Angeles vs Maglaya

SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546

Facts:
1. Nov 20, 1939 when resp Aleli Maglaya was born
2. 1948 when deceased Francisco married Belen
Angeles
3. 1988 when her mother Genoveva died
4. March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in RTC
Caloocan petition to be made administratix of late
Francisco Angeles estate since she is sole legitimate
daughter of Francisco. This was contested by his wife
Belen Angeles.
5. RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation
6. CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was
indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva
ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a
legitimate child
HELD: YES
- Law applied: FC 164 children conceived or
born during the marriage of parents are
legitimate
- Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage
existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In fact, if
they did marry, it would have rendered Franciscos
marriage to Belen as bigamous. However, Aleli
herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse in
her petition for letters of administration
o Without evidence of marriage, one cant
presume Aleli to be legitimate child
- CA erred in declaring that birth certificate
indubitably establishes legitimacy
o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth
certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH mother
and father. Only attending physicians signature was
in the certificate. Thus it only showed the fact of birth
of a child and not legitimacy
- Papers and photographs (school record, weddings
pictures) that show Francisco Angeles as her father is
not sufficient enough to prove filiation. This only
shows that she is a CHILD of Francisco.
RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural
child and NOT a legitimate child.

FACTS:
1. Pablo Aguas, SSS member and pensioner,
died 12/8/96. Pablos surviving spouse,
respondent Rosanna filed a claim with SSS
for death benefits. She indicated in her claim
that Pablo was likewise survived by his
minor child, Jeylnn aka Jenelyn, born
10/29/91
2. 4/97, SSS received a sworn letter from
Pablos sister Letecia contesting Rosannas
claim for death benefits, alleged that
Rosanna abandoned the family abode more
than 6 years before the and lived w/ another
man, de la Pena; Pablo had no legal children
w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth cert of
Jefren born 11/15/96 to Rosanna and de la
Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90
3. Rosanna contends that Jeylnn was a
legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her
birth cert bearing Pablos signature as father
4. Janet, who also claimed to be the child of
deceased and Rosanna, joined as claimant. It
appears in her birth cert that her father was
Pablo and her mother was Rosanna.
5. SSS summoned several persons; some stated
that spouses real child was Jeylnn, Janet
was only an adopted child but there were no
legal papers.
6. SSS ruled that Rosanna was no longer
qualified as claimant. As for Jeylnn and
Janet, they were not Pablos legitimate
children.
ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate
children of deceased (thus entitled to death benefits)
HELD:
- YES (Jeylnn); NO (Janet)
- Jeylnns claim is justified by her birth cert
w/c bears Pablos signature (showing she
was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were
married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until
latters death on 12/8/96). Under A164, FC,
children conceived or born during the
marriage of parents are legitimate.

- Presumption of legitimacy cant extend to Janet

because her date of birth wasnt substantially proven.
Under RA1161, only legally adopted children are
considered dependent children.
*Note: Jeylnn is really the child of Romeo. Lol. Coz
Pabling is infertile.
RESULT: Motion PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA
DECISION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

Rivera vs Heirs of Villanueva

FACTS:
1. Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, halfsis-in-law and children of a half-brother of
deceased PACITA. Respondents are
allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of
ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated
as heirs of Romualdo. Respondent Angelina
is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and
Romualdo.
2. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita
cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the benefit of
marriage because the latter was married to
Amanda Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the
course of their cohabitation, they acquired
several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80
without leaving a will.
3. 8/8/80, Romualdo and respondent Angelina
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
w/sale (an extrajudicial settlement of
Pacitas estate). Petitioners filed a case for
partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of
titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was
never married to Romualdo 2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by
Romualdo
ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate
daughter of Pacita
HELD: NO
-a closer examination of the birth cert reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as adopted by both
Pacita and Romualdo. And mere registration of a
child in his birth cert as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption, it does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and the

legal rights of such child. Thus, she cant inherit from

Pacita.
-A record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive
evidence of the truthfulness of the evidence made
there by the interested parties.
Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause at the
time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living
childless w/ Romualdo for 20 years
SUNTAY v SUNTAY (2012)
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died
intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his
parents. The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III
and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and
Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco,
following the separation of Isabels parents, Emilio I
and Isabel Cojuangco. Intent on maintaining a
relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Cristina filed a complaint for visitation rights to
spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in
the same special lower court. Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted
their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights
which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes,
and ultimately stopped, because of respondent
Isabels testimony in court that her grandparents
visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.
More than three years after Cristinas death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed
before the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas
estate. Federico, opposed the petition saying he
should be the administrator as the surviving spouse
and that theyve been alienated from Isabel and her
siblings for more than 30 years. Further Isabels
allegation that some of the properties are in the hands
of usurpers is untrue. Federico filed a Motion to
Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration

on the ground that Isabel had no right of

representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of
Isabels parents marriage being declared null and
void (SC said NO, voidable marriage=legitimate
kids).

Frederico made Emilio III the administrator, and

Emilio III filed as similar petition as Frederico
alleging Frederico as the rightful administrator. On 13
November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year
thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.
CA however revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the subject estate. SC reversed CA
decision, decided to include Emilio III as coadministrator of Cristinas estate.

Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of

Appeals Decision in favor of her sole
administratorship. Emilio III is illegitimate and
therefore not the next of kin she says.
ISSUE: WHO SHOULD BE THE
ADMINISTRATOR?
HELD:

ISABEL
The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrators interest in the estate. Interest
must be greater than any other candidate,
administrator must act to the benefit of the
estate.
The next of kin has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedents property. It is
generally said that the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of
administrator.Among members of a class
the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to
be preferred.
Silverio Sr. vs CA: the order of preference in
the appointment of an administrator depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances.

Given Isabels unassailable interest in the

estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest
next of kin, the appointment of Emilio III
as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right.
Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in
the management of Cristinas estate, has not
looked after the estates welfare and has
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the
Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable
interest in the estate makes him a suitable
co-administrator thereof, the evidence
reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be
an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
There was a delay in the filing of an
inventory by Emilio and an omission of
properties in the inventory. The general
denial made by Emilio III does not erase his
unsuitability as administrator rooted in his
failure to make and return a true and
complete inventory which became proven
fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by
his inaction on two occasions of Federicos
exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory
heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from
the list of heirs.
Emilio III and Isabel cant be coadministrators, too much animosity.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No.
117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with
dispatch.
[note: sobrang daming nangyari at sinabi, madami
akong di sinama (not even a passing mention)]

ARBOLARIO vs. CA 129163

FACTS:
1. Case is regarding inheritance.
2. The petitioners claim that they are the
legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
the deceased, hence they are qualified to
inherit from the latter. However, the birth
dates of the petitioner were earlier than the
death of the original wife of their father.
3. Decedent Purifacations father , Juan
Arbolario, consorted with Francisca Malvas.
From this cohabitation was born the
petitiners. All of them were born before
1951.
4.

The other relatives of Purification executed

a Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement. Peitioners say that they
succeeded intestate to the inheritance of
their alleged half-sister, Purificacion, and as
forced heirs, they should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate

half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased
HELD: No, they are not.
The petitioners were born before 1951 (signing of the
Declaration of Heirship_. Therefore, in the absence
of any fact that would show that conjugal union of
Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been
judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would
only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing
union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios]
was extra-marital. And consequently, Voltaire
Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan
Arbolario.
As held by the appellate court, without proof that
Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is
presumed to have continued. Even where there is
actual severance of the filial companionship between
spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouses
cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed
to be between husband and wife.

It does not follow that just because his first wife has
dies, a man is already conclusively married to the
woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate
or other generally accepted proof is necessary to
establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
RESULT: PETITION DENIED. CA DECISION
AFFIRMED

Continental Steel v. Montao

Facts:
1. Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
2. The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos
unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature
delivery while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to
fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.
3. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits.
4. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the
CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillanos case.
5. According to the petitioner, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to
a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.
6. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of
the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither

of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the

legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of
the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA- the
death of whom would have qualified the parentemployee for bereavement leave and other death
benefits- bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
7. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had
the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed
or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid
of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.

Issue: Whether or not a fetus can be considered a

legitimate child

Held: Yes. There was no question that Hortillano and

his wife were legally married, making the child
legitimate. Legitimate: children conceived during the
marriage. Illegitimate: conceived and born outside a
valid marriage, unless the law gives them legitimate
status. Legitimacy/ illegitimacy attaches upon
conception. Thus, the child is legitimate upon her
conception.

RESULT: PETITION DENIED.

Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were

born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo
and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco
Suntay.
After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962,
Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal case[ against
her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation,
Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then CFI[2] a
complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her, among others, with infidelity and
praying for the custody and care of their children who
were living with their mother-> RTC granted petition> their marriage was declared null and void.
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels
paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4,
1990 without leaving a will. Later, Isabel filed a
petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother. She says that she is a legitimate
grandchild of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate.-> Frederico
says it should be him since hes the surviving
spouse.-> Courts side with Isabel.

Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the

dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents is null and void and that the legal
effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its
inception is void and the children born out of said
marriage is illegitimate.
ISSUE: WON Isabel is considered illegitimate
because her parents marriage was declared null and
void?
HELD: No.

Suntay vs. Suntay (1998)

FACTS:
Gist: lolo wants to be administrator-> does everything
to make apo not-> Coz he actually wants other apo
(Emilio) to benefit
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of
petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of

-The status of children born in voidable marriages is

governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the
decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are also called natural children by legal
fiction.

There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument

that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which
must control as to whether or not the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable.
6.
RESULT: PETITION DISMISSED.

in Roberts possession. RTC granted. Robert

moved to quash the info saying that the
hospital has a distinct personality and does
not form part of Rositas estate.
CA-> Eleuterio and Rositas other collateral
relatives have no standing to request
production of hospital documents or to
institute petition for settlement of the estate
since she had ADOPTED Raymond.

ISSUES:

Rivera vs Ramirez
FACTS:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Adolfo Ramirez and wife Rosita Rivera

were married in 1942. Their only child died
in infancy. Rosita and Adolfo died. Feb.
1995-> Eleuterio Rivera, Rositas nephew,
filed a pet. for the issuance of letters of
administration with the RTC covering the
estate of Rosita who died intestate and with
no direct ascendants or descendants. He also
submitted to the intestate court a list of the
other nephews and nieces of Rosita who
agreed to Eleuterios appointment as
administrator of her estate.
March 1995-> RTC issued letter of
administration in favour of Eleuterio. Sta.
Teresita General Hospital-> property that
Eleuterio believed is part of Rositas estate
which was being managed by Robert
Ramirez.
Robert and Lydia Ramirez claim that they
are Adolfos children by another woman.
Robert opposed the issuance of the
subpoena. Eleuterios other motions werent
acted upon.
Later on, Eleuterio volunteered to coadminister the late spouses estate with
Adolfos heirs (Raymond, Robert and
Lydia). Robert agreed to the joint settlement
of the estate but stressed that the court also
probate the deceased Adolfos will.
Raymond did not agree with Robert.
Eleuterio reiterated his motion to compel
examination and production of hospital docs

1 WON petitioners were not Rositas heirs and,

therefore, has no right to institute the petition for the
settlement of her estate or to seek the production and
examination of the hospitals documents; and
2. WON Eleuterio, et al. has no standing to subpoena
the specified documents in Roberts possession.
HELD:
1. CA said that an adopted child is deemed a
legitimate child of the adopter. With this, the
other collateral relatives would be barred
from inheriting from her. BUT WON
Rosita had JUDICIALLY adopted Raymond
is a question of fact that had not been passed
upon by the RTC-> this issue was never
raised in the RTC thus, CA committed GAD
in deciding this way.
2. As for the right of the administrator of
Rositas estate to the production and
examination of the specified documents
believed to be in Roberts possession,
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
provides that these can be allowed based on
the administrators belief that the person
named in the request for subpoena has
documents in his possession that tend to
show the decedents right to real or personal
property
RESULT: COURT GRANTS PET AND REVERSES
DECISION OF THE CA.
Moore vs Republic
Facts:
1. Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen)
married Joseph Velarde (also American
citizen). They had a son out of lawful

2.

3.

wedlock, William Michael Velarde (now 14

yrs old) born also at US.
Said marriage however was dissolved
through a decree of divorce from SC of
California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd
marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA,
CA. William (minor) lived with them.
Elaine filed at CFI Rizal a motion to have
her childs surname be changed into Moore
instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition
therefore this appeal.

2.

3.

Issue: WON a legitimate child can change his

surname
Held: Qualified No.
-

Philippine laws do not permit a legitimate

child to use the surname of someone who is
not his father.
NCC 364 legitimate child should use the
surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover
cites that in case of annulment, child
conceived before such decree shall use the
surname of his/ her father.
Likewise, same concept rules over decree of
divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction
such change of name. SC upheld such
position, saying that confusion may arise
with respect to paternity and that said
change may even redound to the prejudice of
the child.
Moreover, the child is still a minor and
therefore aforesaid action is premature. Said
child may in his mature age decide for
himself to instigate such change of name.

Naldoza v. Republic
Facts:
1. Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio
Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2
children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio
abandoned conjugal home after Zosima
confronted him about his previous marriage.
Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep.
Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar,
etc.

Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing

them because of their swindler father. To
obliterate any connection between her
children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the
kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima
filed at CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to
change surname of her 2 children from
Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden
name).
TC dismissed petitioner saying that
aforementioned reasons (swindling,
abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio
<but their marriage has not yet been
annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not
sufficient grounds to invoke such change of
surname. Furthermore, change of name
would give false impression of family
relations.

Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their

fathers surname is justified
Held: NO.
- Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are
LC (legitimate children), therefore they
should use their fathers surname. Said
minors and their father should be consulted
about such, mothers desire should not only
be the sole consideration. Change of name is
allowed only upon proper and reasonable
cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of
name may even redound to the prejudice of
the children later on, may cause confusion as
to the minors parentage and might also
create the impression that said minors are
ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal
status.
-

In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v.

Republic, their petition to change names
have been granted, but petitioners in said
cases have already attained mature age. In
this case, when these minors have attained
the right age, then they can already file said
action for themselves.

Ong vs CA
FACTS:

-Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are

children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel
Ong.
-Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was
introduced to Saturnina by Vicente Sy and Constancia
Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a
relationship and lived together for 4 months. It was
also established that prior to meeting Manuel,
Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic.
-Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was
born in 1955 and Robert Ong (registered as Roberto
Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes
because the midwife informed Saturnina that it
should be the case since she wasnt married to
Manuel. Manuels support dwindled. He stopped
seeing her. She discovered his identity and asked for
support but he refused.
-In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied
them. In two occasions Dolores Dy, Manuels
common-law wife, treated private respondents like
close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving them on
November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of
affection, such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and
Manuel Ong and by visiting them in their house on A.
Lopez Street in 1980.
-Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the
latters high school graduation gift and second, for
the latters educational support. Manuel Ong even
told Alfredo to comeback with a list of what he needs
for school but when he came back with some friends
in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request
and ordered him to leave and threatened to call the
police if he did not leave.
-September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for
recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The
complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to
include Robert as co-plaintiff. Manuel died in May
1990 while the case is pending.
TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children
of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4
of the Civil Code.
CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional
ground for ordering the recognition of private
respondents as illegitimate children.

Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel.

Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is
obliged to recognize) When the child has in his
favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.
Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all
cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even
though insufficient to constitute proof under the other
paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the
case under par. 4.
In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that
she had illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a
long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly
done, would have constituted cohabitation under par.
3 is proof that private respondents were conceived
and born during such relationship and constitutes
evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship was
further established through the testimony of
Constancia Lim. The evidence for private
respondents is not negated by the admission of
Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another
man before, because the relationship terminated at
least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and
two years before the birth of the second child Robert
Caballes.

Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are illegitimate

children of Manuel

Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness

during World War). For despite living with 2 other
women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later
established as Victoria Balili) but they didnt have a

Held/Ratio:

SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2)

When the child is in continuous possession of status
of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or his family--- the times during which
Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money
cannot be considered proof of continuous possession
of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward
his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for
this ground to exist.
Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3)When the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father----------While Saturnina
Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived
together for four months as husband and wife in order
to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship
was not open and public so as to constitute
cohabitation.

child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical proof

and Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born
1939) as his natural child with a Victoria Balili. She
has the right to the bear the name of her natural
father.
An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of
virility and the burden of evidence to prove the
contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise.
Petitioner has not overcome this presumption

Republic vs CA (300 SCRA 138)

Facts:
Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change
of surname, from Vicencio to Yu. Cynthia
alleged that she was born on 19 January 1971 in
Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio
and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On 10 January
1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their
conjugal abode. Since then, Pablo Vicencio never
reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was
Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of her mother.
On 15 April 1986, her mother and Ernesto Yu got
married.

Since her childhood, she had not known much less

remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her
known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu.
Despite of which she had been using the family name
Vicencio in her school and other activities. In view
of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage
and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is
using Vicencio as her family name, both by her
classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme
embarrassment. On two (2) occasions when she ran
as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a
Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as
Cynthia L. Yu. Her step-father had been consulted
about the petition and had given his consent thereto.
The trial court granted the petition. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that it is
for the best interest of Cynthia that her surname be
changed.

Issue: WON Cynthia can change her surname to that

of her stepfather.
Held: No
We have recognized inter alia, the following as
sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or
adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware
of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under
one of the justifiable grounds aforecited. She says
that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because
ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her
father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and
supporting her. Since she is known in society as the
daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been
subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a
different surname, causing her much humiliation and
embarrassment.
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no
proper and reasonable cause to warrant private
respondents change of surname. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal
complications due to the fact that private
respondents step-father has two (2) children with her
mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it is
possible that private respondent may even claim
inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In his
memorandum, the
Solicitor
General,
opines
that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia
as an heir because despite the suggestion made before
the petition for change of name was heard by the trial
court that the change of family name to Yu could very
easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for
such a remedy.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is

that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought. The assailed decision as
affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us
to depart from the applicability of the general rule on
the use of surnames, specifically the law which
requires that legitimate children shall principally use
the surname of their father.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate
offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As
previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears
the surname of his or her father. It must be
stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a
matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the
consequences of a change of name and to deny the
same unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private
respondents parentage because of her surname. But
even, more confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her
step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally
adopted by him.

Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a

position similar to that of her step-fathers legitimate
children, a plausible reason the petition for change of
name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is
laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his
very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a
father would his own flesh and blood. However,
legal constraints lead us to reject private respondents
desire to use her stepfathers surname.
Further, there is no assurance the end result would not
be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of
bringing a stop to questions, the very change of
name,
if
granted,
could
trigger
much
deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. (Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Cynthia
Vicencio, G.R. No. 88202. December 14, 1998)
Joanie Uy vs Jose Chua
Facts:

Oct. 27, 2003- Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed

before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree
of illegitimate filiation against respondent. Petitioner
alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was
then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene
Surposa. Respondent says she and her brother Allan
are the children of that illicit relationship.
Uys claims: Respondent attended to Irene when the
latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959,
and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be
filled out with the names of Irenes father and using
maiden name of her mother. Respondent financially
supported petitioner and Allan: consistently and
regularly given petitioner allowances before she got
married, also provided her with employment and
required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a
firm owned by his family. Petitioner and Allan were
introduced to each other and became known in the
Chinese community as respondents illegitimate
children. During petitioners wedding, respondent
sent his brother Catalino Chua as his representative,
and it was the latter who acted as father of the
bride. Respondents relatives even attended the
baptism of petitioners daughter.
Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship
with Irene, and that petitioner was his
daughter. Hearings then ensued during which
petitioner testified that respondent was the only father
she knew, etc. She also presented documentary
evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Marc 27, 2008- Respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the decision should be
barred by res judicata, because apparently, prior to
Uy filing a case on Oct. 27, 2003 she had already
filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. Petitioner
and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise
Agreement, approved by the RTC on Feb. 21, 2000.
Hence, RTC dismissed petitioners claims, and she
went to SC directly for relief.
Main Issue: WoN the Compromise Agreement
entered into between petitioner and respondent,
approved by RTC on Feb. 21, 2000, constitutes res
judicata in the case already pending sa RTC. (yung
2003 complaint ni Uy)
Held: No. While a judicial compromise has the effect
of res judicata, any compromise agreement that is
contrary to law or public policy is null and void. In

10

this case, the Compromise Agreement between

petitioner and respondent obviously intended to settle
the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and
Allan P2M each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise
Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an
illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement is covered by the prohibition
under Article 2035 NCC (no compromise upon the ff
questions shall be valid: civil status of persons, future
support, future legitime, among others).
It is settled in law and jurisprudence (precedent is
Advincula case) that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands
it. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it
is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the
Compromise Agreement dated between petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and
creates no obligations. RTC had no authority to
approve agreement, and because their judgment is
void, the 2003 case is not barred by res judicata. Case
remanded to RTC.
Catalina Osmena de Valencia v. Emilia Rodriguez
August 2, 1949
Facts:
Action from CFI Cebu, plaintiffs prayed to restrain
defendants from using surname Valencia.
Defendants filed motion to dismiss, sustained.
Plaintiffs allege they are legitimate children of
defendant Pio Valencia in his marriage with Catalina
Osmena, that defendants are illegitimate with
mistress defendant. plaintiffs contend they alone have
right to bear surname in accordance with CC113
providing legitimate have right to bear fathers
surname. In addition, they point that under CC139,
845, illegitimate (who are not natural) are entitled
only to support.
Issue: Whether or not defendants can be enjoined.
Held:

Plaintiffs may use fathers surname as a matter of

right by reason of their being legitimate. But we
cannot agree that CC114 grants monopolistic
proprietary control to legitimate children over
fathers surname. CC114 acknowledges legitimates
right which may not be deprived, but cannot be
interpreted as a prohibition against the use of others
of what may be their fathers surname. If plaintiffs
are correct, then they can stop everyone from bearing
Valencia, as a surname.
Also, from all appearances, Pio Valencia acquiesces
in the adoption of his surname by defendants. But
even if he objects, defendants may still use, in
absence of any law granting exclusive ownership
over a surname.
Separate concurring and dissenting (Ozaeta, J):
Concurs with majority, for it appears from complaint
that Pio Valencia allowed illegitimate children by codefendant Emilia to bear surname even after they
reach age of reason (majority?). From this, may be
inferred that defendants have been given and have
borne Valencia with Pios consent. [CC113 says
legitimate shall have right to bear surnames of father
and mother, CC139,845 say illegitimate not having
natural status only entitled to support, ROC103
prescribing change of name procedure.] Upon facts in
complaint, these statutory provisions are not
sufficient to entitle prayed relief, for mere fact that
legitimate have right to bear surname and that
illegitimate have only right to support does not
necessarily imply that father may not voluntarily
permit illegitimate to bear his surname. ROC103
inapplicable because it is not alleged in complaint
that 12defendants have illegally changed surname to
Valencia. On the contrary, we infer from complaint
that since birth they have always borne surname with
consent of putative father.
Dissents from majority possibly conveying idea that
(1) person claiming to be illegitimate may adopt
surname even against will and without court
authorization, and (2) any person is free to use any
surname without court authorization even though he
may not have originally borne it. I am of the opinion
that a person cannot adjudicate to himself adversely
affecting another without latters consent or court
intervention. ROC103, clear that a person cannot

11

adopt new name, or use one other than one originally

borne, without complying with its rules.
Briones vs. Miguel
October 18, 2004
Facts:
1) Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor
child to mother (custody til child reaches age 10 then
he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay with) w/
visitation rights to the Father, Joey D. Briones.
2) Mar 5, 02 files for Habeas Corpus claiming the
child was visited by s Maricel and Francisca Miguel
relatives of the mother of the child, Loreta Miguel,
under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they
did not return.
3) claims that he extensively looked for the child
but failed so he was compelled to file for habeas
corpus.
4) mother Loreta alleges that the child was not
taken as he was fetched by her w/ the consent.
5) and met in Japan and had a relationship
together w/c bore the child Michael Kevin Pineda
(relationship eventually soured accdg to Loreta
because of illicit relationship w/ another woman,
now married to Japanese national).
6) petitions for joint custody when the mom
Loreta is away.
Issues:
1. WON the natural father of an illegitimate
child may be denied custody of his own
child.
2. Who has the sole parental authority of the
illegitimate child?
Held:
1. Yes, the child being born outside of a
legitimate marriage is considered
illegitimate since his illegitimacy is not
cured by his parents later marriage. As such
he is covered by Art 176 of the family code
that mentions among other things that a
mother shall have parental authority over
the illegitimate child, regardless of whether
the father acknowledges paternity over the
child. Acknowledgment of paternity is only
a means of compelling support for the child
not entitling custody. Moreover the Family
Code does not distinguish b/w the natural
and spurious nature of the illegitimate child

as they are treated in the same category.

Furthermore absent any compelling reason
for depriving Loreta custody over the child
(such as neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity, and affliction w/ a
communicable disease) custody shall remain
w/ the mother, with the father granted
visitation rights.
2. Mother. Right: the child can choose who he
wants to live with when he reaches 10 years
old
(Action moot since child off to Japan during the
pendency of the action)
RESULT: PET DENIED.

Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag vs. de Guzman (June

5, 2009)
FACTS:
Why under FC 148 respondent Eva is the concubine
of the father of the petitioners Proof or evidence that
must be shown It is only in cases where the
insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.
Facts:
Loreto Maramag had insurance policies in Insular
Life and Grepalife. He designated Eva de Guzman
Maramag as beneficiary, as well as his children
Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie. But later on,
it was revealed that it was a misrepresentation; they
were the illegitimate family. Trisha Angelie and Karl
Brian are still minors. Loreto revoked Evas
designation and she was disqualified from claiming
the benefits, but her children were able to claim. The
legitimate family, specifically the children, are
seeking to claim such benefits on the grounds that
Eva is disqualified because she is a concubine and a
suspect in the killing of Loreto; hence, her children
should also be prevented from claiming such benefits.

12

RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondents

a.

Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit

to Use Surname of the Father,

Issue: WON the benefits should be given to the

legitimate heirs (the petitioners) instead of the
illegitimate children

Affidavit of Acknowledgment
b.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY of

Held: No, they should not. Petition denied.

Dominique where he admitted that

Although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of

Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the
insurance policies. Only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are the insured or the beneficiary,
exception if insurance contract was intended to
benefit third persons

he is living with Jennie, that they

The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy

and her disqualification in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate
children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance
policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit
relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in
the view of the prohibition on donations under

stated that now she is pregnant

Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers

themselves for reasons based on the insurance
contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate
children, the designated beneficiaries, to the
exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the
insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.

fell in love and became a good

couple. It was unsigned,
handwritten and was executed
before the child was born. He also
and we are living together.
4.

Civil Registrar Gracia denied her application

of registration on the ground that the father
died before the child was born and thus
cannot acknowledge anymore his paternity
over the child.

5.

Jennie sued on the ground that her son is

being denied of its right as an illegitimate
child.

I: WON unsigned, handwritten autobiography can

be used as proof of recognition of paternity?
H: Yes. Art 176 of FC, as amended by RA 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/ her father if the latter had expressly recognized

DELA CRUZ v GRACIA

him or her as his offspring through the record of birth

Facts:

appearing in the civil registrar or through an

1.

Jennie dela Cruz, 21 and Dominique

admission made in a public or private handwritten.

Aquino, 19 lived together as husband and

2.
3.

wife without the benefit of marriage

Documents presented by Jennie already suffice. The

(common- law marriage)

affidavit executed by the father of Dominique and the

Christian died. On Nov. 2, 2005, or after 2

testimony of his brother, whose successional rights

months, Jenie gave birth to their son.

may be affected corroborates the claim of Jennie.

Jenie wanted to register his sons name using

the surname of Dominique which is

Case at bar, the recognition made in any of the

Aquino. She submitted the following to

documents is, in itself, a consummated act of

support her application:

13

acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no

separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
Art 176 does not explicitly state that the putative
father must sign the private handwritten instrument
for it to have probative value.

MANUNGAS V LORETO

GOTARDO V BULING

F:

F:
1. Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino
Manungas. They had no children and
adopted Samuel Avila.
2. Florentino died in 1977. Avila predeceased his
mother.
3. Upon the death of Florentino, Engracia
motioned to partition the Estate, submitting
that the heirs are herself, Avila and Ramon
Manungas, the natural child of Florentino.
4. Avila's widow executed a waiver of rights.
5. October 1995- Engracia sued Diosdado
Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal
detainer. They claimed that Diosdado is the
illegitimate son of Florentino. MTC
dismissed the case. RTC also dismissed the
same.
6. Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas in his favor, alleging
that as he is the illegitimate child of
Manungas. Loreto opposed. Case was
dismissed.

I: WON Diosdado, an illegitimate child, may exercise

rights over the estate of Engracia Manungas, the wife
of his putative father?

1. Divina Buling filed a case in 1995 for the

compulsory recognition of her child Gliffze
against Charles Gotardo
2. Evidence was presented showing that Divina
and Charles met in 1992 and their sexual
relations started in 1993. It occured twice a
month.
3. She found out she was pregnant in August
1994.
4. She gave birth on March 9, 1995. Charles
failed to show up and did not support
Gliffze.
5. Petitioners impugns the paternity of the child
claiming that hey had their first sexual
encounter in August 1994.
6. RTC dismissed the complaint because of some
inconsistencies of Divina when being crossexamined. CA reversed and concluded
parties had sex even before 1994, that
Divina had only one boyfriend.
I: WON illegitimate child may be given support?
H: Yes

H: No. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate

of Florentino does not mean that he is entitled or even
qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.
It comes with reason and prudence that those who are
appointed special administrator be interested in the
preservation of the estate.
Case at bar, the evidence on record shows that
Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he
is not interested in preserving the latter's estate.

Court found that Gliffze is indeed the child of the

petitioner. This was duly proven through the
testimony of Divina that she only had been sexually
involved with one man at the time of her pregnancy.
Since it had already been established that Charles is
the father of the child, support follows as a matter of
obligation. A parent is obliged to support a child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate.
2,000 monthly child support shall be awarded to
Divina and Gliffze.

14

Andal vs Macaraig
FACTS:
1.

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his

mom Maria Duenas filed a complaint for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of
a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal

Reyes v. Mauricio

and Maria Duenas. Mariano was born on

F:

June 17, 1943.

1. Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a
parcel of land in Bulacan.
2. Librada and daughter Leonida Maurico filed
the case for annulment of agreement
claiming that they are the heirs of Godofredo
Mauricio who was the lawful and registered
tenant of Eugenio.
3. They claimed that Godofredo had been
working on the land since 1936 until his
death in 1994. Further, they argue that the
agreement signed upon Godofredo's death
was had through fraud and deceit.
4. Librada died, Leonida was substituted as a
party.
5. Reyes argues that no tenancy relationship
existed between him and respondents. He
claimed that Librada voluntarily affixed her
signature on the document.
6. It was held that Mauricios are tenants of
Reyes. Case was brought to the CA, CA
sustained the decision.
7. Feeling deperate, Eugenio filed an appeal with
the SC. He presented several arguments,
inter alia, Leonida is not a party to the case,
in effect attacking the legitimacy of Leonida
collaterally.

2.

Eduvigis Macaraig, donated land via propter

nuptias to Emiliano.

3.

Emiliano was suffering from TB.

4.

Maria Duenas eloped with Felix, the brother

of Emiliano.

5.

Maria gave birth to a boy, in the name of

Mariano Andal.

6.

Emiliano died on Jan 1, 1943.

I: WON Mariano Andal is the legitimate child of the

Maria and Mariano?
H:
Art. 108 of the CC provides that children born after
180 days after the dissolution of the marriage or 300
days next following the dissolution or separation of
the spouses are presumed to be legitimate.
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943

I: WON legitimacy of a child may be impugned

collaterally?

and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is

presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because

H: No. Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The

legitimacy of a child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose.

he was born within 300 days following the

dissolution of the marriage (through death).

Art. 170 and 171 of the FC provides that any action

The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not

against questions of legitimacy must be brought up in

sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.

the proper court. It can only be questioned in a direct

Only when it can be shown that it was physically

action seasonably filed by the proper party and not

impossible for the husband to have had access to his

through collateral attack.

wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next

15

preceding the birth of the child can it be considered

that the child was not legitimate.
Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the
husband during the initial period does not preclude
cohabitation between husband and wife. (Meaning,
they can still have sex even when he has another
man). Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a
legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner
of the parcel land.
Macadangdang vs CA
FACTS:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married
woman, her husband Crispin Anahaw. She allegedly
had intercourse with petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. She also
alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband
separated in 1967.
On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a
baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in
baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an
action that would bastardize her child without giving
her husband, the legally presumed father, an
opportunity to be heard.
HELD:
1. Yes, the child Rolando is presumed the
legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and
Crispin Anahaw.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven
months after the initial sexual contact between the
petitioner and the respondent is proof that the said
child was not the petitioner since, from indications,
he came out as a normal full-term baby.
Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child
Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate son of the respondent and her husband.
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence
of proof that there was physical impossibility of

access between the spouses in the first 120 days of

the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the
assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. Hence,
proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual
union prevents the application of the presumption.
(Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p.
311)
2. No, the wife may not institute an action that
would bastardize her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity
to be heard.
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after the
respondents' reckless and immoral pursuits after her
flings. And she deliberately did not include nor
present her husband in this case because she could
not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such
scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish
motives would not be thwarted.
Hence, in general, good morals and public
policy require that a mother should not be permitted
to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in
order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. Flint vs
Pierce, 136 N.Y.S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77). In the
case of a child born or conceived in wedlock,
evidence of infidelity or adultery of the wife and
mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there
is no proof of the husbands' impotency or non-access
to his wife (Iowa-Craven vs Selway, 246 N.W. 821,
cited in 10 C.J.S. 36). The Court says, and as between
the paternity by the husband and the paternity of the
paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law
is inclined to follow the former, hence, the child is
thus given the benefit of legitimacy.

Concepcion vs. CA
Facts:
1. Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo
Concepcion, they had a child named Jose
Gerardo.
2. Gerardo filed for annulment on the ground
that Ma. was still married to Mario Gopiao.
3. RTC ruled that Theresas marriage with
Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting
thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous

16

4.
5.

6.

and the child born was condemned

illegitimate.
Custody was then given to Theresa.
Theresa contends that a putative father
cannot have visitation rights over the
illegitimate child and the childs surname
shall be changed to the mothers maiden
name.
Gerardo opposed the view of Theresa and
claims that he cannot be denied access to
Jose as he is the real father of the same.

Issue: WON a child born out of a bigamous marriage

is considered an illegitimate child of the prior
marriage contracted?

The law and only the law determine, who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children, for ones
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the
minor can change his status for the information
contained therein is merely supplied by the mother
and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law
says and not what a parent says it is.
AGUSTIN V CA
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

Ruling: No. Jose is a legitimate child of Theresa

AND MARIO (former husband) AND NOT
GERARDO

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel

Although it is true that a child is considered

legitimate even when the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. Such legitimacy pertains to the
marriage that was first contracted.

34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on

On the argument of Gerardo that accdg. to Art. 166

(b) of the FC, the legitimacy of the child may be
impugned, when the husband and the wife is living
separately and sexual intercourse is not possible
cannot be given ground because he failed to show
proof that there is an impossibility between Theresa
and Mario to have sex. Mario lives 4 kilometers away
from the residence of Theresa .

later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins

The birth certificate of Jose cannot be given

evidentiary value because it was not offered as
evidence in court. Also, proof of filitiation can only
be given credence when the legitimacy of the child is
in question. Only Mario and other heirs can question
such legitimacy because in the eyes of the law,
Gerardo has no standing as he is considered a
stranger to Jose.

courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate

relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month
old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open
car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported
to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination and

17

moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality

action.

of searches and seizures, and the infringement of

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the

privacy of communication where the constitutional

parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing

right to privacy has been critically at issue.

at the expense of the applicants. The Court of

Petitioners case involves neither and, as already

Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

stated, his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the

Herrera vs. Alba

petitioners MTD

Action to impugn Legitimacy: Biological or other

W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to

scientific grounds

DNA paternity testing and was a form of

unreasonable search

Facts:

Held:

14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba,

1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners

represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial

motion to dismiss because the private respondents

court a petition for compulsory recognition, support

complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of

and damages against petitioner (RosendoHerrera)

action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause

of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the

Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological

defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the

father of respondent. Petitioner also denied

delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant,

physical contact with respondents mother

by which the primary right and duty have been

violated. The cause of action is determined not by the

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of

prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

DNA paternity. Respondent presented the testimony

2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck

of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test

down the proposed national computerized

is 99.99% accurate

identification system embodied in Administrative

Order No. 308, we said:

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the

contended that it has not gained acceptability.

right to privacy does not bar all incursions into

Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing

individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle

violates his right against self-incrimination

scientific and technological advancements that

enhance public service and the common good...

Trial court and CA granted the motion to conduct

Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by

DNA paternity testing

proper safeguards that enhance public service and the

common good.

Issue:

18

Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in

The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on the

this jurisdiction to determine filiation. If yes,what are

caution with the method employed in the actual

the conditions under which DNA technology may

testing DNA.

be integrated into our judicial system andthe

prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,

in a paternity suit

therefore, courts should consider, among other things,

the following data: how the samples were collected,

Held:
1.

how they were handled, the possibility of

Yes. By 2002, there was no longer any

contamination of the samples, the procedure followed

question on the validity of the use of DNA

in analyzing the samples, whether the proper

analysis as evidence. The Court moved from

standards and procedures were followed in

the issue of according official

conducting the tests, and the qualification of the

recognition to DNA analysis as evidence

analyst who conducted the tests.

to the issue of observance of procedures in

2.

conducting DNA analysis People v. Vallejo

It all boils down to evidence and its
admissibility

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact

in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or
the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule
130, which governs the admissibility of expert
testimony, provides as follows

Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG V DIAZ
Heirs of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz G.R. No. 171713

December 17, 2007Chico-Nazario, J.

Third Division (DNA CASE - SUPER LONG)

Facts:
Jinky was already married to a Japanese national
when she met Rogelio. Despite this, they cohabitated

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special

knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess may be received in evidence

and allegedly bore a child together in February

1998. Shortly thereafter, Rogelio abandoned Jinky
and Joanne. Although the presumption was that
Joanne was the legitimate child of Jinky and her

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to

the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.
Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in issue3.

Japanese husband because of their subsisting

marriage, this was turned down by the RTC. It was
established that Jinkys husband lived abroad and
only visited the Philippines once a year. No evidence
was that he visited 1 year preceding the birth of
Joanne. RTC ruled that Joanne was the illegitimate
child of Rogelio because he admitted paying for the
hospital bills connected to her birth, picking up Jinky

19

after giving birth. CA however, reversed this and

scientifically valid technique;(d) The DNA testing

remanded the case to make way for DNA

has the scientific potential to produce new

analysis. Estate of Rogelio files for

information that is relevant to the proper resolution of

reconsideration alleging the death of Rogelio makes

the case; and(e) The existence of other factors, if any,

DNA testing no longer possible.

which the court may consider as potentially affecting

the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. From

Issue: Whether the death of Rogelio affected the

the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the

possibility of a DNA test

petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application

of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate

Held: No. Petition denied.

biological samples of his DNA.

Ratio: Petitioner questions the appropriateness of the

As defined above, the term "biological sample"

order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of

means any organic material originating from a

the case to the RTC for DNA testing given

persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,

that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that

that is susceptible to DNA testing.This includes

a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is

blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and

no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our

bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the

mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the

biological samples as enumerated above as may be

order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more

available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case,

ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without

petitioner has not shown the impossibility of

basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence

obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can

allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu

be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

proprio or upon application of any person who has a

legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus: SEC.

And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct

4. Application for DNA Testing Order

of DNAtesting. In People v. Umanito, citing Tecson

***

v. Commission on Elections, this Court held

The appropriate court may, at any time, either

satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,

motu proprio or on application of any person who has

DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained

a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order

from body cells of the illegitimate child and any

a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due

physical residue of the long dead parent could be

hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing

resorted to

of the following:(a) A biological sample exists that is

."It is obvious to the Court that the determination

relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was

of whether appellant is the father of AAAs child,

not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing

which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is

now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to

material to the fair and correct adjudication of the

DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation

instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the

for good reasons;(c) The DNA testing uses a

20

courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice,

personally known the matters that were alleged

motu proprio to order a DNA testing.

therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on

:x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been

the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent

marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their

as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still

existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing

unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.

technology finally provides a much needed equalizer

for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have

ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA testing be

long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have

considered a search which must be preceded by

repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case

a finding of probable cause in order to be valid?

comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally

evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of

HELD:

evidence gathering. We therefore take this

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the

opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

searches and seizures is still applicable, and

a proper showing
of sufficient justification under the particular factual c

LUCAS versus-LUCASGR 190710, June 6, 2011

ircumstances of the case must be made before acourt

FACTS:

may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various

Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate

jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind

Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties

of procedures which are required, but

to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City.

those jurisdictions have almost universally found that

Respondent was not served with a copy of the

a preliminary showing must be made before a

petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of

court can constitutionally order compulsory blood

the petition to establish filiation. His counsel

testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as

therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy

a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an

of the petition. Petitioner filed with the

order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party

RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the

must show that there is a reasonable possibility of

Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding

paternity. The same condition precedent should be ap

the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

plied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father

issued the Order setting the case for hearing and

from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing

urging anyone who has any objection to the petition

on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must

to file his opposition. After learning of the September

present prima facie evidence

3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for

or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

reconsideration.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the

issuance of a DNA testing order remains

Respondent averred that the petition was not in due

discretionary upon the court. The court may, for

form and substance because petitioner could not have

example, consider whether there is absolute

21

necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already

The motion for reconsideration was denied for late

preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and

filing

the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the

court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

ISSUE: WON Chua Keng Giap is the child of Sy kao

HELD: NO
The issue of his claimed filiation has long been
settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court.
That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has
been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 8

CHUA KENG GIAP VS IAC

decided on September 28, 1984.

In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally

FACTS:

declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.

the petitioner, Chua Keng Giap insists that he is the

"Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua

son of the deceased Sy Kao and that it was error for

Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing

the respondent court to reject his claim.

Guan.

He also says his motion for reconsideration should

Thus, petitioner's opposition is based principally on

not have been denied for tardiness because it was in

the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy

fact filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling.

Kao and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun

This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed, a

and his wife Tan Kuy.

petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy

"After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten

Kao in the regional trial court

years, the court dismissed the respondent's petition on

The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of

a finding that be it not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and

a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to

the deceased, and therefore, had no lawfu linterest in

file the petition.

the estate of the latter and no right to institute the

The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not

intestacy proceedings.

the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao,

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of

for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing

Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any

Guan.

one else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she

The decision in that case had long become final and

has said these many years that Chua Keng Giap was

executory.

not begotten of her womb.

The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who

held that the case invoked decided the paternity and

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

not the maternity of the petitioner.

Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent

People vs Quitoriano:

court reversed the trial judge in a petition for

FACTS:

certiorari filed by the private respondent.

1.
2.

Qutoriano was charged of the crime of rape.

He allegedly raped the victom, Edna Pergis,
on December 24, 1992.

22

3.

June 1993: Her aunt, Teresa Pergis,

Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of

discovered that Edna was oregnant.

Aug. 2, 1993, private complainant filed a

kin) who filed for an MTD (motion to dismiss)

4.

complaint for rape against accused5.

appellant.
She gave birth on Oct. 31, 1993.
CONTENTIONS:
Accused: private complainant gave birth
more than 10 months after the alleged rape;
therefore, the child could not have been the
accuseds

ISSUE: WON the child could have been the

accuseds
HELD: Yes.
-

The fact that private complainant gave birth

more than ten months after the alleged raoe
does not discredit her testimony. Dr.
Honesto Marquez, a physician from the
Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained
that the normal gestation period us 40 weeks
or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond
40 weeks if the woman is having her first
pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child
delivered by private complainant on Oct. 31,
1993 was her first. Hence, it is not
impossible that the child was conceived in
December 1992, the date of the alleged rape.

saying that Guadalupe is a stranger. TC denied the

MTD saying that such was based on indubitable
grounds but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying
that testimonial and documentary evidence failed to
prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad
consenting to the acknowledgement as IC and that
such action should have been filed in the lifetime of
Flaviano . CA reversed TC saying that: Evidence is
ample to prove filiation as IC, evidence is sufficient
to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement
as IC, and that action can be instituted after the death
of putative father.
Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC
Held: YES.
TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin
(agent to logging concessionaire of Flaviano for 18
years) who verified handwriting and signature
of Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming
(Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro) regarding
the hospitalization expenses of Guads daughter. CA
said that TC must have assumed that Flavianos
handwriting must have
metamorphosed during the years but it could be
possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed
at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still
used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married

Gaspay v. CA
238 SCRA 163
Facts:
Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then
married to Agueda Denoso (childless). On 7/6/88 priv
resp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that
shes acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia
Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin of
Flavianos estate.

to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent

to the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action
being instituted after death of putative father, CA said
action based on acknowledgement may be brought
even after death of putative father
. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of
estate. Moreover, the petitioners neglected to apply
for a letter admin 30days after the death of Flaviano
Gaspay.

23

widow of Flaviano, Sr.,filed a petition for

GASPAY, JR. v. CA and ALFARO (version 2)

the issuance of letters of administration. PETITION

238 SCRA 163 (1994)

DISMISSED.

FACTS
October 1983 in Tacloban City. He was then married

OTHER ISSUES

to Agueda Dionisio. They were childless. Gaspay

On Guadalupes claim as illegitimate daughter of

Alfaro filed a petition with the RTC-Naval, Biliran

Flaviano, Sr. The trial court held that the evidence

alleging among others that she is the acknowledged

presented failed to prove her purported status, and

illegitimate daughter of the decedent. Guadalupe

that even if the petition were to be treated as an

prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of

action to compel recognition, it would not prosper

the decedents estate. Flaviano, Jr. and Eriberta

because it should have been filed during the lifetime

opposed the petition. Flaviano is the adopted son of

of Flaviano, Sr

the decedent while Eriberta is a next of kin. Both

alleged that Guadalupe is a stranger, and even
assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of
her recognition or acknowledgment. rsed the
trial court. It found the evidence ample and sufficient
to prove Guadalupes filiation and recognition, and
her consent to the recognition. The CA also held
that actions based on voluntary recognition canbe
instituted after the death of the putative father.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in finding that Guadalupe is
entitled to letters of administration?
HELD: NO.
Guadalupe has, in sum, proved her entitlement to be
administrator of the estate of her father Flaviano, Sr.,
being an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of the decedents, under subsection (b) in
conjunction with subsection (c) thereof, that: If the
husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for 30
days after the death of a person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, x x x it may be granted
to such other person as the court may selected to
apply for letters of administration 30 days after the
death of Flaviano, Sr. Not even Agueda Dionisio,

Benitez-Badua vs. CA Case Digest

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties, upon their death the fight for
administration of Vicentes estate ensued. Vicentes
sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate. On the other hand,
Marisa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition. She
alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased
spouses and is capable of administering the estate.
In RTC, both parties submit their pieces of evidence.
Petitioner Marissa, prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses by submitting
documentary evidence and that the spouses
continuously treated her as legitimate child. On the
other hand, respondents proved by testimonial
evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during
their marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated
by an obstetrician-gynecologist which prevented her
to give birth. The older sister of Vicente also declared
that petitioner was not the biological child of the
spouses, who were unable to procreate, as she was
there at the time the spouses were having this
problem.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was the
biological child of the spouses and has the right to be
the sole heir.
Ruling: Petitioner was not the biological child based
on facts. Live of Birth Certificate was repudiated by
Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate.

24

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly

The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the
biological or adopted child of deceased was denied,
on the ground that Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of
the Family Code do not contemplate a situation
where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where the husband or his
heirs denies as his own a child of his wife.

personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases,

his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest

Liyao vs. Liyao

involved. Hence, it was then settled that the

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a

direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper

FACTS:

parties and within the period limited by law.

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear,

deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon),

competent and positive evidence presented by the

filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl

petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or

L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and

recognized his paternity.

acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the

deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights.
Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and

Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo

enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased

Facts:

having been recognized and acknowledged as such

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed

child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were

that his parents were never married and filed a

two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she

petition in QC to change his name to Julian Edward

and the deceased were legally married but living

Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng (using the maiden

separately for more than 10 years and that they

name of his mother)

cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased.

On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased

Respondent submitted proof. Mother has no record of

stated that her mom and the deceased were legally

marriage from NSO. Records which show that he has

married and that her parents were not separated

been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood

legally or in fact.

(academic records) Trial Court granted petition and

ordered Civil Registrar to: Delete the entry date and

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own

place of marriage (of parents) in respondents live

legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the

birth certificate. Change entry of Last name from

deceased.

Magpayo to Coseteng. Delete entry of Coseteng from

Middle name. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda

HELD:

Magpayo Jr in the entry for Father. Republic filed a

motion against the order of the court stating that:

25

oThe change of name of respondent also calls for a

Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be

change of civil status from legitimate to illegitimate.

considered as anyone of the recognized grounds in

O Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered

rule 103 (respondent denies his legitimacy by

deletion of name of the father.

affecting his legal status in relation to his parents)

A person can effect a change of name under rule 103

Since respondents desired change affects his

using valid grounds:

legitimacy, rule 108 should apply.

O when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or

extremely difficult to write or pronounce

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which

O when the change results as a legal consequence

concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil

such as legitimation

registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled

O when the change will avoid confusion

or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all persons who

O when one has continuously used and been known

have or claim any interest which would be affected

since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware

thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.

of alien parentage
O a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an

signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without

entry in the civil register involves substantial and

prejudicing anybody

controversial alterations including those on

O when the surname causes embarrassment and there

citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,

is no showing that the desired change of name was

or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with

for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name

the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is

would prejudice public interest

mandated

Issue: WON respondents change of name was

Decision of Trial Court was nullified

affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding

Held:

26