Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN,
respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the question for the
resolution of the Court is whether or not a
criminal case for bigamy pending before the
Court of First Itance of Manila should be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The
respondent judge ruled in the negative. We
sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records
follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of
Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N.
Cantor filed an information for bigamy against
herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch
XXXII of said court. The information was filed
based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's
arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a
civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978, which action was docketed
as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was
based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which
was petitioner Donato's second one, since she
had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's
answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the
defense that his second marriage was void since
it was solemnized without a marriage license and
that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent
to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or
second marriage, petitioner and private

respondent had lived together and deported

themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five
years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed
by them on September 26, 1978, for which
reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New
Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional
character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of
Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case
contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking
the annulment of his second marriage filed by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question
which must first be determined or decided before
the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D.
Luna denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for
bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the
ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as
scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein
petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his
grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling
laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz
vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than
that cited by respondent judge in his order of
denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order
was likewise denied in an order dated April 14,
1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one
which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal
action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not
obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's

second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B.

Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of
the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.

court therefore, has not abused

much less gravely abused, its
discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the

second marriage should have been declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed against him by
private respondent only sometime later when he
was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine
elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs.
Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said
case states that:

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even

sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.

The mere fact that there are

actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that
"prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions
as to warrant the suspension of the
case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that the
petitioner's consent to such
marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that his
act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime
of bigamy. The situation in the
present case is markedly different.
At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27,
1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. And it
was the second spouse, not the
petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. And it was
only on June 15, 1963, that
petitioner, as defendant in the civil
action, filed a third-party complaint
against the first spouse alleging
that his marriage with her should
be declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the
first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by petitioner,
the fact would not be material to
the outcome of the case. Parties to
the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the

fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a
later case and as such it should be the one
applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The
situation in the case at bar is markedly different.
In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros
dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for
having contracted a second marriage while a
previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz
was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contradistinguished from the present case wherein it
was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit
since she was not aware that petitioner's
marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la
Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the
civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz
was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
In the present case, there is as yet no such
judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs.
Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule
on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in
the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one
and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist
in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of
the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioner's second marriage on September 26,
1978, he had been living with private respondent
Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than
five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was
obtained by private respondent through force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence in
entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the
fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had
lived together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally
ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil
action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's
contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil
Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28,
1979, or more than the lapse of one year from

the solemnization of the second marriage that

petitioner came up with the story that his consent
to the marriage was secured through the use of
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence.
Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter
left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual
circumstances, it can be seen that the
respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order.
There is no pivotal issue that must be preemptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627

before proceedings in the criminal action for

bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question
shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.