Longinus, Sublime
Longinus, Sublime
Longinus, Sublime
Here, Longinus begins by wondering whether there is such a thing as an art of the
sublime or lofty (76). His first point in this regard is that the sublime is the product in
part of nature, in part of nurture. Some are of the view that a lofty tone (76) is innate,
and does not come by teaching; nature is the only art that can compass it (76). Longinus
argues, however, that
while nature as a rule is free and independent of matters of passion and
elevation, yet is she wont not to act at random and utterly without system.
Further, nature is the original and vital underlying principle in all cases, but
system can define limits and fitting seasons, and can also contribute the
safest rules for use and practice. Moreover, the expression of the sublime is
more exposed to danger when it goes its own way without the guidance of
knowledge. (76)
Indeed, he argues, the very fact that there are some elements of expression which are in
the hands of nature alone, can be learnt from no other source than art (77). In other
words, nature must be supplemented by nurture. Longinus contrasts with the truly
sublime what he calls the pseudo-tragic (77) and frigidity (77).
Chapter III (Defining the Sublime 2:
Sublimitys Antitheses 1: Tumidity, Puerility, Inappropriate Passion)
Here, Longinus gives examples of tasteless tumidity (77), puerility (77) a defect
(77) which is the direct antithesis of elevation, for it is utterly low and mean and in real
truth the most ignoble vice of style (77) and unseasonable and empty passion, where
no passion is required, or immoderate, where moderation is needed (77), that is,
displays of emotion . . . not caused by the nature of the subject, but are purely personal
and wearisome (77).
Chapter IV (Defining the Sublime 3: Sublimitys Antitheses 2: Frigidity)
Here, Longinus discusses frigidity (77), another quality opposed to that of sublimity.
Chapter V (Defining the Sublime 4: Sublimitys Antitheses 3: Faddishness)
Longinus claims here that all ugly and parasitical growths arise in literature from a single
cause, that pursuit of novelty in the expression of ideas which may be regarded as the
fashionable craze of the day (78). He warns that while beauties of expression and
touches of sublimity, and charming elegances withal, are favourable to effective
composition (78), they are also the elements and foundation, not only of success, but
also of the contrary (78).
Later, Longinus also distinguishes between sublimity, on the one hand, and mere
accuracy, on the other, in chapters XXXIII, XXXIV and XXXV, contending that the former is
what separates the Homers, the Demosthenes and the Platos from the Hyperides and the
Lysias.
Chapter VI (Defining the Sublime 5)
Longinus states his intention here to gain . . . clear knowledge and appreciation of the
true sublime (78) and claims that judgment of style is the last and crowning fruit of long
experience (78).
Chapter VII (Defining the Sublime 6: Proof in Universal and Eternal Acclaim)
Here, Longinus compares the true sublime with false pretendants to the throne, fearing
whether some supposed examples have not simply the appearance of elevation with many
idle accretions (78). Our soul is instinctively uplifted by the true sublime; it takes proud
flight, and is filled with joy and vaunting, as though it had itself produced what it has
heard (78). The true sublime has a beneficial spiritual impact upon the audience: its
effect is . . . to dispose the soul to high thoughts (78) and to leave in the mind more
food for reflection than the words seem to convey (79). This is linked, Longinus argues,
to our sense of the majestic and the superlative in the world.
Longinus also argues that true sublimity (79) is timeless and universal in appeal
and, as such, bears a repeated examination (79). Examples of the true sublime
please all and at all times. For when men of different pursuits, lives,
ambitions, ages, languages, hold identical views on one and the same
subject, then that verdict which results . . . from a concert of discordant
elements makes our faith in the object of admiration strong and
unassailable. (79)
In other words, Longinus claims, consensus determines what is sublime in oratory and
poetry: if all men at all times and in all places can agree on the sublimity of a work, then it
can be assumed that such qualities inhere in that work. It is a quality objectively present
in some works, the proof of which is that people from different places and times
acknowledge this to be the case.
Chapter VIII (Explaining the Sublime 2:
the Five Causes: Logos, Pathos, Style and Arrangement)
Here, Longinus identifies the five principal sources of elevated language (79), the
common foundation (79) of all five being the gift of discourse (79), that is, a love for
and an ability to express oneself. The first two two components of the sublime are for the
most part innate (79) in that they are something with which the orator / poet is born (i.e.
they are a product of nature). The first and most important (79) source of the sublime is
what Longinus describes as the poets power of forming great conceptions (79).
Sublimity is, he writes, the echo of a great soul (79) as a result of which a bare idea, by
itself and without a spoken word, sometimes excites admiration just because of the
greatness of soul implied (79). Longinus would seem to have in mind the orators /
poets intellectual capacity or reason (logos) and, thus, his ability to put together a
reasonable argument of some kind. This falls under the rubric of what rhetoricians term
invention whereby the appropriate topics are found and proved by means of abbreviated
forms of deduction (enthymemes) and induction (examples).
The second source is the orators / poets vehement and inspired passion (79),
that is, a great emotional capacity (pathos) which he is able to transfer to his audience.
Longinus is at pains to argue that sublimity and passion (79) are not a unity (79)
because some passions are found which are far removed from sublimity and are of a low
order, such as pity, grief and fear (79). However, it would be wrong, he argues, to
believe that passion never contributes at all to sublimity (79): there is no tone so lofty
as that of genuine passion, in its right place, when it bursts out in a mad enthusiasm and
as it were fills the speakers words with frenzy (79).
Though Longinus does not mention it here, he does discuss the importance of the
orators / poets ethos in chapter XLIV. Moral character might very well function as one
more source of the sublime (for a total of six) but Longinus does not explicitly draw the
Just as all dim lights are extinguished in the blaze of the sun, so do the artifices of rhetoric
fade from view when bathed in the pervading splendour of sublimity (86). This is because
manifestations of passion and the sublime . . . lie nearer to our minds through a sort of
natural kinship and through their own radiance, and always strike our attention before the
figures, whose art they thrown into the shade and as it were keep in concealment (86).
Chapter XVIII (Figures of Speech 3: Questions and Interrogations)
Here, Longinus discusses questions and interrogations (87): just as those who are
interrogated by others experience a sudden excitement and answer the inquiry incisively
and with the utmost candour, so the figure of question and answer leads the hearer to
suppose that each deliberate thought is struck out and uttered on the spur of the moment,
and thus beguiles his reason (87).
Chapter XIX (Figures of Speech 4: the Absence of Connecting Links)
Here, Longinus concerns himself with how the words issue forth without connecting links
and are poured out as it were, almost outstripping the speaker himself (87). The lines
detached from one another, but nonetheless hurried along, produce the impression of an
agitation which interposes obstacles and at the same time adds impetuosity (87) via in
many cases the omission of conjunctions (87).
Chapter XX (Figures of Speech 5: Asyndeton, Anaphora, Diatyposis)
Here, Longinus focuses on the powerful effect (87) which usually attends the union of
figures for a common object, when two or three mingle together as it were in partnership
and contribute a fund of strength, persuasiveness and beauty (87). He cites, for
example, the use of asyndeton, interwoven with instances of anaphora and diatyposis
(87).
Chapter XXI (Figures of Speech 6: Connecting Particles)
Here, Longinus considers connecting particles (87): just as the binding of the limbs of
runners deprives them of their power of rapid motion, so also passion, when shackled by
connecting links and other appendages, chafes at the restriction, for it loses the freedom of
its advance (87).
Chapter XXII (Figures of Speech 7: Hyperbata)
Here, Longinus considers [h]yperbata, or inversions (88) which are departures in the
order of expressions or ideas from the natural sequence (88) which as such bear . . . the
very stamp and impress of vehement emotion (88): just as those who are really moved
by anger, or fear, or indignation, or jealousy, or any emotion . . . at times turn aside, and
when they have taken one thing as their subject often leap to another, foisting in the
midst some irrelevant matter, and then again wheel round to their original theme, and
driven by their vehemence, as by a veering wind, now this way not that with rapid
changes, transform their expressions, their thoughts, the order suggested by a natural
sequence, into numberless variations of every kind; so also among the best writers it is by
means of hyperbaton that imitation approaches the effect of nature (88).
Here, arguing that in discourse, thought and diction are for the most part developed one
through the other (91), Longinus wants to consider any branches of the subject of
diction which have so far been neglected (91). He argues that the choice of proper and
striking words wonderfully attracts and enthralls the hearer (91): this is the leading
ambition of all orators and writers (91) since it is the direct agency which ensures the
presence in writings . . . of the perfection of grandeur, beauty, mellowness, dignity, force,
power, and any other high qualities there may be, and breathes into dead things a kind of
living voice (91). He argues that beautiful words are in very truth the peculiar light of
thought (91). He cautions, however, that stately language is not to be used everywhere,
since to invest petty affairs with great and high-sounding names (91) would be
inappropriate.
Chapter XXXI (Diction 2: Appropriateness)
Here, Longinus considers examples of appropriate and inappropriate diction.
Chapter XXXII (Diction 3: the Amount of Figurative Language to be Employed)
Here, Longinus turns his attention to the number of metaphors to be employed (91).
He says there are no limits and cites Demosthenes in this respect for whom the proper
time for using metaphors is when the passions roll like a torrent and sweep a multitude of
them down their resistless flood (91). He stresses that figurative language possesses
great natural power (92), that metaphors contribute to the sublime (92), and that it is
impassioned and descriptive passages which rejoice in them to the greatest extent (92).
However, he warns that the use of tropes, like all other beauties of expression, is apt to
lead to excess (92).
Chapter XXXIII (Defining the Sublime 7: Mere Accuracy vs. Divine Sublimity 1)
Longinus considers here whether we ought to give the preference, in poems and prose
writings, to grandeur with some attendant faults, or to success which is moderate but
altogether sound and free from error (92). He believes that lofty genius is far removed
from flawlessness (92): low and average natures remain as a rule free from failing and in
greater safety because they never run a risk or seek to scale the heights (92). Moreover,
the worse side of human character is always the more easily recognised, and that the
memory of errors remains indelible, while that of excellences quickly dies away (92).
Homer and other greats are far from perfect but they are not guilty of wilful errors (92)
but of oversights of a random and casual kind, due to neglect and introduced with all the
heedlessness of genius (92). For this reason, he argues that excellences higher in
quality, even if not sustained throughout, should always on comparison be voted the first
place, because of the sheer elevation of spirit if for no other reason (92).
Chapter XXXIV
(Defining the Sublime 8: Mere Accuracy vs. Divine Sublimity 2:
Hyperides versus Demosthenes)
Here, Longinus compares the respective works of Hyperides and Demosthenes. The
former are the staid utterances of a sober-hearted man (93) that leave the hearer
unmoved, no one feeling terror when he reads Hyperides (93). By contrast, Demosthenes
draws as from a store excellences allied to the highest sublimity and perfected to the
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utmost, the tone of lofty speech, living passions, copiousness, readiness, speed (where it is
legitimate) and that power and vehemence . . . which forbid reproach (93). Equipped
with such heaven-sent and mighty gifts (93)and noble qualities (93), Demosthenes
routs all comers (93) and overpowers with thunder and with lightning the orators of
every age (93): one could sooner face with unflinching eyes a descending thunderbolt
than meet with steady gaze and his bursts of passion in their swift succession (93).
Chapter XXXV
(Defining the Sublime 9: Mere Accuracy vs. Divine Sublimity 3: Lysias vs. Plato)
Here, Longinus compares the respective talents of Plato and Lysias, arguing that such
superhuman writers (93) aimed at everything that was highest in composition (93)
rather than an all-pervading accuracy (93). Longinus argues that such writers are
aware that Nature has appointed men to be no base or ignoble animals (93) but to be
spectators of the mighty whole (93) and, to this end, implants in our souls the
unconquerable love of whatever is elevated and more divine than we (93). This is why
not even the entire universe suffices for the thought and contemplation within reach of
the human mind (93) because our imaginations often pass beyond the bounds of space
(93). If we survey life on every side (93), we note how much more it everywhere
abounds in what is striking, and great, and beautiful (93) and quickly discern the
purpose of our birth (93). This is why, out of a sort of natural impulse, we admire not
the small streams . . . but the Nile, the Danube or the Rhine, and still more the ocean
(93), why we do not regard with greater awe (93) a tiny flame of our own kindling (93)
than the celestial fires (93), even though stars are often shrouded in darkness (93-94),
or the craters of Etna, whose eruptions throw up stones from its depths and great masses
of rock, and at times pour forth rivers of that pure and unmixed subterranean fire (94).
For, in all such matters (94), what is useful or necessary men regard as commonplace,
while they reserve their admiration for that which is astounding (94).
Chapter XXXVI (Defining the Sublime 10: Mere Accuracy vs. Divine Sublimity 4)
Here, Longinus turns his focus back to the manifestations of the sublime in literature
(94) where grandeur is never . . . found apart from utility and advantage (94). He
argues that though writers of this magnitude (94) are far removed from faultlessness
(94), they nonetheless all rise above what is mortal (94): all other qualities prove their
possessors to be men, but sublimity raises them near the majesty of God;. . . while
immunity from errors relieves from censure, it is greatness that excites admiration as well
(94). Longinus stresses that each of these supreme authors often redeems all his
mistakes by a single sublime and happy touch (94). The blunders of Homer,
Demosthenes, Plato and all the rest of the greatest writers . . . would be found to be a
very small part (94), an infinitesimal fraction (94), of the triumphs which those heroes
achieve on every hand (94). This is why the judgment of all posterity (94) has offered
those meeds of victory which up to this day it guards intact and seems likely still to
preserve (94). Where in art the utmost exactitude is admired (94), it is grandeur (94)
which is respected in works of nature (94). Given that it is by nature that man is a
being gifted with speech (94), in discourse we demand . . . that which transcends the
human (94), whereas in statues likeness to man is the quality required (94).
Nevertheless, since freedom from failings is for the most part the successful result of art,
and excellence (though it may be unevenly sustained) the result of sublimity (94), the
employment of art is in every way a fitting aid to nature (94) for the simple reason that
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the lessons of a righteous servitude, being all but enswathed in its customs and
observances (97) and never tasting the fairest and most productive source of eloquence
(97), to wit, freedom (97). We are at best sublime flatters (97). This is why no slave
ever becomes an orator (97): the slave manifests only signs of fettered liberty of speech,
of the dungeon as it were, of a man habituated to buffetings (97). All servitude (98) is
the cage of the soul and a public prison-house (98).
Longinus replies that it is easy, . . . and characteristic of human nature, to find
fault with ones own age (98). He argues that it is less the worlds peace that ruins great
natures (98) than the war illimitable which holds our desires in its grasp (98) and those
passions which occupy as with troops our present age and utterly harry and plunder it
(98) and drown[s] us body and soul in the depths (98). These include the love of
money (98) which makes men petty (98) and the love of pleasure (98) which makes
them most ignoble (98). The former makes us allow into our souls . . . the evils which
are inseparable from it (98): extravagance (98) and its offspring ostentation and
vanity, and luxury (98). These children of wealth (98), if permitted to come to
maturity (98), beget in the soul inexorable masters insolence, and lawlessness, and
shamelessness (98). In this way, the ruin of such lives will gradually reach its complete
consummation and sublimities of soul fade and wither away and become contemptible
(98) when men are lost in admiration of their own mortal parts and omit to exalt that
which is immortal (98). No one who has accepted a bribe for a judicial decision (98) can
perforce be an unbiased and upright judge of what is just and honourable (98). The
same is true of an entire life . . . ordered by bribes, and huntings after the death of
others, and the laying of ambushes for legacies (98), We are the slaves of pleasure (98)
and the gain from any and every source we purchase (98) is at the price of life itself
(98). We are all influenced by the passion for gain (98) for which reason in an age . . .
ravaged by plagues so sore (98), there is unlikely to be left an unbiased and
incorruptible judge of works (98). This is why it is perhaps better for men like ourselves
to be ruled rather than to be free, since our appetites, if let loose without restraint upon
our neighbours like beasts from a cage, would set the world on fire with deeds of evil
(98). In short, that half-heartedness in which the life of all of us with few exceptions is
passed (98) is one of the banes of the natures which our age produces (98): we do not
labour or exert ourselves except for the sake of praise and pleasure (98) rather than
those solid benefits which are a worthy object of our own efforts and the respect of
others (98).
Longinus concludes the treatise by shifting topic from these riddles unresolved (98)
concerning the orators / poets morality (ethos) back to the subject of the passions
[pathos], about which I previously undertook to write in a separate treatise (98) and
which forms a material part of discourse generally and of the sublime itself (98). At this
point the manuscript breaks off. . . .