Plato's Banishment of Poetry

Plato's Banishment of Poetry
Author(s): Morriss Henry Partee

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Winter, 1970), pp. 209222
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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MORRISS
Plato's
LIKE THE MEDIEVAL
HENRY
Banishment
"Pearl" and Hamlet,
the aesthetics of Plato provides ample

ground on which the critic may exercise
any particular hobbyhorse he chooses to
ride. While poet-baiters have used some
parts of the dialogues to scandalize poetrylovers, Plato's theories of love and beauty
have inspired generations of poets. To
those who would cite him to damn poetry,
Plato offers such strictures as found in the
Republic II, 377-383, III, 386-404, the
Sophist 234-237, and the Laws II, 658-663,
VII, 800-812, and VIII, 829. To those who
would defend poetry, he gives his theory of
inspiration, his analysis of the ethical uses
of poetry, and the example of the magnificent poetry in his dialogues. But the present inquiry has only one purpose: to consider Plato's most representative thought regarding poetry. His theory of divine inspiration, his frequent citation of poetry, and
his use of ethical myths are historically important in the study of Plato's attitude toward poets and poetry. But while this partial sanction of imaginative literature has
some relevance to Plato's aesthetics, a critic
must not ignore Plato's continual attacks
on poetry, especially the final and complete
exclusion of poets in the Republic X. With
the twentieth century's acceptance of metaphysical and formalist criticism, Plato's
stern moral judgment of poetry has fallen
into increasing disfavor. Thus, Plato's defenders are tempted to make him the friend
of poets, his attacks on Hesiod and Homer
being irrelevant footnotes to his real devotion to poetry.
MORRISSHENRY PARTEE is assistant
professor
of Eng-
lish at the University of California, Los Angeles.
PARTEE
of
Poetry
Plato's consistent mistrust of art in his

explicit consideration of art must take precedence over his tacit enjoyment and his
use of poetry in the dialogues. In practice,
Plato not only quotes poetry with obvious
approval but he also creates dramatic scenes
which rival those of even the greatest of
poets. Nevertheless, in the Republic X, his
most thorough discussion of art, Plato
strongly condemns poetry, both for its confusing of the intellect and for its corrupting
of the emotions. His extreme position in
the last book of the greatest repository of
his thought represents his boldest conclusions. His insistence throughout the greater
part of the dialogues on the importance of
Forms should warn the reader against dismissing the Republic as presenting an impossible ideal. To Plato, the Republic was
more "real" than any state actually in existence. In this book Plato states that he has
banished all imaginative poetry-dramatic,
epic, lyric. He does admit straight-forward
didactic poetry later in the discussion, but
significantly he does not consider at this
point the possibility that this verse could be
beautiful in its own right. Judging poetry
solely in terms of its effects, Plato feels that
artful language, the tool of the sophists,
tends to seduce the unwary to embrace the
transient beauty of pleasure instead of to
lift the soul to contemplate the true beauty
of virtue. His sincerity and finality cannot
be questioned; only the semi-humorous request to hear a defense of poetry in the
Republic X, 607b-8 tempers the passionate
conviction of his reasoning in X, 595-607a.
The philosophical authority of his extended reasoning in the Republic far out-

210
MORRISS
weighs his offhanded and ironic praise of

poetic inspiration in such dialogues as the
Ion and the Phaedrus. Plato's unyielding
refusal to accept anything less than absolute
knowledge precludes any admission that
beautiful language could lead man to virtue. Accordingly, Plato applies the same
strictures to poetry that he places on language throughout his dialogues. Rhetoric,
poetry, reasoned discourse, all must primarily contain the truth. Plato would and does
condemn even his own dialogues should anyone regard them as repositories of beauty
and meaning in themselves. The dialogues,
and indeed all acceptable uses of language,
must be taken as guides for thought; only
under this ideal condition will literature
and poetry of any sort be welcome in the
well-run state. We must not cut Plato's soaring thought down to an ill-considered and
inconsistent espousal of poetry. Plato's reluctance to sacrifice Homer and Hesiod to
the demands of the intellect makes further
tribute to poetry in his name unnecessary.
Plato's theory of poetry is far more abstract and less applicable to the analysis of
poetry than that of Aristotle. Plato's overwhelming bias towards ethics has tempted
scholars to stress his linking of ethics with
poetry rather than to consider what he says
about poetry itself. But the issues Plato
raises are important for aesthetics as well as
for ethics or literary criticism. Because of
the unstated basis of his aesthetics, few critics have pursued the course of his reasoning. The most vociferous attacker of poetry
in the Elizabethan Age, Stephen Gosson,'
cites Plato's aesthetics as superficially as the
great bishop of Hippo, St. Augustine, does.2
Plato's manner of presentation allows a
wide latitude for the interpretation of his
aesthetics. Since Plato was not a systembuilder, a critic takes a firm stand at his
own peril. In addition, the mask of the dialogue form increases the ambiguity introduced by the changing thought of Plato's
long and productive life. His thought may
indeed represent a unity as Paul Shorey has
so eloquently argued, but this unity is a
many-faceted jewel. To compound the
problem, Plato never considers poetry by
itself. He is always pressing toward some
other conclusion, usually the ignorance of
HENRY
PARTEE
rhapsodes or the education of the youth.

The scattered sayings about inspiration, the
uses of poetry, and the nature of poetry
itself only grudgingly, if at all, give up the
heart of Plato's aesthetics.
Scholars today usually avoid the issues in
the Republic X in their attempt to rescue
Plato from charges of philistinism. One approach would directly question the purpose
of the Republic, the only dialogue which
seems to condemn poetry totally. Another
line of thought suggests that Plato throughout the dialogues never seriously attacks poetry. A third, more easily supported, position would admit that Plato has some reservations about art, but would limit Plato's
attack to the abuse of art and, in particular,
realistic art. This third theory will be examined here later; the first two positions must
be carefully considered. First, the most facile and tempting argument holds that the
Republic is an ideal state, a kind of utopia.
This interpretation stresses that poetry
deals with the emotions of real and fallible
men. Thus, Plato dismisses art lest the portrayal of reality shatter the ideal like a
grubby finger destroys a soap bubble. In a
perfect state no imperfection can exist. Darnell Rucker, a recent advocate of this position, persuasively reasons that "Neither the
legislator nor the philosopher nor the poet
has the same role in the Republic as he has
in an actual state; and these differences in
role are consequent upon the difference between an ideal and an actuality." 3 G. M. A.
Grube likewise agrees that Plato is legislating for an ideal republic, a pattern laid up
in heaven. "In such a state no one has ever
claimed a place for Pericles, Themistocles,
or Solon, or indeed for any statesman that
has ever lived. Why should an exception be
made for the poets?" 4 But one might argue
that Plato does provide for enlightened rulers-the philosopher-kings; he specifically
excludes all poets. And Plato would violently object to his Republic's being considered less real than the decaying political
organization of Athens in its decline. Great
though Athenian statesmen had been,
Plato, like Machiavelli, saw the degeneration of past grandeur all around him.
Clearly, radical proposals were needed.
The argument stressing the Republic as


visionary, but impractical, likewise reasons
that, like the state, the ruler of the Republic needs protection from the real world of
heat and dust. The philosopher-king must
be isolated by almost physical barriers, as in
More's Utopia, to guard him from the rigors of a real state. Rucker states, "The philosopher in our world, as Plato says in the
Apology and Socrates exemplifies, must
exist in a private station. Short of the institutionalization of the education process of
the Republic, the philosopher-king could
not hope for the necessary support from the
institutions and the citizens of his city." 5
Indeed Plato is always mindful that philosophers were often ill-treated in the city
state,6 and often alludes to their otherworldliness.7 But the philosopher's present
ills and seeming dreaminess are only the
appearances that the ignorant can see.
The argument that the Republic is an
ideal state has by no means found universal
acceptance. Eric A. Havelock explicitly attacks this view as a present-day fallacy: "On
the over-all issue, Plato is accommodated to
modern taste by arguing that the programme of the Republic is utopian and
that the exclusion of poetry applies only to
an ideal condition not realisable in the recognizable future or in earthly societies. One
might reply that even in that case why
should the Muse of all people be selected
for exclusion from Utopia?" 8 Plato's seriousness can be seen in his consistent demand that poetry and all discourse be subordinate to reason and thought in the
proper education of youth. From the Ion to
the Laws, Plato insists that poetry be
judged in terms of its knowledge and its
usefulness. The great political figures in
Athens' past offer the same danger to the
Republic that poetry does: the weight of
authority may detract from the force of active reasoning. Besides, most good statesmen act only through "right opinion." 9
The greatest danger in making the Republic an ideal is that the interpretation
denies Plato's carefully considered analysis
of knowledge. Our distinction between
ideal and real is not Plato's. "The assertion
that theory comes closer than practice to
truth or reality is characteristically Platonic. The ideal state or man is the true
211
state or man; for if men, who are in fact

always imperfect, could reach perfection,
they would only be realizing all that their
nature aims at being and might conceivably
be." 10 Plato intends the Republic to describe a system better than that of any actual or foreseeable state. But his attack on
poetry is from the standpoint not of politics
but rather of ethics. The dialogue deals as
much with education as with the state.
"Were it not for the title, it might be read
for what it is, rather than as an essay in
utopian political theory. It is a fact that
only about a third of the work concerns
itself with statecraft as such." 11 If Plato
says emphatically that poetry should be
banished from the ideal state, then his criticism applies even more strongly to any lessthan-perfect state. If poetry is a necessary
evil in a real state, poetry must be excluded
from a more perfect commonwealth. A necessary evil is still an evil.
The philosopher to Plato is a realist in
the widest sense of the word. As opposed to
the benighted politicians who must compromise their convictions, a true philosopher
works both in the world of appearances and
in the world of higher realities. Plato himself went to Syracuse in order to advise
Dionysius. And one must agree with Plato
that Socrates lived and died more triumphantly than did the tyrants who were superficially successful in this world of shadows. Otherwise, Plato would insist that the
Phaedo be rejected from a proper state
because of its description of an unjust punishment.
Moreover, in Plato's thought itself, the
philosopher is constantly engaged with the
world. The vision of absolute virtue and
beauty makes the philosopher effective:
"Remember how in that communion only,
beholding beauty with the eye of the mind,
he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold
not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if
mortal man may" (Symposium 212).12 Even
at the moment of greatest remove from the
physical world, Plato makes the philosopher bring forth the realities of true virtue.

MORRISS
212
The poet, on the other hand, is likely to
produce only "images of beauty."
Admittedly, the Republic is not to be
found among actual states, but then, the
true philosopher does not live on the same
plane with ordinary men. In his search for
justice, Socrates states:
When we set out to discover the essential nature
of justice and injustice and what a perfectly just
and a perfectly unjust man would be like, supposing them to exist, our purpose was to use them
as ideal patterns; we were to observe the degree
of happiness or unhappiness that each exhibited,
and to draw the necessaryinference that our own
destiny would be like that of the one we most resembled. We did not set out to show that these
ideals could exist in fact. (Republic V, 472)
He recognizes that theory can never be completely realized in practice, for action always comes less close to truth than thought.
He asks, "Is our theory any the worse, if we
cannot prove it possible that a state so organized should be actually founded?"
(ibid). The Republic, then, is an honest
and courageous attempt to cut through the
confusion inherent in any society already
realized.
Later, Socrates proposes that the philosopher-king may be effective even in an actual
state. The philosopher, in companionship
with the divine order, will first reproduce
that order in his own soul:
Suppose, then, he should find himself compelled
to mould other charactersbesides his own and to
shape the pattern of public and private life into
conformity with his vision of the ideal, he will
not lack the skill to produce such counterpartsof
temperance,justice, and all the virtues as can exist in the ordinary man. And the public, when
they see that we have describedhim truly, will be
reconciled to the philosopher and no longer disbelieve our assertionthat happinesscan only come
to a state when its lineaments are traced by an
artist working after a divine pattern. (Republic
VI, 500)
The philosopher's role is to create a humanity true to its highest possibilities, not
to pander to the confused emotions of ignorant men. The guide of the philosopher,
the true artist, should be the ideal model of
virtue. He is a lover of truth and reality.
The institutions described in the Republic
will certainly be the best if they can be
realized. And Plato rather sanguinely states
that "to realize them, though hard, is not
HENRY
PARTEE
impossible" (VI, 502). A true utopia, a "nowhere" such as Sir Thomas More's, may be
a social satire, a skeptical attack on existing
institutions. The Republic, however, is no
flight of the imagination; the dialogue represents Plato's attempt to suggest the Form
of the state.
Therefore, one cannot dismiss the attack
on poetry in the Republic merely on the
basis of its presenting an ideal state. If a
critic is justified in dismissing any part with
which he happens to disagree, there is no
limit to the material he can ignore. The
Republic is neither an impossible ideal nor
a blueprint for a possible state; its contribution is both to politics and to ethics. Like
Aristotle, Plato identifies the good of the
individual with that of the state. A. E. Taylor comments on the purpose of this dialogue: "It has sometimes been asked
whether the Republic is to be regarded as a
contribution to ethics or to politics. Is its
subject 'righteousness', or is it the 'ideal
state?' The answer is that from the point of
view of Socrates and Plato there is no distinction, except one of convenience, between morals and politics. The laws of
right are the same for classes and cities as
for individual men. But one must add that
these laws are primarily laws of personal
morality; politics is founded on ethics, not
ethics on politics." 13 Plato proposes a guide
for man to order his life, not a utopian
scheme for intellectual amusement. He intends his precepts concerning ethics to be
universally applicable no less than does
Kant. Few men may follow the categorical
imperative, but men's failing does not render the principle less true. So while any
thoughtful discussion of the Republic's
applicability to our humdrum existence is
valuable, one must still consider whether
Plato seriously and consistently attacks poetry in this dialogue and elsewhere.
The second method of making Plato a
patron of the arts does not attack the purpose of the Republic but the seriousness of
Plato in banishing poets. Following Sir
Philip Sidney's example, these apologists
claim that Plato condemns only the abuse
of poetry. The Laws thus represents Plato's
awakening to the necessity of poetry in
human life; the Ion becomes an expose of

213

contemporary Greek criticism. Stressing the
Ion, Allan Gilbert argues that "Plato attempted to banish the bad critics that the
poets might appear as they truly were and
are, even if only to the fit audience who can
discern their nature as artists." 14 This line
of reasoning is attractive, for Plato's main
thrust in the Ion certainly appears to be
against the stupidity of the rhapsodes.
Then, too, Plato's constraints on poetry are,
for the most part, overshadowed by his frequent citations of poetry. Finally, the Republic II and III as well as the Laws II and
VII censure primarily immoral poetry. If
some poetry is moral, Plato would have to
admit its presence in the well-run state.
Unfortunately, grave difficulties beset
each of these arguments. Nowhere in the
Ion does Plato accept poetry as a guide to
proper conduct. Instead, we have only an
ambiguous praise of the source of poetry,
the Muse. This divine source of inspiration
plays no integral role in Plato's discussion
of knowledge or virtue. Surprisingly
enough, Plato never mentions poetic inspiration in the context of his examination of
poetry. He quotes poetry often, but seldom
pauses to consider the poetic worth, the
beauty of any passage. The quotations
usually illustrate some point about conduct.
Next, the dialogue form may not express
Plato's final position. Again, if we dismiss
whatever we please in the dialogues simply
because of the tentative nature of Plato's
reasoning, we have little hope of understanding any of his thought. Finally, if
other dialogues accept the possibility of
moral poetry, the Republic X certainly denies that any poetry which Plato knew
would fulfill the requirement. Plato's final
comment on poetry in the most complete
exposition of his thought surely takes precedence over the trivial Ion15 and the important but pedestrian Laws.16
To vitiate Plato's attack on art in the
Republic X, critics often cite his famous
praise of divine inspiration. Rucker emphasizes that Plato praises inspiration and condemns only art which unjustly pretends to
knowledge. "Socrates does not attack Ion's
ability as a rhapsode in the Ion; he attacks
Ion's claim to knowledge of the topics of
his recitations. So long as the poet makes no
claim to knowledge of those things he is

inspired to say (or make), Plato has no
quarrel with him as a poet." 17 In light of
Plato's careful qualification, however, one
cannot accept his seriousness in praising inspiration. The Ion does indeed attack only
the unlearned rhapsode. But the theory of
poetic inspiration (Ion 533), far from praising the poet, only testifies to poetry's power.
And Plato never questions the effects of poetry. His question is how dangerous are
these effects to the intellect.
Although his theory of divine inspiration
has been extremely influential on poets and
literary critics, Plato does not develop his
scattered comments into a philosophy. Indeed, this minor motif runs counter to Plato's serious investigation of poetry. The
Phaedrus, which cites the poet favorably,
mentions four kinds of madness. The subjects of the dialogue are love and rhetoric;
only one short section (245) mentions poetry at all. Similarly, the Symposium 205
touches on the poet on its way to an exposition of Absolute Beauty. The passages are
frequently attacks on the poet's knowledge,
poetry being praised in a backhanded manner. The Phaedrus 245 would make the
poet a "divine madman," several degrees
below the inspired philosopher. Here Plato
does attribute the same sort of greatness to
poet and to philosopher. But the philosopher more typically in Plato is one who
knows rather than one who is "inspired."
Two other dialogues are even less favorable in their citation of divine inspiration of
the poet. The Apology 22 states that "there
is hardly a person present who would not
have talked better about their poetry than
they did themselves. Then I knew that not
by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a
sort of genius and inspiration; they are like
diviners or soothsayers who also say many
fine things, but do not understand the
meaning of them." This passage, dripping
with Socratic irony, is hardly matter on
which to build a significant praise of inspiration. The Laws shows little development
or refinement of those concepts expressed
early in Plato's thoughts on poetry. The
Athenian states that
the poet, according to the tradition which has
ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all

214
MORRISS
men, when he sits down on the tripod of the

muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he
allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and
his art being imitative, he is often compelled to
represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus
to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether
there is more truth in one thing that he has said
than in another. (Laws IV, 719)
The poet cannot, therefore, be a legislator,

for a legislator must not give two rules
about the same thing. These passages about
inspiration say little about what poetry is.
Plato stresses the poet's ignorance even
while accepting his divine calling.
Plato admits that beauty in all its forms
has a profound effect on the soul. He
stresses, however, that only the beauty of
virtue and of knowledge does not lead to
the impure enjoyment of pleasure. Except
for the early training and discipline of the
soul through harmony, poetry does not lead
directly to an understanding of proper conduct. The poet cannot possess knowledge of
what he does unless he becomes a philosopher too. The poet himself is usually the
passive agent of the Muse; the inexplicable
beauty of poetry comes from its divine origin. But when Plato looks at the poet's own
contribution to the process, he finds the
poet only an unlearned imitator. Plato's
doctrine of divine inspiration applies more
to his theory of love than to his concept of
poetry. The Phaedrus and the Symposium
suggest an affinity between the soul and
beauty with which the doctrine of the
Forms does not completely agree. References to poetic inspiration, however, are almost a dead end; Plato does not attempt to
integrate this inspiration with his main
thought on poetry and language. In no
place in the dialogues does Plato consider
what poetry is together with its source in
the Muse. Thus Plato's occasional references to poetic inspiration do not constitute
a significant approval of poetry itself.
Besides considering the theory of poetic
inspiration, critics may emphasize the dialogues which admit some ethical uses of poetry. Indeed, only the Republic X seems to
deny even the possibility of good poetry.
Plato's strictures in the few places where he
directly considers poetry seem overweighed
by his overall attitude toward the art of the
ancients. Gilbert comments on the Laws:
HENRY
PARTEE
Since the form of the dialogue is still employed

and no speaker can be identified with the author,
it is impossible to say that Plato's opinions are
absolutely laid down. I find it impossible to think
that the Athenian who takes the chief part, for
Socrates no longer appears, is Plato himself, or at
least represents more than aspects of Plato's mind.
The comic picture of eminent generals and statesmen solemnly reciting bad verses is hardly to be
explained as the serious opinion of a man who
knew and loved Homer as Plato did.18
Yet Plato has already admitted in the Republic X that Homer is "the first and greatest of the tragic poets." But truth must not
be sacrificed for personal satisfaction: "if
the dramatic poetry whose end is to give
pleasure can show good reason why it
should exist in a well-governed society, we
for our part should welcome it back, being
ourselves conscious of its charm; only it
would be a sin to betray what we believe to
be the truth. You too, my friend, must have
felt this charm, above all when poetry
speaks through Homer's lips" (X, 606). Of
course Plato is charmed. But he does not on
this account accept disruptive poetry into a
well-run state.
Rather than question the Laws, however,
most critics agree that here Plato offers a
serious theory of art. Warry states that "in
the Laws, which, though it lacks the literary
power of the Republic, offers us a far saner
and more practical version of an ideal
State, no automatic criterion of poetry and
art is offered. Instead, tragedy and comedy
are cautiously admitted, subject to
reservation." 19 Grube agrees that "by far
the most mature, as well as the most complete, discussion of art, is to be found in the
Laws, where it should be noted we are no
longer dealing with the ideal state." 20 Just
as a man at the north pole can move only
south, any variation in the perfect Republic
must be for the worse. The less visionary
Laws, however, seems to allow as much poetry as needed to regulate the souls of imperfect men.
But Plato's treatment in the Laws is at
heart almost exactly the same as in the Republic. Both admit only praises of noble
men and of gods; neither dialogue allows
evil in poetry. Both the Republic (III, 400)
and the Laws (VII, 810) allow poetry to
stimulate harmony in the young. And even
the Republic X, 606 states that "we can

Plato's Banishment
215
of Poetry
admit into our commonwealth only the poetry which celebrates the praises of the gods
and of good men." The Laws would require
the poet to "express, as he ought, by fair
and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good
men" (II, 660). The major difference between the dialogues is that the Republic
defends this restriction philosophically
while the Laws is more concerned with implementing the selection of such noble poetry. The art Plato seems to accept, however, is not actually poetry, but philosophical and didactic discourse.
The argument so far has been essentially
negative. The Republic cannot be dismissed as an "ideal," nor do Plato's comments elsewhere constitute an endorsement
of poetic inspiration or of ethical poetry.
His mistrust of poetry obviously exists side
by side with his love of poetry. The task
remaining is to see whether Plato's reasons
for banishing poetry are consistent and well
thought out. If the Laws and the Republic
do indeed contain the same attitude toward
art, the discussion of poetry in the Republic
X should apply equally to both dialogues.
The Republic X, the source of most of the
controversy over Plato's aesthetics, alone
contains his explicit expulsion of poetry. In
this book, he first considers poetry's misleading of the intellect, then its catering to
the emotions. Poetry is guilty of both offenses. In 595-99 Plato argues that a carpenter
follows a divine form in making a bed, and
an artist copies that imitation. Plato then
explicitly analyzes the analogy between the
painter and the poet. At this point he seems
to leave room for poetry which encourages
virtue and restraint as he has suggested in
the second and third books of the Republic.
But Plato then extends his attack to all poetry in the Republic X, 601-7. Poetry, by
stimulating the emotions, confuses the intellect. Although he does not advance new
arguments concerning poetry's effect on the
emotions, the previous four books have introduced a theory of the soul which renders
poetry, an appeal to the soul directly
through beauty, largely unnecessary. The
soul's perception of beauty is to be mediated through knowledge, not immediately
grasped through the emotions. Nevertheless, Plato then seems to permit poetry to
reenter the state precisely under the same
conditions as in Books II and III. Since
Plato feels that he has banished poetry, his
admission of didactic verse must have little
resemblance to what he deems to be poetry.
The combination of his censure of poetry
with his "poetic" style creates a problem of
interpretation, but the confusion is ours,
not Plato's.
The Republic X is central to any discussion of Plato's aesthetics, both for its inherent philosophy and for its historical importance. Without this book, most critics
would take little offense at Plato's insistence
on the moral judgment of poetry. The earlier parts of the Republic and most of the
Laws present a fairly acceptable attack on
obviously immoral poetry and on foolish
misinterpretations by the uneducated. His
epistemological attacks on poetry and his
ad hominem attack on Homer in Book X,
however, have seldom appealed to readers.
Critics are at loggerheads over the role of
the tenth book in the dialogue as well as its
content. Cornford states in his translation
of the Republic that "the attack on poetry
in this Part has the air of an appendix, only
superficially linked with the preceding and
following context. Possibly the strictures on
dramatic poetry in Chapter IX had become
known and provoked criticism to which
Plato wished to reply." 21 Havelock, on the
other hand, states that "an author possessing Plato's skill in composition is not likely
to blunt the edge of what he is saying by
allowing his thought to stray away from it
at the end." 22 Both agree that the discussion of poetry is a break in the argument of
Republic IX and the Myth of Er.
The first books of the Republic are tentative positions in Plato's study of man and
the state. Plato's comments on poetry are
not extreme here; his ideals obviously resemble those in the Laws. But scholars have
often debated the exact relationships between these first thoughts on poetry and the
final statement in the tenth book of the
dialogue. One argument maintains that
Plato was serious in the first part; in the
last book he is stretching the point. Plato's
argument may carry him further than he

216
MORRISS
would willingly go: "In X. there is an unmistakable trace of sophistry, a use of arguments which cannot have appealed to the
better judgment of the writer; the reasoning in II. and III. is direct, serious, and
convincing.... In the latter book he seems
to be seeking strictly philosophical considerations to support the verdict of the earlier
passage, to be trying to show that this almost a priori conclusion is in harmony with
the great principles upon which the Republic rests." 23 Superficially, Plato does seem to
change his position.24 In Book II he attacks
the content of contemporary poetry, in
Book III the form. Some more useful and
purified poetry would then be a possibility.
But Plato progressively develops the description of the best state and of the ruler
of that state. In the fourth book he discusses the nature of the soul. In the tenth
book he shows the effects of the lesser
beauty of poetry on the soul. The enlightened soul should contemplate the beauty of
virtue directly. Knowledge, not the impure
mixture of emotion and thought found in
poetry, should guide man. Since the last
part of the Republic was probably written
much later than the earlier parts, we may
conjecture that the tenth book answers
some contemporary objections to his previous discussion of poetry.25 Plato states
that "our commonwealth has many features
which make me think it was based on very
sound principles, especially our rule not on
any account to admit the poetry of dramatic representation. Now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul, it
seems to me clearer than ever that such poetry must be firmly excluded" (X, 595). The
reason for the exclusion is that poetry may
injure minds which do not understand its
true nature.
Critics not only disagree on the relationship of the tenth book to the rest of the
dialogue but they question the relevance of
his comments to any useful study of poetry.
Havelock argues that the Republic does not
launch a philosophical attack on the poets,
but rather proposes a social criticism. He
states that the political framework of the
dialogue may be utopian, but Plato is serious about the role of poetry in education.
"It is obvious that the poetry he is talking
HENRY
PARTEE
about is not the kind of thing we identify

today as poetry. Or more properly that his
poetry and our poetry may have a great
deal in common, but that what must have
changed is the environment in which poetry is practised. Somehow, Plato is talking
about an over-all cultural condition which
no longer exists." 26 A. E. Taylor, however,
would extend Plato's attack to poetry for
all times. "It is not the floridity of Timotheus or Agathon which is the object of attack, but the art of the Periclean age. We
are only throwing dust in our own eyes if
we suppose that Socrates wants merely to
repress the cheap music-hall and the garish
melodrama, or the equivalents of freak
movements like Dada. He is seriously proposing to censure just what we consider the
imperishable contributions of Athens to the
art and literature of the world, because he
holds that they have tendencies which are
unfavourable to the highest development of
moral personality." 27 Plato saw too clearly
to confuse the degenerate art of his own
time with all possible art. If Plato's aesthetics comments only on a vanished social
situation, his thought has value only for the
antiquarian.
The Republic does not attack simply a
way of interpreting poetry. The position expressed in this dialogue goes beyond the
reasoning in the Ion. Plato argues as if
Homer himself were claiming authority,
not just the ignorant rhapsode. Yet, Cornford denies that Plato is interested in aesthetics for its own sake in this book: "The
main object of attack, however, is the claim,
currently made by sophists and professional
reciters of the Homeric poems, that Homer
in particular, and in a less degree the tragedians, were masters of all technical knowledge, from wagon-building or chariot-driving to strategy, and also moral and religious
guides to the conduct of life." 28 In the Ion,
Plato has suggested that everyone, not just
the professionals, interpreted poetry incorrectly. So Plato attacks false literary criticism in the Ion, but he extends his reasoning in the Republic. Plato does not directly
mention in the Republic that the sophists
used poetry to bolster their effectiveness. In
fact, he even cites the sophists as his allies
against the poets; Homer's authority chal-


lenges that of Protagoras of Abdera and
Prodicus of Ceos (Republic X, 600).
The Republic X itself shows that there
can be little doubt that Plato intended to
banish at least all "realistic" poetry from
the well-run state. Carried to the extreme
by Zeuxis and Apollodorus, realism was
particularly liable to misinterpretation.
Basing his argument on his doctrine of
Forms, Plato states that there are three
realms of reality: the gods', the carpenters',
and the painters'. For instance, the divine
maker creates the form of a bed. Then the
carpenter copies the form, and the painter
imitates the copy of the bed. Thus, "the
work of the artist is at the third remove
from the essential nature of the thing" (X,
597). Such art is banished, not for its abuse
of the emotions, but for its confusing of the
intellect:
217
Sidney will stress poetry's effectiveness, its

ability to move man's hardened heart, Plato
demands as a prerequisite that there be
complete clarity of the goals for mankind.
The effectiveness of language will follow directly from this vision of the absolute. Art
is inherently amoral, and thus is a poor
guide to virtue. Poetry is liable to the same
misinterpretation that Jonathan Swift sees
for satire. In the preface to Battle of the
Books, Swift declares that satire is a kind of
glass in which beholders generally discover
everybody's face but their own. For this reason, satire receives a kind reception in this
world, and very few are offended by it. Poetry may confirm, but it seldom converts.
Plato could argue that the rational part of
the soul receives little instruction from its
contemplation of the static picture of a cobbler at his trade. The painting might inciThe art of representation, then, is a long way dentally be beautiful. But a man must have
virtue and knowledge first; otherwise he refrom reality; and apparently the reason why there
is nothing it cannot reproduce is that it grasps
ceives not happiness but pleasure from
only a small part of any object, and that only an
beauty.
image. Your painter, for example, will paint us
Nevertheless, Plato's condemnation of
a shoemaker, a carpenter, or other workman,
without understanding any one of their crafts; realistic art need not apply to all art. As
and yet if he were a good painter, he might deHavelock notes, mimesis is "truly a protean
ceive a child or a simple-minded person into
word."29 Elsewhere in the dialogues, the
thinking his picture was a real carpenter, if he
good man "imitates" the Form of virtue.
showed it them at some distance. (Republic X,
And
as Sir Philip Sidney says in his Apolo598)
gie for Poetrie, the poet "painteth not LuThus, anyone who claimed to be able to cretia whom he never saw, but painteth the
produce a copy of every trade must not be outward bewty of such a vertue."30 The
allowed in the state. Plato, of course, is artist need not be limited to
photographic
thinking of poetry and its claims for knowl- copying, the "creating" the world with a
edge it does not possess. It has been argued, mirror (X, 597). If a man can imitate the
reasonably enough, that a painter could not Form of virtue, the poet who copies his acput knowledge of cobbling into a picture tions will be imitating that virtue. Plato
even if he were also an expert cobbler. To himself seems to admit a second kind of
this Plato might reply that, according to his imitation in the Republic
V, 472: "Then
theory of the division of labor found in the suppose a painter had drawn an
ideally
Ion and the Republic, no man can be a beautiful
figure complete to the last touch,
good painter and a good cobbler at the would you think any the worse of him, if he
same time. The painter, like the poet, has could not show that a
person as beautiful as
no specific trade: all humanity is their prov- that could exist?" Plato admits that art
ince. But only the possessor of wisdom, the be true and poetry may contain may
great
philosopher, can understand what is right truths, but only as a possibility. Neverthefor man. Just as Sir Philip Sidney closely less, he does not explicitly allow the artist
identifies artist with philosopher, Plato this ability, and the Republic X seems to
makes the philosopher the supreme crafts- deny even the possibility. Plato does not
man. Sidney stresses the virtue of beauty, reconcile ignorant imitation in art with
Plato the beauty of virtue.
true copying of the eternal forms. "Why
Whereas an apologist of poetry such as should not works of art be imitations in the

218
MORRISS
same sense, expressing the Ideas in the

physical world, without the intermediate
model of that physical world itself? There
is nothing in Plato's conception of the relationship between the two worlds which precludes such an escape out of the difficulty.
There is, however, a very definite objection,
namely that he himself never says a word to
indicate anything of the kind." 31 Similarly,
a critic cannot argue for Plato's acceptance
of good and ethical poetry on the basis of
his admitting the divine origin of poetry.
Plato never makes this connection. Likewise, Plato's thought on the nature of poetry does not directly relate to his discussion of the use of poetry in the education of
the young. Critics may emphasize Plato's
sanction of language which produces harmony, but they are liable to gloss over Plato's real objections to poetry itself.
Plato next attempts to prove that in fact
no physical art or language can capture the
eternal Forms. Art is seductive; only the
intellect can distinguish its true beauty
from mere pleasure, which art can powerfully suggest. After banishing imitative poetry for its liability of being misinterpreted,
Plato discusses poetry which portrays men
in action. Earlier in the Republic, Plato
had admitted the possibility that poetry can
stimulate harmony in the soul. If laments
are prohibited because they encourage softness, perhaps descriptions of courage will
arouse the nobler spirit. Nevertheless, Plato
wishes to extend his argument that poetry
is an imitation of an imitation. The conclusion toward which his discussion of realistic
poetry has been leading is "that paintings
and works of art in general are far removed from reality, and that the element in
our nature which is accessible to art and
responds to its advances is equally far from
wisdom" (X, 603). Both visual art and poetry are condemned. Here Plato suggests an
obvious fact: the appreciation of art is not
exclusively a rational process. Few critics
would disagree although they might enlarge
the province of the rational.
The subject of both painting and poetry
is man's action and his earthbound fortunes. Drama focuses on human beings
rather than on the Forms. Thus, the glorifi-
HENRY
PARTEE
cation of humanity only indirectly, if at all,

leads to a higher understanding:
Then, instead of trusting merely to the analogy
from painting, let us directly consider that part
of the mind to which the dramatic element in
poetry appeals, and see how much claim it has to
serious worth. We can put the question in this
way. Drama, we say, represents the acts and fortunes of human beings. It is wholly concerned
with what they do, voluntarily or against their
will, and how they fare, with the consequences
which they regard as happy or otherwise, and
with their feelings of joy and sorrow in all these
experiences. (Republic X, 603)
These emotions are unsuitable for the

stage, since displays of passion reveal a divided soul. Plato has previously argued that
reason springs from within; "the impulses
driving and dragging the soul are engendered by external influences and abnormal
conditions" (Republic IV, 439).
So with the empiricism usually attributed
only to Aristotle, Plato points out the difficulty in portraying a man of wisdom and
moderation on the stage. Just as today
when popular indifference to temperate
characters calls for Amos to be superseded
by Kingfish and Pogo by Albert, Plato
could observe in his own time that only
great emotions make characters interesting
for the masses. "This fretful temper gives
scope for a great diversity of dramatic representation; whereas the calm and wise
character in its unvarying constancy is not
easy to represent, nor when represented is it
readily understood, especially by a promiscuous gathering in a theatre, since it is foreign to their own habit of mind" (X, 604).
Dramatic poets appeal to the forces which
undermine the reason and exalt the irrational. Plato makes no distinction between
drama and epic; Homer is the greatest tragedian. Presented literally in either form,
no human action is sufficient to inculcate
virtue.
Plato ends the discussion of poetry in
what seems at least to him to be a complete
rejection of all except overtly didactic verse.
One may dispute whether he has proven his
point, but he himself is satisfied with his
reasoning:
You must be quite sure that we can admit into
our commonwealth only the poetry which cele-

219

brates the praises of the gods and of good men.
If you go further and admit the honeyed muse
in epic or in lyric verse, then pleasure and pain
will usurp the sovereignty of law and of the principles always recognized by common consent as
the best. (Republic X, 607)
As in the earlier books of the Republic and

in the Laws, Plato here admits the poetry
which praises gods and virtuous men. Epic
and drama are too directly anthropocentric.
Plato's theory of knowledge does not allow
him to develop a system of literary criticism
which would honor the presentation of
strong emotions. But one might ask why he
does not group lyric poetry with encomia,
for a well wrought eulogy of virtue may
give pleasure. Presumably these encomia
need not resemble such lyric modes as the
Mixed Lydian or Hyperlydian, which have
already been censured.32 Indeed, pleasure
and pain would not necessarily corrupt the
principles of his state, for an effective tribute to "gods and good men" may cause
both delight and agony. But Plato here is
not concerned with the effectiveness of poetry. Earlier in the Republic he has discussed the usefulness of poetry in promoting harmony in the souls of its hearers; the
last book simply states that the only safe
poetry for this purpose is the obviously didactic.
Plato's admission of any poetry at this
point would seem to convict him of inconsistency either in his reasoning or in the
example which his dialogues present. His
dialogues seldom confine themselves to
straighltforward praises of virtue; the description and dramatization of Socrates'
encounters resemble the art Plato has condemned. The earlier dialogues-the Charmides, the Lysis, the Laches-show Socrates
in deliberately inconclusive arguments. The
Phaedrus contains a praise of selfish desire,
and the Symposium presents conflicting
speeches on love. Thus, his own dialogues,
with all their artistic power, must prove
themselves to be "praises of the gods and of
good men." And conversely, these praises of
virtue must prove themselves as something
else than poetry.
An examination of Plato's view of the
relationship of language and thought may
clarify his attitude toward poetry. Plato
clearly saw that art tends to be amoral;

one's final response to beauty is emotional,
a reaction either of pleasure or of pain.
This emotional response should be condemned only when the "poetry" of language interferes with its truth. In reaction
to the claims of the sophists and of the
rhapsodes, Plato insists that style is largely
irrelevant to meaning. Thus, his continual
attention to style shows him in a quandary
about the necessity of being effective, yet
hating the false effectiveness of the sophists.
Plato consistently admits encomia in every
discussion of poetry only because he does
not banish language from his commonwealth. Didactic poetry has the same role as
his dialogues do; discourse which points toward the Good is an integral part of the
perfect state. Yet all language, as it tends
towards poetry, is liable to misinterpretation. Paul Friedlander argues that Plato
intends his dialogues to be an example of
the "art" allowed in the Republic. It is difficult to draw a stable character. "But did
not Plato represent, always and everywhere,
precisely this type of man in Socrates? In
the Phaedo, when Socrates sends away the
women dissolved in sorrow and admonishes
and cheers the weeping friends? In the Symposium, when the Logos defeats the danger
of comic disorder and humiliation? ...
Thus it is even more clear than before that
he claimed for himself the very place he
asked the tragic poets to vacate." 33 But one
might object that Plato has specifically banished lamentations. The dialogues are more
than sketches of Socrates; Plato may present
contradictory opinions or even praises of
immorality as shown by Callicles' speech in
the Gorgias. Each dialogue falls under precisely the same judgment that literature
does. Therefore, the Phaedo, moving as it
is, must suggest the truth lying beyond the
physical scene, or Plato would insist that
this dialogue too must be banished.
While Plato certainly regarded his dialogues as more suitable for the Republic
than most contemporary poetry could be,
he would never wish to take the place of
poets. The fault in Greek poetry was that
the beauty of language tended to discourage thought. Indeed, Havelock stresses that

220
MORRISS
Plato's fundamental objection to art is that

poetry in Athens represented a social consciousness rather than the individual
thought that Plato demanded. Rather than
questioning the meaning behind poetry, the
Greeks were overwhelmed by its beauty.
Just as Socrates continually probed beyond
the physical world, Plato would insist that
the dialogues be points of departure for
thought, not works of art in themselves.
To Plato, language is a living body of
thought, philosophy being possible only in
the dialectic. Poetry errs in seeming to fix
knowledge in order to pass it down from
age to age. Drama and epic, as written and
established by the beloved ancients, interfere with the process of reasoning, for the
beauty of language tends to obscure the
beauty of thought. Precisely because of the
dual role of language as the vehicle of
thought and as the source of mere pleasure,
the poet in Plato struggles constantly
against the philosopher. "Again and again
Plato's written work is mimesis; but it
struggles against being nothing but mimesis. And where it seems to represent most
strongly a pure work of art, it must not
ultimately be read as such, but as an 'existential' document, that is, with the constant
reminder tua res agitur." 34The gifted literary style of the dialogues shows that Plato,
like the sophists, was aware that philosophy
must be effective. But Plato will not compromise the truth in any way for the sake of
mere effectiveness. Didactic verse is permitted in the Republic because such language
is not poetry at all. Like the bad verse he
seems to sanction in the Laws, literature in
the Republic must never sacrifice truth on
the altar of pleasure and emotional appeal.
As Havelock suggests, poetry and language had a different role in Athenian society from that which art has in our own.
Rhetoricians such as Isocrates and Alkidamas debated the proper uses of the written
language. In Greece the written word did
not have the authority which such estab-
HENRY
PARTEE
rects man to his own inadequacy. Plato's

focus on the transcendent suggests that language can be the vehicle for man to escape
his earthbound existence. A modern man
usually lacks this mingled respect and frustration with language. A literary critic or a
linguist will focus on minute nuances of
style or syntax rather than on the meaning
lying beyond the words. The poetry of
Greece, on the other hand, was essentially
oral and for the most part intended for a
wide audience. The Republic itself was
probably composed as "a matter of oral
teaching in the school."36 The written
word to Plato, therefore, follows from the
heat of discourse. To use a phrase of Toynbee, the dialogues of Plato resemble a typescript, the basis for "winged words."
Both the written word and the language
of poetry have the property of fixing the
logos, of establishing an idea rather than
letting thought range freely. In illiterate societies, memory takes the place of writing,
and words such as those of Homer can be
transmitted with great accuracy for generations. Thus Plato questions the worth of
any language, written or orally recited, not
immediately involved with philosophical
reasoning. This probing extends to his own
dialogues. "There is no doubt that Plato, in
Ihis early and even in his later years, was
conscious of the problematic nature of all
writing and that he did not believe he had
said the most serious things in his written
work, that is, in what has come down to us
and what we are often inclined to regard as
his greatest creation, and perhaps the greatest achievement of Greek genius." 37 Plato,
of course, took his dialogues seriously. But
precisely because of his seriousness, he feels
that language is a poor vehicle to describe
his vision of the Good. This gulf between
language and thought explains part of Plato's great effectiveness: his use of myths to
suggest meaning that words cannot reveal.
Plato's attack on poetry comments eloquently on the way he intends his dialogues
lished language now possesses.35 Our atten- to be interpreted. Superficially, the Repubtion to static language derives in part from lic seems to have all of the qualities which
the Hebraic tradition of veneration of sa- Plato condemns in poetry. Not only does
cred writings. The Judeo-Christian empha- the dialogue have allegories, myths, drasis on the fixed language of revelation redi- matic situations, and the presentation of


contrary opinions but immediately after
Plato's attack on imaginative literature
comes the Myth of Er. This flight of fancy
does not make Plato a poet, for myths in
Plato never stop with their literal statement. The myths claim no more authority
for themselves than does Socrates in his famous profession of ignorance. Praises of the
gods and of noble men are allowed in the
state because they are not poetry, poetry
being language beautiful in itself. Plato accepts any language which teaches the soul
to ascend the ladder of the dialectic. Platonic dialogues or encomia may serve this
purpose. The Republic would be allowed
in the well-run state until someone mistakenly turned to study the dialogue as a repository of beauty and knowledge rather than
as the vehicle of winged words. Plato's reluctance to claim undue authority for his
dialogues extends even to his wry profession
of willingness in the Republic X, 607-8 to
hear a defense of poetry. His admission of
the beauty of poetry does not constitute a
sudden change of heart; his seeming impartiality here has overtones of further contempt for contemporary poetry. "Indeed,
the terms in which he makes the concession
to poetry, to plead her case if she chooses,
are themselves damning. For he treats her
in effect as a kind of prostitute, or as a
Delilah who may seduce Plato's Samson if
he lets her, and so rob him of his
strength." 38 Although he has strongly felt
thle charm of Homer, Plato insists that it
would be a sin to betray the truth: "It is
fair, then, that before returning from exile
poetry should publish her defense in lyric
or some other measure; and I suppose we
should allow her champions who love poetry but are not poets to plead for her in
prose, that she is no mere source of pleasure
but a benefit to society and to human life"
(Republic X, 607). Plato declares that he
will be disposed to accept the worth of poetry, but the arguments already given may
serve "as a counter-charm to save us from
relapsing into a passion which most people
have never outgrown." Accordingly, his response to any defense will probably be that
"such poetry has no serious claim to be valued as an apprehension of truth." Yet he
221
does indicate his interest in continuing the
dialectic. The truth will emerge from the
confrontation of Plato's attack and the
poet's defense, not from an uncritical acceptance of the philosopher's words.
In short, Plato's condemnation of imaginative literature in the Republic X is consistent with his attack on empty rhetoric
and misguided literary criticism. His statements about inspiration and the ethical
uses of poetry, while historically important,
do not contradict his insistence that language must at all times point the way to
virtue. Plato's frequent quotations from poetry and his own masterful style show a
powerful response to the charm of language. But as he says, "We must take a
lesson from the lover who renounces at any
cost a passion which he finds is doing him
no good" (X, 607). Certainly, Plato loved
beauty, and especially the beauty of poetry.
Nevertheless, poetry, as beautiful language,
had to be banished from the well-run state
for its ethical as well as for its intellectual
dangers.
A few concluding generalizations may
put the problem in perspective. One must
admit that Plato's aesthetics is not fully developed in the dialogues. While his thought
reveals a surprising unity for such a varied
approach to philosophy, Plato almost always considers art as incidental to some
other study. By evaluating poetry only in
terms of its immediate ethical and intellectual effects, Plato closes the door to any
metaphysical or formalist criticism. His assumptions concerning the soul might be
called into question; the treatment of poetry rests on his analysis of the tripartite
soul. Plato largely denies the importance of
the lesser elements, for the spirited and the
appetitive elements must always be subordinate to the rational. Whereas the dialectic
appeals primarily to the rational element,
poetry appeals chiefly to the emotion,
whether to the nobler passions or to the
senses. Such dialogues as the Phaedrus and
the Symposium have, of course, suggested
that love and beauty can lift the soul in its
contemplation of virtue. But Plato does
not, in his final analysis, allow poetry to
strengthen the rational element through

222
MOR RISS
the direction of the well-disciplined spirited

element. In the Phaedrus 253-4, the white
horse, or the spirited part, does not guide
the charioteer, the rational element. Similarly, in the Republic V, 434-42, the spirited element should help the rational to
subdue the appetite. But Plato does not
show how this partnership is to be formed
and strengthened.
Plato might admit that poetry may ideally present its own golden world, but he
would insist that poetry in the world of
philosophic questioning gives us beauty
rather than truth. The lover of wisdom
seeks only the beauty of virtue and knowledge, not the lesser beauty of language.
This vision, as Diotima describes it in the
Symposilum 210, is ineffable; she doubts
that even Socrates can reach this height.
But Plato must still wrestle with the almost
insurmountable problem of what means
one can use to describe this realm. Poetry is
an important battleground for Plato's divergent approaches to beauty and to knowledge, but his treatment of poetry is too personal, too fragmented to be fully resolved
by us or even by Plato himself. The scraps
scattered throughout the dialogues only
whet the appetite. His aesthetics shows us
not a banquet of thought, but a hunger.
1 The Schoole of Abuse, ed. Edward Arber (London, 1868), p. 20.

2Augustine, Basic Writings, ed.
Whitney J. Oates,
2 (New York, 1948): 42.
3 "Plato and the Poets," JAAC 25 (1966): 167.
4 G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London, 1935),
p. 189.
5 Rucker, p. 167.
6 See Republic V, 487-91.
7 Theaetetus 174.
HENRY
PARTEE
8 Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge,

Mass., 1963), p. 7.
9 See Meno 99.
10Francis MacDonald Cornford, The Republic of
Plato (New York, 1966), pp. 175-76. All quotations
of the Republic will be taken from this edition.
11Havelock, p. 3.
12 The Dialogues of Plato, ed. Benjamin Jowett
(New York, 1937). All references to dialogues other
than the Republic will be taken from this translation.
13Plato: The Man and His Work (London, 1927),
p. 265.
14"Did Plato Banish the Poets or the Critics?"
SP 36 (1939): 19.
15 See A. E. Taylor,
p. 38.
16Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1962),
p. 355.
17 Rucker, p. 170.
18Literary Criticisnm:Plato to Dryden, ed. Allan
Gilbert (Detroit, 1964), p. 55.
19J. G. Warry, Greek Aesthetic Theory (London,
1962), p. 64.
20 Grube, p. 196.
Cornford,
22Havelock,
21
p. 321.
p. 3.
23Carleton Lewis Brownson, Plato's Studies and

Criticisms of the Poets (Boston, 1920), p. 97.
24See J. Tate, "'Imitation' in Plato's Republic,"
CQ 22 (1928): 16-23 and "Plato and 'Imitation,''"
CQ 26 (1932): 161-69.
25 See Shorey, p. 248.
26 Havelock,
p. 10.
27
Taylor,
pp. 279-80.
p. 322.
p. 30.
30Sir Philip Sidney, Prose Works, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge, 1963), III, 10.
31 Grube,
p. 202.
32 See
Republic III, 398.
33Paul Friedlander, Plato: An Introduction (New
York, 1964), p. 121.
34 Friedlander, p. 124.
35See Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New
York, 1958), pp. 47-54.
36 Gilbert Murray, Greek Studies (Oxford, 1946),
p. 37.
37Friedlander, p. 118.
28 Cornford,
29
Havelock,
38
Havelock,
p. 5.


Plato's Banishment of Poetry

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Plato's Banishment of Poetry

Author(s): Morriss Henry Partee

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LIKE THE MEDIEVAL

"Pearl" and Hamlet,

the aesthetics of Plato provides ample

lish at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Plato's consistent mistrust of art in his

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weighs his offhanded and ironic praise of

rhapsodes or the education of the youth.

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