Title: Chavez Vs Court of Agrarian Relations: People v. Tiu San
Title: Chavez Vs Court of Agrarian Relations: People v. Tiu San
Tiu San
G.R. No. L-7301, April 20, 1955
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of
naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April
25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that
occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the
decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530.
The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause
(3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of
the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said
R.A. No. 530.
ISSUE:
Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?
DECISION:
Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date
of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to
have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides:
This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases
pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the
oath of citizenship...
DBPV.CAG.R.NO.28774
Facts:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159
lots, in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC.
However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4, which form
part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses
Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC.
Upon learning of PHHCs previous transaction with DBP, the
spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the PHHC to rescind
the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held
that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in
violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the
legality of the sale?
Held:
Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their
payment in full of the purchase price for the same lots which had
been sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction in question.The
general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can
only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or
subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person who is not
obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an
action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the
detriment which could positively result to him from the contract
in which he had no intervention.
TAC-AN vs. CA
G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984
FACTS:
Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to
Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment for
legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an
that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents
did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they
had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an continued
to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land
previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario.
On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor
of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7,
1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and
Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared
the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and
Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The
CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al appealed
to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section
145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu Contracts w/ NonChristians Requisites.
On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of
quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as nonChristians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which
had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot
affect his right to the land which had already vested.
ISSUE:
Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao &
Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252?
HELD:
Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the
approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was
revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the
repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still
necessary.
Eugenio v. Drilon
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two
lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because
of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two
lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name.
Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to
him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private
Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him
of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it
should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development
does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even
those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not
expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is
the law.
Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997
Facts:
The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC
provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,
1992, which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of
DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After postponements, they were
held December 4, 1992.
RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the
order of the DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election
activities in order to implement the general elections. The case was reraffled to a
different branch of the same court, and the new judge held that DILG had no power
to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that power rests solely in
COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously held
elections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manila
violated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that previously
held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and
supervision over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections
Held:
Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK
elections.
o
COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for
SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.
ESTRADA, vs CASEDA
G.R. No. L-1560
Facts:
On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer,
because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the
first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October
13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave
judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October
1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the
CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689.
The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were
needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said
Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in abovementioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of
that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years
after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946,
amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as
follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years
after its approval."
Issue:
Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth
Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.
Held:
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot
be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be
computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is
October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15,
1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the
Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute
had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form
had been adopted in its stead.
ManilaJockeyClub,Inc.v.GamesandAmusementsBoard
G.R.No.L12727February29,1960
FACTS:
TheauthorizedracingdaysspecificallydesignatedanddistributedinSection4of
RepublicActNo.309,thebasiclawonhorseracinginthePhilippines,aslater
amendedbyRepublic ActNo. 983, areasfollows:12SundaysforPhilippine
AntiTuberculosisSociety,6SundaysforPCSO,4SundaysWhiteCross,Inc.,1
SundayforGrandDerbyRaceofPhilippineAntiTuberculosisSocietyand29
Sundaysforprivateindividualsandentities(30forleapyear).RepublicActNo.
1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but
withoutspecifyingthedaysonwhichtheyaretoberun.Toaccommodatethese
additionalraces,theGamsandAmusementsBoard(GAB)resolvedtoreducethe
numberofSundaysassignedtoprivateindividualsandentitiesbysix.Appellants
protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12
SaturdaysreservedtothePresident,forcharitable,relief,orcivicpurposes,or
shouldbeassignedtoanyotherdayoftheweekbesidesSunday,Saturday,and
legalholiday.
ISSUE:
Whetherornottheadditionalsweepstakesshouldbeinsertedintheclubracesin
relationtothedebateintheHouseofRepresentativesbeforevotingonHouseBill
No.5732
HELD:
Legislativedebatesareexpressiveoftheviewsandmotivesofindividualmembers
andarenotsafeguidesand,hence,maynotberesortedtoinascertainingthe
meaningandpurposeofthelawmakingbody.Itisimpossibletodeterminewith
certaintywhatconstructionwasputuponanactbythemembersofthelegislative
bodythatpassedthebill,byresortingtothespeechesofthemembersthereof.
Thosewhodidnotspeak,maynothaveagreedwiththosewhodid;andthosewho
spoke,mightdifferfromeachother.Inviewoftheseconflictingauthorities,no
appreciablereliancecansafelybeplacedonanyofthem.Itistobenotedinthe
specificcasebeforeus,thatwhileCongressmenMarcosandAbeledawere,
admittedly,oftheviewthattheadditionalsweepstakesracesmaybeinsertedin
theclubraces,stillthereisnothinginRepublicActNo.1502,asitwasfinally
enacted,whichwouldindicatethatsuchanunderstandingonthepartofthesetwo
membersoftheLowerHouseofCongresswerereceivedthesanctionor
conformityoftheircolleagues,forthelawisabsolutelydevoidofanysuch
indication.Upontheotherhand,atthetimeoftheenactmentofRepublicActNo.
1502inJune,1956,thelong,continuous,anduniformpracticewasthatall
sweepstakesdrawsandraceswereheldonSundaysandduringthewholeday.
Withthisbackground,whenCongresschosenottospecifyinexpresstermshow
theadditionalsweepstakesdrawsandraceswouldbeheld,itissafetoconclude
thatitdidnotintendtodisturbthethenprevailingsituationandpractice.Onthe
principleofcontemporaneousexposition,commonusageandpracticeunderthe
statute,oracourseofconductindicatingaparticularundertakingofit,will
frequentlybeofgreatvalueindeterminingitsrealmeaning,especiallywherethe
usagehasbeenacquiredinbyallpartiesconcernedandhasextendedoveralong
periodoftime(Optimusinterpresrerumusus).
Sarcos v. Castillo
G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
FACTS:
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial
Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty
and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner
with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for
their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of
the government. And on the basis of such administrative complaint,
Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent
pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the
Decentralization Act of l967.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967.
HELD:
The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on
the Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan
considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may
have monopoly over the power of suspension. The Provincial Governor
may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal
Mayor.
Montelibano v. Ferrer
Facts:
In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and
general manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in
favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the
Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However,
Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to
Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land
of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by
Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the
petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the
complaint and warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and
Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying
upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides
that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First
Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod.
Held:
No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the
construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature
will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and
by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect.
Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each
in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances
there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or
dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different
conclusion.
In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of
Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints
may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority
to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the
provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of
the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of
Manila should then be interpreted the same.
Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest
issued by the judge shall be annulled.
ON
Decision:
YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in
character which should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to
benefit thereby. This is, as it should be, because the
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
US v. Soliman
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1917/jan1917/gr_l11555_1917.html
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in
which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to
certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn
statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was
in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed
voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by
the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who
presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was
room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined
and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was
entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly
repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective
on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting
and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not
be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect
of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred
under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the
Administrative Code.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and
distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury.
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in
the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Held:
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of
perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing
the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of
opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the
code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law,
not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases
the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of
the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express
repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative
Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching
perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication,
by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in
Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below
must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be
imposed.
Gaerlan vs Catubig
GR No. 23964, June 1, 1966
Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for
councilors in the eight -seat City Council of Dagupan were
Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third
highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected
councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court
to challenge Catubigs eligibility for office on the averment of nonage. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the
time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10,
1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day,
November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are
expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of
R.A. 2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations
in consistent with theprovisions of this Ac t, are hereby repealed.
Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in
the Philippines,
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the
cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section
4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus
showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the
provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to
Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters
in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to
vote for provincial officials.
Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259,
it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to
tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by
what the legislative body has expressly ordained. It is accordingly
held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age
because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time
of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was
below the age of 25 years.
Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377
(Quico's version)
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager
of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines
urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a
government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its
resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after
the said referral of the president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice
and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation
and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant
to a certain provision in republic act 2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the
government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating
funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A.
Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this
court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.
Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?
Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity
as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These
two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not
ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no
such inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued
by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost against petitioners.
the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is
deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for
repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against
petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.
of rates of such public services, ' in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and
unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests.
People vs Pimentedl
G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998
Facts: In 1983, Tujan was charged with possession of illegal
firearms and in 1990 he was once again charged of the same and
was posed with no bail. The counsel of the defendant then filed a
motion to quash the case where the petitioner opposed standing
that Tujan was not in double jeopardy. Petitioner now comes to
this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and
(2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case
against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No.
1789.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Full Text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_108072_1995.html
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against
Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials
of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents
were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative
documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal
Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration
of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from
P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try,
hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under
Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials,
as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with
the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad
was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him
from enforcing suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898)
has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
Held:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA
6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are
not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold
one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws
by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume
their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform