SpecialIssue Vol21 No1

!
States and Social Movements in the Modern World-System1
Mangala Subramaniam
Purdue University
mangala@purdue.edu
The mark of the modern world is the imagination of its profiteers and the counterassertiveness of the oppressed. Exploitation and the refusal to accept exploitation
as either inevitable or just constitute the continuing antinomy of the modern era,
joined together in a dialectic which has far from reached its climax in the
twentieth century. (Wallerstein 1976: 233)
Protest, struggle, and the urge for equality are as old as constricting structures such as caste
hierarchy, inequality of power, wealth, and knowledge. Social movement theorists argue that
movements, protests, and struggles are legitimate expressions of popular interests and attempt to
explain why, when, and how people protest and make claims. Protests and challenges to
inequalities have been visible in discourse and movement activities all over the world. Efforts to
challenge structural inequities also reveal the complex locations of different groups, particularly
in the context of the current trends in globalization. While some attempts have been made to
expand the contemporary social movement scholarship in the United States to include
international cases, the field remains fragmented. At the same time, an increasing number of
U.S.-based scholars are now interested in movement dynamics across countries and contexts.
A significant set of movements globally and across countries have and continue to
challenge the consequences of globalization and specifically the neoliberal agenda.
Neoliberalism generally refers to the ideology that advocates the dominance of a competitiondriven market model and includes a set of policy prescriptions that have defined the world
economy since the late 1970s. Within this doctrine, individuals in a society are viewed, if viewed
at all, as autonomous, rational producers and consumers whose decisions are motivated primarily
by economic or material concerns. But this ideology has little to say about the social and
economic inequalities that distort real economies. The neoliberal order that is supported by
powerful states and wealthy corporate interests has been expanding over time, but that order is
also being vigorously challenged by movements acting both locally and transnationally.
Scholars have begun to integrate tenets from the world-systems approach with
perspectives in social movements to develop an understanding of the dynamics of movement
action as occurring within a world-systemic context (cf. Smith and Wiest 2012; Kaup 2013).
How have changes such as globalization trends and the adoption of neoliberal policy agendas
affected the livelihood of people? How have people across rural and urban spaces and across
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
I appreciate very much the comments and suggestions from Jackie Smith on the draft of this article. I thank Suresh
Garimella, the then Associate Vice President for Engagement, and his office at Purdue for the grant that made the
symposium in Chennai possible. I am also grateful to K. Kalpana, R. Santhosh, and Binitha Thampi and the
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at IIT, Madras for collaborating to organize the symposium on IITMadras campus.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License.
Journal of World-Systems Research, Volume 21, Number 1, Pages 1-7, ISSN 1076-156X
2 Journal of World-Systems Research!
countries assessed opportunities and threats and built movements to resist the capitalist worldsystem? These are the broad questions addressed in this special issue.
This special issue draws from papers presented at a symposium on the state and social
movements, organized jointly by Purdue Universitys department of sociology and the Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT), Madrass Humanities and Social Sciences Department and
convened at the IIT campus in March 2013. The articles interrogate the power of the state and
state institutions within a broader world-system and explore the implications for social
movement challenges to this power.
Throughout the history of modern democracy, contradictory claims and policies have
served as a basis for social movement action, which is often about resisting market forces and
demanding rights. Nonetheless, these papers cover several issues related to challenges to
neoliberalism and the state in the world-system: environmental justice, state engagement in
resistances to neoliberalism and the world capitalist system, the roles of micro-enterprise
development (self-help groups), and the character of mobilization dynamics and leadership of
organized challenges in the context of neoliberal agrarian policies such as opposition to GM
(genetically modified) crops.
Along with an emphasis on the transnational nature of movements, the articles in this
special issue focus on the global South. In sum, authors examine how global forces impact social
movement politics, the local character of neoliberalism and resistance, and the tendency of states
to support (or not) counter hegemonic struggles. Our consideration of cases in this issue is based
on movement politics as being complex, comprising multiple actors and economic and social
forces that include the state, NGOs, and global institutions. Moreover, state structures themselves
vary, and this variation can impact social movement mobilization. The cases that follow are
based in places and countries that have increasingly been integrated into the world system and
that continue to see intense struggles against the growing capitalist economy. Considering the
translocal character of neoliberalism, struggles in both core and periphery nations may involve
the targeting of the state, corporations, and other global economic institutions. Below I discuss
the three main ways the papers in this issue contribute to the effort to better integrate worldsystems tenets with conceptualizations in social movement theory.
Role of State
First, the articles utilize Sklairs (1999) argument to consider processes that transcend the
nation-state and thus to look beyond the state as the unit of analysis. But the state is not a
monolithic whole, nor is its structure stable and constant. The nature of state boundaries and
authority is changing as a result of changing patterns of relations among states, including
evolving international norms (Appadurai 1996; Ohmae 1990 1995; Strange 1996). Moreover, the
state itself may adopt an anti-neoliberal stance, which Almeida, in this issue, describes as antineoliberal political parties (more below).
World-systems scholars draw our attention to the ways in which neoliberal globalization
transforms the state. They include advocating and enforcing deregulation, reduction in state
spending (particularly in the social sector), and increased foreign investment and trade (Harvey
2005; Robinson 2004). Adoption of these policies has reduced states roles in providing basic
services such as education and health while enhancing the power of private sector actors. Thus
the neoliberalization of the state has been particularly detrimental to the countries of the global
Introduction: States and Social Movements in the World-System 3

!
South and to people with relatively less access to resources. However, people in the global South
(and global North) have not idly watched their lives being transformed in the name of
development; they have organized and resisted this collectively (cf. Subramaniam 2014; Sassen
2013; Smith and Wiest 2012; Almieda and Johnston 2006, among others).
As Angelique Haugerud observes, Neoliberalism has sparked a stunning array of
popular countermovements (2010:112) that often target corporate and state power. Since the
late 1990s, there has been a growing tendency to understand these kinds of movement politics as
responding to various forms of dispossession unleashed as part of the latest wave of neoliberal
globalization. Such endeavors for profit accumulation are closely linked to the global capitalist
system, but the struggles against accumulation by dispossession are of greater importance in the
global South (Harvey 2003). Both Almeida and Kalpana, in this issue, discuss the role of the
state in these contests.
Women organized in self-help groups are disciplined by the state to contribute to the
capitalist agenda (Kalpana). But this has enabled women to emerge as agents to seek change
beyond the financial benefit. The local character of neoliberalism is visible in household-based
initiatives such as micro-enterprise development and self-help groups, a theme explored by
Kalpana in this special issue. While world-systems analysts examine such household-based
subsistence work as key to the maintenance of the capitalist world-system, feminists who work
within the world-system approach highlight the economic contributions of women. But as argued
by Wallerstein and Smith (1984), informal sector activity is a market transaction which depends
on the ability of the state to alleviate the inequalities that arise from promoting capitalism.
Drawing from the world-systems approach, Karides (2010), explains the expansion of microenterprise development under neo-liberalism as reflective of two separate strategies of dealing
with economic crisesinformal or unwaged work and government transfer or social safety
netsmerged into one (p. 192). This expansion has been made possible by the state and has
focused largely on women. Feminists have expressly elaborated the economic contributions that
women made to households through their informal enterprises.
Turning to the changing stance of the state, it is pertinent to note that especially in
Central America, the alliance between emerging anti-neoliberal political parties and popular
movements. These trends challenge the world capitalist society. The decades of implementation
of neoliberal policies in Central America have been resisted by social movements and a new path
to progress is being ushered in (Almeida and Johnston 2006). In his analysis of all six Central
American States, Almeida concludes that the shift from state-led development to neoliberal
forms of capitalism at the global level provided new threats and incentives for antisystemic
forces to form electoral political parties as a strategy to resist new harms associated with the loss
of citizenship rights (p. 19).
Resistances to Local and Translocal Neoliberalism
Second, and related to the first point above, several of these essays provide a critical, and much
needed perspective on the local face and character of the consequences of neoliberalism and
resistances by movements particularly in semi-peripheral countries. While neoliberalism itself is
translocal in nature, movement dynamics, including their trajectory, can play out differently in
different places (Subramaniam 2014). Contributing to the discussion of neliberalism, critical
geographers assert that there is neoliberalization of socio-naturea term that is used to
highlight the particular ways in which specific local neoliberalisms are embedded in broader
structures and relations of neoliberalism, which is heterogeneous and contested (Bakker 2005:
544; Peck 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). As noted by Kaup (2013), the struggles against
exploitation and accumulation at the local level are tied to global economic change.
Specific local neoliberalisms are located within broader structures and relations of
neoliberalism, which is a heterogeneous and contested. In fact, global engagements in advocacy
and protest is influenced by processes of mobilization in particular national contexts (Scoones
2008: 159). Yet these processes are transnationally linked. In the loose network making up
global protestors, the GM issue has become a focus of interlinked protests against the
monopolization of knowledge and technology ownerships through patents and the TRIPS
agreement, for trade justice as part of the reform of the WTO, against the perceived depredations
of multinationals (such as Monsanto), or in relation to wider rights campaigns around food,
health and farming (Scoones 2008: 157). Struggles against exploitation and dispossession do
not merely converge when facing a common oppressor, but also when the changing forms and
geographies of exploitation and dispossession bring people together in common places (Kaup
2013). This is particularly evident in the discourse around GM (genetically modified) crops in
India. For many involved in the politics of biotechnology, the national frame was about broader
issues of rights and social justice in the context of neoliberal agrarian policies (see Roy in this
issue).
World-systems analysts have understood social movements as challenging and resisting
the underlying structures of the world economy. But they also recognize that not all movements
challenge the system or view the issues they contend with as being inter-connected (Hall and
Fenelon 2009). Some of these challenges have a local character and are often loosely linked.
Such struggles shape and transform opportunities by advancing claims and challenging power
within countries and can at the same time contribute to the broader anti-system movements. In
addition, new movements may emerge to find ways of meeting the basic needs of those made
vulnerable by the states withdrawal. At the same time, the movements that emerge at a local or
national level may fail or demobilize. Therefore, our analyses must trace the trajectory of these
movements and identify the productive outcomes that may emerge.
According to world-systems analysts, the world economy is not composed of individual
national economies interacting independently of one another, but tied together by a complex
network of capitalist relations. The relations among core, periphery, and semi-periphery
countries are historically conditioned and shaped by an integrated single capitalist world-system.
Periphery countries are subject to the cores development and expansionist policies and practices
because they lack an internal dynamic that would allow for acting as an independent and
autonomous entity within the world world-system (McMichael 2012). Specifically, they are
subject to the rules of the hegemonic regimeshaped by the dominant players in the worldsystem (Arrighi, Giovanni 1994; Arrighi and Silver 2001; Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer 2003).
Core countries retain power through the domination of economic, political, and cultural
life on a world scale. Peripheral and semi-peripheral countries are subject to what Emmanuel
(1972) terms unequal exchange through trade; meaning that core countries define terms of
international trade which are disadvantageous to less developed countries. In the context of
contemporary neoliberal globalization, unequal exchange is no longer propagated by core states
alone but also by transnational corporations which seek to maximize accumulation through the
creation of a system of dependency and exploitation (Bradshaw and Wallace 1996).

!
As Wallerstein (2004: 26) comments, states can create quasi-monopolies through patents,
and other protectionist measures. Quasi-monopolies depend on the patronage of strong states,
and so the firms creating quasi-monopolies are largely located within strong states. Strong states
can use their muscle power to prevent weaker states from creating counter-protectionist
measures. Roy in her analysis of the anti-GM movement notes that the medium-strong semiperipheral Indian state is not in a position to either prevent the strong hegemonic core state and
its leading firms from selling their transgenic technologies to Indian firms or to prevent the flow
of technology fees from Indian farmers to the core bourgeoisie, especially after the Indian state
approved the commercialization of a particular kind of GM seed. The anti-GM coalition has been
successful in pressing ideologically different political parties to protest against the multinational
seed firms based in core states. Further, it has enabled the Indian state to move from a subimperialist to an anti-imperialist role regarding GM seeds. However, Roy asserts that until the
anti-GM coalition in India resolves its inner contradictions and becomes resolutely anti-capitalist
and anti-systemic, it will not be able to effectively challenge the anti-imperialist Indian states
pro-capitalist stance regarding GM seeds and industrial agriculture (p. 88).
In a similar vein and using a comparative case approach, Frey discusses the particular
form of core-periphery reproduction or core capital accumulation as related to ship breaking.
The process of ship breaking contributes to adverse health, safety, environmental, and socioeconomic consequences in the periphery and semi-periphery locales of nations in the world
system but is explained as being beneficial to the core and the states concerned, domestic firms,
workers, and citizens. As very few semi-peripheral countries have the capacity or ability to
address the risks associated with hazards such as ship breaking, the adverse consequences for its
people has spawned resistance. Freys article draws attention to the exploitation of
environmental space by the advanced capitalist countries (the core).
Dynamics of Mobilization
Third, the articles examine the dynamics of mobilization processes as influenced by the
variable opportunities of neoliberalism. Two articles in this special issue (Lapegna, Roy)
consider mobilization dynamics in the agrarian sector. The agrarian sector, in a manner has
witnessed intense farmers struggles. Local farmers movements are embedded in broader
structures and relations of neoliberalism. In fact, the local face of neoliberalism combined with
the privatization agenda of the state has shaken rural society in particular (Borras et al 2008). In
their analysis of transnational agrarian movements (TAM), Borras et al (2008) emphasize that
class too must be considered in any analysis of movement-building and agrarian change
dynamics (p. 25). Class analysis is also important for the analysis of the dissipation of farmers
movements.
Focusing on a variant of dissipation of movement by examining the case of genetically
modified soybeans, Lapegna draws attention to the aspect of class as he examines the
demobilization of popular movements and the mobilization of agribusiness. The introduction of
GM soybeans in Argentina has been advanced the interests of agribusiness companies and large
farmers but resulted in adverse life circumstances for peasants and indigenous peoples, who
faced land evictions and health problems from agrochemical exposure. Using primary qualitative
data and integrating food regime scholarship and world-systems perspective, Lapegna unravels
the relationship between the state and neoliberalism related to agricultural technology which
shows the role of privileged sectors, such as agribusinesses, in promoting a neoliberal agenda.
Roy also examines mobilization against GM seeds in India.
In her analysis, Roy describes the role of the state in seeking public opinion and thereby
facilitating mobilization against GM seeds as was evident from the massive outpouring of letters
and other documents from scientists, agriculture experts, farmers organizations, NGOs,
consumer groups and people from all walks of life. In India, a mlange of actorsdrawn from
the fields of government, judiciary, parliament, civil society, media and businesses, among
othershave jousted with each other for at least two decades regarding the introduction of
biotech, transgenic or genetically engineered, crops in India. While the initial focus in the 1990s
was on the introduction of Bt cotton, which was commercialized in 2002 by the Indian
government, the attention has now shifted to another transgenic crop, Bt brinjal. There is no
national-level consensus emerging on whether Bt brinjal should be commercialized or not. Much
of this indecision is due to the work of the anti-biotech domestic activists.
Although the emphasis of the March 2013 symposium was India, this special issue of the
Journal of World-Systems Research recognizes the importance of extending our attention beyond
India. Included in this special issue are cases from Argentina and Bangladesh in a comparative
paper which illustrates the central themes analyzed in this special issue. I also expect scholars
working in other regions of the world to apply the framework and findings from the papers in
this collection to examine cases in other countries.
References
Almeida, Paul and Hank Johnston. 2006. Neoliberal Globalization and Popular Movements in
Latin America. Pp. 3-18 in Latin American Social Movements: Globalization,
Democratization, and Transnational Networks edited by Paul Almieda and Hank Johnston.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994 (2010). The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of
our Times. New York: Verso.
Arrighi, Giovanni and Beverly J. Silver. 2001. Capitalism and World (Dis)Order. Review of
International Studies 27.
Arrighi, Giovanni, Beverly J. Silver, and Benjamin D. Brewer. 2003. Industrial Convergence,
Globalization, and the Persistence of the North-South Divide. Studies in Comparative
International Development 38:3-31.
Bakker, Karen. 2005. Neoliberalizing Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in
England and Wales. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(3): 54265.
Borras, Sauenino M., Marc Edelman, and Cristbal Kay. 2008. Transnational Agrarian
Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaigns, and Impact. Pp. 1-36 in Transnational
agrarian Movements: Confronting Globalization edited by Sauenino M. Borras Jr, Marc
Edelman, and Cristbal Kay. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Dicken, Peter. 2011. Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy. 6th
ed. New York City: Guilford Press.
Emmanuel, Arghiri. 1972. Unequal Exchange. New York: Monthly Review.

!
Hall, Thomas D. and James V. Fenelon. 2012. Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: Resistance
and Revitalization. Boulder, CO. Paradigm Publishers.
Harvey D. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
__________. 2005. The New Imperialism. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Haugerud, Angelique. 2010. Neoliberalism, Satirical Protest, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential
Campaign. Pp. 112-127 in Ethnographies of Neoliberalism edited by Carol Greenhouse.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Karides, Marina. 2010. Theorizing the Rise of Microenterprise Development in Caribbean
Context. Journal of World Systems Research XVI (2): 192-216.
Kaup, Brent Z. 2013. In Spaces of Marginalization: Dispossession, Incorporation, and
Resistance in Bolivia. Journal of World Systems Research XIX (1): 108-129.
McMichael, Phillip. 2012. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. 5th ed.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. Beyond National Borders: Reflections on Japan and the World.
Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin.
__________. 1995. Putting Global Logic First. Pp. 129-140 in The Evolving Global Economy:
Making Sense of the New World Order edited by Kenichi Ohmae. Cambridge: Harvard
Business Review Book.
Peck J. 2001. Neoliberalizing States. Progress in Human Geography 25(3):445455
Peck J. and Tickell A. 2002. Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode 34(3):380404.
Sassen, Saskia. 2013. Expelled: Humans in Capitalisms Deepening Crisis. JWSR 19(2)
Scoones, Ian. 2008. Mobilizing against GM Crops in India, South Africa, and Brazil. Pp.
147-176 in Transnational agrarian Movements: Confronting Globalization edited by
Sauenino M. Borras Jr, Marc Edelman, and Cristbal Kay. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Sklair, Leslie. 1999. Competing Conceptions of Globalization. Journal of World Systems
Research 2: 143-163.
Smith, Jackie and Dawn Wiest. 2012. Social Movements in the World-System. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Subramaniam, Mangala. 2014. Neoliberalism and Water Rights: Case of India. Current
Sociology 62(3): 393-411.
__________. 1976. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press
__________. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel and Joan Smith. 1984. Core-periphery and Household Structures Pp.
253-262 in Households and the World Economy edited by Joan K. Smith, Immanuel
Wallerstein and Hans-Dieter Evers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Neoliberal Forms of Capital and the Rise of Social Movement Partysim in Central America
Paul Almeida
University of California, Merced
palmeida@ucmerced.edu
ABSTRACT
Historical shifts in global economic formations shape the strategies of resistance movements in
the global South. Neoliberal forms of economic development over the past thirty years in Central
America have weakened traditional actors sponsoring popular mobilization such as labor unions
and rural cooperatives. At the same time, the free market reforms produced new threats to
economic livelihood and well-being throughout the region. The neoliberal measures that have
generated the greatest levels of mass discontent include rising prices, privatization, labor
flexibility laws, mining projects, and free trade. This article analyzes the role of emerging antineoliberal political parties in alliance with popular movements in Central America. Countries
with already existing strong anti-systemic parties in the initial phases of the global turn to
neoliberalism in the late twentieth century resulted in more efficacious manifestations of social
movement partyism in the twenty-first century resisting free market globalization.
!
KEYWORDS: Popular Resistance, Neoliberalism, Social movement Partyism, Central America,
Global Capitalism
!
!
With the rise of the third world debt crisis and revolutionary political conflict in the 1980s,
Central America transitioned from a period of state-led development to a free market social
formation with relatively more democratic polities. Neoliberal forms of economic development
over the past thirty years in the region have weakened traditional actors sponsoring popular
mobilization such as labor unions and rural cooperatives (Silva 2012). At the same time, the free
market reforms produced new threats to economic livelihoods and well-being throughout the
region. The neoliberal measures that have generated the greatest levels of mass discontent
include rising prices, privatization, labor flexibility laws, mining projects, and free trade (see
Almeida 2014 for extensive empirical documentation). This article analyzes the role of emerging
anti-neoliberal political parties in alliance with popular movements in Central America, with a
special emphasis on the current period of accelerated globalization. It addresses a fundamental
conundrum in the epoch of global neoliberalism: how is mass-coordinated resistance possible
given economic restructuring trends away from the public sector and state infrastructure and
towards private organization and consumption that exalts individualism and fragments civil
society?
Journal of World-Systems Research, Volume 21, Number 1, Pages 8-24 ISSN 1076-156X
Social Movement Partyism in Central America!9!
The Shift to Global Neoliberalism and the rise of Social Movement Partyism
Past scholarly attention connecting large scale economic change to mass resistance has largely
focused on waves of antisystemic or social movement activity (Wallerstein 1990; Martin 2008).
For example, Gunder Frank and Fuentes (1994) associated long term economic trends in
Kondratieff cycle dynamics between 1780 and 1990 with the temporal grouping of major social
movements around the world, including womens, ecology, peace, and peasant movements.
Argarton, Choi, and Huynh (2008) uncovered clusters of similar styles of movements in their
study of the long eighteenth century (1750-1850). In this nascent period of global capitalist
development, new transnational trade networks emerged with the ascendancy of British
economic hegemony. The incursion of western trade, markets, and colonial expansion into
Africa, Asia, and Latin America set off similar types of religious, nationalist, anti-plantation, and
de-linking collective revolts. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Arrighi,
Hopkins, and Wallerstein (1989) contend in the global North that antisystemic movements
grouped at the point of production as peasants and craft labor were increasingly displaced by
mechanized forms of capital. In a separate analysis of the late nineteenth century, Bush (2008)
aggregates episodes of collective action responding to the imperial phase of global capital into
the womens movement, abolition struggles, anti-colonial resistance, and labor/socialist
mobilizations.
In more recent historical examples, Silver (2003) demonstrates trends in global labor
organizing and strike activity between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century
in rhythm with changes in capitalist production technologies and spatial distributions of
assembly and manufacturing. Wallerstein (2014) viewed the clustering of radical movements
around the globe in the late 1960s as associated with the decline of U.S. and Soviet hegemonic
power as well as the end of the Kondratieff A-phase of mid-twentieth century economic
expansion. In the early neoliberal period of the late twentieth century, Walton and his
collaborators work highlights the synchronicity of austerity protest and food riots as the
response to the Third World debt crisis (Udayagiri and Walton 2003). Smith and Weist (2012)
also find a growth in transnational social movement organizations in the late twentieth century as
a direct outgrowth and response to the social and environmental consequences of neoliberal
globalization.
These ambitious studies of global economic change and antisystemic mobilizing largely
focus on levels of social movement-type activity and their temporal clustering. Another related
dimension of heightened mobilization in relation to world-wide economic shifts beyond clusters
or waves is the form of the oppositional movements. More specifically, with the transition from
state-led development to neoliberalism, an upturn of oppositional political parties organizing
with popular movements has taken place. This party-popular movement allianceor social
movement partysimmay be one of the more potent forms of slowing the pace of unwanted
economic changes in Polanyian terms (Silva 2012, Spalding 2014; Block and Somers 2014).
Most analyses of these anti-systemic political parties and movements focus at the national
level by comparing a set of countries or concentrate on a single movement as a case study. The
present study adds to these previous frameworks by analyzing the interaction of national regimes
in the context of shifts in the capitalist world economy. Such an approach takes into account the
transformations of the global capitalist system over time. In this case, the transition from a
Keynesian model of welfare state capitalism to neoliberal forms of accumulation in the late

twentieth century had varying impacts on the types of resistance at the national level as new
economic grievances impacted the urban and rural working classes (Shefner and Stewart 2011).
Indeed, Chase-Dunn (2006: 90) writes, Under conditions of increased economic globalization
the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This
results in increasing inequalities within countries and increasing levels of dissatisfaction
compared with the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian
regimes. The neoliberal transition also coincided with the third wave of global democracy
(Huntington 1991; Markoff and White 2009). Over the past three decades, these dual pressures
of neoliberal restructuring and democratization pushed the forms of anti-systemic mobilization
away from armed conflict into more nonviolent forms of social movement struggle (Schock
2005; Nepstad 2011) and electoral politics (Foran 2005).
Anti-neoliberal political parties are beginning to fill an organizational void in civil
society by mobilizing resistance movements against neoliberalism over a vast territorial space.
These political parties directly challenge the move toward free market globalization and the
corresponding state institutions that implement the economic liberalization policies
(Subramaniam 2015). The new social movement political parties are also increasing their
electoral fortunes as they deepen their alliance with popular movements. The alliance between
oppositional parties and social movements is termed social movement partyism (Almeida
2006; 2010). Organizations such as political parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
need to be given more recognition for their roles in mobilizing large numbers of people in
opposition to externally imposed forms of capitalism. Oppositional political parties and NGOs
fill the void of labor unions, rural cooperatives and peasant associations that have been
decimated by decades of labor flexibility laws and structural adjustment agreements that reduce
formal employment and cut of subsidies to the rural sector. Political parties in particular, use the
emerging democratic space to organize across a national landscape, while NGOs tend to work in
more local environments. This provides political parties a privileged position and capacity to
organize in the neoliberal era. NGOs vary in terms of their missions and capacity to serve as
organizers of subaltern groups. In many contexts in the developing world, NGOs carry out the
policies and frameworks of their northern donors (Bob 2005; Subramaniam 2007). NGOs in
many times and places serve to de-mobilize popular classes (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Jackson
2005). Nonetheless, nongovernmental organizations in countries with an exclusive and
repressive history tend to mobilize people in social movement campaigns.
Examples abound of the role of opposition political parties mobilizing large numbers of
people against free market reforms in the early twenty-first century. In Greece, traditional leftist
parties and the new left SYRIZIA coalition have played a critical role in mobilizing citizens and
aligning with other popular sectors in the Greek anti-IMF protests between 2009 and 2015
(Kousis 2014; Diani and Kousis 2014). Similar dynamics have occurred in Spain with the rapid
rise of the PODEMOS party from anti-austerity protests in the 2010s. In South America over the
past two decades political parties such as the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) and the
Pachakuti in Bolivia, Pachakutik in Ecuador (MPP), the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, and the Polo
Democrtico in Colombia have used their party structures in mobilizing large numbers of
citizens against neoliberalism in alliance with popular movements (Almeida 2010). Moreover, all
of the above oppositional parties also vie for state power via national elections as a new pathway
for achieving structural transformation in the twenty-first century in the context of
democratization and relatively competitive elections (Foran 2005).
In countries with strong anti-systemic movements and revolutionary political parties at

the dawn of the transition to neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, we would expect a more rapid
and extensive resistance to neoliberal forms of capitalism. The growing trend of political parties
mobilizing with social movements in the twenty-first century is a product of deepening
neoliberalism with relatively more democratic polities encouraging the expansion of electoral
parties.
The regions debt crisis between 1980 and 2010 and the corresponding market reforms
that governments enacted to comply with structural adjustment accords negotiated with the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank are outlined below. In terms of civil society
response to the reforms, there was a transition phase whereby new alliances were forged between
the popular classes and emerging oppositional political parties in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Specific attention is given to the economic threats posed by the market reforms in terms of
deteriorating livelihoods for the working rural and urban classes (Shefner, Pasdirtz, and Blad
2006). The period from 1980 to the 2010s was also characterized by greater levels of
democratization and competitive elections in Central America. Sustained anti-neoliberal
resistance campaigns did not occur until sufficient organizational power was created by a variety
of social groupings, including, labor unions, public sector employees, womens collectives,
students, NGOs, and oppositional political parties. These civil society associations and popular
organizations used the emerging democratic spaces to shape new multi-sectoral alliances that
could withstand pressure from the neoliberal state for their dismemberment.
The general pattern of these alliances is illustrated with experiences from Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. These cases include mobilizations
centered on free trade, price hikes, labor flexibility, privatization and extraction of natural
resources. The mass resistance movements are embedded within the context of their broader
interaction with large-scale economic shifts in the world system and represent a broader trend
observed in South America and other regions of the democratizing global South. The article
concludes by highlighting differences in the pace of social movement partyism across Central
America in the era of free market globalization and the limits of social movement partyism once
the opposition party takes executive power.
!
Earlier Rounds of Integration into the World Capitalist System, 1940s-1980s

!
Robinson (2003) has outlined the various phases of Central Americas incorporation into the
global capitalist economy since colonial rule through the early twenty-first century. After World
War II, as elsewhere in the global South, the nations of Central America embarked on a path of
state-led economic development. The process centered on an unprecedented expansion of state
and economic infrastructure. This included the massive building of highways, public schools,
hospitals, power grids, aqueduct systems, and other urban amenities. The period also witnessed a
move away from reliance on a few agricultural exports (namely coffee and bananas) to a
diversification in agricultural production with the expansion of sugar cane, beef, and cotton
(Brockett 1998), as well as investments in light manufacturing industries, often through joint
ventures with foreign capital. These efforts eventuated in sustained rates of economic growth in
the 1950s and 1960s throughout the isthmus (Bulmer-Thomas 1987). Hence, the state-led
development era in Central America initiated a new articulation with the world capitalist
economy with the diversification of agricultural production and the emergence of an urban
manufacturing sector (Robinson 2003). This marked a clear departure from the previous

incorporation in the world system as peripheral provider of a reduced number of agricultural
commodities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The 1940s to the 1980s also witnessed the rise of organized social movements with the
expansion of the state infrastructure, urbanization, light manufacturing, and agricultural
diversification. Peasant cooperatives, labor unions, student groups, and public school teachers
associations grew markedly under state-led development throughout Central America.
Guatemala experienced a short-lived democracy from 1944 to1954 in which these civil society
groups flourished (including the organization of the peasantry and the legalization of organized
labor) until a U.S.-sponsored military coup (Gleijeses 1991). Costa Rica also enjoyed multi-party
political competition in the period of state-led development, even though the Communist Party
was banned from formal political participation until the mid-1970s. The Costa Rican state also
encouraged agricultural sector mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s with its rural colonization
program and legalization of banana worker unions. El Salvador and Nicaragua suffered under
repressive military regimes, while Panama and Honduras oscillated between oligarchic political
parties and military populism that at times mobilized urban and rural working classes (Almeida
2014). By the early 1980s, the state-led development model had largely reached exhaustion
levels via the third world debt crisis, failed social reform, heavy state repression, and
revolutionary conflicts (Robinson 2003).
In sum, in the state-led development era, resistance movements could be characterized as
urban movements benefiting from modernization at times coalescing with the rural proletariat
and small landholders. Electoral political parties challenging the distribution of wealth and
international economic dependency were largely suppressed under authoritarian rule.1 Hence,
the conditions for social movement partyism as a potent antisystemic resistance movement did
not emerge until the global shift to free market democracy in the late twentieth century
(Robinson 2006).
The Current Round of Insertion into the Global Capitalist Economy and Multiple Rounds
of Popular Resistance: 1980-2010
With the global debt crisis of the 1980s, Central American states were hampered by billions of
dollars they owed in foreign loans. As elsewhere in the global South, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank stepped in to manage the crisis (Babb 2009). The main strategy
for these international financial institutions centered on conditionality agreements or structural
adjustment loans (SALs). SALs involved the re-negotiation of debts and future lines of credit for
Central American states in exchange for free market reforms enacted on domestic economies.
Early SALs in the 1980s in the region included currency devaluations, price hikes, subsidy cuts
on basic goods, agricultural inputs and transportation, wages freezes, and mass layoffs in the
public sector. A new generation of SALs in the 1990s and 2000s used these same austerity
policies in addition to privatization of much of the public sector and state-run industries (Bull
2008).
The consequences of these economic reforms emanating from core powers in the world
system resulted in new transnational alliances between Central American capitalists and the
global financial elite, especially in industries such as export manufacturing and processing zones,
non-traditional agricultural crops, pharmaceuticals, tourism, and call centers (Robinson 2003;
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Even in relatively democratic Costa Rica in the state-led development era, the Communist Party (Partido
Vanguardia Popular) was banned from electoral competition until 1975.
Spalding 2014). The external debt also debilitated governments in Mesoamerica from sustaining
vital social services in health, education, and utilities for the subaltern classes (Lehoucq 2012).
Figure 1 demonstrates that all six Central American States were under some kind of structural
adjustment agreement for the majority of years between 1980 and 2004. 2 These structural
adjustment pressures illustrated in Figure 1 provide the link between global neoliberalism,
national economic policy and local mass resistance in the form of social movement partyism. In
particular, within the SAL agreements, Central American states consented to privatize the state
infrastructure, lift price controls on food, transportation, and utilities, engage in free trade, and
open up natural resources to foreign investment and extraction. These types of arrangements
empirically measured as IMF Pressure were associated with heightened outbreaks of austerity
protest in the first decades of the global debt crisis throughout the developing world (Walton and
Ragin 1990).
Figure1. Number of Years under IMF or World Bank Structural Adjustment Agreement,
1980-2004
!
25!
20!
15!
10!
Years!Under!Structural!
Adjustment!
5!
0!
Source: Figure constructed from Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007)
The first major sustained protest campaigns against structural adjustment erupted in Costa Rica
and Panama in the 1980s, while El Salvador and Guatemala experienced short term campaigns of
popular resistance. In Costa Rica, the popular classed assembled the first rounds of the social
movement party-alliance against neoliberal reforms. Costa Rica entered a foreign debt crisis by
the early 1980s (Spalding 2014). At the same time, the countrys long standing democracy
expanded political freedoms and political competition in the mid-1970s by legalizing leftist
political parties. Several of these emerging socialist opposition parties would unify into the
Pueblo Unido electoral coalition between 1978 and 1982. Pueblo Unido gained steam by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
The percentage of years under structural adjustment ranged between 56% (Guatemala) to 88% (Panama).!!

supporting mobilization against the debt crisis especially in terms of battling subsidy cuts on
vital urban services and necessities such as transportation, food, and electricity. This movementparty alliance peaked with the movement against IMF-sponsored price hikes in consumer
electricity prices in mid-1983 (Alvarenga Venutulo 2005). Pueblo Unido party militants aligned
with neighborhood organizations in dozens of towns and villages to oppose the austerity
measures. The mobilizations included the construction of make-shift barricades on the countrys
major transportation corridors. The nation-wide mobilizations were potent enough to force the
government to halt the measure and return prices to their pre-1983 levels.
As other countries began to democratize in the region in the 1990s, they followed a
similar pattern as Costa Rica, leftist political parties aligned with popular movements to
challenge the implementation of neoliberal policies issued by the IMF and World Bank. In some
cases, the alliance benefited the electoral fortunes of the oppositional party. Hence, social
movement partyism emerged as a key mode of resistance in the shift to global neoliberalism. For
example, in Nicaragua, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacin Nacional (FSLN) party immediately
launched a massive campaign with labor unions and rural cooperatives in 1990 in response to
newly elected president Violeta Chammoros privatization and austerity measures. The national
outpouring of popular unrest represented the largest collective actions since the revolution of
1979. Local level resistance to the neoliberal transition was more pronounced where the FSLN
maintained a stronger territorial foothold and could mobilize popular organizations affiliated
with the party (Almeida 2014).
By the 2000s, all six Central American states had democratized. At the same time, the
international financial institutions were pushing a more aggressive form of privatization within
structural adjustment accords as the external debt on the isthmus continued to increase (Almeida
2014). In particular, each country in the region came under pressure to begin privatizing and
outsourcing strategic components of the state economic and social infrastructure that had
expanded so markedly in the previous period of state-led development. Development scholars
refer to the privatization policies dismantling the basic social, public, and economic
infrastructure as a second generation of structural adjustment (Bello 2007). These privatizations
included public lands, hospitals, telecommunications, energy production and distribution, water
and aqueduct administration, ports, mail services, public works, and dozens of other state
institutions and services. Some of these privatizations began in the 1990s and went through with
mild public opposition. However, by the 2000s, opposition political parties gathered enough
potency to initiate campaigns of mass defiance against privatization and free trade throughout the
region. The oppositional party-movement alliances were more extensive in Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua. However, social movement partyism gained strength in Honduras,
Panama, and Guatemala with the deepening of neoliberalism in the twenty-first century.
Strong Cases of Social Movement Partyism (Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua)
Costa Rica
Costa Ricas road to social movement partyism is rooted in the campaigns against the debt crisis
in the early 1980s discussed above. A new round of social movement partyism began in 2000
with the historic struggle against the privatization of electricity and telecommunications in a
single legislative package, referred to as el Combo by opponents (Almeida 2008; Frajam
2009). Oppositional leftist parties played key roles in the mobilization including the Fuerza
Democrtica the Pueblo Unido Coalition, and small Trotskyist parties. Hundreds of roadblocks
were erected around the country combined with mass marches to successfully force the
government to backpedal and cancel its privatization plans. Local regions where leftist parties
maintained territorial influence reported higher levels of resistance to privatization (Almeida
2012). Most significantly, the social movement and oppositional party mobilizations provided a
blueprint on how to confront an even larger challenge to the survival of Costa Ricas tropical
welfare state (Edelman 1999) the threat of the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA). The key organizations and oppositional political parties that successfully overturned
energy and electricity privatization formed a coordinating body (el Comit Nacional de Enlace)
that provided the organizational seeds for the largest opposition to CAFTA on the isthmus. Also
in the early 2000s, two new left-of-center oppositional political parties emerged - the Citizens
Action Party (PAC) and the Frente Amplio. Both parties originated from public discontent with
the neoliberal direction and corruption of the countrys two long-standing traditional political
parties (Lehoucq 2007).
By 2003, as the initial rounds of CAFTA were being discussed between the United States
and governments of the region, mobilizations broke out on the streets of Costa Rica. By 2004,
national campaigns against CAFTA were launched, while the PAC and Frente Amplio political
parties publicly opposed the measures. PAC and Frente Amplio party members and legislative
representatives often took part in the street marches against CAFTAhand to hand with public
school teachers, students, state employees, truck drivers, and ordinary citizens. The PAC almost
won the presidency in early 2006 in a presidential campaign where CAFTA served as the
principal public issue for debate, falling just one percentage point short of a victory over Oscar
Arias and the long dominant (and pro-neoliberal) Partido de Liberacin Nacional (PLN).
Mobilizations continued building momentum against free trade in 2006 and 2007, including a
two day-long general strike against CAFTA in October of 2006 that included actions in dozens
of localities throughout the national territory. Mass mobilization reached historic levels in 2007
with two of the largest public demonstrations in modern Costa Rica history, reaching up to
150,000 people in February and September, respectively. The February 2007 mass march was so
immense that it forced the government to hold a referendum on CAFTA.
In the second half of 2007, the referendum resulted in renewed electoral mobilization
between anti-CAFTA movements on the streets and the PAC and Frente Amplio political parties.
These opposition parties mobilized the No vote in the referendum. This new social movement
party mobilization was in the form of Patriotic Committees (Los Comits Patriticoslocal
bastions of resistance to CAFTA at the community level in charge of getting out the vote in the
No referendum campaign (Raventos 2013). CAFTA ultimately passed by a narrow margin in
the popular vote of October 2007. After this time, a lull occurred in popular and electoral
mobilization until the 2010s. Between 2008 and 2014, new struggles over open pit mining, water
access, and privatization of highways and ports galvanized citizens to vote for left leaning parties
in the 2014 elections whereby the leftist Frente Amplio won an unprecedented 9 parliamentary
seats (out of 57) and the left-of-center Citizens Action Party (PAC) won the presidency and 13
parliamentary seats. The socialist Frente Amplio party ran candidates for the legislative assembly
that played major roles in the anti-systemic movements against mining, free trade, and
privatization over the previous two decades.

El Salvador
El Salvador entered the neoliberal order after over a decade of brutal civil war (1980-1992). The
leftist insurgents of the Farabundo Mart National Liberation Front (FMLN) survived the war
and converted into an electoral political party (Allison and Martin 2012). The new oppositional
party continued to expand its electoral reach throughout the 1990s winning greater representation
in the national parliament and local governments. The FMLN often sided with social movement
struggles against agricultural debt, privatization of pensions, telecommunications, and energy
distribution and benefited with a growing electoral constituency.
By the end of 1999, the FMLN political party was on the front lines of a battle over
health care privatization. The FMLN combated health care privatization from 1999 to 2003 in
two massive social movement campaigns using the partys membership to mobilize on the streets
and plazas against the neoliberal measures. The protests succeeded in halting health care
privatization and eventuated in even more party success in the elections following the antiprivatization campaigns. Between 2003 and 2008, the party turned its mobilizing efforts to
confronting the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The anti-CAFTA
mobilizations included street marches, road blocks, and educational workshops. Even FMLN
mayors participated in the protest activities. The party capitalized on this momentum to increase
voter turnout in the 2004 and 2006 national elections, even though it did not harbor sufficient
representation in parliament to prevent CAFTAs passage (Spalding 2014). In 2009, the FMLN
won presidential power for the first time with nearly 1.3 million votes. In 2014, the party
triumphed for a second consecutive period, reaching a historic 1.5 million votes. Between 2009
and 2015, in the midst of the world financial crisis, the FMLN governments have worked to
reduce poverty and resist further neoliberal measures such as the privatization of water and
sewage administration, along with the implementation of many post-neoliberal social programs
for the elderly, school children (e.g., paquetes escolares), the rural poor, and women (e.g.,
Ciudad Mujer).
Nicaragua
Nicaragua was baptized into the neoliberal era via counter-revolution. With the stunning
presidential loss in the February 1990 elections, the revolutionary Sandinista (FSLN) party
stepped down from power. The victorious neoliberal government of Violeta Chamorro unleashed
a series of economic measures that slowly dismantled the cornerstones of the 1979 revolution.
The policies included privatization of state-run farms, factories, and infrastructure. The FSLN
immediately used its mass organizations to resist the neoliberal measures, resulting in a slower
pace of the implementation of some of the reforms and greater concessions. These battles moved
to the countryside by the mid-to late 1990s as the neoliberal state de-funded state agricultural
banks (Enrquez 2010). The FSLN as an oppositional party also tried to maintain the educational
budget in the 1990s and early 2000s for the public universities that expanded during the
revolution.
By the 2000s, former FSLN militants in the mass organizations, government offices, and
the Sandinista army engaged in the NGO sector leading major campaigns against water and
electricity privatization as well as consumer price hikes in utilities and transportation. These
mobilizations resulted in greater electoral gains in the 2004 local elections and the 2006 national
elections for the FSLN. In late 2006, the FSLN won the presidency and the party was re-elected
in 2012. During this time in executive power, the FSLN has protected much of the remaining
state infrastructure from further privatization programs and implemented a number of antipoverty and anti-hunger programs.
Emergent Social Movement Partysim (Honduras, Panama, and Guatemala)

Honduras
Neoliberal reforms in Honduras have also pushed political parties and movements into a close
alliance. In 1990, the Honduran state made a decisive turn toward neoliberalism by enacting its
first major structural adjustment agreements between the IMF and World Bank. A wave of
sustained resistance resulted, but no major left-leaning electoral oppositional party existed at the
time. In the end, between 1990 and 1993 a series of structural adjustment reforms (including
energy and land privatization) were implemented by the Callejas government in one of the
earliest phases of privatization in the region (Sosa 2010).
By the late 1990s a new left oppositional party emerged, the Unificacin Democrtica
(UD) (Allison 2006). At the same time, the Honduran state initiated a second round of structural
adjustment reforms with the international financial institutions between 1999 and 2004 in order
to reduce its foreign debt and enter the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative
governed by the IMF and World Bank (Almeida 2014). Once again, popular organizations
began to form alliances to battle the new neoliberal reforms. The two most important coalitions
of popular organizations to develop were the Bloque Popular (formed in 1999) and Coordinadora
Nacional de Resistencia Popular (established in 2003). The UD oppositional political party
entered both of these coalitions. These multi-sectoral alliances fought several campaigns between
2000 and 2009 against privatization, price hikes, and the Central American Free Trade
Agreement. Water privatization in particular, provided a central focus of the largest multisectoral mobilizations between 2003 and 2009. As elsewhere in Central America, the new round
of free market policies emanating from the world economy and global financial institutions
shaped the alliance between social movements and political parties in Honduras.
With the ascendancy and then overthrow of the populist Manuel Zelaya presidency in
2009, the party-movement alliance strengthened even further. Large factions of Zelayas Liberal
Party split off to join the Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular (FNRP) along with the UD in a
protest campaign to restore democracy. The threat to power-holders of social movement
partyism as a major strategy of action resisting the military coup appeared so great that it resulted
in the assassination of two party militants of Unificacin Democrtica (UD) in the cities of San
Pedro Sula and Santa Barbara within weeks of the military ousting of Manuel Zelaya (Estrada
2012). The FNRP focused on building up sufficient social and political forces across the national
territory to eventually take state power as an explicit goal. The FNRP sustained a two year battle
against the military coup, renewed neoliberal policies and state repression.
With Zelayas return to the country in mid-2011, an even more powerful social
movement party was formedthe Libertad y Refundacin (LIBRE) oppositional party. 3
Between 2011 and 2014 the FNRP and LIBRE have largely focused on electoral mobilization. In
particular, the LIBRE party used social movement mobilization against neoliberal measures in
order to support electoral turnout. Indeed, Sosa Iglesias (2014) has documented an upturn in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
An overwhelming majority of UD party grassroots militants changed affiliation to the LIBRE party in 2011.

social protest between 2012 and 2013 from 212 annual protest events to 497, respectively. This
upsurge in popular contention occurred simultaneously with the presidential, parliamentary, and
presidential election campaign of November 2013. In these historic elections, the LIBRE party
broke up the 100 year old system of two party elite rule and became the second largest political
party in Honduras campaigning on a platform of anti-neoliberalism and democratic socialism.
This electoral appeal achieved nearly 900,000 votes for president and garnered the second largest
number of parliamentary seats in the legislature.4
Panama
In Panama, anti-systemic movements emerged from struggles against labor flexibility, and
privatization of energy, telecommunications, and water administration in the 1990s. By the
2000s, popular movements used these experiences to build a powerful multi-sectoral coalition
called the National Front in Defense of Social Security (FRENADESSO). FRENADESSO is a
coalition of high school and university students, labor unions (including the militant construction
workers in SUNTRACS), school teachers, and health care staff and professionals. Between 2003
and 2005 FRENADESSO fought two major battles against the restructuring and privatization of
the Panamanian health and pension systemthe Caja de Seguro Social (one of the more
extensive social security systems in Latin America). The mobilizations reached across the
national territory and served as a critical organizing experience for the next round of antineoliberal contentionthe period between 2010-2014 with the arrival of the Martinelli
government.
Beginning in 2010, another round of mass mobilization occurred in Panama over a new
labor flexibility law that combined other anti-popular legislation such as watering down
environmental laws and penalizing protests with harsh legal measures. The 2010 labor flexibility
laws were followed by protests over mining contracts and hydroelectric dam construction in the
Ngobe-Bugle Comarca in 2011 and 2012. These protests involved solidarity actions across the
national territory and forced the government to backtrack on the mega-projects. Out of these
anti-neoliberal struggles between 2003 and 2010 emerged a new left oppositional political party
in early 2011 the Frente Amplio por la Democracia (FAD). In late 2012, the Martinelli
government and his majority Cambio Democrtico Party in the parliament approved the
privatization of lands surrounding the Canal Zone in the Province of Coln. The FAD party used
its links in the popular movement to coordinate a massive nonviolent uprising against the
privatization, leading to mobilizations throughout the countrys nine provinces. The
mobilizations were successful and the government overturned its plans for the privatizations.
Nonetheless, the FAD was unable to convert its successful mobilizations on the streets into
electoral victories. The party was only able to garner about 1 percent of the national vote in
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014.
Guatemala
The case of Guatemala is similar to Panama and Honduras (before the formation of LIBRE) with
small leftist parties aligning with popular movements against major neoliberal reforms between
2000 and 2014. In particular the ANN and URNG oppositional parties have used their
organizational structures to protest against new taxes (Almeida and Walker 2007), free trade,
mining, and electricity price hikes. The oppositional parties have engaged with large multisectoral coalitions such as the MICSP and the FNL composed of dozens of civil society
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
The author witnessed these elections as an international election monitor.
organizations across the country (Yagenova 2015). These small left parties were weak at the
dawn of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s and unable able to overcome the massive state
repression of the past or the fragmentation of the Guatemalan competitive party system (Allison
2006; Pallister 2013). The ANN and URNG (and smaller aligned parties such as Winaq) usually
garner only between 3 and 10 percent of the popular vote in national elections. Nevertheless,
with their high commitment followers scattered across Guatemalas 22 departments, these
oppositional parties continue to hold national days of protest against mining and for the renationalization of energy distribution (including major nation-wide mobilizations in 2014 and
2015).
Table 1. Global Neoliberalism and Social Movement Partyism in Central America
Country
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Honduras
Panama
Guatemala
Neoliberal Policies that Led to the

Formation or Consolidation of
Social Movement Partyism
Telecommunications and Electricity
Privatization, Central American Free
Trade Agreement, Mining, Ports and
Highway Privatization
Health Care Privatization, Central
American Free Trade Agreement,
Water Privatization
Land Reform Privatization, Electricity
Privatization, Water Privatization,
Mass Transportation Subsidy Cuts
Telecommunications Privatization,
Water Privatization, Model Cities
Program
Water Privatization, Labor Flexibility,
Social Security/Health Care
Privatization, Mining, Land
Privatization
Electricity Privatization, New Taxes,
Mining/Mega-Projects
Social Movement Party

Fuerza Democrtica/Frente
Amplio/Partido de Accin
Ciudadana (PAC)
Frente Farabundo Mart para la
Liberacin Nacional (FMLN)
Frente Sandinista de Liberacin
Nacional (FSLN)
Unificacin Democrtica (UD),
Libertad y Refundacin (LIBRE)
Frente Amplio por la Democracia
(FAD)
FDNG/URNG/ANN
Conclusion
The shift from state-led development to neoliberal forms of capitalism at the global level
provided new threats and incentives for antisystemic forces to form electoral political parties as a
strategy to resist new harms associated with the loss of social citizenship rights. The concurrent
process of democratization pushes subaltern groups to form oppositional political parties as one
pathway to impede the process of neoliberalization. Table 1 summarizes the major neoliberal
measures in Central America that unified oppositional parties with popular movements over the
past two decades. Many of these policies emanating from the global shift toward deepening
economic liberalization have motivated some of the largest outbreaks of popular unrest in

modern Central America, especially over free trade and the privatization of health care, water,
electricity and natural resources (Almeida 2014). The mobilizations have led to electoral
triumphs for leftist opposition parties in El Salvador and Nicaragua, center-left parties in Costa
Rica, and near leftist victories in Honduras and Costa Rica.
Nation-states with strong challenges from the left at the dawn of the shift to global
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s were able to form strong versions of social movement
partyism at a rapid rate, as in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador.5 In countries with a two
party system, the elite neoliberal parties had to weaken before a social movement party was able
to gain substantial strength, as the cases of Costa Rica and Honduras illustrate.6 Even countries
with small left-wing parties, such as Guatemala and Panama, the oppositional parties have
played a fundamental role in mobilizing popular sectors against major free market reforms such
as privatization, free trade, and foreign extraction of natural resources, even if they have yet to
convert social movement mobilization into major electoral victories. As elsewhere in Latin
America and other regions of the global South, Central America demonstrates an innovative
mode of mass resistance emerging between party and movement with the world historical
transformation from state-led development to a renewed cycle of accumulation centered on
privatization and free trade.
A logical next step for the analysis of social movement partyism would be to examine the
party-movement relationship once the oppositional party takes power (Levistky and Roberts
2011; Prevost, Vanden, and Campos 2012; Goodale and Postero 2013). For the most part social
movement activity has declined in the countries where the left has taken power. This partially
indicates that in our cases of strong social movement partyism, much of the prior anti-neoliberal
mobilization emanated from the political parties with their ability to chill out mobilization
after electoral triumph. The left parties in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and to some extent in Costa
Rica, originated out of social movements with many rank and file members simultaneously party
affiliates and activists in civil society organizations.
In Central America, even when left-leaning governments have taken power in Costa Rica,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua they still operate their national economies within the broad
parameters of CAFTA and the larger capitalist world system. Even though major reforms have
been implemented in Nicaragua and El Salvador (such as Zero Hunger, low interest loans to the
rural sector, minimum allowances to the elderly, and school food and uniform programs, etc.),
the post-neoliberal states still are largely organized along free market lines. Scholars view the
social movement party mobilizations and their reformist outcomes in Central and South America
as resembling more of Polanyian-type struggle of reducing the most harmful impacts of
unregulated markets such as the sharp social cuts associated with neoliberalism of the early
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
The case of Nicaragua also has some variation over time with the pact between Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo
Alemns Liberal Party (Marti Puig 2015). At times the pact was used by the FSLN to demobilize street protests,
especially in the late 1990s and against CAFTA in the mid-2000s. The Pact also divided the Liberal Party making
Ortega and the FSLNs election victory achievable in late 2006. In El Salvador, the FMLNs electoral success is also
due to the partys ability to reach out to sectors beyond its traditional base such as business sectors and groups
alienated with the long dominant ARENA party. The choice of presidential candidate Mauricio Funes for the 2009
presidential elections demonstrated this willingness of the party to move beyond its core base of supporters.
6
The case of Honduras is somewhat unique in that the military coup of 2009 gave a great boost to the scale of social
movement partyism by Zelayas ability to pull a substantial portion of the traditional Liberal Party into the social
movement party of LIBRE. Nonetheless, the party movement alliance had already been formed on a much smaller
scale between the UD and popular movements a relationship that centered on mobilizing against neoliberal
measures implemented in the period from 1999-2009.
twenty-first century (Silva 2009; Spalding 2014). 7 Systematic empirical evidence is also
mounting that reformist governments in Latin America are effectively reducing poverty levels
and increasing social well-being as observed in measures of health and educational outcomes
(Flores Macas 2012; Cohn 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012).
References
Abouharb, M. Rodwan., and David Cingranelli. 2007. Human Rights and Structural Adjustment.
Agartan, Tuba, Woo-Young Choi, and Tu Huynh. 2008. The transformation of the capitalist
world: 1750-1850. Pp. 10-49 in W. Martin, ed., Making Waves: Worldwide Social
Movements, 1750-2005. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Allison, Michael. 2006. The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in
Central America. Latin American Politics and Society 48(4): 137-162.
Allison, Michael and Alberto Martin Alvarez. 2012. Unity and Disunity in the FMLN. Latin
American Politics and Society 54(4): 89-118.
Almeida, Paul D. 2014. Mobilizing Democracy: Globalization and Citizen Protest. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press.
____. 2012. Subnational Opposition to Globalization. Social Forces 90(4): 1051-1072.
____. 2010. Social Movement Partyism: Collective Action and Political Parties. Pp. 170-196
in N. Van Dyke and H. McCammon, eds., Strategic Alliances: New Studies of Social Movement
Coalitions. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
____. 2008. The Sequencing of Success: Organizing Templates and Neoliberal Policy
Outcomes. Mobilization 13(2): 165-187.
____. 2007. Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements against Economic Adjustment
Policies in Latin America. Latin American Perspectives 34(3): 123-139.
____. 2006. Social Movement Unionism, Social Movement Partyism, and Policy Outcomes.
Pp. 57-73 in H. Johnston and P. Almeida, eds., Latin American Social Movements:
Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield.
Almeida, Paul D. and Erica Walker. 2007. El Avance de la Globalizacin Neoliberal: Una
Comparacin de Tres Campaas de Movimientos Populares en Centroamrica. Revista
Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales 4(1): 51-76.
Alvarenga Venutolo, Patricia Ana. 2005. Los ciudadanos y el estado de bienestar: Costa Rica en
la segunda mitad del siglo XX. San Jos: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica.
Arrighi, Giovanni,Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein 1989. Anti-Systemic
Movements. London: Verso.
Babb, Sarah. 2009. Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the
Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bello, Walden. 2007. "The post Washington Dissensus." Focus on Trade 132.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
Another interesting outcome to examine would be the international relationships between social movement
partyism and other leftist governments and anti-neoliberal alternatives such as ALBA in terms of the effectiveness
of social movement partyism and the success of reformist governments after an electoral triumph.

Block, Fred and Margaret Somers. 2014. The Power of Market Fundamentalism : Karl Polanyi's
Critique. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bob, Clifford. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism.
Brockett, Charles. 1998. Land, Power, and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political
Conflict in Central America. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bull, Benedicte. 2005. Aid, Power, and Privatization: The Politics of Telecommunication Reform
in Central America. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1987. The Political Economy of Central America since 1920.
Bush, Caleb. 2008. Reformers and Revolutionaries: The Rise of Anti-Systemic Movements and
the Paradox of Power, 1848-1917. Pp. 50-81 in W. Martin, ed., Making Waves:
Worldwide Social Movements, 1750-2005. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2006. Globalization: A World System Perspective. Pp. 79105 in
C. Chase-Dunn and S. Babones, eds, Global Social Change: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cohn, Samuel. 2012. Employment and Development under Globalization: State and Economy
in Brazil. London: Palgrave.
Diani, Mario and Maria Kousis. 2014. The Duality of Claims and Events: The Greek Campaign
against Troikas Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2012. Mobilization 19(4): 387 -404.
Edelman, Marc. 1999. Peasants against Globalization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Enrquez, Laura. 2010. Reactions to the Market: Small Farmers in the Economic Reshaping of
Nicaragua, Cuba, Russia, and China. University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press.
Estrada, Oscar. 2012. Honduras: Crnicas del golpe de Estado y Resistencia. Brimfield, MA:
Casasola Editores.
Flores Macas, Gustavo. 2012. After Neoliberalism?: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin
America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foran, John. 2005. Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Frajman, Eduardo. 2009. Information and Values in Popular Protests: Costa Rica in 2000.
Bulletin of Latin American Research 28(1): 44-62.
Gleijeses, Piero. 1991. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States,
19441954. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Goodale, Mark and Nancy Postero. Eds. 2013. Neoliberalism Interrupted: Social Change and
Contested Governance in Contemporary Latin America. Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press.
Gunder Frank, Andre and Marta Fuentes. 1994. On Studying the Cycles in Social Movements.
Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 17: 173-196.
Huber, Evelyne, and John Stephens. Democracy and the Left: Policy and Inequality in Latin
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hulme, David, and Michael Edwards. Eds. 1997. NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for
Comfort. London: St. Martins
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jackson, Jeffrey T. 2005. The globalizers: development workers in action. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Kousis, Maria. 2014. The Transnational Dimension of the Greek Protest Campaign against
Troika Memoranda and Austerity Policies, 2010-12. In D. della Porta and A. Mattoni
(eds) Spreading Protests in Social Movements of the Crisis, Colchester: ECPR Press.!
Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2012. The Politics of Modern Central America: Civil War, Democratization,
and Underdevelopment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
____. 2007. Policymaking, parties and institutions in democratic Costa Rica. Mexico City:
Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas.
Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth Roberts. 2011. Introduction: Latin Americas Left
Turn: A Framework for Analysis, in The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, 130.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Markoff, John and Amy White. 2009. The Global Wave of Democratization. Pp. 55-73 in
Christian W. Haerpfer, Ronald Inglehart, Chris Welzel and Patrick Bernhagen, eds.,
Democratization in a Globalized World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marti Puig, Salvador. 2015. Social Movements in Nicaragua (1979-2014): an Exceptional
Case. In P. Almeida and A. Cordero. Eds. Handbook of Social Movements across Latin
America. New York: Springer.
Martin, William. 2008. Conclusion: World Movement Waves and World Transformations.
Pp.168-180 in W. Martin, ed., Making Waves: Worldwide Social Movements, 1750-2005.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late Twentieth
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pallister, Kevin. 2013. Why No Mayan Party? Indigenous Movements and National Politics in
Guatemala. Latin American Politics and Society 55(3): 117-138.
Prevost, Gary, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry Vanden, eds. 2012. Social Movements and
Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation? London: Zed.
Raventos, Ciska. 2013. My Heart Says No: Political Experiences of the Struggle against
CAFTA-DR in Costa Rica. In J. Burrell and E. Moodie, eds., Central America in the
New Millennium: Living Transition and Reimagining Democracy, 8095. New York:
Berghahn.
Robinson, William. 2003. Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and
Globalization. London: Verso.
____. 2006. Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America: The Oxymoron of "Market Democracy."
In (eds.) Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen Latin America After Neoliberalism. New York:
The New Press.
Schock, Kurt, 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Shefner, Jon and Julie Stewart. 2011. Neoliberalism, Grievances and Democratization: An
Exploration of the Role of Material Hardships in Shaping Mexico Democratic
Transition. Journal of World Systems Research 17(2):!353-378.
Shefner, Jon, George Pasdirtz, and Cory Blad. 2006. Austerity Protests and Social
Immiseration: Evidence from Mexico and Argentina. In Latin American Social
Movements, edited by Hank Johnston and Paul Almeida. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.

Silva, Eduardo. 2012. Exchange Rising? Karl Polanyi and Contentious Politics in
Contemporary Latin America. Latin American Politics and Society 54(3): 1-32.
Silver, Beverly. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers Movements and Globalization since 1870.
Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Wiest. 2012. Social Movements in the World System: The Politics of
Crisis and Transformation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Sosa, Eugenio. 2010. La protesta social en Honduras: del ajuste al golpe de estado.
Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras.
Sosa Iglesias, Jos Eugenio. 2014. Honduras: Entre criminalidad, enfrentamiento meditico,
protesta social y resultados electorales cuestionados. Revista de Ciencia Poltica 34(1):
203 219.
Spalding, Rose. 2014. Contesting Trade in Central America: Market Reform and Resistance.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Subramaniam, Mangala. 2015. Introduction: States and Social Movements in the Modern
World-System Journal of World System Research.
Subramaniam, Mangala. 2007. NGOs and Resources in the Construction of Intellectual Realms:
Cases from India Critical Sociology 33 (3): 551-73.
Udayagiri, Mridula, and John Walton. 2003. "Global transformation and local counter
movements: the prospects for democracy under neoliberalism." International Journal of
Comparative Sociology 44(4): 309-343.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1990. Antisystemic Movements: History and Dilemmas. Pp. 13-53 in
S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A. Gunder Frank, and I. Wallerstein, eds., Transforming the
Revolution: Social Movements and the World System. New York: Monthly Review Press.
____. 2014. Anti-systemic Movements, Yesterday and Today. Journal of World Systems
Research 20(2):158-172.
Walton, John, and Charles Ragin. 1990. Global and National Sources of Political Protest: Third
World Responses to the Debt Crisis. American Sociological
Review 55(6): 87691.
Yagenova, Simona. 2015. Guatemalan social movements: From the peace process to a new
cycle of popular struggle, (1996-2013). In P. Almeida and A. Cordero, eds. Handbook of
Latin American Social Movements. New York: Springer.
Breaking Ships in the World-System: An Analysis of Two Ship Breaking Capitals, AlangSosiya, India and Chittagong, Bangladesh
R. Scott Frey
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
rfrey2@utk.edu
Abstract
Centrality in the world-system allows countries to externalize their hazards or environmental
harms on others. Core countries, for instance, dump heavy metals and greenhouse gases into the
global sinks, and some of the cores hazardous products, production processes and wastes are
displaced to the (semi) peripheral zones of the world-system. Since few (semi) peripheral
countries have the ability to assess and manage the risks associated with such hazards, the
transfer of core hazards to the (semi) periphery has adverse environmental and socio-economic
consequences for many of these countries and it has spawned conflict and resistance, as well as
a variety of other responses. Most discussions of this risk globalization problem have failed to
situate it firmly in the world-system frame emphasizing the process of ecological unequal
exchange. Using secondary sources, I begin such a discussion by examining the specific problem
of ship breaking (recycling core-based ocean going vessels for steel and other materials) at the
yards in Alang-Sosiya, India and Chittagong, Bangladesh. Attention centers on the nature and
scope of ship breaking in these two locations, major drivers operating in the world-system,
adverse consequences, the unequal mix of costs and benefits, and the failure of existing political
responses at the domestic and international levels to reduce adequately the adverse
consequences of ship breaking.
Keywords: Ship Breaking, Hazardous Wastes, Environmental Injustice, Risk Globalization,
World-Systems Theory, Ecological Unequal Exchange, Political Ecology, Capital Accumulation,
Recycling
our world is an ocean world, and it is wild (Langewiesche, 2004:8)
The world-system is a global economic system in which goods and services are produced for
profit and the process of capital accumulation must be continuous if the system is to survive.1
The world-system can be conceptualized as a three-tiered open system (consisting of a core,
semi-periphery, and periphery) that can be understood not only in economic terms but also in
1
See especially Wallerstein (1976-2011, 2000, 2004) for the origin and nature of the world-system perspective and
Harvey (2010) for a recent discussion of continuous capital accumulation under capitalist relations in the global
economy.
Journal of World-Systems Research, Volume 21, Number 1, Pages 25- 49, ISSN 1076-156X
26 Journal of World-Systems Research

physical or metabolic terms (a world-ecology according to Moore [2011b]): it is a system
embedded in the natural environment and open to the entry of energy and materials and the exit
of dissipated energy and material waste across regions of the system (Frey 1998a; Hornborg
2011; Martinez-Alier 2007, 2009; Moore 2011a, 2011b). In fact, the world-system and
globalization itself can be described as a process of ecological unequal exchange (e.g., Clark
and Foster 2009; Foster and Holleman 2014; Hornborg 2011; Jorgenson and Clark 2009a; Rice
2007, 2009) or a process of accumulation by extraction and contaminationor the
undervaluation of environmental and human health (Martinez-Alier 2002, 2009). Frey has
described the process of ecological unequal exchange in terms of wealth and anti-wealth flows
between core and (semi) periphery (1998, 2006a).2
Wealth (in its many forms, including economic value, as well as material and energy)
flows from the resource-rich countries of the (semi) periphery or resource frontiers to the core
countries with adverse environmental and socio-economic consequences for the (semi) periphery
(see, e.g., Bunker 1985, 2007; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Clark and Foster 2009b; Foster and
Holleman 2014; Hornborg 2007; Moore 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a; Robins 2011; Uglietti et al.
2015).3 On the other hand, the core displaces anti-wealth (wastes and the attendant risks, entropy
broadly defined or appropriates carrying capacity or environmental space)4 by transporting it to
the global sinks and to sinks or waste frontiers located in the peripheral zones of the worldsystem. Heavy metals, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, as well as other hazardous
materials such as lead and plastic are pumped into the global atmosphere and the oceans at high
rates by the affluent or core countries of the world-system (see, e.g., Dietz and Rosa 1997;
Jorgenson 2006; Kentor and Grimes 2006; Prew 2010; Roberts, Grimes, and Manale 2006;
Roberts and Parks 2007; York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003; York and Rosa 2006).
Core-based transnational corporations export hazards to the peripheral zones of the
world-system, including hazardous products (e.g., cigarettes, pesticides, and asbestos),
production processes (dirty industries such as benzene and pesticide production plants and other
production processes), and wastes (e-waste, lead batteries, and other wastes such as phenols,
meracaptans, hydrogen sulfide) (see, e.g., Auyero and Swistun 2009; Clapp 2001; Clelland 2014;
Dick and Jorgenson 2011; Frey 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2006a, 2006b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013;
Gottesfeld and Pokhrel 2011; Grineski et al. 2010; Hooks and Smith 2012; Margai and Barry
2011; Nixon 2011; Pellow 2007:73-224; Rice 2011).5 These export practices not only damage
2
The world-system is best characterized as the unequal, asymmetrical flow of ecosystem goods and services as well
as bads. Ecological unequal exchange is not confined solely to the core-periphery relations in the world-system but
includes relations within nations and regions of the world-system.
3
This is not only a current process (Bunker 1985; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Hornborg 2011), but a historical
process that gave rise to the first core nations in Europe and modern global capitalism (Moore 2007, 2010a, 2010b;
Robins 2011; Uglietti et al. 2015).
4
One reviewer suggested that the use of the term entropy in the present context is misleading. But theories of
ecological unequal exchange relations are based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics: the shift from order to
disorder in the universe (see, e.g., Bunker 1985; Foster and Holleman 2014; Hornborg, 1998, 2009, 2011). Rifkin
(1980:5) has noted: According to the Entropy Law, whenever a semblance of order is created anywhere on earth or
in the universe, it is done so at the expense of causing greater disorder in the surrounding environment. (See also
Adams [1988].) Consider the fact that the core is able to increase its order (eliminating the environmental and
human health risks embedded in obsolete hazardous ocean-going vessels) at the expense of the periphery which
experiences increased disorder in the form of environmental and health risks when core-based ocean-going vessels
are dismantled on its beaches.
5
See Carmin and Agyeman (2011) and Fabers (2008, 2009) restatement of much of the earlier work by Frey
(1998a, 1998b, 2006a) and others (Clapp 2001). Clelland (2014) uses the term dark value to describe part of the
Breaking Ships in the World-System 27

the environment, but they have adverse health, safety, and socio-economic consequences for the
human populations of the (semi) periphery and they represent a form of environmental injustice
(e.g., Bullard et al. 2005; Margai and Barry 2011). (Semi) peripheral countries are particularly
vulnerable to the risks posed by hazardous exports because (semi) peripheral states and domestic
firms have limited means for or interest in assessing and managing risks, and many workers and
citizens are often unaware of the risks associated with these hazards.
This paper examines one core-based hazardous export to the periphery to illustrate a
dimension of the process of ecological unequal exchange: the transfer of the cores ocean-going
ships to yards located in Alang-Sosiya, India and Chittagong, Bangladesh for breaking.6 These
two geographic sitessome would call them toxic hotspots or sacrifice zones to use
Lerners [2010] termare the ship breaking capitals of the world, since a majority of the worlds
ships are broken on their beaches. Ship breaking is the process of dismantling and recycling or
scrapping a ship for steel and other materials when it is no longer profitable for transport use due
to age, as well as low shipping rates and/or high steel prices. The case of ship breaking
documents one of the ways in which asymmetric, core-periphery relations are reproduced in the
world-system. In other words, the process of ecological unequal exchange (as defined in terms of
wealth and anti-wealth flows as noted above which serves the metabolic needs of core country
economies) facilitates core capital accumulation within the current world-system through
extraction from and contamination of the (semi) periphery.7
Discussion of this particular form of core-periphery reproduction or core capital accumulation
proceeds in five steps. The nature and scope of ship breaking are first examined and the specific
political-economic forces driving the transfer of ships to the (semi) periphery for breaking are outlined.
The extent to which ship breaking contributes to adverse health, safety, environmental, and socioeconomic consequences in the periphery is then examined. An approximate analysis of the costs and
benefits is presented in an effort to assess the neo-liberal claim that the movement of ship
breaking and other hazards to the (semi) periphery is beneficial to the core and the states,
domestic firms, workers, and citizens of these two peripheral countries. Various policy and
political responses to curb the adverse consequences of ship breaking are briefly reviewed and
discussed. It is argued that conventional efforts (whether globalization of regulation or
renationalization of capital) and the emergence of transnational NGO networks (sometimes
referred to as globalization from below [Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000; Chase-Dunn 2002,
2010; Subramaniam 2015]) to deal with ship breaking and many other hazardous exports have
had limited success because they fail to fully take into account the existence of a world-system
based on ecological unequal relations between core and periphery. The paper concludes with
value created through the cores extraction of wealth in its many forms from the (semi) periphery and its ability to
offshore or externalize what I call anti-wealth. See Urry (2014) for a discussion of the offshoring of not only antiwealth but economic and other forms of wealth.
6
See the documentary film Echoes of Shipbreaking (2014), produced by Vega Productions and directed by
Prathamesh Rane at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vV3M4jqD-Sg. Shortly before completing an earlier draft
of this paper, I discovered Demarias (2010) insightful paper on ship breaking in the yards of Alang-Sosyia, India.
Although we take different approaches and he confines his attention to India, I have incorporated several important
elements from Demarias paper that are noted in the text.
7
See Foster and Holleman (2014), Hornborg (1998, 2009, 2011), Jorgenson and Clark (2009), and Rice (2007,
2009) for detailed discussions of the process of ecological unequal exchange in which the core extracts energy and
material from the (semi) periphery and exports entropy to the (semi) periphery. Harvey (2010) provides a recent
discussion of capital accumulation, which is relevant for world-systems theory and the processes of ecological
unequal exchange.

several suggestions for future research on the hazardous waste stream in the world-system and
ongoing conflicts and efforts to curb it.
The Nature and Scope of Ship Breaking in Bangladesh and India
The global shipping industry, which facilitates the transport of wealth to the core and anti-wealth
to the periphery, is one of the major components of the infrastructure underlying the worldsystems social metabolism (Demaria 2010; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005). 8 Consider, for
instance, the fact that a majority of the global trade in materials and goods is by sea: 80% of all
raw materials and manufactured goods. Slightly more than 100,000 ocean-going vessels were
operating during the 2009-2010 period (see Demaria 2010; International Maritime Industry
2011:8; World Bank 2010).
After an average life span of 25 to 30 years or longer, many ocean-going vessels are
scrapped for their steel and other resources, though the number of vessels sent to the breaking
yards varies according to freight charges and steel prices (Demaria 2010; Greenpeace
International 2000, 2001; World Bank 2010). The industry is subject to boom and bust cycles. It
thrives during times of economic contraction and declines during periods of economic growth.
Approximately 1,000 (more than 25 million tons) of the 100,000 ocean-going vesselsincluding
oil tankers, container ships, bulk carriers, naval ships, chemical tankers, and general cargo
shipswere sent to the periphery in 2009 for scrapping (Puthucherril 2010:12-14;
Robindebois.org 2010; World Bank 2010:3; see also Greenpeace International [2000] for earlier
figures). The number of ships broken increased dramatically during the economic downturn in
2008-2009 when there was excess shipping capacity (Robindebois.org 2009). And it is expected
that there will be a dramatic increase in the number of ships broken in the near future as a result
of the International Maritime Organizations regulation phasing out older, single-hull tankers
during the period from 2010 to 2015 (Karim 2010; Puthucherril 2010:14; World Bank 2010).
Other options for obsolete ships or ships of limited economic value include moth-balling or
scuttling, but these options are problematic: moth-balling does not solve the long-term problem
of disposal, and sinking a ship leads to toxic discharges and forgoes the recyclable value of the
ship (Puthucherril 2010:14)
Over 90 percent of the vessels slated for breakingtypically owned by interests based in
the core but sailing under foreign flags of convenienceare currently transported to Bangladesh,
Pakistan, China, the Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam.9 The remaining ships are broken in
8
Bunker and Ciccantell (2005: xxii) describe the role played by the shipping industry in the emergence of the worldsystem in the following way: the development of shipping technology was a critical, and very concrete, element
in the material intensification and spatial expansion of the world economy over the past six hundred years, proving
that the nation that could develop and control the most efficient shipping could also guarantee its access to cheap
raw materials. The global shipping industry has grown dramatically since the 1960s. This growth is in large part a
result of the development of standardized shipping containers (see Cudahy, 2006; Levinson, 2006). These containers
have facilitated efficient production and transport of manufactured goods in the world-system. Individual container
ships carry thousands of tons of freight (mostly from East Asia) and travel more than two hundred thousand miles
each year. See American Association of Port Authorities (2008) for data on total cargo volume and container traffic
at many ports in the world-system. Halpern et al. (2008) present estimates of the environmental impact of the
shipping industry and other human activities on marine ecosystems around the world. And Shin and Ciccantell
(2009) provide an excellent overview of the changing nature and location of shipbuilding in the world-system.
9
Ocean-going vessels change their nation of registry to reduce national and regional regulations (Kotoky 2015). The
British Petroleums (BP) Deepwater Horizon, for instance, was registered under the flag of the Marshall Islands in

locations such as the United Kingdom and the United States under strict health, safety, and
environmental regulation. Ship breaking is pursued mainly in the former countries because labor
is cheap; health, safety, and environmental regulations are weak; workers are desperate for jobs;
and the recovered steel in used in domestic construction activities. The ship breaking industry
was centered in the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom during and after World War
II, but it moved to Turkey and Spain in the 1960s, then to Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s, and it
shifted to several countries in South and Southeast Asia starting in the mid-1980s (Demaria
2010; World Bank 2010). In other words, ship breaking moved from the core to peripheral
countries in Asia when the cost of breaking ships in the core (due to increased regulations and
other forms of ecological modernization, as well as increased labor costs estimated to be more
than 50 times that of developing countries [Rousmaniere and Raj 2007:362]) exceeded the price
obtained from the scrapped metal.10
Ship breaking can be defined as a pollution haven industry since it has moved from
several core countries to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and several (semi) peripheral countries due
to increased environmental, health, and safety regulations in the core, as well as low wage labor
available elsewhere.11 But other factors have clearly contributed to the movement of the ship
breaking industry to South and Southeast Asia (see, e.g., Buerk 2006; Demaria 2010; Hossain
and Islam 2006:2). These include strong domestic markets for steel and other materials; the
temperate climate of the region allows ship breaking to take place throughout the year; high tides
and favorable beach conditions; and close proximity to the main eastbound sea trade routes.
Sixty to seventy percent of the ships scrapped each year go to the Alang-Sosiya yards in
India (often described as the ship breaking capital of the world-system) and Chittagong,
Bangladesh (Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005;
Robindebois.org 2009, 2010, 2011; World Bank 2010:14), though China has become
increasingly important in breaking ships and may become more important in the future (See
an effort to reduce US government regulations (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011). This factor was undoubtedly
partly responsible for the BP oil spill disaster.
10
Ecological modernization theorists (e.g., Mol 2001) maintain that highly developed countries are adept at dealing
with their environmental problems because of increased public concern with the environment, the economic means,
and increased environmental regulation. One of the ironies (or, perhaps hypocrisies) surrounding the ecological
modernization perspective is that the highly developed countries do often deal with their environmental harms
effectively, but they do so by displacing them to countries located in the peripheral zones of the world-system. Of
course, the movement of ship breaking to the periphery (and the movement of other hazards from the core to the
periphery, see Bonds and Downey [2012]) can be framed as a manifestation of ecological modernization processes.
Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) developed the term the Netherlands Fallacy to refer to the fallacy of thinking that the
environmental impacts of rich countries are contained within their national boundaries. And it is this fallacy that is
entrenched in the ecological modernization narrative. See York and Rosa [2003] and Bonds and Downey (2012) for
theoretical and empirical critiques of the ecological modernization perspective.
11
A research literature has emerged around the pollution haven debate or the idea that the cores hazardous
industries and wastes move to the (semi) periphery to escape environmental regulation (see Bonds and Downey
2012; Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2012; Frey 1998b, 2006a, 2012a; Levinson and Taylor 2008;
Muradian and Giljum 2007). See Clapp (2002) for an early but nonetheless relevant critical review of the literature,
much of the research was conducted by neo-liberal economists reporting little or limited support for the thesis.
Clapp (2002:11-13) is highly critical of this research and notes that the hazardous waste management industry (this
would include industries like ship breaking, battery recycling, e-waste recycling, among others) has not been the
subject of research by neo-liberal economists. See recent research on several of these industries, which supports the
pollution haven thesis (Frey 2012a; Committee for Environmental Cooperation 2012). On the other hand,
subsequent research conducted by economists on the thesis is open to Clapps criticisms (e.g., Cole 2004; Eskeland
and Harrison 2003; Levinson and Taylor 2008).

Figure 1 for the geographic location of the two ship breaking capitals). Leadership in ship
breaking has alternated between India and Bangladesh over the last ten years (World Bank
2010:14).
Figure 1. Location of Alang, India and Chittagong, Bangladesh
Steps in Breaking a Ship

Brokers based in Dubai, Hamburg, London (where Clarkson, the worlds largest ship broker is
based), and Singapore sell the cores ships (typically registered under flags of convenience) to
breakers who pay anywhere from 400 to 500 dollars or more per ton for the ships
(Robindebois.org 2010). The buyers have a financial incentive to break ships quickly so they can
recover their investments. It normally takes a workforce of 200 to 250 workers three to five
months to dismantle an average-sized ship (Demaria 2010).
Several steps are followed in this extremely dangerous process once the ship is anchored
offshore (see, e.g., Buerk 2006; Demaria 2010; Langewiesche 2004; Puthucherril 2011:285-286;
Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World Bank 2010). Local authorities must first complete various
legal formalities (ensuring, for example, the ship is gas free to reduce the risk of explosions). The
ship is then beached at full speed during high tide. Once the ship is beached, workers vent
!

flammable gases in the interior of the ship by hammering or punching large holes in the hull and
seawater during high tide washes out the fuel tanks. Ships are stripped of all furnishings and
appliances, as well as other materialsuch as asbestos, generators, wiring, life boats, life vests,
pipes, toilets, wash basins, navigation equipment, wooden doors, foam, and the likeand often
sold along the road outside the yards. Large sections of the ship are then cut off by gas torches
and dragged closer to shore by giant winches. The large sections of steel are cut into smaller
pieces and teams of men carry the metal sections to trucks for loading and removal. The steel is
transported by truck to re-rolling mills for recycling. The recycled steel, often in the form of
reinforcement rods, is used domestically in building and road construction.
Thousands of mostly young, male, and illiterate migrant workers from poor rural areas
are employed in the ship breaking yards.12 Workers are categorized into several groups: those
using torches to cut up ships and their helpers, those carrying large iron plates, laborers,
contractors, supervisors, winch operators, crane drivers, fitters, carpenters, asbestos workers, and
firemen. Daily wages are anywhere from $2 to $7 per day, depending on the job (DeMaria 2010;
Puthucherril 2011:287).
The Case of the Alang-Sosiya Yards in India. Alang is located in the highly prosperous,
manufacturing state of Gujarat and the shipyards are located on a six-mile stretch of beach on the
western coast of the Gulf of Cambay. Ship breaking employed over 40,000 workers and others in
related industries in early 2000 and upwards of 50,000 by 2009 (Demaria 2010; Greenpeace
International 2000, 2001; International Federation for Human Rights 2002). Established in 1982,
the Alang-Sosiya yard is the largest breaking yard in the world in terms of the actual number of
ships broken. Alang-Sosiya was the number one ship breaking site in 2007 (with 129 ships),
2008 (194), 2009 (435), and 2010 (422) (see Robindesbois.org 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). An
average of approximately 200 ships have been dismantled each year for the past decade
(Robindebois.org 2010). Over 5,000 ships have been dismantled since the yard opened (Demaria
2010:255). In addition to the recycling of steel and other metals, hazardous wastes are generated
as noted above (Basha et al. 2007; Demaria 2010; Greenpeace International 2001; Reddy et al.
2005).
The Case of Chittagong, Bangladesh. Chittagong is the primary port of Bangladesh and
the center of much of the countrys industry (Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World Bank 2010).
The Chittagong yards are located on a ten-mile stretch of beach named Fauzdarhat, which is
approximately twelve miles northwest of Chittagong and located on the Bay of Bengal. Ship
breaking was introduced in 1969 when a vessel (the Greek ship M.D. Alpine) was beached on
the shore during a storm (Puthucherril 2010:27). Large ships (tankers, cargo ships, and container
ships) have traditionally been dismantled at the yards. The yards have employed upwards of
20,000 to 22,000 workers and 200,000 people are thought to be employed in businesses related
to ship breaking such as shops and steel re-rolling mills, and the dependents of workers may
number as many as 500,000 people (Buerk 2006; Hossain and Islam 2006; Puthcherril 2010:28;
World Bank 2010). The Bangladesh Ship Breakers Association and government officials
maintain that Chittagong surpassed Alang in terms of steel tons broken in late 2008 (Anonymous
12
The International Federation for Human Rights and Young Power in Social Action (2008:7) report that 25% of the
workers in Chittagong are under the age of 18, some as young as 12. They identify the main cause of child labor to
be poverty and debt, resulting from a familys loss of land, disappearance of a father, the cost of a wedding, or some
combination of the three.

2008; Basha et al. 2007), but the Bangladeshi Supreme Court put heavy restrictions on importing
ships for breaking in early 2010 that reduced the number of ships broken in 2010 and 2011
(Robindebois.org 2010; 2011). The numbers of ships dismantled each year from 2007 to 2010
were 105, 182, 214, and 93, respectively (Robindebois.org 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). The future
of ship breaking remains somewhat uncertain in Chittagong, though recent developments suggest
that ship breaking will return to its previous level (Anonymous 2011). Hazardous materials and
unsafe dismantling practices are pervasive in the yards (Basha et al. 2007; Greenpeace
International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; International Federation for
Human Rights and Young Power in Social Action 2008; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World
Bank 2010).
Adverse Consequences
Approximately 95 percent of an ocean-going vessels bulk consists of steel (much of which can
be recycled) and the remaining 5% consists of hazardous materials (Greenpeace International
2000; World Bank 2010). Hazardous materials include bacterial oil sludge, toxic paints, asbestos,
halons in foam and firefighting equipment (ozone depleting substances), fuel residues, heavy
metals (arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury), organotins or biocides, persistent organic
pollutants (dioxins, PVCs, PAHs), and radioactive substances (Basha et al. 2007; Buerk 2006;
Demaria 2010; Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005;
Hossain and Islam 2006; Puthucherril 2010:18-19; Reddy et al. 2005; Tewari et al. 2001). Such
hazards can damage the environment and adversely affect human health through occupational
exposure and environmental dispersion in the soil, water, and air or large-scale failures such as
explosions and fires. Workers come into direct contact with toxic materials on the job and in
their squalid sleeping quarters located in the yards (Basha et al. 2007; Greenpeace International
2001; Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Hossain
and Islam 2000; Reddy et al. 2005; Sahu 2014; World Bank 2010). Numerous undesirable social
and economic consequences are also associated with ship breaking, including staggering
economic costs and an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits to be discussed below
(World Bank 2010).
Bangladesh and India are particularly vulnerable to the risks posed by ship breaking
because of the young, poorly trained, uninformed, undernourished, unhealthy, migrant workforce
with limited access to safety and protective equipment, adequate housing and sanitation facilities,
and limited risk assessment and management skills (e.g., Demaria 2010; Greenpeace
International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Hossain and Islam 2006;
International Federation for Human Rights 2002; Sahu 2014). The heavy humidity and heat in
the local environment discourages the use of protective clothing and gear even when it is
available. Most of the work is done by hand with hammers, torches, and crowbars (Puthucherril
2011:286).
Other problems exist, including limited awareness of the risks associated with hazards,
nonexistent labor unions, politically unresponsive state agencies, inadequate risk assessment and
management capabilities, and limited health care facilities (Sahu 2014). In addition, organized
activism among workers is limited because potential participants are unaware of their rights and
have little time for such activity since they work six days a week and there are few channels
through the courts or legislature for effective public participation. The problem is compounded
!

by labor conditions: workdays often run from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. with no overtime or leave
benefits, and wages are anywhere from $2.00 to $7.00 (or less) per day depending on the specific
job and location (Demaria 2010; International Federation for Human Rights 2002; Greenpeace
Sahu 2014; World Bank 2010).
Environmental Risks
Emissions of toxic substances contained in the bilge and ballast waters of ships and the improper
disposal of hazardous wastes and materials contribute to the risk of environmental damage.
Environmental damage includes soil contamination, soil erosion, water pollution, contamination
of coastal regions and subsequent biodiversity loss such as the destruction of vast areas of
mangroves, air pollution, and threats to plant and animal health. Since reliable data do not exist
on the full scope and nature of the problem in the shipyards of Alang-Sosiya and Chittagong, it is
not possible to estimate the actual environmental damage (see, e.g., Basha et al. 2007; Demaria
2010:256; Greenpeace 2001; Hossain and Islam 2006:18-32; Puthucherril 2011:288; Reddy et al.
2005; World Bank 2010:33-37). Such damage is a serious problem because it can deplete
important natural resources, disrupt the stability of larger ecosystems, and threaten human health
and the livelihoods of farmers and fishers in surrounding villages (Demaria 2010). And, of
course, hazardous materials are carried outside the yards by equipment and other materials taken
off the ships and reused elsewhere. Steel re-rolling mills, for example, disperse toxic materials
into the atmosphere through heating steel coated with toxic materials. Rising sea levels resulting
from climate change may increase environmental damage by washing out legacy pollution on
the beaches of the breaking yards (World Bank 2010:38-39).
Human Health and Safety Risks
Occupational and environmental exposure to the hazards posed by ship breaking and the
attendant health consequences are not fully known, but those exposed are at a high risk of death,
disease, and injury because of their increased susceptibility to various site-specific cancers, skin
irritation, respiratory problems such as asbestosis, and neurobehavioral problems. Accidents are
common and workers are at increased risk of death and injury from snapping cables, chemical
spills, welding fumes, falls, falling objects, fires, and explosions (Demaria 2010; Greenpeace
Puthucherril 2011:285-288; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; Sahu 2014; World Bank 2010).
Since reliable data do not exist on the full occupational and environmental exposure to
the emissions of hazardous substances in the yards, it is not possible to estimate the actual
number of deaths or cases of disease and injury that can be attributed to them. It is quite clear,
given what we know about the environmental risks discussed above, that health problems linked
to ship breaking are pervasive. Air pollution and water contamination have been well
documented (Basha et al. 2007; Reddy et al. 2005). Hazardous waste management is also a
problem, for hazardous wastes are dumped in a haphazard fashion (Demaria 2010; Puthucherril
2010, 2011). Accidents and the adverse health and safety conditions facing workers and the
inhabitants of the areas surrounding the yards are serious (Greenpeace International and
International Federation for Human Rights 2005; International Federation for Human Rights and
Young Power in Social Action 2008; Sahu 2014; World Bank 2010).
!

Adverse human health effects have been reported by a number of researchers
(Greenpeace International 2001; Greenpeace International and International Federation for
Human Rights 2005; Sahu 2014; World Bank 2010). The conditions are so severe that a
doctor at the Red Cross Hospital in Alang [is reported to have said that] working one day in the
ship breaking yards is equal to smoking 10-15 packs of cigarettes (Greenpeace International and
International Federation for Human Rights 2005:10). Reliable data on the number of accidental
deaths and future deaths resulting from diseases with long latency periods such as asbestosis,
lung cancer, and mesothelioma are not available, but a recent study of Taiwanese ship breaker
workers who had stopped working for a period of 24 years indicated they are at substantially
increased risk of asbestos-related diseases such as overall cancer, oral cancer, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma (Wu et al. 2014). Nixon (2011) captures this idea of long-term consequences with
his concept of slow violence. Estimates indicate that one in every six workers may have
asbestosis and workers are at inflated risk of lung and related forms of cancer in the shipyards of
Alang-Sosiya and Chittagong (Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human
Rights 2005). Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights (2005)
estimate that thousands of workers have died in the last several decades and thousands are at risk
in the future.
Communicable diseases are also a problem in the yards. One researcher described the
situation in Alang in the following way:
The labourers in Alang live in poor housing and sanitary conditions and little
attention is paid to their health and safety concerns. According to the physicians
in and around Alang who treat numerous Alang patients, the combination of
hazardous working conditions, congested and unhygienic living conditions, poor
drinking water, () and rampant prostitution have given rise to a number of skin,
gastrointestinal, and liver diseases besides tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria,
malnutrition, cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases (cited in
Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights
2005:11).
The stories of a number of workers who were injured or killed in the breaking yards
of Alang-Sosiya and Chittagong are included in a 2005 report by Greenpeace International
and the International Federation for Human Rights (2005). Several of these witness stories
from Alang and Chittagong are quoted at length to illustrate the seriousness of the problem:
Alang-Sosiya, India
Bhaskar Zena was 35 when he was burnt alive at plot no. 17. His family in
Nuashai did not get any compensation (Greenpeace International and
International Federation for Human Rights 2005:37).
My name is Ramhari. I am 53 years old and I have lived in Dudurapada hamlet of
Adapada village all of my life, except for the four black months in Alang. There
are about 3,000 households in my village and about 1,000 young people have
migrated to Alang looking for a job. Out of sheer poverty I also left for Alang
looking for a job. I was desperate after one of my sons died of a snakebite.

I stayed in Alang for a few months, not aware of what could happen to me. One
morning a major catastrophe struck me and my family. I was working on the deck
of a ship beached at plot no. 49. Somebody dropped a large iron ball, which struck
my head. I fell unconscious and was brought to the hospital, but I did not know
how long I stayed there. Maybe two or three months. I wasnt aware of my
condition, but gradually I found out that my left arm was fully paralysed.
I encountered a great hardship with my family and was compelled to start
begging. Our lives have become extremely miserable. Since the accident I have
lost six children due to various illnesses. I tried my best to obtain some kind of
treatment for them, but it didnt work as I didnt have enough money. I undertook
several things, basically washing dishes in small hotels, to feed my family.
My wife couldnt bear all this and she has since become mentally ill. How could
one bear so much loss? I dont remember everything clearly, because I was grief
stricken. My mind was in one place and my body somewhere else.
After the incident, they paid me 3,000 rupees (60 euros) plus some money for
medical treatment. I knew that the money given to me was meager, but I couldnt
do anything. How can I fight in an alien place where I know nothing and nobody?
The money didnt last long. Now I am forced to beg, due to the ship breaking
work (Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights
2005:30).
Chittagong, Bangladesh
Shorab died in July 1998 while he was lifting an oxygen bottle, used for gas
cutting, onto a ship. The rope broke and the bottle fell on his chest. He fell in the
muddy water. Two hours later his fellow workers found his body (Greenpeace
International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005:21).
[Muhun a] 36-year old cutter from Sylhet was injured during the major
explosion on the TT Dina oil tanker on 31 May 2000 in Chittagong. This
explosion killed 16 workers and left 40 people injured. Muhun escaped death on
that occasion, but three years later he suffered another blast that left him paralysed
(Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights
2005:29).
Economic Costs
The economic costs associated with the cleanup of contaminated sites in Alang and Chittagong,
as well as the surrounding communities and beyond are high. The treatment and compensation of
the victims of hazardous exposures are potentially very costly. Destruction of marine life and the
livelihoods of fishers, mangroves, biodiversity, soil and the livelihods of farmers, water and air
quality, and other natural resources is also likely to be costly. Reductions in human health are
costly, and they can impede future economic growth (Price-Smith 2001). These and other

tangible and intangible economic costs associated with the transfer of this particular hazardous
industry appear to be substantial (Demaria 2010; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World Bank 2010).
Social Costs and Environmental Injustice
Proponents and the institutions of global environmental goverance (GEG) and proponents of
ecological modernization maintain that international trade spreads benefits such as the reduction
of environmental harms and provides many benefits and opportunities for countries engaged in
recycling practices such as ship breaking (see, e.g., the discussion of Okereke [2008] on
environmental justice and neoliberal environmental goverance). Contrary to the goals of GEG,
most of the costs or risks associated with the transfer of ship breaking to the beaches of
Bangladesh and India (and other hazards for that matter) are distributed in an unequal fashion.13
In other words, most of the benefits go to the core-based interests that control shipping and the
brokers and breakers/owners who profit from the sale of the ships, while Bangladesh and India
bear most of the costs. Losses are distributed in an unequal fashion within Bangladesh and India:
some groupsespecially the state and local capitalare able to capture the benefits and other
groupsthose marginalized by age, class, race/ethnicity, and geographic location, including
workers and their families as well as those in surrounding communitiesbear the costs
(Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; International
Federation for Human Rights and Young Power in Social Action 2008; Sahu 2014; World Bank
2010).
An Approximate Analysis of Economic Costs and Benefits
Are the costs associated with the displacement of ship breaking to countries like Bangladesh and
India offset by the economic and other benefits as proponents of neoliberalism (Grossman and
Krueger 1993, 1995) and some ecological modernization theorists (Mol 2001) suggest? After all,
ship breaking employs thousands of poor workers desperate for jobs in Bangladesh, India, and
elsewhere. The steel recovered from the ships is recycled and used domestically in road and
building construction which reduces the environmental and health impacts of mining and reduces
energy use; the yards supply upwards of 80% of Bangladeshs steel and upwards of 15% of
Indias steel at half the price of furnace produced steel (Demaria 2010; International Federation
for Human Rights 2002; Hossain and Islam 2006; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World Bank
2010). In addition, import duties and other fees on incoming ships provide revenue for the state.
Answering the question raised above as noted by some analysts (Frey 2006a, 2012a) is
problematic because it is difficult to identify, estimate, and value the costs and benefits
(especially the costs) associated with hazards in monetary terms (see, e.g., Frey, McCormick,
and Rosa 2007; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Despite suggestions and efforts to the contrary
(e.g., Logan 1991), there is no widely accepted factual or methodological basis for identifying,
estimating, and valuing the costs and benefits associated with the flow of core hazards to the
13
The unequal distribution of the costs or risks between core and periphery and within the periphery is contrary to
Ulrich Beck's (1992, 1999) "risk-society" thesis. His argues that risks increasingly impact both the poor and rich.
See Alario and Freudenburg (2010) who use the analogy of the Titanic sinking in their discussion of the unequal
distribution of risks in the risk-society.

periphery. Even if the consequences of hazardous exports could be meaningfully identified and
estimated, there remains the question of valuing them in monetary terms and identifying
appropriate discount rates and time horizons. Economists typically look to the marketplace for
such a valuation, but adverse health, safety, environmental, and socio-economic consequences
are not traded in the marketplace. Efforts have been made to deal with this problem by using
either expert judgment or public preferences (Mitchell and Carson 1989), but such techniques are
deeply flawed and morally suspect (see Dietz, Frey, and Rosa 2002; Foster 2002a).
Comments contained in the often cited 1991 memo by former World Bank Chief
Economist Lawrence Summers (1992) are worth quoting at length because they illustrate the
difficulties and contradictory outcomes of applying traditional economic reasoning to the transfer
of hazardous industries and wastes like ship breaking to the periphery. Sounding a bit like Marie
Antoinette, Summers notes:
Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more
migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs? I can think of three reasons:
(1) The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the
forgone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view
a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with
the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages.
(2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments of
pollution probably have been very low cost. I've always thought that underpopulated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is
probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City....
(3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely
to have very high income-elasticity. The concern over an agent that causes a onein-a-million chance in the odds of prostate cancer is obviously going to be much
higher in a country where people survive to get prostate cancer than in a country
where under-5 mortality is 200 per thousand. Also, much of the concern over
industrial atmosphere discharge is about visibility of particulates. These
discharges may have little direct health impact. Clearly trade in goods that
embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be welfare enhancing. While
production is mobile the consumption of pretty air is a non-tradable.
The editors of The Economist (2007:14) magazine based in London made a
similar argument more recently:
the best way of recycling waste may well be to sell it, often to emerging
markets. That is controversial, because of the suspicion that waste will be
dumped, or that workers and the environment will be poorly protected. Yet
recycling has economics of scale and the transport can be virtually free--filling
up the containers that came to the West full of clothes and electronics and would
otherwise return empty to China. Whats more, those who are prepared to buy
waste are likely to make good use of it.
Such reasoning undervalues nature and assumes that human life in the periphery is worth
much less than in the core because of wage differentials (see also Foster 2002b; Frey 2006a;
!

Harvey 1996:368; Martinez-Alier 2009). Although most costs occur in the periphery, and many
of the benefits are captured by core countries and elites located in the periphery, the costs to the
periphery are deemed acceptable because life is defined as worth so little.14 In sum, it can be
argued that the costsonce we consider non-economic values and long-term time horizons,
including impacts on the environment, human and animal health, and the unequal distribution of
the health, safety and environmental risksoutweigh the benefits, but the valuation discourse of
economics of the neo-liberal variety continues to dominate the policy discourse and empowers
those who benefit from the industry, impeding efforts to effectively regulate the industry.
What Can Be Done? And Who Should Do it?
The image of ghost ships sailing to the breaking yards located on the beaches of India and
Bangladesh is a disturbing one. Unlike the Flying Dutchman, however, many of these ships have
been and will be beached and broken with adverse health, safety, environmental, and socioeconomic consequences. The displacement of ship breaking to the beaches of Bangladesh and
India can be framed as racist (Bullard et al. 2005; Pellow 2007:37ff; Puthucherril 2010:51), but it
represents something more. It reflects the unequal power relations underlying relations between
countries occupying different positions in the world-system. Centrality in the world-system
allows core countries to engage in Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) like behavior and to impose
their anti-wealth on the (semi) periphery.
Efforts to curb the adverse consequences associated with ship breaking in Bangladesh
and India and hazardous industries located throughout the periphery have taken a wide variety of
forms: various national and regional regulatory efforts such as the 2013 European Union (EU)
Shipbreaking Regulation banning EU flagged ships from being beached in Asia; bilateral and
multilateral environmental agreements; various international conventions, including the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal (hereafter the Basel Convention) and the Hong Kong International Convention for the
Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships (Hong Kong International Convention)
adopted in May 2009 under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, that
becomes effective in 2015 (see Bhattacharjee 2009; European Commission DG Environment
2009; Frey 2006a; Karim 2010; Lucier and Gareau 2014; Moen 2008; Okereke 2008:80-98;
Puthucherril 2010, 2011); Codes of Conduct such as the International Chamber of Shipping
Industry Code of Practice on Ship Recycling; and a range of trade treaties (see, e.g., Demaria
2010; Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Hossain
and Islam 2006; International Federation for Human Rights 2002; Okereke 2008; Puthucherril
2010: Chapters 3-5, 2011; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007; World Bank 2010). These efforts to
globalize responsibility are problematic because of noncompliance and weak implementation
and enforcement capacity at the national and supranational levels, resulting from fragmented
efforts, limited resources, increased capital mobility, the neoliberal project that frames regulation
as a trade barrier, and increasing legitimation discourse efforts by exporting countries and
14
Or, as Herman Daly (1993:57) has noted: "By separating the costs and benefits of environmental exploitation,
international trade makes them harder to compare." To put it another way, the metabolic rift between the core and
(semi) periphery (Foster, Clark, and York 2010; see also Moore 2000, 2011a) resulting from ecological unequal
exchange is made invisible by globalization and the attendant market ideology espoused by proponents of the neoliberal perspective and ecological modernization.

industry lobbies to redefine hazardous wastes as resources to be recycled (see, e.g.,
Bhattacharjee 2009; Frey 1998a, 2006a, 2006b; Greenpeace International and International
Federation for Human Rights 2005; Karim 2010; Lucier and Gareau 2014).15
Several analysts have called for more stringent measures, including the renationalization
of capital (Daly 1996:145-162) or the dismantling of what Schnaiberg (1980) and his colleagues
(Gould et al.1996, 2008) have called the transnational treadmill of production.
Implementation of such proposals appears unlikely given the structural constraints posed by the
current world-system. In effect, stopping the displacement of hazards or environmental harms (as
noted elsewhere [Frey 2006a]) through the globalization of responsibility or the
renationalization of capital is unlikely as long as the core countries control a majority of the
wealth generated in the world-system.
What is actually being done to challenge ship breaking as it is currently practiced in
Bangladesh and India? Several organizational and political activities are currently underway.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs, including Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers
Association, Toxic Links, Human Rights Law Network, and Young Power in Social Action)
have pressured state authorities in Bangladesh and India to develop and enforce higher standards
and open the policy discourse to the public about toxic wastes (Demaria 2010; Rousmaniere and
Raj 2007). Several labor organizations (e.g., Alang-Sosyia Recycling and General Workers
Association) have sponsored strikes for better wages and working conditions with limited
success. International NGOs such as Greenpeace International, the Basel Action Network
(BAN), and Platform on Shipbreaking monitor and study actual conditions in and around the
yards, as well as pressure yard owners and state authorities to change operating procedures (see,
e.g., Demaria 2010; Greenpeace International 2000, 2001; Greenpeace International and
International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Rousmaniere and Raj 2007). Greenpeace
International, the Basel Action Network, the Ship Breaking Platform, and other organizations
(such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Labour Organization,
International Metalworkers Federation, the European Commission Director General of the
Environment, and the United Nations Environment Programme) as well as many analysts have
made a number of specific recommendations (European Commission Director General of the
Environment 2009; International Federation for Human Rights 2002; Greenpeace International
and International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Hossain and Islam 2006; Puthucherril
2010, 2011:191-207; Aahu 2014). These include:
Ship breaking yards should be open to inspection by NGOs, trade unions, and other
groups.
Operating ships should be made cleaner through maintenance and retrofitting.
A global regulatory regime should be developed and fully implemented to regulate ship
breaking.
The next generation of ships should be constructed to reduce health, safety, and
15
The 2013 European Union Shipbreaking Regulation banning ship beaching in Asia is easily defied by changing
nation of registry (Kotoky 2015). See Lucier and Gareau (2014) for a discussion of efforts by interested economic
actors to redefine how hazardous wastes should be regulated under the Basel Convention. They provide an insightful
discussion of efforts by exporting countries and industry lobby groups to redefine hazardous wastes as resources
to be recycled in an effort to marginalize environmental injustice claims and to therefore define appropriate policy
and promote their economic interests. See also Puthucherrils (2010, 2011) detailed and critical discussion of the
ambitious Hong Kong International Convention and other efforts to curb the risks associated with ship breaking. See
also Karims (2010) excellent discussion.

environmental impacts at the time of decommissioning.
Ship owners and flag state holders should be responsible for the clean and safe
dismantling of ships.
Workers should be protected through improved health and safety practices in the yards.
Economic globalization and the attendant adverse consequences have clearly fostered
counter-hegemonic forces or anti-systemic movements (see, e.g., Arrighi et al. 2012; Bandy and
Smith 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Martinez-Alier 2002; Pellow 2007, 2011; Smith and Wiest
2012; Wallerstein 2002) in the form of transnational networks of NGOs. The extent to which
national and transnational NGOs will actually curb the adverse consequences of economic
globalization in India, Bangladesh, and elsewhere is the subject of much debate (see, e.g.,
Brecher et al. 2000, Buraway, 2010; Chase-Dunn 2002, 2010; Evans 2000; Mol 2001; Pellow
2007: Chapters 3 and 7, 2011; Swerts 2013; Wallerstein 2002). Counter-hegemonic globalization
in the form of transnational networks of NGOs (referred to as globalization from below by
Brecher et al. [2000] and Chase-Dunn [2002, 2010], among others) is often seen as a viable
means for curbing some of the worst abuses associated with the transfer of hazardous production
processes, whether ship breaking, e-waste recycling, battery recycling, or otherwise, to sacrifice
zones located in the (semi) periphery (see also Frey 2012a; Gould et al. 2008:103-104; Pellow
2007; Smith and Wiest 2012). This approach is not without its critics, who argue that domestic
NGOs involved in transnational networks often become dependent on Western financial
resources and frames and exclude those directly engaged in or affected by ship breaking and
other forms of hazardous production practices from the political process, contributing to what
Swerts (2011) calls a democracy deficit. Transnational networks of NGOs seem incapable of
providing the strong opposition needed to curb the adverse consequences of the industry.
Stopping ship breakingin other words ending the cores appropriation of the
peripherys carrying capacity or environmental spaceis difficult, for it is deeply embedded
in the very structure of the current world-system and influences the domestic political economy
of both Bangladesh and India. Ship breakers/yard owners lobby hard against state regulation and
judicial activism (Demaria 2010; Parman 2012) with considerable success.16 This latter point is
well illustrated by state efforts of both countries to curb anti-ship breaking NGO activity and
strong regulation by branding such policies as anti-developmental and disruptive to business
activity (Bahree 2014). And there are few financial incentives (in this race to the bottom) for
Bangladesh and India who are in direct competition with each other and the other ship breaking
countries (China, Pakistan, and Vietnam) to establish strong regulatory measures comparable to
those found in Europe, Japan, South Korea, and North America or to stop breaking ships. In sum,
the ecological unequal relations these two countries share with the core are important for
maintaining elite advantage in Bangladesh and India and continuous capital accumulation in the
core as noted above.17
16
See Demarias (2010:256-259) discussion of the Indian Supreme Court and the Blue Lady case and the
Bangladeshi Supreme Courts 2010 restrictions on ship breaking in Chittagong (Anonymous, 2011). See also Karim
(2010) for additional discussion of the issue.
17
Puthucherril (2010:12) is much more optimistic. He notes international standards for ship recycling, along
with greater North-South cooperation, are necessary to ensure sustainable ship recycling.
Conclusion
What this paper brings into sharp focus is the ecological contradictions of globalization and the
current world-system. To be more specific, it contributes to the emerging literature on ecological
unequal exchange and what some have called the exploitation of environmental space by the
advanced capitalist center. Much of the existing literature has focused on the extraction of wealth
from the resource frontiers located in the peripheral zones of the world-system. The ship
breaking case reported here represents an important example of the displacement of the cores
anti-wealth to the waste disposal frontiers of the (semi) periphery and the resulting adverse
health, safety, environmental, and socio-economic consequences for the periphery. Ship breaking
illustrates quite clearly that capital accumulation in the core is dependent on (semi) peripheral
contamination.
Much more research is needed on core capital accumulation through (semi) peripheral
contamination and the process of ecological unequal exchange. Future research should look at
the full range of hazardous production practices and wastes that are displaced to the waste
disposal frontiers and the resulting political conflicts and responses. One direction for future
research should be the examination of the movement of the cores hazardous production
practices to the more than 3,500 export processing zones located in (semi) peripheral countries
scattered throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean (Dicken 2011:193, 2015).
These zones have limited regulatory restrictions on hazardous production practices and waste
disposal and offer many other concessions to core capital that facilitate capital accumulation,
including harsh restrictions on domestic and transnational NGO activity. The zones represent an
increasingly important feature of the expanding rift in the world-system (resulting from
ecological unequal exchange) and needs to be more fully addressed in efforts to understand
relations between the core and (semi) peripheral zones in the world-system.
References
Adams, Richard N. 1988. The Eighth Day: Social Evolution as the Self-Organization of Energy.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
Alario, Margarita V. and William R. Freudenburg. 2010. Titanic Risks Are Not So Titanic
After All. Sociological Inquiry 80: 500-512.
American Association of Port Authorities. 2008. World Port Rankings 2008. Available at
www.aapa-ports.org/Industry/.
Anonymous. 2008. Alang Loses Out to Bangladesh. Seatrade Asia Online (August 28).
_____. 2011. Scrap Ship Import Gets Further Extension. The Daily Star (Online Report July
21).
Arrighi, Giovanni, Terrence Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein. 2012. Anti-Systemic
Movements. London: Verso.
Auyero, Javier and Debora Alejandra Swistun. 2009. Flammable: Environmental Suffering in an
Argentine Shantytown. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bahree, Megha. 2014. Modi Governments Message to NGOs in India: Big Brother is Watching
!

You. Forbes (June 16) Available at http://www.forbes.com.
Bandy, Joe and Jackie Smith, editors. 2005. Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest
and the Neoliberal Order. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Basha, Shaik, Premsingh Mansingh Gaur, Ravikumar Bhagwan Thorat,
Rohitkumar Harikrishna Trivedi, Sandip Kumar Mukhopadhyay, Nisha Anand,
Shalin Hemantbhai Desai, Kalpana Haresh Mody, and Bhavnath Jha. 2007. Heavy
Metal Content of Suspended Particulate Matter at Worlds Largest Ship-Breaking Yard,
Alang-Sosiya, India. Water, Air, and Soil Pollution 178: 373-384.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.
_____. 1999. World Risk Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Bhattacharjee, Saurabh. 2009. From Basel to Hong Kong: International Environmental
Regulation of Ship-Recycling Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps Back. Trade,
Law and Development 1: 193-230.
Bonds, Eric and Liam Downey. 2012. Green Technology and Ecological Unequal Exchange:
The Environemntal and Social Consequences of Ecological Modernization in the WorldSystem. Journal of World-Systems Research 18: 167-186.
Brecher, Jeremy, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith. 2000. Globalization from Below: The Power
of Solidarity. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Buerk, Roland. 2006. Breaking Ships: How Supertankers and Cargo Ships Are Dismantled on
the Shores of Bangladesh. New York: Chamberlain Brothers.
Bullard, Robert D., Glenn S. Johnson, and Angel O. Torres. 2005. Addressing Global Poverty,
Pollution, and Human Rights. Pp. 279-297 in The Quest for Environmental Justice:
Human Rights and the Politics of Pollution, edited by Robert D. Bullard. San Francisco:
Sierra Books.
Bunker, Stephen G. 1985. Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the
Failure of the Modern State. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
_____. 2007. Natural Values and the Physical Inevitability of Uneven Development under
Capitalism. Pp. 239-258 in in Rethinking Environmental History: World-System History
and Global Environmental Change, edited by Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, and Joan
Martinez-Alier. New York: AltaMira Press.
Bunker, Stephen G. and Paul S. Ciccantell. 2005. Globalization and the Race for
Resources. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Buraway, Michael. 2010. From Pollyanna: The False Optimism of Global Labor Studies.
Global Labour Journal 1: 301-313.
Carmin, Jo Ann and Julian Agyeman, editors. 2011. Environmental Inequalities Beyond
Borders: Local Perspectives on Global Injustices. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 2002. Globalization from Below: Toward a Collectively Rational and
Democratic Commonwealth. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Sciences 581:48-61.
_____. 2010. Globalization from Below: Toward a Democratic Global Commonwealth.
Journal of Globalization Studies 1: 46-57.
Clapp. Jennifer. 2001. Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich to
Poor Countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
_____. 2002. What the Pollution Haven Debate Overlooks. Global Environmental Politics
2: 11-19.
Clark, Brett and John Bellamy Foster. 2009. Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic
!

Rift: Unequal Exchange and the Guano/Nitrates Trade. International Journal of
Comparative Sociology 50: 311-334.
Clelland, Donald A. 2014. The Core of Apple: Dark Value and Degrees of Monopoly in Global
Commodity Chains. Journal of World-Systems Research 20: 82-111.
Cole, Matthew A. 2004.Trade, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the Environmental Kuznets
Curve: Examining the Linkages. Ecological Economics 48: 71-81.
Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 2012. Hazardous Trade? An Examination of US
Generated Lead-Acid Battery Exports and Secondary Lead Recycling in Mexico, the
United States, and Canada. Montreal, Canada: Commission for Environmental
Cooperation. Located at http://www.cec.org/Storage/142/16758_SLAB-publicdraft30Nov_en.pdf
Cudahy, Brian. 2006. Box Boats: How Container Ships Changed the World. New York:
Fordham University Press.
Daly, Herman. 1993. The Perils of Free Trade. Scientific American 262: 50-57.
_____. 1996. Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Demaria, Federico. 2010. Shipbreaking at Alang-Sosiya (India): An Ecological Distribution
Conflict. Ecological Economics 70: 250-260.
Dick, Christopher and Andrew K. Jorgenson. 2011. Capital Movements and Environmental
Harms. Journal of World-Systems Research 37: 482-497.
Dicken, Peter. 2011. Global Shift: Mapping the Contours of the World Economy. (Sixth Edition.)
New York: Guilford Press.
_____. 2015. Global Shift: Mapping the Contours of the World Economy. (Seventh Edition.)
New York: Guilford Press.
Dietz, Thomas and Eugene A. Rosa. 1997. Effects of Population and Affluence on CO2
Emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 94: 175-179.
Dietz, Thomas, R. Scott Frey, and Eugene Rosa. 2002. Technology, Risk, and Society. Pp.
329-369 in Handbook of Environmental Sociology, edited by Riley Dunlap and William
Michelson. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
The Editors. 2007. Editorial. The Economist (June 9): 14.
Ehrlich, Paul R. and John P. Holdren. 1971. Impact of Population Growth. Science 171: 12121217.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. and Ann E. Harrison. 2003. Moving to Greener Pastures?: Multinationals
and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. Journal of Development Economics 70: 1-23.
European Commission DG Environment. 2009. Support to the Impact Assessment of a New
Legislative Proposal on Ship Dismantling. Kongens Lyngby, Denmark: COWI.
Evans, Peter. 2000. Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter
Hegemonic Globalization." Contemporary Sociology 29: 230-241.
Faber, Daniel. 2008. Capitalizing on Environmental Injustice: The Polluter-Industrial Complex
in the Age of Globalization. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
_____. 2009. The Unfair Trade-off: Globalization and the Export of Ecological Hazards. Pp.
181-199 in Environmental Sociology: From Analysis to Action, edited by Leslie King and
Deborah McCarty. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Foster, John Bellamy. 2002a. The Ecological Tyranny of the Bottom Line: The Environmental
and Social Consequences of Economic Reductionism. Pp. 26-43 in Ecology Against
Capitalism, by John Bellamy Foster. New York: Monthly Review Press.
!

_____. 2002b. Let Them Eat Pollution: Capitalism in the World Environment. Pp. 6068 in Ecology Against Capitalism, by John Bellamy Foster. New York: Monthly Review
Press.
Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York. 2010. The Ecological Rift: Capitalisms
War on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Foster, John Bellamy and Hannah Holleman. 2014. The Theory of Unequal Ecological
Exchange: A Marx-Odum Dialectic. The Journal of Peasant Studies 41: 199-233.
Freudenburg, William R. and Robert Gramling. 2011. Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oilspill
Disaster and the Future of Energy in America. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Frey, R. Scott. 1995. The International Traffic in Pesticides. Technological Forecasting and
Social Change 50: 151-169.
_____. 1998a. The Hazardous Waste Stream in the World-System. Pp. 84-103 in Space and
Transport in the World-System, edited by Paul Ciccantell and Stephen G. Bunker.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
_____. 1998b. The Export of Hazardous Industries to the Peripheral Zones of the WorldSystem. Journal of Developing Societies 14: 66-81.
_____. 2006a The Flow of Hazardous Exports in the World-System. Pp. 133-149 in
Globalization and the Environment, edited by Andrew Jorgenson and Edward Kick.
Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill Academic Press.
_____. 2006b. The International Traffic in Asbestos. Nature, Society, and Thought 19: 173180.
_____. 2012a. The E-Waste Stream in the World-System. Journal of Globalization Studies
3: 79-94.
_____. 2012b. The Displacement of Hazardous Products, Production Processes, and Wastes in
the World-System. Pp. 440-442. Handbook of World-Systems Analysis: Theory and
Research, edited by Salvatore Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn. New York:
Routledge.
______. 2013. Cigarette Trafficking in the World-System. Journal of Globalization Studies
4: 74-81.
Frey, R. Scott, Sabrina McCormick, and Eugene A. Rosa. 2007. The Sociology of Risk. Pp.
81-87 in The Handbook of 21st Century Sociology, Volume II, edited by Clifton D. Bryant
and Dennis Peck. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Funtowicz, Silvio O. and Jerome R. Ravetz. 1994. The Worth of a Songbird: Ecological
Economics as a Post-Normal Science. Ecological Economics 10: 197-207.
Gottesfeld, Perry and Amod K. Pokhrel. 2011. Review: Lead Exposure to Battery
Manufacturing and Recycling in Developing Countries and Among Children in Nearby
Communities. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 8: 520-532.
Gould, Kenneth A., David N. Pellow, and Allan Schnaiberg. 2008. The Treadmill of Production:
Injustice and Unsustainability in the Global Economy. Boulder, CO: Paradigm
Publishers.
Gould, Kenneth A., Allan Schnaiberg, and Adam S. Weinberg. 1996. Local Environmental
Struggles: Citizen Activism in the Treadmill of Production. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Greenpeace International. 2000. Shipbreaking: A Global Environmental, Health, and Labour
Challenge. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace International.
_____. 2001. Steel and Toxic Wastes for Asia: Findings of a Greenpeace Study on Workplace
!

and Environmental Contamination in Alang-Sosiya Shipbreaking Yards, Gujarat, India.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace International.
Greenpeace International and International Federation for Human Rights. 2005. End of Life
Ships: The Human Cost of Breaking Ships. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Greenpeace
International.
Grineski, Sara E., Timothy W. Collins, Maria de Loures Romo Aguilar, and Raed Aldouri. 2010.
No Safe Place: Environmental Hazards and Injustice along Mexicos Northern Border.
Social Forces 88: 2241-2266.
Grossman, Gene M. and Alan B. Krueger. 1993. Environmental Impacts of a North America
Free Trade Agreement. In The Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, edited by Peter M.
Garber. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
_____. 1995. Economic Growth and the Environment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
110: 350-377.
Halpern, Benjamin S., Shaun Walbridge, Kimberly A. Selkoe, Carrie V. Kappel, Fiorenza
Micheli, Caterina DAgrosa, John F. Bruno, Kenneth S. Casey, Colin Ebert, Helen E.
Fox, Rod Fujita, Dennis Heinemann, Hunter S. Leniham, Elizabeth M.P. Madin,
Matthew T. Perry, Elizabeth R. Selig, Mark Spalding, Robert Steneck, and Reg Watson.
2008. A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems. Science 319 (15
February): 948-952.
Harvey, David. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
_____. 2010. The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Hooks, Gregory and Chad L. Smith. 2012. The Treadmill of Destruction Goes Global:
Anticipating the Environmental Impact of Militarism in the 21st Century. Pp. 60-83 in
Stratocracy: Society and the Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism, edited by
Kostas Gouliamos and Christos Kassimeris.
Hornborg, Alf. 1998. Towards an Ecological Theory of Unequal Exchange: Articulating World
System Theory and Ecological Economics. Ecological Economics 25: 127-136.
_____. 2009. Zero-Sum Game: Challenges in Conceptualizing Environmental Load
Displacement and Ecologically Unequal Exchange. International Journal of
Comparative Sociology 50: 237-262.
_____. 2011. Global Ecology and Unequal Exchange: Fetishism in a Zero-Sum World. New
York: Routledge.
Hossain, M. Maruf and Mohamamad Mahmudul Islam. 2006. Ship Breaking Activities and Its
Impact on the Coastal Zone of Chittagong, Bangladesh: Towards Sustainable
Development. Chittagong, Bangladesh: Young Power in Social Action.
International Federation for Human Rights. 2002. Where Do the Floating Dustbins End Up?
Paris: International Federation for Human Rights.
International Federation for Human Rights and Young Power in Social Action. 2008. Child
Breaking Yards: Child Labour in the Ship Recycling Industry in Bangladesh. Paris:
International Federation for Human Rights.
International Maritime Association. 2011. International Shipping Facts and Figures
Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, and the Environment. London:
International Maritime Association.
Jorgenson, Andrew K. 2006. Global Warming and the Neglected Greenhouse Gas: A Cross!

National Study of the Social Causes of Methane Emissions Intensity, 1995. Social
Forces 84: 1779-1799.
Jorgenson, Andrew and Brett Clark, editors. 2009a. Ecologically Unequal Exchange in
Comparative Perspective. Theme Issue, International Journal of Comparative
Sociology 50 (3-4).
_____. 2009b. The Economy, Military, and Ecologically Unequal Relationships in
Comparative Perspective: A Panel Study of the Ecological Footprints of Nations, 19752000." Social Problems 56: 621-646.
Karim, Md. Saiful. 2010. Environmental Pollution from Shipbreaking Industry: International
Law and National Legal Response. Georgetown International Environmental Law
Review 22: 185-240.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Kentor, Jeffrey and Peter Grimes. 2006. Foreign Investment Dependence and the
Environment: A Global Perspective. Pp. 61-77 in Globalization and the Environment,
edited by Andrew Jorgenson and Edward Kick. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston:
Brill Academic Press.
Kotoky, Aurang. 2015. Changing Flags to Use Indias Ship Graveyard. Bloomberg News
(February 12) at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles.
Langewiesche, William. 2004. The Outlaw Sea: Chaos and Crime on the World's Oceans.
New York: North Point Press.
Lerner, Steve. 2010. Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United
States. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levinson, Arik and M. Scott Taylor. 2008. Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect.
International Economic Review 49: 223-254.
Levinson, Marc. 2006. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the
World Economy Bigger. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Logan, Bernard I. 1991. An Assessment of the Environmental and Economic Implications of
Toxic-Waste Disposal in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of World Trade 25: 61-76.
Lucier, Cristina A. and Brian J. Gureau. 2014. Obstacles to Preserving Precaution and Equity in
Global Hazardous Waste Regulation: An Analysis of Contested Knowledge in the Basel
Convention. International Environmental Agreements (Published online in September,
DOI 10.1007/s10784-014-926-6)
Margai, Florence and Fatoumata B. Barry. 2011. Global Geographies of Environmental
Injustice and Health: A Case Study of Illegal Hazardous Waste Dumping in Cte
dIvoire. Pp. 257-281 in Julianna A. Maantay and Sara McLafferty, editors. Geospatial
Analysis of Environmental Health. New York: Springer.
Martinez-Alier, Joan. 2002. The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts
and Valuation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
_____. 2007. Marxism, Social Metabolism, and International Trade. Pp. 221-237 in Rethinking
Environmental History: World-System History and Global Environmental Change, edited
by Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier. New York: AltaMira Press.
_____. 2009. Social Metabolism, Ecological Distribution Conflicts, and Languages of
Valuation. Capitalism Nature Socialism 20: 58-87.
Mitchell, Robert Cameron and Richard T. Carson. 1989. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods:
The Contingent Valuation Method. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
!

Moen, Amy. 2008. Breaking Basel: The Elements of the Basel Convention and its Application
to Toxic Ships. Marine Policy 32: 1053-1062.
Mol, Arthur P. 2001. Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization
of the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Moore, Jason W. 2000. Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical
Perspective. Organization and Environment 13: 123-157.
_____. 2007. Silver, Ecology, and the Origins of the Modern World, 1450-1640. Pp. 123-142
in Rethinking Environmental History: World-System History and Global Environmental
Change, edited by Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier. New York:
AltaMira Press.
_____. 2010a. Amsterdam is Standing on Norway Part I: The Alchemy of Capital,
Empire and Nature in the Diaspora of Silver, 1545-1648. Journal of Agrarian Change
10: 33-68.
_____. 2010b. Amsterdam is Standing on Norway Part II: The Global North Atlantic in the
Ecological Revolution of the Long Seventeenth Century. Journal of Agrarian Change
10: 188-227.
_____. 2011a. Transcending the Metabolic Rift: A Theory of Crises in the Capitalist WorldEcology. The Journal of Peasant Studies 38: 1-46.
_____. 2011b. Ecology, Capital, and the Nature of Our Times: Accumulation & Crisis in the
Capitalist World-Ecology. Journal of World Systems Research 42:107-146.
Muradian, Roldan and Stefan Giljum. 2007. Physical Trade Flows of Pollution-Intensive
Products: Historical Trends in Europe and the World. Pp. 307-325 in Rethinking
Environmental History: World-System History and Global Environmental Change, edited
by Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier. New York: AltaMira Press.
Nixon, Rob. 2011. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Okereke, Chukwumerije. 2008. Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance:
Ethics, Sustainable Development and International Cooperation. London and New York:
Routledge.
Parmar, Vijaysinh. 2012. Strike in Alang to Protest Arrests of Ship Breakers. The Times of
India (October, 12). Available at www.timesofindia.com.
Pellow, David Naguib. 2007. Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for
Environmental Justice. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
_____. 2011. Politics by Other Greens: The Importance of Transnational Environmental Justice
Movement Networks. Pp. 247-266 in Environmental Inequalities Beyond Borders:
Local Perspectives on Global Injustices, edited by Jo Ann Carmin and Julian Agyeman.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Prew, Paul. 2010. World-Economy Centrality and Carbon Dioxide Emissions; A New
Look at Position in the Capitalist World-System and Environmental Pollution. Journal
of World-Systems Research 16: 162-191.
Price-Smith, Andrew T. 2001. The Health of Nations: Infectious Diseases, Environmental
Change and the Effects of National Security and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Puthucherril, Tony George. 2010. From Shipbreaking to Sustaianable Ship Recycling: Evolution
of a Legal Regime. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____. 2011. Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Ships for their Last Rites: Will the Ship
Recycling Conventions Make a Difference. Ocean Yearbook 24: 283-330.
Reddy, M. Srinivasa, Shaik Basha, H.V. Joshi, and G. Ramachandraiah. 2005. Seasonal
Distribution and Conatmination Levels of Total PHCs, PAHs and Heavy Metals in
Coastal Waters of the Alang-Sosiya Ship Scrapping Yard, Gulf of Cambay, India.
Chemosphere 61: 1587-1593.
Rice, James. 2007. Ecological Unequal Exchange: International Trade and Uneven Utilization
of Environmental Space in the World System. Social Forces 85: 1369-1392.
_____. 2009. The Transnational Organization of Production and Uneven Environmental
Degradation and Change in the World Economy. Journal of Comparative International
Sociology 50: 215-236.
_____. 2011. The Global Reorganization and Revitalization of the Asbestos Industry, 19702007. International Journal of Health Sciences 41: 239-254.
Rifkin, Jeremy. 1980. Entropy: A New World View. New York: The Viking Press.
Roberts, J. Timmons, Peter Grimes, and Jodie Manale. 2006. Social Roots of Global
Environmental Change: A World-Systems Analyis of Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Pp.
79-117 in Globalization and the Environment, edited by Andrew Jorgenson and Edward
Kick. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill Academic Press.
Roberts, J. Timmons and Bradley C. Parks. 2007. A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality,
North-South Politics, and Climate Policy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Robindebois.org. 2008. Special issue. Global statement 2008 of ships sent to demolition.
Available at www.robindesbois.org.
_____. 2009. Special issue. Global statement of 2007 ships sent to demolition. Available at
www.robindesbois.org.
_____. 2010. 2009 Collection.Shipbreaking.com #15 to 18 Ships sent to demolition
from January 1st to decembre 31st. Available at www.robindesbois.org.
_____. 2011. 2010 Collection. Shipbreaking.com #19 to 22 Ships sent to demolition
from January 1 to decembre 31st. Available at www.robindesbois.org.
Robins, Nicholas A. 2011. Mercury, Mining, and Empire: The Human and Ecological Cost of
Colonial Silver Mining in the Andes. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press.
Rousmaniere, Peter and Nikhil Raj. 2007. Shipbreaking in the Developing World: Problems and
Prospects. International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health 13: 359368.
Sahu, Geetanjoy. 2014. Workers of Alang-Sosiya: A Survey of Working Conditions in a ShipBreaking Yard, 1983-2013. Economic and Political Weekly 49: 52-59.
Schnaiberg, Allan. 1980. Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Shin, Kyoung-ho and Paul S. Ciccantell. 2009 The Steel and Shipbuilding Industries of South
Korea: Rising East Asia and Globalization. Journal of World Systems Research 15: 167192.
Smith, Jackie and Dawn Wiest. 2012. Social Movements in the World-System: The Politics of
Crisis and Transformation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
World-System. Journal of World System Research.
Summers, Lawrence. 1991. Selections from a World Bank Memo. The Economist
!

(February 8): 66.
Swerts, Thomas. 2013. The Democratic Deficit of Transnational Environmental Activism: A
Case Study of E-Waste Governance in India. Global Networks 13: 498-516.
Tewari, A., H. V. Joshi, R. H. Trivedi, V. G. Sravankumar, C. Raghunathan, Y. Khambhaty, O.
S. Kotiwar, and S. K. Mandal. 2001. The Effect of Ship Scrapping Industry and Its
Associated Wastes on the Biomas Production and Biodiversity of Biota in in situ
Condition at Alang. Marine Pollution Bulletin 42: 462-469.
Uglietti, Chiara, Colin A. Cook, Paul Vallelonga, and Lonne G. Thompson. 2015. Widespread
Pollution of the South American Atmosphere Predates the Industrial Revolution by 240
Y. National Academies of Science 112:2349-2354.
Urry, John. 2014. Offshoring. Cambridge, MA: Polity.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974-2011. The Modern World System. (4 Volumes.) New York:
Academic Press.
_____. 2000. The Essential Wallerstein. New York: The New Press.
_____. 2002. "New Revolts Against the System." New Left Review 18
(November-December): 29-39.
_____. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University.
World Bank. 2010. Ship Breaking and Recycling Industry in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Wu, Wei-Te, Yu-Jen Lin, Huei-Sheng Shiue, Chung-Yi Li, Perng-Jy Tsai, Chun-Yuh Yang,
Saou-Hsing Liou, and Trong-Neng Wu. 2014. Cancer Incidence of Taiwanese
Shipbreaking Workers Who Have Been Potentially Exposed to Asbestos. Environmental
Research 132: 370-378.
York, Richard and Eugene A. Rosa. 2003. Key Challenges to Ecological Modernization
Theory. Organization and Environment 16: 273-288.
York, Richard, Eugene A. Rosa, and Thomas Dietz. 2003. A Rift in Modernity? Assessing the
Anthropogenic Sources of Global Climate Change with the STIRPAT Model.
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 23: 31-51.
York, Richard and Eugene A. Rosa. 2006. Emissions of Sulpher Dioxide and Nitrogen
Oxides. Pp. 119-132 in Globalization and the Environment, edited by Andrew
Jorgenson and Edward Kick. Leiden, The Netherlands and Boston: Brill Academic Press.
Economic Entitlements via Entrepreneurial Conduct?

Women and Financial Inclusion in Neoliberal India1
K. Kalpana
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
kkalpana@iitm.ac.in
Abstract
This paper examines the gendered local character of neoliberalism at the household level by
focusing on microcredit/finance programs in India. Microfinance promoted by the state as an
informal activity targeting women is intended to alleviate income inequalities, even as it
contributes to maintaining the world capitalist system. In India the inception of microfinancebased Self Help Groups (SHGs) or peer groups of women savers and borrowers in the 1990s
has coincided with a rightward turn towards neoliberal policies of structural adjustment,
privatization and economic deregulation. In this paper, I show how Indian policy makers
have endeavored to make womens economic entitlements contingent upon their disciplined
financial behavior and their willing participation in neoliberal agendas of creating and
deepening self-regulating markets at village levels. Drawing on an ethnographic study
conducted in a South Indian state, I show that the community level neoliberal disciplining
that microfinance entails does not proceed without resistance. Whilst SHGs seek to constitute
women as fiscally disciplined savers and borrowers, women stake their rightful entitlement
to bank credit even as they reject outright the entrepreneurial subjectivities they are expected
to assume. They pursue purposes and ends that extend well beyond financial inclusion.
Keywords: Microfinance, Women, Neoliberal Governmentality, Capitalist Accumulation,

India
The intertwining of neoliberal capitalism and development policymaking in the last two
decades of the twentieth century and beyond is perhaps best exemplified by the case of
microfinance/credit programs. Microfinance programs!which involve neighborhood-based
peer groups that save and rotate small amounts of capital and subsequently leverage the
resources of formal financial institutions in order to on-lend larger sums of capital to group
members (Pagura and Kirsten 2006)!have won powerful adherents and supporters that
include international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the international development industry (including United Nations
agencies), national governments, commercial banks and other for-profit lending institutions.
Microfinance is celebrated for having dramatically expanded the frontier of formal finance
by moving it down market, or towards small farmers, micro-entrepreneurs, small and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
I thank Mangala Subramaniam and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on my paper. I
also thank Mangala Subramaniam for having encouraged me to contribute to the special volume and for guiding
me through the process of writing for the JWSR.
Women and Financial Inclusion in Neoliberal India 51

medium enterprises, the very poor and those in remote areas (Von Pischke 2003: 6-7). In so
doing, it contributes to rural financial deepening, or an expansion in financial transactions
in rural areas through the offer of new contract terms and conditions and a wide range of
financial services to broader clienteles (Gonzalez-Vega 2003).
The microfinance phenomenon epitomizes what world-systems theorists identify as
capitals imperative to seek profit, to endlessly accumulate itself, in the process generating a
need for constant technological change, a constant expansion of frontiers geographical,
psychological, intellectual, scientific (Wallerstein 2004: 2). Insofar as microfinance is
concerned, the emergence of novel transactional technologies that entail innovations in
lending and repayment methodologies have set it apart from an older generation of rural
credit programs. Some of these innovations include the peer pressure mechanisms inherent to
group-based or joint-liability lending that deliver on-time repayment and close-to-market
rates of interest typical of most programs. Compared to individual-targeted lending, these
programs significantly reduce transaction costs and labor expended by lending institutions in
disbursing loans, monitoring loan use or inducing loan repayment (Johnson and Rogaly 1997:
38-51, Wenner 1995). Formerly deemed credit-unworthy, low-income households and
communities have come to be perceived not only as bankable but a vast market of savers
and borrowers and consumers of financial services waiting to be tapped at the bottom of the
pyramid (Prahalad 2005).
The global ascendance of microfinance signals an enormous commercial and
governmental investment in the quotidian disciplining and responsibilizing of its program
participants, in keeping with the imperatives of capital accumulation under neoliberal
capitalism. As is well known by now, this disciplining is gendered: women from land-poor
and low-income households are the overwhelming constituency of microcredit projects
worldwide. Feminist scholars have observed that the valorizing of the economic agency of
women in poverty proceeded apace with the advance of neoliberalism in the 1980s, and they
raised growing concerns about the devastating social impacts resulting in the 1990s. In
response to both anti-poverty and efficiency-related concerns, women came to be
constructed as a valuable and under-utilized resource for development or the missing link
(Razavi 1997) in low-cost poverty alleviation strategies. Their participation was expected to
deliver optimal outcomes such as enhancing household wellbeing, ensuring child survival,
increasing food security, and raising family incomes (Jackson 1996; Razavi 1997).
In this paper, I examine ongoing strategies of capital accumulation in the world
economy via feminized and poverty-targeted economic development programs in India. I
situate these with respect to transnational processes, such as neoliberal Structural Adjustment
Programs, SAPs, and transnational development interventions, such as microfinance, which
have flourished in India and elsewhere in consonance with the SAPs. Even as I draw upon
theoretical debates that tease out the relationship between microfinance and capitalist
accumulation (Aitken 2010; Karides 2010; Karim 2011; Mayoux 2002; Rankin 2001; Weber
2002), I situate these with respect to analytical literature on the Indian experience of
neoliberal reforms (Chatterjee 2008; Corbridge et al 2011; Harriss 2011) and the Indian
variant of the global microfinance phenomenon viz., Self Help Groups (SHGs) or villagelevel microfinance-centered peer groups. I do so in order to explore the irreducibly specific
and particular forms that transnational strategies of capital accumulation may acquire in
varied country contexts.

In India, SHG-based microfinance is currently the most visible and successful
embodiment of the mainstreaming of women within economic development and antipoverty programs. 2 In this paper, I show how womens participation in economic
development projects is solicited, mobilized, and harnessed by policy makers as part of the
social safety net of hou
seholds in poverty during a period in which the Indian state has transited from a
developmental to an emergent capitalist state (Vasavi and Kingfisher 2003). I argue that
while an emergent neoliberal state in India extends survival-oriented financial assistance to
poor households (via their responsibilized women members), it simultaneously advances
neoliberal agendas of creating and deepening self-regulating markets at the grassroots.
Drawing upon ethnographic field work conducted in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, I
explore the contradictions and the unintended outcomes that ensue when rural women, the
intended instruments of this process, subvert and re-define project goals and objectives. I use
these narratives of subversion to make the case that projects of financial governance that
bring a financial rationality to bear on the domains they seek to govern are neither stable nor
uncontested, and that we would do well to understand finance itself (and microfinance as part
of it) as an assemblage that draws on diverse materials in ways that are often politically
contested (Aitken, 2010).
Theorizing Microfinance Under Neoliberal Capitalism: Self-regulating Markets and
Political safety Nets
The poor themselves can create a poverty-free world.... Credit can create selfemployment instantaneously. Why wait for others to create a job for you?
(Yunus 2005).
As articulated by Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus and others, globally dominant
microfinance imaginaries valorize entrepreneurial individuals as responsible agents of their
own economic well being. This has taken place even as budget-constrained governments
implementing neoliberal economic reforms struggle to provide access to social services and
livelihood opportunities for economically marginalized citizenry (Rankin 2001; Mayoux
2002). Analysts note that the massive expansion of microfinance and micro-enterprise based
development interventions occurred in the 1990s!a period marked by the articulation of a
poverty agenda by the global development industry in response to the resurgence of poverty
and income inequalities associated with neoliberal economic restructuring (Thomas 2000;
Weber 2002). Microfinance was promoted as the grassroots dimension, or the human face
of economic liberalization policies and an ideal self-help strategy that would enable the
poor to secure services such as education, health, water and sanitation despite increased
unemployment and rising costs of basic amenities (Mayoux 2002).
Situating microfinance in the historical context of crisis management in capitalist
societies at the turn of the 20th century, Weber (2002) uses Karl Polanyis (1957) thesis of the
double movement to argue that neoliberal policy reforms, which may be seen as
representing the tendency of capitalism to dis-embed the economy from society by permitting
the free market to self-regulate (the first movement), have provoked popular resistance at
local levels in several countries undergoing structural reforms (the counter-process or the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
By late March 2013, over 7.3 million SHGs (of which 81% were womens SHGs) maintained savings worth
Rs.82 billion (equivalent to approximately US $1.4 billion) with the banking sector in India. Of these SHGs,
over 4.4 million SHGs (of which 84% were womens groups) had loans outstanding from banks worth Rs.394
billion (NABARD 2013).

second movement). In this context, the strategic embedding (Weber 2002) of
microfinance in the global political economy of poverty reduction serves the dual function of
advancing the goals of the first movement (by extending trade in financial services at the
grassroots), even as it acts as a political safety net by financing and promoting private
entrepreneurship, thereby absorbing surplus labor in informal sectors and mitigating income
insecurity. Through its latter role, it simultaneously dampens, contains, and disciplines the
politics of the second movement (Weber 2002).
The structural compatibilities between microfinance-based development interventions
and economies undergoing neoliberal reform are further developed by Karides (2010) who
observes that public assistance to low-income populations in the Caribbean region has
increasingly taken the form of support for petty market operations, which was vigorously
promoted during the SAPs. In effect, two historic and distinct strategies aiming to overcome
the crisis of capitalism!namely governmental transfer and informal self-employment!have
fused into the single form of micro-enterprise development that has come to be perceived as
a safety net under globalization (Karides 2010). While Weber (2002) and Karides (2010)
have underscored the palliative relief that microfinance programs offer to populations
impacted adversely by neoliberal economic re-structuring, others have argued that
microfinance itself may be seen as a financial object capable of generating and sustaining
forms of profit and capital accumulation (Aitken 2010). To attract international investors
specialized financial services providers and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) often charge
their borrowers interest rates that are as high or even significantly higher than rates in the
formal financial sector. This distorts the agenda of financial inclusion of the poor,
entrenching a two-tier system of credit wherein marginal groups are marked out for highcost credit (Aitken 2010).
The above-mentioned frameworks help us understand the strategic embedding
(Weber 2002) of microfinance in the gendered political economy of anti-poverty initiatives in
India. I also seek to identify the precise mechanisms of capital accumulation via SHG-based
microfinance by showing how the extension of trade in financial services has opened up new
disciplined and feminized markets of micro-borrowers and savers for the formal financial
sector in India. I examine also whether the second function of microfinance (Weber
2002)!that is the promotion of private entrepreneurship, or the agenda of micro-enterprise
development!actually alleviates income inequality by absorbing surplus labor and enabling
women of working poor households to participate in and contribute to capitalist accumulation
projects at the grassroots.
While I situate my analysis of microfinance with respect to Indias experience of
neoliberal economic reforms, I draw on Foucaultian scholars of governmentality who
conceive of neoliberalism not so much as a withdrawal or retreat of the state, but as a
positive technique of government that spawns new regulatory technologies seeking to govern
economic life. By acting upon diverse and multiple social forces and entities (individuals,
households, collectives, businesses), the state autonomizes and responsibilizes these so that
they may, in turn, regulate and align the conduct of governed populations with broader sociopolitical objectives (Burchell 1996; Rose 1999:174). I propose that microfinance is an
emergent regulatory technology of neoliberal governmentality whose rise (in India as well as
other parts of the world) coincides with and is, in part, reliant on modes of government that
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) describe as transnational governmentality. Key elements of
these global governance regimes include the regulatory and disciplining strategies of SAPs
implemented by International Financial Institutions, the proliferation of voluntary
organizations supported by transnational funding, and the outsourcing of the functions of the
state to non-state actors and agencies that assume responsibility for delivering an array of
basic amenities and services to governed populations (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

To understand how pivotal the responsibilizing and disciplining of women is to these
processes, I turn to literature that explores the making of new gendered subjectivities in
keeping with the emergence of neoliberal developmental rationalities. Drawing on their
ethnographic research in Nepal and Bangladesh respectively, Rankin (2001) and Karim
(2011) argue that microfinance programs attempt to constitute rational economic woman or
women clients who function efficiently and sustainably as self-maximizing entrepreneurs
(Rankin 2001), embodying the principles of competition, profit, and entrepreneurship and
acting in consonance with market rationalities (Karim 2011). It appears then that women in
poverty must re-fashion themselves in order to populate the new grassroots level selfregulating markets for microfinance that peer-group based lending has opened up in several
parts of the world.
Microfinance Origins and Organizational Specificities in India
In the decades following Indias independence, the post-colonial state adopted the mandate of
eliminating the monopoly of the traditional moneylender in rural India and ending the
exploitative ties binding the landlord-cum-moneylender to the cultivator-borrower (Pulley
1989). Literature on chronic debt in the rural countryside has shown that indigenous
moneylenders accumulated capital through relations of monopoly power and social control
over poor cultivators and sharecropper households, enabled by the interlocking of credit with
other factor markets such as product and labor markets (Bhaduri 1973, 1986). During the
years of social banking (1969 end-1980s), the central government launched an aggressive,
supply-led approach to rural credit, primarily through nationalization and the ensuing
mobilization of commercial banks in the cause of wealth redistribution and affirmative action
(Pulley 1989). The rural banking initiatives launched during these years included the massive
proliferation of bank branches in semi-urban and rural areas, the introduction of specialized
lending schemes, the capping of interest rates for specific classes of borrowers, and the
setting of targets to lend to designated priority sectors of the economy or weaker sections
of the population.
However, the intended linkages between banks and the land-poor or the poorest
sections of rural India were stymied by the high transaction costs of doing business with a
geographically dispersed population, the urban orientation of field staff, and perceptions of
the bank as an alien institution inaccessible to the poor, among other reasons (NABARD
1999: 1.7.2). The unwillingness of banks to lend to rural population groups in the premicrofinance era, despite policy mandates to do so, is not unique to India, as the literature on
rural finance testifies (Hulme and Mosley 1996). Since the advent of microfinance and peergroup based lending, commercial banks and specialized microfinance institutions are willing
and eager to lend to informal grassroots collectives in low-income rural and urban settlements
leading to the critique of capital accumulation by microfinance lenders as discussed above
(Aitken 2010). However, we must attend more closely to the organizational structuring of
SHG-based microfinance in India in order to better understand the processes at play.
Residence-based groups that range from 12 20 members each, SHGs are grassroots
collectives that generate their own capital and take collective decisions with respect to the
terms of their financial transactions, such as rates of saving, interest rates, repayment
schedules, and disciplinary mechanisms. Promoter agencies!both state and non-state such
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs)!facilitate the formation of SHGs and play a
supportive role through the provision of training, assistance in accounts-maintenance,
financial auditing, and other critical services. As soon as it is formed, an SHG opens a
savings account in a proximate commercial bank as the first step in establishing a relationship

with the formal banking sector. The group leaders, selected from within the group, assume
responsibility for maintaining group accounts and liaising with banks, promoter NGOs, and
government agencies. Being user-owned and member-controlled entities, SHGs have been
described as micro-banks (Harper 2002) or Community-Managed Loan Funds (Murray
and Rosenberg 2006). It is important to note that in this model of lending, the total capital
generated within the group through member savings (including interest incomes) belongs to
the group and is usually distributed among group members at the end of a stipulated,
mutually determined period of time.
While SHGs own the internal finances they generate and make group-level decisions
regarding the terms of lending and borrowing, they also borrow from external sources!
primarily the commercial banks that are the account-holders of the groups finances. In 199091, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD), the prime institution promoting agricultural and rural financing in
India, initiated the SHG-bank linkage project that linked residence-based peer groups to
commercial banks so that the resources of the latter are optimally utilized by sections of the
rural population (hitherto) un-served by public sector banks. SHG-banking offers nonsubsidized credit linked to the volume of group savings, which the poor can use for any
purpose, including household consumption (RBI 2009: 2-4).
In April 1999, the central government introduced a nationwide poverty alleviation
program called the SwarnJayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), which used SHGs to
deliver a mix of bank credit and government subsidy to targeted beneficiaries below the
official poverty line to encourage self-employment activities. The rural development
administration (the District Rural Development Agency at the district level and the Block
Development Office at the sub-district or block level) provided the subsidy component of the
scheme, while loan funds were provided by commercial banks. Being a targeted anti-poverty
intervention that focused on vulnerable sections of the rural poor, the SGSY guidelines
prescribed that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes must account for at least 50%,
women 40% and the disabled 3% of its total beneficiaries3 (RBI 2011).
Apart from the policy push towards SHG-banking by the highest strata of financial
policy makers in India, does SHG-banking also make sense to the banking sector from the
point of view of enhancing its financial performance and capital accumulation strategies in
the neoliberal era? In the following section, I discuss this issue.
Situating Microfinance in Neoliberal India: Why Lend to SHGs?
Significantly, the enthusiastic promotion of women-targeted microfinance programs since the
early 1990s has coincided with the Indian governments adoption of liberalization policies
consisting of the standard IMF/ World Bank policy prescription of short-term stabilization
and medium and long-run structural adjustment measures. While some states in the worldsystem have entirely resisted the adoption of neoliberalism, as Subramaniam (2015) points
out in her introduction, India has embraced economic liberalization. As Gupta and
Sivaramakrishnan (2011) observe, the relationship between economy and state has been reformulated in wide-ranging ways, besides also transforming Indias perception of itself and
its place in the world-system. In addition to reforms aiming at the international integration of
the Indian economy through changes in taxation, trade barriers and investment, a spate of
internal changes have facilitated the entry of private operators in core sectors that include
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
The Indian government classifies the Scheduled Tribes (STs), Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Other Backward
Classes (OBCs) in decreasing order of social oppression and deprivation.

health care, education, transport, telecommunications, sanitation, and energy (Gupta and
Sivaramakrishnan 2011).
Since the 1990s, reforms in the Indian banking sector were also undertaken as a
component of the overall economic policy reforms, following the recommendations of the
first Narasimham Committee on Financial System set up in August 1991. Critics observe that
the reforms emphasized improvement of the allocative and financial efficiency of the banking
sector, with performance evaluation criteria of the banks shifting towards restoring
profitability and portfolio quality above other indices (Kohli 1997). However, the trajectories
of neoliberal reforms have been mediated by a strong state tradition (Harriss 2011) in India
and path dependencies (Corbridge et al 2011) that have tempered the effects and
consequences for different sections of the population. Following from his early work
suggesting that the post-colonial Indian state derives its legitimacy by steering the program of
economic development and national regeneration, as opposed to the alien, extractive
colonial state (Chatterjee 1998), Partha Chatterjee (2008) contends that the growing
hegemony of corporate capital in India during the 1990s and the ongoing primitive
accumulation of capital dispossesses subaltern classes and necessitates welfarist policies
targeted to the poor in the electoral/political context of a representative democracy. The
recognition that the marginalized may become dangerous classes if left utterly bereft of
state support is reflected in the continuance of governmental policies that seek to reverse the
effects of primitive accumulation (Chatterjee 2008: 62).
Projects of inclusive banking that originated in the early 1990s have thus taken
shape in a policy context marked, on the one hand, by the banking sectors pursuit of
institutional viability in a competitive and deregulated environment and, on the other, the
governmental imperative of complementing the newly-unfettered market mechanism. Apart
from the policy push that motivated nationalized banks to finance SHGs, the efficiency
considerations of enhancing repayment performance, reducing transaction costs for the lender
and restoring the institutional viability of the financing banks (especially Indias rural
development banks or Regional Rural Banks that had displayed several operational
inefficiencies in the past) have also accounted for the vigorous promotion of SHG-financing
within the formal financial sector. 4 Notably, SHG-banking in India was conceived and
initiated after the notion of women as disciplined borrowers had gained the status of a
development truism, following the proliferation of women-targeted microcredit programs in
neighboring Bangladesh during the 1980s. It is hardly incidental, therefore, that the
overwhelming participation of women in SHGs was enthusiastically welcomed by financial
policy-makers during a period when considerations of commercial viability and transactional
efficiency came to dominate the banking sector.
Linking Economic Entitlements and Entrepreneurial Conduct: Microfinance and
Neoliberal Governmentality
In India and elsewhere finance (and microfinance) is not governed in relation to a single set
of interests, but is marked instead by complicated networks of social actors and assembled
from diverse materials in ways that are often contested (Aitken 2010). On the one hand, the
RBI and NABARD have endeavored to mold SHG-banking in keeping with the commercial
principles of banking and the guidelines generally identified as best practices in
microfinance, such as the avoidance of capital subsidies, non-directed or untied lending, and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
The first NABARD-issued circular on the SHG-Bank Linkage project expresses these concerns clearly
(NABARD 1992).

linking loan size to group savings. On the other hand, the Ministry of Rural Development has
sought to use SHGs as cost-effective channels for reaching a subsidy-bearing anti-poverty
scheme to a targeted population group for the pre-determined purpose of financing enterprise
activity. The multiple and conflicting motives and interests of the different institutional actors
involved may be attributed, in part, to the legacies of state developmentalism in India. While
the SHG phenomenon emerged and grew during the reform years in India, the linkage of the
SHGs to nationalized or state-owned banks and, in particular, their incorporation within
central government sponsored anti-poverty schemes have been facilitated by pre-existing
state tradition (Harriss 2011) and path dependencies (Corbridge et al. 2011) of social
banking in the sector of rural and agricultural financing.
While SHG-banking therefore makes it possible for women from unbanked rural
households and communities to lay claim to development resources earmarked for them by
policies of the Indian state, this access nevertheless hinges on the women constituting
themselves as fiscally disciplined actors!prudent savers and responsible borrowers!in
village-level markets for microfinance that the SHG phenomenon has opened up and on their
acquisition of the appropriate subjectivities. For instance, an SHG that had functioned for a
minimum period of six months was eligible to seek a linkage loan, provided it demonstrated
financial discipline, credit history, and mature financial behavior through the rotation
of the groups internally generated financial corpus. Rural women were expected to imbibe
the essentials of financial intermediation (NABARD 2006: 2) and provide manifest evidence
of their creditworthiness so that commercial banks may finance them through the Direct
Linkage scheme. In order to secure financial assistance through the SGSY scheme, women
members of SHGs were required to display entrepreneurial agency by demonstrating
willingness and capacity to initiate enterprise activity, besides cultivating proper financial
intermediation skills (as in the case of the Linkage scheme).
SHG-based microfinance thus offers a safety net (Karides 2010; Weber 2002) for
households in poverty or those belonging to the potentially dangerous classes (Chatterjee
2008) through the provision of low-cost bank credit for consumption purposes (via the
Linkage scheme) and subsidy-bearing credit for initiating new income-generating activities
(via the SGSY scheme). However, in order to avail of the promised financial assistance, the
women members of SHGs must undertake to efficiently manage their micro-banks, create
and deepen self-regulating markets for microfinance at village levels, and inculcate the
skills and capacities required to inhabit these market spaces, advancing thereby the goals of
capital!accumulation!(e.g.,!Weber!2002). We see, therefore, how SHG-based microfinance,
as an emergent technology of neoliberal governmentality, strives to shape and direct the
self-regulating capacities and self-steering mechanisms (Miller and Rose 1990) of
women of rural poor households so that they responsibly manage the financial resources they
generate, choose to adopt financial calculations, practices and identities in domains where
these logics may not have been dominant earlier (Aitken 2010), and willingly bear the risks
of collectively-managing micro-enterprise activities.
In the following sections of the paper, I draw on case studies from the state of Tamil
Nadu that highlight the processes of negotiation between the womens SHGs, on the one
hand, and bankers and the rural development bureaucracy, on the other, when the women
stake claim to their economic entitlements (via subsidy-bearing and non-subsidized loan
schemes).

A Note on the Field Study: Rationale and Methods
While the operational guidelines of the SGSY scheme and the NABARD and RBI-promoted
Direct Linkage scheme apply uniformly across the country, the SHG phenomenon has
displayed marked regional variations and unevenness in its growth. The two Southern states
of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh assumed an early lead in the program and accounted for
44% of all credit-linked SHGs by late March 2005, with the four Southern states accounting
for 59% of all credit-linked SHGs in the same period (NABARD 2005: 41).
The ethnographic study this paper draws upon was conducted in two phases between
August 2004 and April 2006. The first phase included interviews with a total of 12 NGOs
active in SHG promotion in six districts of Tamil Nadu. The second phase consisted of
intensive fieldwork involving 27 SHGs in three villages in a district of Northern Tamil
Nadu.5 In these villages, women from land-poor households!the principal constituency of
the SHGs!performed daily wage labor in agriculture, brick kilns, the construction sector,
leather-based industries (shoe companies and tanneries), domestic work in wealthier
households, and subsistence-level self-employment activities in the lower end of the informal
sector. The fieldwork included participant observation of the weekly village-level SHG
meetings, multiple rounds of open-ended, wide-ranging discussions with group leaders and
group members as well as field staff of promoter agencies, and visits to the bank and the
Block Development Office (BDO). My aim was to to observe first-hand the processes that
preceded the sanction and disbursal of bank loans.
SHGs in the study villages
In the three study villages, the SHGs were exclusively womens groups, with age ranging
from three to seven years. The number of members per SHG ranged from 16 to 20. Of the 27
SHGs, 15 were composed exclusively of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 10 of the Other
Backward Classes (OBCs), while 2 SHGs had members of both caste groups.6 While each
SHG had a savings account with its nearest bank branch, the 27 SHGs were promoted by
diverse agencies that included development NGOs, the BDO and the rural branch of a
nationalized commercial bank. Table 1 shows the distribution in the study villages of all
SHGs, those that had received the SGSY financial (loan-cum-subsidy) assistance and those
that had received the Direct Linkage loan.
Table 1: SHG distribution in study villages
Village 1 Village 2 Village 3
Total No of SHGs studied
Of total, SHGs that received
SGSY assistance
Of total, SHGs sanctioned (not
disbursed) SGSY assistance
Of total, SHGs that received the
Direct Linkage loan
Total
10
5
8
6
9
2
27
13
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
While all relevant contextual information is provided, the names of the study villages, the administrative block
and district and the promoter NGOs are withheld.
6
For the most part, the two principal caste groups (SCs and OBCs) live in segregated fashion in separate
hamlets in rural Tamil Nadu. Hence, most SHGs are also caste-segregated.!

The total financial assistance ranged from Rs.50,000 to Rs.200,000 per SHG for the 15
groups that received or were sanctioned the SGSY loan. Of this, the subsidy component
ranged from one-third to one-half of total loan value. The amount of the Direct Linkage loan
received by the 9 SHGs ranged from Rs.40,000 to Rs.200,000 per SHG.
Poverty, Social Context, and Financial Intermediation
The women members of SHGs were expected to constitute themselves as responsible savers
and disciplined borrowers who demonstrated to banks!through the efficient rotation of their
own capital!that they were fiscally responsible agents qualifying for bank credit. The
information in the SHGs books of accounts (the savings pass books and loan ledgers) on the
repayment status of all loans borrowed by the women informed the judgments of bank
officials regarding the creditworthiness of the group as a collective and of individual
members. Conscious that SHG-banking linked them to women from households and
communities that had been the targets of social banking-type schemes associated with poor
credit discipline in the past,7 the financing banks were found reluctant to make loans through
the Linkage scheme which carried no lending quota. Consequently, the bank personnel
subjected the SHGs account books to intense scrutiny whenever women sought loans
through the scheme. The NGOs that engaged in SHG promotion in other parts of Tamil
Nadu also testified that the zero tolerance displayed by some bank managers towards any
delay in the repayment of internal loans disadvantaged groups comprising very poor and
socially marginalized communities when they applied for the Linkage loans. In contrast, the
anti-poverty mandate of the SGSY scheme and its disbursal targets to vulnerable social
groups mediated bankers credit-assessment procedures.
In the three study villages, the women attempted to make the bank officials
understand that irregular repayment (of internal loans) was, to an extent, inevitable due to
poverty and uncertain livelihoods. More commonly, women altered SHG account books
before bank supervision to create a semblance of timely repayment. The promoter NGO
played the critical role of setting right the account books by camouflaging repayment
irregularities prior to bank evaluation of SHGs loan ledgers. Directly promoted by the
financing bank, the nine SHGs in village 3 were deprived of this dimension of promotional
support. When the five SHGs comprising women of the OBC communities in village 3
received a loan of Rs.200,000 per group through the Linkage scheme, the four SHGs located
in the Scheduled Caste habitation of the village applied for the loan as well. Arguing that the
irregular repayment of their internal loans demonstrated diminished capacity to repay bank
loans, the bank manager firmly turned them away.8 One of the more tenacious of the four
SHGs was sanctioned a (smaller) sum of Rs.150,000 after the women wore down the
manager through their repeated visits and requests. Eventually the other three SHGs in the SC
habitation were also sanctioned the Linkage loan after a change of guard at the bank. The
President of one of the SHGs commented, The former manager was too strict in judging our
repayment record. But the new man has a conscience and is more humane. He understands
our poverty.
Interestingly, the women did not always concede the banks right to govern their
financial decision-making through evaluation, and thus regulation, of their responses to
livelihood and other crises. The President of an SC SHG in village 3 challenged the manager
(who had denied their Linkage loan) saying, We have no employment now and have not
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Poor institutional incentives for repayment had plagued older, credit-based anti-poverty schemes also
implemented by commercial banks (Kabeer and Murthy 1996).
8
As per current rates, approximately Rupees 60 = 1 US $
7

repaid our loans. But it is our savings money that we havent repaid. And that is not your
business. You have a right to question us if we dont repay your loans. When the bank
officers brought to bear an intense scrutiny of their internal loan repayment, women from the
poorest SHGs drew attention to the economic oppression of their households and
communities. They framed their entitlement to the Linkage scheme not in terms of their fiscal
performance, but rather the dire nature of their need for development resources from the
state. They reminded the bank officials that household poverty and the vagaries of livelihoods
inevitably mediated the forms of financial intermediation their SHGs displayed.
Fabricating Entrepreneurship: The Costs and the Gains
World-systems theorists analyzing household structures in the capitalist world-system argue
that the structural importance of subsistence work and petty production for the survival of
poor households signals an incomplete or semi-proletarianization, with wages constituting
only part of the incomes on which these households rely (Wallerstein and Smith 1984). In the
three villages studied, the households of SHG members were engaged in a range of petty
market activities that involved both petty commodity production and micro-scale retail or
trade, which supplemented incomes from (seasonally-available) wage work in the farm and
non-farm sectors. The vast majority of these market-oriented activities may be classified as
survival activities (Ghate, Ballon and Manalo 1996) into which the poor are pushed for the
want of more profitable activities. They involve rudimentary skills and low entry barriers and
are over-crowded and clustered at the bottom of the informal sector. Some of the most
common examples in the region of study were home-based beedi9-rolling, vegetable, fruit
and flower vending, mobile door-to-door sales of cooked food, and petty hawking.
A few of the other remunerative activities, that were regarded as commercial
successes in the context of the village economy, may be classified as micro-enterprises
wherein experience and skill requirements restricted entry. While micro-enterprises, in
contrast to survival activities, are generally seen to generate savings for expansion and
potential for growth (Ghate, Ballon and Manalo 1996), this was not always the case in these
villages. Most of the micro-enterprises in question (such as shops, grocery stores or hotels)
were home-based (with the front portion of the house serving as the premise for the activity),
catered to village-specific markets, and survived through the intensive exploitation of family
labor!usually comprising the SHG member and her husband.10 The owners of these homebased shops or hotels contributed to the profitability of larger, wholesale stores and shops in
the neighboring towns from which they sourced their wares, but they hardly, if ever,
maintained detailed financial accounts of their own businesses and often drew on their stock
to feed and supply provisions to their households. While the loans sourced from SHGs were
used to supplement working capital for these small businesses, their owners ruled out any
possibility of re-investment of their earnings to grow the business either through investing in
new technologies, expanding the scale of operation, shifting their unit to the nearest town, or
hiring waged (i.e., non-household) labor. The only prospect of capital-intensive business
activity offered to the SHG members in these villages was the invitation from the state to
participate in the SGSY scheme.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
Beedis are low-cost, hand-rolled cigarettes.

None of the women in the villages of study participated in sub-contracted production chains that accumulated
capital and derived profits by linking womens home-based income-earning activities to global or overseas
markets. A classic example of this instance may be found in Maria Mies (1981) description of Indian housewives making lace for global export markets.
10

In April 1999, the SGSY was introduced as the outcome of a policy decision to
consolidate multiple extant self-employment promotion programs into a single
comprehensive scheme, based on a group approach, in contrast to the earlier focus on the
individual beneficiary (RBI 2011). By way of addressing some of the shortcomings
associated with pre-existing programs, the SGSY guidelines prescribed that (a) development
resources be concentrated in developing a few selected economic activities in a block and
that (b) the rural development administration, commercial banks, and the Panchayat 11
collaboratively undertake comprehensive planning to ensure the viability of enterprise
activities selected under the scheme (RBI 2011). The SHGs that received the SGSY loan
were expected to set up group-owned and managed enterprises, selecting from the list of
activities pre-approved in each block.
In the study villages, the women members of the SHGs dismissed as far-fetched and
impractical the underlying premise of SGSY policy viz., the posited linear relationship
between enterprise activity managed by the rural poor (organized into SHGs) and the
generation of business incomes that would enable them to cross the income-poverty line. In
particular, the women rejected in toto the idea of group-owned, capital-intensive and statefinanced micro-enterprises, or the particular entrepreneurship model advanced by the SGSY
scheme. This had as much to do with the absence of support from the rural development
administration in sourcing markets for the proposed new enterprises as the saturation of local
village markets by existing small businesses and the perceived non-viability of groupmanaged business activity.
Nonetheless, the SGSY scheme was much sought after on account of the coveted
subsidy component, which induced women to make the scheme work for them by subverting
its official borrowing purpose. Rather than being invested in a group enterprise, in 11 of 13
SHGs that received the loan, the loan-cum-subsidy amount (following group practices with
internal loans or Linkage loans) was equally distributed amongst the members and used for a
variety of household-related needs.12 The loan was repaid to the bank, not through business
incomes as envisioned by policy, but through incomes earned by the SHG women and their
earning household members via multiple forms of wage and self-employment.
Even as the women repudiated the official borrowing purpose of the SGSY loan
package, they strove to sustain the myth of womens entrepreneurship financed by the
scheme. The case of an SHG, which proposed to manage a brick kiln business, illustrates the
modus operandus involving a three-way nexus between the SHG, the bank and a local
business owner. The SHG contacted a brick kiln owner in the neighborhood and struck a deal
with him. The owner provided documentary evidence to the bank stating that the SHG had
acquired a brick kiln and leased it to him to manage. The SHG women paid the brick kiln
owner Rs.4000 for providing the document and extending his cooperation. Bank staff
inspected the brick kiln thrice for purposes of verification and photo documentation.
However, as the Secretary of the SHG put it: Of course the bank knew that we were not
managing the brick kiln! Importantly, the fiction of make-believe enterprises was created
and sustained by the SHGs with the full knowledge of promoter NGOs, financing banks and
the subsidy-sanctioning BDO. This collusion was rendered necessary by the mandate of all
agencies to ensure that an annual quota of loans allocated under the scheme was disbursed to
women who were neither willing nor able to engage in loan-financed income generation.
The enterprise activities that the SHGs proposed to manage included poultry farming,
the leasing of coconut groves, tailoring units, shoe-making units, brick kilns, manure
preparation, mosaic stone making and coir (rope) making units. In each case, the back-door
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
12
The Panchayat is the lowest unit of local self-governance in India.

The two groups that were sanctioned, but had not yet received the loan also planned to do the same. !

entry of locally based and small-scale business operators was crucial to sustaining SGSY
policy on the field. Identifying willing enterprise owners was difficult and the pay-offs
correspondingly high if the owners feared a possible seizure of their enterprise by the bank,
in case of a loan default by the group. The expenses incurred by SHGs did not always end
with the disbursal of the loan. SHGs were required to participate in government-sponsored
exhibitions of SHG products that celebrated the emergence of women micro-entrepreneurs
and SGSY-promoted livelihoods. Such exhibitions demanded that the fiction of managing
enterprises be sustained over a longer period and at higher cost.
The women valued the SGSY scheme despite the costs, the stress, and the efforts
involved in the complex and often conflict-ridden negotiations that preceded loan sanction
and disbursal. SHGs had no control over timing of bank loan sanction. Hence, bank loans
were used to fulfill the long-term needs, distinct from immediate or emergent needs of
households such as the acquisition of assets, gold jewelry in particular, the repayment of old
debt, and improvements to housing. The women also used bank loans to seek elective
medical treatment for chronic, long-term conditions, in contrast to the internal loans that were
used to finance treatment for medical emergencies or sudden illness.
The value that women attached to the successful implementation of the SGSY
scheme was reflected in their extraordinary efforts to ensure disciplined, on-time loan
repayment. The misgivings of bank officials regarding womens ability or intent to repay
bank loans were belied by on-time repayment of all bank loans (whether subsidy or nonsubsidy) by all SHGs. The repayment discipline was sustained through punitive practices
such as the verbal abuse of borrowers (by co-members), the imposition of fines for late
repayment, and the quicker-than-necessary repayment of bank loans. Defaulting on a bank
loan was inconceivable, no matter the circumstances.
Invoking the State: Beyond Financial Inclusion
A significant non-material resource that the SHGs presented was the opportunity to network
closely with state agencies and build strategic relationships, which were drawn upon by
women to advance interests that extended well beyond access to low-cost bank credit or antipoverty schemes. The SHGs in Tamil Nadu functioned as a state-legitimized, village-level
organizational structure that represented women at public forums from which they were
customarily excluded as individuals. On the orders of the state government, SHGs were
routinely invited to participate in all public events relating to local governance, such as the
village-level Panchayat meetings. The links that the womens groups developed with state
institutions were invaluable insofar as they enabled the women to navigate local vested
interests and caste-based power structures. In one of the villages, the traditional (unelected)
village headman was incensed at the women (and women of the socially marginalized castes,
in particular) for their participation in the village-level public meeting (Grama Sabha) of the
Panchayat, and he challenged their right to do so. The SHGs promptly reported the matter to
the chief of the rural development administration (the District Collector), on whose orders the
officials of the BDO and police personnel rebuked the headman for over-stepping the limits
of his jurisdiction.
As this case suggests, the women proactively used the official support for their SHGs
to gain access to other state institutions, in particular the police. It was uniformly reported
that police stations were more willing to register cases of sexual harassment, marital violence,
and dowry-related abuse when these were referred by the SHGs. Some women reported that
they used the threat of filing a complaint using the SHG letterhead to reign in abusive
husbands or sons-in-law. My interviews with men revealed that rural communities popularly

interpreted the presence of multiple state actors in SHG promotion and financing as support
for an agenda of gender equality. The disgruntled husband of an SHG member informed me
that the government had made the big mistake of declaring that women are equal to men
through its support for womens SHGs. The exhibitions organized by the local administration
to showcase enterprises financed by the SGSY scheme served to reinforce the perception that
womens social status and power as a collective had grown since the advent of SHGs. It did
not matter that the SHGs did not actually own or operate the enterprises on display because
the exhibition served as a visible manifestation of womens access to state institutions and
public spaces and a powerful means to convey a sense of what women could achieve.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the simultaneously intertwined and divergent trajectories of the
feminized SHG phenomenon and an emergent neoliberal capitalism in India. It situates this
with respect to broader structural compatibilities between microfinance/credit based
development interventions and capitalist accumulation on a world scale. The frontiers of
formal finance in India have moved down market (Von Pischke 2003) via SHGs to the
women of rural land-poor households and socially oppressed castes that did not previously
have access to the formal financial sector, despite the inclusive promise of social banking
and its endeavors to reach the financially excludedpoor. However, the highest echelons of
Indias policy making institutions, such as the RBI, NABARD and the Ministry of Rural
Development, have designed inclusive banking and anti-poverty projects that make
womens economic entitlements contingent on their appropriate financial behavior and the
display of disciplined financial intermediation. Despite the relative autonomy that SHGs
enjoy as micro-banks (Harper 2002) that generate their own capital and decide the terms of
group transactions, they function nevertheless under the watchful gaze of the state via
promoter NGOs, the rural development administration, and nationalized commercial banks.
If microfinance strives to produce rational economic actors (Karim 2011; Rankin
2001) who efficiently participate in the new self-regulating markets that it creates (Weber
2002), the SHG phenomenon requires that women imbibe the skills, capacities and
entrepreneurial subjectivities deemed necessary, and that they engage in (self and peer)
disciplining in order to successfully advance the agenda of financial deepening at village
levels. We might understand the SHG-targeted SGSY scheme as part of the Indian states
endeavors to increase the reliance of rural poor households on self-employment activities that
are sufficiently capital-intensive and large-scale enough to enable them to cope with
economic adversity without making additional demands of the state or private capital. The
SHG phenomenon itself might be seen as an emergent technology of neoliberal
governmentality that aims to autonomize and responsibilize rural poor communities, who are
being urged to take over some of the functions of the state through generating local
employment and increasing profits for small enterprises (Rose 1999: 174; Miller and Rose
1990; Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
However, as my fieldwork suggests, the long-term transitions that the liberalizing
state has attempted to initiate at household and community levels have had uneven and partial
effects, involving conflict, collaboration, collusion, and even outright subversion. The women
members of SHGs laid claim to bank credit even when they did not adhere to the professed
objectives and formal rules of the schemes through which they availed state developmental
resources. The women of socially oppressed castes coaxed, cajoled, beseeched and argued
with bank managers to secure access to the Direct Linkage loans, even if the repayment
record of their internal loans was judged and found wanting. Despite their outright rejection

of the enterprise-management clause, the women in all the SHGs that applied for the SGSY
loan finance sought what they perceived as their rightful entitlement to the financial
assistance it entailed.
In the latter instance, the women converted state support for micro-enterprise
development to a form of government transfer or welfare provisioning through their (labor,
cost, and effort-intensive) appropriation of the SGSY scheme, strengthening, thereby, the
safety net (Karides 2010; Weber 2002) component of SHG-based microfinance. Although
expected to cultivate disciplined repayment performance by the bank managers they
interacted with, the women vigorously defended their right to permit flexibility and latitude
with respect to the repayment schedules of their internal or group-generated loans. However,
they recognized that the disciplinary dynamics that accompanied bank loans were of a
different kind altogether. Resorting to punitive disciplinary mechanisms, the women bent
over backwards to repay bank loans, offering the advantage of a new, hyper-disciplined and
feminized clientele to commercial banks operating in a performance-oriented and portfolioconscious reform environment.
While Weber (2002) expects that the political safety net function of microfinance will
dampen/ contain political mobilization or popular protests that challenge neoliberal policies
at the grassroots, the women, on the contrary, used the platform provided by the SHGs to
bring to the attention of state representatives their anger and despair at the deplorable
working conditions that prevailed in the lower rungs of the informal sector in which they
were employed. During the monthly block-level meetings13 organized by promoter NGOs
and attended by government representatives, the women raised issues relating to the
unsanitary work environment of leather-processing industries, the pitiably low wages offered
by the smaller shoe companies, the Rs.10-a-day wage that home-based beedi work earned,
and the verbal abuse and sexual exploitation of women workers (of the subordinate castes) in
the construction sector by the (mostly dominant caste) site supervisors.
Refusing to confine their concerns to the self-employment oriented micro-enterprise
activities that were deemed the exclusive business of the SHGs, the women persistently drew
attention to all the sites in which they labored. They urged the state to legislate effectively in
order to increase the monetary returns to their labor in the informal sector and to re-structure
their everyday work lives in ways that would attenuate its oppressive dimensions. In so
doing, the women demanded, in effect, a re-embedding of the economy within social and
political control (Weber 2002) and sought to hold the state to account for its evident
disinterest in doing so. We see therefore that while SHG-based microfinance seeks to govern
the subjects of development!rural women from land-poor households!bringing them in
line with mainstream financial practices and constituting them as disciplined neoliberal
subjects, the dissenting counter-conducts of the women and the collusive nexus they create
with the agents of the state demonstrate the variegated and ambiguous terrain on which
financial governance proceeds, the decentered and heterogeneous practices that
constitute it, and the uneven effects it generates (Aitken 2010: 237).
The womens responses to the SHG phenomenon that I have mapped in this paper
suggest that we are witnessing a complex re-configuring of the relationship between the
liberalizing state and rural households and communities in India. It is evident that these
women have eschewed a position of thoroughgoing opposition to the state, given the
valuable, survival-oriented resources it offers. Equally importantly, this reflects their
experience-derived recognition of what feminist scholars have reiterated in multiple
contexts!that the state can be a valuable ally for women who negotiate multiple patriarchies
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
These meetings were held to discuss the routine management and smooth functioning of SHGs and
the repayment of bank loans.!

embedded within family/kin relationships and at broader community levels (Sangari 2007;
Rai 2008). If the SHG women and their households are not attempting a radical dissociation
from a statist agenda of financial governance, they do not give up resistance to (some)
elements of neoliberal governmental rationalities that conflict with the survival imperatives
of their households either. As womens SHGs continue to remain central to the anti-poverty
initiatives of the central government in India,14 it remains to be seen what new strategies
women in poverty will devise to wrest development resources from the state, even while they
may (or may not) fully or partially reform their conduct and fashion themselves in keeping
with policy expectations. The question of whether womens struggles in and against the
state (Rai 2008: 56) as they play out in the evolving terrain of SHG-based microfinance will
continue to marshal allies from local state agents in order to sustain challenges to caste,
household and kin-based patriarchies is one that remains equally open-ended.
Self-help programs such as the Indian microfinance case are one instance of
contemporary state-led initiatives in the capitalist world-system to autonomize and
responsibilize households and communities in ways that render them efficient actors who
survive adversities and utilize, with entrepreneurial zeal, the new market opportunities
ostensibly opened up by neoliberal reforms. In order, however, that we understand the longterm transitions in the capitalist accumulation strategies they set in motion and capture more
fully the contradictions and complex, often unintended outcomes they generate, academic
research must create spaces whereby theoretical literatures on the capitalist world-system and
neoliberal governmentalities are allowed to inflect and engage with each others perspectives
and concerns. Perhaps through such creative engagements we might delineate better the
emergent local face of neoliberalism in many parts of the world, the political contests it has
generated, and the gendered characteristics it often bears.
References
Aitken, Rob. 2010. Ambiguous Incorporations: Microfinance and Global Governmentality.
Global Networks 10 (2): 223-243.
Bhaduri, A. 1986. Forced Commerce and Agrarian Growth. World Development 14(2):
267-72.
Bhaduri, A. 1973. A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism.
Economic Journal 83 (329): 120-37.
Burchell, G. 1996. Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self. Pp 19-36 in Foucault
and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Rationalities of Government
edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Chatterjee, P. 2008. Democracy and Economic Transformation in India. Economic and
Political Weekly 43(16): 53-62.
Chatterjee, P. 1998. Development Planning and the Indian State. Pp 82-103 in The State,
Development Planning and Liberalization in India edited by Terence J. Byres. Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
Corbridge, S., J. Harriss, S. Ruparelia, and S. Reddy. 2011. Introduction: Indias
Transforming Political Economy, Pp 1-16 in Understanding Indias New Political
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14
While the SGSY scheme is in the process of being phased out and replaced by the National Rural Livelihoods
Mission (NRLM), the latter also seeks to incorporate womens microfinance SHGs within the ambit of its
programs. Its stated aim is to bring a woman from each identified rural poor household under the SHG network
as part of a universal social mobilization strategy it espouses (MoRD n.d: 8).

Economy: A great transformation? edited by Sanjay Ruparelia, Sanjay Reddy, John
Harriss and Stuart Corbridge. London and New York: Routledge.
Ferguson, J. and A. Gupta. 2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal
Governmentality. American Ethnologist 29 (4): 981-1002.
Ghate, P., E. Ballon and V. Manalo. 1996. Poverty Alleviation and Enterprise Development:
The Need for a Differentiated Approach. Journal of International Development 8
(2): 163-178.
Gonzalez-Vega, C. 2003. Deepening Rural Financial Markets: Macroeconomic, Policy and
Political Dimensions. Paper for Paving the way forward: An international
conference on best practices in Rural Finance. Washington D.C., 2-4 June, 2003.
Gupta, A. and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2011. Introduction: The State in India after
Liberalization, Pp 1-27 in The State in India after Liberalization: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives edited by Akhil Gupta and K. Sivaramakrishnan. London and New
York: Routledge.
Harper, M. 2002. Self-help Groups and Grameen Bank Groups: What are the differences?
Pp 169 - 198 in Beyond Micro-Credit: Putting Development Back into MicroFinance, edited by Thomas Fisher and M. S. Sriram. New Delhi: Vistaar Publications
and UK: Oxfam.
Harriss, J. 2011. How far have Indias economic reforms been guided by compassion and
justice? Social policy in the neoliberal era Pp 127-139 in Understanding Indias
New Political Economy: A great transformation? edited by Sanjay Ruparelia, Sanjay
Reddy, John Harriss and Stuart Corbridge. London and New York: Routledge.
Hulme, D. and P. Mosley. 1996. Finance against Poverty. Volume 1. London and New York:
Routledge.
Jackson, C. 1996. Rescuing Gender from the Poverty Trap. World Development 24 (3):
489-504.
Johnson, S., and Ben Rogaly. 1997. Microfinance and Poverty Reduction. UK and Ireland,
Oxfam and ACTIONAID.
Kabeer, N., and Ranjani K.Murthy. 1996. Compensating for Institutional Exclusion?
Lessons from Indian Government and Non-Government Credit Interventions for the
Poor. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, Discussion Paper 356.
Karides, Marina. 2010. Theorizing the Rise of Microenterprise Development in Caribbean
Context. Journal of World Systems Research 16 (2): 192-216
Karim, L., 2011. Microfinance and its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh
University of Minnesota Press.
Kohli, R. 1997. Directed Credit and Financial Reform. Economic and Political Weekly 32
(42): 2667 2676.
Mayoux, L. 2002. Womens Empowerment or Feminization of Debt? Towards a New
Agenda in African Micro Finance. Report based on a One World Action Conference.
London, March 2002. Available:
http://www.womankind.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/49.Womens-Empowerment-orFeminisation-of-Debt1.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2015
Mies, M., 1981. Dynamics of sexual division of labour and capital accumulation: Women
lace workers of Narsapur. Economic and Political Weekly 16 (10/12): 487-500.
Miller, P. and N. Rose 1990. Governing Economic Life, Economy and Society, 19 (1): 1-31
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) n.d. National Rural Livelihoods Mission:
Framework
for
Implementation.
Government
of
India.
Available:
http://rural.nic.in/sites/downloads/latest/NRLM_23122010.pdf Accessed 17 March,
2015

Murray, J. and R. Rosenberg. 2006. Community-managed Loan Funds: Which Ones
Work? Small Enterprise Development, 17 (3): 13-27
NABARD. 2013. Status of Microfinance in India 2012-2013. Micro Credit Innovations
Department, Mumbai: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development.
NABARD. 2006. Progress of SHG Bank Linkage in India 2005-06. Mumbai: National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NABARD. 2005. Annual Report 2004-2005. Mumbai: National Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development.
NABARD. 2002. Guidelines for the Pilot Project for linking banks with Self Help Groups,
Circular dated 26 February, 1992, Development Policy Department: National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development.
NABARD. 1999. Microfinance Scenario in the Country, (Chapter 1) in Task Force on
Supportive Policy and Regulatory Framework for Microfinance, Report. Mumbai:
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
Pagura, M. and M. Kirsten. 2006. Formal-informal Financial Linkages: Lessons from
Developing Countries. Small Enterprise Development 17(1): 16-29
Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
Time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Prahalad C.K. 2005. The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through
Profits. New Jersey, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Pulley, Robert V. 1989. Making the Poor Creditworthy: A Case Study of the Integrated
Rural Development Program in India. World Bank Discussion Papers, Washington
DC: The World Bank
Rai, Shirin M. 2008. The Gender Politics of Development. New Delhi: Zubaan and London
and New York: Zed Books
Rankin, K.N. 2001. Governing Development: Neoliberalism, Microcredit and Rational
Economic Woman. Economy and Society 30 (1):18-37.
Razavi, S. 1997. Fitting Gender into Development Institutions. World Development 25(7):
1111 1125.
Reserve Bank of India. 2011. Master Circular on Priority Sector Lending Special Programs
SGSY.
(http://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?Id=6557&Mode=0)
Accessed 17 March, 2015
Reserve Bank of India. 2009. Master Circular on Micro Credit, Available:
(http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/40MCMC010709_F.pdf). Accessed
17 March, 2015
Rose, N. 1999. The Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Sangari, K. 2007. Shaping Pressures and Symbolic Horizons: The Womens Movement in
India Pp 36-67 in At the Cutting Edge: Essays in Honour of Kumari Jayawardena
edited by Neloufer De Mel and Selvy Thiruchandran. New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
Subramaniam, M. 2015. Introduction: States and Social Movements in the Modern WorldSystem Journal of World Systems Research.
Thomas, Caroline. 2000. Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The
Challenge of Poverty and Inequality. London: Pluto Press.
Vasavi A.R., and Catherine P. Kingfisher. 2003. Poor Women as Economic Agents.
Indian Journal of Gender Studies 10 (1): 1-24.
Von Pischke, J.D. 2003. The Evolution of Institutional Issues in Rural Finance: Outreach,
Risk Management and Sustainability, Paper for Paving the Way Forward for Rural

Finance: An International Conference on Best Practices, Washington D.C., 2-4 June,
2003.
Wallerstein, Immanuel and Joan Smith. 1984. Core-periphery and Household Structures
Pp. 253-262 in Households and the World Economy edited by J. Smith, I. Wallerstein,
and H. Evers. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham and
London: Duke University Press.
Weber, H. 2002. The Imposition of a Global Development Architecture: The Example of
Microcredit. Review of International Studies 28 (3): 537-555.
Wenner, Mark D.1995. Group Credit: A means to Improve Information Transfer and Loan
Repayment Performance. Journal of Development Studies 32(2): 263-281.
Yunus, Muhammad. 2005. Eliminating Poverty through Market-based Social
Entrepreneurship. Global Urban Development Magazine 1(1). Available:
http://www.globalurban.org/Issue1PIMag05/Yunus%20article.htm
Accessed
17
March 2015
Popular Demobilization, Agribusiness Mobilization, and the Agrarian Boom in PostNeoliberal Argentina
Pablo Lapegna
University of Georgia
plapegna@uga.edu
Abstract
Based on ethnographic research, archival data, and a catalog of protest events, this article
analyzes the relationship between popular social movements, business mobilization, and
institutional politics in Argentina during the post-neoliberal phase, which arguably began circa
2003. How did waves of popular mobilization in the 1990s shape business mobilization in the
2000s? How did contentious politics influence institutional politics in the post-neoliberal
period? What are the changes and continuities of the agrarian boom that cut across the
neoliberal and post-neoliberal periods? While I zoom in on Argentina, the article goes beyond
this case by contributing to three discussions. First, rather than limiting the analysis to the
customary focus on the mobilization of subordinated actors, it examines the demobilization of
popular social movements, the mobilization of business sectors, and the connections between the
two. Second, it shows the ways in which the state can simultaneously challenge neoliberal
principles while also favoring the global corporations that dominate the contemporary
neoliberal food regime. Finally, the case of Argentina sheds light on the political economy of the
Left turn in Latin America, particularly the negative socio-environmental impacts of
commodity booms. The article concludes that researchers need to pay closer attention to the
connections between contentious and institutional politics, and to the protean possibilities of
neoliberalism to inspire collective actions.
Keywords: Demobilization, Business mobilization, GM soybeans, neoliberalism, Argentina
In the last decade and a half, South America has experienced a series of political and social
changes. Several governments in the regionincluding Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Ecuadorhave challenged many of the neoliberal policies initially
implemented in the 1970s and deepened in the 1990s, all while building strong alliances with
popular social movements. This historical conjuncture has been labeled a Left turn (Cameron
and Hershberg 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011), and different interpretations abound. Some
emphasize its populist tendencies, questioning the excessive power of the executive branch
and the lack of checks and balances (e.g. Weyland 2010), while others admonish governments
for succumbing to reformism (e.g. Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Webber 2011). Regardless of the

labels, recent changes in South America indicate the role that state and social movements play in
bringing about social change, posing a challenge to neoliberal globalization, and opening spaces
for alternative futures (e.g. Smith and Wiest 2012).
In this article, I analyze the relationship between popular social movements, the state, and
agribusiness in Argentina to bridge the literatures on critical agrarian studies, social movements,
and post-neoliberalism in Latin America. In doing so, I pay particular attention to changes and
continuities in contentious politics and the political economy of the agrarian boom in Argentina
to illuminate empirical and theoretical issues concerning Latin America and the contemporary
global food regime.
Argentina shares three features with its South American counterparts. First, social
movements emerged in reaction to processes of neoliberalization, predating and promoting the
anti-neoliberal agenda that was later implemented by the national government (Silva 2009).
Second, similar to the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela, the Argentine government had to face the
disruptive mobilization of business actors and elites that opposed a post-neoliberal agenda and
de-stabilized the government (Domnguez 2011; Eaton 2007). Third, revenues yielded by
agribusiness benefitted the state via export taxes, but the government largely ignored the
environmental and social consequences of agricultural expansion (Binimelis, Pengue and
Monterroso 2009; Leguizamn 2014), a situation comparable to the effects of the commodity
booms in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay (Altieri and Pengue 2006; Bebbington 2012;
Haarstad 2012). Focusing on Argentina, my goal is to address three questions. How did waves of
popular mobilization in the 1990s shape business mobilization in the 2000s? How did
contentious politics influence institutional politics in the post-neoliberal period? What are the
changes and continuities of the South American commodity boom that cut across the
neoliberal and post-neoliberal periods?
The article is based on primary data from interviews and participant observation and a
database of protests based on newspaper reports. I did fieldwork for more than twelve months
between 2003 and 2013, conducting forty-five semi-structured interviews in northeast Argentina
and in Buenos Aires. The database of protests is based on the national newspaper Clarn, from
which I collected records of 919 protests events for the 2003-2006 period, using a sampling
method of revising Tuesday and Friday editions, and classifying each event by actors, actions,
location, demands, and targets.
In what follows, I first elaborate my arguments on social movements and global agro-food
systems in the post-neoliberal context, and then delve into the Argentine case to examine the
ways in which popular mobilization, the state, and agribusiness mobilization shape each other
and the countrys political economy. In the conclusion, I draw the connections between the
Argentine case and trends in Latin America more broadly, suggesting lines for future research.
Food Regimes and Mobilization
Critical agrarian scholars have been greatly influenced by the food regime perspective, which
highlights the role of agriculture and food in the expansion of global capitalism (Friedmann and
McMichael 1989). Historically, the transitions between global food regimes responded to
changes in world capitalism and mobilization from below (Friedmann 2005), as the global
food regime dominated by British Empire (ca. 1870-1930s) was followed by a regime that
developed under U.S. hegemony (ca. 1950s-1970s). The contemporary neoliberal or corporate
Agrarian Boom in Post-Neoliberal Argentina 71
food regime is characterized by the relative weakness of national states in a global system
dominated by transnational corporations (McMichael 2009). This current context has inspired
researchers to analyze transnational agrarian movements (Borras, Edelman and Kay 2008) and
movements of global scope that challenge neoliberal hegemony, such as Via Campesina
(Desmarais 2007). Scholars in this tradition have also considered the articulation between global
processes and the mobilization of peasants and indigenous peoples at national and local scales
(Edelman 1999; Otero 2004) and the re-embeddedness of farming systems with local markets
and agro-ecosystems (Friedmann and McNair 2008). Food regime scholars, in short, converge in
seeing social movements and contentious mobilization as a tool of subordinated actors to
challenge neoliberalism. Accordingly, research has overwhelmingly emphasized resistance to
agricultural biotechnology (Fitting 2011; Heller 2013; Klepek 2012; Newell 2008; Pechlaner
2012; Schurman and Munro 2010; Scoones 2008).
In this article, I argue that we can expand this scholarship by showing how powerful actors
also use contentious mobilization to legitimize the contemporary neoliberal food regime, both in
terms of its principles and institutions (free market policies) and its agrarian manifestations
(agricultural biotechnology). To do so, I focus on the demobilization of popular social
movements and the emulation of disruptive tactics by powerful agribusiness actors. In other
words, rather than limiting my analysis to the mobilization of subordinated actors, I examine the
demobilization of popular social movements, business mobilization, and the connections between
the two (Lapegna 2014; Peine 2010; Peschard 2012; Roy 2013).
Below I bridge the literatures on critical agrarian studies, social movements, and postneoliberalism by way of example, inspecting the role of threats in unifying and spurring
business mobilization (Walker and Rea 2014). I show that, in a context of anti-neoliberal
policies, the taxation of soybean exports provided the incentives to unify agribusiness in
Argentina. On the one hand, this agribusiness mobilization created political opportunities for
candidates aligned with agribusiness interests and, on the other, it cemented certain alliances
between the national government, authoritarian governors, and social movements. This shows
that contentious politics can have an impact on institutional politicsa scenario less explored
than the inverse one, i.e. the opportunities offered by institutional politics for the mobilization of
challengers outside the polity. Finally, I show how the Argentine government challenges some
neoliberal principles, while also favoring transnational corporations that dominate the
contemporary neoliberal food regime. The net effect has been a deepening of the agrarian
economic arrangements initiated in the neoliberal period.
The State, Contentious Politics, and the Agrarian Boom in Argentina
Argentina went from being a poster child of neoliberalism in the 1990s to becoming one of the
post-neoliberal countries of South America in the early 2000s. In the 1990s, the national
government promoted a wide program of neoliberalization, closely following the
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This process dismantled the
institutional arrangements that governed agricultural production for much of the twentieth
century, eliminating subsidies and regulatory bodies. By the mid-1990s, these institutional
reforms paved the way for an agricultural boom in Argentina. In 1996, the national secretary of
agriculture approved the use of genetically modified (GM) soybean seeds, engineered to endure a
particular herbicide. Favored by free market policies, global agribusiness corporations eagerly

promoted GM seeds that were adopted by farmers and agribusinesses. By the mid-2000s, more
than half of the arable land in Argentina was sowed with GM soybeans (see figure 1, below).
Beyond agriculture, the national government pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar,
privatized state-owned companies, eliminated tariffs for exports and imports, and promoted a
pro-business climate.
These neoliberal policies resulted in a cycle of protest (Tarrow 2005), as contention diffused
among different social actors (Farinetti 2002; Silva 2009; Villalon 2007). In 1993 and 1995,
several provinces affected by budget cuts experienced puebladas, or massive riots (Auyero
2003). The deregulation of agricultural markets also spurred the creation of new peasant and
indigenous social movements in Northern provinces and the southern Patagonia region, and
some of the associations of medium and small farmers adopted confrontational discourses and
actions (Domnguez 2009; Giarracca 2001).
A disruptive form of protest, roadblocks, took hold in this ascending cycle of contention.
Initially organized in company towns affected by massive layoffs prompted by the privatization
of the national oil company (Auyero 2003; Barbetta and Lapegna 2001), roadblocks or
piquetes became the main form of action for popular social movements towards the end of the
1990s (Rossi 2013; Scribano 1999; Silva 2009). Despite their ideological and organizational
differences (see Svampa and Pereyra 2003), the variegated piquetero movement became a key
political actor that besieged the administration of then-President Fernando de la Ra (1999-2001)
(Epstein 2003). By the end of the 1990s, the organizations of the unemployed and their visible,
disruptive, and characteristic form of action (i.e. roadblocks) put the negative consequences of
neoliberalization on the public agenda. The state responded to these contentious challenges by
repressing social movements, dismissing their protests, or providing piecemeal resources to quell
contention (Lodola 2005). By the mid-2000s, this confrontational relationship between popular
social movements and the state was replaced by a collaborative relationship.
From Neoliberalization to Post-Neoliberalism
In December of 2001, lootings spread throughout several Argentine cities in the midst of a deep
economic crisis, emerging from a grey zone of politics made up of political machines, party
brokers, and law enforcement (Auyero 2007). As a reaction to the lootings, President de la Ra
declared a state of siege, which only prompted residents of Buenos Aires to protest this
authoritarian response. The next day, December 20, thousands took over the streets and the
president resigned.
Nstor Kirchner was sworn in as President in May of 2003, and he soon sought to
differentiate his administration from the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. During his presidential
campaign, Kirchner was not a well-known public figure and did not have a widespread support
from his party (the Peronist or Justicialista party). Upon taking power, Kirchner sought to shake
off the influence of Peronisms strongman Eduardo Duhalde, who had served as interim
President in 2002. To do so, the Kirchner administration crafted an ideological position distinct
from previous governments, while building alliances with organizations of the unemployed
(piqueteros), which controlled nearly 208 thousand workfare subsidies in 2001 and more than
2.3 million in 2003 (Ronconi and Franceschelli 2007: 233).
Kirchners approach to disruptive protests and piquetero organizations contrasted with that of
his predecessors: his administration tolerated roadblocks, met with piquetero leaders, and
established a relationship of collaboration and mutual support (Wolff 2007). The anti-neoliberal
position of the new government resonated with many popular social movements. Yet social
movement activists remained aware of the pragmatic aspect of Kirchners alliances. As Julio, a
local leader of a peasant movement told me in 2011: To me, it was a strategy of KirchnerThe
guy had no backbone; he needed support from somewhere. And he took the easy road; he won
over the people and the organizations, thats why he emerged. Who knew of Kirchner back then?
Nobody. So he found support in the organizations, and that worked for him.
The Kirchner administration developed what social movement scholars call a relationship of
consultation (Giugni and Passy 1998: 86). The discursive and political affinities between the
administration and popular social movements translated into forms of institutional collaboration,
as the latter gained access to resources and joined the state bureaucracy. Access to the
administration allowed social movement organizations to place their members in the offices and
programs in charge of the issues that gave rise to the movements in the first place. As Luis
DEla (the head of the national organization FTV, the largest piquetero organization) put it:
For us [the participation in the administration] allowed us to gather information, to get to know
the territories, to be in touch with grassroots organizations; its a capital that is useful for us
(quoted in Gmez and Massetti 2009: 43). In other words, from the point of view of national
leadership, participation in the government gave organizations a national platform to expand
their scope.
From the point of view of local activists, the collaboration with the government afforded
material and political benefits. The FTV, for instance, developed a close relationship with the
national Ministry of Social Development, which allowed them to appoint employees in provinces
were the Ministry runs programs. This was the case for Estela, a peasant activist in Formosa, a
province in northeast Argentina. Through the FTV, she and other eleven activists in a peasant
movement were appointed as Territorial Promoters for Social Change (Promotores
Territoriales para el Cambio Social), and they donated forty percent of their wages to fund the
movements activities. These appointments not only provided job security, but also a certain
level of autonomy vis--vis the provincial government, which sees this peasant movement as part
of the political opposition. In this and similar provinces ruled by authoritarian regimes, being an
activist means to be unemployable in state agencies or programs. As a relative said to Estela
when she tried to recruit him to the movement: Im more than forty years old and Im
unemployed Im not going to oppose Gildo [the governor], are you nuts?
Hugo is another case in point. He belongs to the same peasant movement as Estela, and in
2008 he was appointed to work in a national office in Buenos Aires on land tenure issues. In
2011 we met in Buenos Aires, near the train station where he starts his two-hour commute to the
irregular settlement (asentamiento) where he lives. The government gives things to the
organizations, but does not always give what the organizations want; they bring down dough
[cash], but they do it badly (bajan guita pero la bajan mal), he told me with a hint of despair.
Despite this critical stance, Hugo is aware of the importance of being part of the downward
movement of information and resources coming from the national state. His position provides
his organization with vital information to keep track of the institutional and political
realignments within the national government, and access to national allies can provide resources
and access to state programs (more on this below).
Popular social movements and the Kirchner administration thus developed a relationship of
mutual support. The mobilization of popular social movements buttressed specific government
policies and offered Kirchners administration political support at critical moments. For instance,
in March 2005 when Kirchner confronted the oil company Shell over a spike in gas prices,

several piquetero organizations supported a boycott, blocked gas stations, and protested at the
companys offices.1 In November 2005, the government-movement alliance took a transnational
turn when massive demonstrations (many of them organized by piquetero organizations) derailed
the project of United States, Canada, and Mexico to launch a Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTTA) during a summit in the Argentine city of Mar del Plata. A group of presidents,
led by Hugo Chvez, Nstor Kirchner, and Lula da Silva, created a counter bloc that defeated
the FTAA project and confirmed the power of movement-state alliances in Latin America,
posing a challenge to the U.S. hegemony in the region (Smith 2014; Smith and Wiest 2012).
In Argentina and Latin America, then, the political stances and economic policies of
Kirchners government represented a break with the neoliberal past, in part achieved through the
support of popular social movements. At the national scale, however, the affinities and
collaborations between the post-neoliberal state and popular social movements also translated
into a progressive demobilization of the latter. For instance, the data I gathered about contentious
collective actions shows that the unemployed accounted for more than half of the protest events
in 2003, but by 2006 they only organized less than 10 percent of them (see Table 1).
Table 1. Contentious Collective Action by Actor, 2003-2006
Contentious Collective Action
2003
Actor
Unemployed/"Picketers"
Neighbors
Victims Relatives &
Friends
Public Sector Workers
Private Sector Workers
Transportation Workers
Other
TOTAL
2004
2005
2006
N
74
14
%
52.5
9.9
N
114
19
%
43.5
7.3
N
74
12
%
25.8
4.2
N
22
55
%
9.6
24.0
9
12
7
7
18
141
6.4
8.5
5.0
5.0
12.8
100
21
26
23
15
44
262
8.0
9.9
8.8
5.7
16.8
100
25
75
21
42
38
287
8.7
26.1
7.3
14.6
13.2
100
15
38
18
20
61
229
6.6
16.6
7.9
8.7
26.6
100
Source: Database of Protests in Argentina. N = 919
The macroeconomic policies of the Kirchner administration contrasted with the neoliberal
policies of the 1990s, as his government eliminated most free trade arrangements and
strengthened the state intervention in the economy. This was most clearly evidenced in the taxes
applied to agricultural exports. In 2002, the interim government of Duhalde reinstated the export
taxes (retenciones) that had been eliminated in the 1990s. Starting in 2002 at a rate of 10
percent, retenciones were increased later that year to 20 percent. During Kirchners presidency,
export taxes for soybeans were raised to 35 percent and the administration used this revenue to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Kirchner llam a un boicot nacional por los aumentos La Nacin, March 10 2005 and Escracharon a Shell y
bloquearon dos estaciones, Pgina 12, March 11, 2005. !
fund what some call an export-oriented populism (Richardson 2009).2 These polices, however,
did not deter agricultural expansion. On the contrary, the acreage and production of GM
soybeans increased every year, as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate. By the end of Nstor Kirchners
government, the exports of the soybean agro-industrial complex (soybeans, oil, and soybean
meal) represented nearly one-fourth of the total Argentine exports (INDEC 2012).
Figure 1. Soybean Area in Argentina, 1988-2013 (in hectares)
25000000
20000000
15000000
10000000
1988/89
1990/91
1992/93
1994/95
1996/97
1998/99
2000/01
2002/03
2004/05
2006/07
2008/09
2010/11
2012/13
5000000
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadera y Pesca
These post-neoliberal changes should not obscure key continuities with previous periods,
particularly regarding agricultural production and subnational politics. The expansion of
agribusiness and GM soybean production resulted in a series of negative consequences for rural
populations and the environment. First, the growing demand for soybeans at the global level
increased pressures for arable land in the Argentine countryside. In northern provinces, large
tracts of land held by provincial elites increasingly encroached on the small properties of peasant
families and indigenous communities. This demand for land and processes of accumulation by
dispossession soon resulted in violent conflicts (Cceres 2014). Since 2011, the murder of
peasant activists in northern Argentina have occurred in the provinces of Santiago del Estero,
Tucumn, and Formosa (Lapegna 2013a), while leaders and members of peasant-indigenous
movements are constantly harassed (Domnguez and De Estrada 2013).
Second, the diffusion of GM soybean production has increased processes of deforestation
(Pengue 2005). According to governmental reports, between 1998 and 2008 almost 1.7 million
acres of native forest were destroyed (Leguizamn 2014). Third, the extensive production of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Export taxes comprised 8 to 11% of the Kirchner governments total tax receipts, and around two-thirds of this
nearly US$2 billion in 2006came from soy exports (Richardson 2009: 242).

GM, herbicide-resistant soybeans have resulted in agrochemical runoff into water supplies and
herbicide drifts contaminating the air, putting the health of rural and suburban populations at risk
(Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso 2009).
Figure 2. Soybean Production in Argentina, 1988-2013 (in metric tons)
60000000
50000000
40000000
30000000
20000000
1988/89
1990/91
1992/93
1994/95
1996/97
1998/99
2000/01
2002/03
2004/05
2006/07
2008/09
2010/11
2012/13
10000000
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadera y Pesca
In short, the reliance of the post-neoliberal state on primary exports shows strong continuities
with the neoliberal period. This, in turn, creates a cycle in which agriculture generates resources
to the government (), a portion of which is redistributed through social policies, which
increases well-being, which provides the social and political support needed to validate the
model (Cceres 2014: 24-25). Politically, this socio-economic and environmental scenario
translates in partnerships between national and subnational governments. Governors and
provincial elites profit from primary economic activities and, in turn, support the national
government. These trends, as we will see next, deepened during the administrations of Nstor
Kirchners successor and wife, Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner.
Agribusiness Mobilization and Die-Hard Neoliberalism
In October 2007, Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner (a Peronist Senator and hereafter CFK) was
elected president in a landslide, obtaining more than 45 percent of the votes. In December of
2007, she was sworn in and shortly after entered into a profound conflict with agribusiness. In
March 2008, the national government raised export taxes from 35 to 44 percent, triggering the
opposition of medium and large landowners and farmers associations. Supported by media
conglomerates and national newspapers, these farmers launched a lockout, refusing to bring
crops and meat to the market, blocking roads throughout Argentina between March and July. As
a counter-reaction to the contentious collective actions of agribusiness and middle classes,
popular social movements mobilized in Buenos Aires in support of the national government in
March and April of 2008.
Farmers associations had organized shorter protests against export taxes in previous years.
But in 2008 they were able to build a broad coalition in order to create a sustained challenge to
the government. Massive demonstrations in the city of Rosario further emboldened agribusiness,
which took the offensive and demanded the complete elimination of all export taxes (Giarracca
and Teubal 2010). Agribusinesses, farmers, and sectors of the middle classes thus adopted the
form of action (the roadblock) that was generally used by poor peoples movements and
organizations of the unemployed. An analysis of protest events between 2003 and 2006 shows
that the use of roadblocks as a tactic was progressively decoupled from unemployed workers and
adopted by neighbors (vecinos), a category that journalists often use in reference to middle
class demonstrators. As Figure 3 illustrates, whereas piqueteros organized more than 60% of the
roadblocks in 2003-2004, they only organized 10% of the roadblocks by 2006. In contrast, while
vecinos only accounted for 10% of the roadblocks in 2003, the number had risen to 50% by
2006.
Figure 3. Blockade by Participant, 2003-2006
!
100%!
90%!
Percentage!
80%!
Others!
70%!
Transportation Workers!
60%!
Workers of the Private Sector!
50%!
Workers of the Public Sector!
40%!
Neighbors!
30%!
Unemployed/"Picketers"!
20%!
10%!
0%!
2003!
2004!
2005!
2006!
Yea
r!
Source: Database of Protests in Argentina. N = 919
The trend evidenced by my catalog of protest events, together with the agribusiness
mobilization of 2008, suggests a process of tactical emulation. As piquetero organizations and
popular social movements progressively abandoned disruptive contention and collaborated with
the government (moving, so to speak, from the streets to the offices), agribusiness emulated the
disruptive tactic of roadblocking, moving from the farms to the roads. Whereas the streets, roads,
and squares were the turf of popular social movements during the 1990s, by 2008 these spaces
had been occupied by the mobilized middle and upper classes in support of free market
policies.

The national government initially dismissed agribusiness protests, but ultimately had to take
a stand in face of the disruption caused by the lockout and roadblocks. CFK sent a bill to
Congress, which modified export taxes by adjusting its rate to the fluctuations of international
prices. The bill was approved in the lower house of congress (Diputados), but the parties of the
opposition and agribusiness lobby fiercely opposed the bill in the Senate (Fairfield 2011: 447).
Farmer and agribusiness associations, supported by middle class sectors, mobilized in Buenos
Aires to oppose the bill. During a dramatic, nationally televised congressional debate on July
16th, Vice President Julio Cobos (in his capacity as head of the Senate) verbally expressed his
negative vote and transformed a deadlock into a defeat for the government-sponsored bill.
The 2008 agribusiness protest posed a twofold challenge to the political and economic
policies of the national government. On the one hand, the protests expressed a neoliberal view,
opposing the governments intervention in the economy. The mobilization against export taxes
was, in large part, motivated by the fact that agribusinesses were expecting to reap the benefits of
higher international prices in the near future (Fairfield 2011: 439-440). The scheme of
retenciones mviles, or variable export taxes promoted by the national state, would increase
the tax rate as prices went up. For agribusiness and farmers associations, this was a violation of
free market principles. As Figure 4 shows, international prices for soybeans went down in
2009, but began to move up again in 2010, confirming both agribusinesses forecasts and
concerns.
Figure 4. International Price of Soybeans, Soybean Oil, and Soybean Meal 1988-2012 (US$)
1200.00
1000.00
__ Soybean oil ($/mt)

..... Soybean $ ($/mt)
_ .._ Soybean meal ($/mt)!
.
Price
800.00
600.00
400.00
200.00
0.00
Year
Source: World Bank
On the other hand, beyond specific policies the agribusiness mobilization became an
oppositional political force against the national government. In many of the hundreds of
roadblocks and mobilizations, demonstrators deployed a de-stabilizing discourse and even
demanded the presidents resignation. By the 2009 mid-term elections, ten political parties had
!
incorporated pro-agribusiness activists as candidates, electing thirteen of them to the lower house
and one to the Senate.
As I explain in the next section, the national government responded to the agrarian challenge
in two ways. First, it created new institutional spaces catering to organizations and activist
networks closely connected to the government. Second, it expressed support for global
agribusiness corporations, creating dilemmas and ambiguities that puzzled many of the social
movements supporting the government.
Social Movement Dilemmas and the Ambiguities of the Post-Neoliberal State
After the confrontation with agribusiness, the national government created institutional spaces to
garner the support of small farmers and peasants. In 2009, the government converted the Social
Agricultural Program (PSA), a program created in the 1990s and renewed annually, into a
permanent office: the Sub-Secretara de Desarrollo Rural y Agricultura Familiar (SSDRAF,
Under-Secretary of Rural Development and Family Agriculture). This institutional recognition
was well received by peasant social movements, but they also had to face a complex and
sometimes contradictory scenario. On one hand, peasant movements supported a national
government that recognized them as a valid social and political actor, gave them access to
institutional spaces, and reversed some of the neoliberal policies of the 1990s. On the other hand,
their constituency had been suffering the consequences of the sweeping expansion of transgenic
agriculture, which the government did little to address. The conflict between agribusiness and the
national government was manifested in a clash between the neoliberal views of the former and
the post-neoliberal policies of the latter. Yet the conflict was mostly about who had the right to
reap the benefits of soybean exports, while the socio-environmental consequences of GM
soybean expansion were largely ignored.
During CFKs second term in office (2011-2015), the relationship between the national
government and popular social movements was redefined by the governments stance towards
transgenic agriculture, which further exposed the ambiguities of its post-neoliberalism. In the
2011 elections, CFK built her political support on three pillars: the Peronist party, provincial
governors, and social movements created after 2003. On the heels of the conflict between the
government and agribusiness, the CFK administration cemented its relationship with governors
and the Peronist party to maintain political stability and ensure support in Congress. The alliance
of the national government with governors put social movements in a difficult position, since
provincial elites are often business partners with soybean growers and authoritarian governors
who usually dismiss or repress peasant movements (Domnguez 2009).
Since 2011 the CFK administration has sidelined social movements created in the 1990s (that
is, those movements predating the start of Nstor Kirchners regime) and relied instead on the
social movement organizations that emerged during the Kirchner period. These social movement
organizations doubled as political cliques of the Peronist party and factions of the national
government. In 2012, the government launched an umbrella network (Unidos y Organizados,
United and Organized) that included, among others, the group La Cmpora led by Mximo
Kirchner (the son of Nstor and Cristina Kirchner), Kolina, a faction of the national
government led by Alicia Kirchner (the sister of Nstor Kirchner and minister for social
development), and the Movimiento Evita led by Emilio Prsico (more on him below).
Members of local organizations predating the Kirchner regime were sidelined by these

realignments, but they also felt that it was hard to disengage from their connections to the
government, lest be isolated, lose their voice, or be left without resources to organize activities
and address the needs of their members.
I witnessed these dilemmas firsthand in 2009 while participating in a meeting at the office of
a peasant social movement in a small town in northeast Argentina. At the meeting, Hugo (a
leader appointed to a program in Buenos Aires introduced above) argued for further involvement
with the FTV. He informed movement participants about a recently created CMP, Central de
Movimientos Populares, an initiative of FTV to create a confederation of popular organizations
and social movements.
Hugo If we were to analyze what the FTV offered and what we offered, I think
its about the same. () CMP has a political goal, if were not interested in
participating in electoral politics, then were not going to rise up or grow. The
CMP is targeting the 2011 elections, but if we want to get things through CMP we
have to commit. I talked to [an official of the under-secretary of rural
development] and he told me that they want to support CMP. He underlined that
they will do that with compaero organizations; in other words, Peronist
organizations. We have to see if its convenient for us, if we want that. CMP isnt
going to have resources, but could give contacts () If we want to get in on this,
the time is now. Later, youre not going to get in at the end of the line.
Arturo We have to think seriously about what it would mean to create CMP
here, to see with which organizations [are we going to work with].
Julio If we think about the elections, we have to be the initiators. If not, later we
join the others and it wont work. You have to get on the line and be at the will of
others [tens que ponerte en la cola, y depender de otro]
Hugo If we enter CMP, its now. CMP is FTV. If someone from here gets ahead
of us, were screwed; there will be fewer resources. To achieve this, we have to
say to Luis [the head of FTV], reserve us the first place.
When I met with Hugo in 2012, he said that during the 2008 conflict with agribusiness, his
peasant movement supported the government, but that involvement had them bouncing from
place to place (estuvimos de ac para all). They mobilized in Buenos Aires and neglected
the inner workings of the movement (descuidamos lo de adentro). We tried to be in every
place to make sure we didnt miss anything, and we [end up] missing ourselves, he told me
metaphorically (Tratamos de cubrir todos los espacios para no quedarnos afuera, y quedamos
afuera de nosotros mismos). When I saw him again in 2013, he summarized the relationship
between social movements and the government, saying: What happened with the Kirchner
government was that they took our claims and made them theirs, and in doing so, they
neutralized us. During our conversation I mentioned that Emilio Prsico (the leader of the
Movimiento Evita) had been appointed under-secretary of Rural Development and Family
Agriculture. He was a public official in the province of Buenos Aires in 2005, and his
appointment puzzled peasant social movements given his relative lack of experience with rural
and peasants issues. We made demands for small farmers and peasants, but now, who is in
charge? A neighborhood leader [referring to Prsico]. They leave you without arguments. They
always seem to think that we have put out our hands to see what they give us [like a beggar].
And anyone seems to be better than us when it comes to filling the positions. This was how
Hugo expressed his feelings of peasant movements being sidelined. In 2011, Estela also voiced
her discontent with her work at the Ministry of Social Development: If you criticize something,
they tell you that you belong to the opposition. She was also dissatisfied with the pressures she
received to do political work for Kolina, a faction within the government led by Minister
Alicia Kirchner.
Specific policies of the national Ministry of Agriculture and discourses of CFK contributed
to tense relationships between peasant-indigenous social movements and the national
government, while also revealing the ambiguities of the post-neoliberal state in Argentina.
During its second term, CFKs administration maintained a cold stance towards Argentine
agribusiness, yet its relationships with global agribusiness corporations progressively improved.
In 2012, for instance, CFK expressed her support for Monsanto, praising the company for
opening a plant to produce GM corn seeds. In June 2012, President CFK stated:
I was with Monsanto, which announced to us a very important investment
concerning corn. () And besides they were very happy because Argentina today
is shall we say at the forefront in matters of biotechnological progress ()
Here I have and the truth is that I want to show you it all because I am very
proud the prospectus of Monsanto [which made] a very important investment in
producing a new transgenic corn seed in the province of Crdoba. () And today,
the head [of Monsanto] told me that they were very impressed by the support that
our government was giving to science and technology. You should all be certain
that we are going to continue in the same line. () We are nearly 40 million
residents [in Argentina] and we have a territory that is the eighth [largest] in the
world. This places us in a pole position [sic] in terms of food producers and
biotechnology in Argentina.
In this speech, CFK also referenced the Strategic Agro-Food Plan, 2020, an initiative
launched in September 2011 to increase agricultural production and further expand the area of
cultivated land in Argentina. She finally referred to the acceptance of GM seeds, reflecting the
rate of government approval for new GM seeds. During her first two terms in office (20082013), eighteen new GM crops were released in Argentina (in contrast to the eleven approved in
the decade before, see Figure 5).
In 2012 shortly after CFK praised Monsanto, the Minister of Agriculture announced the
approval of a new variety of GM soy, which combines resistance to both the Roundup herbicide
and pests. During an event organized by Monsanto at a five-star hotel, the Minister said: I
fundamentally agree with Monsanto, not only in the approval of the Intacta RR2 [the new GM
soybean], but also in the investment and trust that it has given Argentina through investments
that have already been announced by our nations president.3 The government continued this
support by promoting policies that advance global agribusiness interests and ensuring a friendly
business environment. For example, the government presented a bill in Congress to limit seed
use and strengthened intellectual property rights over GM seeds.4 It also dropped a long-running
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
4
Una de cal y muchas de arena: Monsanto en Argentina Marcha, August 24th 2012.
Semillas en debate, Pgina 12, October 5, 2012.

investigation into tax evasion by Cargill, one of the largest global corporations in the soybean
export market (Teubal, Domnguez and Sabatino 2005) (Kneen 2002).5
Figure 5. GM Seeds Approved for Commercialization in Argentina, 1996-2013
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1996-2001 (7)
2002-2007 (4)
2008-2013 (18)
Source: Argentine Office of Biotechnology, CONABIA
Conclusion
In this article, I provided an overview of recent Argentine history to expand the purview and to
bridge social movement research and critical agrarian studies, and illuminate some of the
contradictions and ambiguities of the contemporary post-neoliberal scenario in Latin America.
During the 1990s, Argentine popular social movements opened political opportunities for
political actors that shared with them a similar anti-neoliberal position. The challenge to
neoliberalism in Latin America thus emerged from key charismatic figures but also, and perhaps
fundamentally, from the sustained efforts of popular social movements. The collaboration and
consultation between governments and social movements, however, resulted in the progressive
replacement of disruptive contention with more conventional forms of mobilization. In the
context of post-neoliberal governments, social movement organizations became increasingly
ensnared in state bureaucracy and patronage politics (Lapegna 2013b; Wolff 2007: 22-24). It
would be simplistic, however, to interpret the institutional incorporation of popular social
movements as a sign that they are duped or directly controlled by the national government.
Social movement leaders are keenly aware of the challenges and perils entailed in supporting the
national government. At the same time, it is hard for leaders to reject the access to resources
offered by the national government, knowing that the members of their movement have urgent
material needs.
Paradoxically, the mobilization of subordinate actors against processes of neoliberalization in
the 1990s also opened opportunities for pro-neoliberal social actors. The wave of popular protest
in the 1990s legitimized the use of roadblocks as a form of protest. As popular social movements
progressively refrained from disruptive mobilizations (i.e. roadblocks), powerful social actors
emulated this form of action to protest the curbing of free markets via export taxes and the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Giro de la AFIP: desisti de un reclamo millonario contra Cargill La Nacin, October 3, 2013.
threat posed by the post-neoliberal state. In 2008, the actors of agribusiness appropriated
roadblocks as a form of disruptive mobilization to promote their interests, oppose the postneoliberal agenda of the national government, and ultimately gain institutional spaces in
Congress.
The Argentine case illustrates that so-called post-neoliberal governments have given short
shrift to the socio-environmental effects of commodity booms (Altieri and Pengue 2006;
Bebbington 2012; Haarstadt 2012). In Argentina, the macro-economic policies of the postneoliberal state have had a Keynesian orientation in that they seek to stimulate aggregate demand
by increasing government spending and the income of popular sectors. A large part of revenues
redistributed by the state, however, were created by the production of GM soybeans that have
had negative socio-environmental consequences for some of those very same sectors; namely,
peasant families, indigenous communities, and rural populations. The government of CFK first
confronted Argentine agribusiness, and then supported global agribusiness corporations during
the second term, suggesting the power of what Peter Newell (2009) calls bio-hegemony.
In terms of delineating a research agenda, agribusiness mobilization in Argentina suggests
the importance of paying closer attention to two social processes: the dynamics of mobilization
and demobilization connecting subordinate and powerful actors with institutional politics, and
the protean possibilities of neoliberalism. First, by further investigating the iterative relationships
between institutional and contentious politics we can go beyond the customary emphasis on how
the former informs the latter and better capture the ways in which contention modifies elite
alliances and the trajectory of governments and states.
Second, neoliberalization needs not to be imagined in solely negative terms. The neoliberal
polices of the 1990s in Argentina not only implied budget cuts, privatization, and the adoption of
export-oriented transgenic agriculture, but also promoted the creation of political subjectivities
aligned with these ideas and policies. This means that we need to identify the productive effects
of neoliberalization and understand it as a process that not only destroyed the social fabric, but
also benefitted certain social actors (e.g. medium to large agribusiness in Argentina, see Gras
2009) and constructed a political common sense that motivated the massive agribusiness
mobilization in 2008. Business mobilization tends to be more effective when their collective
actions look like grassroots campaigns (Walker and Rea 2014). Argentine agribusinesses
capacity to mobilize in large numbers should prompt us to pay closer attention to how a
neoliberal reason is constructed by think tanks and foundations (Peck 2010), but also to
identify the ways in which neoliberal ideas, policies, and values are transmitted and adopted by a
variety of actors beyond the business community.
Agricultural biotechnology is one of the main tools of the current global food regime
controlled by corporations and governed by neoliberal principles. Together with the United
States and Brazil, Argentina is one of the leading players in the global production of genetically
modified crops, a key input in todays feed and food industry. As a battleground in the
contemporary global food regime, Argentina is likely to play an important role in the future
agricultural production at a global scale. Thus, the interplay between popular social movements,
business mobilization, and the state analyzed here, although national in scale, could thus have
global reverberations.

References
Altieri, Miguel A., and Walter Pengue. 2006. "GM soybean: Latin Americas new colonizer."
Pp. 13-17 in Seedling.
Auyero, Javier. 2003. Contentious lives: Two Argentine Women, Two Protests, and the Quest for
Recognition. Durham: Duke University Press.
______. 2007. Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Barbetta, Pablo, and Pablo Lapegna. 2001. "Cuando la protesta toma forma: los cortes de ruta en
el norte salteo." Pp. 231-57 in La protesta Social en la Argentina. Transformaciones
econmicas y crisis social en el interior del pas, edited by Norma Giarraca. Madrid,
Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial.
Bebbington, Anthony (Ed.). 2012. Social Conflict, Economic Development and the Extractive
Industry: Evidence from South America. London and New York: Routledge.
Binimelis, Rosa, Walter Pengue, and Iliana Monterroso. 2009. "'Transgenic treadmill':
Responses to the emergence and spread of glyphosate-resistant johnsongrass in
Argentina." Geoforum 40(4):623-33.
Borras, S.M., M. Edelman, and C. Kay. 2008. Transnational agrarian movements confronting
globalization: Wiley Online Library.
Cceres, Daniel M. 2014. "Accumulation by Dispossession and Socio-Environmental Conflicts
Caused by the Expansion of Agribusiness in Argentina." Journal of Agrarian Change
15(1):116-47.
Cameron, Maxwell A, and Eric Hershberg. 2010. Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies,
and Trajectories of Change. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers
Desmarais, Annette Aurlie. 2007. La Va Campesina: globalization and the power of peasants.
Halifax: Fernwood Pub.
Domnguez, Diego. 2009. "La lucha por la tierra en Argentina en los albores del Siglo XXI. La
recreacin del campesinado y de los pueblos originarios." in Facultad de Ciencias
Sociales. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Domnguez, Diego Ignacio, and Mara De Estrada. 2013. "Asesinatos y Muertes de Campesinos
en la Actualidad Argentina: La Violencia como Vector (Des)Territorializador."
Astrolabio 10:489-529.
Domnguez, Francisco. 2011. "Venezuelas opposition: desperately seeking to overthrow
Chavez." Pp. 113-29 in Right-wing politics in the new Latin America : reaction and
revolt, edited by Francisco Domnguez, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam. London:
Zed Books.
Eaton, Kent. 2007. "Backlash in Bolivia: Regional autonomy as a reaction against indigenous
mobilization." Politics & Society 35(1):71-102.
Edelman, Marc. 1999. Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Epstein, Edward. 2003. "The piquetero movement of Greater Buenos Aires: working class
protest during the current Argentine crisis." Canadian Journal of Latin American and
Caribbean Studies 28(55-56):11-36.
Fairfield, Tasha. 2011. "Business power and protest: Argentinas agricultural producers protest
in comparative context." Studies in comparative international development 46(4):424-53.
Farinetti, M. 2002. "La conflictividad social despus del movimiento obrero." Nueva Sociedad
182:61-75.
Fitting, Elizabeth. 2011. The Struggle for Maize: Campesinos, Workers, and Transgenic Corn in
the Mexican Countryside. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
Friedmann, Harriet. 2005. "From colonialism to green capitalism: Social movements and
emergence of food regimes." Research in Rural Sociology and Development 11:227-64.
Friedmann, Harriet, and Amber McNair. 2008. "Whose Rules Rule? Contested Projects to
Certify Local Production for Distant Consumers." Journal of Agrarian Change 8(23):408-34.
Giarracca, Norma (Ed.). 2001. La Protesta Social en la Argentina: Transformaciones
Econmicas y Crisis Social en el Interior del Pas. Buenos Aires: Alianza.
Giarracca, Norma, and Miguel Teubal (Eds.). 2010. Del paro agrario a las elecciones de 2009:
tramas, reflexiones y debates. Buenos Aires: Antropofagia.
Giugni, Marco G., and Florence Passy. 1998. "Contentious politics in complex societies." Pp. 81108 in From contention to democracy, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and
Charles Tilly. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Gmez, Marcelo, and Astor Massetti. 2009. Los movimientos sociales dicen: conversaciones con
dirigentes piqueteros. Buenos Aires: Nueva Trilce.
Gras, Carla. 2009. "Changing Patterns in Family Farming: The Case of the Pampa Region,
Argentina." Journal of Agrarian Change 9(3):345-64.
Haarstad, Hvard (Ed.). 2012. New Political Spaces in Latin American Natural Resource
Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Heller, Chaia. 2013. Food, Farms, and Solidarity: French Farmers Challenge Industrial
Agriculture and Genetically Modified Crops. Durham and London: Duke University
Press.
INDEC. 2012. "Exportaciones del complejo soja, por zonas econmicas, segn componentes.
Aos 2006-2010.". Buenos Aires: Instituto Nacional de Estadsticas y Censos (INDEC).
Klepek, James. 2012. "Against the grain: knowledge alliances and resistance to agricultural
biotechnology in Guatemala." Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue
canadienne d'tudes du dveloppement 33(3):310-25.
Kneen, Brewster. 2002. The invisible giant. Cargill and its transnational strategies. London:
Pluto Press.
Lapegna, Pablo. 2013a. "The Expansion of Transgenic Soybeans and the Killing of Indigenous
Peasants in Argentina." Societies without Borders: Human Rights and the Social Sciences
8(2):291-308.
______. 2013b. "Social Movements and Patronage Politics: Processes of Demobilization and
Dual Pressure." Sociological Forum 28(4):842-63.
______. 2014. "Global Ethnography and Genetically Modified Crops in Argentina: On
Adoptions, Resistances, and Adaptations." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 43(2):202-27.
Leguizamn, Amalia. 2014. "Modifying Argentina: GM soy and socio-environmental change."
Geoforum 53:149-60.
Levitsky, Steven, and Kenneth M Roberts (Eds.). 2011. The Resurgence of the Latin American
Left. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Lodola, Germn. 2005. "Protesta popular y redes clientelares en la Argentina: El reparto federal
del Plan Trabajar (1996-2001)." Desarrollo econmico 44(176):515-36.

McMichael, Philip. 2009. "A food regime genealogy." The Journal of Peasant Studies
36(1):139-69.
Newell, Peter. 2008. "Trade and Biotechnology in Latin America: Democratization, Contestation
and the Politics of Mobilization." Journal of Agrarian Change 8(2-3):345-76.
______.2009. "Bio-Hegemony: The Political Economy of Agricultural Biotechnology in
Argentina." Journal of Latin American Studies 41(1):27-57.
Otero, Gerardo. 2004. "Global economy, local politics: Indigenous struggles, civil society and
democracy." Canadian journal of political science 37(2):325-46.
Pechlaner, Gabriela. 2012. Corporate Crops: Biotechnology, Agriculture, and the Struggle for
Control. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Peck, Jamie. 2010. Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. New York: Oxford Univ Pr.
Peine, Emilie Kaye. 2010. "Corporate Mobilization on the Soybean Frontier of Mato Grosso,
Brazil." Pp. 132-49 in Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change,
edited by Philip McMichael. New York: Routledge.
Pengue, Walter A. 2005. "Transgenic Crops in Argentina: The Ecological and Social Debt."
Bulletin of Science Technology Society 25(4):314-22.
Peschard, Karine. 2012. "Unexpected discontent: exploring new developments in Brazil's
transgenics controversy." Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne
d'tudes du dveloppement 33(3):326-37.
Petras, James F., and Henry Veltmeyer. 2005. Social movements and state power: Argentina,
Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador. London: Pluto Press.
Richardson, Neal. 2009. "Export-Oriented Populism: Commodities and Coalitions in Argentina."
Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID) 44(3):228-55.
Ronconi, L., and I. Franceschelli. 2007. "Clientelism, Public Workfare and the Emergence of the
Piqueteros in Argentina." Pp. 228-52 in Political institutions and development: failed
expectations and renewed hopes, edited by Natalia Dinello and Vladimir Popov.
Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Rossi, Federico M. 2013. "Piqueteros (workers/unemployment movement in Argentina)." in The
Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, edited by David A.
Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell.
Roy, Devparna. 2013. "To Bt or not to Bt? State, civil society, and firms debate transgenic seeds
in democratic India." Pp. 153-69 in The Neoliberal Regime in the Agri-Food Sector,
edited by Steven Wolf and Alessandro Bonanno. London: Routledge.
Schurman, Rachel, and William A. Munro. 2010. Fighting for the Future of Food: Activists
Versus Agribusiness in the Struggle Over Biotechnology. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Scoones, Ian. 2008. "Mobilizing Against GM Crops in India, South Africa and Brazil." Journal
of Agrarian Change 8(2-3):315-44.
Scribano, Adrin. 1999. "Argentina cortada: cortes de ruta y visibilidad social en el contexto
del ajuste." Pp. 45-71 in Lucha Popular, democracia, neoliberalismo: protesta popular
en Amrica Latina en los aos del ajuste., edited by Margarita Lpez Maya. Caracas:
Nueva Sociedad.
Silva, Eduardo. 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Smith, Jackie. 2014. "Counter-hegemonic networks and the transformation of global climate
politics: rethinking movement-state relations." Global Discourse 4(2-3):120-38.
Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Wiest. 2012. Social movements in the world-system: The politics of
crisis and transformation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Svampa, Maristella, and Sebastin Pereyra. 2003. Entre la ruta y el barrio. La experiencia de las
organizaciones piqueteras. Buenos Aires: Biblos.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2005. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Teubal, Miguel, Diego Domnguez, and Pablo Sabatino. 2005. "Transformaciones agrarias en la
Argentina. Agricultura industrial y sistema agroalimentario." Pp. 3778 in El campo
argentino en la encrucijada. Estrategias y resistencias sociales, ecos en la ciudad, edited
by Norma Giarracca and Miguel Teubal. Buenos Aires: Alianza Editorial.
Villalon, Roberta. 2007. "Neoliberalism, Corruption, and Legacies of Contention: Argentina's
Social Movements, 1993-2006." Latin American Perspectives 34(2):139-56.
Walker, Edward T., and Christopher M. Rea. 2014. "The Political Mobilization of Firms and
Industries." Annual review of sociology 40:281-304.
Webber, Jeffery R. 2011. From rebellion to reform in Bolivia: Class struggle, indigenous
liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
Weyland, Kurt. 2010. "The performance of leftist governments in Latin America." Pp. 1-27 in
Leftist Governments in Latin America, edited by Kurt Weyland, Ral Madrid, and Wendy
Hunter. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wolff, Jonas. 2007. "(De-) Mobilising the Marginalised: A Comparison of the Argentine
Piqueteros and Ecuador's Indigenous Movement." Journal of Latin American Studies
39(1):1-29.
Contesting Corporate Transgenic Crops in a Semi-peripheral Context:

The Case of the Anti-GM Movement in India1
Devparna Roy
University of Puget Sound
droy@pugetsound.edu
Abstract
Market penetration by the hegemonic core states agricultural biotechnology firms has been
preceded and accompanied by a vigorous anti-genetically modified seeds (anti-GM) movement
in semi-peripheral India. To understand the extent of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism
exhibited by the Indian state, it is useful to investigate the character of democratizing forces
such as the anti-GM movementwhich interact with and shape the state. I use primary and
secondary data sources to analyze the anti-GM movement in India and argue that the movement
is anti-corporate without being anti-capitalist. Further, it is counter-hegemonic but not antisystemic. These four traits reflect the strengths and weaknesses of exemplary coalition-building
between right-wing nationalists, centrists, and left activists. The Indian anti-GM movement
suffered an early failure when the Indian state commercialized Bt cotton seeds in 2002, following
the entry of unauthorized Bt cotton seeds and lobbying by farmers groups for legalization of Bt
cotton seeds. However, an effective coalition between the right-wing, centrist, and left elements
was built by about 2006. This was followed by a most significant victory for the anti-GM
movement in February 2010, when the Indian state placed an indefinite moratorium on the
commercialization of Bt brinjal seeds. A second, more qualified, victory was achieved by the
anti-GM movement when the Indian state placed a hold on field trials of GM crops in July 2014.
The anti-GM coalition has been successful in pressing ideologically different political parties to
take steps against the multinational seed firms based in core states. Further, it has enabled the
Indian state to move from a sub-imperialist to an anti-imperialist role regarding GM seeds. But
until the anti-GM coalition in India resolves its inner contradictions and becomes resolutely
anti-capitalist and anti-systemic, it will not be able to effectively challenge the anti-imperialist
Indian states pro-capitalist stance regarding GM seeds and industrial agriculture.
Keywords: anti-GM movement, India, anti-corporate, coalition politics
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
I would like to thank Mangala Subramaniam for her helpful input on an earlier version of this paper and the
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the
author alone.
Contesting Corporate Transgenic Crops in India 89
Much of the debate around genetically modified (or GM) seeds and crops has focused on the
local or national regulatory systems and the potential adverse effects of the products of
agricultural genetic engineering on health and the environment. I will address some of these
debates from the angle of world-systems analysis, because such an approach explains why
contemporary issues related to GM seeds cannot be successfully addressed at the level of the
individual state, but rather must be resolved at the world-system level. I argue that at the current
stage of its evolution, the Indian anti-GM movement is anti-corporate without being anticapitalist. Further, it is counter-hegemonic but not anti-systemic. Finally, the anti-GM movement
has enabled the Indian state to move from a sub-imperialist to an anti-imperialist role when it
comes to GM seeds.
Genetic engineering has emerged as a leading industry of the core states of the modern
world-system (Wallerstein 2004; Chase-Dunn 2006). Seeds are the delivery system of
agricultural genetic engineering. GM seeds are a leading product of multinational firms based
mostly in core states, and certain multinational biotechnology firms have made attempts to
penetrate markets in semi-peripheral countries such as India. Some of these firms have met with
notable success. For example, Bt cotton seed, a kind of transgenic or genetically engineered or
GM cotton seed, was commercialized in India in 2002.2 Bt cotton seeds quickly captured the
Indian cotton market between 2002 and 2012. It has been estimated that over 92 percent of the
cotton grown in India in 2012 was Bt. Writing in the prestigious international journal Nature,
K.S. Jayaraman (2012) claimed that the vast majority (97 percent) of the Bt cotton in India was
sold or licensed by the U.S-based agricultural biotechnology firm Monsanto. There are at least
two problems with Monsantos GM hybrid seeds for Indian farmers. These seeds are expensive
for the farmers and, like other hybrid seeds, they lose vigor after one generation (ibid). Thus,
farmers must buy new stocks every year, which for many results in a never-ending cycle of
market dependency.3
During the course of my research, I found that many Indian farmers had joined anti-GM
activistsright-wing nationalists, centrists, and leftistsin protesting against transgenic seeds
and Monsantos dominance in the Indian market. Market penetration by biotechnology firms
such as Monsanto was preceded and accompanied by a vigorous anti-GM movement in India, as
well as the simultaneous creation of various pro-GM groups.
This paper is divided into eight sections. Following the introduction, I give some
background information about India. Next, I provide a theoretical discussion of quasimonopolies and semi-peripheral actors. Following a section on data and methods, I discuss the
early phase (1998-2005) and mature phase (2006-present) of the Indian mobilization against GM
seeds and an analysis of the movement. In the concluding section, I reflect on the successes of
the Indian anti-GM movement and its future challenges.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Transgenic or GM seeds are created by scientists by introducing foreign gene(s) into a host genome. For example,
Bt crops are created by introducing gene(s) from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis into the crop genome.
Scientists introduce genes from B. thuringiensis into the cotton genome to create Bt cotton plants. These Bt cotton
plants produce pesticide-like substance that make these GM cotton plants resistant to certain lepidopteran pests.
Similarly, the Bt brinjal plants produce pesticide-like substances that make these transgenic brinjal plants resistant to
specific pests. The vegetable brinjal (Solanum melongena) is also known as eggplant.
3
GM or genetically engineered seeds are available either as hybrids or varieties. GM hybrid seeds have to be
replaced every year to get maximum yield, and they are costlier than GM varieties. GM varieties can be saved and
re-used by the farmer for several years. GM hybrids generally give better yields compared with GM varieties.
!
!
! Journal of World-Systems Research!!!

90
Setting the Context

To better understand the Indian anti-GM movement, it is useful to briefly analyze how its main
interlocutor, the Indian state, operates. Following independence from British colonial rule in
1947, the Indian state has travelled through two major phases of democratic developmentalism:
(i) the mixed economy era, the period 1947 to 1990, characterized by long periods of rule by one
political partythe Indian National Congress and (ii) the neoliberal globalization era, 1991 to
the present, characterized by rule of various political parties.4 By using the term democratic
developmentalism, I mean to acknowledge that the Indian state actors operate in a democratic
context, and they continue to prioritize the role of seed markets in meeting certain social and
developmental needs, such as addressing the livelihood concerns of small and marginal peasants,
rather than a focus on just creating profits for seed firms. Elsewhere, I have argued that the
contemporary Indian state is a hybrid formationpursuing neoliberal policies in some sectors of
the economy, such as the information technology industry, but exhibiting a strong democratic
developmental impulse in others, such as the seed sector (Roy 2014).
It is also important to keep in mind that India is one of the very few non-core countries to
have built up a robust tradition of formal democracy. Since its inception, the Indian state has
played a crucial role in industrializing the country and helping support a modern democracy and
civil society in India. Observers will broadly agree that a vibrant civil society flourishes in India
today. Along with the state, different civil society groups are playing a vital role in deepening
democracy in India.
As McMichael (2013) comments, India has long been part of a countertrend of sorts to
the globalization project,5 as the Indian state has never completely accepted neoliberal principles
because of compelling social and ecological reasons. In response to the globalization project, the
Indian state has initiated many welfare measures for rural citizens. This Indian form of twentyfirst-century development finds resonance with recent Latin American initiatives to bring
markets under social control (McMichael 2013).
Though certain states are fast urbanizing, India continues to be an agricultural society,
with possibly the largest contingent of peasant-farmers in the world, most of whom are
smallholders owning less than two hectares of land per household. Most Indian farmers continue
to self-provision seeds, planting them from the previous years harvest and exchanging seeds
among themselves. However, there are also thousands of farmers in India who buy seeds from
the market. Should most Indian farmers be somehow convinced to buy hybrids and transgenic
hybrids from the market instead of self-provisioning seeds, the Indian commercial seed market
would become immensely profitable for private seed firms.
There were few indigenous seeds firms existing in India prior to the 1970s. There was an
exponential increase in the number of private seed firms since the late 1980s, coinciding with
economic liberalization. Foreign seed firms have entered India since the late 1980s, with 100
percent foreign equity allowed in the seed industry since 1991. In terms of seed technology, it
should be noted that the Green Revolution seeds were based on imported technology that Indian
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
Neoliberalism is the dominant economic ideology in the world since the 1980s, and under its influence, many
national governments (including that of India) have deregulated, privatized, and restructured national economies so
to become more internationally competitive. Globalization is characterized by the extension of production and
consumption activities across national boundaries, under a global neoliberal economic regime.
5
McMichael (2000: 259) defines the globalization project as an emerging vision of the world and its resources as a
globally organized and managed free trade/free enterprise economy pursued by a largely unaccountable political and
economic elite. For a brief breakdown of its components, see McMichael (2000: 187).
public sector scientists adapted to local conditions. Further, during the Green Revolution era,
which had marked the beginning of industrial agriculture in many regions of India in the 1960s,
seed markets in India were dominated by public sector firms. Today, in the Gene Revolution era,
which began in 2002, seed markets in India are dominated by private firms.
As Ramamurthy (2011) notes, the entire cotton chain, from seed to fiber to fabric and
apparel, is a global chain. Cottonseed production in India is at the center of the investment
strategies of the biggest multinational seed companies in the world. Companies such as
Monsanto, Bayer, and Dow have operated in India since 2001, when the Government of India
promulgated an act to protect their intellectual property. These foreign corporations have been
eagerly buying Indian seed companies and investing in them. The Indian market, already twice
the size of the U.S. market in 2010, is expected to grow even further by 2020. Indian hybrid
cottonseed is at the core of multinational seed company strategies for the extended reproduction
of capital (Ramamurthy 2011).
Market concentration in the worlds seed industry has been growing over the years. In
1995, before the commercial release of transgenic seeds, the worlds top ten seed companies
controlled 37 percent of the worlds commercial seed sales (Shand 2012). In 2009, the top ten
companies accounted for 73 percent of the commercial seed market. The three largest seed
firms Monsanto, DuPont, Syngentaaccounted for 53 percent of the proprietary seed market
globally in 2009, and the same three corporations accounted for nearly three quarters of all U.S.
patents issued for crop cultivars between 1982 and 2007 (Shand 2012).
The vast majority of farmers in developing countries are self-provisioning in seed, and
they represent the seed industrys biggest competition. In 2006, seeds from the public sector
accounted for 11 percent of the global seed market value, while farmer-saved seeds accounted
for 21 percent and proprietary seeds accounted for 68 percent (Shand 2012). Currently, the
domestic seed market in India is one of the largest in the world. It is worth about U.S. $1.3
billion, and has been growing at a compounded annual growth rate of about 15 percent,
according to a report in a major Indian financial daily, The Economic Times (2012).
In 2007, Monsantos GM biotechnology traits accounted for about 85 percent of all area
(trait-acres) devoted to commercial GM crops in 13 countries where GM crops were planted
(Shand 2012). Only five firms, Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, and Dow Agrosciences,
accounted for 98 percent of all biotech trait-acres in 2007 (Shand 2012). It should be noted that
all five firms are based in core countries. According to Shand (2012), the worlds six largest
seed/agro-chemical/biotechnology firms, which are BASF, Bayer, Dow Agrosciences, DuPont,
Monsanto, and Syngenta have a dangerous chokehold on the global agricultural research
agenda. In the perception of many activists with whom I have spoken, these Big Six
corporations constitute what may be termed the GM cartel. Whether or not the GM cartel has
been intentionally formed by the six corporations, the evidence is that the Big Six corporations
have agreed to cross-license proprietary germplasm and technologies, consolidate R&D efforts,
and terminate costly patent litigation battles.
Theoretical Background
According to Schumpeter (1941), the success of capitalism could be measured in terms of
technological innovation and avalanches of consumer goods. Capitalism was driven by
repeated examples of creative destruction in the course of which new technologies, products,
!
!

92
materials, organizational methods, and markets destroyed old institutions and practices and
replaced them with new ones (Schumpeter 1941: 83). Further, this unsteady dynamism of the
capitalist economy was increasingly the work of big business. Monopoly and oligopoly protected
innovators, and kept their rivals out of the marketplace. According to Schumpeters analysis, the
individual entrepreneur was becoming redundant as research teams took over. The entrepreneurs
sense of personal ownership of the business declined as large corporations became limited
companies with shareholders.
Building on Schumpeters narrative of capitalism, Wallerstein (1984) argues that the
capitalist world-economy, which came into existence in Europe in the sixteenth century, is a
network of integrated production processes united in a single division of labor. The basic
economic imperative of this world-economy is the ceaseless accumulation of capital, made
possible by the continuous appropriation of surplus-value, which is centralized via primitive
accumulation, the concentration of capital, and the mechanisms of unequal exchange
(Wallerstein 1984). Further, the political superstructure of the world-economy is the interstate
system composed of states. The zones under the jurisdiction of these states have never been
economically autonomous, since they have always been integrated into a larger division of
laborthat of the world-economy.
To better understand competing conceptualizations of the current phase of globalization
by world-systems theorists, let us turn to the work of Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986), who use
global commodity chain analysis to argue that globalization is not a new process and that
capitalism as a world-system has been spatially expanding since the seventeenth century. The
competing conceptualization of globalization (by theorists such as Peter Dickens, Miguel
Korzeniewicz, and Gary Gereffi) argues that whereas the internationalization of bygone eras
also involved the extension of business activities beyond national borders, it was a simple
quantitative process; globalization instead involves the functional integration of production, or a
qualitative process of change (Ramamurthy 2004). Dickens and other theorists shift the scale of
analysis from national to multinational corporations (drivers or leading firms), which now
increasingly control the process of integration of production. In their work, they demonstrate
how multinational corporations are able to overcome the nation-states protectionist measures
and enhance their competitive advantage by lowering labor costs and increasing industrial
flexibility (Ramamurthy 2004).
Sellers who are best located within a given market always prefer a monopoly because this
allows them to create a relatively wide margin between the production costs and the sales price,
and thus realize high rates of profit (Wallerstein 2004). Marginal firms prefer competition,
Perfect monopolies are difficult to create, and therefore rare, but quasi-monopolies are not. The
normal situation for so-called leading products (that is, products that are both new and have an
important share of the overall world market for commodities) is an oligopoly rather than an
absolute monopoly (Wallerstein 2004). This observation by Wallerstein holds true for the global
market for seeds, especially for GM seeds, as I discussed above.
As Wallerstein (2004: 26) comments, states can create quasi-monopolies through patents,
and other protectionist measures. Quasi-monopolies depend on the patronage of strong states,
and so the firms creating quasi-monopolies are largely locatedjuridically, physically, and in
terms of ownershipwithin strong states. Strong states can use their power to prevent weaker
states from creating counter-protectionist measures. The medium-strong semi-peripheral Indian
state is not in a position to either prevent core states and their leading firms from selling their
transgenic technologies to Indian firms or to prevent the flow of technology fees from Indian
farmers to the core bourgeoisie. This was especially the case once the Indian state approved the
commercialization of a particular kind of GM seed. I argue that the Indian Bt cotton seed market
can be said to be a quasi-monopoly of Monsanto for at least three reasons. First, in India, the Bt
cotton seed market is currently in the hands of about fifty private players, most of whom are
domestic firms who license the gene constructs from one multinational firmMonsanto
(calculated by the author from IGMORIS data6). Second, Indian farmers pay annual technology
fees to Monsanto amounting to millions of Indian rupees (about one hundred million US dollars,
according to Pray and Nagarajan [2010]). This amounts to a transfer of wealth from the semiperipheral peasantry to the semi-peripheral and core bourgeoisie. Third, the Indian public sector
is not yet in a position to challenge the quasi-monopoly of Monsanto within India. Even though
the Indian state created a public sector with R&D investments in transgenic seed technology in
the 1980s, the Indian public sector has so far released and later, withdrawn only one variety of
GM seed (for details of this case see Roy 2013).
In such a situation, I argue that the role of the national anti-GM movement in the public
debates over GM seeds in India becomes especially salient for the Indian state. As noted by
Subramaniam (2015) in her introductory essay to this issue, the state has played a pivotal role in
implementing and sometimes resisting neoliberal practices that have constituted the global
capitalist system. In this article, I will consider how the Indian anti-GM movement has enabled
the Indian state to move from a sub-imperialist role to an anti-imperialist role when it comes to
GM seeds.7
But before I discuss the anti-GM movement in India and its interactions with the Indian
state, I will briefly consider the features of semi-peripheral states, of which India is one. Some
states have a near even mix of core-like and peripheral processes; they may be called semiperipheral states. These semi-peripheral states have unique political properties: they apply
pressure on peripheral states and they are under pressure from the core (Wallerstein 2004). Their
crucial problem is not to slide into the peripheral category as well as to do what they can to
propel themselves toward the core. Both goals require considerable state interference with the
world market (Wallerstein 2004). In the twenty-first century, semi-peripheral countries such as
South Korea, Brazil, and India have strong firms that export products (such as automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and steel) to peripheral zones, but they also connect to core zones as importers
of more advanced products (Wallerstein 2004).
According to Chase-Dunns structural theory of the world-system (1990), the most
important feature of the semi-peripheries is that fascinating political movements are more likely
to emerge there than in core states or peripheries. Concurring with Goldfrank (1978), ChaseDunn (1990) argues that movements of both the right and the left have often found fertile ground
in semi-peripheral and second-tier core states. The contradictory location of semi-peripheral
areas in the larger world-systems is the reason for this political fertility. More stratified semiperipheries are likely to produce social revolutions which challenge the logic of capitalism, while
relatively less stratified and politically liberal semi-peripheries are likely to achieve the degree of
class harmony necessary for upward mobility within the capitalist world-economy (Chase-Dunn
1990). In my analysis, contemporary India may be classified as a politically liberal but socially
stratified semi-periphery with a low degree of class harmony. The liberal political environment
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
IGMORIS is a government of India service available at: igmoris.nic.in/Files2/YearWise_List 2002_May2012.pdf!

For reasons of space, in this paper, I am not going to discuss the linkages between the Indian anti-GM movement
and other national and/or continental anti-GM movements. However, I will argue that the Indian anti-GM movement
is not anti-systemic in nature, and thus, it is not part of the family of anti-systemic movements spanning the globe.!
7
!
!

94
and working democracy dissipates some of the tensions created by the class structure of Indian
society, leading to a situation where groups across the political spectrumright-wing
nationalists, centrists, and left activistscan operate in various states of India today, meeting
with differing levels of success in different regions.
For Chase-Dunn (1990: 25), both the workerist (Marxs notion that socialism will most
effectively be built by the action of core proletariat) and the Third Worldist (Samir Amins
contention that agents of socialism are most heavily concentrated in the periphery) positions
have important elements of truth, but he suggests an alternative: the semi-peripheral areas are the
weak link of the modern world-system. For him, semi-peripheral areas, especially those where
the territorial stage is large, have sufficient resources to be able to stave off core attempts at
overthrow and to provide some protection to socialist institutions if the political conditions for
their emergence should arise. While core exploitation of the periphery creates and sustains
alliances among classes in both the core and the periphery, the most important experiments with
socialism have emerged in semi-peripheral states, and there is reason to believe that semiperipheral areas will continue to produce powerful challenges to the capitalist mode of
production in the future. Chase-Dunn (1990) cautions that semi-peripheral revolutions and
movements are not always socialist in character (e.g. Iran in 1979), but when socialist intentions
are present, they are greater possibilities for real transformation than in the core or the periphery.
Such semi-peripheral revolutions may transform the character of the capitalist world-system.
The BRICS countriesBrazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, or emerging
economiesare an important sub-group of semi-peripheral states. According to Wallerstein
(2013), the BRICS states have emerged both as anti-imperialist agentsif anti-imperialism is
defined as opposing the hegemony of the United Statesand as sub-imperialist agents of the
core. Further, he argues that BRICS states have demonstrated little capacity to resist and
transform capitalism. Thus, unlike Chase-Dunn (1990), Wallerstein (2013) is not optimistic
about the possibilities of the larger semi-peripheral states or a BRICS nation such as India
emerging as both authentic anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist agents. When it comes to a leading
product such as GM seeds, is the semi-peripheral Indian state generating authentic antiimperialist resistance by restricting the quasi-monopolies of leading firms based in core states? Is
it supporting real anti-capitalist movement and hastening the demise of the capitalist worldsystem? I will speak to this unfolding key debate on the role of semi-peripheral countries later in
this article.
Data and Methods
Empirical material presented in this article builds on the insights gathered during intermittent
fieldwork over twenty-two months carried out in various parts of India between 2000 and 2014.
During my fieldwork, I extensively interviewed farmers, farmers leaders, activists, politicians,
social movement leaders, media persons, and natural scientists. For this paper, I conducted semistructured formal and informal telephone interviews in 2014 and 2015 with fifteen key actors
based in India, including anti-GM activists and intellectuals, journalists, and scholars. Some key
informants were interviewed two or more times in order to clarify their opinions and views.
While the interviews were being carried out, I took notes based on their answers to my questions.
Direct quotes from their interviews were later scrutinized by the informants for accuracy. I also
draw upon archival documents such as scholarly articles, newspaper articles, activist
organization publications and websites.
Indian Mobilization against GM Seeds: The Early Phase (1998-2005)

In 1995, the Government of India granted permission MAHYCO, a large domestic seed
firm, to import Bt cotton seeds from Monsanto. Imported Bt cotton seeds were used by
MAHYCO for backcrossing into Indian cultivars. In 1996-98, MAHYCO was granted
permission by the Indian government to conduct field trials on these Bt cotton hybrids. I argue
that in the 1990s, the Government of India acted as a sub-imperialist agent of the core for two
reasons. First, it permitted MAHYCO to bring Monsantos proprietary Bt gene construct into
India. Second, the central governments economic policies in 1991 allowed for one hundred
percent foreign direct investments (FDI) in the seed sector, thus creating the opportunity for
multinational firms to enter and significantly influence the Indian seed sector.
All these developments were taking place away from public attention. However, the
terminator seeds controversy brought the debate about GM crops to the national media
attention for the first time in 1998(Scoones 2008). Monsanto was suspected of trying to release
products with a terminator genea gene which would prevent replanting and make farmers
reliant on annual purchases from seed companies. Monsanto released a series of press
advertisements to counter the notion that it was releasing products containing the terminator
gene. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concurrently launched the Monsanto Quit India
campaign to heighten public awareness about GM crops.
Although it was well known that field trials of Bt cotton had been established, details of
trial sites became public only in November 1998 (Scoones 2008). The Karnataka Rajya Raitha
Sangha (KRRS), an influential farmers group based in the southern state of Karnataka,
announced the Cremate Monsanto campaign at once. The leader of the KRRS, the late
Professor M.D. Nanjundaswamy, identified a series of anti-GM slogans and gave notice that all
field trial sites in Karnataka would be burned, in front of the media.
The GM crops debate continued in the national media at a high pitch throughout 1999
and 2000, with the anti-GM NGOs in various parts of the country continuing to garner
significant press attention. Scoones (2008) notes that there were a number of workshops and
consultations on transgenic crops, and more concerted counter-moves by the pro-GM groups,
with interventions by non-resident Indian and foreign scientists, other farmers leaders (such as
Sharad Joshi of Maharashtra), and industry commentators, including a Monsanto-commissioned
public opinion survey which claimed to show Indian farmers support for biotechnology.
Legal actions or public interest litigations were undertaken by the anti-globalization
activist Vandana Shivas organization, Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and
Ecology (RFSTE), and the geneticist-activist Suman Sahais organization, Gene Campaign,
against both Monsanto and the state. Besides public interest litigations, direct protests also
occurred during this time. The KRRS was active in crop-burning media events, and argued for a
five-year moratorium on GM seeds. There were regular rallies and demonstrations at Monsantos
former India research headquarters at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore (Scoones
2008). Events such as citizens juries in Karnataka in 2000 and in Andhra Pradesh in 2001
created platforms for activists to discredit GM crops and industrial agriculture (Scoones 2008).
Media interest in GM issues remained high, with industry and NGO websites providing
alternative views on the Indian scene.
!
!

96
Despite elaborate tests, the Indian government refused MAHYCO permission to

commercialize Bt cotton in June 2001. MAHYCO was asked to conduct further tests. Thus, in
June 2001, it was unclear how long it would be before the Indian government approved the
commercialization of Bt cotton. But the situation changed within a few months with a discovery
of unauthorized Bt cotton growing on hundreds of hectares in Gujarat (a western state of India)
in September-October 2001.8 Following this discovery, in March 2002, the Indian government
approved the commercial release of Bt cotton seed produced by a private company, MAHYCO
Monsanto Biotech Limited or MMB. How do we understand this change of mind of the Indian
government? According to Ramanna (2006), the reasons for the decision moving from de facto
to de jure acceptance of Bt cotton must be understood in terms of a powerful story line of GM
as farmers choice, which emerged following the events in Gujarat and which posed a challenge
to the discourse of the anti-GM civil society groups. News of farmers growing Bt cotton in
Gujarat and other states prior to the central governments approval led to a shift in the way
transgenic crops were portrayed in the media and policy-making circles. The rationale was then
put forward that if farmers want the technology, what right does the national government have to
deny them transgenic seeds?
The anti-GM civil society groups could not refute this powerful logic. If they opposed Bt
cotton, it made them appear indifferent to the real interests of the farmers they were supposed to
represent. The pro-GM lobby presented Indian farmers as decision-makers and voters for Bt
cotton, which trumped the portrayal of Indian farmers as hapless victims of globalizationa
picture which had been put forth by the anti-GM lobby and which had garnered widespread
attention because of Indian farmers suicides. The pro-GM lobbys strategy following the
Gujarat incident was not to stress the intellectual property rights violation caused by the
unauthorized Bt cotton seeds, but to emphasize the issue of farmers choice (Ramanna 2006).
Pro-GM farmers groups such Sharad Joshis Shetkari Sangathana demanded the rapid approval
of Bt cotton. The discourse of farmers choice essentially blurred the distinction between
unauthorized seeds and MMB Bt cotton, when it came to the Bt cotton hybrids success.9
Scoones (2008) notes that the legal introduction of Bt cotton in 2002 led to more protests.
Gene Campaign held a high-profile conference in Delhi that argued for an overhaul of the
regulatory system. Greenpeace, with its India office located in Bangalore, geared up for
consumer-based protests in shopping malls, and caught the attention of the media with its
protests around regulatory discussions. However, the KRRS protests became muted because of
the failing health of Nanjundaswamy prior to his death in February 2004.
Around 2004, many campaign-based NGOs had begun to see the anti-GM campaign as
inherently limiting, and they were eager to develop a narrative about possible alternatives to GM
crops and industrial agriculture (Scoones 2008). A lot of attention was infused by anti-GM
NGOs into providing alternative evidence of the limits of Bt cotton technology just in time for
the three-year-review of Bt cotton results in 2005 (Scoones 2008). In addition to discussing the
problems with Bt cotton technology, the anti-GM NGOs also began to seriously develop the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
!The unauthorized Bt cotton seeds in Gujarat was called Navbharat 151 which was marketed by a small Indian
seed company as a hybrid but was in reality an unlicensed Bt cotton hybrid. Although the Navbharat 151 seed
contained the same Bt toxin gene as the MMB Bt cotton, it was crossed with a different parent. It is unclear how the
MMB gene construct got into Navbharat 151.
9
See Roy (2006) and Roy, Herring and Geisler (2007) for a discussion of how the unauthorized GM hybrid seeds
(namely Navbharat 151) performed better than MMBs Bt cotton hybrids for many farmers interviewed in Gujarat
during the years 2002-2004.
story of a possible alternative to industrial agriculture. Thus, in the move from what I call a
constrained narrative, which centered around anti-GM campaigns in which GM seeds were
painted as being harmful for the farmers, consumers, environment, economy, and society, to
what I call a powerful counter-hegemonic narrative which subsumed the earlier narrative,
questioned not just GM seeds but the entire model of industrial agriculture itself. It focused on
alternatives to the paradigms of industrial agriculture and GM seeds; the anti-GM civil society
groups were able to raise the debate on GMOs to a higher and more-encompassing level. ProGM groups argued that the debate should be restricted to the single issue of whether GM seeds
were advantageous for various social groups and the economy, but anti-GM groups brought in
the larger issues of choice of agricultural paradigmsagro-ecological or industrialand choice
of development strategiescorporate-led or state-ledand the implications of such choices for
Indian democracy. 10
Indian Mobilization against GM Seeds: The Mature Phase (2006-present)
Efforts were made since 2003 in India to launch a second transgenic crop, Bt brinjal. Brinjal is a
very popular vegetable in India, consumed by the rich and poor alike. When it comes to brinjal,
Indian farmers cultivate both hybrids and open pollinated varieties (OPVs). This market
segmentation facilitated collaboration between the public sector and the private sector, beginning
in 2003 (Herring and Shotkoski 2011). MAHYCO shared its biotechnology (which it had
developed in collaboration with Monsanto) with Indian public institutions for development of Bt
brinjal. These public institutions developed Bt brinjal varieties with technology donated by
MAHYCO, while MAHYCO itself continued to concentrate on Bt hybrids, assuming that many
farmers would eventually favor them for their yield advantage.
In contrast to the Bt cotton story where hundreds of private sector hybrids have been
released from 2002 onwards, and only one public sector variety was released, more brinjal OPVs
from the public sector than hybrids from the private sector were planned for release. This would
give Indian farmers a choice between two types of GM cultivars: the lower-cost and save-able
seeds of Bt brinjal varieties and the higher-yielding and more expensive hybrid seeds. The
central governments Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC)s Expert Committee
concluded in October 2009 that the technological trait in brinjal was effective in controlling
target pests, safe to the environment and humans, and had the potential to benefit farmers. Given
the approval by the GEAC, one would assume that the stage had been set for Bt brinjal to be
legally introduced in India. However, that was not to be.
In a serious attempt to solicit opinions from the public about developing human-centered
policies regarding Bt brinjal, the then Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh,
announced that he would not accept the GEAC recommendations for commercial release of Bt
brinjal, but would instead open public consultations on a tour of seven Indian cities. In January
2010, he toured far-flung cities within India: Kolkata and Bhubaneshwar in the eastern states,
Ahmedabad and Nagpur in the western states, Hyderabad and Bangalore in the south, and
Chandigarh in the north. There was a massive outpouring of letters and other documents from
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
For further discussion, see Roy (2014). Moreover, while GM seeds are often associated with the paradigm of
industrial agriculture, this need not be the case for all farmers. See Roy (2010, 2012) for reasons why self-identified
organic farmers in Gujarat (India) chose to cultivate Bt cotton and why their attitudes toward GM seeds changed (or
did not change) over time.
!
!

98
scientists, agriculture experts, farmers organizations, NGOs, consumer groups and people from
all walks of life. These publicly available documents run into hundreds of pages and are written
in many languages by many different individuals and groups, both pro-GM and anti-GM. After
the consultations, in February 2010, Minister Ramesh placed an indefinite moratorium on the
commercialization of Bt brinjal until independent scientific studies established the safety of the
product in terms of its long-range impact on human health and the environment (including the
rich biodiversity existing in brinjal in India).
Which factors led to this unprecedented opening up of the debates regarding GM crops
and the future of Indian agriculture in January 2010? The anti-GM civil society groups played a
major role in launching public awareness campaigns about the problems with Bt brinjal,
mobilizing public opinion in January 2010 to get citizens to respond to Minister Rameshs public
consultations. But the demonstrated efficacy of anti-GM civil society groups was not the only
reason why the February 2010 indefinite moratorium came into being. Roy (2014) notes four
other reasons that led to the 2010 moratorium on Bt brinjal. The first is the lack of release of
unauthorized Bt brinjal seeds to farmers at that point in time and the second is the difficulty of
mobilizing brinjal-producing farmers to rally in support of Bt brinjal. The third reason is the
lack of scientific consensus on the issue of Bt brinjal. Unlike in the case of Bt cotton where few
Indian scientists joined the anti-GM groups, the GM food crop Bt brinjal saw a divided scientific
community. The fourth reason is the opposition by many powerful regional/state governments to
Bt brinjal. Minister Rameshs announcement of the indefinite moratorium on Bt brinjals
commercial release continues to this day and is the first major victory for the anti-GM civil
society groups in India. The salience of this major victory of the anti-GM coalition over
corporate transgenic seeds needs to be emphasized. The noted food and trade policy analyst
Devinder Sharma told me, The February 2010 government decision to announce an indefinite
moratorium on the commercialization of Bt brinjal was the most significant victory achieved by
movements arising from within the Indian civil society in the last forty years. Given Indias
numerous social/environmental movements, some of which are globally renowned, this
assessment by Sharma should give the reader pause for thought.
Just before the national elections in summer 2014, the GEAC of the environment ministry
of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government approved field trials of some
fifteen GM crops. In June 2014, a new government was formed by the right-wing Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) in New Delhi. There was some fear among anti-GM activists that the new
government would continue with the previous governments stance on field trials of GM crops.
However, due to pressure from the right-wing organizations such as the Swadeshi Jagaran
Manch (SJM)11 and the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS), the new government placed a hold in July
2014 on the field trials of fifteen GM crops. This decision by the New Delhi government was
sought to be overturned by some states. For example, Maharashtra has just allowed open field
trials for five GM crops, including Bt brinjal. Nevertheless, many other states including Gujarat,
the home state of Prime Minister Narendra Modi are not allowing field trials of GM food crops,
at least for the present. The earlier decision by the central government to place a hold on the field
trials of GM crops can be counted as a qualified success for the anti-GM movement, however
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
The Swadeshi Jagaran Manch or SJM (Forum for National Awakening) is associated with the BJP, and is an
organization devoted to both economic and cultural nationalism. The Bharatiya Kisan Sangh or BKS (Indian
Farmers Union) is also associated with the BJP, and is a nationwide farmers organization. Both SJM and BKS are
part of the right-wing Sangh Parivar (the Family of Organizations associated with the politically and culturally
influential civil society group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Association of Volunteers).
short-lived it may have been. But even if the central government in New Delhi were to approve
of field trials of GM crops in the future, the state governments would have the last word on
whether field trials of GM crops would be permitted in their respective states. Biotechnology is
decided at the level of the central government, but agriculture ultimately falls under the
administrative ambit of the state.
Analysis of the Anti-GM Movement in India
In this section, I will make five points. First, in the early phase (1998-2005), the anti-GM
movement did not score any notable victories because of its inability to develop an effective
coalition between right-wing nationalists, centrists, and left activists between 1998 and 2001. A
further problem was created by the entry of unauthorized Bt cotton seeds unnoticed by the Indian
state and civil society groups, a fact which was discovered only in fall 2001. In the case of Bt
cotton, the pro-GM corporate interests were able to outmaneuver the anti-GM groups and state
actors due to the alignment of powerful cotton farmers interests with Monsantos interests in the
wake of the discovery of unauthorized Bt cotton.
Second, in the mature phase (2006-present), the anti-GM movement was finally able to
build an effective coalition comprising of right-wing, centrist, and left-wing groups. Each
component built links with their respective political parties, parliamentarians and policymakers
in both state-level (regional-level) and central governments, as well as scientists, media persons,
urban consumers groups, and farmers groups sympathetic to their ideologies.
Scoones (2008) notes that the GM debate in India was characterized by the strategic
development of alliances and the linking of actors and organizations in new, often fragile
coalitions. However, I will argue that the fragility of the civil society coalitions in the area of
GM crops became a thing of the past by about 2006. Despite the ideological differences and the
contrasts in personalities and work styles, Indian activists were able to form nationwide looselyknit yet robust networks such as the Coalition for GM-Free India. This Coalition nurtured an
energetic and wide-ranging campaign against GM crops in India from about 2006. Different
actors fought on different fronts across the country. Thousands of activists throughout the
country worked with peasants to mobilize support against Bt brinjal. Though longstanding
activists such as Devinder Sharma, Suman Sahai, and Vandana Shiva were also present in this
struggle, new activists had begun to play a larger role.
Many strands of activism came together to form the anti-GM movement in India from the
early 1990s onward. There were activist organizations that had been long tackling the negative
side effects of industrial agriculture in the Green Revolution areas. Such environmental groups
felt that not only had Indians overlooked the old dangers associated with Green Revolution
technologies, they were inviting new dangers by welcoming plants releasing pesticide-like
substances into the environment. Other groups worried about the biosafety implications of
transgenic crops; after viewing the chaos surrounding Bt cotton, they fought for a stronger
regulatory system that would effectively monitor GM crops from the lab to the field.
Further, there were centrist and left wing organizations that focused on the negative
impacts of contemporary capitalism, including the WTOs trade-related intellectual property
rights (TRIPS). These civil society groups concentrated on localization and developing
community-based self-reliance in all matters, including food. Such groups created local and
village-level seed banks to maintain seed diversity and farmers autonomy, they promoted
!
!
!
100
Journal of World-Systems Research!!!
organic and sustainable agriculture among farmers, and they educated the non-farming public on
why they should buy and eat organic, GM-free food and use GM-free fiber. Additionally, there
were individuals and groups that mobilized different constituencies: women (seen as providers of
food to families and as seed guardians), consumers (who could vote with their wallets), and
farmers. Also, there were groups that had a rights-based approach to food and farming.
There were right-wing groups that fought against the idea of cultural and economic
imperialism by non-indigenous technology and foreign firms while seeking to preserve native
economies and cultures. There were left groups that sought to resist the same types of
imperialism but with the goal of creating a socialist economy. Thus, a heterogeneous medley of
individuals and groups with very different interests and representing various constituencies
cobbled together the Coalition for GM-Free India by 2006.
Third, I argue that the anti-GM Indian movement is anti-corporate and anti-imperialist.
Let me illustrate with examples. On January 30, 2010, the day that Minister Ramesh held the
public consultations in the northern city of Chandigarh city, more than a hundred thousand
Indians across the country, organized by the anti-GM movement, went on a fast to deliver the
message that the independence won by the country through the freedom struggle and through the
leadership of non-violent (ahimsa) non-cooperation (satyagraha) offered by Mahatma Gandhi
cannot be lost to GM crops such as Bt brinjal (Dutta 2012). The protestors drew on Gandhis
concept of Hind Swaraj (sovereign self-rule) and noted that the agricultural economy cannot be
turned into a source of exploitation by foreign seed firms. They used the slogan: Remember the
Mahatma, Stop Bt Brinjal, and Protect Indias Seed & Food Sovereignty.
The Monsanto Quit India day continues to be organized as a site of protests against the
power of the global agribusiness in shaping the Indian farming landscape, corporatizing farming,
and undermining the food sovereignty and food security of local grassroots farmers (Kuruganti
2011, quoted in Dutta 2012). On this day, protests were organized by farming communities all
across India. On August 9, 2011, farmers gave voice to their resistance to the commoditization
and privatization of agriculture in the form of four key claims made to the Indian government:
(a) no collaborative research projects and partnerships with Monsanto or other similar food
corporations in state-owned agricultural universities or within the national agricultural research
system; (b) no commissioned projects under GM crop trials in these institutions and no GM crop
trials; (c) no public-private partnerships in the name of improving food productivity, particularly
for crops such as rice and maize that pose serious concerns of food security and food
sovereignty; and (d) setting up sustainable grassroots systems of seed self-reliance that respect
the local knowledge and technology of farmers, and simultaneously seek to support institution
building and infrastructure around self-reliant systems (Dutta 2012). The Monsanto Quit India
movement draws its cultural relevance from the 1942 Gandhi-led Quit India movement.
On the Monsanto Quit India day of August 8, 2013, farmers from twenty Indian states
gathered in New Delhi for a day-long dharna (sit-in) to demand freeing the country from GM
organisms and the withdrawal of lopsided provisions in the Biotechnology Regulatory Authority
of India (BRAI) Bill, 2013, which allows ease of release of GM crops in India (Sood 2013). The
farmers presented a national flag made from non-Bt-organic cotton to Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh for unfurling on the Independence Day. Pankaj Bhushan, co-convener of Coalition for a
GM-Free India, told the audience,

It is a shame that cotton and khadi,12 the symbols of our fight for Independence, are today
controlled by an American MNC13 because of our indifference and inaction. Ninety-three
per cent of Indian cotton seed has the proprietary technology of Monsanto. On this
Independence Day we will hoist non-Bt organic cotton national flags in all the 20 states
from where people have joined this dharna; this is a symbolic beginning to regaining our
seed sovereignty. We also request the Prime Minister to hoist this flag from the ramparts
of the Red Fort this year. (Sood 2013)
The Indian anti-GM NGOs have been dismissed as agents of the state in some quarters,
but the events of February 2010 and July 2014 raise the question of who drives whom: does the
semi-peripheral state use social movements for its own gains or do social movements
successfully press the semi-peripheral state to accept their goals? I would argue that the states
decisions in February 2010 showed the power of the centrist and left-of-center elements within
the anti-GM coalition to force the Indian statewhen the governing party also subscribed to a
left-of-center ideologyto cede to their demands, while the central states decision in July 2014
showed the power of right-wing elements within the anti-GM coalition to coax the right-wing
governing party in New Delhi to agree with their demands.
By cobbling together an umbrella-like organization, the Coalition for GM-Free India has
provided space for right wing, centrist, and left wing NGOs and activists to interact and promote
the national interest. Further, the Coalition for GM-Free India has proved that a loosely knit yet
robust network of NGOs subscribing to a wide range of ideologies has its organizational
advantages. It remains nimble and pragmatic enough in being able to achieve its goal of creating
a GM-free India, whether a left-of-center or a right-wing political coalition is in power. The
right-wing NGOs in the anti-GM movement have conduits to the right-wing BJP, while the
centrist and left-wing NGOs in the anti-GM movement have connections with the Congress party
and left parties.
Fourth, this analysis of the anti-GM movement supports Chase-Dunns claim that for the
world-system analysts, the most fascinating political movements arise in the semi-peripheral
countries. As Chase-Dunn argues, movements of the left and right have both emerged in semiperipheral countries. However, to my knowledge, the Indian anti-GM movement is probably the
first case of right, centrist and left elements together building an effective coalition to thwart the
ambitions of core states and leading firms based in core states to create more quasi-monopolistic
situations with regards to GM seeds. The successful and exemplary Indian anti-GM coalition
may trigger similar coalition-building activities in other non-core states.
Fifth, this analysis partly supports Wallersteins argument that semi-peripheral states play
the dual roles of anti-imperialism; by opposing the hegemonic core state and its leading firms,
and sub-agents of imperialist core. During the 1990s, the Indian state acted as a sub-imperialist
agent. But by 2010, the visible pressure created by the anti-GM coalition on the Indian state
emboldened the state to act as an anti-imperialist agent in the realm of GM food crops, if antiimperialism is defined as opposing the hegemony of the United States. But until policies that
uphold and further capitalism in agriculture are jettisoned by the Indian state, it is possible that
the Indian state will act to develop capitalism in the agriculture sector in other non-core regions.
For example, the legal researcher and policy analyst Shalini Bhutani believes that the February
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
Khadi is handspun cloth, the creation of which was popularized by Gandhi as a means of winning back the
economic independence of India.
13
MNC is the acronym for multinational corporation.
!
!
!
102
2010 decision of Minister Ramesh was actually undertaken to buy time for the Indian public
sector which is after all carrying out R&D work on GM crops, including GM brinjal. Bhutani
informed me, After all, if you carefully read Jairam Rameshs statement on why he announced
an indefinite moratorium on Bt brinjal, you will see that he did not announce a blanket ban on
GM crops. According to Bhutani, India is one of the few countries where the state is seeking to
respond to the issue of seed pricing in the sector of agricultural biotechnology by developing its
own public sector transgenic seeds, the belief being that if you have competition in the market, it
will offer more choices to the farmers, that is more Bt varieties to choose fromforeign brands
versus made in India brands, and also keep prices of GM seeds in check.
The Indian anti-GM coalition is currently divided on the issue of public sector transgenic
seeds.! For example, Dr. Vijoo Krishnan, the joint secretary of the All-India Kisan Sabha
(AIKS)a civil society group which has over twenty million members, all of whom are small
farmerstold me,
We are for scientific innovation. The issue of who controls our seeds is important.
Monopolies in seeds should not be encouraged, especially if these monopolies rest with
private seed firms. Public sector seed firms should be encouraged. Participatory plant
breeding and participatory seed development leading to public sector seeds should be
encouraged by the government. These processes build on interface between scientific
fraternity, agricultural research institutions, and farmers. Research on GM crops must be
through the public sector research institutions and must be allowed only after putting in
place a stringent regulatory mechanism for ensuring bio-safety concerns are effectively
addressed. Field trials can only be allowed after such a process and until then there must
be a moratorium.
Concluding Reflections
The February 2010 moratorium on Bt brinjal and the July 2014 hold on field trials of GM crops
signal the coming of age of the Indian anti-GM movement. The moratorium on Bt brinjal is an
especially important milestone in the Indian citizenrys participation in human-centered policy
approaches. The two policy decisions also opened up debates about the different paths to
development that Indians can adopt. Though the interactions of state actors with civil society
actors remain something of a black box for investigators, it is possible to speculate that the
Indian state moved from a sub-imperialist role in the 1990s to an anti-imperialist role by 2010,
because counter-hegemonic actors still existing within the state can play a role in contesting the
power of core-based firms, provided the semi-peripheral state faces sufficient pressures from
domestic civil society.
Nevertheless, I discern three problems with the Indian anti-GM movement. First, as Bello
(2002) points out in a different context, normal corporate behavior is construed by some activists
as abnormal. The assumption they make is that the problems associated with certain
multinational firms can be solved by removing those corporations from the capitalist system.
They do not realize that the problem is really with the way the capitalist system functions as a
whole. They do not realize that reforming the capitalist system by excising certain firms may
be out of question because new firms behaving in old ways will emerge to replace the excised
firms.
Second, as I have already noted, the Indian anti-GM coalition is currently divided on the
issue of public sector transgenic seeds. I argue that the anti-GM coalition will have to soon reach
a consensus on the desirability of public sector transgenic seeds so that it can become more than
a pawn in the game between the hegemonic core state, multinational firms, and the antiimperialist Indian state.
Third, Bt brinjal has been legally introduced in neighboring Bangladesh in January 2014,
and may be cultivated in open-air field trials in Maharashtra in the near future. The prospects of
Bt brinjal seeds travelling across the porous Indo-Bangladeshi borders or the borders between
Maharashtra and other Indian states is acknowledged as a problem by activists, scientists and
state actors who fear a repetition of the Bt cotton story. If unauthorized Bt brinjal seeds reach
Indian farmers, then the Indian debates about alternative pathways to developmentwhich are
premised on not seeing entry into the core region as the endpoint of semi-peripheral
developmentand the experiments in democratic decision-making about GM seeds will be
short-circuited.
The Indian state has been transformed from a sub-imperialist agent of the core to an antiimperialist agent because of the pressure created by the anti-GM Indian coalition. If unauthorized
Bt brinjal seeds do not reach Indian farmers, if the anti-GM Indian coalition becomes resolutely
anti-capitalist (not just anti-corporate), and if it also takes a stand against public-sector GM
seeds, then it will possibly influence the semi-peripheral Indian state to move in an anti-capitalist
direction. My reading of the anti-GM Indian movement supports Chase-Dunn (1990)s optimism
about the possibilities of larger semi-peripheral states such as India, in conjunction with the antiGM movement, to emerge as agents that will transform the character of the capitalist worldsystem. Wallerstein (2013) has claimed that BRICS states have demonstrated little capacity to
resist and transform capitalism. However, as I have shown in this paper, through an exemplary
coalition-building between right-wing, centrist, and left elements, the Indian anti-GM movement
has influenced the Indian semi-peripheral state to resist those multinational capitalist firms which
seek to further capitalist accumulation through the creation of monopolies of GM seeds and GM
crops. Whether, and to what extent, the Indian state will seek to transform capitalism within and
outside its boundaries depends to a large extent on the Indian anti-GM movements capacity to
resolve its inner contradictions and press the Indian state to do likewise.
References
Bello, Walden. 2002. Towards a Deglobalized World. Pp. 292-295, in Global Backlash:
Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy, edited by Robin Broad. New York:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1990. Resistance to Imperialism: Semiperipheral Actors. Review 13
(1): 1-31.
______. 2006. Globalization: A World-Systems Perspective. Pp. 79-105, in Global Social
Change: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, edited by Christopher Chase-Dunn
and Salvatore J. Babones. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dutta, Mohan J. 2012. Voices of Resistance: Communication and Social Change. West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
!
!
!
104
Goldfrank, Walter. 1978. Fascism and World-Economy. Pp. 75-120, in Social Change in the
Capitalist World-Economy, edited by Barbara H. Kaplan. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications.
Herring, Ronald J. and Frank Shotkoski. 2011. Eggplant Surprise: The Puzzle of Indias First
Transgenic Vegetable. Scientific American Worldview. Retrieved March 10, 2015
(http://www.saworldview.com/archive/2011/download-the-2011-issue/).
Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1986. Commodity Chains in the World
Economy Prior to 1800. Review 10(1):157-170.
Jayaraman, K.S. 2012. India Investigates Bt Cotton Claims. Nature, February 15, Retrieved
March 9, 2015 (http://www.nature.com/news/india-investigates-bt-cotton-claims1.10015).
Kuruganti, Kavitha. 2011. Monsanto Quit India Day Marked Across the Country. Alliance
for Holistic and Sustainable Agriculture. Retrieved March 10, 2015
(http://www.kisanswaraj.in/2011/12/13/monsanto-quit-india-day-marked-across-thecountry/).
McMichael, Philip D. 2000. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective, 3rd ed.,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
______. 2013. Globalization: A Project in Crisis. Pp. 75-87 in Global Political Economy:
Contemporary Theories, 2nd ed., edited by Ronen Palan. New York: Routledge.
Pray, Carl E. and Latha Nagarajan. 2010. "Price Controls and Biotechnology Innovation: Are State
Government Policies Reducing Research and Innovation by the Ag Biotech Industry in India?"
AgBioForum 13(4): 297-307.
Ramamurthy, Priti. 2004. Why Is Buying A Madras Cotton Shirt A Political Act? A Feminist
Commodity Chain Analysis. Feminist Studies 30(3):734-769.
______. 2011. Rearticulating Caste: The Global Cottonseed Commodity Chain and the Paradox
of Smallholder Capitalism in South India. Environment and Planning A, 43: 1035-1056.
Ramanna, Anitha. 2006. Indias Policy on Genetically Modified Crops, Asia Research Center
Working Paper 15. London: Asia Research Center (ARC), London School of Economics
& Political Science.
Roy, Devparna. 2006. Farming White Gold: Early Experiences with Genetically Engineered
Cotton Production in Gujarat, India, PhD. thesis, Cornell University. USA.
______. 2010. Of Choices and Dilemmas: Bt Cotton and Self-Identified Organic Cotton
Farmers in Gujarat. Asian Biotechnology and Development Review 12(1):51-79.
______. 2012. Cultivating Bt Cotton in Gujarat (India): Self-Identified Organic Cotton Farmers
Revisited. Asian Biotechnology and Development Review 14(2):67-92.
______. 2013.Toward Genetic Democracy? Seed Sovereignty, Neoliberal Food Regime, and
Transgenic Crops in India. Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue. Yale University
Conference
Paper
#64,
Retrieved
March
10,
2015
(http://www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/foodsovereignty/pprs/64_Roy_2013.pdf).
______. 2014. To Bt or Not to Bt? State, Civil Society, and Firms Debate Transgenic Seeds in
Democratic India. Pp. 153-169 in The Neoliberal Regime in the Agri-Food Sector:
Crisis, Resilience, and Restructuring, edited by Steven A. Wolf and Alessandro Bonanno.
New York: Routledge.
Roy, Devparna, Ronald J. Herring, and Charles C. Geisler. 2007. Naturalizing Transgenics:
Loose Seeds, Official Seeds, and Risk in the Decision Matrix of Gujarati Cotton
Farmers. Journal of Development Studies 43(1):158-176.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. [1941] 1976. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Reprint, New York:
Harper & Row.
Scoones, Ian. 2008. Mobilizing Against GM Crops in India, South Africa and Brazil. Pp. 147175 in Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, edited by
Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Marc Edelman and Cristobal Kay. Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell.
Shand, Hope. 2012. The Big Six: A Profile of Corporate Power in Seeds, Agrochemicals &
Biotech. Pages 10-15 in The Heritage Farm Companion (summer). Seed Savers
Exchange.
Retrieved
on
March
10,
2015
(http://www.seedsavers.org/site/pdf/HeritageFarmCompanion_BigSix.pdf).
Sood, Jyotika. 2013. Monsanto Told to Quit India. Down to Earth, August 8. Retrieved on
March 9, 2015 (http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/quit-monsanto-protest-nearparliament).
World-System. Journal of World Systems Research.
The Economic Times. 2012. Indias Seed Industry to Grow by 53 % by 2015: Assocham.
Retrieved on March 10, 2015 (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-1209/news/35705464_1_hybrid-seeds-quality-seeds-high-yielding-varieties).
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1984. The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements,
and the Civilizations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
______. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
______. 2013. Whose Interests are Served by the BRICS? Commentary No. 352, May 1.
Retrieved on March 9, 2015 (http://www.iwallerstein.com/interests-served-brics/)
!
!

SpecialIssue Vol21 No1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SpecialIssue Vol21 No1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

SpecialIssue Vol21 No1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

!

States and Social Movements in the Modern World-System1

2 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Introduction: States and Social Movements in the World-System 3

4 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Introduction: States and Social Movements in the World-System 5

6 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Introduction: States and Social Movements in the World-System 7

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!9!

10 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!11!

In countries with strong anti-systemic movements and revolutionary political parties at

Earlier Rounds of Integration into the World Capitalist System, 1940s-1980s

12 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!13!

Source: Figure constructed from Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007)

14 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!15!

16 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!17!

Emergent Social Movement Partysim (Honduras, Panama, and Guatemala)

18 Journal of World-Systems Research!

The author witnessed these elections as an international election monitor.

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!19!

Neoliberal Policies that Led to the

Social Movement Party

20 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!21!

22 Journal of World-Systems Research!

Social Movement Partyism in Central America!23!

24 Journal of World-Systems Research!

26 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 27

28 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 29

30 Journal of World-Systems Research

Steps in Breaking a Ship

Breaking Ships in the World-System 31

32 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 33

34 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 35

36 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 37

38 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 39

40 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 41

42 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 43

44 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 45

46 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 47

48 Journal of World-Systems Research

Breaking Ships in the World-System 49

Economic Entitlements via Entrepreneurial Conduct?

Keywords: Microfinance, Women, Neoliberal Governmentality, Capitalist Accumulation,