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Dqlutmt:r \ o( De!mIe or any of Its "lIICieL Thla
may noe be mUMCi (or pub(k.adoft untl
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TASK FORCE SMITH--A LEADERSHIP FAILURE?
BY
COLONEL WILLIAM J. DAVIES
United States Army National Guard
DISTRIBUTION Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
USAWC CLASS OF 1992
U.S. ARMY WAR COUEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 170135050
PROPERTY OF US ARMY
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
This doc''llent may not be released for open publication
until it has been cleared by the appropriate militarv
service or government agency.
TASK FORCE SMITH, A LEADERSHIP FAILURE?
by
Colonel William J. Davies
Colonel Harry R. Yarger
Project Adviser
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
DlSTlUBUTlOU STATEMENT A: Approved for publie_
Te1eas i. unltmite4.
LIBRARY
Jll8l992
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
I
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: William J. Davies, COL, ARNG
TITLE: Task Force smith, A Leadership Failure
DATE: 15 April, 1992 PAGES: 84 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
On July 5, 1950, an American regimental combat team led by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" smith engaged North Korean
soldiers in combat. This force was referred to as "Task Force
Smith." Post World War II leadership in the military and
civilian sectors failed the soldiers of Task Force smith and all
servicemen who fought in the Korean War. Thousands of lives were
unnecessarily lost due to the failure of senior military leaders
to demand high training and readiness standards and senior
military and political leadership to see the nature of future
warfare and prepare for it. In the face of budgetary constraints
and resultant reduction of the force structure, our military and
civilian leadership today must study and absorb the lessons
learned from the Task Force smith experience to insure this
failure does not reoccur. This study is an examination of Task
Force smith and of the failure of senior leadership of the post
World War II era to assume the mandated responsibility to
maintain a strong defense. Failure of our military and political
leadership to recognize the need for and needs of land power
forces today could be even more costly than that experienced in
Korea between 1950 and 1953.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT .................... .
.. ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............. . . ... i v
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ..
... 1
A BATTLE LOST .. . .3
II. THE EIGHTH ARMY AND MACARTHUR ... .10
TRAINING.................
14
EQUIPMENT .......... .27
III. THE NEW ORDER OF POLITICS. .. 29
KOREA, JUNE 25 1950 ...... .
.. 31
NO PERCEIVED THREAT ....... .
.32
POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM TAKES OVER. .34
IV. THE ROLE OF SENIOR ARMY LEADERSHIP ........ . .38
BUDGET CUTS ....... .42
THE BUDGET AND DOWNSIZING.
48
MODERNIZATION ...... . .50
INTELLIGENCE .........
54
QUALITY OF SOLDIERS ..
.61
V. CONCLUSION. . 65
ENDNOTES ..... .
.73
BIBLIOGRAPHY. .81
iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
1. Korea and Adjacent Areas (Map 1) ........................ 68
2. North Korean Invasion (Map 2) 69
3. Task Force Smith, July 5, 1950 (Map 3) ................. 70
4. South Korea: Taejon to Pyongyang (Map 4) ........... 71
5. The Far East Defense Line, January 12, 1950 (Map 5) ..... 72
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the immediate post World War II era in
the Army between 1945 and 1950, because the similarities to the
military drawdown of that era and the "new world order" of the
1990's are strikingly similar. The Truman Administration was
compelled to "bring the boys home" and redirect the defense
budget to solve domestic problems on the "home front".
The great military leaders who fought in World War II were
now the senior leaders at the Pentagon and Defense Department.
They were successful in total war in Europe and Asia, but in many
respects failed to assess the capabilities of our potential
enemies and the new nature of warfare; limited war, so unlike the
global wars of World War I and II. That leadership failed to
effectively serve the interests of national security between 1945
and 1950 at all levels is in some ways self evident in
retrospect. But why and how did this occur? .This is the
insight history can provide. Hopefully the answers gained in
retrospect will preclude a similar fate for soldiers tossed into
war in the future.
Traditionally, the major reasons advanced for the Army's
unpreparedness are political in nature. According to this
school of thought, domestic political pressures upon the
1
government caused the security of the nation to take a back seat
to domestic economic imperatives and the national desire to
return to peace after the nearly five years of world war. But
this is an inadequate explanation - American casualties of the
Korean War were 54,246 killed (33,629 killed in combat) and
103,284 wounded. A professional officers corps cannot accept
such a cavalier explanation. A more appropriate interpretation
of Army unpreparedness is our senior military leaders failed to
visualize the nature of the next war, focus on readiness and
convince the democratic institutions of government of the need
for a well equipped, trained and ready Army.
This paper briefly examines the key economic, domestic and
political issues that confronted leadership between 1945 and the
beginning of the Korean War but focuses on how Army readiness
failed. It is intended that the issues surfaced in this paper
will serve as a warning to our senior military leaders of
political and readiness pitfalls of the current post-war era and
provide insights which may preclude unnecessary loss of soldiers
lives in future conflicts.
2
A Battle Lost
A NATION THAT DOES NOT PREPARE POR ALL
FORMS OP WAR SHOULD RENOUNCE THE USE OP
WAR IN NATIONAL POLICY. A PEOPLE THAT
DOES NOT PREPARE TO PIGHT SHOULD THEN
BE MORALLY PREPARED POR SURRENDER. TO
PAIL TO PREPARE SOLDIERS AND CITIZENS
POR LIMITED, BLOODY GROUND ACTION AND
THEN ENGAGE IN IT, IS POLLY VERGING ON
THE CRIMINAL. I
- T.R. Pehrenbach
On the evening of June 30th, 1950, Lieutenant Colonel
Charles Brad Smith assembled his task force, packed up equipment
and prepared to move out. Task Force Smith departed Camp Wood
Japan, at 3:00 A.M. the next morning in a rainstorm for Itazuke
Airfield - an Air Force base some seventy five miles away. The
convoy arrived at 8:05 A.M., five hours later. Smith was met at
the airfield by Major General William Dean, Commander of the 24th
Infantry Division. Brad Smith later commented the order given
him by General Dean was "the most general, widespread, far-flung
order that a battalion commander ever had."2 Dean issued the
following order to Smith at Itazuke Airfield:
When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to
stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can.
Block the main road as far north as possible. contact
General Church. If you can't locate him, go to Taejon
and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give you more
information. That's all I've got. Good luck to you,
and God bless you and your men.)
3
General Dean could not even tell Smith where Brigadier
General John Church could be located. Brad Smith later said that
he was convinced that Dean did not know if they could even land
in Pusan because the enemy might already be there waiting for
them.4 Some have criticized General Dean for not challenging the
Eighth Army Commander, General Johnnie Walker, for sending 24th
Division soldiers into combat.
5
Task Force smith departed Japan on six C-54 transport
aircraft headed for Pusan, Korea. Because of the restricted
cargo capacity of the C-54's, critical weapons, equipment and
vehicles were sent via ship with the remainder of the battalion.
D Company, the heavy weapons company, traveled by ship because of
the heavy load of equipment it carried. It would not rejoin the
battalion until after the initial battle was over. In Japan,
Smith had no knowledge of additional support, if any, that he
would have with which to fight the North Koreans with.6
Arriving at Pusan on July 1st, Task Force smith proceeded to
Taejon by train on an all night ride. About 7 A.M. the next
morning, smith located General Church's command post and
requested his orders. Church " . pointed to a place on the map
and said 'we have a little action up here. All we need is some
men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to
move you up to support the ROK's,."7 smith sought and received
permission to conduct a forward reconnaissance to select a
position where he could stand and fight the North He
headed north, up the main Pusan-Seoul highway, toward Suwon with
4
his driver and a few staff officers. He stopped on five
different occasions - reconning possible fighting positions and
recording them in case of later need. As he proceeded North
toward Osan and Suwon, he passed increasing numbers of ROK
soldiers - headed the opposite direction - south! The afternoon
of July 3d, he finally reached the location where he would set
up his initial position. Located on a ridgeline about three
miles north of Osan (See maps on pages 70 and 71), the position
had a panoramic view overlooking the countryside clear to Suwon
nearly seven miles in the distance. It also provided an
excellent view of the main highway and a railroad close by.
Reporting back to Church, smith gathered his force that
evening in Taejon and headed up the main highway to pyongtaek
where he was joined by Battery A of the 52d Field Artillery
Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Miller o. Perry. The battery
consisted of six 105mm howitzers, 73 vehicles and 108 men.
8
About 3:00 A.M. on the 5th of July, Smith's small task force
moved into position at the pre-selected site north of Osan where
the men began to dig in on the ridgeline. Battery A occupied a
position approximately one mile behind the ridgline where the
fighting positions were being dug. One of the battery's six
howitzers was emplaced along the highway - halfway between the
battery and Smith's position to serve as an antitank gun. Taking
stock of his fighting resources for the upcoming attack Smith
found the following:
5
Two understrength infantry companies [B and C)
- A few headquarters personnel
- Comma and heavy-weapons troops
- two 75mm recoilless rifles [from 21st Rgt's 3d Bn
Recoilless Rifle Platoon - "M" Co]
- two 4.2 inch mortars [from 21st Rgt's Hvy Mortar Co]
- six 2.36 inch rocket launchers [teams] [4 teams from
Btry A]
- four 60mm mortars
- six light howitzers (105mm)
- four .50 caliber machine guns [from Btry A]9
Miller Perry sent volunteers from Battery A with four teams
with .50 caliber machine guns and four teams with 2.36 rocket
launchers to augment smith's forward positions.
tO
The artillery
battalion possessed eighteen rounds of "HEAT" (High Explosive
Antitank) ammunition before departing Japan. However, Battery A
was allocated only six rounds of HEAT along with 1,200 rounds of
105mm ammunition. HEAT rounds were "extremely scarce in the Far
East because the Department of the Army had given priority to
Europe for the few it had. "II Significantly there were no
antitank or antipersonnel mines available to Task Force Smith in
Korea. Antitank mines placed in the road would have had
significant success in delaying or stopping the tanks and
personnel. Additionally, each soldier carried 120 rounds of
ammunition for his rifle and two days supply of C-rations.
On the morning of July 5, 1950, Task Force Smith consisted
6
of 540 soldiers: Smith;s original contingent of 406 (17 officers
and 389 enlisted men) augmented by 134 officers and enlisted
soldiers of Battery A, 52d Field Artillery Battalion. At about
7:00 A.M. tanks were observed in the distance - moving along the
highway towards Task Force smith's position. At 8:16 A.M., the
battery began directing fire upon the columns of North Korean
soldiers and their tanks. The enemy infantry began to scatter
a ~ d take cover, but the soviet built T-34 medium tanks continued
driving forward. The artillery 105mm high explosive rounds
scored direct hits on the T-34's with no effect. Even HEAT
rounds bounced off the T-34's, a second class tank. Firing 85mm
cannons and machine guns, the T-34's continued to close with the
American soldiers. The Task Force's 75mm recoilless rifles were
fired at distances of no more than 700 yards scoring direct hits,
but without effect.12 First Lieutenant Ollie Conners, Platoon
Leader in B Company, took a 2.36 rocket launcher and crawled into
a ditch within fifteen yards of tanks moving along the road. In
all, Conners fired 22 rounds at the rear of a tank - supposedly
where the armor was the thinnest; the rounds either deflected or
didn't work at all. Of the thirty three T-34 tanks only four
were put out of action.
One event in the battle was recounted as follows:
7
Sergeant First Class Loran Chambers, a veteran of World
War II already had five Purple Hearts. When he called
over the telephone for some 60mm mortar support, the
answer was: 'Won't reach that far.'
'How about some 8l!' he yelled.
'We don't have any.'
'Hell, for Christ's sake, throw in some 4.2's1'
'We're out of that too.'
'How about the artillery?'
'No communications.'
'How about the Air Force?'
'We don't know where they are.'
'Then damn it, qall the Navyt'
'They can't reach this far.'
Chambers shouted an obscenity. 'Send me a camera.
I want to take a picture of this.' A few minutes
later a mortar fragment gave Chambers his sixth
Purple Heart.
13
The ability to communicate between the infantry positions
and the artillery proved critical. Commo wire connecting these
positions was laid on top of the road surface rather than burying
it in. Tanks moving across the highway severed the wire and the
communications were out by approximately 8:30 A.M. Training,
equipment, and doctrine had failed the valiant soldiers of Task
Force Smith.
The battle lasted nearly seven hours until ammunition was
about gone and the North Koreans were flanking and over-running
the defensive positions. At approximately 2:00 P.M. Smith
directed his men to withdraw toward Ansong. Brigadier General
Brad Smith later gave the following account of the North Korean
force he was up against:
8
I
It is estimated by the time we fired the first shot at
the oncoming infantry that there were two
regiments of the 4th Division [NKPA] in our view.
did not know what their composition was; I knew there
was a hell of a lot of people coming at us and I didn't
know what was left at Suwon. It turns out that it was
what was left of the 4th Division and all of the 5th
Division coming right behind them. So, I had
to face 20,000 instead of maybe four or five
thousand. 4
Smith's force carried out as many wounded as could be
carried. However, other wounded and dead, together with
equipment, were left behind. In a matter of a few hours, Task
Force Smith had been over run. Thus ended the first involvement
of American soldiers in the Korean War. "smith and Perry had
lost about 185 men killed, wounded, captured or missing."tS The
North Koreans continued south toward Osan and Taejon. In light
of his command's capabilities, the quality of the equipment, the
training of the soldiers, the intelligence given, the orders
received, Task Force smith fought bravely and its accomplishments
should not be degraded. Task Force Smith failed and the reasons
for failure point to unpreparedness for war. We need the
insights from Task Force at this time in our history. Why did
Task Force Smith fail? Why was the world's greatest army
unprepared for a third world conflict? The answers lie far above
smith's level.
9
CHAPTER II
THE EIGHTH ARMY AND MACARTHUR
MacArthur's strategy during the early days and months of the
war was intended to prevent the enemy from capturing Pusan which
was the most critical port in Korea - with a capacity many times
greater than Inchon. The more the enemy could be slowed down,
the more time would be available to move troops and supplies into
Pusan. He later explained that Brad Smith's force was to "serve
as an arrogant display of strength,,16 to the enemy. It was more
an arrogant ignorance of the readiness of the forces under his
command.
MacArthur's headquarters had instructed the Eighth Army
Commander, Lieutenant General Johnnie Walker, to provide a
delaying force of
.. two rifle companies under a battalion commander
reinforced by two platoons of 4.2 inch mortars and one
platoon of 75mm recoilless rifles to go by air to Pusan
and report to General Church for orders .... the mission
of the advance elements was phrased as follows:
'Advance at once upon landing with delaying force, in
accordance with the situation to the north by all
possible means, contact enemy now advancing south from
Seoul towards Suwon and delay his advance!' 17
As we have seen, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th
Infantry Division led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" smith
10
was tasked for the mission. How well prepared were they for this
task? smith was a west Pointer who had served under the command
of then "Lightening Joe" Collins in the 25th Division at
Guadacanal (who at this time was the Army Chief of Staff) as a
battalion commander and Division G-3. Collins later said
Lieutenant Colonel Smith " ... had come to my attention then as a
bright young officer who showed great promise. Now matured and
combat experience back of him, he was well qualified to lead
the first American army troops to fight in the Korean War. ,,18
LTC Smith reported to his new duty station at Camp Wood
Kyushu, Japan, in the summer of 1949. A year later, on June 30,
1950, after spending long hours on alert duty as a result of the
North Korean invasion which had taken place five days earlier, he
had gone to bed early. At approximately 10:30 P.M., the phone
rang and his wife Bettie answered. Colonel Richard W. Stephens,
Commander 21st Infantry Regiment, was on the phone and he wanted
to talk to Brad Smith. Bettie quickly awakened her husband and
he listened to Colonel Stephens issue orders as follows: "The lid
has blown off. Get on your clothes and report to the CP. ,,19 At
the command post, he learned that he would a task force,
gathered together at Camp Wood, to counter the invasion by the
North Korean Army. At this time, his force consisted of a part
of his battalion headquarters company and a mixture of .troops
from his communication section, and a platoon formed with a mix
of 75mm recoilless rifles and 4.2 inch mortars; a total of 406
w
officers and men.
11
Only a third of his officers had been in combat during World
War II. One half of his NCO's were veterans, but not all of them
had actually been in combat. Most of the enlisted men were
twenty years old or under. Brad smith was himself thirty-four. 21
What would have been the outcome of this encounter with the North
Koreans if more officers and men had been combat veterans? What
would have been the outcome if there had been no combat veterans
in Task Force Smith? These are questions that cannot be
answered, but some surprising insights are available on the
readiness of these men. General Collins later said that Task
Force Smith "was scarcely a formidable body for checking even the
leading elements of the North Korean divisions driving south from
Seoul toward Taejon.... "ll General Collins may never have
realized the extent of this understatement.
Japan was occupied by U.S. Forces under the Far East
Command, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur (CINCFE).
MacArthur also was the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and
Commander in Chief, united Nations Command (CINCUNC). As the
CINCFE, he had control of the Eighth Army, comprised of the 24th,
25th and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division.
The Eighth Army was commanded by Lieutenant General Walton Harris
"Johnnie" Walker who commanded the XX Corps under George S.
Patton in World War II. The primary mission given to the Eighth
Army was "occupation duty" - to watch over the defeated nation of
Japan. MacArthur had been the senior military and political
leader in Japan since the end of World War II. Walker became the
12
Eighth Army Commander in 1948.
The Army of 1950 was the post World War II Army which was
"shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future ... than by
the last war of whose massive armies it was the remnant. ,,23 In
Japan, American leaders and soldiers had fallen into the calm and
peacefulness of the post war period. occupation forces in Japan
lacked the knowledge of basic combat skills. There was little
emphasis on training beyond the squad and platoon level. Live
fire weapons training and exercises were the rare exception,
rather than the rule.
Many of the men were more familiar with beer halls and
brothels of the Japanese cities than with the basics of
soldiering as one critic later complained, it was a
'cream puff' army .. if these guys had spent more time
on the firing range and less time in the PX snack
bar ... they might be alive t o d a y . ~
The prevailing attitude of the peacetime occupation and lack of
emphasis on training and readiness by military leadership was
evident. This leadership failure would later prove to be a
notable cost to American lives.
13

WAR SEVERELY TESTS THB PHYSICAL ENDURANCB AND
MORAL STAMINA OP THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER. TO
PERPORM HIS DUTIBS BPPICIBNTLY HE MUST NOT
ONLY BE WELL EQUIPPED AND TECHNICALLY TRAINED
BUT HB ALSO MUST BB PHYSICALLY QUALIPIED TO
BNDURB THB HARDSHIPS OP THE PIELD SERVICE AND
BB CONSTANTLY PORTIPIBD BY DISCIPLINE BASED
ON HIGH STANDARDS OP MILITARY
CONDUCT. 25
- PM 100-5, AUGUST 15, 1949
The Army in 1949 and 19S0 was untrained and unprepared to
meet the severity of combat. Irrespective of existing
at the time, such as the operations manual, FM 100-S, one of the
most striking criticisms that can be made of the senior Army
leadership between 1945 and 19S0 was their failure to insist upon
quality training, doctrine, and standards. It is significant to
note that FM 100-S that came out in August 1949, superseded the
version of June lS, 1944. For nearly five years (1944-1949), the
u.s. Army had been operating on World War II doctrine even though
significant changes took place in the force structure as a result
of budget cuts and downsizing.
The deactivation of one battalion in each of the three
divisional regiments and removal of one of the three firing
batteries in each of the four artillery battalions had serious
repercussions for doctrine. The modification of the divisional
regiments and artillery battalions for budget reasons, conflicted
14
with the Army's training and doctrine under the triangular system
of maneuver units.
26
No doctrine replaced the three-battalion
regiments and therefore the deactivation significantly
compromised the readiness and combat effectiveness of the
divisions. First into combat in 1950, the 24th Division was the
first of many to pay the price for the lack of complete fighting
units. Three days after Task Force Smith had fought the North
Koreans north of Osan, Major General William F. Dean, Commander
of the 24th Division, conceded that the divisions must be brought
up to their full triangular organization. His letter of July
eighth to MacArthur expressed his concerns on this subject as
follows:
The two battalion regimental organization with which we
are operating does not lend itself to effective combat.
The same is true, though possibly to a lesser degree of
our two battery artillery battalions. Recommend that
infantry battalions be sent us to bring all regiments
of the 24th Division up to regular triangular
organization.
v
None of the four divisions of the Eighth Army had the capability
to project more than 62 percent of its normal combat power.
28
The doctrine publications were based on an assumption that units
would be able to deploy their full wartime strength and
compliment of A regimental commander would normally be
able to deploy his three battalions with two forward and one held
in reserve. In this case, "no matter which course was adopted,
the regiments tactical integrity was gravely The
commanders and officers in Korea were not trained in or
experienced with such a modified tactical system. This concept
15
had not been taught in the Army schools, perhaps because it was
believed that the spaces would be filled prior to combat. 31 such
was not the case in June 1950. Thus the basic tenet of train how
you will fight was violated.
Reports on combat efficiency of the four division's of the
Eighth Army were sent to the Department of the Army in May 1950
showing estimates ranging from 84 percent to 65 percent of full
combat efficiency.32 These four divisions "mirrored the Army's
state of unreadiness in all respects.
tlD
Lack of training of the
American soldier in the continental United states, as well as
overseas, was known to the leadership at the most senior levels.
Yet, sufficient and appropriate corrective action was not taken,
nor were the actions that were taken followed up adequately.
In 1945, Basic Training had been cut from seventeen weeks to
eight weeks as a cost saving measure. But this proved to be a
tremendous burden upon the gaining units to provide the
additional training needed. Later, in March 1949, the training
cycle was increased to fourteen weeks, but it did not include
specialty or branch This attempt to economize and
cut the "fat" had a far reaching and devastating effect upon
readiness of the Army.
MacArthur in response to rising readiness concerns issued a
new training directive to the Eighth Army on June 10, 1949. The
Eighth Army, relieved of many of its administrative occupation
duties, was provided time for training in combat skills. This
was a dramatic change to the relaxed life style prevalent in
16
Japan at the time. The poor condition of training was evident
when the Eighth Army headquarters conducted a CPX (Command Post
Exercise) to comply with the increased level of training directed
by MacArthur. The results were not satisfactory:
The Assistant G-3, Mike Michaellis, remembered with
amusement: 'General Walker called an "alert" and moved
the headquarters to the field. It was a top secret CPX
which envisioned a Russian invasion off Hokkaido.
Until then combat preparations had been almost
negligible. The CPX was a disaster. It took almost
three days for them to get the tents set up. The people
had no'place to sleep. There was no lighting, no
communications. They couldn't get the meals together.
It was god awful. But by June 1950 [the Korean War
started in June 1950!] we'd done this so many times
that the headquarters was adequately trained to go into
the field. ,35
People at the lower echelon of the chain of command were well
aware of the problems with training, as in the case of Major
Michaellis. It is evident that even rUdimentary training was
lacking and major efforts were required if soldiers were to be
successful in combat!
To meet MacArthur's training directive, Walker intensified
the Eighth Army training program. Training plans emphasized the
field environment using a graduated schedule to meet certain
level training standards by given time-frames: "Completion of
company-level training by December 1949, battalion level by May
1950, regimental-level by July 1950, and divisional level by
December 1950.,,36 Even if accomplished perfectly, the Army could
not have fielded an integrated combat ready force by June, 1950.
In fact, when the war started, regimental, division, and. Army
levels of training had not been carried out.
17
Most units were on record for having completed battalion
level training on paper; some were noted as failing their
tests.
37
However, there are indications that validation of
battalion level training was questionable at best. If such
battalion tests were administered, some of the key commanders
were not aware of it. For example, in a recent interview with
Brigadier General (retired) Charles Brad Smith, he was not aware
that such formalized testing had been implemented. smith did not
believe that any live fire training had been conducted during the
year he was commanding his battalion in Japan.
38
He recalled an
Army Training Test (ATT) being administered by the Eighth Army,
but that was only in the form of a staff and commander Command
Post Exercise (CPX). 39 In regard to a requirement to conduct
training at company, battalion, regimental and division level,
Brad Smith sai.d "if that included live firing and maneuvers,
that's hogwash.,,40 He recalled that one CPX and a few amphibious
exercises had been conducted during his tenure in Japan, but it
was not clear to him that this training was associated with a
requirement to achieve battalion, regimental or.division level
training.
41
Smith reflected that training "was almost non
existent. We had PT. We probably did physical training as well
as we did anything. It was PT in place - it wasn't a three mile
run followed by a half dozen pushups . nothing like that. ,,42
The Department of the Army staff conducted a training
inspection visit to the Far East Command during September and
october 1949. Prior to that visit, there ~ a d been no training
18
inspection visits of overseas commands since the end of World War
II! The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, in
a memorandum to Joe Collins confirmed this at the time. Major
General Clint Andrus, Director of Organization and Training for
the Department of the Army, in a memorandum to Colonel Philip
Dwyer of that office to arrange for a training inspection of
overseas commands references this exchange. He states:
General Bradley in a memorandum to General Collins
dated 16 February 1949, stated that there has been no
plan, since termination of hostilities (end of World
War II], which the Department of the Army inspects
training of overseas units. The changing conditions,
in addition to the reorganization of occupation
troops in combat type units, warrants a deeper
interest by the Department of the Army [in
determining the] training status of these units.
43
General Bradley himself had not visited the Far East Command
while he was the Army Chief of Staff! It would be easy to draw
the conclusion that the senior leadership had been unconcerned or
at best complacent about the status of training and readiness
overseas. But a better question is what did the senior leadership
know about the readiness of the force?
Soon after assuming the job as Army Chief of Staff (October
1, 1949), General Collins visited the Far East Command to
ascertain combat readiness. While in Japan, he wrote a
memorandum "Report of Visit to Hawaii and Far East Command"
(October 20, 1949) to the Secretary of the Army:
19
As a result of the reductions in strength of
personnel ... and because our troops were primarily
engaged in occupation missions until recently, the
troops of the Eighth Army are now in fighting
condition... given another six months the divisions I
inspected should be in excellent
He later commented in his book, War In Peacetime:
In my subsequent inspection visits to the troops it
was evident that the recent emphasis on training,
inaugurated by General Walton H. Walker, the commander
of the . Eighth Army in Japan, had reached only the
battalion level and had not overcome the inevitable
slackness that results from occupation duty. On my
return to Washington I reported to Secretary of the
Army Frank Pace that given time, deficiencies in
combat readiness could be corrected. Now it appeared
there would not be time. 4.5
The disparity in these reports is striking. Collins had his six
months. His earlier report lacked depth and knowledge about the
realities of readiness. He did not address the shortage of
critical equipment, weapons and munitions. He apparently was not
aware of the poor condition of the aged and worn out weapons and
equipment on hand. Most assuredly, his assessment of the Eighth
Army as being in condition" was unrealistic and
misleading to say the least.
The Department of the Army's first training inspection of
the Far East Command (FEC) was conducted by Colonel F.M. Harris
and his party in the fall of 1949. The inspection was documented
in a SECRET "Report of Training Inspection of the united states
Army, FEC.,,46 The inspection covered the Far East Command with
the exception of the Philippines and Korea. The report showed
significant shortcomings that would question the Far East
Command's readiness, but at the same time it also revealed DA's
20
failure to oversee the commands under it. Overall, conclusions
in the report stated training in the Far East Command was
"considered satisfactory to the Department of the Army
[andl ... the individual soldier in the Far East Command is
considered to meet Department of the Army training standards. ,,47
The paradox of this report was seen nine months later, when u.s.
soldiers went into combat against the North Koreans. They were
not ready for combat at the time of the inspection and they did
not get themselves ready by June, 1950! The report also
contradicted itself. On one hand, it said training in the Far
East Command was "satisfactory". On the other hand, the report
cited serious shortcomings, that in retrospect, should have
seriously challenged the Eighth Army's readiness for combat.
Eighth Army divisional units and commands were inspected
during the period of September 24 through October 29, 1949. The
divisional commands of the Eighth Army were the 24th, 25th, and
7th Infantry Divisions and also the 1st Cavalry Division
(Infantry). Shortcomings of the Far East Command noted in the
inspection report revealed many deficiencies that should have
been noted by the senior Army leadership. Eighth Army units
reflected a disparity in MOS overages and shortages that could
not be matched with the strength reports. There were also
critical shortages of ammunition and equipment. The report
clearly identified concerns about the lack of adequate training
areas and training aids. Although the emphasis was on combat
training, there were far too many combat being used for
21
administrative and other "overhead" duties.'" Misleading summary
findings of the report stated that the
Department of the Army directives concerning training
are being carried out [and] the attitude of-all
headquarters toward training is excellent. The feeling
that training is the primary mission of all combat
units exists in all echelons. Every effort is being
made to meet established training
At best, units had good intentions, but there was little analysis
that clearly quantified a state of readiness for combat. It is
apparent from the report that not all was well in training and
readiness. A key statement in the report should have sent a
chilling signal of warning back to Washington: "That a standard
criterion tor determining combat ettectiveness be developed and
made applicable to all There was apparently no
standard to quantify what "combat readiness" meant!
It is also evident that there was no clearly defined
procedure to receive feedback on the conduct of training
throughout the Department of the Army. The report recommended
"that a periodic report on training matters be submitted by the
Far East Command to the Department of the Army .... ,,51
Apparently, there was no procedure in the Army to determine if
its subordinate commands were complying with established training
doctrine in the Far East and perhaps Europe. As a result of
this visit, it was recommended that annual training inspections
be conducted of overseas commands.
52
To be certain that training
was accomplished and evaluated, the report also recommended that
DA be represented when major field training exercises were
conducted. 53 What had the Army used to monitor and gauge the
22
combat effectiveness of its overseas commands? Apparently, there
was no formalized Army policy for evaluating and documenting the
readiness of units in the Far East Command and Eighth Army before
the DA visit in september 1949.
Historical analysis of the period has well documented the
unsatisfactory training throughout the Army between 1945 to
1 9 5 0 . ~ MacArthur's new training program was underway, but far
from reaching its objective at the time of the DA inspection in
September of 1949.
The DA inspection of the Far East Command should have been a
clear signal that the U.S. Army in the Far East Command was not
ready for combat. Instead, it was misleading and it apparently
had no bearing upon the decision of the Department of the Army
and MacArthur to question the prudence of sending troops into
combat. Overall, the report shows a satisfactory evaluation of
the Far East Command in meeting what the inspection team
perceived as the Department of the Army's training and readiness
standards. If this report had been more candid and accurate,
would the Army have taken a different approach in its training
policy and w,ould it have been more prudent when it was confronted
with sending soldiers into combat eight months later? The report
is representative of a system that was either unaware of what
training was required and how to evaluate it or was implemented
by people who were unwilling to report the short-comings. Either
is an indictment of the senior leadership of the Army and the
institutional climate they tolerated.
23
What is incomprehensible about the level of training and
readiness is the general lack of concern about it. Surely the
senior officers with their extensive warfighting experience must
have known the ultimate risk of this unpreparedness. When told
to commit Task Force Smith to Korea, Walker would likely have
known about the poor training of the Eighth Army. Brad Smith
later commented in an interview that he believed Walker was
"intimately familiar with the terrible training facilities in
If Walker didn't know about the poor training and lack
of readiness, he is equally at fault for not insuring that his
staff and command inspections identified the state of combat
readiness. Yet, he apparently raised no objections to MacArthur
to the orders to send Task Force Smith into combat. The same
question should be asked of Major General Dean, Commander of the
24th Division:
Bill Dean well knew his division was in no way
prepared for combat, but he raised no objections to
Johnnie Walker. In view of the existing frenzy, had he
done so it was likely he would have been relieved of
command if not by Walker, then by GHQ. He subscribed
to the prevailing American view that his division
however ill equipped, had merely to make an appearance
on the battlefield and the NKPA would melt into the

Neither of these justifications are acceptable on today's battle
field with its fast pace and limited opportunities for recovery.
It represents a mind set that should be incomprehensible to a
professional officer corps.
However, it should be emphasized that poor readiness was
evident throughout the Army and not just with the Eighth Army in
24
Japan. For example, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Headquarters
prohibited the use of live ammunition in training exercises
following the end of world War II. "Live fire demonstrations
conducted at schools continued, but unit-level exercises with
live ammunition were not conducted from 1945 until the beginning
of the Korean War in 1950."n General Mark Wayne Clark as Chief
of the Army Field Forces (AFF) Headquarters extended this policy
in 1949 when he issued his Training Memorandum No.1., which
stated: "Training in infiltration courses is not authorized;
Training in 'Combat in cities and Villages' course and 'Close
Combat Course' are not to be conducted with service ammunition
(original emphasis)." 9 It is interesting to note that live
ammunition was not used in these training exercises until July
17, 1950, nearly two weeks after U.S. troops went into combat in
Korea. S9
In a similar fashion, use of tanks in Japan was
restricted:
For economy reasons and to avoid damage to the roads
in Japan, the Eighth Army divisions were restricted to
one company of old M-24 Chaffee light tanks, which were
used primarily for ceremonial purposes. The few
Shermans and Pershings or variants in Japan were stored
in warehouses.
60
The inaccessibility to critical weapons and equipment for
training is a sad commentary of American military leadership.
Training certainly took a back seat in occupied Japan. Brad
Smith later commented that "you couldn't get any proper training.
don't think anybody felt there was any need for it. ,,61
General Matthew Ridgway later expressed his concerns for
training levels and his observations are an indictment of peace
25
I
time readiness and the Army's leadership failure. Upon assuming
command of the Far East Command after MacArthur's relief by
President Truman, General Ridgway aggressively worked to get his
Eighth Army forces back into shape. The war had been going on
for seven months, but there was still a lot of work to do. On
February 4, 1951, Ridgway held a meeting with his corps
commanders and covered several issues he observed while visiting
their commands in the field. His comments on the need for
training were noteworthy and typical of the failure of senior
leadership to demand hard training to achieve combat readiness.
On the subject of training he stated: "Cannot over-estimate
importance. Present levels [on February 4, 1951J unsatisfactory.
Front line Infantry now appears uninspiringly seasoned. Requires
ceaseless
Training was impeded in the Army as a whole for several
reasons. High personnel turnover, low test scores and standards
for enlistment into the Army, a shortage of equipment and a lack
of funds. These will be examined later, but one cannot escape
the fundamental failure of leadership at all levels to be
cognizant of and act on obvious training and readiness issues.
This is indicative of an institutional environment which has lost
its primary focus - a senior leadership task.
26
Equipment
Training and combat readiness in the Eighth Army was
significantly impaired by the lack of equipment and the poor
condition and age of the equipment it possessed. The post World
War II Army acquired no replacement of unserviceable equipment.
Army procurement in the post war period was generally limited to
clothing, medical supplies and food stuffs.
63
The Eighth Army
fought with equipment that had been left rusting on the Pacific
islands and was retrieved and placed in a repair program to fill
the shortfall of the Eighth Army and Far East Command. Ninety
percent of the weapons and seventy-five percent of the vehicles
in Japan had been recovered from the Pacific battlefields at the
end of the war.M Vehicles, weapon systems, and other equipment
recovered from the battlefields were repaired by Japanese
laborers - with little attention to quality control. This
equipment did not stand up to sustained combat conditions.
This program was necessary because Army leadership failed to
implement an adequate acquisition program. No new tanks or
vehicles had been received into the inventory since the end of
World War II. Such items as 4.2 inch mortars, recoilless rifles
and medium tanks were difficult to find. "The Eighth Army was
authorized 226 recoilless rifles, but had only 21. Of 18,000 4x4
vehicles in the Eighth Army's stocks, 10,000 were unserviceable
and out of 18,780 2 1/2-ton 6x6 trucks only 4,441 were in running
27
condition. 1165 This worn out equipment simply could not be
depended upon when needed " . an estimated 80 percent of the
Army's 60 day reserve of armament equipment was unserviceable on
25 June
Equally ominous was the datedness of equipment. Much of the
equipment the Army fought with in World War II had been
inadequate even during World War II. Most notable, among these
were the tanks and anti-tank weapons. Yet in 1950, five years
after the close of the World War, American soldiers still used
weapons proven to be ineffective. The ineffectiveness of Task
Force Smith's weapons against North Korean tanks is not the
result of a progressive North Korean research and development
effort, but the failure of Army senior leadership to push an
adequate U.S. program through the political process. One must
ask - how can this occur?
28
CHAPTER III
THE NEW ORDER OF POLITICS
Korea was split along the 38th parallel between the Soviet
union and the allied forces following the Japanese surrender on
August 10, 1945. As a provision of the Potsdam Conference less
than a month earlier, several divisions of soviet troops rushed
into Korea to get their share of the spoils of war. Colonel Dean
Rusk (later to be secretary of state under President Kennedy in
1961) and Colonel C.H. Bonesteel, both on Marshall's staff,
recommended that a line be drawn on the j8th parallel to separate
the areas to be occupied by Soviet and u.s. forces. Japanese
soldiers surrendered to the Russians north of the 38th parallel
and to the Americans south of the 38th parallel. The Russians
backed the communist totalitarian leadership of-Kim Il Sung and
the united States advocated a free democratic government, later
to be headed by Syngman Rhee. Tensions in Korea continued to
mount as North and South Korea argued for leadership of a unified
Korea. Both sides were defiant and unwilling to compromise.
u.s. national policy toward Korea became known to the world
for the first time on January 12, 1950, when Secretary of State
Dean Acheson spoke before the National Press Club in Washington.
29
---
He " ... declared Formosa outside 'our defense perimeter.' He also
excluded South Korea from the American defense outposts. ,,67 The
.
to Janan. defense Derimeter
-
was drawn from the Aleutian Islands.
- ...- ,
to the Ryukyus Islands - including Okinawa, and the Philippine
Islands.
68
(see Map 5, page 72) Many historians believe this
speech, along with the troop withdrawal in September 1949, was
misinterpreted to mean that the United States had no interest in
defending South Korea. Acheson's statement was seen as
encouragement to North Korea, with the Soviet Union's and China's
blessing, to invade South Korea. In his book War in Peacetime,
General Joseph Lawton Collins said: "Why the Secretary of State
felt impelled to make this disclaimer publicly, I have never
understood. I imagine that, like a batter swinging at a bad
ball, he later would have liked to have had that swing back
again.,,69 In his memoirs) Nikita S. Krushchev wrote: "Late in
1949 ... Kim II Sung, the North Korean leader, visited Joseph
Stalin seeking approval for an attack in South Korea. Stalin
after Mao Zedong gave Kim the green light."M Acheson's speech
certainly gave more assurance to the North Korean leadership's
desire to invade South Korea.
30
Korea. June 25 1950
sunday, June 25th, 1950, the North Korean People's Army
(NKPA) crossed the 38th parallel to the south with tanks and
thousands of troops (see Map 2, page 69. Opposing them were
about 65,000 ROK soldiers who were partially trained in combat
skills and who were armed only with small arms, mortars,
howitzers and ineffective bazookas.
Before the invasion, the United states policy was firmly
committed not to get involved in a war in Korea. The sudden
change in policy was explained by General Collins:
We could not believe that such a small puppet state as
North Korea would blatantly defy the United States and
United Nations. Our prestige in Asia and that of the
United Nations was suddenly at stake, and we reacted
accordingly. If South Korea were to fall to Communism,
Indo-China and, probably, Indonesia would follow, and
the whole balance of power in the Far East would be
upset. Such a upset would be a direct threat, not only
to Japan, but also to the united States and to the
whole concept of international peace under the charter
of the United Nations.
n
Contrary to an existing plan to withdraw all U.s. personnel from
Korea if invaded, the National Security Council and the President
determined that the United states should repel the invaders
because of the prestige at stake. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Omar Bradley, said the invasion was a
31
... major escalation in the cold war ... a 'moral outrage'
whi .... h i-ho TTnirDn rho n ..';i- ... ..:a _____.. ,..1
- _-..... vA ........ ""' ---- ----'-''''''' ". ...................... "" ...... """liW'-& J.lIQl...UIlt:t \",oVU,LU
not countenance. To knuckle under in this test, he
said, would be tantamount to 'appeasement'. One act of
appeasement could lead to further acts and hence almost
rn 'wo ... ' d ... .. +-h ... __ ..... m... ... J
- ... -- '"!J----. -......... - - - ...... ,J,w .J."'C::
somewhere,' Bradley concluded, and Korea 'offered as
annn rhD lino ... ...
- ------- --- ----- '"!J _ ... - -_... - - ..... - .. ........ "'""' .........
else.,n
But this insight on Bradley's part was sadly late, the line could
neither be drawn nor defended. It would take three years of war
and 54,246 American lives to draw the line. How could the
obvious degradation of capabilities occur?
No Perceived Threat
After World War II, as now, the nation had difficulty in
identifying a formidable force that threatened National Security.
There was no clearly defined threat following the war and that
made it difficult for the services to bid for funds to maintain a
modern and strong military force. The Axis powers had been
defeated, culminating with the Japanese surrender on August 10,
1945. Although the Soviets were of some concern, with the
oncoming of the "atomic" age it was believed that they could not
achieve nuclear parity with the united States until the early
1950's. Chief of Staff of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, sent a
TOP SECRET memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of staff related to
this on January 9, 1946. Attached to that memorandum was a
enclosure (dated December 17, 1945) from the G-2, titled
"Estimate of the World Situation", stating that war was
32
improbable because
... it is most unlikely that the u.s. will use armed
force to implement u.s. foreign policy.. From the
soviet viewpoint, war is most undesirable during the
period under consideration since the USSR is presently
weaker than she will be at any subsequent period. It
is to the Soviet interests to consolidate her present
gains and eliminate internal weakness. She will
therefore avoid war with the Anglo-Americans in the
near future. At the same time, however, [the] Soviets
will endeavor to extend their influence beyond areas
presently occupied by means short of war. 73
The United states strategy was to diffuse a potential Soviet
threat with its monopoly on atomic weapons - believing it would
win a full-scale war with air delivered atomic The
soviet Union challenged this strategy when it detonated its first
atomic bomb on September 3, 1949, but it did not have sufficient
nuclear weapons to be an immediate threat to the security of the
united states. Even though the Soviet atomic tests signified a
loss of the u.s. monopoly on atomic weapons, the response was a
rush to design the hydrogen bomb, not modernize land forces. The
u.s. also felt it could contain the Soviet influence by achieving
collective security both through the united Nations and later
NATO.
7s
In part, senior military leaders saw no potential enemies to
the United states that were sophisticated enough in modern combat
power to warrant their concern. China was not considered a
threat, since it had no modern military structure and weapon
systems. This was the atomic age, no nation in its right mind
would go to war against the united states, especially since it
had already demonstrated it would use nuclear weapons. However,
33
events would soon reveal the irresponsibility and lack of
vision of this thinking. Only senior military leaders have the
task of determining the nature of warfare in their time and
advocating adequate preparations.
Korea shattered the American illusion that atomic
weaponry had outmoded the foot soldier. Politically
world opinion would not support the use of such hellish
weapons. Tactically atomic bombs were worthless
against infantry units scattered over scores of miles
of rugged
History illustrates time and again, that although it can't
necessarily be seen, a threat is inevitably there. An unprepared
nation will suffer the consequences when that threat exposes
itself.
Political and Democratic System Takes Over
The period following World War II promised prosperity and
peace for the American public. Although there were some economic
and political issues during the era, American life was mostly
uneventful. "With the Depression over, cherished
buying cars and going to ball games; they wished no further
worries about weighty affairs of state."
n
Comfortable with post World War II peace coupled with
domestic economic uncertainties, the American people and
politicians demanded minimal expenditures on military
preparedness. Truman reacted to the American public when they
"Cried to 'bring the boys home!' and shippe,d scores of hundreds
34
of baby shoes to congressmen to emphasize they wanted their
husbands and fathers home immediately. ,,78 Representative John E.
Rankin of Mississippi expressed the popular sentiment of the
time, by saying:
If the Congress does not get busy and expedite the
release of these men from the armed forces - men who
are needed at home, who have jobs to go back to, who
have wives and children to look after or who have crops
to gather, or young men who should finish their
education you will soon be in the hottest water you
have ever been in since you have been in congress - and
you ought to b e . ~
And so, Truman heeded the outcry's of the public and politicians
and brought ten and one half million servicemen home by the end
of 1948. Military leaders were ineffective in convincing the
President that a graduated drawdown was necessary in order to
keep a qualified force of officers and enlisted soldiers as a
nucleus for a modern well trained Army.
Ridgway in his book The Korean War spoke of the American
people's mind set of the time:
The concept of 'limited warfare' never entered
councils. We had faith in the United Nations. And the
atomic bomb created for us a kind of psychological
Magninot line that helped us rationalize our national
urge to get the boys home, the armies demobilized.... so
As a result of this political pressure, Truman addressed
domestic concerns using funds from the Department of Defense.
Truman was eager to improve health, education and living
conditions. As Roosevelt's successor, he sought to increase the
size and coverage of social security. He addressed unemployment,
old age, sickness and disability and recommended a system of
national prepaid medical insurance under social security.8t To
35
do anvthinq less, would not pass the votina Dublic's scrutinv_
- _.. - .. -""
Truman's Secretary of Defense, Louis B. Johnson; was
formerly the Budaet Director and determined to reduce
- ------ -- ------ ---------"l
spending. Not only a mandate from Truman motivated Johnson, he
had his own aspirations to become President of the United States.
secretary of the Army Frank Pace had also been Budget Director
and he had similar motivations for reducing the Army budget. A
formidable budget reducing civilian leadership confronted the
military.
President Truman lacked respect for many military officers
and "knew their prolific tendencies with dollars."n However, he
gained respect for and sought the counsel of Marshall,
Eisenhower, and Bradley who were perceived by him as visionary
and not narrow minded about issues confronting the Presidency as
well as the military: "When Truman became president and inherited
some of these renowned figures as advisers, he looked up to them
and -thought them sincere. As time went on he valued their advice
particularly because they were not political
However, even with Truman's confidence, these senior
military leaders failed to develop a combat ready military force.
The inability of these leaders to see the need for and obtain
congressional and presidential support for the defense department
had dramatic repercussions for the Army. Lack of sufficient
funds to support the Army's needs in CONUS, the Far East and
elsewhere - to provide sUfficient men, equipment and supplies
resulted in a "hollow" army that was ineffective and unable to
36
respond to a national crisis. "In sum, the shortages of men and
supplies combined with inadequate training to affect adversely
the combat readiness of the Far East Command just as they
hindered the effectiveness of the U.S. Army
Collins in his book, War In Peacetime, describes this paradox:
It would seem that proper planning and budgeting should
have obviated these personnel and material shortages.
However, military plans and budget limitations except
in wartime have invariably been in conflict. The
essence of military planning is to look ahead to the
requirements of the next war; but this is antithetic to
the common American hope that each war will be the
last. While war is on, Congress and the people have
supported unstintingly the demands of the military
services but, once the war is over, political and
economic pressures relegate military planning to the

Despite the obvious truism of Collins' insight, this is precisely
where the leadership earns their money for the job they hold.
The post war military leaders failed to gain the support and
confidence of Congress. This failure and the reasons for it had
a dramatic effect upon the defense posture of the United states
in 1950.
37
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP
5 JUL E HET SOHE VEHICLES AND
AMERICAN PYa. WB ALSO SA. SOHE
AMERICAN DEAD. .E I'OUHD .. 01' OOR
TANltS. NEAR OSAN THERB WAS A
GREAT BATTLB. 86
- DIARY 01' A DEAD NORTH KOREAN SOLDIER
Elections took place in South Korea on May 10, 1948, and
Syngnam Rhee was elected President of the new Republic of Korea
(ROK). The U.S. Government had announced that troops would be
withdrawn from South Korea after the elections. With this
announcement, it was believed that North Korea might take the
opportunity to invade the South--once U.S. troops were withdrawn.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff state-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating
Committee on united states Foreign policy in Korea made the
following statement in a TOP SECRET document, dated 24 February
1948:
38
Present information indicates that withdrawal of u.s.
forces will probably result in Communist domination and
it is extremely doubtful if it would be possible to
build up the constabulary [South Korean Army] in
time and with the facilities available which would be
able to prevent Soviet encroachment. Therefore
eventual domination of Korea by the USSR will have to
be accepted as a probability if u.s. troops are
withdrawn. 87
On March 26th, 1948, the same committee wrote another
SECRET document as follows:
From the military point of view, it is the op1n1on of
the joint Chiefs of staff (see SANACC 176/38*) that the
"US has little strategic interest in maintaining its
present troops and bases in Korea." Moreover, in the
event of hostilities in the Far East, these troops
would constitute a military liability. us troops could
not be maintained there without substantial
reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities,
but this would be militarily inadvisable since any land
operations would in all probability, bypass the Korean
Peninsula. 88
It was clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no military or
national interest in fighting a major conflict in Korea. This
policy was also advocated by the President and state Department
and, therefore, created a complacent mind set in regard to Korea.
u.s. forces were to be withdrawn if hostilities began. This
policy would be reversed in June 1950.
At 4 A.M. on the morning of June 25, 1950, the North Korean
Peoples Army (NKPA) invaded the South. With eight full strength
infantry divisions plus "two more infantry divisions activated at
an estimated half strength, a separate infantry regiment, a motor
cycle reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. "89
General MacArthur was awakened and told of the invasion. He
~ e s p o n d e d years later by saying ...
39
How I asked myself, could the united states have
allowed such a deplorable situation to develop? I
thought back to those days only a short time before,
when our country had been militarily more powerful than
any nation on earth... but in the space of five years
this power had been frittered away in a bankruptcy of
positive and outrageous leadership toward any long
range
MacArthur, obviously, did not accept any responsibility for the
lack of training and preparedness of the u.s. forces that went
into combat against the North Koreans.
The NKPA continued southward over the next several days and
General MacArthur was convinced u.s. troops must fight a delaying
action "to buy some time to bring more troops .... "M He sent a
TOP SECRET message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 30, 1950,
as follows:
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a
US regimental combat team to [Korea) for the
reinforcement of [the ROK and the] build-up to a two
[u.S.] division strength from troops in Japan for an
early counter offensive. Unless provision is made for
the full utilization of the Army-Navy-Air Force team in
this shattered area our mission will at best be
needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At
worse, it might even be doomed to
The Army Chief of Staff, General Collins; quickly responded to
MacArthur's request and called the Army Secretary, Frank Pace,
requesting that he obtain approval of MacArthur's request from
President Truman. Secretary Pace contacted President Truman at
4:57 A.M. on Friday June 30, 1950, and read MacArthur's cable to
Truman approved the request of MacArthur to send one
regimental combat team to Korea, but delayed approving division
sized forces until the matter could be looked into further.
Collins then sent the approval back to MacArthur. It is
40
significant to note that MacArthur's request and subsequent
approval to commit American combat forces in Korea was not
discussed or coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) by Collins until
after MacArthur was notified of the President's approval to do
so!
Having thus committed American ground forces into the
Korean War, Collins telephoned his JCS colleagues at
about 5:30 A.M. to tell them what he had done. In
fact, they all were shocked, not only because they were
not consulted, but also because of the grave
implication of the
The JCS collectively had formulated a policy to not defend Korea
because it was considered a military liability. Therefore, it is
remarkable that General Collins made a commitment of troops into
combat without first consulting the Chairman and his fellow JCS
members. Thus a course of action was adopted for which the
senior military leadership understood the Army was unprepared to
accomplish and the nation to support in the short term. It is
unclear if the extent of unpreparedness was made clear to the
President and civilian leadership.
41
Our senior leaders were ineffective in dealing with the
Presidential and Congressional budget cuts. This is normally
interpreted as one result of domestic problems driving the
budget. But, how effective were the senior leaders in addressing
defense needs? Can all of this be attributed to domestic
politics?
The post World War II budget ceilings imposed on the
Department of Defense were draconian. General Collins, who was
Army Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the Korean War, reflected
on the "skeptical attitude of Congress" that prevailed before the
war.
9S
A report of the House Appropriations Committee said:
.. the committee's careful scrutiny of the estimates of
manpower, equipment, and missions to be performed leads
to the conclusion that the estimates of funds required
are out of proportion to the actual needs on the
basis of the Army's predictions of requirements. While
the committee does not propose to reduce the size of
the Army below numbers estimated by military
authorities as requisite or the amounts of equipment
and supplies necessary to maintain such an Army, it is
well aware of the fact that it is the habit of the
services to estimate their fund generously in order
that they may be able to meet all contingencies. This
is sound policy to follow during actual warfare and the
Congress at that time approved it but there is no sound
reason why the Army cannot be administered in peacetime
with more regard for dollars that apparently is their
custom or intent.%
This political logic was remarkably unchallenged by senior
military leadership. The military leaders were not sufficiently
committed to insist this reasoning did not apply to the post war
42
Army. This implies they failed to recognize the nature of the
security threat or were unwilling to challenge political
In Fiscal Year 1945,
billion, but by FY 1947 it had decreased to $13.5 billion which
equated to about five percent of the Gross National Product
(By way of comparison, the military budget for 1992 is
than four percent of the GNP!) Upon reelection, President
Truman's goal was set on obtaining a balanced federal budget and
reducing the $250 billion national debt without incurring new
taxes.
98
Responding to the budget, the Pentagon in turn
maintained that the new budget must be kept at $15 billion in
order to adequately support national defense needs. However, the
President ..
arbitrarily cut the Pentagon budget by a third - to
about $10 billion a year and turned a deaf ear to
repeated pleas from the military chiefs for more. In
fact, his announced goal was to cut the Pentagon budget
even more drastically: to about $6 or $7 billion a
year.
99
Eisenhower displayed his frustrations about the reduced military
budget in his diaries and complained that the budget certainly
did not take into consideration the needs of defense:
During 1946, 1947, and early 1948 I pleaded for a $15
billion budget. We never got it .. [Later he jotted:]
One of our greatest troubles is inability to plan for a
given amount of money. Some new authority always
intervenes to cut it down in spite of prior commitment
by the president himself.
1OO
The military leadership had failed to convince the President that
these budget reductions would severely compromise the ability of
43
the armed forces to protect the national interests and defense
needs of the United states.
Louis B. Johnson took office as the secretary of Defense in
March 1949. committed to cut the "fat" out of the defense
budget, in May, 1949, he announced Truman's fiscal year 1951
military budget to be capped at $12.3 billion. Bradley later
wrote that "the news came as a profound shock". Eisenhower also
" ... of course the results will not show up until we
get in serious trouble. We are repeating our own history of
decades - we just don't believe we ever will get into a real
jam. ,,101 After the Korean War, General Matthew Ridgway said: "If
ever we were unprepared for a war, we were on this
occasion.... Our armed forces had been economized almost into
ineffectiveness. ,,100
Because inflation in 1947-1948 had a critical impact upon
the buying power of the services, Truman was forced to raise the
military spending ceiling to $14 billion. But, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley supported the budget submitted
by the President. He said: "considering the budget constraints
and 'intelligence estimates' I am in complete agreement with that
ceiling. ,,103 As Chairman of the JCS, Bradley reiterated his
support for the President's budget when he spoke before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings on March 13,.1950:
44
I emphasized in my statement-maybe I did not emphasize
it sufficiently-that the eventual strength of our
country depends upon its industrial capacity. We must
not destroy that by spending too much from year to
year. So if we came here and recommended to you a
$30,000,000,000' or $40,000,000,000 budget for
defense, I think we would be doing a disservice and
that maybe you would get a new Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff if I were one that did t h a t . l ~
History has shown that this recommendation was ill-advised to say
the least. But it reveaLs that the senior military leadership's
ignorance of the actual readiness of the Army or the
unwillingness to confront it and the extent of the security
threat.
One month after Bradley made his statement before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, he received a letter from Mr. Vannevar
Bush, which must have been alarming news in view of what he said
before the committee. Mr. Bush's TOP SECRET letter of April 13,
1950, to Bradley gave him a clear warning as to the serious state
of the defense posture of the united States. commissioned by
Secretary of Defense Gray, Mr. Bush worked with the Army to
study defense problems in Europe. The revelations of his
findings were alarming and it caused him to write his letter to
Bradley. He remarked to Bradley that
... [these] are serious and disturbing
conclusions .... the problem of defense of the united
states is in a serious condition, at which I am
appalled. If this problem is attacked vigorously at
this time, and properly coordinated... it can be put in
satisfactory condition in a few years. If we drift as
we are going, it will remain in unsatisfactory
condition and might well lead to disaster .... the result
is that if war should break out tomorrow it would be a
long desperate war, in which we could hope to prevail
only after a period of years .... l ~
45
Mr. Bush's concluding statement succinctly expressed the resolve
necessary to repair the deplorable condition of U.S. defense:
The primary desideration [spelling in document] is that
we should think fearlessly, without prejudice or false
service interests, that we should face tough facts,
and that we should act. We have the organizational
machinery for all this, if it will function with
sufficient vigor, and if it is allowed to do so. We
need to get up to date, and to tackle our really
central military problems with all our energy. We
have the opportunity, if we have the w i l l . l ~
Bradley did not have two years to fix the problem outlined by
Bush; the Korean War broke out two months and twelve days after
Bush wrote his letter. Bradley later conceded in his book,
A General's Life, that the President's military budget cutting
... was a mistake, perhaps the greatest of Truman's
presidency... my belief that significantly higher
defense spending would probably wreck the economy - was
likewise a mistake, perhaps the greatest mistake I made
in my post war years in Washington.... I was a dedicated
fiscal conservative. I sincerely believed in those
economists who were advising Truman to sharply limit
defense spending .107
Collins also admitted that he supported the FY 1951 budget:
"I likewise, as Army Chief of Staff, defended the $13 billion
budget before the same senate subcommittee."
ull
Collins as well
as Bradley admitted that the military budget they supported - as
well as the other Chief's of Staff - was not sufficient for
maintaining a strong defense:
From this record it is clear that members of the JCS,
including General Bradley and myself, shared with the
president, the Administration, and the Congress the
responsibility for reductions in JCS estimates of
military requirements, which so hampered our conduct of
the Korean War. 109
The readiness shortfalls and the leadership's inattention to them
46
outlined earlier indicate senior military leadership may not have
grasped the extent of unpreparedness or the probable nature of
warfare in the Cold War era. If they had, these in themselves
raise serious questions about how existing money was spent.
Another leadership pitfall is also suggested here. The senior
leadership clearly gave in to the pressures of the President and
Congress and failed to stand for a course of action that would
promote the best defense. This supports the idea the senior
leadership...
found themselves in a tough moral dilemma. They did
not agree in the slightest with Truman's budget ... but
Johnson was the civilian authority to whom they owed
obedience and loyalty. They had either to support his
orders or resign. None elected to resign; they
unanimously supported the Johnson Budget.
l1O
Collins commented directly on this sensitive subject - believing
that his loyalty was to the President so long as he held the
position as Army Chief of Staff, but, when he morally could not
support that policy, then it was time to resign:
I always believed in loyalty to the President, who as
Commander in Chief, bears the ultimate responsibility
for the defense of our country an officer of the armed
services should fully support the president's program
once it has been determined... A Chief of Staff is some
times faced with the dilemma of resigning or of going
directly to the President, over the head of the
Secretary of Defense which he is entitled by law to do
if he cannot, in all conscience as a responsible
military man, accept the final budget limitations ....
When Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson announced
.. another cut in the Army budget for the fiscal year
1951, which would have resulted in a further reduction
in the effective strength of the Army, I finally had to
say to him, 'Mr. Secretary, this is the last cut in the
Army that I will be able to accept.' Johnson glared at
me, and I am afraid I glared back. I feel certain that
if the Korean War had not intervened, I would have been
relieved or forced to resign.
lll
47
Why hadn't our senior military leaders taken a stronger stance in
addressing other critical deficiencies of defense? In view of
the consequences to American soldiers, answers of ignorance,
inattention, and loyalty to political leadership are weak
defenses.
The Bud2et and Downsizin2
As the budget dwindled, so did the strength of the armed
forces. Historically, our downsizing of the force structure has
resulted in a "hollow force" whereby reduced combat readiness and
effectiveness has resulted. In August 1945, the united states
had a little more than twelve million men and women in uniform.
In January 1946, Dwight Eisenhower (Army Chief of Staff) wrote to
Bernard Baruch saying: "What plans we make must be made now
before our forces have completely disintegrated and before we
become paralysed by public apathy which seems inevitable in times
of relative peace."1t2 By December 1948, at the end of Truman's
first term as President and Commander in Chief, the active forces
had shrunk to a mere 1.5 million men and women.,m Bradley
complained in his book, A Soldiers Life, that upon assuming the
office of Chief of Staff on December 1, 1947:
The Army had almost no combat effectiveness. Ike
had left me an administrative rather than a military
force. Half of the 552,000 officers and men were
overseas on occupation duty, serving as policemen or
clerks. The other half were in the States performing
various administrative chores. Actually the Armx of
1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag. 14
48
This insight is retrospect and is not reflected in Bradley's
actions as a senior leader at the time. He gave no indication of
his comprehension of a "hollow" Army in 1950.
The spartan distribution and strength of the Army during
this period was spread throughout many regions. For example,
MacArthur's strength in the Far East was about 114,000 men;
10,000 short of the authorized. He was informed later by the JCS
to expect additional cuts in the strength - down to 106,000 men,
of which only 30,000 would be stationed in Korea.
lls
In 1950,
the authorized strength of the Army had risen to 630,201; but it
actually had 591,000 in the ranks. Of those, 360,000 were
stationed in the United states; 108,500 in the Far East; 94,300
in Europe and the rest in Hawaii, Alaska, or the Caribbean.
1l6
Secretary Johnson's new fiscal year 1952 budget guidelines
called for a greater reduction in strength to 610,900. At that
time, the United states Army had ten divisions. However, that
was very misleading. To stay within budgetary constraints, the
Army Chief of Staff, Joe Collins, deactivated one battalion in
each of the three regiments in each division. One of the three
firing batteries in each of the four artillery battalions (in
each division) was also deactivated to accommodate these budget
cuts. As discussed earlier (See "Training", page 14), these
units were severely handicapped when it came to executing
doctrinal operations in combat. It was assumed that there would
be time to fill these voids before troops were committed into
combat.
1I7
First into combat in the Korean ,War, the Eighth Army
49
divisions were severely void of their full authorized combat
manpower.
An American infantry division at full war strength
numbered about 18,000 men. owing to the budget
restrictions, however, three of the Eighth Army's four
divisions each wer. authorized only 12,500 men; the
25th (to which all blacks were assigned) 13,500. On
paper the 1st CAV, 7th, and 24th divisions were thus
about 6,000 men short of full war strength; the 25th,
about 5,000 men short. In reality because of the
limits on personnel, rotation policies, and other
factors, the 1st CAV, 7th, and 24th divisions numbered
only about 11,300 men each and were thus about 7,000
men short of full war strength. The 25th Division,
numbering 13,000 men, was 5,500 men short of full war
strength. On the whole, none of the four divisions
were capable of laying down more than 62 percent of its
normal infantry firepower."
8
Eighth Army units were unsuccessful in applying doctrinal
techniques and maneuvers in the first few months of combat owing
to the absence of infantry and artillery battalions in the
divisions. senior leaders were brought too late to the sober
realization that they had failed to conceive of and plan for the
prospect that there would be no time to fill these voids before
combat began.
Modernization
senior Army leaders of the post World War II era had the
inherent responsibility to keep the Army modern and competitive
through research and development and procurement of modern
equipment. Their inability to gain congressional and
Presidential support resulted in a severe compromise to the
50
combat power of the United States.
Cuts in the federal budget resulted in a significant
reduction in the quantity and quality of equipment in the U.S.
forces. T.R. Fehrenbach in his book This Kind of War captures
the status of modernization in the united States between 1945 and
1950: "Since the end of World War II ground weapons had been
developed but none had been procured. There were plenty of old
arms around; and it has always been a yankee habit to make do.
The Army was told to make do. ,,119
In 1950, vehicles and equipment were in a deplorable state,
especially in Japan. This was mainly due to the rapid
demobilization and loss of personnel who were needed to provide
continuous maintenance for the Army's maintenance program. Much
of that equipment was of World War II vintage which had been
through combat. It was not being replaced because of budget
cuts. Vehicles were parked in the open, tires were rotted,
engines were worn out, and radiators clogged. Weapons were in
disrepair, especially small arms which often required unavailable
parts. For example, there were no more spare barrels to be found
for machine guns and manufacturing had ceased. Radios were old,
poorly maintained, and in short supply. "No ammunition had been
manufactured since World War II and the existing ammunition
stocks were in limited supply and subject to deterioration as a
result of extended storage. The limited amount of ammunition
in various categories was not sufficient to meet the training
needs of both the Active Army and the Reserve Components even
51
when firing environments were available
In a speech before the Armor Association in the fall of
1951, Army Chief of staff Joe Collins said:
As you remember, at the end of World War II, the nation
reverted to a peacetime economy. Production was
stopped on military goods and concentrated on civilian
products. Army appropriations were drastically cut and
the reduced budget permitted only limited funds for
research and development and almost none for
production. The budget for research and development on
all types of automotive equipment of which tanks were
only a part, averaged about $5,000,000 a year .. When
this is compared to Chrysler's R&D budget of
$25,000,000 for the same period, you see how little we
had. 120
Collins knew that research and development was necessary to
maintain a combat ready Army, but he was not effective in
convincing the military and civilian leadership to make it
happen.
The budget restricted the acquisition of new equipment that
was sorely needed to modernize the Army .
... the Ordnance Department estimated that it would need
$750,000,000 to cover procurement of essential
ammunition and equipment, storage and distribution of
ordnance material, maintenance of stand-by plants and
arsenals, training research and development. The
Bureau of the Budget put this figure to $275,000,000
and the Congress reduced this appropriation in final
form to $242,532,000.
121
Just after taking office as the Army Chief of Staff
(December 3, 1945) from George C. Marshall, Eisenhower wrote to
Bernard Baruch saying: "Developments of modern warfare tend to
emphasize the necessity of more and more technical knowledge for
an ever increasing number of men. This requires intensive and
extensive training in the use of elaborate and expensive
52
equipment.
ltln
Eisenhower was not successful in obtaining
necessary funds for the acquisition of "elaborate and expensive
equipment" that he felt necessary for a modern army.
Research and development for better equipment was
practically stopped following World War II and there was little
to be expected in the future. Procurement, if possible, was even
worse. A new heavy tank had been developed, but due to budget
constraints only 310 were built; in June 1950, they were all in
the united states. The 3.5 inch rocket launcher had been
introduced to replace the ineffective World War II 2.36
"bazooka". However, due to budget constraints, only a few 3.5's
were available in June 1950; none were available in the Far East.
Less than three months prior to the beginning of the Korean
War, Omar Bradley received a TOP SECRET letter from Mr. Vannevar
Bush outlining the Army's failure to advance in research and
development. He commented on the almost negligible acquisition
of new technology necessary for the Army to be effective in
combat. He recommended that the Army must procure advanced
weapons and ammunition to combat Russian tanks. He said:
.. we have the means of rendering those heavy tanks
absolute, of turning a great asset into a liability, of
throwing the enemy preparations into confusion and
forcing upon him sweeping readjustments which will take
him years. We have the means in embryo in our hands
now. If we had been sufficiently alert we could have
had them, several years ago, but at least we have them
now. 123
He also referred to the need to develop new munitions and
hardware such as antiaircraft guns and rockets, ground to air
missiles, antitank mines and even new means of laying them.124
53
The technology and means to modernize the Army and other Services
existed, but the senior military and civilian leadership lacked
the vision and aggressiveness to improve combat effectiveness.
This technology certainly would have saved many American lives as
combat multiplier's against the North Koreans in June 1950.

The military and civilian leadership also failed to
correctly assess the intelligence information coming from Korea.
It is remarkable that they did not heed the warnings. General
Collins felt that both the military and civilian "system" failed
to paint an accurate picture of the impending battle. Collins
said "More valid charges of military failures in the early phases
of the Korean war - or, more accurately, failures of established
civilian-military system - can be made in the field of military
intelligence. ,,125
As early as September of 1947, Lieutenant General Albert C.
Wedemeyer investigated the military conditions that existed at
that time in Korea. His assessment of the military situation
noted that the North Korean Army was a potential threat to the
peace of Korea - especially if the United states were to withdraw
its He concluded in his report to President Truman
that the United States would suffer an "immense loss in moral
prestige among the peoples of Asia .. ,,127 if troops were
withdrawn as South Korea was being invaded.: He also noted in the
54
document that he considered Korea as "strategically important"
and he cautioned that Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's two
divisions could not hold back invading North Korean forces if
attacked.
lu
Wedemeyer's report had clearly shown that Korea was
a hot spot that should not be overlooked. The indications were
clear that future actions and policies regarding u.s. involvement
in Korea should have been formulated based upon the possibility
of conflict with the North Koreans. Nevertheless, Truman
apparently did not take Wedemeyer's report seriously; one year
later tactical u.s. troops under General Hodge were withdrawn
from Korea.
Brigadier General William Lynn Roberts, head of the Korean
Military Advisory Group (KMAG) under Ambassador Muccio, rendered
contrary and misleading intelligence reports to the Pentagon. He
believed tank warfare in Korea was impossible because the roads
were too narrow and the rice paddies were too s o f t . l ~ General
Roberts' reports were taken seriously and, in fact, were the
basis of the testimony given to a congressional hearing in June
1949 defending the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. On
that subject, Major General Charles L. Bolte testified before
Congress:
55
We feel that the (native] forces in Korea now are
better equipped than the North Korean troops .. the Army
as the Executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of staff
for the Far East is not only agreeable to the
withdrawal of the tactical formations from Korea, but
is heartily in favor of it as they [sic] feel that the
point has been reached in the development of south
Korean forces and in the supplying of material aid to
the South Korean forces that it has reached a point
[sic] where the tactical units can and should be
withdrawn. 130
Reports and testimonies such as this were pervasive and show the
fneptness of the leadership to ascertain and interpret the
reality that existed prior to the invasion. For example, two
weeks before the invasion, William C. Foster, as the Deputy
Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration,
testified before the Senate Appropriations committee regarding
the ROK's ability to meet an attack from the North. He told the
committee:
The rigorous training program [of the ROK Army] has
built up a well-disciplined army of 100,000 soldiers,
one that is prepared to meet any challenge by the North
Korean forces, and one that has cleaned out the
guerilla bands in South Korea in one area after
another. 131
All these reports were being digested by Congress who were
allowed to believe that all was well.
In contrast to these optimistic reports by Roberts and
Foster, Ambassador Muccio provided statements to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on June 6, 1950, stating: "The undeniable
materiel superiority of the North Korean forces would provide
North Korea with the margin of victory in the event of a. full
scale invasion of the Republic .... ,,132 By materiel superiority,
Muccio was talking about heavy infantry support weapons, such as
56
tanks and artillery--to include aircraft. It was a known fact
that the nearly 100,000 man ROK army was understrength and under
equipped. The "South Korean forces had no tanks or medium
artillery whatsoever. Nor could South Korea field any fighter or
bomber aircraft."133 contrary to Foster's and Roberts'
statements, it was obvious that the South Korean Army was not
prepared to meet the horde of the NKPA crossing over the 38th
parallel. Senior military leadership did not control these
various sources of information, but it is clear that they should
have been aware of the disparities and possible consequences.
Also the civilian leadership in Washington must bear
responsibility for neglecting to take appropriate action.
Presidential advisors kept crucial information from the President
even when intelligence information made its way back to
Washington. The advisors simply chose not to believe the reports
coming from Korea.
In retrospect, the misjudgment was astonishing.
Intelligence reports to Washington provided an almost
classic description of enemy preparations for imminent
war. North Korean civilians were being evacuated from
the immediate vicinity of the parallel. Non military
freight deliveries in the area had been halted.
Transport was being restricted to military purposes,
including large shipments of weapons and
ammunition.. the intelligence reports were greeted by
Washington officials with all sorts of
rationalizations. Forgetting the same kind of
misjudgment before, at the time of Pearl Harbor, they
hoped and believed that the North Koreans were unlikely
to do that which they had the capacity to do.
Washington was simply not persuaded that the North
Koreans's intended to involve themselves in armed
conflict. 134
There are no records that show any of Truman's advisers, civilian
57
or military ever went to him in the month of June, 1950, to tell
him of the serious developments near the 38th parallel. 135
The state Department also proved incompetent and negligent
in analyzing intelligence information. After the election of
Syngnam Rhee in August, 1948, MacArthur had no further
responsibility to deal with Korean issues; that responsibility
came under the jurisdiction of the state Department. Assistant
secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk testified
before the House Foreign Affairs committee five days before the
North Korean invasion. Rusk's testimony was faulty and showed a
lack of knowledge and understanding about the real conditions
existing in Korea. When asked about the strength of the ROK Army
and the potential of North Korea invading South Korea, he stated
that "we see no present indication that the people across the
border have any intention of fighting a major war for that
purpose."I36 He added that the ROK Army "could meet credibly the
kind of force which the North Koreans have established. ,,137 This
statement was contrary to known information about the size and
combat power wielded by the NKPA. General Ridgway later
commented that Syngman Rhee and other ROK leaders had expressed
their concerns about a formidable North Korean Army because they
knew their own Army was so weak. 138
Although MacArthur no longer had responsibility for Korean
matters, he did retain his intelligence network there.
MacArthur's intelligence officer (G-2), Major General Charles A.
Willoughby, maintained contact with Korea through his "Korean
58
Liaison Office." It is significant that Willoughby had furnished
"Daily summaries" to Washington of invasion plans contemplated by
North Korea. These reports were sent in routine intelligence
messages between December 30, 1949, and May 25, 1950.
139
Willoughby himself, discredited the reports, however, as being
very unlikely and no action resulted.
In retrospect, Collins later commented on the concern about
the intelligence gathering process. He wrote that " ... it is
difficult to understand the woeful underestimating by the Korean
Military Advisory Group and the Far East Command of the
leadership and fighting qualities of the North Korean
In his book Reminiscences, MacArthur attributed the blame to the
Pentagon for not heeding reports his command had sent it. He
would never assume any responsibility for failing to convince the
JCS that an invasion was about to take place. Instead, he said:
The doomed little country was under the sole charge of
the state Department, but my intelligence section was
increasingly aware of the distinct menace of an attack
by the North Korean Communists in the summer of
1950 .. in vain were my attempts to expose the growing
Communist threat in the Far East. From June 1949 to
June 1950, constant intelligence of increasing
urgency were submitted to Washington,' advising of a
possible North Korean thrust .. one of these reports
even suggested that June 1950 would 'be likely time for
North Korea to cross the 38th parallel. 141
Once again Willoughby was the source of many of these reports.
If MacArthur was so sure that war was soon to begin, why wasn't
he persuasive and persistent in presenting his concerns to the
JCS and the Pentagon as he was so eloquently capable of doing in
retrospect?
59
Even the Director of the CIA "implied" to the Senate
Appropriations Committee that an attack from the North was
coming. 142 It seems that many key agencies of the State
Department and the Pentagon and even the CIA had predicted a
North Korean attack could come, but none, had predicted it would
come. 143
For example, Major General Alexander R. Bolling, the
Department of the Army G-2, responded to criticism that he had
failed to properly interpret the information he received from the
Far East Command. He maintained that "there is no intelligence
agency that reported a definite date for the opening of
hostilities or stated that an invasion was imminent."I44 This
answer was unsatisfactory. In fact, there were enough reports
being sent to his office to warrant serious analysis to determine
if a war was imminent or not.
Perhaps it is possible that war could have been averted
altogether if these reports had been taken seriously. In The
Korean War, General Matthew Ridgway raised the appropriate
questions in regard to the senior leadership: "How could it
happen that a major conflict like this could explode without
warning? Was there ineptitude among our decision makers or were
our intelligence forces lacking? Why did the outbreak of war
find us so ill-prepared to
60
Quality of Soldiers
The poor quality of the soldiers in the peacetime Army was a
problem that compromised the Army's capability to fight future
wars and conflicts. As the Army downsized following World War
II, senior leaders failed to realize the need for higher quality,
Intelligent soldiers. They accepted what was offered instead
demanding what was required. In addition, the Army undertook
social efforts such as education, which seriously detracted from
unit training.
The post World War II peacetime Army underwent unfathomable
personnel turnover and turbulence as it reduced from a force of
8.2 million in 1945 (which included the Air Force at that time)
to 591,000 in 1950.
1
% The draft was discontinued in March 1947
and the last draftee separated from the Army on June 30, 1947.
Soon thereafter, volunteer enlistments dropped off dramatically.
In July of 1948, the draft was resumed to compensate for the
shortfall of draftees that had reached expiration of their
enlistments and new conditions for enlistment were established.
Accession standards were lowered to bring more people into the
Army in order to meet the manning requirements.
The problem was further compounded when budget cuts forced
basic training to be reduced from 17 weeks to eight weeks and the
burden of training fell on the gaining units. This meant overall
much less training was p r ~ v i d e d for the new enlistee's. contrary
61
to this practice, these recruits actually needed more time for
such training because of their lower capacity to learn. It
didn't make sense to lower the Army General Classification Test
(AGCT) scores and reduce basic training time for soldiers that
actually required more training! This problem was further
compounded by the adoption of an Army education program designed
to teach reading and writing skills to soldiers in the units.
This extensive social effort used valuable training time. In
effect units became incumbered conducting a social program of
literacy training courses that caused an inordinant
administrative burden and training impediment.
147
It effectively
precluded team training.
In April 1949, forty three percent of Army enlisted
personnel were classified with ratings of IV and V on the Army
General Classification The Army test scores for the
Eighth Army reflected a significant flaw in the quality of its
soldiers by this standard. In 1948, " . 90% of the personnel of
one battalion were illiterate. ,,149 On an average, over fifty
percent of the Eighth Army personnel fell into Class IV and V,
the lowest two categories. Sixty percent of the soldiers in the
7th Infantry Division fell within Class IV and V. This was
II
considered by the Department of the Army to be .. a serl.OUS
handicap to the attainment of a satisfactory state of
effectiveness .. The 21st Regiment, Task Force Smith's
regiment, consisted of 55% soldiers in Class IV and V. In
October 1949, Army test scores for Eighth Army soldiers were the
62
following:
Percentage of Grade
command: IV and V on AGCT:
8th CAV Rgt (1st CAV Div)
7th Inf Div
51%
60%
24th Inf Div 48%
25th Inf Div 55%
Remedial literacy training schools were conducted throughout
the theater, either at the regiment level, or consolidated at
division level.
l5I
Significant and crucial training time that
could have been devoted to combat training was diverted to
remedial literacy training. Consequently, the Eighth Army was
unable to create a "team" concept in training. Soldiers absented
for literacy training courses were not available to participate
in a much needed integrated team training environment for the
remainder of the unit. Eighth Army units never achieved a
cohesive training capability which was an essential requisite for
discipline, coordination, and maneuver in combat. For example,
in October 1949, the 24th Infantry Division had 188 soldiers
attending a literacy training course, yet there were 1,603 that
still needed the training. 152 During the same period, the 25th
Infantry Division had a total of 1,279 soldiers identified for
the same program. 1.53
Lowering the entrance test scores also resulted in increased
disciplinary problems in the units. These soldiers tended to be
more disruptive, indifferent, and disgruntled about military life
63
than their predecessors and were more difficult to train. The
"poor character of many replacements" to the Far East Command was
seen as significant training A former battalion
commander in the 2d Infantry Division during this period claimed
that many soldiers had "sullen and resentful attitudes."l" The
situation was considered so bad a formal recommendation was made
that further replacements with Class V scores in the Far East
Command not be assigned to units on occupation
Failure to establish high enlistment standards for post war
soldiers in light of the massive drawdown illustrated a lack of
vision and understanding by the senior leadership and the
consequences proved to be insurmountable. By lowering
intelligence requirements and permitting enlistment of new
soldiers with backgrounds of questionable character, the
leadership acquiesced to the unprepared and combat "unready"
Army.
64
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Task Force Smith is a classic illustration of
unpreparedness. Major historical interpretations of this period
conclude, as Fehrenbach so vividly illustrated, that Task Force
smith went into combat unprepared as a direct result of
insufficient national political commitment to a strong defense
and as a result of the failure of the senior military leadership
to recognize the nature of the threat and compete effectively
with domestic political issues. There is no reason to doubt the
validity of these historical interpretations, but they beg the
question of what role did the senior military leadership of the
Army and the institution of the Army itself play in the
unpreparedness of forces? The answers to that question suggest
that both fell far short of what might have been done. The
following major conclusions summarize the nature of this failure:
a. The senior leadership of the military failed to
visualize the nature of the next war.
b. Senior Army leadership did not understand the state of
preparedness (readiness) of the forces subordinate to them and
had no standard or clearly defined procedures or means to
65
identify or measure readiness.
c. Standards of readiness were not established and
enforced.
d. Senior Army leadership failed to develop and present a
credible program for the military forces required for national
defense and protection of u.S. national interests.
e. Training across the Army was unrealistic and not focused
on war fighting. This was compounded by a lack of resources and
facilities, but the basic failure was one of institutional
environment and values.
f. Officer leadership at every level in the chain of
command failed to address readiness issues, resulting in a
institutional acceptance of unpreparedness.
g. Senior leadership failed to develop and advocate
adequate programs of research, development, and acquisition.
h. Senior leadership tolerated low quality accession and
retention standards for personnel at a time when the lack of
resources and ambiguity in threat demanded higher quality
standards.
i. Senior leadership demonstrated reluctance in advising
the political leadership on critical matters of national security
in light of contemporary politics.
j. Intelligence information was not objectively analyzed
and resolved. Decisionmakers were not aware of critical
intelligence and had no system for considering
contrary opinion.
66
k. Non-military programs and duties such as literacy
training courses were accepted even when counter productive to
readiness.
1. Equipment was allowed to deteriorate reflecting the lack
of interest and emphasis on readiness.
m. units that were allowed to become under strength
hollowed out by assignment shortages and personnel policies
resulting in loss of capability to meet mission and doctrinal
requisites.
In retrospect, the insights afforded by examining this
period in u.s. military history may seem obvious. This is
particularly true in view of the current Army's focus on training
and readiness and the obvious preparedness evidenced in the
recent Gulf War. But the period is not irrelevant and serves as
a stark warning of how successful militaries of democratic
societies deteriorate rapidly in a "peacetime" environment.
After all, the leadership of the Army that failed Task Force
Smith commanded the greatest Army in the world just five years
earlier.
67
CHINA
(MANCHURIA)
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Miles
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, ,
,
68
YELLOW ~
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....
-
SEA OF
) A /' AN
.. "'
,.,;:: ..
"
TASK FORCE SMITH
JULY 5, 1950
t"'Ib bi'. T F Smith Infantry
...... T F Smith Artillery
~ Q = = - .. North Korean Tanks
~ ~ . ....""C..... North Korean Infantry ...
T F Smith Withdrawal
--Roads
--- Railroads
o
,
1
,
1 Mil.
70
Y H I. t () W
SEA
U.S. FAR EAST DEFENSE LINE (JAN 1950)
,
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U.S.S.R.
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.'

N
ENDNOTES
1. T.R.
Unpreparedness, (New York: Bantham Books, 1964), 637.
2. Charles Brad Smith, Interview by William Davies,
Scottsdale, Arizona, 7-8 January 1992.
3. Joseph Lawton collins, War In Peacetime: The History and
Lessons of Korea, (Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company, 1969), 45
46.
4. Brad smith Interview.
5. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, July
1950-1953, (New York: Times Books, 1987), 93.
6. Brad Smith Interview.
7. John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea,1950-1953, (New
York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 81.
8. Michael Cannon, "Task Force Smith: A Study in (Un)
Preparedness and (Ir) Responsibility", Military Review, (February
1988): 66.
9. Feherenbach, 89-90; Cannon, 68.
10. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War,
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1982), 118.
11. Bevin R. Alexander, Korea The First War We Lost, (New
York: Hipocrene Books, Inc., 1986), 58.
12. Brad smith Interview.
13. Toland, 81.
14. Brad smith Interview.
15. Blair, 103.
16. Douglas MacArthur, General Douglas MacArthur:
Reminiscences, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), 337.
17. Roy Edgar Appleman, South To The Naktong, North To The
Yalu, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1960), 59.
73
18. Collins, War in Peacetime, 45.
19. Ibid. , 45.
20. Ibid. , 45.
21. Toland, 78.
22. Collins, Wat: in feacetime, 45-46.
23. Russell Frank Weigley, Histot:y of the United States
~ , (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), 502.
24. Callum A. MacDonald, The Wat: Befot:e Vietnam, (New York:
The Free Press, 1986), 203.
25. FM 100-5, Department of the Army Field Manual Field
Service Regulations: operations, (Washington: Department of the
Army, 15 August 1949), 17.
26. William Glenn Robertson, Leavenworth Papers:
Counterattack on the Naktong. 1950, (Kansas: Combat Studies
Institute, December 1985), 8.
27. James F. Schnabel, The United states Army in the Korean
War. policy and Direction: The First Year, (Washington D.C.:
Office of Chief of Military History, 1972), 89.
28. Blair, 48.
29. Robertson, 8.
30. Ibid. , 8.
31. Ibid. , 8.
32. Appleman, 57.
33. Robertson, 4.
34. Blair, 28.
35. Ibid. , 49.
36. Ibid. , 55.
37. Appleman, 113.
38. Brad Smith Interview.
39. Ibid. , 9.
.'
74
40. Ibid., p. 10.
41. Ibid., p. 10.
42. Ibid., p. 8.
43. Department of the Army General Staff, Memorandum For
Colonel Philip R. Dwyer, General Staff Corps, Subject: Training
Inspection of Overseas Commands, 20 September 1949, National
Archives, Washington D.C., RG 319 (Army Staff) Plans and
Operations Division Decimal File 1949-Feb 1950, 353 Case 21 to
353.41, Box 662.
44. Schnabel, 56-57.
45. Collins, War in Peacetime, 6.
46. "Report of Training Inspection of the United States
Army,' FECOM by COL F.M. Harris and Party", (24 September to 29
october 1949), Washington National Archives, RG 319 (Army Staff)
Plans and Operations Division Decimal File 1949-Feb 1950, 353
Case 21 to 353.41, Box No. 662, 1. (hereafter referred to as DA
Inspection)
47. Ibid. , 1.
48. Ibid. , 4.
49. Ibid. , 4.
50. Ibid. , 5.
51. Ibid. , 5.
52. Ibid. , 5.
53. Ibid. , 5.
54. Appleman, 113; Weigley, 503; Robertson, 4.
55. Brad Smith Interview, 10.
56. Blair, 93.
57. William W. Epley, Information Paper, Subject: Army Live
fire Training, 1945-1950, DAMH-RAM, 23 December 1991, 1.
58. Ibid., 1.
59. Ibid., 1.
60. Blair, 48.
75
61. Brad smith Interview.
62. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Matthew B. Ridgway Papers,
"Notes of Corps Commanders Conference", SUWON, 041130 February,
Box 22, Korean War - Historical Record 1950-1952, Folder:
Historical Record, Feb 1951-0ct 1951, MHI, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
63. Wallace J. Theis, "A Twenty First Century Army,
"Parameters, (Spring 1991): 64.
64. Robertson, 4.
65. Appleman, 59.
66. Schnabel, 59.
67. MacArthur, 322.
68. The War History Compilation Committee, The History of
the united Nations Forces in the Korean War, (Korea: The Ministry
of National Defense the Republic of Korea, December 1973), 28.
69. Collins, War in Peacetime, 31.
70. Robert J. Donovan, Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the
Coils of War in Asia, (New York: st. Martin's/Marek, 1984), 19.
71. Collins, War in Peacetime, 41 & 44.
72. Blair, 71.
73. Dwight David Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David
Eisenhower: The Chief of Staff, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 1984), 744.
74. Weigley, SOL
75. Appleman, 41-42.
76. Goulden, xvi.
77. Ibid. , xvi.
78. Ibid. , 24.
79. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and crises: The Presidency
of Harry S. Truman. 1945-1948, (New York: Norton, 1977), 127.
80. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (New York: DA CAPO
Press, 1967), 12.
76
81. Donovan, Nemesis, 2.
82. Robert H. Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries, (New York:
Norton, 1981), 150.
83. Ibid., 141.
84. Schnabel, 46.
85. Collins, War in Peacetime, 28.
86. Eric C. Ludvigsen, "The Failed Bluff Of Task Force
smith: An Arrogant Display Of strength", ADD,y, (February 1992),
37.
87. State-Army-Navy-Air Force coordinating Committee United
states Policy in Korea, SANACC 176/35, file: 1948-1950 CCS 383.21
Korea (3-19-45) RG 218 JCS Sec 15 Box 32, U.S. National Archives,
Washington D.C. (Hereafter referred to as "National Archives")
88. Ibid., file: 1948-1950 CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) RG 218
JCS Sec 15 Box 32. (Nat'l Archives)
89. Appleman, 59.
90. MacArthur, 327-328.
91. Ridgway, 15.
92. National Archives, Message from CINCFE, Tokyo Japan to
DEPPTAR Pass to JCS, RG 218 JCS 1948-1950 CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19
45) Sec 20 to Sec 23 Box 34, 30 June 1950, 2-3.
93. Blair, 165.
94. Ibid., 85.
95. Collins, War in Peacetime, 70.
96. Ibid., 70.
97. Rosmary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the
Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953, (Ithaca and London:
Cornel University Press, 1985), 41.
98. Blair, 6.
99. Ibid., 6.
100. Ibid., 987.
101. Ferrell, 159.
77
103. Blair, 27.
104. Collins, War in Peacetime, 71.
105. Clay and Joan Blair Collection, Letter to Omar N.
Bradley, Chairman of the JCS from Mr. Vannevar Bush, April 13,
1950, Folder: 1950, Chapter 1988, Box: Omar N. Bradley
Chronological Files 1948-1950, Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, PA (hereafter referred to as "Blair Collection")
106. Ibid., 8.
107. Omar N. Bradley, A General's Life: An Autobiography by
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, (New York:
simon and Shuster, 1983), 487.
108. Collins, War in Peacetime, 71.
109. Ibid., 73.
110. Blair, 26-27.
111. Collins, War in Peacetime, 73-74.
112. Eisenhower, p. 736.
113. Blair, 7.
114. Bradley, 474.
115. Blair, 42.
116. Ibid., 28.
117. Robertson, 8.
118. Blair, 48.
119. Fehrenbach, 409.
120. J. Lawton Collins, "Address of General Lawton Collins,
united States Army Chief of Staff Before the United States Army
Association", Armor, (January-February 1952), 8.
121. Schnabel, 46.
122. Eisenhower, 736.
123. Blair Collection, Letter to General Omar Bradley,
Chairman JCS, from Mr. Vannevar Bush, Folder: 1950, Chapter 1988,
Box: Omar N. Bradley - Chronological Files 1948-1950, 7.
78
124. Ibid., 7.
125. Collins, War in Peacetime, 76.
126. Lt. Gen A.C. Wedemeyer, Report to the President: Korea,
September 1947 (United States GPO Washington: 1951), 83127,
National Archives, Washington D.C., 6-7.
127. Ibid. , 13.
128. Ibid. , 26.
129. Goulden, 42.
130. Ibid. , 42.
131. Collins, War in Peacetime, 42.
132. Ibid. , 43.
133. Robertson, 5.
134. Donovan, Nemesis, 19.
135. Ibid., 19.
136. Goulden, 41.
137. Ibid., 41.
138. Ridgway, The Korean War, 11.
139. Collins, War in Peacetime, 76.
140. Ibid., 77.
141. MacArthur, 323-324.
142. Alexander, 6.
143. Ibid. , 6.
144. Schnabel, 64.
145. Ridgway, The Korean War, vi.
146. Whelan, 58 & 169.
147. DA Inspection, 3.
148. Appleman, 56.
79
147. DA Inspection, 3.
148. Appleman, 56.
149. DA Inspection, GHQ Brief, 4.
150. Ibid. , 7th ID, 1.
151. Ibid. , GHQ, 8.
152. Ibid. , Tab R, 1.
153. Ibid. , Tab S, 1.
154. Ibid. , 2.
155. Sherry, DAMH-RAM Information Paper, Subj: "The
Political and Military Environment When Task Force smith Was
Formed in July 1950", 13 December 1991, 12.
156. DA Inspection, GHQ, 2.
80
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Alexander, Bevin. Korea: The First War We Lost. New York:
Hippocrene Books Inc., 1986, ix;6-7;46-60.
Appleman, Roy Edgar. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.
Washnington: Chief Of Military History, Department of the
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81
Gugeler, Russel A. Combat Actions in Korea. Washington D.C.:
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Goulden, Joseph C. Korea: The Untold story of the War. New York:
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1987, 15-22.
Heller, Charles E., William A. stofft. America's First Battles
1776-1965. Leavenworth, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
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Policy and Direction: The First Year. Washington D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972, 25-81.
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82
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Cannon, Michael, "Task Force smith: A study in (Un)Preparedness
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63-73.
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united states Army Chief of Staff Before the United states
Armor Association." Armor, (January-February 1952): 7-15.
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1949): 17.
Kmiecik, Robert J., "Task Force smith: A Revised Perspective."
Armor, (March-April 1990): 33-36.
Ludvigsen, Eric C., "The Failed Bluff of Task Force smith: An
'Arrogant Display of Strength.' Army, (February 1992): 36
45.
Ridgway, Matthew B., "Troop Leadership at the Operational Level:
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58.
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Leavenworth Papers, (December 1985): 1-32.
SFR, "No More Task Force smiths." Military Rev'
1991: 1.
" (November
Sullivan, Gordon R., "A Trained and Ready ;.._-my:
Military Review, (November 1991): 9.
The Way Ahead."
Theis, Wallace J., "A Twenty First century Army." Parameters,
(XXI No.1, 1991): 62-76.
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Smith, Charles Brad B, Interview by William Davies, 7-8
January 1992. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa. 1-23.
83
Public Documents
Blair, Clay and Joan Collection, Letter to General Omar Bradley,
Chairman JCS, from Mr. Vannevar Bush, Folder: 1950, Box 12,
Omar N. Bradley - Chronological FIles 1948-1950, 6.
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Blair, Clay and Joan Collection, Bradley JCS Letter to MacArthur,
dated 16 August 1949, Omar N. Bradley, Box 12:
Chronological Files 1948-1950; Folder NSC-68 post war 4-14
50, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
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u.s. Department of the Army General Staff, Memorandum For Colonel
Philip R. Dwyer, General Staff Corps, Subject: "Training
Inspection of Overseas Commands", 20 September 1949,
National Archives, Washington D.C., RG 319 (Army Staff)
Plans and operations Division Decimal File 1949-Feb 1950,
353 Case 21 to 353.41, Box 662.
u.S. Department of the Army, "Report of Training Inspection of
the United States Army, FECOM by COL F.M. Harris and Party",
(24 September to 29 October 1949), Washington National
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662.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Message from CINCFE, Tokyo Japan to
DEPPTAR Pass to JCS" u.S. National Archives, Washington
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, "State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating
Committee united states policy in Korea (3-19-45) RG 218 JCS
Sec 15 Box 32, U.S. National Archives, D.C.
Ridgway, Matthew B., The Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, "Notes of
Corps Commanders Conference," SUWON 041130 February, Box 22,
Korean War - Historical Record 1950-1952, Folder: Historical
Record, Feb 1951-0ct 1951, Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
"
84
Speeches
Sullivan, Gordon R., Address to National Guard Association of the
United States, Honolulu, Hawaii, september 4, 1991.
Vuono, Carl E., "Address to Veterans of Task Force smith", Army
Public Affairs: Monthly Update, (October 1990), pp. 12-16.
unpublished Documents
U.s. Department of Defense, Executive Summary/Cover Brief,
"Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of
Defense," 22 October 1991.
U.s. Army Department of Military History, DAMH-RAM (Epley,
William W.), Information Paper, Subject: "Army Live Fire
Training, 1945-1950, 23 December 1991.
U.s. Army Department of Military History, DAMH-RAM (Sherry)
Information Paper, Subject: "The Political and Military
Environment When Task Force smith Was Formed in July
1950," 13 December 1991.
principal Deputy Under secretary of Defense, Executive Summary,
"Historical Background on Post-War Drawdowns, 22 October
1991.
85