The document discusses the concept of 'mission creep', where a military mission expands beyond its original objectives. It analyzes whether mission creep is occurring in the ongoing US intervention in Iraq, looking at factors like the broad scope of the stated mission, increasing US personnel and contractors in Iraq, and demands from Iraqi officials for more US assistance against ISIS.
The document discusses the concept of 'mission creep', where a military mission expands beyond its original objectives. It analyzes whether mission creep is occurring in the ongoing US intervention in Iraq, looking at factors like the broad scope of the stated mission, increasing US personnel and contractors in Iraq, and demands from Iraqi officials for more US assistance against ISIS.
The document discusses the concept of 'mission creep', where a military mission expands beyond its original objectives. It analyzes whether mission creep is occurring in the ongoing US intervention in Iraq, looking at factors like the broad scope of the stated mission, increasing US personnel and contractors in Iraq, and demands from Iraqi officials for more US assistance against ISIS.
The document discusses the concept of 'mission creep', where a military mission expands beyond its original objectives. It analyzes whether mission creep is occurring in the ongoing US intervention in Iraq, looking at factors like the broad scope of the stated mission, increasing US personnel and contractors in Iraq, and demands from Iraqi officials for more US assistance against ISIS.
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Mission Leap
BY MICAH ZENKO-AUGUST 22, 2014
On Feb. 12, 1993, journalist Christopher Burns fled a story from Somalia ontainin! a term that had ne"er before appeared in #n!lish lan!ua!e press$ %&he '.S.(led military mission to halt lan )arfare and !et aid to the needy has uno*ially )idened its role to inlude suh tas+s as rebuildin! houses, di!!in! )ells and reatin! polie fores. O*ials all it ,mission reep.,% -s -meria,s reent inter"ention in .ra/ !athers steam, the phrase and its impliit )arnin!s ha"e reemer!ed amon! poliyma+ers and publi ommentators. 0orryin!ly, thou!h, it seems some top o*ials don,t !et it. -s 1resident Bara+ Obama noted on &uesday$ %&ypially, )hat happens )ith mission reep is )hen )e start deidin! that )e,re the ones )ho ha"e to do it all oursel"es. -nd beause of the e2ellene of our military that an )or+ for a time. 0e learned that in .ra/.% &his is a pu33lin! lesson to ta+e a)ay from .ra/$ rather than preferrin! unilateralism, the Bush administration be!!ed e"ery ountry )ith deployable military fores to partiipate in the in"asion and oupation. On 0ednesday, 1enta!on spo+esperson 4ear -dm. 5ohn 6irby o7ered a more onise defnition$ %mission reep doesn,t refer to numbers of sorties, numbers of troops, numbers of anythin!. .t doesn,t refer to timelines. .t doesn,t e"en refer to intensity. .t,s about the mission itself.% &his is true in the tehnial sense of ho) the 1enta!on defnes a mission$ %&he tas+, to!ether )ith the purpose, that learly indiates the ation to be ta+en and the reason therefore.% &he problem )ith relyin! upon '.S. o*ials, artiulation and desription of military missions is that there is a time(honored history of denyin!, dissemblin!, or outri!ht lyin! about mission reep (( )hile it ours. &his inludes the '.S. bombin! of 113,819 sites in Cambodia bet)een 199: to 1983 )hile the 5ohnson and ;i2on administrations laimed other)ise< 4ea!an,s deployment of 1,=>> ?arines to @ebanon, initially %to pro"ide an interposition fore at a!reed loations,% but later openly ta+in! sides in that ountry,s i"il )ar< and the 2>11 inter"ention in @ibya to pro"ide airpo)er for re!ime han!e, just after the Obama repeatedly said this )ould not happen. %Sayin! one thin! and doin! another% has alsoharateri3ed '.S. non(battlefeld drone stri+es from their introdution in ;o"ember 2>>2. Ai"en the tendeny of the 'nited States to routinely underta+e additional military missions, all )hile ontendin! that they are not, e"eryone should be s+eptial of ho) o*ials justify and depit the on!oin! inter"ention in .ra/. ;e"ertheless, here are f"e lues to loo+ for and thin!s to thin+ about, )hen onsiderin! )hether mission reep is ourrin! no) in .ra/. 1. Don't fence me in. 1residents artiulate missions in a manner to assure they ha"e the !reatest Be2ibility to do )hate"er they )ant. #"en the supposedly limited missions for the urrent airstri+es (( humanitarian assistane and protetin! '.S. personnel (( are broad enou!h to justify pratially anythin!. .ndeed, most ountries laim that their uses of fore are stritly to protet their iti3ens or sa"e someone,s life (( in the 0estern )orld, rarely is "en!eane or bloodlust an aeptable reason to bomb someone. Ai"en that there are more than 1>,>>> '.S. !o"ernment employees or ontrators in .ra/ (( and militant !roups see+in! to atta+ them or the ritial infrastruture that supports them (( there are many ne) types of ombat operations that ould be justifed to protet them. ?oreo"er, the Obama administration already ontends the ri!ht to use fore any)here on #arth )here %the rele"ant !o"ernmental authorities ... annot or )ill not e7eti"ely address the threat to '.S. persons.% .ra/ is only the most reent ountry )here this broad remit has been e2erised. 2. We've got people on the ground. &he need for suh fore protetion airstri+es only inreases )ith eah additional troop or %ad"isor% and ontrator sent to .ra/. &he number of '.S. troops in .ra/ has steadily !ro)n sine the 5une 19 announement of a deployment of up to 3>> military personnel. By 5une 3>, three Speial Fores units had deployed, and just one day later 1resident Obama stated that an additional2>> troops )ould be sent to Ba!hdad. On -u!. 13, it )as announed that 13> military ad"isers )ould be sent (( brin!in! the total number of -merian military personnel in .ra/ to more than 1,>>> (( and the 1enta!on is disussin! sendin! another 3>> troops. -lon!side these a+no)led!ed fores are thousands of pri"ate ontrators pro"idin! lo!istis and seurity support on behalf of the 'nited States. .n 5anuary, '.S. Central Command CC#;&CO?D /uit pro"idin! data for .ra/ )hen it optimistially announed$ %&his )ill be the fnal 'SC#;&CO? report on .ra/ ontrator numbers.% 'ntil C#;&CO? republishes this data in its /uarterly reports, it )ill be impossible to +no) ho) many ontrators are in .ra/, and )hat perenta!e of them are '.S. iti3ens. But as a point of omparison, durin! the hei!ht of the .ra/ and -f!hanistan deployments there )ere sli!htly more 1enta!on(employed pri"ate ontrators than '.S. troops. &hus, )hen '.S. o*ials pro"ide an updated estimate for troop le"els in .ra/, it is safe to double it (( sine that number )ill not inlude ontrators. -!ain, more '.S. personnel and failities dispersed throu!hout .ra/ raise the prospet of more fore protetion stri+es. 3. Call the exterminator. 4. -dam Sie!el,s e2ellent 199= e2amination of the onept pro"ides a useful typolo!y for dia!nosin! the onset of mission reep$ Task accretion is the !eneral assumption of tas+s neessary to ahie"e the mission,s initial objeti"e. Mission shift ours )hen fores adopt tas+s that e2pand the mission. Mission transition is an unlear or unstated transition to a ne) set of objeti"es. Mission leap ours )ith a lear deision (( an e2pliit hoie (( to han!e the mission and, therefore, the military,s tas+s. -ny of these han!es ould our in the near(term )ith or )ithout a lear deision. &here are indiators that future airstri+es ould e2pand to simply +ill suspeted .slami State C.SD members as poliyma+ers and o*ials inreasin!ly demand the defeat or total destrution of the terrorist or!ani3ation. On Sunday, Sen. 4on 5ohnson C4(0.D termed .S as %e"il people that need to be defeated.% Similarly, 4ep. -dam Shi7 CE(C-Do7ered his belief that the 'nited States has %a ompellin! strate!i interest in defeatin! this !roup.% &he follo)in! day, State Eepartment spo+esperson ?arie Farf stated$ %@oo+, )e belie"e that .S.S needs to be ta+en out.% -nd on -u!. 2>, Seretary of State 5ohn 6erry a!reed,delarin!$ %.S.@ and the )i+edness it represents must be destroyed.% On -u!. 21, the hairman of the 5oint Chiefs of Sta7, Aen. ?artin Eempsey, apped it o7, sayin!, %&his is an or!ani3ation that has an apoalypti, end(of(days strate!i "ision )hih )ill e"entually ha"e to be defeated.% #liminationist ounterterrorism objeti"es suh as these are faniful, but not unommon. .n -pril 2>12, then(0hite Fouse ounterterrorism ad"iser 5ohn Brennan laimed$ %0e,re not !oin! to rest until al Gaeda the or!ani3ation is destroyed and is eliminated from areas in -f!hanistan, 1a+istan, Hemen, -fria, and other areas.% Hou probably notied that ne"er happened, and no o*ials )ere held aountable for the !larin! mismath of stated objeti"es and aomplishments. Similarly, in .ra/, '.S. airpo)er, e"en in oordination )ith loal !round fores, )ill not eliminate .S, )hih intelli!ene o*ials estimate to inlude at least 1>,>>> ommitted f!hters. Fo)e"er, as the Wall Street Journal reported, the tatially suessful airstri+es around the ?osul Eam are %reatin! momentum for a broader ampai!n that ould ta+e -merian air po)er to the militant !roup,s heartland.% &hat apparent momentum may ha"e been in"i!orated )ith the "ideo release of the .slami State,s latest sa"a!ery (( the abhorrent beheadin! of -merian journalist 5ames Foley. -s an anonymous senior 1enta!on o*ial rudely desribed it, %Funt )hile the huntin!,s !ood% (( meanin! +ill )hoe"er you an. 4. ut the! need it" 0ath for the ine"itable demands by 6urdish and .ra/i politiians for !reater airpo)er, intelli!ene, and )eapons support to defeat the insur!eny in its midst. %I&he 'nited States,J tehnolo!y apability )ill o7er a lot of intelli!ene information and monitorin! of the desert and many thin!s )hih )e are in need of,% said -hmed 6halaf al(Eulaimi, the !o"ernor of -nbar pro"ine. ;ote that )ord$ need. -s Aha3i Gadir, head of the 6urdistan Eemorati 1arty in A)er, stated, %'.S. assistane on the !round is "ery important to us. .t needs to ontinue as )e !radually push for)ard.% .ra/i ?inister of 1arliament Kainab al(Sahlani, framed her e2petations a bit di7erently, but in e/ually demandin! terms$ %&he '.S. has to pro"ide further military assistane to the .ra/i army per a!reements bet)een the t)o sides to assist )ith the f!ht a!ainst terrorist !roups.% &hen there,s al)ays the !uilt trip, as Sunni la)ma+er Faider al(?utla/ put it, notin! that .ra/is )ere %e2petin! the '.S. to e2pand their airstri+es,% other)ise %.ra/ )ill remain in its bro+en state and the '.S. )ill be responsible for that.% 1resident Obama mi!ht not belie"e that the 'nited States is .ra/,s air fore, but .ra/i politiians and o*ials inreasin!ly )ill. -nd .ra/,s seurity ould beome -meria,s obli!ation, espeially the use of airpo)er to assure the ne)ly formed !o"ernment in Ba!hdad sur"i"es and thri"es. #. Watch out for tal$ing stars. Be)are of those )ho arelessly use the onept to pre"ent disussions of military missions. -s 4ihard Folbroo+e obser"ed re!ardin! Clinton administration debates$ %I?ission reepJ )as a po)erful pejorati"e, onjurin! up ima!es of /ua!mire. But it )as ne"er learly defned, only in"o+ed, and al)ays in a ne!ati"e sense, used only to +ill someone else,s proposal.% &he plannin! sta7s )ithin C#;&CO? and the 5oint Sta7 are de"elopin! numerous operational plans for senior i"ilian and military o*ials to debate, and )hih Obama may ultimately authori3e. 0e +no), based upon historial preedent, that military o*ials are more li+ely to oppose disrete military operations, and )ill repeatedly raise )arnin!s about their ris+s, osts, and relati"e unimportane ompared to %"ital national interests.% &hese onerns are then e2pressed "ia media lea+s or throu!h sympatheti retired !eneral o*ers, e"en )hen they ha"e no diret insi!hts into the operations that are bein! re"ie)ed. -s these statements ine"itably ome for)ard the e2periened opinions should be respeted, but readers should be )ary of their situational a)areness of .ra/ or insi!hts into O"al O*e disussions. - fe) months a!o, . inter"ie)ed retired '.S. -rmy Aen. 1eter Shooma+er. Fe )as one of the ori!inal 22 members of the 1st Speial Fores Operational Eetahment(Eelta, a.+.a. Eelta Fore, and later ommanded e"ery speial operations fore for )hih he )as eli!ible. Fe led one of the three Eelta teams used in the failed -pril 19=> raid to free '.S. hosta!es in .ran, and many other resue missions that appropriately ha"e ne"er made the li!ht of day. Shooma+er o7ered a )arnin! that has resonated )ith me as . )ath e"ents unfold in Syria and .ra/$ %Sometimes military fore is most e7eti"e )hen it is held in reser"e. One you use it, it ta+es on a )eather of its o)n.% ?iti!atin! mission reep re/uires 1resident Obama spea+in! %learer than truth% Cto borro) Eean -heson,s phraseD about )hat '.S. fores in .ra/ are doin!, and then a+no)led!in! adjustments as that %)eather% unfolds. 1residents ha"e a poor reord in doin! this, inludin! Obama. Het, !i"en that any strate!y to ounter the threat that the .slami State poses to the 'nited States )ill be lon!er and ostlier than most )ant to admit, it,s not only essential to the military, he o)es it to the -merian people. 0in ?;ameeLAetty .ma!es Posted by T!"!#