ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC.

ET
AL., respondents
No. L-15315.     August 26, 1960

Facts:

On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina Tan, filed
a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground
that he was threatened and intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and Elizabeth
had been living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing their
marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that he was
again threatened by Elizabeth and her relatives to enter into the marriage on August 21,
1957; and that he never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages in the amount of P2,000.

In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of
the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff’s previous
marriage. According to her, it was Merced who insisted on the marriage. As a
counterclaim she asked for P50, 000 for moral damages. She later on filed a
criminal complaint for bigamy against Merced.

Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final
termination of the civil case on the ground that the latter involves facts which if proved
will determine the innocence of the accused. This motion was granted, but upon a
motion for reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and
denied on the ground that in People vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of nullity of a
second and bigamous marriage is not necessary.

Issue:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a

Ruling:

The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before
the criminal case.

The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be determinative of
the case before the court; (2) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.

For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be
declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action
must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person
may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage. One of the elements is consent, without it, a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of
the second marriage is determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.

The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case of People vs.
Mendoza. The same cannot be applied in this case because of different set of facts. In
this case, Mendoza was first married with Josefa, then married Olga, and after the death
of Josefa, married Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage.
The Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with Olga was void,
having been contracted when Josefa was still alive, whereas the marriage with
Carmencita is valid because it was contracted when the first wife was already dead.

For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN THE SAME COURT) Spanish
jurisprudence, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action
must be cognizable by another court. This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish
courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively divided into civil or criminal. In the Philippines,
where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of
prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil
action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when
exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is
considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action
for bigamy.

G.R. No. L-14534             February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and
Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405
pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was
filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and
without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446
against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress,
force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the
same was denied on July 7 of the same year.  1äwphï1.ñët

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend
proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge
denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and
ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question
— we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the
same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in
the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act
was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the
annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy
claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court,
the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There
is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second
marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-37652 December 26, 1984

VIRGINIA B. PRADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. RAFAEL SISON, Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVII, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Whether or not a pending civil suit for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial question in a
Bigamy Case is the issue involved in this Petition for certiorari & Prohibition.

On August 5, 1971, an Information was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXVII, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5877 (the Bigamy Case) charging petitioner Virginia B. Prado
with the crime of Bigamy, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 17th day of October 1969, in Saigon, South Vietnam, at the
Philippine Embassy which is an extension of Philippine Sovereignty and therefore
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having been
previously legally united in wedlock with one Arturo R. Espiritu without said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract, a subsequent and second marriage with one Julio Manalansang.

Contrary to law. 1

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over the marriage solemnized in Saigon, as it
is outside Philippine territory and the case does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
which allow enforcement of criminal laws outside the Philippine Archipelago.2 Opposition based on the principle of extraterritoriality was filed
by the prosecution. Dismissal was denied by the Trial Court, which Order was assailed by petitioner in a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-36344. 3 We resolved to dismiss the same "for being premature, an appeal by way of review on certiorari in
due course being the proper remedy. 4

On July 21, 1973, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action for annulment of
her Saigon marriage (Civil Case No. C-2894) contending that her consent thereto was obtained by
means of force and intimidation, and that she never freely cohabited with her second husband, Julio
Manalansang. The case was subsequently transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, Caloocan City, docketed as Family Case No. 029.

On July 23, 1973, a "Motion to Suspend Trial by Reason of the Existence of Prejudicial Question"
was filed by petitioner in the Bigamy Case. The prosecution opposed the same maintaining that it
was merely a device resorted to by petitioner to delay the disposition of said criminal case.

Respondent Court denied suspension of trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating her
argument that a prejudicial question exists, which must first be resolved as the same would be
determinative of her guilt or innocence. Reconsideration was denied on September 19, 1973, the
Trial Court ruling that the Motion to Suspend was only a scheme to unduly delay the hearing of the
case. Thus, this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of said Order.

On November 16, 1973, respondent Court, motu proprio, suspended the proceedings in the Bigamy
Case upon being informed of the pendency of the present Petition before this Court.  5

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.  6

The foregoing requisites being present in the case at bar, the suspensive effect of a prejudicial
question comes into play. The Solicitor General's opposition to the suspension of trial in the Bigamy
Case on the allegations that the civil action for annulment was belatedly filed after petitioner had
faced trial in the Bigamy Case and only to stave off prosecution; that the grounds for annulment of
her second marriage are bereft of factual basis and truth in that petitioner would not have waited for
two (2) years from the filing of the bigamy charge, or for almost four (4) years from the celebration of
the second marriage, before filing the annulment case, if she had valid grounds to annul the same;
that she had freely cohabited with Julio Manalansang for about six (6) months after their marriage;
and that even her mother was present during the marriage ceremony, are all defenses which may be
raised in the Annulment Case, and which must still be proved. Should petitioner be able to establish
that her consent to the second marriage was, indeed, obtained by means of force and intimidation,
her act of entering into marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary, and there can be no
conviction for the crime of Bigamy.

And while it may be, as contended by the Solicitor General, that the mere filing of an Annulment
Case does not automatically give rise to a prejudicial question as to bar trial of a Bigamy Case,
considering the gravity of the charge, petitioner cannot be deprived of her right to prove her grounds
for annulment, which could wen be determinative of her guilt or innocence. The State is not thereby
deprived from proceeding with the criminal case in the event that the Court decrees against
petitioner in the Annulment Case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of September 19, 1973 is hereby set aside. As the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 5877 had already been suspended, the same shall be resumed by the proper
Regional Trial Court upon the final determination of Family Case No. 029 of the former Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City, if the same has not yet been terminated, and if the
Decision in the latter case should so warrant.

SO ORDERED.