FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006.]

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J :
p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, nding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE,
and it is hereby ordered:
1.

The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and
Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 363524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001
and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2.

Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered

REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36
of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and

3.

Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to

ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of
private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in
said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,

Isabela, which were later identied as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were led against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago
City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001,
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he
executed a sworn confession and identied petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo
B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe,
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao led a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners led an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio
in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed
for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in
a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking
to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify
the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September

2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer
for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued
a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder
against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent's
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals
for adjudication on the merits.
SHTcDE

Respondent Tuliao led with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001,
we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondent's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting
the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of
Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the
following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 363524; and, erred in upholding, arming and reinstating the Order dated July
6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the
alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in
the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court
of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to reissue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional
trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent
to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a

warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
The rst assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
Appeals' ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person
to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of
arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to
the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of
the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must rst be placed in the custody of
the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. 3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested
or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they led their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash
warrants of arrest." 4
Petitioners counter the nding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required
before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their ling of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar
Herrera:

Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to rst
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or
grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the

Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno

(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for
lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul
Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered
to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by
the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301
SCRA 102 5 ), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause. 6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their ling of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez 7 :
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by ling a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by ling bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, 9 while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant les a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody
of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
11 Being in the custody of the law signies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of
the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr ., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should
not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for
admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph
of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts

of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the
accused before considering the application for bail. 14

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we

clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an armative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an armative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
HTDCAS

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan , 16 we held that "
[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant
bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release
of a person who is in the custody of law.'" The rationale behind this special rule on
bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that ling pleadings seeking armative
relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer
is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The rst two are consequences of the fact
that failure to le them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he les any
pleading seeking an armative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of
the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
upon seeking armative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for
him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law,
but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.

Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash
an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest:
1.

I n Allado v. Diokno , 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition

for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to
us.

2.

I n Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , 20 upon the accused's Motion

to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they led a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with
the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.

3.

In Lacson v. Executive Secretary , 21 on the prayer of the accused

in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan
to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even
before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in

applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we
allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable
that many persons who can aord the bail will remain at large, and could elude
being held to answer for the commission of the oense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in
the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to
liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the
warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he
really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of ocial functions, the
warrant continues in force and eect until it is quashed and therefore can still be
enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. 22 Furthermore, the
continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of
probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In ne, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human
rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, 23
demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its
taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based

on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice
and based on doubts engendered by
the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless nd grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases
against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by
his predecessor because of a subsequently led appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political
climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice armed the prosecutor's
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with dierent accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to
issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming oce, quashed the warrant of arrest
on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, ". . . prudence dictates (that)
and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the
warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the
future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But
even if the petition for review was led before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the
prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
cCEAHT

I n Webb v. de Leon , 25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as

premature the ling of the information in court against them on the ground that
they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest
is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and
resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of
Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the abovecited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the
arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, nds
merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. 26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having

been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and eects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or armation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause,
we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated
that the determination of probable cause was based on the certication,
under oath, of the scal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the
order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscal's certification. 28

Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order contains no such

indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor's certication. The Joint Order
even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records . . . . 29

The records of the case show that the prosecutor's certication was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix 30 and
People v. Inting. 31 The supporting documents are the following:
1.

Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

2.

Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;

3.

Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;

4.

Joint Counter Adavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda

and Reynaldo de la Cruz;

5.

Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

6.

Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;

7.

Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

8.

Information dated 22 June 2001;

9.

Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10.

Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente

Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of
Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to nd probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given
after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it
was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for
ve years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the
information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically
charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along
the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to
disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is
not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb
33 :
A nding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and denitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
As well put in Brinegar v. United States , while probable cause demands more
than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A nding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
. . . Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial . . . .

Dismissing a criminal case on the

basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other
things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor's resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice armed the
prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases
against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al.,

RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other
police ocers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of
the Supreme Court absolving the ve cops of murder, certainly makes his
sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of
the decision acquitting said ocers "who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the
defense's views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal's statements when the
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's evidence presented and adduced
in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision
adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
EaCDAT

xxx xxx xxx

This Court nds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in eect disregarding all the evidence presented by the
prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder
filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. 34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large
when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision,
even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of
the dismissal of criminal case against dierent accused for the same crime. The
blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in
Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did
not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence,
which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners
in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It is preposterous to conclude that because of our nding of reasonable doubt in

Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and
perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." 35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution's
version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.

We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's dismissal of the informations two
days after we resolved to issue, upon the ling of a bond, a temporary restraining
order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was led the
day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able
to beat the eectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal
of the informations (days after this Court's resolve to issue a TRO against Judge
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding
necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did
not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead
directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. 36 According to
the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of
arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy
whereof should not be allowed to aect the dispositions on the merits, especially in
this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of
Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it
the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullied proceedings. Judge
Anghad's order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullied; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of
arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally
permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been
available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both
the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case
and not merely rely on the certication of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado
v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals , the determination of probable cause does
not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
nding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a
finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the
reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals

committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.

36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had
become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition led by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals.
As carefully enumerated in the rst page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.)

Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.)

Order dated September 21, 2001;

3.)

Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and

4.)

Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is
NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint
Order of November 14, 2001. 38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was led not with the Court of Appeals, but with this
Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them
in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was led on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in ling with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in
view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
EDATSI

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided
by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this
Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to
Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order
on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the eects of our 12 November
2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao's ling of a bond in the amount of

P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part
of respondent, 39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other
reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer
for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case
was dismissed. 40
As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as
in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of
Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao , 41 by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City
of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and
the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modication that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be
transferred to and raed in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this
connection,
1)

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of

the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to eect
the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

2)

The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela,

is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto
within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

3)

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to rae

the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4)

The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to

report to this Court compliance with the order to rae within ten
(10) days from said compliance; and

5)

The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raed is directed
to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
HAEIac

6)

Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith

warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel

T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao with Acting Presiding Justice (now
Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Eloy R.
Bello, Jr., concurring.

2.

Rollo, pp. 109-110.

3.

Id., p. 103.

4.

Id.

5.

This should have been 301 SCRA 298.

6.

Oscar Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39 (2001 ed.).

7.

G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643.

8.

Id.

9.

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 741,
750; Dinapol v. Baldado, A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110, 116117. In some jurisprudence, voluntary surrender is termed as "voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court by surrender to the proper authorities."

10.

Layosa v. Rodriguez , G.R. No. L-46080, 10 November 1978, 86 SCRA 300, 303;
People v. Umbrero, G.R. No. 93021, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 821, 829.

11.

This is because of the rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, attaches until the nal
disposition of the case. In such a situation, the escapee's right to confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses are deemed waived by his failure to appear
during the trial of which he has notice (Gimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, 15
April 1988, 160 SCRA 1, 5).

12.

See Larranaga v. Court of Appeals , 351 Phil. 75, 88-89 (1998).

13.

A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 421.

14.

Id., at 424.

15.

Sapugay v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 86792, 21 March 1990, 183 SCRA 464,

471.
16.
17.

Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 112 Phil. 781, 783 (1961).

Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9, p. 749. This is what the Court of
Appeals erroneously rephrased just before quoting Pico. Cf. note 1.

18.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, Section 20.

19.

G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 198.

20.

324 Phil. 568, 590 (1996).

21.

361 Phil. 251, 284 (1999).

22.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Section 6.

23.

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Orga. v. Phil. Blooming Mills Inc ., 151-A Phil. 656,
676 (1973).

24.

Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo, p. 204.

25.

317 Phil. 758, 796 (1995).

26.

Joint Order dated 17 October 2001, rollo, p. 196.

27.

CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 2.

28.

Petitioner's Memorandum, rollo, pp. 477-478.

29.

Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order dated 6 July 2001, rollo, p. 193.

30.

G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 300.

31.

G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788, 792.

32.

Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo pp. 197-201.

33.

Webb v. De Leon, supra note 25, pp. 675-676.

34.

Joint Order dated 14 November 2001, rollo, pp. 271-272.

35.

Id.

36.

Petitioners' Memorandum, rollo, p. 493.

37.

Rollo, pp. 150-151.

38.

Id., pp. 498-499.

39.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Section 3 (b) and (c).

40.

People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, 21 December 1990, 192 SCRA 548, 553.

41.

419 Phil. 241 (2001).