EUROPE EXPANDS, TURNOUT FALLS:

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2004

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION

 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2004

International IDEA publications are independent of specic national or political interests. Views expressed
in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council
members. Maps created for this publication in order to add clarity to the text do not imply any judgement on
the part of the Institute on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement of any boundaries, nor does
the placement or size of any country or territory reect a political view of the Institute.
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should be made to:
Publications Ofce
International IDEA
SE -103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
International IDEA encourages dissemination of its work and will promptly respond to requests for
permission to reproduce or translate its publications.
Graphic design by: Holmberg & Holmberg Design AB, Stockholm, Sweden
Printed by: Elanders Infologistics Vst AB, Sweden
ISBN: 91-85391-12-3

Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Signicance

of the 2004 European Parliament Election
Richard Rose*

The biggest free election in European history appeared to be

Figure 1: National Differences in the Euro-Gap, 2004

100

80

60

40

% turnout most recent national Election

% turnout at 2004 European Parliament Election

electors preferred to stay at home rather than go out to vote

in June 2004 for members of the European Parliament. Of

20

EURO-GAP: Difference in turnout at latest national election and 2004

European Parliament election.
0

Europes biggest democratic op when a majority of European

96
91
87
90
96
82
81

Belgium
Luxembourg

an electorate of more than 340 million persons, more than

186 million did not votea higher proportion of abstentions

Malta
Italy

73
92

Cyprus

than in parliamentary elections in India, notwithstanding its

higher rates of illiteracy and poverty. However, the behaviour
of citizens varied greatly between the 25 member countries. In
Slovakia, only 17 per cent of electors bothered to vote, while
in Malta turnout was 82 per cent. Such great dierences cry
out for explanation: why should turnout in one European
country be almost ve times that in another?

71
75

Greece

63
63
60
59

Ireland
Lithuania

48
87

Denmark

48
69

Spain

45

France

43

79

Germany

43
80

Austria

42
72

Latvia

41

Finland

Basic Facts

The body which has become the European Union (EU)

was created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. Like all international treaties, this was a document binding national
governments. Just as there is no popularly elected parliament in the United Nations, so there was no provision
for a popularly elected parliament. The Parliament was
initially an assembly of appointed members.
With the expansion of the powers of the European
Union, the rst direct election of members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) was held in 1979. However,
the powers of the European Parliament (EP) are still limited. Key decisions are made by a multinational team
of non-elected ocials in the European Commission in
Brussels and through consultations between representatives of national governments, sitting as the Council of
Ministers, and the Commission. The resignation of the
This paper was also prepared as part of a research project on Diverging Paths of PostCommunist Countries, supported by grant RES 000 23 0193 from the UK Economic
and Social Research Council. Dr Neil Munro provided very useful research assistance.
*

60

65

39

63

Portugal

39
71

Hungary

39
59

United Kingdom

39
80

Netherlands

39
80

Sweden

38
59

Czech Republik

28
70

Slovenia

28

Estonia

57

27
46

Poland

21
70

Slovakia

17
0

20

40

60

80

100 %

Source: <http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites>. Ofcial

returns as of 9 July 2004 plus provisional returns for Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg and the UK. National election results: Rose, Richard and
Munro, Neil, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003); and update from authors les.

president and the entire Commission in 1999 due to

mismanagement and corruption led to an expansion of
the EPs powers to hold the Commission accountable.
Nonetheless, the inuence of MEPs falls far short of the
inuence of national parliaments.
The most striking feature at the 2004 European
Parliament election is that turnout varied greatly between
European countries (gure 1). Nine-tenths of electors
went to the polls in Belgium and Luxembourg and more
than two-thirds voted in three more countries. In seven
countries turnout was higher than the average in elections for the president of the United States since World
War II. However, less than one-third of the electorate
bothered to vote in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia.
Second, there is a big Euro-Gap. Turnout in the EP
election of 2004 was in most countries much lower than
turnout at the latest election for the national Parliament.
The Euro-Gap in 2004 averaged 25 percentage points
across the member states of the European Union. In
Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden, half or more of
those who voted at the latest national election did not
participate in the election of MEPs, and the same was
true in ve of the EUs new member states. The biggest
Euro-Gap was registered in Slovakia, where 70 per cent
had turned out to vote in a bitterly contested national
parliamentary election in 2002, but only 17 per cent
voted in 2004 to elect Slovakias MEPs.
Third, turnout has been falling at each successive
European Parliament election. When the rst popular
election was held in 1979, turnout was 63 per cent. By
1999 it had fallen to below half of the European electorate, and in 2004 it was down by more than 17 percentage
points from the level of 1979 (gure 2). In the nine
countries that participated in the rst direct election to
Figure 2: Turnout at European Parliament Elections,
19792004
Mean for nine countries in 1979, 10 in 1984, 12 in
1989 and 1994, 15 in 1999, and 25 in 2004.
100%

65.9%

63.8%

62.8%
58.4%
53.0%
45.6%

Figure 3: The Euro-Gap in the Established and New EU

Member States, 2004
% turnout most recent national election
% turnout at 2004 European Parliament election

100%

75.2%
69.0%

52.8%
40.3%

15 established members

10 new members

Source: <http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites>. Ofcial

returns as of 9 July 2004 plus provisional returns for Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg and the UK. National election results: Rose, Richard and
Munro, Neil, Elections and Parties in New European Democracies
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003); and update from authors les.

the EP, turnout in 2004 was on average 9 percentage

points lower than in 1979.
As membership in the European Union has expanded,
turnout has fallen. This was made very evident in the
2004 election: turnout averaged almost 53 per cent in
the 15 established member states, whereas in the ten new
member states it averaged only 40 per cent (see gure 3).
There were, however, big dierences between the enlargement countries. Turnout was as high as 82 per cent in
Malta but was 65 percentage points lower in Slovakia
(gure 1). (For the dates of accession to the EU, see
International IDEA, 2004, Part II, pp. 5574.)
The new member states are not indierent or averse to
politics, for in their most recent national elections turnout has averaged only 6 percentage points less than in
national elections in the established EU members, but
the Euro-Gap is bigger in the new member statesa difference of 29 percentage points as against 22 points in
established member statesbecause of much lower turnout for the EP election. Moreover, in the enlargement
countries turnout for the EP elections was 23 percentage points lower than in the national referendums held
months before to endorse entry to the EU.
Alternative Explanations

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

The European Parliament operates as a unitary assembly

and its 732 MEPs are organized in transnational parties rather than along national lines. However, MEPs
are elected in 25 dierent national contests. Each is conducted according to the particular countrys own election

laws, distinctive national political circumstances, and distinctive position in the European Union, for example, as
an established or new member country. Because there are
dierences in national context, it is possible to undertake
statistical analysis to identify which dierences between
countrieselectoral institutions, national politics or EUrelevant circumstanceshad a statistically signicant
inuence on turnout at the 2004 EP election.1
Electoral System and Practice

Compulsory voting has consistently had a signicant

inuence on turnout at national elections (see the annex).
Even where it is not fully enforced, it nonetheless establishes a social norm that many electors respect. In the
latest European Parliament election, where there was
compulsory voting, turnout was higher (correlation r:
.68; gure 4). However, the overall impact of compulsory
voting was reduced because it is conspicuously absent
from the election laws in all the new EU member states.
This is a response to the communist practice of securing
100 per cent endorsement for a one-party regime through
intimidation and vote fraud, which produced turnout gures that were literally too good to be true.
A distinctive feature of the European Parliament election is that national governments could, if they chose,
hold national and EP elections on the same day so that
people could vote twice, making just one trip to a polling station. Luxembourg has regularly held elections to
its national Parliament on the same day as it elects its
MEPs. In Lithuania, the impeachment of the president
resulted in the rst-round vote to choose a new president
being held on the same day as the EP election. In
Belgium, Ireland and parts of the United Kingdom
(England and Wales) regional or local government elections were held simultaneously with the vote for MEPs.
With control of important oces at stake, national parties had an incentive to get out the voters out and voters
had stronger incentives to go to the polls. Once there,
they almost invariably cast a vote for their MEP as well;
thus, holding national and EP elections on the same day
had a positive inuence on turnout for the European
Parliament election (r: .45).
The eect of synchronizing, or yoking, elections,
reduced to insignicance the impact of holding elections
on a rest day. In both Britain and Ireland, the EP and
regional/local elections were held on a normal working
day and turnout went up in comparison with the EP
election of 1999.
Following the EU Council decision of May 2002, all
members of the European Parliament must be elected on
the basis of proportional representation, using the ListPR system or the Single Transferable Vote (STV). In
practice, 23 member states used the List-PR system but
two, Ireland and Malta, used STV. The type of electoral
system thus cannot account for dierences in national
turnout in 2004.
1

Figure 4: Inuences on Turnout at the 2004 Election to

the European Parliament
Correlation
Electoral system/practice
Compulsory voting

.68**

Holding national and EP elections

on the same day

.45*

Rest day

not signicant

Proportional representation

not signicant

National politics
Trust in parties

.62**

Trust in government

.54**

Post-communist country

.58**

Perception of corruption

not signicant

Vote for biggest governing party

.44*

European Union position

Over-representation in the European
Parliament

.57**

Duration of EU membership

.46*

Benets of EU membership

not signicant

** Pearson r correlation signicant at <.01; * signicant at <.05.

Source: Calculations by the author.

National Politics

While in theory the European Parliament is a supranational assembly, its members are elected in national
contests, are nominated by national parties and make
national appeals to national electorates in their respective national languages. Thus, the decision of electors
about whether to vote and how to vote invariably reects
national inuences such as trust or distrust in parties and
in government.
In the run-up to the EP election, the Eurobarometer
poll of the European Commission asked electors about
trust in many political institutions. At the time of the
European election, there was widespread distrust of political institutions. The average level of trust in national
political parties was 21 per cent, and only 37 per cent
trusted their national government.
Where distrust of parties and of government is lower,
turnout at the European Parliament election was signicantly higher; the cross-national correlation between
trust in parties and turnout was .62 and for trust in
government and turnout .54. Where trust in parties is
very lowas in Poland, 3 per cent, and Slovakia, 8 per
centturnout was very low. Where voting is voluntary
and trust in parties is relatively high, as in Ireland and
Denmark, turnout was above average. In statistical terms,

Conventional correlation analysis is used (Pearsons r) because there are insucient cases to undertake reliable multiple regression analysis. See gures in the Annex.

Figure 5: The Inuence of Trust in National Parties on Turnout in Elections to the European
Parliament
100 -

R-square: .38

Lux

BE

Malta

EP turnout 2004

80 -

IT

CY
Gre

IRE

60 -

DK
Lith

40 -

FI

Ger FR

Lat
UK

Por
Hun

AT

Swe

Spain
NL

Slvn
CZ

20 -

Est

Pol
Slovak

0
0

10

20

30

40

% Trusting national parties

Source: Eurobarometer survey, March 2004

for each 1 per cent higher the national level of trust in

political parties, turnout was up by 1.4 percentage points
(gure 5). The inuence of trust in government was also
substantial, but not so high, boosting turnout by 0.7 percentage points for each additional 1 per cent increase in
trust in the government.
Given a legacy of repressive and corrupt communist
rule, distrust is higher in post-communist countries. (The
apparent association between very recent membership of
the EU and lower turnout is actually a reection of the
fact that eight of the ten new member states were dominated by Moscow before the Berlin Wall fell.) In the eight
new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, only
11 per cent trust political parties and 26 per cent express
trust in national government. By contrast, in the new
member states of Cyprus and Malta trust in parties and
government is actually above the average for established
EU member countries, and so was turnout, reaching 82
per cent in Malta, where voting was not compulsory.
Distrust of government does not reect a belief
that those in government are corrupt. There was no
signicant correlation between turnout and Transparency
Internationals Perception of Corruption Index, which
shows wide variations in perceived corruption between
European countries. Nor does distrust reect concern
with governments taxing and spending powers. There
is no signicant correlation between public expenditure and turnout at the European Parliament election.
Instead, evidence from the European Social Survey

(see Rose 2004) indicates that distrust in political institutions is boosted by electors feeling that politicians do
not care what people like themselves think.
Dissatisfaction with the government of the day is
linked to distrust in national government. In 22 of the 25
EU member countries, the share of the vote for the largest party in government fell in the European Parliament
contest by an average of more than 10 percentage points.
The parties which had been the largest party in government emerged from the EP election with an average
of only 23 per cent of the national vote. In Poland the
Socialist government was already leaving national oce
before the EP election, so it was not surprising that its
share of the vote was down from 41 to 9 per cent. In
the Czech Republic, the Social Democratic prime minister resigned after his partys vote dropped from 30 to
9 per cent. In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconis
governing party lost more than one-quarter of its vote,
leading to the dismissal of the minister of nance and the
resignation of the leader of one partner party in the government coalition. In Germany the Social Democratic
Party suered its worst result in generations, as its share
of the vote fell to 21.5 per cent. While Chancellor
Gerhard Schrder survived, his political prestige was
badly aected.
The fall in votes for the governing party was not so
much due to a rise in support for the opposition as it
was to dierences between the supporters of dierent
parties in the retreat into abstention. The more the gov-

erning partys vote was down, the more turnout was down
(r -.44). This pattern reects the fact that electors regard
a European election as a mid-term election. Those who
normally expect to support the government in a national
election use the mid-term ballot to send a warning to
the party they favour by abstaining. The loss in popularity need not be long-term. Governments suering from
mid-term unpopularity can respond by changing cabinet
ministers or by changing party leaders and prime ministers.
From the perspective of European federalists, indifference to the European project is worrisome. From the
perspective of elected governments, however, it is better
to lose support through dierential abstention than to see
voters stirred up to vote for the ocial oppositionor, as
happened in Britain in 2004, to see a strong performance
by a radical outsider party, the anti-EU United Kingdom
Independence Party.
The European Dimension

From the perspective of advocates of strengthening the

European Union, the European dimension is seen as the
most important in elections to the European Parliament.
However, the European dimension is only one of three major
sources of inuence on turnout. Moreover, by comparison
with national election laws and practices and national political inuences, it is the least important inuence.
The European Parliament is not a federal assembly with
a lower house representing electors on the basis of one
vote, one value, and an upper house containing territorial
representatives with little or no regard for population (as in
the German Bundesrat or the US Senate). Instead, the EP
has only a single chamber in which the number of MEPs
assigned to each country is only approximately related to
population. It varies from ve MEPs for Malta and six for
Cyprus, Estonia and Luxembourg to 99 for Germany.
The distribution of seats in the European Parliament
results in the countries with the smallest populations being
over-represented. There is one MEP for every 36,000
electors in Luxembourg and for every 58,000 electors in
Malta, while in Germany, Italy and Spain there are more
than 600,000 electors for each MEP. At the national level,
this means that MEPs in countries with smaller populations may be closer to the electorate. However, inequality
at the level of the individual elector is counterbalanced
by inequality in the total number of seats in Parliament.
There are 16 times more German MEPs than representatives from Luxembourg and 13 times more Italian MEPs
than MEPs from Malta. At the European level, the votes
of MEPs from countries such as Luxembourg and Malta
are usually wasted, for only if the 732 MEPs are divided
almost evenly can their votes be decisiveeven if they all
vote together.
The electorates in smaller member states of the
European Union are readier to participate in electing their
MEPs. The greater the degree of over-representation, the
higher the turnout (r .57). A greater readiness to vote does
not appear to be in expectation of getting greater benets.

While 54 per cent of the citizens of Europe see their

country as beneting from EU membership, there is no
signicant correlation between a belief that EU membership is benecial and voter turnout.
Is There a Trend Down in Turnout?

Integrationist theories of the European Union assume that

the longer countries are members of the EU, the more
they, and their national electorates, will actively participate
in it. Prior to the latest round of EU enlargement, there
have been three previous waves of enlargement, starting
with the entry of the UK, Denmark and Ireland in 1973.
There is a positive correlation between the duration
of a countrys EU membership and turnout (r .46). This
encourages the hope that the low turnout in enlargement
countries in 2004 may rise at future elections. However,
the rise is likely to be slight, since, statistically speaking,
the eect of EU membership for almost half a century
boosts turnout by less than 3 per cent compared to the
newest members.
Among the long-standing members of the EU, there
is no common trend in turnout. At the 2004 European
Parliament election, three countries that had participated
in every EP election had a higher turnout than their average for the ve elections from 1979 to 1999 (see gure 1
and annex, gure A.2) . In the UK turnout was up by
6.6 percentage points from that average, in Ireland it was
up by 4.9 points, and in Luxembourg it was up by 2.1
points. In four countries the fall in turnout was less than
6 percentage points. In only two long-standing member
countries was turnout well below their past average: it
was down by 10.3 percentage points in France and by
15.0 points in Germany.
The downward trend in aggregate turnout depicted
in gure 2 is due only in part to the enlargement of the
European Union by the introduction of Central and East
European countries. Inuences which depress turnout
operate in Western Europe too. For example, turnout in
Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania was higher or virtually
the same as in four of the established member states, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK.
Implications

Constitutional analysis and the Euro-Gap both point to

the same conclusion: the institutions of the European
Union dier greatly from those of the 25 states that
constitute its membership and are distant from citizens
political priorities. Thus, any prescription to boost turnout at elections to the European Parliament must take
into the account the fact that the political process for
conducting EP elections is in the hands of 25 dierent
national parliaments, 25 dierent party systems and 25
dierent sets of electors. Thus, even if common rules or
electoral formulae were applied throughout Europe, the
responses of electors would dier.
Changes Within the Existing Framework

The rst and fundamental obstacle to high turnout at EP

elections, or simply a turnout as high as at a countrys

national elections, is that they are regarded by voters as
secondary elections, less important than the national
elections held in each member state. Lower turnout at
secondary elections is normal. It is demonstrated in the
much lower turnout for local elections than for national
elections in many European countries. In the United
States, turnout drops from around 50 per cent in a presidential election to 33 per cent in the years when only seats
in Congress are at stake. As long as the European Union is
of secondary importance to citizens across the continent, a
Euro-Gap will remain, just as there is a Local Gap within
countries that hold local and national elections at dierent times and a Congress Gap in the United States.
Elections will continue to reect national inuences
as long as they are fought by national parties rather than
pan-European parties. In theory, there is nothing to stop
national leaders from forming such parties without any
legislation or direction from Brussels. In practice, such a
party requires a degree of agreement on programmes and
principles. It would also require a belief among national
politicians that running on a pan-European ticket would
win them more national votes than running as candidates only of a familiar national party.
To consider this proposition, it is worth noting
that, in order to organize the business of the European
Parliament, it is already necessary for MEPs to form party
groups. This amplies the voice of individuals and every
party group receives money and administrative resources
from the EP budget. To form a group requires a minimum of 19 members drawn from at least ve dierent
member states. There is no requirement that members
of a parliamentary group agree with each other. While
the largest parliamentary group, the European Peoples
Party, has MEPs from all 25 member states, the extent of
the ideological divergence within it is shown by the fact
that it includes free-market British Conservatives, social
market German Christian Democrats and supporters of
French President Jacques Chirac. The second-largest parliamentary group, the European Socialists, has members
drawn from 23 dierent states. It too is full of parties
that dier not only in their interpretation of the word
socialism but also, like French socialists and the British
Labour Party, over the Iraq war and much else.
Given that turnout at national elections is higher,
holding European elections on the same day as national
elections would be likely to raise turnout signicantly.
This occurred in ve countries in 2004. However,
only in Luxembourg is this a matter of standard practice. Elsewhere it was an ad hoc response to events, for
example, following the impeachment of the president
of Lithuania. In England and Wales it was a matter of
administrative convenience to hold both local government and European elections at the same time rather
than having to hold one election in May and another
a month later. However, the practical obstacles are
immense. It would require 25 member states to agree
to xed-term parliaments and to make that term ve

Figure 6: Variations in Turnout in the EU and in the

United Kingdom, European Parliament Elections, 2004
Figures are percentages.
Belgium

90.8

EU mean: 15 established members

52.8

Northern Ireland

51.7

EU mean: 25 member states

47.8

Wales: local elections, no postal ballot

41.4

English: local, all-postal regions

40.0

UNITED KINGDOM overall

38.9

England: local elections but no postal vote

38.3

Scotland: no local elections, no postal ballot

30.9

Source: UK Electoral Commission; European Parliament.

yearswell above the European averageor shorten the

term of MEPs. This would be undesirable in countries
where coalition governments can collapse during the life
of a four-year parliament. Nor is it politically realistic to
expect a British or Irish prime minister to abandon the
prerogative of choosing an election date.
National politicians can object to holding the elections
on the same day on the grounds that voting for MEPs
would introduce a confusing element into an important
national vote. Promoters of European integration also
have grounds to object, for the eect would almost certainly be to increase the importance of national inuence
on the choice of each countrys MEPs.
In 2004 the British government experimented with
holding the EP election and local elections on the same
day in England and Wales, and with all-postal voting in
four English EP constituencies. In the United Kingdom
as a whole, turnout increased from 24.0 per cent in 1999
to 38.9 per cent in 2004. A portion of this increase was
due to the emergence of the anti-EU UK Independence
Party, which encouraged opponents of the EU to vote
rather than abstain; a part was due to the local and EP
contests being held on the same day; and a part was due
to the use of postal voting. The EP constituency with
the highest turnout in the UK was once again Northern
Ireland, where almost 52 per cent of the electorate voted
(gure 6) in a situation in which elections can be seen
as a continuation of civil war by other means. Second in
turnout was Wales, where there were local elections but
no postal voting. In the four English regions which held
ballots exclusively by post, turnout was up by an average
of almost 21 percentage points, compared to an increase
of 15 per cent in the ve English regions where there
was no postal ballot but local elections were also held.
Turnout in Scotland, where there was neither a local election nor a postal ballot, was 8 percentage points below
the overall UK gure.
While all-postal voting appeared to boost turnout by

up to 6 percentage points in the electoral districts involved,

the turnouts in Wales and Northern Ireland show that
postal voting was not a necessary condition for achieving
above-average turnout. In addition, three-fths of British
electors who received a postal ballot at their home threw
it away or left the envelope unopened rather than vote
for an MEP, and in every constituency that had all-postal
voting the number of invalid ballot papers increased. In
London, where the EP election was held on the same day
as two other sets of elections held under two further different sets of rules, upwards of one-quarter of ballots were
rejected as improperly marked in one or another contest.
(See International IDEA, 2004, chapter 6.)
One prescription for increasing turnout does not require
any legislative or institutional change: politicians should
act in ways that create public trust rather than distrust.
Electors who think that politicians do not care what they
think and are only interested in looking after themselves
rather than their constituents or the national interest are
less likely to vote. Such causes of political distrust go far
beyond the powers of the EU to deal with. Yet they are
within the capacity of national politicians to act upon.
More and Different Elections?

Since the secondary nature of the European Parliament creates a Euro-Gap that discourages turnout, there are voices
calling for European elections to be made more important to the electorate in order to attract a bigger turnout
and make the EU more democratic. The fact that Brussels
ocials are accountable to 25 national elected governments is regarded as unsatisfactory. A democratic decit
is presumed to exist as long as the European Commission
is not primarily accountable to 340 million electors and
their MEPs.
Proponents of strengthening the European Union
assume that making the EU more important ought to
increase participation in European elections. However, the
evidence of the 2004 election calls this assumption into
question. Even in smaller European democracies, such
as Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia, where the European
Commissions pre-election Eurobarometer surveys found
that the national population tended to see the European
Union as more important its national government, turnout was not signicantly higher than in countries such
as France and Italy, where the national government was
regarded as more important.
Proposals for the president of the European Union to
be directly elected may be justied on grounds of increasing the EUs accountability and because it is assumed that
the legitimacy provided by popular election would give
the EU president the political clout to enable him to
resolve disputes and to promote the integration of Europe
and its global role. Such proposals typically ignore nutsand-bolts issues about how an EU president would be
elected. If the EU elected a president by popular vote, the
combined electorates of ve member states would constitute an absolute majority, and the electors of 20 member
states that benet from disproportional representation in

the European Parliament would be left with little or no

inuence. If election were by a plurality, then the president of Europe could be elected with one-third or less of
the voteand, if turnout were the same as turnout for
elections to the EP, with the support of only one-sixth of
Europes electorates. If a second-round run-o election
were required to ensure an absolute majority, the eventual winner could be the rst-round choice of less than
one-fth of voters and less than one-tenth of the electorate.
The problems associated with referendums in
European countries on the draft EU Constitution are
greater still. Whatever the aggregate vote total, a referendum is likely to show some electoral districts (in the case
of the European Union, some countries) producing a
majority Yes vote while in others most vote No. To require
approval by three-quarters of the member statesthe
margin for amendments to the US Constitutionwould
need approval by 19 countries. The anxieties of national
leaders over the thought of holding referendums on the
endorsement of the draft EU Constitution is an indicator
of the diculties, when many national elections are held,
of securing a majority view that is the same everywhere.
Moreover, when turnout is so low, then the real majority
in a European vote is not those who favour a party or a
referendum issue but those who cannot be bothered to
vote.
References and Further Reading

Rose, Richard, Political Trust, Turnout and Governance Capital,

R
Studies in Public Policy no. 386 (Glasgow: University of
Strathclyde, 2004)
Gratschew, Maria and Lpez Pintor, Rafael, Voter Turnout
Since 1945: A Global Report (Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2002)
Eurobarometer, spring 2004, Public Opinion in the European
Union,
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/
eb61_en.pdf>
f
f>
European Parliament, <http://www.elections2004.eu.int /epelection>
European Social Service, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.
org/>
Gratschew; Maria and Lpez Pintor, Rafael, Voter Turnout
in Western Europe Since 1945 (Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2004)

Figure 7:

Country

Turnout Turnout Turnout Referendum EuroEP04 National EP99

on
gap
accessn
(4)

Vote
Compulsory
Change for
voting
Govt Party

No. of
Electors
per MEP

Yoked
election

ESTABLISHED MEMBER STATES

Austria

42,4

84,3

49,0

na

-41,9

-9,6

No

322 222

No

Belgium

90,8

91,6

91,0

na

Denmark

47,9

87,1

50,4

na

-,8

-1,8

Yes

312 500

Yes

-39,2

-11,8

No

285 714

No

Finland

39,4

69,7

30,1

na

-30,3

-1,3

No

300 000

No

France

42,8

60,3

46,8

na

-17,6

-3,3

No

471 795

No

Germany

43,0

79,1

45,2

na

-36,1

-17,0

No

620 202

No

Greece

63,4

75,0

75,3

na

-11,6

-2,4

Yes

391 667

No

Ireland

59,7

62,6

50,7

na

-2,9

-12,0

No

230 769

Yes

Italy

73,1

81,4

70,8

na

-8,3

-8,4

No

633 333

No

Luxembourg

90,0

86,5

85,8

na

3,5

7,7

Yes

36 167

Yes

Netherlands

39,3

80,0

29,9

na

-40,7

-4,2

No

448 148

No

Portugal

38,6

62,8

40,4

na

-24,2

-4,5

No

370 833

No

Spain

45,1

68,7

64,4

na

-23,6

0,2

No

629 630

No

Sweden

37,8

80,1

38,8

na

-42,3

-15,3

No

352 632

No

United Kingdom

38,9

59,4

24,0

na

-20,5

-18,4

No

569 231

Yes

Mean for establ. Members

52,8

75,2

52,8

na

-22,4

-6,8

na

398 323

na

Cyprus

71,2

91,8

na

na

-20,6

-6,8

Yes

83 333

No

Czech Republic

28,3

57,9

na

55,2

-29,6

-21,4

No

345 833

No

NEW MEMBER STATES

Estonia

26,8

58,2

na

64,1

-31,4

-17,9

No

150 000

No

Hungary

38,5

70,5

na

45,6

-32,0

-7,8

No

250 000

No

Latvia

41,3

71,2

na

72,8

-29,9

-10,1

No

155 556

No

Lithuania

48,4

58,6

na

63,4

-10,2

-14,8

No

200 000

Yes

Malta

82,4

95,7

na

90,9

-13,3

-12,0

No

58 800

No

Poland

20,9

46,2

na

58,9

-25,3

-31,7

No

544 444

No

Slovakia

17,0

70,1

na

52,2

-53,1

2,0

No

300 000

No

Slovenia

28,3

70,1

na

61,1

-41,8

-14,3

No

228 571

No

Mean for new members

40,3

69,0

na

62,7

-28,7

-13,5

na

231 654

na

EU MEAN

47,8

72,8

na

-24,9

-9,5

na

331 655

na

Notes
(1) % MEPs divided by % European electorate
(2) 100 divided by district size or legal threshold whichever is higher. RR to supply note
(3) 75 divided by square root of total number of districts multiplied by average district magniture plus one. Taagepera index. RR to supply note
(4) Difference between turnout at EP04 and latest national vote
(6) 0=5th wave; 1=4th wave; 2=3rd wave; 3=2nd wave; 4=founder member.
(7) Spain and Portugal denite; rest are maybes.
Source: BBC Online 23.6.04

10

Sunday
election

% Vote
% Vote
lgst govt pty lgst govt pty
lst election
EP 2004

Wasted
votes
%

Year
EU
entry

PR
or
STV

No. of No. of
National
EP
RepresenMEPs Districts electorate electorate tation
Trust
Trust
million
million index (1)
EU natl govt

0,8

1995

List PR

18

Yes

42,27

32,7

Yes

15,40

12,8

7,0

1957

List PR

24

Yes

31,20

19,4

1,4

1973

List PR

14

Yes

24,69

23,3

6,7

1995

List PR

14

5,80

343,0

1,45

31

39

7,50

343,0

1,50

49

34

4,00

343,0

1,64

41

44

4,20

343,0

1,56

40

59

Yes

19,90

16,8

11,9

1957

List PR

78

36,80

343,0

0,99

42

29

Yes

38,50

21,5

9,9

1957

List PR

99

61,40

343,0

0,76

35

23

Yes

45,37

43,1

5,1

1981

List PR

24

9,40

343,0

1,20

68

55

No

41,50

29,5

1,2

1973

STV

13

3,00

343,0

2,03

56

39

Yes

29,40

21,0

3,8

1957

List PR

78

49,40

343,0

0,74

54

26

Yes

30,20

37,1

10,9

1957

List PR

0,22

343,0

12,78

53

61

No

28,57

24,4

7,0

1957

List PR

27

12,10

343,0

1,05

39

39

Yes

40,10

34,0

7,0

1986

List PR

24

8,90

343,0

1,26

60

34

Yes

43,33

43,5

3,6

1986

List PR

54

34,00

343,0

0,74

58

42

Yes

39,85

24,8

2,1

1995

List PR

19

6,70

343,0

1,33

29

48

No

40,67

22,3

5,1

1973

List PR

78

12

44,40

343,0

0,82

19

19

na

34,06

27,1

5,6

1973

List PR

38

19,19

343,0

0,93

45

39

Yes

34,71

27,9

16,0

2004

List PR

0,50

343,0

5,67

57

75

No

30,21

8,8

17,1

2004

List PR

24

8,30

343,0

1,35

42

25

Yes

24,60

6,7

23,0

2004

List PR

0,90

343,0

3,12

39

45

Yes

42,10

34,3

5,3

2004

List PR

24

6,00

343,0

1,87

54

31

No

16,68

6,6

26,7

2004

List PR

1,40

343,0

3,01

39

28

Yes

19,64

4,8

13,2

2004

List PR

13

2,60

343,0

2,34

50

31

No

51,79

40,0

11,0

2004

STV

0,29

343,0

7,87

50

49

Yes

41,04

9,1

8,3

2004

List PR

54

13

29,40

343,0

0,86

33

Yes

15,09

17,1

19,5

2004

List PR

14

4,20

343,0

1,56

47

17

Yes

36,23

21,9

22,7

2004

List PR

1,60

343,0

2,05

47

27

na

31,21

17,7

16,3

2004

List PR

16

5,52

343,0

1,36

46

34

na

32,92

23,3

9,9

1986

List PR

29

13,72

343,0

0,99

45

37

11

Belgium

91.2

Luxembourg

87.9

Note: Turnout is the average for all elections held since the country's first European P

Annex

Source: Figures supplied from the International IDEA Voter Turnout database.

Figure A.3: Influences on Turnout in Elections to the

European Parliament, 197999 (UK 19791994)
Results of a multiple regression analysis explaining 65.4% of
the variance in turnout in 63 national European Parliament
elections, 197999.

Figure A.1: Influences on Voter Turnout in the EU Member

Countries
Results of a multiple regression analysis explaining 59.1% of
the variance in turnout in 233 national elections from 1945 to
April 2002

Betaa

Compulsory voting

22.6

0.50

Proportional representation

13.0

0.29

0.43

Election day a rest day

10.5

0.27

ba

Betaa

elections have been heldb

4.9

0.44

Proportional representation

8.8

Length of time over which free

5.0

0.27

0.6

0.21

Compulsory voting

5.3

0.29

Duration of EU membership (years)b

Election day a rest day

3.9

0.23

Govt. expenditure as % of GDP

Electors per MP ('000)

0.066

0.22

Electors per MP ('000)

not significant

GDP per capita

not significant

GDP per capita

not significant

Government expenditure
as a % of GDP
a

2004-08-20

is the standardized regression coefficient.

11:59

Four categories of duration of EU membership are used: (a) the six

founder countries; (b) three older members, the UK, Ireland and
Denmark; (c) three newer members, Spain, Portugal and Greece; and
(d) the three newest members, Sweden, Finland and Austria.
b

The b value is the unstandardized regression coefficient; the Beta value

AST_Inlaga_eurpean 13-78.qxd
b

a
The b value is the unstandardized regression coefficient; the Beta
value is the standardized regression coefficient.

not significant

Sida 22

The lengths of time for which countries have held free elections are

divided into three categories: (a) for the lifetime of present-day voters;

Source: Figures supplied from the International IDEA Voter Turnout

database.

(b) consistently since 1945; and (c) for about a quarter-century (Greece,
Portugal and Spain).
Source: Figures supplied from the International IDEA Voter Turnout
database for elections in all EU member countries from 1945 to April
2002.

Figure A.2: Turnout in Elections to the European Parliament, by Country, 197999

No. of European
Parliament elections

Turnout in European
Parliament elections (%)

Turnout in
national elections (%)

Difference

Sweden

40.2

80.8

40.6

United Kingdom

32.3

72.1

39.8

Denmark

49.4

88.3

38.9

Netherlands

44.3

81.3

37.0

Germany

58.0

82.9

24.9

Austria

58.3

80.4

22.1

Finland

43.8

65.3

21.5

Portugal

49.9

66.1

16.2

Ireland

54.8

70.9

16.1

France

53.1

68.9

15.8

Spain

61.7

73.5

11.8

Italy

79.0

86.6

7.6

Greece

74.7

81.5

6.8

Belgium

91.2

92.7

1.5

Luxembourg

87.9

87.9

Note: Turnout is the average for all elections held since the country's first European Parliament election.
Source: Figures supplied from the International IDEA Voter Turnout database.

12
Figure A.3: Influences on Turnout in Elections to the
European Parliament, 197999 (UK 19791994)