MOC Guidance
MOC Guidance
MOC Guidance
By Carl Harrison
Managing Change in
Manufacturing &
Production Facilities
Why Do We Need a
Management of Change Process?
The incidents that occurred in 1974 at the Nypro
UK plant in Flixborough and in 1984 at the Union
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, are examples of change
gone terribly wrong.
At Flixborough, a 20-in. pipe was installed, bypassing a damaged reactor to allow the plant to operate
while the reactor was repaired. Three months later,
the temporary pipe failed releasing 30 tons of flammable cyclohexane. The ensuing vapor cloud explosion
killed 28 workers, injured 89 workers and members of
the public and destroyed the plant. The piping design
and supports had not been reviewed by an engineer
or technical authority prior to makFigure 1
ing the change, and risks associated
with hydraulic surge in the piping durOSHA Management of Change Regulation
ing process upsets had not been fully
addressed.
1910.119(1) Management of change. 1) The employer shall
In the Bhopal incident, a runaway
establish and implement written procedures to manage
reaction resulted in the release of
changes except for replacements in kind) to process
methylisocyanate (MIC). The MIC
chemicals, technology, equipment and procedures; and,
cloud left the plant and drifted over the
changes to facilities that affect a covered process. 2) The
neighboring town killing thousands and
procedures shall assure that the following considerations are
injuring tens of thousands. The effects
addressed prior to any change:
of the MIC release are still felt in
Bhopal today. A contributing factor in
(i) the technical basis for the proposed change;
the incident was the temporary bypass
(ii) impact of change on safety and health;
of some plant safety systems. Risks
(iii) modifications to operating procedures;
associated with safety system bypass
at the same time as a runaway reaction
(iv) necessary time period for the change; and
were not considered and properly
(v) authorization requirements for the proposed change.
managed.
As illustrated here, improperly man3) Employees involved in operating a process and maintenance
aged risks can have serious and someand contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a
times fatal consequences. Because of
change in the process shall be informed of, and trained in, the
these incidents, other accidents in the
change prior to startup of the process or affected part of the
U.S. and inconsistent change manageprocess. 4) If a change covered by this paragraph results in a
ment practices in the chemical and
change in the operating procedures or practices required by
refining industries, OSHA enacted the
paragraph (d) of this section, such information shall be
process safety management (PSM) regupdated accordingly. 5) If a change covered by this paragraph
ulation in the early 1990s. Two of the
results in a change in the operating procedures or practices
main components of the PSM regulation
required by paragraph (f) of this section, such procedures or
are management of change (MOC) and
practices shall be updated accordingly.
prestartup safety review (PSSR).
hange is all around us. As soon as a plant or
processing facility is commissioned, employees and engineers begin to think of ways to
make it better. Vendors develop new and
improved products. Equipment needs to be
bypassed or temporary repairs need to be made to
reach the next turnaround. Leak-repair clamps are
installed to stop environmental releases.
Changes like these will require updating procedures, modifying the existing equipment or adding new
equipment. A robust management of change process
can help prevent these improvements from creating
problems ranging from off-spec product to catastrophic
events.
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Figure 2
OSHA Prestartup Safety Review Regulation
1910.119(i) Prestartup review. 1) The employer shall perform a prestartup
safety review for new facilities and for modified facilities when the
modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety
information. 2) The prestartup safety review shall confirm that prior to the
introduction of highly hazardous chemicals to a process:
(i) Construction and equipment is in accordance with design
specifications.
(ii) Safety, operating, maintenance and emergency procedures are in
place and are adequate.
(iii) For new facilities, a process hazard analysis has been performed and
recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup;
and modified facilities meet the requirements contained in
management of change, paragraph (1).
(iv) Training of each employee involved in operating a process has
been completed.
MOC Process
The MOC process must address changes
that range from minor changes to major capital projects as well as handling temporary and permanent
changes. This can be accomplished in many ways. Some
companies have developed one-size-fits-all MOC processes that are used for every change. Other companies
find it easier to have multiple MOC systems. The multiple systems can be split based on the type of change
(equipment vs. procedural), the duration (temporary vs.
permanent) or the size of the change (minor vs. major).
The decision to use an electronic MOC process or a
paper process should also be considered. The important
thing to remember is that the MOC process or processes
should be flexible, easy to use and fit your plant culture.
A basic MOC process contains the following steps:
initiation;
preliminary review;
risk assessment/technical review;
approval to design/construct;
design/construct/precommissioning;
PSSR;
approval to start up;
follow-up activities.
In the initiation step, any employee should be able
to propose a change to a procedure, equipment or technology of the PSM-covered process. The MOC forms
should allow the initiator to document the what, why
and when of the proposed change. The initiator then
forwards the information to a member of the facility
management team for review and approval.
The preliminary review consists of a go/no go
decision based on the information supplied by the
initiator. This may include discussions between the ini-
tiator and the reviewer to clarify the details of the proposed change and alignment with the facilitys needs.
If the decision is made to proceed with the change, the
preliminary reviewer should, as much as s/he is able,
document the technical basis for the change, impact
on safety and health and the timeframe to accomplish
the change. If the change is temporary, the preliminary
reviewer should also ensure that the date that the temporary change will be reverted to normal is included in
the MOC documentation.
The risk assessment/technical review step is one of
the most important activities within the MOC process.
It is critical to involve the facility engineer, technical
authority or someone with a deep understanding of the
PSM-covered process in this step. The risk assessment
should match the complexity of the change. For minor
changes, it may be okay to ask the question What
if? More complex changes require tools like process
hazard analysis or failure mode-effect analysis. Some
companies find it useful to include a risk assessment
checklist in their MOC process. The checklist includes
questions like Does this change involve a shutdown
or safety system? and Does this change increase
or decrease the pressure, temperature or flow rates
within the process? The completed checklist can be
the risk assessment or it can point the user toward a
more sophisticated risk assessment tool or additional
review by safety, environmental or technical experts.
Regardless of the risk assessment method, it is important to document what could reasonably go wrong and
the steps required to prevent it within the MOC prior to
obtaining approval to design/construct.
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Figure 3
Sample MOC Review Checklist
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Interested in Presenting
at Safety 2013?
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