Atp 3-60
Atp 3-60
Atp 3-60
TARGETING
MAY 2015
Targeting
Contents
Page
PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. viii
Scope................................................................................................................... viii
Summary of New Material and Changes From FM 3-60 ..................................... viii
Chapter 1 TARGETING GUIDELINES AND PHILOSOPHY .............................................. 1-1
SECTION I GUIDELINES OF TARGETING ................................................... 1-1
Doctrinal Basis .................................................................................................... 1-1
Targeting............................................................................................................. 1-2
Targeting Guidance ............................................................................................ 1-2
Targeting Categories .......................................................................................... 1-4
SECTION II- METHODOLOGY OF TARGETING ............................................. 1-6
Targeting Methodology ....................................................................................... 1-6
Targeting and the Military DecIsionMaking Process .......................................... 1-6
Targeting Personnel Responsibility .................................................................. 1-10
Chapter 2 TARGETING METHODOLOGY ......................................................................... 2-1
SECTION I- GENERAL TARGETING METHODOLOGY .................................. 2-1
General Targeting Methodology ......................................................................... 2-1
SECTION II- DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, ASSESS (D3A) ........................... 2-1
Decide................................................................................................................. 2-2
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ........................................................... 2-2
Target Value Analysis and Wargaming .............................................................. 2-3
Target Selection ................................................................................................. 2-4
High-Payoff Target List ....................................................................................... 2-4
Detect ................................................................................................................. 2-7
Deliver............................................................................................................... 2-10
Assess .............................................................................................................. 2-13
Chapter 3 CORPS AND DIVISION TARGETING ............................................................... 3-1
iii
Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. Targeting categories ............................................................................................ 1-5
Figure 1-2. Targeting methodology ........................................................................................ 1-6
Figure 1-3. D3A methodology and the MDMP ....................................................................... 1-7
Figure 2-1, D3A methodology cycle ....................................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. Target validation considerations ........................................................................ 2-10
Figure 2-3. Assessment levels and measures ..................................................................... 2-14
Tables
Table 1-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, and MDMP .......................... 1-9
Table 4-1. Targeting working group agenda (example) ....................................................... 4-15
Table C-1. Carver Matrix Tool ............................................................................................... C-2
Table D-1. High-payoff target list (example) .......................................................................... D-2
Table D-2. Target selection standards matrix (example) ...................................................... D-3
Table D-3. Attack guidance matrix (example) ....................................................................... D-4
Table D-4. Target synchronization matrix (example) ............................................................ D-5
Table D-5. Lethal and nonlethal target synchronization matrix (example) ........................... D-6
Table D-6. Alternative lethal and nonlethal target synchronization matrix (example) .......... D-7
Table D-7. Delivery standards matrix (example) .................................................................. D-8
Table D-8. Target report (example) ...................................................................................... D-9
Table F-1. Division targeting working group (example) .......................................................... F-2
Table F-2. Targeting working group agenda (example) ......................................................... F-3
Table H-4. Additional assignment of blocks of numbers (example) ...................................... H-2
Table H-1. Assignment of first letter (example) ..................................................................... H-1
Table H-2. Assignment of letters (example) .......................................................................... H-2
Table H-3. Assignment of blocks of numbers (example) ...................................................... H-2
DOCTRINAL BASIS
1-1. Targeting is a critical component of the fires warfighting function. The fires warfighting function is
the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and
missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process (ADRP 3-0). It includes tasks associated with
integrating and synchronizing the effects of the types of fires with the effects of other warfighting
functions. Commanders integrate these tasks into the concept of operations during planning and adjust them
based on the targeting guidance. Fires normally contribute to the overall effect of maneuver, but
commanders may use them separately for decisive and shaping operations. The fires warfighting function
includes the following tasks:
Deliver fires.
Integrate all forms Army, joint, and multinational fires.
Conduct targeting.
1-2. These tasks are integrated into military operations during planning and adjusted based on the
targeting guidance.
TARGETING
1-3. The enemy presents a large number of targets that must be engaged with available intelligence,
acquisition, and attack assets. The targeting process weighs the benefits and the cost of engaging various
targets in order to determine which targets, if engaged, are most likely to contribute to achieving the desired
end state. Adhering to the five targeting guidelines should increase the probability of creating desired
effects while diminishing undesired or adverse collateral effects. These guidelines are:
Targeting focuses on achieving the commanders objectives. It is the function of targeting to
achieve efficiently those objectives within the parameters set at the operational level, directed
limitations, the rules of engagement, or rules for the use of force, the law of war, and other
guidance given by the commander. Every target nominated must contribute to attaining the
commanders objectives.
Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. Target
analysis encompasses all possible means to create desired effects, drawing from all available
capabilities. The art of targeting seeks to create desired effects with the least risk and
expenditure of time and resources.
Targeting directs lethal and nonlethal actions to create desired effects.
Targeting is a fundamental task of the fires warfighting function that encompasses many
disciplines and requires participation from many staff elements and components.
Targeting creates effects systematically. A targeting methodology is a rational and iterative
process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets systematically
to create those effects that will contribute to achieving the commanders objectives. If the
desired effects are not created, targets may be considered again in the process or operations may
have to be modified.
TARGETING GUIDANCE
1-4. The commanders targeting guidance must be articulated clearly and simply to enhance
understanding. The guidance must be easily understood by all warfighting functions. Targeting guidance
must focus on essential threat capabilities and functions that could interfere with the achievement of
friendly objectives.
1-5. The commanders targeting guidance describes the desired effects to be generated by fires, physical
attack, cyber electromagnetic activities, and other information related capabilities against threat operations.
An effect is 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or
another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or
degree of freedom (JP 3-0). Targeting enables the commander through various lethal and nonlethal
capabilities the ability to produce the desired effects. Capabilities associated with one desired effect may
also contribute to other desired effects. For example, delay can result from disrupting, diverting, or
destroying enemy capabilities or targets.
1-6. Terms that are used to describe the desired effects include:
Deceive. Military leaders attempt to mislead threat decision makers by manipulating their
understanding of reality.
Defeat. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or
permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is
unwilling or unable to pursue that individuals adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the
friendly commanders will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of
friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 3-90-1).
Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders, abandonment of
positions, equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations. A commander can create different
effects against an enemy to defeat that force. For example a commanders employment of field
artillery fires to attack an enemy force may result in the enemy no longer having sufficient
personnel, weapons systems, equipment, or supplies to carry out its mission. Likewise the
delivery of massed, synchronized and intense fires can cause enemy personnel to lose the will to
continue to fight.
Degrade. To degrade is to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of a threat.
Delay. To delay is to slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter
the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities. (FM 3-09)
When enemy forces are delayed, friendly forces gain time. For delay to have a major impact the
enemy must face urgent movement requirements or the delay must enhance the effect(s) of
friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment a more
concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results.
Deny. An example of deny is to destroy the threats communications equipment as a means of
denying his use of the electromagnetic spectrum; however, the duration of denial will depend on
the enemys ability to reconstitute. Denial operations are actions to hinder or deny the enemy
the use of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (FM 3-90-1).
Destroy. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-
ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so
badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being
entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1).
Destruction. Destruction is 1. In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires,
destruction renders a target out of action permanently, or ineffective for a long period of time,
producing 30-percent casualties or materiel damage. 2. A type of adjustment for destroying a
given target (FM 3-09).
Disrupt. Disrupt is 1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and
indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemys formation or tempo, interrupt the
enemys timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal
fashion (FM 3-90-1). 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause
the enemy force to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit breaching
assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort (FM 3-90-1).
Divert. To divert is to turn aside or from a path or course of action. A diversion is the act of
drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack,
alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). Diversion causes enemy forces to consume
resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly
operations. Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations
and prevent enemy forces and their support resources from being employed for their intended
purpose. Diversions can also cause more circuitous routing along lines of communication,
resulting in delays for enemy forces. An option for field artillery employment in support of a
commanders diversion is to use high explosive fires to encourage an enemy to adopt a different
route.
Exploitation. Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows a successful attack and is
designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (ADRP 3-90).
Interdict. Interdict is a tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts, or delays
the enemys use of an area or route (FM 3-90-1).
Neutralize. Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or
materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1).
Neutralization. Neutralization in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires,
neutralization renders a target ineffective for a short period of time, producing 10-percent casualties or
materiel damage (FM 3-09).
Suppress. Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the
performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission
(FM 3-90-1). Also see suppressive fire and suppression. (FM 3-09)
1-7. The commander can also direct a variety of nonlethal actions or effects separately or in conjunction
with lethal actions or effects.
1-8. The commander can also provide restrictions as part of his targeting guidance. Targeting restrictions
fall into two categoriesthe no-strike list and the restricted target list.
1-9. The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by:
Law of war.
International laws.
Rules of engagement.
Other considerations.
1-10. A restricted target list is a valid target with specific restrictions such as:
Limit collateral damage.
Preserve select ammo for final protective fires.
Do not strike during daytime.
Strike only with a certain weapon.
Proximity to protected facilities and locations.
Note. See FM 1-04, FM 3-57, JP 1-04, JP 3-57, JP 2-0 and JP 3-60 for additional information on
legal considerations and targeting restrictions.
TARGETING CATEGORIES
1-11. There are two targeting categoriesdeliberate targeting and dynamic targeting.
DELIBERATE TARGETING
1-12. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the area of
operations and have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the
applicable plan or order, targets detected in sufficient time to be placed in the joint air tasking cycle,
mission type orders, or fire support plans.
1-13. There are two types of planned targets: scheduled and on-call:
Scheduled targets exist in the area of operations and are located in sufficient time so that fires or
other actions upon them are identified for engagement at a specific, planned time.
On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander
expects to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions.
DYNAMIC TARGETING
1-14. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives.
Targets of opportunity are targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in
deliberate targeting. Targets engaged as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned,
or newly detected.
1-15. There are two types of targets of opportunity: unplanned and unanticipated:
Unplanned targets are known to exist in the area of operations, but no action has been planned
against them. The target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet
planning deadlines. Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously
considered of sufficient importance to engage.
Unanticipated targets are unknown or not expected to exist in the area of operations.
TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS
1-16. A time-sensitive target is a joint force commander validated target or set of targets requiring
immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon
pose) a danger to friendly forces (JP 3-60). A time-sensitive target (TST) is a joint force commander
(JFC) designated target or target type of such high importance to the accomplishment of the JFC mission
and objectives or one that presents such a significant strategic or operational threat to friendly forces or
allies, that the JFC dedicates intelligence collection and attack assets to ensure success.
1-17. TSTs comprise a very small or limited number of planned targets due to the required investment of
assets and potential disruption of planned execution, and are only those targets designated by the JFC and
identified as such in the JFC guidance and intent. TSTs are normally executed dynamically; however, to be
targeted successfully, they require considerable deliberate planning and preparation within the joint
targeting cycle.
1-18. Service component commanders may designate high-priority targets that present significant risks to
or opportunities for component forces and missions. These are generally targets that the Service component
commander(s) have nominated to the JFC TST list, but were not approved as TSTs. This class of targets
known as component critical targets may still require dynamic execution with cross-component
coordination and assistance in a time-compressed fashion. The JFC and Service component commanders
should clearly designate these targets prior to execution of military operations. Such targets will generally
be prosecuted using dynamic targeting. These targets should receive the highest priority possible, just
below targets on the JFC TST list.
SENSITIVE TARGETS
1-19. Certain targets require special care or caution in treatment because failure to engage them or to
engage them improperly can lead to major adverse consequences. Examples include leadership targets
(high-value individuals [HVI]) that must be handled sensitively due to potential political repercussions;
targets located in areas with a high risk of collateral damage; and weapons of mass destruction facilities,
where an attack can lead to major long term environmental damage. Such targets are often characterized as
sensitive in one respect or another, without having the intrinsic characteristics, by definition, of a
sensitive target. Nonetheless, the manner in which they are attacked is sensitive and may require
coordination with and approval from the JFC or higher authorities. In most cases, it is best to establish
criteria for engaging such targets in as much detail as possible during planning, before combat commences.
(See figure 1-1.)
TARGETING CATEGORIES
DELIBERATE TARGETING DYNAMIC TARGETING
Target Types
Planned Targets of Opportunity
Scheduled On-call Unplanned Unanticipated
Targets Targets Targets Targets
Time-sensitive Targets
Sensitive Targets
TARGETING METHODOLOGY
1-20. Targeting and the D3A methodology is designed to be performed by the commanders staff in
planning the engagement of targets. The methodology has four functions. Details of each function are
presented in Chapter 2. The D3A methodology organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to
accomplish key targeting requirements. Targeting is an outgrowth of the commanders decisions and
establishes the requirements for the development of an effective information and intelligence collection
effort. It helps the staff and targeting working group decide which targets must be acquired and engaged.
Targeting working groups can vary in make-up and size as determined by the commander and standard
operating procedures of the unit. Targeting working groups, their-duties and make-up are discussed
throughout this publication. Targeting develops options used to engage targets. Options can be lethal or
nonlethal, organic or supporting at all levels throughout the range of military operations as listed
maneuver, electronic attack, psychological, attack aircraft, surface-to-surface fires, air to surface, other
information related capabilities, or a combination of these operations. In addition, D3A assists in the
decision of who will engage the target at the prescribed time. It also assists targeting working groups
determine requirements for combat assessment to assess targeting and attack effectiveness. (See Figure 1-2)
Decide
1-24. The decide function is the most important and requires close interaction between the commander and
the intelligence, plans, operations, fires cell, and servicing judge advocate. The staff officers must clearly
understand the following:
Unit mission.
Threat vulnerabilities.
Commanders intent.
Commanders planning guidance.
Rules of engagement.
1-25. With this information, the staff officers can prepare their respective running estimates. From the
standpoint of targetingthe fire support, intelligence, information related capabilities, and operations
estimates are interrelated and closely coordinated among each cell. Key staff products include target value
analysis and the intelligence estimate from the targeting and intelligence officers. War gaming allows the
deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) or fire support officer (FSO) to develop the decide function
products.
Detect
1-26. The detect function is conducted during the execution of the OPORD. Target acquisition assets
gather information and report their findings back to their controlling headquarters, which in turn pass
pertinent information to the tasking agency. Some collection assets provide actual targets, while other
assets must have their information processed to produce valid targets. Not all of the information reported
would benefit the targeting effort, but it may be valuable to the development of the overall situation. The
target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. Situations
arise when the engagement, upon location and identification, of a target is either impossible (for example
out of range) or undesirable (outside of but moving toward an advantageous location for the attack).
Critical targets that we cannot or choose not to attack in accordance with the attack guidance should be
tracked to ensure they are not lost. Tracking suspected targets expedites execution of the attack guidance.
Tracking suspected targets keeps them in view while they are validated. Planners and executers must keep
in mind that assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition.
Deliver
1-27. The deliver functions main objective is to attack targets in accordance with the attack guidance
provided. The tactical solution (the selection of a weapon system or a combination of weapons systems)
leads to a technical solution for the selected weapon. The technical solution includes the following:
Specific attack unit.
Type of ordnance.
Time of attack.
Coordinating instructions.
Assess
1-28. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and
compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to
ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The commander and his staff assess the
results of mission execution. If combat assessment reveals that the commanders guidance or conditions of
operational success have not been met, detect and deliver functions of the targeting process must continue
to focus on the targets involved.
1-29. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commanders decisions throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs assist the commander by monitoring the
numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely
information needed for decisions. The commanders critical information requirements are linked to the
assessment process by the commanders need for timely information and recommendations to make
decisions. Planning for the assessment identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander is
interested in closely monitoring, and where the commander wants to make decisions.
Targeting Interralationship
1-30. While the targeting tasks may be labeled differently at the joint level the same targeting tasks are
being accomplished in D3A, as demonstrated in table 1-1. For more information on the Joint Targeting
Process see JP 3-60.
Table 1-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, and MDMP
Operations Joint Targeting D3A MDMP Targeting Task
Process Cycle
Mission Perform target value analysis to develop
Analysis fire support (including cyber electromagnetic
1. The End State and information related capablitiies) high-
and Commanders value targets.
Objectives Provide fire support, information related
capabilities, and cyber electromagnetic
activities input to the commanders targeting
guidance and desired effects.
Designate potential high-payoff targets.
Deconflict and coordinate potential high-
payoff targets.
Develop high-payoff target list.
Course of
Establish target selection standards.
Action
Development Develop attack guidance matrix.
2. Target
Develop fire support and cyber
Development and
electromagnetic activities tasks.
Prioritization
Develop associated measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness.
Plan
3. Capabilities
Analysis Refine associated measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness.
Develop the target synchronization matrix.
Draft airspace control means requests.
Finalize the high-payoff target list.
4. Commanders Finalize target selection standards.
Decision and Force Finalize the attack guidance matrix.
Assignment Finalize the targeting synchronization
matrix.
Orders
Production Finalize fire support tasks.
Finalize associated measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness.
Submit information requirements to
battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer -
S-2.
Execute Information Collection Plan.
Update information requirements as they
are answered.
Prepare
1-31. This common approach to targeting mirrors the D3A methodology functions presented in this
manual. Each Service component conducts targeting applying their methodology within a joint framework
established by the JFC. The organizational challenge for the JFC is to meld existing Service component
architecture into an effective joint targeting working group for operational level targets without degrading
their primary mission of targeting support to their respective components.
1-32. From the JFC perspective, a target is designated because its presence in the battle area has strategic
or operational consequences. Subsequently, a decision made whether to engage the target involves asset or
capability employment. The targets selected in this process must support the JFC campaign plan and
contribute to the success of present and future major operations. The JFC relies on the tactical level
commanders to orchestrate the execution by attacking those targets and target sets that meet the
commanders success criteria. Control measures, such as a fire support coordination line, must be
repositioned when needed to take full advantage of all assets available to the joint force. The JFC best
influences the outcome of future tactical battles by setting the conditions for those battles, assigning
missions and allocating resources to each of the Service components.
D3A Methodology
DECIDE
ASSESS DETECT
DELIVER
DECIDE
2-6. The decide function begins the targeting cycle. This step provides the overall focus and sets priorities
and criteria for intelligence collection and engagement planning. The decide function draws heavily on the
staffs knowledge of the enemy, (to include their tactics, culture, and ideology), a detailed intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities must be
addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The decisions made are reflected in visual
products. The products are as follows:
The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation
(FM 3-09). A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute
to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). A high-payoff target (HPT) is a high-
value target (HVT) that must be acquired and successfully engaged for the success of the
friendly commanders mission. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires
for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60).
The Decide function helps build the information collection plan. HPTs are nearly always a
priority intelligence requirement (PIR).
Target selection standards address accuracy or other specific criteria that must be met before
targets can be attacked.
The attack guidance matrix is a targeting product approved by the commander, which
addresses the how and when targets are engaged and the desired effects.
2-7. The products of the decide function are briefed to the commander. Upon his approval, his decisions
are translated into the OPORD.
TARGET SELECTION
2-17. The war game phase identifies HPTs and helps the commander synchronize collection assets on
those HPTs. The ACE collection manager helps identify and the operations officer tasks the sensors needed
for collection of the HPT. The collection manager will determine the best sensor and its availability by
referencing the collection synchronization matrix. A detailed discussion of the collection synchronization
matrix is contained in ATP 2-01.
Note. Any format serves the purpose of a HPTL for linking targets with phases of battle.
2-20. One way to organize the HPTL is to group all HPTs into target sets that reflect the capabilities and
functions the commander has decided to engage. Target sets are identified and prioritized for each phase of
the operation. Within the sets, individual targets are rank ordered by target value, sequence of appearance,
importance, or other criteria that satisfy the commanders desired effects. In this way, the targeting working
group reduces, modifies, and reprioritizes HVTs while ensuring that HPTs support the concept of
operations.
2-21. The commanders guidance may require changes, which should be annotated on the HPTL. The
target name or number and description are placed on the list for specific HPTs in each category. Once the
commander approves or amends the HPTL, it goes back to the targeting working group to help them
develop the AGM and collection plan. See appendix D for a sample HPTL.
2-23. Target selection standards are based on the enemy activity under consideration and available weapon
systems by using the following:
Weapon system target location accuracy requirements (target location error [TLE]).
Size of the enemy activity (point or area).
Status of the activity (moving or stationary).
Timeliness of the information.
2-24. Considering these factors, different target selection standards may exist for a given enemy activity
based on different weapons system. For example, an enemy artillery battery may have a 150-meter TLE
requirement for attack by cannon artillery and a 1 kilometer requirement for attack aircraft. Target selection
standards are developed by the fires cell in conjunction with military intelligence personnel. Intelligence
analysts use target selection standards to quickly determine targets from battlefield information and pass
the targets to the fires cell. Weapon system managers such as fires cells, fire control elements, or fire
direction centers use the target selection standards to identify targets for expeditious attack. Commands can
develop standard target selection standards based on threat characteristics and doctrine matched with the
standard available weapon systems.
2-25. Target selection standards worksheets are given to the intelligence officer by the fires cell. The FAIO
uses Target selection standards to identify targets that are forwarded to a fires cell. Intelligence analysts
evaluate the source of the information as to its reliability and accuracy, confirm that the size and status of
the activity meet the target selection standards, and then compare the time of acquisition with the dwell
time. Accurate information from a reliable source must be verified before declaring it a target if the elapsed
time exceeds dwell time.
Note. Dwell time is the length of time a target is doctrinally expected to remain in one location.
2-26. Some situations require intelligence assets to identify friendly or foe before approval to fire is given.
HPT that meet all the criteria should be tracked until they are attacked in accordance with the AGM.
Location of targets that do not meet target selection standards should be confirmed before they are attacked.
The target selection standards can be depicted in a target selection standards matrix. See appendix D for a
sample target selection standards matrix.
2-27. The matrix lists each weapon system that forwards targets directly to the fires cell, fire control
element, or fire direction center. The effects of weather and terrain on the collection assets and on enemy
equipment are considered. Target selection standards are keyed to the situation. However, the greatest
emphasis is on the enemy situation, considering deception and the reliability of the source or agency that is
reporting.
ATTACK GUIDANCE
2-28. Knowing target vulnerabilities and analyzing the probable effect an engagement will have on enemy
operations allows a staff to propose the most efficient available engagement option. Key guidance is
whether the commander wishes to disrupt delay, damage, or destroy the enemy. During war gaming,
decision points linked to events, areas of interest, or points on the battlefield are developed. These decision
points cue the command decisions and staff actions where tactical decisions are needed.
2-29. Based on commander's guidance, the targeting working group recommends how each target should
be engaged in terms of the desired effects and engagement options. Desired effects are translated into
automation system default values to more effectively engage targets.
2-30. The decision of what engagement means or system to use is made at the same time as the decision on
when to acquire and engage the target. Coordination is required when deciding to engage with two or more
means such as electronic attack, information related capabilities, and attack aviation.
2-31. The commander, with recommendations from the targeting working group, must approve the attack
guidance. This guidance should detail the following:
A prioritized HPTL.
When, how, and desired effects of engagement.
When Column
2-35. Timing the engagement of targets is critical to maximizing the effects. During war gaming, the
optimum time is identified and reflected in the WHEN column. The letter P indicates that the target should
not be engaged now but should be planned for future firing or simply should be put on file. Immediate
engagements the letter I take precedence over all others and are conducted even if weapon systems must be
diverted from engagements already underway. The letter A means the target should be engaged when
acquired.
2-36. The operations officer, fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), and brigade FSO must establish
procedures within the main command post (CP) that allow for immediate engagement of targets.
How Column
2-37. The HOW column links the engagement means to the HPT. It is best to identify a primary and
alternate engagement means of HPTs.
Effects Column
2-38. Effects column refers to the target engagement criteria. The targeting working group should specify
engagement criteria according to the commander's general guidance. Target engagement criteria should be
given in quantifiable terms.
Remarks Column
2-39. This column should note which targets should not be engaged in certain tactical situations (for
example, targets not to be engaged if the enemy is withdrawing). Some examples of how this column
should be used are:
Collateral Damage Estimate Limitations
Note accuracy or time constraints.
Note required coordination.
Limitations on the amount or type of ammunition.
Any need for BDA.
2-40. As the operation progresses the AGM may change. The AGM is a tool that must be updated based on
the changing enemy situation. The AGM should be discussed and updated during routine staff planning
meetings. Consider a separate AGM for each phase of the concept of operations.
FORMATS
2-41. The formats for the HPTL, target selection standards, and AGM presented in the preceding
paragraphs are examples only. Targeting personnel must understand all the considerations that are involved
in building these targeting tools. However, experienced staffs may prefer to develop their own formats
tailored for their situation.
DETECT
2-42. Detect is the next critical function in targeting. The operations officer at all levels is responsible for
directing the effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. In order to have the ability to identify
the specific who, what, when, and how for target acquisition, the operations officer must work closely with
the:
The intelligence officer.
ACE.
Information operations officer.
FAIO.
Targeting officer.
FSO.
2-43. Targets are detected and tracked by the maximum use of all available assets. The G-2 or S-2 must
focus the intelligence acquisition efforts on the designated HPTs and PIRs. The collection manager
considers the availability and capability of all collection assets. The intelligence officer translates the PIR
and intelligence requirement into specific information requirements and specific orders and requests. If
possible, he arranges direct dissemination of targeting information from the collector to the targeting cell or
targeting intelligence to the fires cell.
2-44. Intelligence factors of the operational environment that affect the populace require particular
attention. Such intelligence is important for developing political, social, and economic programs.
Intelligence personnel continuously analyze large quantities of all-source intelligence reporting to
determine:
Threat validity.
Actual importance of potential targets.
Best means to engage the target.
Expected effects of engaging the targets (which will guide actions to mitigate negative effects).
DETECTION PROCEDURES
2-45. HPTs must be detected in a timely, accurate manner. Clear and concise tasks must be given to the
reconnaissance units or surveillance systems that can detect a given target. Mobile HPTs must be detected
and tracked to maintain a current target location. Target tracking is inherent to detection. Tracking priorities
are based on the commander's concept of the operation and targeting priorities. The fires cell tells the G-2
or S-2 the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for engagement. The G-2 or
S-2 must match accuracy requirements to the TLE of the collection systems. If the target type and its
associated signatures (electronic, visual, thermal, and so forth) are known, the most capable collection asset
can be directed against the target. The asset can be placed in the best position according to estimates of
when and where the enemy target will be located.
2-46. As the assets collect information for target development, it is forwarded to the intelligence analysts
of the ACE. They use the information in performing situation and target development. When the analysts
identify a target specified for engagement, it is passed to the fires cell. The fires cell executes the attack
guidance against the target. Close coordination among the intelligence staff and the fires cell is essential
and is facilitated by the FAIO.
2-49. The date time group is important as the dwell time of the target is analyzed. The dwell time of the
target determines whether to engage based on the likelihood of the target moving.
2-50. The target description and size are compared with the AGM. This information is used to determine
the following:
Engagement means.
Intensity of attack.
Number of assets to be committed.
Other considerations such as collateral damage estimation, target mensuration only, and
weaponeering.
2-51. See appendix D for a sample target report.
TARGET DEVELOPMENT
2-52. Target development is the systematic examination of potential target systems and their components,
individual targets, and even elements of targets to determine the necessary type and duration of the action
that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commanders specific
objectives (joint publication [JP] 3-60). Target development includes functions such as target research,
nomination, deconfliction, aimpoint recommendation, target materials production, and collateral damage
estimation. Target development generally results in four products: target development nominations, target
folders, collection and exploitation requirements, and target briefs. Detailed analysis should characterize
the function, criticality, and vulnerabilities of each potential target, linking targets back to targeting
objectives and measures of effectiveness. Target development includes target vetting and target validation.
TARGET VETTING
2-53. Vetting is a part of target development that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence to
targeting (JP 3-60). Vetting is a key component of the target development process to establish a reasonable
level of confidence in a candidate targets functional characterization. In target vetting, the intelligence
officer coordinates an intelligence community review of the target data for accuracy of the supporting
intelligence. An assessment of the supporting intelligence will include a minimum of target identification,
significance, collateral data estimation, geospatial or location issues, impact on the enemy or friendly
forces, impact of not conducting operations against the target, environmental sensitivity, and intelligence
gain or loss concerns. Vetting does not include an assessment of compliance with the law of war or rules of
engagement.
TARGET VALIDATION
2-54. Validation is a part of target development that ensures all vetted targets meet the objectives and
criteria outlined in the commanders guidance and ensures compliance with the law of war and rules of
engagement (JP 3-60). Targets are validated against multinational concerns in a bilateral environment.
Target vetting and validation should be revisited as new intelligence becomes available or the situation
changes. Target validation is done by targeting personnel, in consultation with the planners, servicing
advocate general, and other experts and agencies, as required.
2-55. Target validation asks such questions as:
Does the desired target effect contribute to achieving one or more of the commanders,
objectives, desired operational effects, or supporting sub tasks?
Does the desired target effect support the end state?
Does the desired target effect comply with the commanders guidance and intent?
Is engaging the target lawful? What is the law of war and rules of engagement considerations?
Does the target contribute to the enemy capability and will to wage war?
Is the target (still) operational? Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? Where is the
target located?
Will striking the target arouse political or cultural sensitivities?
How will striking the target affect public opinion (enemy, friendly, and neutral)?
Are there any facilities or targets on the no-strike list or restricted target list collocated with the
target being validated?
What is the relative potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, to include casualties?
Consider collateral damage concerns in relation to law of war, rules of engagement, and
commanders guidance.
What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the adversary, indigenous
populations, friendly forces, and multinational partners?
Is it feasible to engage this target at this time? If not, could it be targeted at another time? What
is the risk?
Would engaging the target generate significant environmental impacts or arouse environmental
sensitivities?
Will engaging the target negatively affect friendly operations due to current or planned friendly
exploitation of the target?
How will actions taken against the target impact other operations?
2-56. Figure 2-2 on page 2-10 provides several examples of both desirable and undesirable effects to be
considered during target validation.
DELIVER
2-57. The deliver function of the targeting process executes the target engagement guidance and supports
the commander's battle plan once the HPT has been located and identified.
ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS
2-58. The engagement of targets must satisfy the engagement guidance developed in the decide function.
Target engagement requires several decisions and actions. These decisions fall into two categories: tactical
and technical.
2-59. Tactical decisions determine the:
Time of the engagement.
Desired effect, degree of damage, or both.
Asset to be used.
Potential for collateral damage.
TACTICAL DECISIONS
Time of Engagement
2-61. The time of engagement is determined according to the type of target: planned target or target of
opportunity. Time of engagement is a consideration in the effect that will be achieved on the target. The
decision maker needs to weigh the operational risk of tactical patience balanced with the immediacy of the
directed action in the attack guidance matrix.
Targets
2-62. Current operations anticipate the enemy and friendly conditions for target engagement. Some targets
will not appear as anticipated. The detection and tracking of enemy activities and associated friendly
maneuver with the target trigger the target engagement. Once the designated activity is detected the
targeting working group does the following:
The intelligence officer or operations officer verifies the enemy activity as the planned target to
be engaged. Monitoring decision points to include NAIs and TAIs associated with HPTs.
The G-2 validates the target by conducting a final check of the reliability of the source and the
accuracy (time and location) of the target. Then he passes the target to the fires cell.
The current operations officer checks the rules of engagement and if necessary with the
operational law personnel to determine the legality of the target.
The current operations officer determines if the delivery means planned is available and still the
best weapon for the engagement.
The G-2 alerts the appropriate assessment asset responsible for BDA (when applicable).
Targets of Opportunity
2-63. Targets of opportunity are processed the same as planned targets. Targets of opportunity are first
evaluated to determine when, or if, they should be engaged. The decision to engage targets of opportunity
follows the engagement guidance and is based on a number of factors such as the:
Activity of the target.
Dwell time.
Criticality of target compared to other targets being processed for engagement.
2-64. If the decision is made to engage immediately, the target is processed further. The availability and
capabilities of assets to engage the target are assessed. If the target exceeds the capabilities or availability
of the unit delivery asset, the target should be sent to a higher headquarters for immediate engagement. If
the decision is to defer the engagement, then continue tracking, determine decision point(s) for
engagement, and modify collection tasking as appropriate.
Desired Effects
2-65. Desired effects may result in a change in attitude, the will to fight, or the damage or casualties to
personnel or material that a commander desires to achieve.
2-66. Effects can only be properly assessed by a trained observer or an analyst. It is important that each
target has a primary and alternate observer. Each observer must understand the desired effects to include
the when and for how long they are required.
Delivery Systems
2-67. The last tactical decision to be made is the selection of the appropriate delivery system. For planned
targets, this decision is made during the decide function of the targeting process. A check must be made to
ensure that the selected delivery system is still available and can conduct the engagement. If not, the
targeting working group must determine the best delivery system available to engage the target.
2-68. A key part of determining the appropriate method of engagement is weaponeering. Weaponeering is
defined as the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal means required to
create a desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60). Weaponeering also considers such things as enemy
actions (the effects of actions and countermeasures), munition delivery errors and accuracy, damage
mechanism and criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, and trajectory. The commanders intent and
end state, desired effects, tasks, and guidance provide the basis for weaponeering assessment activities.
Targeting personnel quantify the expected results of fires against prioritized targets to produce desired
effects. Since time constraints may preclude calculations of potential effects against all targets, calculations
should proceed in a prioritized fashion that mirrors the HPTL.
2-69. The weaponeering process is divided into several general steps and is not tied to a specific
methodology or organization. The steps are not rigid and may be accomplished in different order or
combined. The steps of the weaponeering process are:
Identify collection requirements.
Obtain information on friendly forces.
Determine target elements to be analyzed.
Determine damage criteria.
Determine weapons effectiveness index.
Determine aim points and impact points.
Evaluate weapon effectiveness.
Prepare preliminary documentation.
Review collection requirements.
2-70. Collateral damage estimation is a methodology that assists the commander in staying within the law
of war and rules of engagement. The law of war requires:
Reasonable precautions to ensure only legitimate military objects are targeted.
Combatants to refrain from intentionally targeting civilian or noncombatant populations or
facilities.
Anticipated civilian or noncombatant injury or loss of life and damage to civilian or
noncombatant property incidental to engagements must not be excessive in relation to the
expected military advantage to be gained.
2-71. Failure to observe these obligations could result in disproportionate negative effects on civilians and
noncombatants and be considered a law of war violation. Furthermore, United States leadership and the
military could be subject to global criticism, which could adversely affect achievement of current and
future military objectives and national goals.
2-72. During targeting the staff has the responsibility to mitigate the unintended or incidental risk of
damage or injury to the civilian populace and noncombatants, military personnel, structures in the
immediate area, targets that are on the no-strike, restricted target list, livestock, the environment, civil air,
and anything that could have a negative effect on military operations. This will assist the commander in
weighing risk against military necessity and in assessing proportionality within the framework of the
MDMP.
2-73. Taking into account the weaponeering for a given target, the collateral damage estimation level 2
(see CJCSI 3505.01B) provides the assessment of whether a target meets the minimum requirement
(criteria and approving authority) for employment of surface-to-surface scalable fires. A qualified
individual with a current certification helps the commander and staff to evaluate collateral risk against
targets during planning and the execution phases.
2-74. One method of mitigating collateral damage is reducing TLE by conducting target coordinate
mensuration. Mensuration is the application of mathematical principles to a two dimensional surface in
order to accurately determine the most accurate location of a target on all three planes of a Cartesian
surface. Correlating the expected target location to a highly refined coordinate reduces the TLE and
provides a accurate aimpoint that can be engaged with only the force necessary to achieve the desired
effect.
2-75. The targeting working group determines the delivery means subject to the maneuver commander's
approval. All available engagement assets should be considered. Engaging targets should optimize the
capabilities of:
Light and heavy ground forces.
Army aviation.
Field artillery.
Mortars.
Naval gunfire.
Close air support (CAS) and air interdiction.
EW.
Military information support operations.
Information related capabilities.
Civil affairs teams.
2-76. The availability and capabilities of each resource is considered using the following:
Desired effects on the target.
Degree of risk in the use of the asset against the target.
Impact on friendly operations.
TECHNICAL DECISION
2-77. Once the tactical decisions have been made, the S-3 directs the appropriate to engage the target. The
fires cell provides the asset manager with the following:
Selected time of engagement.
Desired effects.
Any special restraints or requests for particular munitions types.
2-78. The asset or systems managers, for example field artillery battalion S-3, psychological officer, air
liaison officer (ALO), aviation, and brigade naval gunfire liaison officer, determine if their system can
meet the requirements. The fires cell is notified when a delivery system or asset is unable to meet the
requirements. There are various reasons a delivery system or asset may not be able to meet the
requirements which may include the following:
Systems or asset not available at the specified time.
Required munitions or asset not available.
Targets out of range.
2-79. The fires cell must decide if the selected delivery system or asset should engage under different
criteria or if a different delivery system or asset should be used.
ASSESS
2-80. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and
compare them to their initial vision and intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to
ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.
2-81. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commanders decisions throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous
aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information
needed for decisions. The commanders critical information requirement is linked to the assessment process
by the commanders need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. Planning for the
assessment process identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely
monitoring, and where the commander wants to make decisions.
2-82. Figure 2-3 on page 2-14 shows how assessment occurs at all levels and across the range of military
operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important. As a
rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such
activity is assessed. To do this, commanders and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and
measures during planning, preparation, and execution. This properly focuses assessment and collection at
each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.
COMBAT ASSESSMENT
2-83. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military
operations.
2-84. Combat assessment is composed of three elements:
BDA.
Munitions effectiveness assessment.
Reengagement recommendation.
2-85. In combination, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment inform the commander of effects
against targets and target sets. Based on this information, the enemies ability to make and sustain war and
centers of gravity are continuously estimated. During the review of the effectiveness of operations, redirect
recommendations are proposed or executed.
and intentions. This helps the staff determine when, or if, their targeting effort is accomplishing
their objectives.
As part of targeting, BDA helps to determine if a reengagement is necessary. The information is
used to allocate or redirect weapon systems to make the best use of available combat power.
2-87. The need for BDA for specific HPTs is determined during the decide function of targeting. BDA
requirements should be recorded on the AGM and the information collection plan. The commander's
decision must be made with the understanding that an asset used for BDA may not be available for target
development and acquisition. BDA information is received and processed by the ACE, and the results of
engagement are analyzed in terms of desired effects. The results are disseminated to the targeting working
group. The targeting working group must keep the following BDA principles in mind:
BDA must measure things that are important to commanders.
BDA must be objective. The intelligence officer should verify BDA received from another
echelon if time permits. Intelligence officers strive to identify and resolve discrepancies between
the BDA analysts at different headquarters at all echelons.
The degree of reliability and credibility of the assessment relies largely upon collection
resources. The quantity and quality of collection assets influence whether the assessment is
highly reliable (concrete, quantifiable, and precise) or has low reliability (best guess). The
information collection manager plans and coordinates organic and nonorganic collection assets
to obtain the most reliable information when conducting BDA for each HPT.
2-88. Each BDA has three components. They are:
Physical damage assessment.
Functional damage assessment.
Target system assessment.
2-93. Damage assessments may also be passive by compiling information in regards to a particular target
or area. An example is the cessation of fires from an area. If BDA is to be made, the targeting working
group must give information collection systems adequate warning for sensor(s) to be directed at the target
at the proper time.
2-94. BDA results may change plans and earlier decisions. The targeting working group must periodically
update the decisions made during the decide function concerning the following:
IPB products.
HPTL.
Target selection standards.
AGM.
Information collection plan.
OPLAN.
2-96. The targeting working group may recommend modifying commander's guidance concerning:
Unit basic load.
Required supply rate.
Controlled supply rate.
Reengagement Recommendation
2-97. Failure to achieve BDA, or failure to achieve necessary effects as a result of BDA, requires a
decision from the commander as to whether to continue as planned. The targeting team and current
operations must assess operational risks associated with the HPT. They provide options to mitigate the
risks. One option is to reengagement. Based on the BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment analysis,
the intelligence officer in conjunction with the FSCOORD or DFSCOORD and operations officer consider
the level to which objectives have been achieved and make recommendations to the commander.
Reengagement and other recommendations should address objectives relative to:
Targets.
Target critical elements.
Target systems.
Enemy combat force strengths.
Friendly maneuver.
Assessment Metrics
2-98. Metrics can be objective (using sensors or personnel to directly observe damage inflicted) or
subjective (using indirect means to ascertain results), depending on the metric applied to either the
objective or task. Both qualitative and quantitative metrics should be used to avoid unsound or distorted
results. Metrics can either be inductive (directly observing the operational environment and building
situational awareness cumulatively) or deductive (extrapolated from what was previously known of the
threat and operational environment). Success is measured by indications that the effects achieved are
influencing activity in desired ways among various target systems.
Measurement Types
2-99. The assessment process uses selected measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness
(MOE) to evaluate progress toward task accomplishment, effects creation, and objective achievement. Well
devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific
tasks and desired effects (JP 3-60). Figure 2-4 provides an example of assets that may be available when
conducting D3A methodology.
Measures of Performance
2-100. MOP answers the question such as are we doing things right and are the criteria for measuring task
performance or accomplishment defined. MOP is quantitative, but can apply qualitative attributes to
accomplish the task. Measurements are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks
specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks.
MOP has relevance for noncombat operations such as tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants
evacuated. Tactical level assessment typically uses MOP to measure task accomplishment (JP 3-60).
2-101. MOP helps answer questions like, was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or
how much effort was involved? Regardless of whether there was or was not a tactical, immediate effect,
did the assigned force execute the fires, maneuver, or information related capabilities actions as
required by the specified or implied task? MOP is used by the commander to assess whether his directives
were executed by subordinate units as intended or if the units were capable of completing the specified
action. Typical measures might include the following:
Did the designated unit deliver the correct ordinance?
Was a sufficient quantity of leaflets dropped to cover the target: was the message understood as
intended: and did they reach the intended target?
How many potholes were filled and include the time taken to complete the task?
How much potable water was delivered to the village?
Measures of Effectiveness
2-102. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level and
uses MOEs that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level
assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state.
MOE answers the question, are we doing the right things? and are used to assess changes in system
behavior, capability, or the operational environment. They are tied to measuring the attainment of an end
state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. They do not measure task accomplishment or
performance. While MOE may be harder to derive than MOP for a discrete task, they are nonetheless
essential to effective assessment (JP 3-60).
2-103. MOE indicates progress toward attainment of each desired effect or indicate the avoidance of an
undesired effect. MOE is a direct form of measurement, like an eyewitness account of a bridge span being
down; some may be more circumstantial indicators, such as measurements of traffic backed up behind a
downed bridge. MOE is typically more subjective than MOP but can be crafted as either qualitative or
quantitative indicators to reflect a trend as well as show progress relative to a measurable threshold.
Characteristics of Metrics
2-104. Assessment metrics should be relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced so there is no false
impression of task or objective accomplishment. Both MOP and MOE can be quantitative or qualitative in
nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they may be less susceptible to
subjective interpretation (JP 3-60).
Relevant
2-105. MOP and MOE should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the
desired end state, and the commanders decisions and objectives. This criterion helps avoid collecting and
analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by
eliminating redundant efforts.
Measurable
2-106. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured
against to avoid unsound or distorted results. To measure change effectively, a baseline measurement
should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation.
Responsive
2-107. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response
by the staff and timely decisions by the commander to meet his objectives. Assessors should consider the
time required for an action or actions to take effect within the operational environment and for indicators to
develop. Many actions require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.
Resourced
2-108. To be effective, the assessment process must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure
resource requirements for collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. An effective
assessment process can help avoid duplication of tasks and avoid taking unnecessary actions, which in turn
can help preserve military power.
3-5. For more information on the role of the fires cell see FM 3-09.
FIRES SECTION
3-6. The fires section provides the FSCOORD (the division artillery or field artillery brigade commander)
the ability to synchronize joint, interagency, multi-national assets, fire support, and sensor management of
counterfire radar assets. It provides input to the information collection plan, information collection
synchronization matrix, and the targeting process.
3-7. Specific targeting functions include:
Synchronize joint, interagency, and multi-national assets.
TST nomination, management, and execution.
Conduct target development.
Conduct target coordinate mensuration.
Conduct munitions effects analysis (weaponeering).
Conduct collateral damage estimation.
Conduct target management.
Review and comply with rules of engagement.
3-17. The corps uses the collection assets in the surveillance brigade to collect data throughout the area of
operations. The corps targeting working group also has various systems that link it to echelons above corps
and national collection and delivery systems. The corps main CP has communications, computers, and
intelligence elements to synchronize the overall operations and long range targeting.
targeting working group determines whether the commander's attack guidance has been achieved or further
fires are necessary.
3-27. Targets and missions beyond the capability of the corps or division to effectively attack with their
assets are passed to higher headquarters for action. The staff must be aware of the supporting echelons
target planning cycle to know when the requests must be submitted. The synchronization of these missions
with ongoing operations is critical to the successful completion of the unit mission. Close coordination
between supported and supporting components is required to ensure vertical integration and
synchronization of plans. The effective use of liaison teams, at all headquarters, ensures support is
coordinated during both planning and execution phases of the operation.
3-28. Targeting involves the entire staff with the commander, chief of staff, intelligence officer, operations
officer, Army aviation commander, FSCOORD, and DFSCOORD. Leaders must keep the targeting effort
focused as the battle evolves so that the targeting cells are able to adjust plans and exploit advantages as
they appear.
3-29. Targeting is a continuous and cyclical effort. Recurring events and their associated products are best
managed through workable standard operating procedures (SOP). SOPs must be tailored to the unit's
structure and operating environment to ensure a cohesive, coordinated targeting effort. A sample SOP for a
targeting working group at corps or division level is located in Appendix F.
COMMANDER
3-31. The commander issues targeting guidance on the concept of operation. The commanders concept of
operation and mission statement define the commanders intent and are structured to facilitate a shared
understanding and focus for the targeting working groups.
OPERATIONS OFFICER
3-33. The operations officer duties include:
Develop the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements and ensure they are integrated into the
decision support template and with the other members of the targeting working group.
Periodically reassess the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements with the intelligence plans and
operations officers.
Determine if an attack resulted in the desired effects or if additional attacks are required with the
DFSCOORD, intelligence plans and operations officers.
Coordinates the implementation of tailored rules of engagement to support national policies.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
3-34. The intelligence officer synchronizes the information collection plan and provides information on the
current enemy situation as well as provides estimates as to what the enemy is capable of doing in the future.
The intelligence officer provides assessments of probable enemy actions, analyzes, and identifies targets
based on the commander's guidance. The intelligence officer duties include:
Develop and provide IPB products to the other targeting working group members.
Develop and refine HVTs.
Pass HPTs and suspected HPTs to the fires cell.
Develop and refine HPT data.
Develop, monitor, and refine the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements with other members of
the targeting working group.
Distribute the information collection plan to collection managers.
Provide input to the fires cell on target selection standards.
Periodically reassess the HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements with the operations plans and
operations officer.
Receive BDA and, with the deputy fire support coordinator, determines if an attack achieved the
desired effects or if additional attacks are required.
Provide input for the decision support template.
Recommend target priorities for acquisition and engagement based on target value analysis and
war gaming.
Recommend to the chief of staff methods of engagement for targets.
Support the other members of the targeting working group, develop the HPTL, AGM, and BDA
requirements.
Develop timeliness and accuracy guidelines for the target selection standards for use by the
FAIO and the fires cell with the plans and operations officer.
Assist the EW officer to develop targets for electronic attack.
Monitor changes in the situation and reassess the HPTL, AGM, timeliness and accuracy
guidelines of the target selection standards, and BDA requirements.
Synchronize timing of engagement with the operations officer and subordinate units.
Coordinate support for subordinate units engagement requirements.
Coordinate suppression of enemy air defenses, and joint air attack team.
Receive BDA and, with the intelligence officer and operations officer, determine if an attack
resulted in the desired effects or if additional attacks are required.
Ensure target nominations meet validation review for integration on the joint integrated
prioritized target list.
Pass targets received from the FAIO to engagement systems in the most expedient manner.
ENGINEER OFFICER
3-42. The engineer officer's actions are as follow:
Advise on the obstacle and barrier plan.
Advise on engagement of targets with scatterable mines.
Template potential HPT (mechanical breaching and minelayers).
Assist in developing time-phase lines on the decision support templates and describe the effects
of terrain on maneuver.
Develop HPTL, AGM, and BDA requirements with other members of targeting working group.
Recommend HPTs, NAIs and TAIs to support the employment of artillery scatterable mines in
support of obstacles.
Advises on environmental issues and coordinates with other members to determine the impact of
operations on the environment.
PROVOST MARSHAL
3-45. The provost marshal provides a critical understanding of the criminal environment, develops linkages
between criminal actors, establishing critical correlations in time and space, or identifying trends and
patterns in criminal activity that contributes to the targeting process, enabling selection and prioritization of
crime and criminal targets. The provost marshals duties include:
Develop police intelligence products that enable targeting.
Fuse police intelligence products within mission, regulatory, and policy constraints with the G-2.
Identify high-payoff criminal targets and timelines for recommended engagement.
Identify military police and U.S. Army criminal investigators (as required) for participation as
part of the physical attack.
OTHER PERSONNEL
3-46. During certain operations, personnel and agencies that will support targeting could include the
following:
Staff judge advocate.
Air-naval gunfire liaison company representative.
State Department and other United States government and non-governmental agencies.
ALO.
Chaplain.
Civil affairs officer.
Surgeon.
Public affairs officer.
SECTION I- FUNCTIONS
4-1. Targeting functions at brigade and below include:
Develop the HPTL to include collection and attack triggers.
Establish target selection standards.
Nominate targets to higher headquarters.
Synchronize the information collection plan.
Synchronize maneuver and fire support.
Integrate counter-mobility, mobility, and survivability operations.
Receive and evaluate BDA.
Develop and synchronize the information collection plan with targeting (Focus on positioning
observers early).
rather than disrupt operations. Thus, task organization changes, modifications to the information collection plan,
target nominations that exceed organic capabilities, air support requests, and changes to the HPTL and specified
fire support, information operations, and electronic warfare (EW) tasks all must be made with full awareness of
time available to prepare and execute. This cycle is a continuous process for the working group throughout the
battle.
4-12. Additional staff personnel may be present and provide relevant information and recommendations to the
commander, S-3, FSCOORD, or FSO as necessary.
Brigade Commander
4-14. The brigade commander provides command guidance. He defines the mission and objectives, concept of
the operation and his intent; assigns missions; and task organizes. The commanders intent focuses and drives the
targeting process.
Establishing target refinement standards to facilitate completion of the fire support plan prior to
execution.
Consolidating target refinements and planned targets from subordinate and supporting unit FSOs and
fires cells and resolving duplications.
Providing target refinement to higher headquarters for established division, corps and theater army
targets.
Coordinating requests for additional fire support from subordinate and supporting unit fire support
officers and fires cells.
Coordinating support for subordinate unit attack requirements.
Receiving assessment reports and, with the intelligence officer and operations officer, determining to
what extent the desired effects were achieved.
Formulating the re-attack recommendation.
Ensuring target nominations are validated and processed and updated to support the air tasking order
(ATO).
Coordinating with the ALO on use of tactical air assets.
Targeting Officers
4-20. The targeting officer in the fires cell facilitates the exchange of information among the military intelligence
companys analysis and control team, brigade intelligence officer, subordinate and supporting unit fires cells, and
other staff members as required. His responsibilities are similar to the field artillery intelligence officer at the
division and corps. His targeting duties include:
Helping the brigade intelligence officer to develop the information collection and target acquisition
plans.
Helping to provide staff supervision of target acquisition assets organic to, attached to, or under
operational control of the BCT.
Coordinating with the brigade intelligence officer for target acquisition coverage and processing of
HPTs.
Producing the targeting synchronization matrix for target acquisition assets supporting the BCT.
Developing, recommending, and disseminating the MOP, and MOE to subordinate and supporting
elements.
Developing, recommending and disseminating approved fire support tasks to subordinate and
supporting elements.
Coordinating and distributing the restricted target list in coordination with the brigade FSO.
Engineer Officer
4-21. The BCT engineers targeting responsibilities include:
Providing technical information on enemy engineer units or equipment that are potential HPT
nominations, to include their relative location within the area of operations.
Providing technical information on the employment of scatterable mines.
Providing ATO nominations for tactical air-emplaced scatterable mines.
Updating the engineer portion of the intelligence update based on new information on enemy
engineer units, activities, or obstacles (known or templated) based on results of reconnaissance and
surveillance.
Coordinating with the geospatial engineer team for tailored terrain visualization products to support
targeting decisions.
Providing input to the restricted target list based on environmental considerations.
Assisting the intelligence officer with the electronic attack and the electronic warfare support portion
of IPB; identifying threat electronic attack capabilities and targets.
Recommending electronic attack methods of target engagement; assisting the targeting working
group in determining electronic attack requirements against specific HPTs.
Ensuring electronic attack can meet the BCT commanders desired effects.
Planning and coordinating taskings and requests to satisfy electronic attack and electronic warfare
support requirements.
Coordinating with the signals intelligence staff element through the collection manager to satisfy
electronic attack and electronic warfare support information collection requirements.
Recommending to the operations officer and brigade FSO whether to engage a target with electronic
attack.
Expediting electromagnetic interference reports to the targeting working group and targeting board.
Liaison Officers
4-27. Liaison officer targeting responsibilities include:
Addressing concerns of their respective commanders. Submitting and explaining the significance of
target nominations to support their respective units operations.
Providing feedback to their respective commanders on which targets are added to the HPTL and how
they are synchronized with the information collection plan.
Providing feedback to their commanders on target nominations made to higher headquarters.
Informing their respective units or organizations of higher level targets that fall into units or
organizations area of operations along with the tasking and coordination measures involved.
Providing the brigade with required targeting information from their respective subordinate or
supporting units and vice versa.
Targeting Officers
4-32. The brigade targeting officers serve as advisors to the brigade commander, FSCOORD, brigade FSO, and
the brigade staff on all targeting matters.
4-33. Targeting officers work with the plans section, brigade FSO, and the targeting working group throughout
the operations process to determine which targets need to be engaged and the desired effects for each engagement
in order to achieve the commanders intent. These individuals produce the targeting and assessment guidance to
be distributed with the brigade OPLAN or OPORD. The targeting officers develop the:
HPTL.
Targeting synchronization matrix.
Targeting related MOP and MOE for brigade assessment.
4-34. The targeting officers collect, analyze, process, produce, and disseminate targeting information and
products. The targeting officers provide counterfire guidance, and radar deployment instructions to the organic
field artillery battalion S-2.
4-35. The brigade acquisition systems and assets available through reach-back are critical to locating HPTs for
attack. The targeting officers assist in collateral damage estimation recommendations for the brigade commander
and staff.
4-36. The role of the targeting officer is similar to the functioning of the FAIO. In this capacity, these individuals
help the S-2 and the brigades FSO determine specific target vulnerabilities. The targeting officer, in coordination
with the brigade FSO, consolidates and distributes the target list, restricted target list, and no-strike list. During
operations, these individuals monitor compliances with the restrictions and report incidents where the restrictions
may have been violated.
4-37. The targeting officers provide recommendations to the targeting working group on updating targeting
priorities. These individuals prepare products for the targeting working group as directed by the brigade FSO.
They direct updating and purging of targeting files as required. The targeting officers ensure that interoperability
is maintained with collection assets of the brigade.
4-38. The targeting officers provide the targeting experience to conduct 24 hour brigade operations and targeting
expertise in both the lethal and nonlethal effects elements and deploy to a tactical CP if necessary.
behavior. The public affairs officer plans and executes Soldier and community outreach both foreign and
domestic. The public affairs officer and staff provide training and support to stability operations in coordination
with the S-9 and civil affairs staff in the fires cell nonlethal effects element.
Proposed HPTL and targeting synchronization matrix for the time period discussed.
4-66. The specific situation dictates the extent of the remaining targeting working group or targeting board
members participation. Members discuss in detail (within their own warfighting functional or staff section area)
available assets and capabilities, the integration of their assets into targeting decisions, and the capabilities and
limitations of enemy assets. The following tools should be available to facilitate the conduct of the targeting
working group and targeting board: HPTL, consolidated matrices (for example, targeting synchronization matrix),
or other product(s) per standard operating procedures, a list of delivery assets and resources, and a list of
collection assets and resources. For example:
The targeting synchronization matrix visually illustrates the HPTs and is designed to list specific
targets with locations, in each category. The matrix has entries to identify if a target is covered by a
NAI; the specific detect, deliver, and assess assets for each target; and engagement guidance. Once
completed, the targeting synchronization matrix serves as a basis for updating the information
collection plan and issuing a fragmentary order once the targeting working group and targeting board
concludes their sessions. In addition, the targeting synchronization matrix facilitates the distribution
of results produced by the targeting working group and targeting board.
A list of all potential detection and delivery resources available to the brigade helps all attendees
visualize what assets may be available for detection and delivery purposes. It is essential that
targeting working group and targeting board members be prepared to discuss the potential
contribution for the particular assets within their respective staff area or warfighting function.
Staff Participation
4-68. Maximum participation by the staff is essential. Staff members and warfighting function representatives
must share their expertise and respective running estimate information on the capabilities and limitations of both
friendly and enemy systems. They should also consider providing redundant means, if feasible, to detect, deliver,
and assess targets.
4-71. The intelligence officer provides an intelligence update. He briefs the current enemy situational and event
templates, current HVTs with locations, the commanders critical information requirements, NAI, and an
overview of the current information collection plan. He provides BDA on targets previously engaged since the last
session of the targeting working group and the impact on the enemy COA. Most importantly, he prepares a
predictive analysis of the future enemy COA for the next 24-72 hours using the event template and a list of HVTs.
Finally, he briefs changes to the commanders critical information requirements for review by the staff. The
intelligence officers products must be tailored to the designated time period to be discussed at the session but
generally include:
The enemy situation.
Review of the current information collection plans.
BDA of targets engaged since the last session of the targeting working group or targeting board and
the impact on the enemy COA.
An analysis of the enemys most probable COA and locations for the next 24 to 36 hours (possibly
projecting out 72 hours for targets subject to attack through ATO nominations).
Recommended changes to the PIRs for the commanders approval (if the commander is present), or
review by the staff.
4-72. The operations officer or his representative discusses any particular guidance from the commander,
changes to the commander's intent, and any changes since the last session of the targeting working group or
targeting board to include task organization, requirements from higher headquarters to include recent fragmentary
orders and taskings, current combat power, the current situation of subordinate units, planned operations, and
maneuver assets and resources available. Finally, he informs the staff of the status of assets and resources
available for the targeting process. The operations officers products must be tailored to the designated time
period to be discussed at the session but generally include a friendly situation update that:
Briefs any new requirements from higher headquarters since the last targeting working group or
targeting board session.
Summarizes the current tactical situation.
Informs on the status of available assets and resources (combat power).
Briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to his intent.
Briefs planned operations during the period covered by the targeting working group or targeting
board session.
4-73. The targeting officer or fires cell representative briefs fire support assets available including status of fire
support tasks, radars, CAS sorties available, status of naval surface fire support, ammunition availability, HPTL,
target selection standards, AGM, and targeting synchronization matrix.
4-74. The brigade fire support officer reviews approved planned air requests (alternatively, this may be briefed
by the Air Force ALO) for the period covered by the session and those planned for the next two ATO cycles
normally done in 24-hour increments. In coordination with the Air Force ALO, he also recommends changes to
the working planned air requests and nominations for the planning cycle. He provides proposed targeting guidance
for the designated periods, and a new targeting synchronization matrix with the proposed list of high-payoff
targets and locations, for the staffs' concurrence and refinement.
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
4-75. Upon completion of the targeting working group session, targeting products are updated, written, and
prepared for the targeting board. Targeting working group products include:
The updated HPTL, AGM, and target selection standards. These, with data from the information
collection plan, may be combined into a unit-specific targeting synchronization matrix.
Updated information collection plan. The S-2 reorients his acquisition assets and updates and
disseminates the information collection plan.
SYNCHRONIZATION
4-79. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum
effect relative to combat power at a decisive time and place (JP 2-0).
4-80. The key to effective synchronization of targeting is the thorough use of targeting in the planning,
preparation, and execution of the maneuver plan. As the commander and staff form the operations plan during
war gaming: the decision support template is developed. It is the key to synchronizing the fire support plan with
the scheme of maneuver. The war gaming facilitates the BCT commanders staff decision support template
development. It also identifies critical fire support triggers on the battlefield and is an aid in synchronizing the
warfighting functions. The war gaming process identifies the decision points for the commander. The decision
support template graphically portrays the decision points and the options available to the commander if an action
occurs. The decision support template provides the information required to provide effective fires in support of the
maneuver force.
4-81. Units must define how, when, with what restrictions, and in what priority to engage different targets. At
task force level, the battalion FSO prepares the fire support execution matrix. The battalion FSO coordinates with
the company FSO and mortar platoon leader. In conjunction with the task force S-3, the battalion FSO positions
and controls the organic mortars of the task force. With the S-2, the FSO positions and controls observation assets.
This coordination is needed to ensure the fire support plan meets the commanders guidance and avoids unplanned
duplication. The fire support plan each FSO and forward observer is responsible for during execution may include
amplifying information such as:
Field Artillery organization for combat.
Ammunition available.
Delivery asset locations.
FSCMs and restrictions.
Coordinating instructions.
HPTs and attack guidance.
Dynamic targeting is primarily designed to attack TSTs and high-payoff targets (HPT). Time
sensitive targets should not be confused with sensitive targets. A target may be both time-
sensitive due to posing an immediate threat and sensitive depending on engagement option.
Lower priority targets are normally not worth redirecting assets from previous planned or
assigned missions.
The process developed to facilitate dynamic targeting at the joint level is find, fix, track,
target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). While the steps are listed in the order presented to ease
explanation, several steps are accomplished simultaneously and overlapped. For example, the
track step frequently continues through the completion of the assess step.
FIND
A-1. The find step of F2T2EA involves intelligence collection based on joint intelligence preparation of
the operational environment, the Army uses IPB. Traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets, as well as nontraditional assets, may provide initial detection of an entity.
A-2. Each entity is immediately evaluated as a potential target. Based on the situation and the
commanders guidance, some entities are clearly identified not a target. Other entities may be clearly
identified as a target already included in targeting. The remaining entities display some characteristics of a
target, but need more analysis to categorize them properly. These entities requiring further analysis are
called emerging targets.
EMERGING TARGET
A-3. The term emerging target is used to describe a detection that meets sufficient criteria to be
developed as a potential target using dynamic targeting. The criticality and time sensitivity of an emerging
target, and its probability of being a potential target, is initially undetermined. Emerging targets normally
require further reconnaissance and analysis to develop, confirm, and continue dynamic targeting. Figure A-
1 on page A-2 shows the find step determination and follow on actions.
A-4. During the find step, an emerging target will be:
Designated a probable target or identified as a TST and the dynamic targeting process is
continued.
Designated a probable target not requiring dynamic targeting and passed to deliberate targeting.
Discarded completely or entered on the no-strike list.
Analyzed until a determination can be made (that is, continuing the find step).
INPUTS
A-7. Inputs to the find step:
Clearly delineated joint force commander (JFC) dynamic targeting guidance and priorities.
Focused joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment to include identified
named areas of interest, TAI, and cross cueing of intelligence disciplines to identify potential
target deployment sites or operational environments. (The Army still uses IPB).
Collection plans based on the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment.
OUTPUTS
A-8. Outputs of the find step:
Potential targets detected and nominated for further development within dynamic targeting.
FIX
A-9. The fix step of F2T2EA includes actions to determine the location of the probable target. This step
also results in a positive identification of a probable target as worthy of engagement as well as determining
its position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement.
A-10. The fix step begins after a probable target requiring dynamic targeting is detected. When a probable
target is identified, sensors are focused to confirm target identification and accurate location. This may
require diverting assets from other uses. The collection manager may have to make a recommendation on
whether the diversion of reconnaissance assets from the established collection plan is merited. The S-3
decides if the collection, correlation, and fusing of data confirms that the target meets the criteria to be
classified as a TST or other target requiring dynamic targeting.
A-11. Completing the fix step in a timely manner requires reconnaissance and surveillance with the
capability to identify stationary and mobile targets, day or night, in any weather conditions, through all
forms of terrain, camouflage, or concealment, to the degree of accuracy required by the engaging asset.
A-12. An unanticipated or unplanned target may be identified during the fix step, requiring JFC
confirmation and classification as a TST. The determination or estimation of the targets window of
vulnerability defines the timeliness required for successful prosecution, and influences the required
prioritization of assets and the risk assessment. TSTs receive the highest priority in dynamic targeting.
INPUTS
A-13. Inputs to the fix step:
Probable targets requiring dynamic targeting.
Sensor information on the target.
OUTPUTS
A-14. Outputs of the fix step:
Target identification, classification, and confirmation.
Target location accuracy refined to the level required for target engagement.
Determination or estimation of target time characteristics.
TRACK
A-15. During the track step, the target is observed and its activity and movement are monitored. Once the
target is located and identified, maintain observation until an engagement decision is made and executed.
A-16. The track step of F2T2EA begins once a definite fix is obtained on the target and ends when the
engagement results in the desired effect upon the target. Some targets may require continuous tracking
upon initial detection as an emerging target. Sensors may be coordinated to maintain situational awareness
or track continuity. Target windows of vulnerability should be updated when warranted. Relative priorities
for information requirements are based on JFC guidance and objectives. If track continuity is lost, the fix
step will likely have to be recompleted (and potentially the find step as well).
INPUTS
A-17. Inputs to the track step:
Confirmed target.
Target location and plot of movement (if applicable).
OUTPUTS
A-18. Outputs of the track step:
Track continuity maintained on a target by appropriate sensor or combination of sensors.
Sensor prioritization.
Updates to target window of vulnerability.
TARGET
A-19. The target step takes an identified, classified, located, and prioritized target; finalizes the desired
effect and applicable weaponeering solution against it to include obtaining required approval to engage.
The target step can be time consuming due to the large number of requirements that must be satisfied.
Timely decisions are more likely if target step actions can be initiated or completed in parallel with other
steps.
A-20. The target step of F2T2EA begins with target validation. Operations personnel ensure that an
engagement on the target complies with guidance, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. The target
step matches available engagement and sensor assets against the desired effect. The target is weaponeered,
engagement options are formulated, a recommendation is nominated, an option is selected to affect the
target, and assessment requirements are submitted. Restrictions are resolved and the actions against the
INPUTS
A-21. Inputs to the target step:
Identified, classified, located, and prioritized target.
Restrictions for consideration are collateral damage estimation guidance, weapons of mass
destruction, consequences of execution, law of war, rules of engagement, no-strike list, and
restricted target list, component boundaries, and FSCMs.
Situational awareness on available assets from all components.
OUTPUTS
A-22. Outputs of the target step:
The desired effect is validated.
Target data finalized in a format useable by the system that will engage it.
Asset deconfliction and target area clearance considerations are resolved.
Engagement authority (decision) in accordance with JFC and Service components commanders
guidance.
Assessment collection requirements are submitted.
Consequence of execution prediction and assessment for weapons of mass destruction targets is
performed.
ENGAGE
A-23. During the engage step of F2T2EA, the targets are confirmed as hostile and action is taken against
the target.
A-24. The engagement is ordered and transmitted to the system selected to engage it. Engagement orders
must be transmitted to, received by, and understood by those engaging the target. The engagement is
managed and monitored by the engaging component and the desired result is successful action against the
target.
INPUTS
A-25. Inputs to the engage step:
Engagement authority decision.
Selected engagement option.
Combat identification prior to and throughout target engagement.
OUTPUTS
A-26. Outputs of the engage step:
Issuing and passing of the engagement order.
Lethal or Nonlethal means against target.
Engagement direction and control.
ASSESS
A-27. The assess step of F2T2EA is the same as the assessment phase of D3A and the joint targeting cycle
phase 6. Both examine the results of the target engagement and the results of both must be integrated to
provide the overall combat assessment.
A-28. During the assess step, information is collected about the results of the engagement to determine
whether the desired effects were achieved. TST or other HPT may require an immediate assessment to
provide quick results and to allow for expeditious re-attack recommendations.
INPUTS
A-29. Inputs to the assess step:
Assessment requests matched against desired effects or engagement system.
OUTPUTS
A-30. Outputs of the assess step:
Confirmed engagement.
Estimated or confirmed engagement results to decision makers in a timely manner.
Re-attack recommendations.
F3EAD is especially well suited and is the primary means for engaging high-value
individuals (HVI). A high-value individual is a person of interest who is identified,
surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged. A HVI may become a high-payoff
target that must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured, or killed)
for the success of the friendly commanders mission. In this role, F3EAD features
massed, persistent reconnaissance, or surveillance cued to a powerful and
decentralized all source intelligence apparatus to find a HVI in the midst of civilian
clutter and find his exact location. This accurate location enables surgical finishing
effects (lethal or nonlethal) that emphasize speed to catch a mobile target. The
emphasis on speed is not only to remove a combatant from the area of operations, but
also to take the opportunity to gain more information on the threat enemy advisory.
The exploit and analyze steps are often the main effort of F3EAD because these steps
provide insight into the enemys network and may open new targeting efforts. The
information accumulated during the exploit and analyze steps frequently starts the
cycle over again by providing leads, or start points into the network that can be
observed and tracked.
Analyze
ASSESS DETECT
Target exploitation Exploit
Document exploitation Find
Site exploitation
Detainees
Finish
Confirm probable HVI
Fix Focus sensors
Locate
DELIVER Maintain track
Determine time available
Launch mission Maintain HVI identification
Capture Refine location
Kill Update time available
Legend:
D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess F3EAD find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
HVI high-value individual
FIND
B-7. Collection plans that support the F3EAD process are, driven by the requirement for time
compression. IPB and area situational awareness collection are an ongoing effort. Once an insurgent cell or
HVI is identified, the targeting folder must be quickly developed. After the targeting folder is approved for
collection, very specific information on possible engagement locations must be collected quickly without
alerting the HVI. This requires layering of collection efforts and assets.
B-8. HVI targeting will most often be conducted in counterinsurgency operations where the enemy
frequently hides among the civilian population. Persistent and high fidelity intelligence is often the key to
defeating a threat whose primary strength is denying friendly forces access to a target.
B-9. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are most effective against such enemies when massed. The
insurgents ability to hide in plain sight demands persistent collection in order to detect his presence.
Persistent collection requires long dwell times and must be focused using multiple sensors on discrete parts
of the network in order to achieve the fidelity of information required for targeting.
B-10. The effectiveness of reconnaissance and surveillance grows exponentially when it is cued to and
driven by other sources of intelligence rather than operating alone. The enemy is so well hidden that it takes
multiple sources of intelligence to corroborate information. Signals intelligence for example, can locate a
target but may not be able to discern who it is. An airborne sensor with full motion video can track but not
necessarily identify the target. Human intelligence can provide intent but may not be able to fix a target to a
accurate location. However, these disciplines working together are able to focus the spotlight on a HVI who
is hidden in the general population. Without a robust, collaborative intelligence network to guide it, sensors
are often used in reactive modes that negate their true power and tend to minimize their full potential.
These intelligence sources provide a start point into the enemy network that can be exploited through
persistent and patient observation. With this type of start point, one can mass reconnaissance forces with
confidence that assets are not being wasted.
B-11. Massing intelligence resources implies focus and priority. Selected parts of the enemys network
receive focus, which should be unwavering for a specified time. The problem with a low-contrast and
fleeting target is that threat actions are not easily predictable. Without prediction, the next best things are
redundancy and saturation. The inability to mass employment of collection assets over a large geographic
area often results in a loss of effectiveness.
B-12. One technique that is critical to improve effectiveness against an insurgent is nodal analysis (or link
analysis). Insurgent networks do not exist in a vacuum. They interact with supporters in the population and,
less directly with their supporters buried in the power structure. An HVI may interact with key leaders in
politics, security, the economy, and real estate, as well as the general population.
B-13. Life pattern analysis is connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their
patterns of life. While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and
notes every location and person visited. Connections between those sites and persons to the target are built,
and nodes in the enemys network emerge. Link analysis and life pattern analysis identify these
relationships in order to complete the targeting folder. To be effective, there must be sufficient intelligence
on the network the HVI belongs to in order to know the effect of his removal. Just because he is the cell
leader may not be a good enough reason to target him. How will the cell be degraded by his removal? How
long will it take to replace him?
B-14. This analysis has the effect of revealing the HVIs physical infrastructure for things such as funding,
meetings, headquarters, media outlets, and weapons supply points. As a result, the network becomes more
visible and vulnerable. Nodal analysis uses the initial start point to generate additional start points that
develop even more targeting opportunities within the enemys network. The payoff of this analysis is huge
but requires patience to allow the networks picture to develop over a long period of time.
B-15. Networks are notably resistant to the loss of any one or even several nodes. The focus of targeting is
not just to identify an individual who is a leader in the network. Instead, it is to identify the critical leader
whose removal will cause the most damage to the network. The ultimate success is to remove sufficient
critical nodes simultaneouslyor nearly sosuch that the network cannot automatically reroute
linkages, but suffers catastrophic failure.
INPUTS
B-16. Inputs to the find step:
Commanders guidance and priorities.
IPB, to include identified NAI, TAI, and cross cueing of intelligence disciplines to identify
potential target sites or operational environments.
Life pattern analysis.
Collection plans based on the IPB.
OUTPUTS
B-17. Outputs of the find step:
Potential HVI detected and nominated for further development.
Targeting folders.
HVI network identified and analyzed.
FIX
B-18. The continued collection effort paints a picture of the HVI. The intelligence staff officer can draw
broad behavior patterns that will focus the specific collection requirements from analysis of the
intelligence. The information harvested from the focused and persistent collection reveals the life patterns
of the HVI including overnight locations, daily routes, visitations, and trustworthy associates. National and
unit intelligence assets then corroborate the life patterns. As the details are filled in, it becomes possible to
anticipate where the HVI is most likely to spend time or visit.
B-19. Maintaining persistent, continuous intelligence support is particularly hard at lower echelons of
command and small units where intelligence assets are less available than at the brigade and higher
echelons. At lower-echelon units, it is important for the command to establish intelligence support teams
with personnel who know the targets and are trained in the unit SOPs for sensor preparation and briefings,
patrol debriefings, data collection, and able to fuse this information with the units operational plan to
finish the target.
B-20. As the probable location of the HVI target is narrowed to a few sites, the unit is able to identify
feasible courses of action and begin refining the planned actions of the finish force. At some point the
information leads the unit to determine a HVI target is likely to be a specific location (Fix) at a specific
time or within a specific time frame. Depending on the accuracy and reliability of the information, the unit
may chose to verify the information through other means. Once the unit is satisfied that the Fix is valid,
they may chose to launch the finish force.
INPUTS
B-21. Inputs to the fix step:
Probable HVI.
Information on the target and the targets network.
OUTPUTS
B-22. Outputs of the fix step:
Target identification and confirmation.
Target location accuracy refined to the level required for target engagement.
Determination or estimation of target time characteristics.
FINISH
B-23. The window of opportunity to engage the target requires a well-trained and rehearsed finish force and
a well-developed SOP. The force will normally not have the time to create elaborate plans. Instead, the
force will be required to adapt a known drill to the existing conditions and rapidly execute the required
actions, such as a raid, ambush or cordon and search. The force must also be prepared to conduct follow on
operations based on information found during exploitation on the objective.
INPUTS
B-24. Inputs to the finish step:
HVI location within a given time frame.
OUTPUTS
B-25. Outputs of the finish step:
Target isolated and engaged.
Target location secured.
Exploitation force on site.
EXPLOIT
B-26. F3EAD differs from other targeting models because of its emphasis on the exploit and analyze steps
as the main effort. This recognizes the importance of information in fighting the low contrast threat and
aggressively supplying multisource start points for new information collection. More than the other steps,
this feeds the intelligence operations cycle in which intelligence leads to operations that yield more
intelligence leading to more operations. The emphasis on raids is essential to gather intelligence on the
enemy network; simply killing the enemy will not lead to greater effectiveness against their networks. In
fact, capturing the enemy for purposes of interrogating is normally the preferred option.
B-27. Once secured, the target site must be exploited. Site Exploitation is as a series of activities to
recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and materiel found during the
conduct of operations (JP 3-31). Effective site exploitation requires prior planning to include SOP, search
plans, prepared site exploitation kits, and tactical questioning plans. Units must make these preparations in
advance of the finish step in order to enable effective actions on the objective. See Army, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures manual 3-90.15 for a more detailed discussion of site exploitation activities
and enablers.
B-28. The site exploitation team may have a variety of enablers in direct support, or it may come solely
from the unit. In any case, they must have clear instructions on what to look for in the specific site and
training in how to conduct the search and collection. Some units use smart cards with target specific
information and predetermined questions. Such aids have been useful in preparing and guiding the
exploitation teams. Some organizations prefer designated assault or exploitation units. Continual
preparation for these type missions allows the development and refinement of SOP.
B-29. Target exploitation and document exploitation are important operations and intelligence activities
critical to F3EAD. Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found on computers and cell
phones, can provide clues that analysts need to evaluate enemy organizations, capabilities, and intentions.
The threats network becomes known a little more clearly by reading his email, financial records, media,
and servers. Target and document exploitation help build the picture of the threat as a system of systems.
B-30. The tactical questioning of detainees is crucial to revealing the threats network. The ability to talk to
insurgent leaders, facilitators, and financiers about how the organization functions offers significant insight
on how to take that organization apart. Intelligence from detainees drives operations, yielding more
detainees for additional exploitation and intelligence.
INPUTS
B-31. Inputs to the exploit step:
Secured target location.
Targeted questions.
OUTPUTS
B-32. Outputs of the exploit step:
Documented information.
Detailed reports.
Follow on targets for immediate execution.
ANALYZE
B-33. The bottom line of the analyze step is to examine and evaluate information and rapidly turn it into
actionable intelligence that can be applied to defeat the threats network. Some information may be
immediately actionable, such as information providing the location of another HVI. Other information may
need further analysis and corroboration.
B-34. The information requires the staff to streamline operations to allow for this data to be stored,
analyzed, recalled, and disseminated as necessary. New or additional players must be included in the
collection and assessment process. National and theater level technical assets will also be critical and
mechanisms to facilitate their integration must be developed. All of this will require modifications of
existing planning mechanisms and procedures, and learning how to incorporate new sources.
B-35. The objective is to make intelligence, not information. To do this you have to invest resources, and
focus on preparation. The level of dedicated resources (mainly personnel) will have a direct correlation to
the quality and quantity of developed intelligence. Too few resources result in an extrication of raw
information effort, instead of an analytical and understanding effort. The right balance of personnel and
resources creates a greater return; under or over resourced teams risk diminished returns.
INPUTS
B-36. Inputs to the analyze step:
Document information.
Detailed reports.
OUTPUTS
B-37. Outputs of the analyze step:
Actionable intelligence.
Correlated information.
Intelligence assessments.
DISSEMINATE
B-38. The Disseminate step is simple but time consuming. The goal is to make sure everyone else knows
what you know. Even information that appears to be irrelevant may hold the key to unlocking a network for
someone else. Fortunately, the various computer programs and networks greatly aid the dissemination
process.
B-39. Prioritizing the dissemination effort is essential. Some information will answer a PIR and should be
forwarded to the requesting agency immediately. Other information may be important based on the
operational environment. Still other information will be routine and can be handled routinely.
INPUTS
B-40. Inputs to the disseminate step:
Relevant and correlated information.
Actionable intelligence.
Intelligence assessments.
OUTPUTS
B-41. Outputs of the disseminate step:
Databases, matrices, and assessments are updated.
Intelligence and information is pushed to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
Information is made available to everyone with a need to know.
MEASURING SUCCESS
B-42. Measuring success when conducting F3EAD requires analysis conducted in two stages. The first
stage occurs immediately after the finish step and should answer questions associated directly to the target
and its network. Examples of first stage metrics include:
Killed or captured insurgents.
Changes in insurgent patterns.
Captured equipment and documents.
B-43. The second stage of analysis takes the longer view. These metrics provide the yardstick for the JFC
to examine progress made toward meeting objectives established in the joint campaign plan to include:
Changes in local attitudes towards United States and Host Nation Forces to include public
perceptions.
Changes in the quality or quantity of information provided by individuals or groups.
Changes in the economic or political situation of an area.
CARVER TOOL
CRITICALITY
C-1. Criticality means target value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is critical when
its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic operations. Targets
within a system must be considered in relation to other elements of the target system. The value of a target
will change as the situation develops, requiring the use of the time-sensitive methods which respond to
changing situations. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroad bridges may be less critical as
targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be critical to maneuvering conventional forces which require
use of such bridges.
ACCESSIBILITY
C-2. A target is accessible when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and
equipment to accomplish its mission. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of
knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the operational
element must take to achieve its objectives, and measuring those things that aid or impede access.
RECOUPERABILITY
C-3. A target's recouperability is measured in time; that is, how long will it take to replace, repair, or
bypass the destruction of or damage to the target? Recouperability varies with the sources and type of
targeted components and the availability of spare parts availability.
VULNERABILITY
C-4. A target is vulnerable if the operational element has the means and expertise to successfully attack
the target. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of the critical component needs to be
compared with the capability of the attacking element to destroy or damage it.
EFFECT
C-5. The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and
sociological impacts at the target and beyond. This is closely related to the measure of target criticality. The
type and magnitude of given effects desired will help planners select targets and target components for
attack. Effect in this context addresses all significant effects, whether desired or not, that may result once
the selected target component is attacked. Traditionally, this element has addressed the effect on the local
population, but now there are broader considerations.
RECOGNIZABILITY
C-6. A target's recognizability is the degree to which it can be recognized by an operational element and
intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets under varying conditions. Weather has an obvious and
significant impact on visibility. Rain, snow, and ground fog may obscure observation. Road segments with
sparse vegetation and adjacent high ground provide excellent conditions for good observation. Distance,
light, and season must also be considered. Table C-1 is an example of a CARVER matrix tool.
Table C-1. CARVER matrix tool
3 Loss Would Accessible Can Be Replaced May Have The Favorable Recognized With
Reduce In Relatively Short Means And Impact, Some Training
Mission Time (Months) Expertise To Some
Performance Attack Adverse
Impact On
Civilians
1 Loss Would Very Difficult Easily Replaced Very Little Unfavorable Extremely
Reduce To Gain In A Short Time Capability To Impact Difficult To
Mission Access (Days) Attack Assured Recognize
Performance Adverse Without
Impact On Extensive
Civilians Orientation
C-7. For more information on how to use CARVER as a target value analysis tool see ATP 2-33.4 and
ATP 3-05.20.
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a menu of formats and a focus on the
targeting information and knowledge the commander and staff requires. The formats
may be copied or modified by the targeting working group to support requirements of
the command.
D-5. The following steps are a recommended way of completing the target synchronization matrix while
conducting the targeting working group.
D-6. Step One. Select, or update the HPTL. These targets are derived from the S-2s list of HVTs.
D-7. Step Two. Determine and prioritize collection assets responsible for detecting, confirming, or
denying the location of each suspected target or HPT. This information should then be entered into the
detect portion of the targeting synchronization matrix. See figure D-6. Be specific, state what unit or
asset must detect or confirm or deny the location of each specific target. Clear and concise tasking must be
given to acquisition assets and resources. Mobile HPT targets must be detected and tracked to maintain
current target location. Assets and resources should be placed in the best position according to estimates of
when and where the enemy targets will be. Consider assigning a NAI to the target and enter the number on
the targeting synchronization matrix.
D-8. Step Three. Determine which attack asset or resource will be used to attack each target once
detected or confirmed by using the list of delivery assets and resources available. Enter this information
into the deliver portion of the target synchronization matrix. The lethal and nonlethal effects and
applicable aspects of electronic warfare and information related capabilities are considered depending on
the commanders targeting guidance and desired effects. Consider redundant means to attack each target.
When determining an attack asset or resource for each target, the attack guidance is also determined and
entered. Determine for each delivery means when to attack the target (immediately, as acquired, or
planned) and the effects to be achieved by attacking the target. For example the effects of Army indirect
fires, joint fires, and electronic warfare, including nonlethal effects can be to deceive, degrade, delay, deny,
destroy, disrupt, divert, exploit, interdict, neutralize, or suppress the target.
D-9. Step Four. Determine and prioritize which assets will assess how well the attack was executed and
whether desired effects were achieved on targets. Enter this information into the assess portion of the
target synchronization matrix
D-10. Both nonlethal and lethal assets may be included in the same matrix. Tables D-5 and D-6 provide an
example of a combined lethal and nonlethal target synchronization matrix.
Table D-5. Lethal and nonlethal target synchronization matrix (example)
TARGET REPORT
D-12. When targeting information is passed from one agency to another, all essential information must be
included to allow for proper analysis and attack. The sample format below will give the targeting working
group enough information to properly formulate the best attack response. See table D-8.
D-16. The target information folder will also contain additional information as it becomes available:
Human intelligence reports on the HVI.
Signal intelligence reports that reference the HVI.
_____What targeting assets (organic, attached, and supporting) are available to detect and attack HPTs?
_____What detect, deliver, and assess support is needed from higher headquarters?
_____When must requests to higher headquarters be submitted to obtain the support required?
_____Are systems in place to pass the detected targets to assets that are capable of tracking them?
_____What detect, deliver, and assess support is required from subordinate units, and when is it required?
_____What detect, deliver, and assess support requests have been received from subordinate units, and what has
been done with them?
_____Has the target synchronization matrix been synchronized with the decision support template and the
maneuver and fire support plans?
_____Are all commands using a common datum for locations? If not, are procedures in place to correct
differences in datum?
DETECT
_____Does the collection plan focus on PIRs and finding the necessary HPTs?
_____What accuracy, timeliness, and validity standards target selection standards are in effect for detection and
delivery systems?
_____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit agency for detection of each HPT?
_____Have verification procedures using alternate systems been established where necessary?
_____Are target acquisition and BDA requirements distributed properly among systems that can accomplish
both?
DELIVER
_____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for engagement of each HPT?
_____Has an alternate engagement asset been identified for each HPT? (The primary system may not be
available at the time the HPT is verified.)
_____Have applicable FSCMs, airspace coordinating measures and clearance procedures, and the AGM been
established to facilitate target engagement?
_____Have on-order FSCMs and airspace coordinating measures and AGM been established to facilitate future
and transition operations?
_____Have potential fratricide situations been identified, and have procedures been established to positively
control each situation?
_____Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for tracking specified HPT and
providing BDA on specified HPTs?
_____What are the procedures to update the HPTL and synchronize the AGM and decision support template if
it becomes necessary to change the scheme of maneuver and fire support as the situation changes?
ASSESS
_____Are the collection assets, linked to specific HPTs, still available?
_____Has the collection manager been notified of the engagement of a target requiring assessment?
_____Have the assessment asset managers been updated as to the actual target location?
_____Has all coordination been accomplished for the assessment mission, particularly airborne assets?
_____Has the information from the mission been delivered to the appropriate agency for evaluation?
_____Has the targeting working group reviewed the BDA to determine if requests for restrike are required?
_____Has the target intelligence gathered from the assessment been incorporated into the overall threat
situational development?
PURPOSE
F-2. The SOP provides guidelines, routine functions, and delineates responsibilities for operations in the
targeting working group.
ORGANIZATION
F-3. The FSCOORD or DFSCOORD leads the targeting working group. In their absence, the operations
officer will be the alternate. Membership of the targeting working group routinely consists of
representatives from the following staff sections and major subordinate commands. The composition of the
targeting working group is a command decision and may vary based on the operation. See Table F-1 on
page F-2 for an example of the representatives that may form the division targeting working group.
CONDUCT
F-4. The targeting working group agenda is divided and briefed during current and future operations. (See
Table F-2.) The FSCOORD or DFSCOORD directs the process and keeps the members focused on the unit
mission, commanders intent, targeting guidance, and targeting priorities. The targeting agenda is included
in routine staff meetings or drills. Meeting times should be established to allow timely coordination of the
parallel targeting effort of senior and subordinate headquarters.
F-5. The staff weather officer begins the session by providing current and predicted weather and its
effects on combat operations for the next 72 to 96 hours. Next, the team examines the current situation
(present out to 96 hours). The intelligence officer and operations officer brief the enemy and friendly
situation with emphasis on anticipated actions during the period of the targeting cycle. The intelligence
collection manager briefs battle damage collection currently in effect and possible HPT nominations for
immediate reengagement.
F-6. The current operations agenda involves enemy and friendly situation updates from the intelligence
and operations officers that impact on the HPTL and the AGM. They confirm the joint air missions for the
following day, nominated targets, or changes to targets. A significant change in the situation would warrant
redirecting allocated joint air capabilities. If there are no significant changes, planning continues for the use
of aircraft to support ground operations. The operations plans officer briefs a review of operations planning
for the next targeting cycle. The operations officer briefs the concept of operations against the targets
assigned. The intelligence collection manager briefs the collection plan to validate targets and pursue BDA
based on the target guidance and target priorities. The executors of planed operations brief their respective
execution matrixes and conduct any remaining staff coordination needed.
F-7. The future operations agenda involves the intelligence officer and operations officer briefing the
anticipated enemy and friendly situations. A review of the war gaming session for this time period is
discussed. Recommended target guidance, target priorities, and objectives are provided to the commander
for approval at the targeting board. Targets nominated to support corps and division objectives and
priorities are approved and forwarded through channels to the battlefield coordination detachment. The
operations officer briefs shaping operations and attacks for corps or division assets.
F-8. Scheduled meetings between corps and division provide an interactive process for planning and
coordinating the allocation of available joint air capabilities during the execution of the joint air tasking
cycle (see figure F-1). These meetings synchronize corps and division current and future operations with
usually at least five joint ATOs at any given time for future actions, todays plan, tomorrows plan, and the
day after tomorrows plan to include the plan in strategy development. The continuous assessment
conducted during these meetings allows for the targeting working group to focus on lessons learned,
deliberate targeting, and TST in the detect and deliver functions during the decide, detect, deliver , and
assess D3A methodology.
Figure F-1. Meeting times interface between corps and division (example)
Operations
F-11. Briefs recently completed or ongoing attacks and their effects on the current battle. Current
operations briefs the:
Changes to task organization.
Current FSCMs.
Relative combat power of all friendly maneuver brigade size units.
Friendly maneuver unit locations.
Friendly operations (last 24 hours).
Friendly scheme of maneuver (next 48 96 hours).
F-12. Representatives of the executing agencies of each shaping operations (corps or division aviation,
special operations forces, and others as needed) brief their execution matrix. They may request input or
additional guidance from the chief of staff.
Targeting officer
F-13. The targeting officer presents BDA obtained from division, corps, and echelons above corps
intelligence gathering assets on critical HPT attacked by division, corps, supporting, and subordinate units.
Specificity and timeliness are essential. The targeting officer must be proactive in receiving BDA because
the degradation of specific targets may be a trigger mechanism for future operations. The corps intelligence
officer and aviation combat element help the targeting officer review and formulate BDA. Target
nominations for immediate reattack of HPTs are made at this time.
Plans
F-14. The intelligence plans officer briefs the disposition of important enemy units and associated systems
impact on the unit mission. The intelligence officer also briefs the most likely enemy COA in the next 48 to
96 hours.
F-15. The operations plans officer reviews the plans for the next 48 to 96 hours that have been handed off
to subordinate units for execution. The operations officer briefs the current concept of operations.
Fires Cell
F-16. The FSCOORD or DFSCOORD discusses the approved targeting guidance, HPTL, AGM, and target
selection standards with the team in light of the intelligence and operations situation briefings. The team
determines if changes are required.
Collection Manager
F-17. The collection manager reviews the intelligence collection plan for all division, corps, and echelons
above corps systems that will assist in targeting. The collection management officer highlights those HPT
that cannot be covered with available assets. The guidance is received from the operations officer on
specific or additional requirements.
Plans Officer
F-22. The intelligence plans officer briefs the disposition of important enemy units and associated systems
impacting on the unit mission. He also briefs the most likely enemy COA. This briefing includes enemy
follow on forces anticipated to be committed in the unit sector and other forces that will affect future
operations. The briefing includes potential HPT that if nominated for attack, meet the commanders intent
and if not attacked will significantly impact the future OPLAN.
Plans Officer
F-23. The operations plans officer will brief any operations planned during this time period, and briefs any
branches or sequels to the current OPLAN.
Fires Cell
F-24. The DFSCOORD presents a proposed decision briefing to the working group for the targeting board
on proposed targeting guidance and priorities. This includes:
Recommended target guidance, objectives, and priorities.
Recommended HPTL, AGM, and target selection standards.
Proposed prioritized target list to be forwarded to higher headquarters for execution and
targeting tasking for subordinate units.
Targeting Officer
F-27. The targeting officer prepares information briefings for the deputy fire support coordinator to
include
Targeting guidance and priorities.
The targeting working group meeting agenda.
HPTL, AGM, and target selection standards.
F-28. The HPTL include HPT nominations submitted by the subordinate units to the unit fires cell. The
targets are prioritized based on approved targeting guidance and priorities. The targeting officer also
updates the situation map and provides the team with all current and proposed FSCMs. The targeting
officer is also responsible for consolidating, coordinating, providing to the team for approval and
disseminating the restricted target list, and no-strike list. The list includes historical, religious, educational,
civic, and humanitarian sites within the unit boundaries.
Engineer Officer
F-29. The unit engineer officer provides expertise on enemy capabilities for bridging, breaching, and
infrastructure construction. The engineer officer helps the targeting working group determine target
feasibility of enemy engineer equipment. Specifically, the engineer officer or his representative must be
prepared to discuss:
The width of a gap that the enemy can bridge.
The depth of any minefields the enemy can breach and location of breach sites.
The ability of the enemy to repair bridges, roads, airfields, and ports.
The obstacles plan is included in target planning.
Deception Officer
F-30. The deception officer advises the team on conflicts between targeting and deception plans.
Liaison Officer
F-35. The division or brigade liaison officer addresses the concerns of their commanders pertaining to
targeting and future operations. They are prepared to discuss their commanders targeting priorities, future
plans, and air interdiction target nominations. The discussion prepares the unit staff to support and
anticipate the targeting needs of subordinate units. The liaison officer is prepared to discuss updates to
FSCMs.
F-40. The five functions provide a fully functional, synchronized information system. The signal officer
coordinates with the operations officer, and other targeting working group members as required.
During the first days of Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force reported that the B-52
raids consistently fell short of the target. The weapon systems locating targets were
on a different datum from the Boeing B-52 navigation system. The B-52 bomber
missions were successful after the datum issues were identified and corrected. In
some cases, forward observers, fire direction centers, and weapon systems were using
issued maps with different datums. Location variances exceeded 700 meters. In other
Operation Desert Storm examples, a global positioning system receiver position was
compared to a paper map position and in many cases the positions varied by
hundreds of meters. In another example, troops deploying to Somalia found the maps
available were a mix of Russian maps found in Gauss Kruger and World Geodetic
System 72.
All joint operations utilize the World Geodetic Systems 84 datum for references
coordinates according to the CJCSI 3900.01C.
DATUM USE
G-5. The JFC must identify which datum information is to be used within the joint force for exchange of
position information. Subordinate personnel must know which datum to use and ensure that operational
datum target coordinates, position coordinates, fire control systems, and current operational maps are all on
the same datum.
H-3. The target number is comprised of six characters consisting of two letters and four numbers in the
following positions, for example AB1234. The two letters indicate the originator of the target number and
the echelon holding the target data. The senior headquarters establishes and publishes the assigned first
letter in the operations order. The letter Z is the only permanently assigned first letter. The target number
prefix Z is reserved for technical use by automatic data processing systems among nations when
transferring target information from one nation to another. The second letter E is allocated for Service
components forces in automatic data processing systems in those instances where a Z prefix target is
generated for example ZE. Table H-1 is an example of the assignment of first letters for targeting in an
operational environment.
Table H-1. Assignment of first letter (example)
Organization Letter
CENTCOM C
United States A
United Kingdom B
EUROCORPS E
France F
Germany D
MNC M
NRDC Italy N
Legend:
CENTCOM Central Command
EUROCORPS European Corps
MNC Multi National Corps
NRDC NATO Rapid Deployable Corps
H-4. Target numbers serve as an index to all other information regarding a particular target, such as
location, description, and size. Normally, a common target numbering system is used at corps and within a
major force. Target block numbers are traceable to its originating source to specific users. Corps down to
brigade combat team (BCT) level may assign the second letter (A through Z). See table H-2 on page H-2.
H-5. Once a target is assigned a target number that association remains as long as the target exists. The
target and target number maintain their association even when passed to an adjacent, higher or lower
headquarters.
Elements Letters
Corps AA
Fires Cell AB
TACP AC
X Division AD
1 BCT AE
2 BCT AF
3 BCT AG
4 BCT AH
Y Division AJ
1 BCT AK
2 BCT AM
3 BCT AN
4 BCT AQ
Legend: TACP tactical air control party
BCT brigade combat team
H-6. Table H-3 is an example of standard blocks of numbers assigned within a brigade.
Table H-3. Assignment of blocks of numbers (example)
H-7. Table H-4 is an example of how a battalion size element with a block of numbers may allocate their
numbers. Consult the unit SOP for specific unit target numbers. Additional number blocks are requested
from the supervising fires cell.
Table H-4. Additional assignment of blocks of numbers (example)
SECTION II TERMS
*attack guidance matrix
A targeting product approved by the commander, which addresses the how and when targets are
engaged and the desired effects.
board
A grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision authority for a particular
purpose or function. (FM 6-0)
defeat
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the
physical means or the will to fight. The defeated forces commander is unwilling or unable to pursue
that individuals adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commanders will and can
no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the
use of force or the threat of its use. (FM 3-90-1)
denial operations
Actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of spacew, personnel, supplies, or facilities. (FM 3-90-1)
destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is
reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform
any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)
destruction
1. In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of
action permanently or ineffective for a long period of time, producing at least 30-percent casualties or
materiel damage. 2. A type of adjustment for destroying a given target. (FM 3-09)
disrupt
1. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and
obstacles to upset an enemys formation or tempo, interrupt the enemys timetable, or cause enemy
forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy force to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its
timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 3-90-1)
diversion
The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the prinicipal operation; an
attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. (JP 3-03)
dynamic targeting
Targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late, or not selectedd for action in time to be included in
dleiberate targeting. (JP 3-60)
effect
1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another
effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or
degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)
fires warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air
and missile defense and joint fires through the targeting process. (ADRP 3-0)
high-payoff target
A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of
action. (JP 3-60)
high-payoff target list
A prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation. (FM 3-09)
*high-value individual
A person of interest who is identified, surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged.
high-value target
A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)
site exploitation
A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, peronnel, and/or
materiel found during the conduct of operations. (JP 3-31)
synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)
target
1. An entity or object that performs a function for the adversary considered for
possible engagement or other action. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area,
installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An
area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact
burst that hits the target. (JP 3-60)
target development
The systematic examination of potential target systemsand their components, individual targets, and
even elements of targetsto determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be
exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commanders specific objectives.
(JP 3-60)
targeting
The process of selecting and priortizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them,
considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)
time-sensitive target
A joint force commander validated target or set of targets requiring immediate response because it is a
highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly
forces. (JP 3-60).
validation
A part of target development that ensures all vetted targets meet the objectives and criteria outlined in
the commanders guidance and ensures compliance with the law of war and rules of engagement. (JP
3-60)
vetting
A part of target development that assesses the accuracy of the supporting intelligence to targeting. (JP
3-60)
weaponeering
The process of determining the quanity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal means required to
create a desired effect on a given target. (JP 3-60)
working group
(Army) A grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate,
and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. (FM 6-0)
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm
JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 August 2011.
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.
JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, 14 October 2011.
JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, 10 February 2014.
JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 24 February 2014.
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 11 September 2013.
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 31 January 2013.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html.
FIELD MANUALS
FM 1-04, Legal Support To The Operational Army, 18 March 2013.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Most army forms are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/
DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms, February 1974.
A C N
AGM, 2-2, 2-6, 2-15, D-3, 2 corps and division targeting, 3- neutralize, 1-3
air tasking order, D-9 1
O
assess, 1-8, 2-13, A-4, D-4, E- D on-call target, 1-4
2
datum, G-1
assessment, 2-13 P
decide, 1-7, 2-2, B-1
attack guidance, 2-5, 2-10 physical damage assessment,
deliberate targeting, 1-4, A-1 2-15
attack guidance matrix, 2-2,
2-6, 2-15, D-3, 2 deliver, A-1, B-2 planned targets, 1-4
detect, 1-8, 2-7, A-1, B-2
B S
disrupt, 1-3
battle damage assessment, 2- scheduled target, 1-4
14, 3-3 doctrinal, 1-1
sensitive target, 1-5
BCT battalion dynamic targeting, 1-4, 1-5, A-
1 service components and
fire support sergeant, 4-13 targeting, 1-10
terminal attack control for E suppress, 1-3
close air support, 4-13
effects
BCT battalion/squadron disrupt, 1-3
T
fire support/targeting interdict, 1-3 target development, 2-8
noncommissioned officer, neutralize, 1-3 target selection standard, D-2
4-13 suppress, 1-3
fires cell, 4-12 target selection standards, 2-4
electronic warfare officer, 3-8,
BCT command and staff target validation, 2-9
4-10, F-8
S-7, 4-9 target vetting, 2-8
S-9, 4-10 F targeting, 1-2
BCT fire cell FAIO, 3-4, 3-7 targeting, 3-5
information coordinator, 4-9 field artillery intelligence officer, targeting board, 4-3
BCT fires cell 3-7
civil affairs officer, 4-10 targeting methodology, 1-6
field artillery intelligence officer,
fire support 3-4 targeting officer, F-7
noncommissioned officer, targeting officer, 3-7
fires cell, 4-12
4-9
fires cell, 3-1 targeting officer, 4-8
fire support specialist, 4-9
Marine Corps liaison officer, targeting working group, 2-6, 2-
H 8, 2-11, 2-12, 2-15, 4-1, 4-2,
4-12
military information support high-payoff target, 2-2 E-1, F-1
operations high-payoff target list, 2-2, 4-1, brigade fire support officer
noncommissioned officer, D-1 as lead, 4-5
4-10 information provided by
high-payoff target list, 3-4 core members, 4-15
naval surface fire support
liaison officer, 4-11 high-payoff target list, D-3 membership, 4-3
tactical air control party, 4- high-value individual, B-1, D-9 targeting working group and
11 high-value target, 2-2 board
target analyst/targeting preparation for, 4-13
HPT, 2-2
noncommissioned officer, targeting working group and
4-9 HVI, B-1, D-9
targeting board
BCT fires cell operations HVT, 2-2 member responsibilities, 4-3
noncommissioned officer, 4- targeting working group or
I
8 targeting board
interdict, 1-3
BCT fires cell public affairs subsequent actions, 4-16
officer, 4-11 J time-sensitive target, 1-5, A-1
BDA, 2-14, 3-3 joint targeting cycle, 3-1, 3-3 TST, 1-5, A-1
joint targeting process, 3-1, 3-3
U V W
unanticipated target, 1-4 validation, 2-9 weaponeering, 2-11
unplanned target, 1-4 vetting, 2-8
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. OKEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1511405
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media
only (EMO).
PIN: 105207-000