COCOFEDvs.

Republic,
GRNos.17785758,January24,2012

FACTS:
In1971, RepublicAct No.6260was enacted creating the CoconutInvestmentFund(CIF). Thesourceofthe CIFwasaP0.55 levy
onthe saleofevery100kg.ofcopra. ThePhilippineCoconutAdministrationwastaskedto collectand administerthe Fund.Outof
the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized nationalassociationofcoconut producers
declared by the PCA. Coco Fund Receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.During the MartialLaw regime,then
PresidentFerdinandMarcosissuedseveralPresidentialDecreespurportedlyfortheimprovement ofthecoconut industry.Themost
relevantamong these isP.D.No. 755 which permittedtheuseoftheFundfortheacquisitionofacommercial bank forthebenefit
ofcoconutfarmersandthedistributionofthesharesofthestockofthebankit[PCA]acquiredfreetothecoconutfarmers(Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United CoconutPlantersBank (UCPB).The PCAboughtthe
72.2%ofPUBsoutstandingcapitalstockor137,866sharesatP200pershare(P27,573,200.00)fromPedroCojuangco
inbehalfofthecoconutfarmers.
The restoftheFundwasdepositedtotheUCPB interest free.Farmers whohadpaidtheCIFandregisteredtheirreceiptswithPCA
weregiven their correspondingUCPB stock certificates.Only16millionworthofCOCAFUNDreceiptswereregisteredandalarge
numberofthecoconutfarmersoptedtosellall/partoftheirUCPBsharestoprivateindividuals.Simply put,partsofthecoconutlevy
fundswent directlyorindirectlytovariousprojectsand/or was convertedinto differentassetsorinvestmentsthroughtheyears.After
the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order1whichcreated the PresidentialCommissionon Good
Government (PCGG).ThePCGGaimedtoassistthePresidentintherecoveryof illgottenwealthaccumulatedbytheMarcosesand
theircronies.PCGG was empoweredtofile casefor sequestration inthe Sandiganbayan. Amongthesequesteredpropertieswere
the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The
Sandiganbayanallowedthesequestrationbyruling in a PartialSummary JudgmentthattheCoconut LevyFunds areprima facie
publicfundsandthatSection1and2ofPDNo.755(andsomeotherPDs)wereunconstitutional.
The COCOFED representingtheoveramillioncoconut farmersviaPetitionforreviewunderRule45soughtthe reversalofthe
rulingcontendingamongothersthatthesequestrationamountedtotakingofprivatepropertywithoutjustcompensationand
impairmentofvestedrightofownership.

ISSUE:WhatistheNATUREoftheCoconutLevyFund?

RULING:
The SCruledinfavorofthe REPUBLIC.Tobeginwith,theCoconutLevywasimposedinthe exerciseoftheStates inherentpower
of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory
enactments by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.The Funds were collected to advancethe government's
avowedpolicyofprotecting the coconutindustry.TheSCtookjudicialnoticeofthefactthatthecoconutindustryisoneofthe great
economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the countries export
products.Taxationis donenotmerelytoraiserevenuesto supportthegovernment,butalso toprovidemeansforthe rehabilitation
andthestabilizationofathreatenedindustry,whichissoaffectedwithpublicinterest.

ATTY.ROMULOB.MACALINTALV.PRESIDENTIALELECTORALTRIBUNAL
G.R.No.191618,November23,2010

FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionalityofthePresidential ElectoralTribunal (PET) onthegrounds that it
violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner chafes the creation of the separate tribunal which was
complementedbyabudgetallocation,aseal,asetofpersonnelandconfidentialemployees,toeffecttheconstitutionalmandate.

ISSUE:Whetherthepetitionerhaslocusstanditofiletheinstantpetition.

HELD: NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as he was unmistakably estopped in
assailing thejurisdiction of thePETbeforewhich tribunalhehadubiquitouslyappearedandhadacknowledgeitsjurisdictionin2004
therefore making the petitioners standing still imperiled by thee white elephant in the petition. Judicialinquiry requiresthat the
constitutionalquestion be raised attheearliest possible opportunitytochallengethe constitutionality of theTribunalsconstitution.
The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme Courts independence as citedin Section4,Article VII. The
judicialpowerexpanded,butitremainedabsolute.

Macalintalv.PresidentialElectoralTribunal
G.R.No.191618June7,2011

FACTS:
Before us is aMotionforReconsiderationfiledby petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal of ourDecision In G.R.No.191618 dated
November23,2010, dismissing hispetition anddeclaring theestablishmentofrespondentPresidentialElectoralTribunal(PET) as
constitutional.

PetitionerreiterateshisargumentsontheallegedunconstitutionalcreationofthePET:

1.Hehasstandingtofilethepetitionasataxpayerandaconcernedcitizen.
2.He isnotestoppedfromassailing the constitution ofthePETsimplybyvirtue ofhisappearanceas counselofformerpresident
GloriaMacapagalArroyobeforerespondenttribunal.
3.Section4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiondoesnotprovideforthecreationofthePET.
4.ThePETviolatesSection12,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution.

To bolster hisarguments thatthePETis anillegal andunauthorizedprogenyofSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,petitioner

invokesour ruling ontheconstitutionalityofthePhilippineTruthCommission (PTC).Petitionercitesthe concurringopinionof Justice
Teresita J.LeonardodeCastro that thePTC isapublicoffice whichcannotbe createdbythePresident,thepowertodosobeing
lodgedexclusively withCongress.Thus,petitioner submitsthatifthePresident,asheadoftheExecutiveDepartment, cannot create
thePTC,theSupremeCourt,likewise,cannotcreatethePETintheabsenceofanactoflegislature.
Ontheotherhand,initsCommenttotheMotionforReconsideration,theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralmaintainsthat:

1.Petitioneriswithoutstandingtofilethepetition.
2.PetitionerisestoppedfromassailingthejurisdictionofthePET.
3.TheconstitutionofthePET is"onfirm footing on thebasisofthegrantofauthoritytothe [Supreme]Courttobe thesolejudgeof
allelectioncontestsforthePresidentorVicePresidentunderparagraph7,Section4,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution."

ISSUE:WhetherthecreationofthePETisunconstitutional

HELD:No

POLITICALLAW:PresidentialElectoralTribunal

We reiterate that the abstractionofthe SupremeCourtactingas a PresidentialElectoral TribunalFromtheunequivocal grantof

jurisdictioninthelastparagraphofSection4,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionissoundandtenable.

Petitionerisgoingtotownunder themisplacedassumptionthat the text of theprovisionitselfwasthe onlybasisfor thisCourtto

sustainthePETsconstitutionality.

Wereiteratethatthe PET isauthorizedbythelast paragraphofSection 4, ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionandassupportedbythe

discussionsoftheMembersoftheConstitutionalCommission,whichdraftedthepresentConstitution.

The explicitreferencebytheframersofour Constitutionto constitutionalizingwhatwasmerelystatutorybeforeisnotdilutedbythe

absenceofaphrase,lineorword,mandatingtheSupremeCourttocreateaPresidentialElectoralTribunal.

Suffice ittostatethat theConstitution,verbose asitalreadyis,cannotcontainthespecific wordingrequiredbypetitionerinorderfor

himtoaccepttheconstitutionalityofthePET.

Judicial power grantedto the Supreme CourtbythesameConstitutionisplenary.And underthedoctrine of necessaryimplication,

the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of theConstitution to decidepresidential and
vicepresidentialelectionscontestsincludesthemeansnecessarytocarryitintoeffect.

PETITIONDENIED.

AngaravsElectoralCommission
Postedbykayeleeon3:28PM
G.R.No.L45081July151936

FACTS:
Jose AngaraandPedroYnsua,MiguelCastillo andDionisioMayorwerecandidates voted fortheposition of member ofthe
NationalAssemblyforthe1stdistrictofTayabasprovince.
OnOct17 1935, theprovincialboardofcanvassersproclaimedAngara asmemberelectoftheNationalAssemblyforgarnering the
most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, National Assemblypassed Res. No8which
declaredwithfinalitythevictory of Angara.OnDec8,Ynsuafiled beforetheElectoralCommissionamotionof protestagainst the
electionof Angara,thathe bedeclaredelected memberof theNat'lAssembly. ElectoralCommission passedaresolutioninDec9th
asthelast dayforthefilingoftheprotests againsttheelection,returns andqualificationsofthemembersoftheNationalAssembly.
OnDec20,AngarafiledbeforetheElec. Commissionamotiontodismiss theprotestthatthe protestinquestionwas filedoutofthe
prescribedperiod.TheElec.CommissiondeniedAngara'spetition.
Angara prayedfor theissuanceofwritof prohibitionto restrainandprohibittheElectoralCommissiontakingfurthercognizanceof
Ynsua's protest.Hecontended that theConstitution confers exclusivejurisdiction uponthesaid ElectoralCommissionsasregards
themeritsofcontestedelectionstotheNationalAssemblyandtheSupremeCourtthereforehasnojurisdictiontohearthecase.

ISSUE:
WhetherornottheSChasjurisdictionovertheElectoralCommissionandthesubjectmatterofthecontroversy
WhetherornotTheElectoralCommissionhasactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction.


RULING:
In thiscase, thenature ofthepresent controversyshowsthenecessityofafinal constitutionalarbitertodeterminethe
conflictofauthoritybetweentwoagenciescreatedbytheConstitution.The courthas jurisdictionover theElectoralCommissionand
the subject matterof the presentcontroversyfor the purposeofdetermining thecharacter, scopeandextentofthe constitutional
granttotheElectoralCommissionas"thesolejudge ofallcontestsrelatingto theelection,returnsandqualifications of themembers
oftheNationalAssembly."(Sec 4 Art.VI1935Constitution).It isheld,therefore,thatthe ElectoralCommissionwas actingwithinthe
legitimateexerciseofitsconstitutionalprerogativeinassumingtotakecognizanceoftheelectionprotestfiledbyYnsua.

BUREAUOFCUSTOMSEMPLOYEESASSOCIATION(BOCEA),vs.HON.MARGARITOB.TEVES

FACTS:
OnJanuary25,2005,formerPresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyosignedintolawR.A.No.9335.
RA [No.] 9335wasenactedtooptimize therevenuegenerationcapabilityandcollection oftheBureau ofInternalRevenue (BIR)
andtheBureauofCustoms(BOC).

The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets byprovidingasystemof
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)and a RevenuePerformanceEvaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least sixmonthsofservice,regardless of
employmentstatus.

TheFund issourcedfrom thecollectionofthe BIRandtheBOCinexcessoftheirrevenue targetsfor theyear,asdetermined bythe

DevelopmentBudget and CoordinatingCommittee (DBCC). Anyincentiveorrewardistakenfromthefund andallocatedtotheBIR
andtheBOCinproportiontotheircontributionintheexcesscollectionofthetargetedamountoftaxrevenue.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are taintedwithconstitutional infirmities in violationof the
fundamental rights of its members, petitioners, directly filed the present petition against respondentsMargaritoB.Teves,inhis
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance(DOF), CommissionerNapoleon L.Morales(CommissionerMorales),in his
capacityasBOCCommissioner,andLilianB.Hefti,inhercapacityasCommissioneroftheBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR).
In2008, highrankingofficialsof the BOC pursuanttothemandateofR.A.No. 9335andits IRR,and inorderto complywiththe
stringentdeadlines thereof, startedtodisseminateCollectionDistrict Performance Contracts(PerformanceContracts) forthelower
rankingofficialsandrankandfileemployeestosign.

BOCEA opined thattherevenuetarget was impossibletomeet duetotheGovernmentsownpoliciesonreducedtariff ratesandtax

breakstobigbusinesses,theoccurrenceofnaturalcalamitiesandbecauseofothereconomicfactors.
BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced andforcedtosign thePerformanceContract. Theyalso allegedthey
werethreatenedthatifthey donotsign theirrespectivePerformanceContracts,they wouldfacepossible reassignment, reshuffling,
orworse,beplacedonfloatingstatus.

Thispetition was fileddirectlywiththisCourt onMarch3,2008. BOCEA asserted thatin viewofthe unconstitutionalityofR.A.No.

9335and itsIRR, andtheiradverseeffectsontheconstitutionalrightsofBOCofficialsandemployees,directresorttothisCourtis
justified.TheIssues

ISSUE/S:(1)Whether there is unduedelegationoflegislativepowertothe Board(2)WhetherR.A.No. 9335anditsIRRviolatethe

rightsofBOCEAsmembers to:(a)equal protectionoflaws,(b) securityoftenureand(c) dueprocess and(3)WhetherR.A.No.
9335isabillofattainder.

HELD:
1.No. In theface oftheincreasing complexityofmodernlife, delegationof legislativepowertovarious specializedadministrative
agencies is allowed asan exceptiontothisprinciple. Giventhevolumeandvarietyofinteractionsintodayssociety,itisdoubtfulif
thelegislature can promulgatelawsthatwilldealadequatelywithandrespondpromptlytotheminutiaeofeverydaylife.Hence, the
needto delegate to administrativebodies theprincipal agenciestaskedto executelawsin theirspecializedfields theauthority
topromulgaterules andregulationstoimplementagiven statute andeffectuateitspolicies.Allthatisrequiredforthevalidexercise
of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law andthatthe
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are
denominatedasthecompletenesstestandthesufficientstandardtest.32
Twotests determinethevalidity of delegation of legislativepower:(1)thecompletenesstestand(2)the sufficient standardtest.A
law is complete when it sets forth therein thepolicytobeexecuted,carriedout orimplementedby thedelegate.Itlaysdown a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates
authority,announce the legislativepolicy andidentifytheconditionsunderwhichit istobeimplemented.Atanyrate, thisCourthas
recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and
collection of theBIRand the BOC isinfused with public interest.33The Court findsthatR.A. No.9335,readandappreciated inits
entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEAs
suppositionofunduedelegationoflegislativepowertotheBoard.
2. No. a. On Equal Protection The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the

optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the
revenuegeneration capability and collection oftheBIR and theBOC,theincentives and/or sanctions provided inthe law should
logicallypertaintothesaidagencies.Moreover,thelawconcernsonlytheBIRandtheBOCbecausethey havethe commondistinct
primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
BoththeBIR andtheBOCare bureausunder theDOF. They principallyperformthespecialfunctionof being theinstrumentalities
throughwhich theStateexercisesoneofitsgreatinherentfunctions taxation.Indubitably,suchsubstantialdistinctionisgermane
andintimatelyrelated tothepurpose ofthelaw.Hence,theclassificationandtreatmentaccordedtothe BIRandtheBOCunderRA
[No.]9335fullysatisfythedemandsofequalprotection.37

b.SecurityofTenure
RA[No.]9335innowayviolatesthesecurityof tenureofofficialsandemployees oftheBIRandthe BOC.Theguaranteeofsecurity
oftenureonly means that anemployee cannot bedismissedfromtheservice forcausesotherthanthoseprovidedbylawandonly
afterdueprocessisaccordedtheemployee.Inthe caseofRA[No.]9335,itlaysdownareasonableyardstickforremoval(whenthe
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affectingthe level of
collection. This standardisanalogoustoinefficiencyandincompetence intheperformance ofofficial duties,agroundfor disciplinary
action undercivil servicelaws.Theactionforremoval isalsosubject to civilservicelaws,rulesandregulationsandcompliancewith
substantiveandproceduraldueprocess.38

c.DueProcess
BOCEAsapprehension of deprivation of dueprocess findsitsanswerin Section7(b)and (c)ofR.A.No.9335.40Theconcerned
BIRorBOC official oremployeeisnotsimplygiven a target revenuecollection and capriciouslyleftwithoutanyquarter.R.A. No.
9335and itsIRR clearly givedue considerationtoall relevant factors thatmay affect thelevelofcollection. In thesamemanner,
exemptions were set,contraveningBOCEAsclaim that itsmembers may be removedfor unattainedtarget collectionevendueto
causeswhichare beyond theircontrol.Moreover,anemployeesright to beheard isnotatall preventedandhisrighttoappealis
notdeprivedof him.43 In fine, a BIRorBOCofficialor employeeinthis casecannotbearbitrarilyremovedfrom theservicewithout
accordinghimhisconstitutionalrighttodueprocess.

3. No. R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflictspunishment onindividualsor
members of a particular group without ajudicial trial.Essentialtoabillof attainderare a specificationofcertainindividualsora
groupofindividuals,theimpositionofapunishment,penalorotherwise,andthelackofjudicialtrial.451phi1

R.A.No. 9335doesnotpossesstheelementsofabillofattainder.Itdoesnotseek toinflictpunishmentwithout a judicialtrial.R.A.

No. 9335 merelylaysdownthe groundsfortheterminationofaBIR orBOCofficialoremployeeandprovidesfortheconsequences
thereof.Thedemocraticprocessesarestillfollowedandtheconstitutionalrightsoftheconcernedemployeeareamplyprotected.

CesarBengzonvsFranklinDrilon
208SCRA133PoliticalLawVetoPowerofthePresident

FACTS: In 1990, Congresssoughttoreenact some oldlaws(i.e.Republic ActNo.1797) that were repealedduring the time of
formerPresidentFerdinandMarcos.These old lawsprovidedcertainretirement benefitstoretiredjudges,justices,andmembersof
the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
governmentofficials.However,PresidentCorazonAquinovetoedthebill(House Bill No.16297)onthegroundthatthelawshould
notgivepreferentialtreatmenttocertainorselectgovernmentofficials.

Meanwhile,agroupofretiredjudges andjustices filedapetitionwiththeSupremeCourtasking thecourttoreadjusttheir pensions.

They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed(by P.D. No.644)because the saidPDwas one of those unpublishedPDs
whichwere subjectofthecaseofTaadav. Tuvera.Hence, therepealinglawneverexisted duetononpublicationandineffect,RA
1797wasneverrepealed.TheSupremeCourtthenreadjustedtheirpensions.

Congress tooknoticeofthereadjustment andson inthe General AppropriationsBill (GAB)for 1992,Congressallottedadditional

budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: General Fund Adjustment included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the
governmentamongsuchobligationsistheallotmentforthepensionsofretiredjusticesofthejudiciary.

However,PresidentAquinoagainvetoedthesaid lines whichprovidedforthepensions oftheretiredjusticesinthejudiciaryin the

GAB.SheexplainedthatthatportionoftheGABisalreadydeemedvetoedwhenshevetoedH.B.16297.

ThispromptedCesar Bengzon andseveralotherretiredjudges andjusticestoquestiontheconstitutionalityofthe veto madeby the

President.ThePresidentwasrepresentedbythenExecutiveSecretaryFranklinDrilon.

ISSUE:
WhetherornotthevetoofthePresidentonthatportionoftheGeneralAppropriationsbillisconstitutional.

HELD:
No.The JusticesoftheCourthavevestedrights totheaccruedpensionthatisdue totheminaccordancetoRepublicAct
1797whichwasnever repealed.The presidenthas nopowertoset asideand overridethedecisionoftheSupremeCourtneither

doesthepresidenthavethepowerto enact oramendstatutespromulgatedby herpredecessorsmuchlesstothe repealofexisting

laws.

The Supreme Court alsoexplainedthat theveto isunconstitutionalsincethepowerofthepresident todisapprove anyitemoritems

in the appropriations bill doesnot granttheauthority to veto partofanitemand to approvetheremaining portionofsaid item.It
appears thatin the same item, the Presidentsvetoedsomeportion ofit and retainedthe others.Thiscannotbedone.Theruleis:
theExecutivemustvetoabillin itsentiretyor notatalltheExecutivemustvetoanentire lineitemin itsentiretyornot atall.Inthis
case, thepresidentdidnotvetotheentirelineitemofthegeneraladjustmentfund. She merelyvetoedtheportionwhichpertained to
thepensionsofthejusticesbutdidnotvetotheotheritemscoveringobligationstotheotherdepartmentsofthegovernment.