Guidance Relating To The Implementation of Solas Chapter Xi-2 and The Isps Code - Msc/Circ. 1132
Guidance Relating To The Implementation of Solas Chapter Xi-2 and The Isps Code - Msc/Circ. 1132
Guidance Relating To The Implementation of Solas Chapter Xi-2 and The Isps Code - Msc/Circ. 1132
E
IMO
Ref. T2-MSS/2.11.1
MSC/Circ.1132
14 December 2004
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MSC/Circ.1132
ANNEX
GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE
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8
SOLAS regulation XI-2/4.5 also requires ships to report to the appropriate competent
authority if they cannot comply with the security level set by their Administration or by a
Contracting Government and applicable to that ship. MSC/Circ.1097 on Guidance relating to the
implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code provides further guidance on this
requirement.
9
If a ship entering a port or within a port, is operating at a security level set by its
Administration which is higher than that set by the ports Contracting Government, arrangements
have to be agreed with the PFSO to allow the ship to continue to operate at the security level set
by its Administration. A Contracting Government or PFSO cannot require a ship to reduce that
ships security level.
10
Notwithstanding the set security level applying to a ship, to a port or a port facility or to a
territorial sea, if a threat emerges or an incident occurs the ship or port facility will have to
respond to the security threat or incident as it develops, in accordance with the ship or the port
facility security plan, without waiting for the Administration or Contracting Government to set a
higher security level. The initiation of an appropriate response to an emerging threat or actual
incident cannot, and should not, await change of the security level by the Administration or
Contracting Government. The ship or port facility should report the threat or incident, and the
action taken, to the Administration and/or Contracting Government at the earliest practicable
opportunity.
DECLARATION OF SECURITY
11
Under SOLAS regulation XI-2/10.3 Contracting Governments determine when the
submission of a Declaration of Security (DoS) from a ship is to be required by a port facility.
Section A/5.2 of the ISPS Code specifies when a ship can request a DoS from a port facility.
Paragraphs B/5.1 to B/5.6 of the ISPS Code offer guidance in relation to DoS. The practice of
requiring or responding to requests for a DoS should be set out in the Port Facility Security Plan
(PFSP) and that on requesting a DoS in the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
12
Though a ship has to comply with a request from a port facility to complete a DoS, a port
facility does not have to comply with a request for the completion of a DoS from a ship, though a
request from a ship to complete a DoS has to be acknowledged by the port facility (section A/5.3
of the ISPS Code). In the same way another ship does not have to comply with the request for a
DoS though it should acknowledge receipt of the request (section A/5.3 of the ISPS Code).
13
The DoS is intended to be used in exceptional cases usually related to higher risk, when
there is a need to reach an agreement between the port facility and the ship as to the security
measures to be applied during the ship/port interface because, either the provisions of the PFSP
and of the SSP did not envisage the situation or SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the
ISPS Code have not anticipated the specific circumstances as listed in section A/5.2 of the
ISPS Code. There should be a security-related reason relating to the specific ship/port interface
or ship-to-ship activity for requiring or requesting completion of a DoS.
14
Experience since entry into force of the special measures to enhance maritime security
has shown that DoS are being frequently requested by ships, in part because ships anticipate
being requested to produce DoS covering previous port visits or ship-to-ship activities by duly
authorized officers by a Contracting Government (duly authorized officers) during control and
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compliance measures pursuant to the provisions of SOLAS regulation XI-2/9. However, while a
ship can request a DoS the port facility or other ship is not required to complete one.
15
Unless there are specific security reasons for doing so relating to the specific ship/port
interface or ship-to-ship activity, a ship should not request a DoS. The circumstances specified
in section A/5.2 of the ISPS Code should apply. A DoS should not normally be completed if
both the ship, port facility or other ship covered by the ISPS Code are operating at security
level 1.
16
Under section A/5.2 of the ISPS Code a ship can request completion of a DoS when:
.1
the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another ship
it is interfacing with;
.2
.3
there has been a security threat or a security incident involving the ship or
involving the port facility, as applicable;
.4
the ship is at a port which is not required to have and implement an approved port
facility security plan; or
.5
the ship is conducting ship to ship activities with another ship not required to have
and implement an approved ship security plan.
17
Duly authorized officers can inspect those DoS that have been completed during the last
10 calls at port facilities and any evidence that the request by a ship for a DoS, during the period
of the last 10 calls at port facilities, where applicable, was acknowledged by a port facility or
another ship even though the port facility or the other ship did not comply with the request. Duly
authorized officers should not expect ships to have DoS covering all previous port calls or
ship-to-ship activities.
THE NEED FOR AND THE BENEFITS FROM AN EFFECTIVE AND CONTINUING DIALOGUE
General
18
Effective and continuing dialogue between Company and Ship Security Officers and
PFSOs, duly authorized officers and control authorities is central to the efficient implementation
of the security regime established under SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. Without such
dialogue issues can arise which could lead to possible misunderstandings and the risk of delay or
disruption to ship/port interfaces, the ability of shipboard personnel to exercise effective access
controls to their ship or undertake essential safety-related inspections or safety exercises.
19
In most cases dialogue on security-related matters will be between the ship and the PFSO.
If issues arise which are the responsibility of Government control authorities operating at the port
facility, the PFSO should seek to facilitate dialogue between the ship and such authorities, for
example by providing the contact details of the relevant authority.
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20
To the extent that such dialogue involves the exchange of security-related information
including, for example, information on the security level the ship is operating, details of the
ships access controls or the timing of ship related exercises they should be conducted by secure
means and, if possible, the transmission of such information using VHF radio communications
should be avoided.
21
All ships to which SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code apply are required to exercise
appropriate access controls in accordance with their SSPs. The purpose of such dialogue is to
secure agreement on the procedures to be followed when the ship is in port. Examples of
situations where such dialogue and agreement would be beneficial include, but are not limited to:
pilots;
stevedore identification;
Control of access
22
Control of access by shore based personnel to ships when in port should be regulated
under the provisions of the respective PFSP. The circumstances when access to ships through the
port facility is restricted, or denied, to owners representatives, safety inspectors or auditors,
maintenance and repair personnel and representatives of seafarers welfare and labour
organizations should be specified in the PFSP and approved by the Contracting Government. In
general every effort should be made to facilitate such access unless there are specific
security-related reasons specified in the PFSP for not doing so.
Identification is required
23
The ISPS Code requires all those wishing to board the ship to have a means of
identification which is acceptable to that ship. This includes stevedores and other port workers.
Stevedores and other port workers should carry identification issued by the port facility or a local
authority responsible for the engagement or employment of stevedores. The dialogue between
the ship and the PFSO should establish how access to the ship by stevedores and other port
workers is to be controlled. In cases where the stevedores, or other port workers, do not carry
identification issued by either the port facility or a local authority the ship may issue its own
temporary identification before allowing access.
Reading of draught marks and safety-related inspections
24
The visual reading of draught marks by the shipboard personnel is an essential safety
requirement. Shipboard personnel is required to carry out a varied of safety-related inspections
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and maintenance of the ship which require access to the immediate vicinity of the ship. In cases
where the shipboard personnel may not possess the appropriate documentation to allow them
access to the territory of the Contracting Government or country, arrangements should be agreed
to allow them to undertake such activity. Such arrangements will require co-ordination between
the PFSO and the relevant control authorities and there should be a presumption that they will be
facilitated unless a specific security threat exists at the port facility. In such cases alternative
arrangement to allow the accurate reading of draught marks or other safety-related inspections
and maintenance by the shipboard personnel should be in place.
Lifeboat and evacuation drills and exercises
25
Lifeboat and evacuation drills and exercises are essential to the safe operation of the ship
and are most safely undertaken when a ship is in port. If such drills or exercises are planned
when the ship is in port, the arrangements to allow them to be undertaken should be agreed in
advance by the ship, the PFSO or control authorities. There should be a presumption that such
drills or exercises will be facilitated unless a specific security threat exists.
FAMILIARIZATION OF THE SHIP SECURITY OFFICER
26
It is a fundamental requirement that the Ship Security Officer (SSO) should have
adequate training and be familiar with the security arrangements on the specific ship on which
the SSO serves. In cases where changes in shipboard personnel involve the replacement of the
serving SSO it is the responsibility of the Company to ensure that the replacement SSO has an
appropriate opportunity to become familiar with the particular ship, and its SSP, on which SSO is
to serve before taking over and assuming their security-related duties and responsibilities.
CONTACTING THE COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
27
The position of Company Security Officer (CSO) is a 24-hour responsibility. However,
the CSO does not have to directly undertake all the duties and responsibilities of the CSO and
their delegation is acceptable. In most instances the direct point of contact between a ship and its
Company will be through the duty officer of the Company, who, if not the actual CSO, can alert
the Company official undertaking the duties of the CSO. If duly authorized officers wish to
confirm the procedures under which the ship can contact the CSO it would appear appropriate
that a reasonable test would be the speed with which the ship can contact the duty officer of the
Company and receive a response from either the CSO or the Company official acting on the
behalf of the CSO.
CONTROL MEASURES OR STEPS
28
If the imposition of control measures or steps against a ship, pursuant to the provisions of
SOLAS regulation XI-2/9, is considered necessary these should be based, as far as possible, on a
thorough assessment of the prevailing security risks. Such assessments should be undertaken on
a non-discriminatory basis. When action is being considered on the basis of information
provided anonymously, or from non-official sources, every effort should be made to confirm the
authenticity of the information.
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