
the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in
the case ofHeirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario [23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the
said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay
filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation
on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners predecessor and by virtue of
succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance.[24]
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate
their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is
there anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves
declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the
case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in
interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations
therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered
co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to
cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in
the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by
the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this
case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither
had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs,
considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in
this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case,
this Court finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the
complaint is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Subject Matter
G.R. No. 73864 May 7, 1992
TEODORO PALMES HERNAEZ, JR., represented by his mother and natural guardian, EVELYN
PALMES,petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, TEODORO HERNAEZ, SR., ESTRELLA G. HERNAEZ,
FERDINAND R. HERNAEZ, DOUGLAS F. HERNAEZ, ARLENE F. HERNAEZ, WINSTON F. HERNAEZ,
NIEL F. HERNAEZ, and MA. ESTRELLITA F. HERNAEZ, respondents.
Pepino Law Office for petitioner.

NOCON, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision dated November 6, 1985 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) 1 in AC-G.R. No. SP-05928, Teodoro G. Hernaez, et al. vs. Hon. Regina G.
Ordoez Benitez, et. al., which held as void the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XLVII, in Civil Case No. E-02786 declaring petitioner Teodoro Palmes Hernaez, Jr. as the recognized
natural child of private respondent Teodoro G. Hernaez and entitled to a P400.00 monthly support.
It appears from the records that on September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his mother and natural
guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic Court (now Regional Trial
Court) against Teodoro Hernaez for acknowledgment and support with support pendente lite. A decision
dated March 23, 1984 was rendered by said court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiff, Teodoro Palmes Hernaez, Jr., the recognized natural child of
defendant, Teodoro G. Hernaez;
2. Ordering said defendant to give a monthly support of P400.00 to the minor until he
reaches the age of majority or completes his education or training commencing February
10, 1979. The total amount in arrears shall be paid in two equal installments, the first, one
(1) month after this Decision shall have become final and executory; and the second, two
(2) months after the first installment. The monthly support for June, 1984 shall be paid
within the first five (5) days of July, 1984. Thereafter, the monthly support shall be paid
within the first five (5) days of the succeeding months, which shall be deposited with the
Cashier of the Regional Trial Courts of Manila at City Hall, Manila, from whom plaintiff's
mother or her duly authorized representative may withdraw the same; and
3. Ordering the defendant to give plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees.

On June 29, 1984, Teodoro Hernaez filed a notice of appeal of said decision which he received on May
31,1984.

As the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days as mandated by Section 39 of Batas
Pambansa 129, petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as the decision of the trial court has become final
and executory.
Realizing the defect in his notice of appeal, Teodoro Hernaez filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal
or Petition for Relief on August 8, 1984 which was denied in the Order of September 12, 1984 on the
ground that the motion was filed out of time and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of
the Revised Rules of Court. 3
On September 19, 1984, Teodoro Hernaez thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lower court. On the same date, private
respondent's wife, Estrella Hernaez, together with their six children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with Motion to Intervene because they were not included as parties in the instant case, which
petitions and motion were denied in the order of December 21, 1984 4 for lack of merit and on the ground
that the decision had already become final and executory.
From said order, private respondents appealed which was granted in an order dated January 25, 1985.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of January 25, 1985 which
was also granted by the trial court on February 20, 1985.
Private respondents then filed a motion for clarification inquiring as to whether their appeal which was
granted on January 25, 1986 was subsequently denied because of the order of February 20, 1985. The
trial court issued an order declaring that there is no need for a clarification.
On March 20, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to require private respondent Teodoro Hernaez to deposit
support in arrears or to be cited for contempt.
During the hearing of the motion for contempt, private respondents' counsel requested for 10 days within
which to comply with the questioned decision. However, on April 10, 1986, private respondents, instead of
complying with said decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an
action for the annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate
Court, 5 which declared the decision of the trial court null and void for lack of summons by publication
being an action in rem. 6
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 21, 1986, petitioner instituted this
Petition for Review.
It is petitioner's contention that the requirement of publication is not necessary in an action for compulsory
acknowledgment and support of an illegitimate child since said action is not one of the instances
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised Rules of Court requiring publication of the petition
before jurisdiction can be acquired by the Court. Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius"
principle on statutory construction, this action should be considered a proceeding in personam.
We find merit in the petition.

An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special proceedings
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be governed
by the rules on ordinary civil actions.
The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since the same applies only to cases
falling under Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor
natural child, i.e., prior recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of birth or
a will, which is absent in the instant case.
Private respondents' claim that notice of an action for compulsory recognition should also be given to the
wife and legitimate children of the putative parent, Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious. First of all, in a
case for compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent
himself.
Secondly, implicit in both Articles 283 7 and 285 8 of the Civil Code is the general rule that an action for
compulsory recognition should the brought against the putative father, 9 the exceptions being the
instances when either the putative parent died during the minority of the child, or when after the death of
the parent a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both of the
parents recognize the child, in which cases the action is brought against the putative parent's heirs.
In fine, an action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus, service of summons on the
putative parent shall be as provided for under Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against the putative
parent only; his heirs may be made party defendants only under the circumstances mentioned in Article
285.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
decision dated March 23, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLVII in Civil Case No. E02786 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Applicability of rules on civil actions

G.R. No. 163604

May 6, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L.
MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29,
1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report 2 and accordingly declared the
absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family
Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years,
the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a
Notice of Appeal.3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as
required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case
being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied
by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and
substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its
petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for
Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover,
the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente
Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. On this score
alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.

However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive
issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive
death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30
days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a
record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to
appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected
by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong"
while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del
Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the
nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a
declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any
person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying
OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice
of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on
appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg.
129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner
contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004
Resolution9requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:

RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for
in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
(Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in
disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract
a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following
above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW,
contains the following provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.

That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended, andall laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure
to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioners 8-page petition10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order
disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.
SO ORDERED.

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

REYES, JJ.

VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

December 13, 2007

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This

resolves

the

Petition

for

Review

on Certiorari seeking

the

reversal

of

the

Order[1] of

the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order
dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all
the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on
October

7,

2002

contingent

claim

for

agent's

commission

due

him

amounting

to

approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and
the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in
the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim
against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum
shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and
served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against
non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed
for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? [2]

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the
payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. [3]

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules
governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary
actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose
an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an
estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of
the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against
the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective
money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. [5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material
but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental
matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer
to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate

docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
[9]

After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the

estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is
squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule
13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or
paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should
expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away
with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following
less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office
that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party
may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming
it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the
court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes
of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to
why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion

must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11

itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may
resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation
as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing
of pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court
notes that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals
and Donsol, Sorsogon where
the
petition
was
posted,
clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying
permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13
may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is
83
kilometers
away
from Lucena City. Such
distance
makes
personal
service
impracticable. As

in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have
been superfluous.

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure
has been allowed where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable
to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of
petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered
as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to
dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for
the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid. [13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was
further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling
him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15](Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
dated

January

15,

2003

and

April

9,

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,

2003,
Branch

respectively,
6,

is

herebyDIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Distinguished from civil actions

G.R. No. 16680

September 13, 1920

BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,

vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.
Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the
petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of
First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose
of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to
appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section 5762 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section 2477
of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act
No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190
provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only
provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special
proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in
the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by
said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190,
which gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an
"action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."
In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature itself,
we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding,"
and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special proceeding."

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is
the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County Judge,
13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding
to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110;
Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required,
unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon an
application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given:
Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate
testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code
Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge of
the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby
overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same is
hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA

MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO,
ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking
to annul the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court and
the Resolution[4]which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts[5] are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February
14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M.
Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin,
Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of
legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine
Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty
Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a
petition[6] with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila [7] for the judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the
said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order
declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial
court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio,
Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the
filing of an Omnibus Motion[8] on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the
trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2)

to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate
inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order[9] which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only
for the purpose of considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as
ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the
intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
July 30, 1993 was denied by the trial court in its Order [10] dated September 15, 1993. In their petition
for certiorari with the appellate court, they contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the
surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts
toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping
was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution[11] promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the
said resolution was likewise dismissed.[12]
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of
the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments which,
according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
xxx

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO
MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the
deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
xxx
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased
TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein
petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
xxx
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this
suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not
less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in
court xxx.[13]
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the
ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the
petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition
pursuant to Article 222[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments[15] and the character of the relief sought [16] in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. [17] The petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo, to wit:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for
the administration of the estate of the deceased TORADIO MANALO upon the giving of a
bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and
expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c) That the litigation expenses o these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorneys
fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in
the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
MANALO.[18]
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said
defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is
actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs [19] in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action an ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant
and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a probate court,
has limited and special jurisdiction[20] and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which
may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the
effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem.[21] So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered
as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the
Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a
ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides
that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Petitioners contend
that the term proceeding is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in Article 2035 (underscoring supplied).[22]

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of
justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or
the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.[23] A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[24] Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed
to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than strangers.[25]
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is
a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. [26] The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of
the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza,

G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT
No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09
February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60
square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land
subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area
of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of
396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot 2 to a
third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was

issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his
six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein
private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of
TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's
estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial
separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of
sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited
by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of
the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What
the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of
the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law
or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary
in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a
distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently
of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice." 10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first
settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a
quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject
property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper
proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that
trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in
regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance." 12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 andMendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional
Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived". 15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six
children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to
rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. 16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate
that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be
reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 18 The net estate of the decedent must be

ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With
the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and
only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these wellentrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's
estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.