Goldman Sachs: Risk M anagement and the Residential Mortgage M ar ket

I. Executive Summary

The financial crisis has been a humbling experience for every participant in the financial system.
The events of the past few years have put a particular focus on risk management, its failures and
its economic implications.

At Goldman Sachs, we have dealt with both the challenges of navigating the crisis itself and with
questions about our actions before and during the crisis. Our risk management and business
practices in the mortgage market have received much attention. In that connection, we would
like to make the following points:

¾ *ROGPDQ6DFKVGLGQRWWDNHDODUJHGLUHFWLRQDO³EHW´against the U.S. housing market,

and the firm was not consistently or significantly net ³short WKHPDUNHW´LQresidential
mortgage-related products in 2007 and 2008, as the performance of our residential
mortgage-related products business demonstrates.

¾ Goldman Sachs was not a dominant participant in the residential mortgage-related

SURGXFWVPDUNHW7KHILUP¶Vnet revenues from residential mortgage-related activities
were very small, both in total and relative to the rest of our business. In fact, from 2003
to 2008, annual net revenues attributable to mortgage-related products, commercial and
residential, QHYHUH[FHHGHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\RIWKHILUP¶VRYHUDOOQHWUHYHQXHV In
fiscal year 2007, the firm had less than $500 million of net revenue from residential
mortgage-related products ±approximately RIWKHILUP¶VRYHUDOOnet revenues.

¾ Goldman Sachs did not have access to any special information that caused us to know
that the U.S. housing market would collapse. In fact, as a result of the spread of the crisis
from subprime to all residential mortgages, Goldman Sachs had overall net losses of
approximately $1.7 billion with respect to residential mortgage-related products for fiscal
year 2008.

¾ Goldman Sachs did not engage in some type of massive ³EHW´ against our clients. The
risk management of WKHILUP¶Vexposures and the activities of our clients dictated the
ILUP¶VRYHUDOODFWLRQV, not any view of what might or might not happen to any security or
market.

¾ We maintained appropriately high standards with regard to client selection, suitability

and disclosure as a market maker and underwriter. As a market maker in the mortgage
market, we are primarily engaged in the business of assisting clients in executing their
desired transactions. As an underwriter, the firm is expected to assist the issuer in
providing an offering document to investors that discloses all material information
relevant to the offering.

1
 ¾ Goldman 6DFKV¶ULVNPDQDJHPHQWGHFLVLRQVZere motivated not by any collective view
RIZKDWZRXOGKDSSHQQH[WEXWUDWKHUE\IHDURIWKHXQNQRZQ7KHILUP¶VULVN
management processes did not, and could not, provide absolute clarity; they underscored
deep uncertainty about evolving conditions in the U.S. residential housing market. That
uncertainty dictated our decision to attempt to UHGXFHWKHILUP¶VRYHUDOOULVN

¾ Goldman Sachs sold &ROODWHUDOL]HG'HEW2EOLJDWLRQV³CDOs´ principally to large

financial institutions, insurance companies and hedge funds with a focus on this type of
product.1 These investors had access to highly detailed information that allowed them to
conduct their own independent research and analysis.

¾ Goldman Sachs never created mortgage-related products that were designed to fail. It is
critical to remember that the decline in value of mortgage-related securities occurred as a
result of the broader collapse of the housing market. It was not because there were any
deficiencies in the underlying instruments. The instruments performed as would have
been expected in those unexpected circumstances.

There are valuable lessons to be learned from the financial crisis in general, and the collapse of
the mortgage market in particular. It is critical that we and other financial institutions learn the
right lessons, if we are to avoid future crises in the financial system.

II. Goldman Sachs as Market Maker

$WWKHKHDUWRI*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶VDOHVDQGWUDGLQJEXVLQHVVLVour UROHDVD³PDUNHWPDNHU´$VD
market maker, the firm stands ready, willing and able to buy and sell financial instruments at the
initiation of our FOLHQWV*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶FOLHQWVH[SHFWthe firm to do so, regardless of whether
the other side of a transaction has been identified or is readily available. In light of the global
and complex nature of markets, it would be very difficult for companies, institutions and
governments to raise capital, manage their risks and fund their operations without financial
institutions committing their capital on behalf of clients.

2XUFOLHQWV¶QHHGVDUHthe single biggest factor driving Goldman Sachs to accept risk. The
H[SRVXUHVFUHDWHGWKURXJKWUDQVDFWLRQVZLWKFOLHQWVDUHSDUWRIWKHRYHUDOO³LQYHQWRU\´RI
instruments we generally carry as part of our business. These risks -- like market price, volatility
and credit -- all must be actively managed. Once the firm transacts with a client, thereby taking
on an exposure, our most effective risk management tool is to enter into a transaction that
counterbalances the risk we have just assumed. In many cases, however, this can be difficult
because of imperfect, mismatched or unavailable offsetting exposures. Nevertheless, Goldman
6DFKV¶FOLHQWVH[SHFWWKHILUPWRVWDQGUHDG\to transact in all market conditions.

1
A corporate-related pension fund that had long been active in this area also made a purchase of less than $5 million.

2
III. *ROGPDQ6DFKV¶3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQthe Residential Mortgage Market

*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶ residential mortgage-related business consists of structuring, trading,

underwriting and distributing mortgage- and asset-backed related products. These products
include loans, securities and derivatives backed by residential real estate loans.

The residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) is one such product. Through an RMBS,
pools of home loans are structured into a security, with the underlying mortgage loans serving as
collateral and providing income to the investors in the security.

A Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) pools various RMBS and other income-producing
assets into different tranches with varying degrees of risk. The most senior tranches carry the
least risk of default and, in turn, provide the lowest interest rate to the investor. ,QD³V\QWKHWLF´
CDO, two parties enter into a derivative transaction, which references particular assets. By the
very nature of a synthetic CDO, one counterparty must be long the risk (i.e., hoping to benefit
from an increase in the value of the referenced assets), and the other counterparty must be short
the risk (i.e., hoping to benefit from a decrease in the value of the referenced assets).

Goldman Sachs has not been a significant participant in the market for originating mortgages. In
fact, the number of loans originated by Goldman Sachs, which acquired a small originator in
March 2007, never exceeded one-tenth of one percent of total domestic residential mortgages.

In structuring and underwriting RMBS, Goldman Sachs often purchased the underlying loans
from banks and other lenders. In other cases, Goldman Sachs acted as an underwriter for
securitizations of the loans of mortgage originators. In both situations, Goldman Sachs engaged
in a due diligence process to examine (i) the counterparty, (ii) loan level credit, (iii) compliance
and (iv) property valuation.

In this context, the firm was acting as an underwriter of financial instruments, rather than a
market maker. A market maker is primarily engaged in the business of assisting clients in
executing their desired transactions. This business is client-driven, and serves an intermediary
function. Goldman Sachs strives to provide a fair price to our clients.

In contrast, an underwriter of financial instruments works with the issuer in connection with
offering financial instruments to investors. In this context, federal securities laws effectively
LPSRVHD³JDWHNHHSHU´UROHRQ*ROGPDQ6DFKVDVDQXQGHUZULWHUWKHILUPLVH[SHFWHGWRDVVLVW
the issuer in providing an offering document to investors that discloses all material information
relevant to the offering.

In connection with our underwriting of residential mortgage-related securities, Goldman Sachs

had a process to examine the management, relevant policies and procedures, underwriting
standards, creditworthiness and other aspects of each mortgage originator before the firm began
purchasing loans for securitization. As a result of these reviews, we determined not to do
business with dozens of originators and suspended our business relationships with many more.

3
The firm also employed internal and third-party resources to conduct due diligence on the
individual loans in the pools backing the securities in our RMBS offerings, including reviewing
selected loan files, verifying compliance with state and federal lending statutes, and selective
review of property appraisals against comparable values. As a result, Goldman Sachs generally
did not accept loans that, based on our review and analysis, appeared to have potentially
significant legal, regulatory compliance or other issues. Knowing what we know today, of
course, we wish we had done even more.

Regardless of the degree of due diligence performed by underwriters in connection with RMBS
securitizations, however, they cannot and do not guarantee payment, performance or any rate of
return. Rather, it is up to the purchaser of securities to evaluate whether the securities are worthy
RILQYHVWPHQWEDVHGRQWKHSXUFKDVHU¶VRZQYLHZDQGDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHFXULWLHV¶YDOXHLQOLJKWRI
WKHSXUFKDVHU¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHIXWXUHRIWKHKRXVLQJPDUNHWDQGWKHHFRQRP\.
Importantly, in the case of asset-backed securities, the disclosures set forth in the ILUP¶Voffering
documents included detailed descriptions of the underlying assets.

IV. *ROGPDQ6DFKV¶3RVLWLRQLQWKHResidential Mortgage and CDO Markets

Goldman Sachs certainly was not the dominant participant in the residential mortgage securities
underwriting market. The firm entered this market space relatively late, with a small amount of
customer activity and without a significant mortgage origination business.

Goldman Sachs Underwriting Market Shares in Subprime RMBS and CDOs

Subprime RMBS CDOs
Market  Share

Market  Share

95.4% 93.9% 91.2% 91.1% 94.3%

>95.8%

4.6% 6.1% 8.8% 8.9% 5.7%

<4.2%

2005 2006 2007¹ 2005 2006 2007

Year Year
Others GS

4
 Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Asset Backed AlertGS
1
For 2007, Inside Mortgage Finance published market share data for only the top 10 underwriters. The 10th largest underwriter in 2007 was Bank
of America with a 4.2% market share. As Goldman Sachs did not appear in the top 10, we can deduce that it had a market share of less than
4.2%.

V. Risk Management

A. *HWWLQJ³&ORVHUWR+RPH´

7KHIRXQGDWLRQRI*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶DSSURDFKWRULVNPDQDJHPHQWLV disciplined mark-to-market

accounting. This involves the daily practice of valuing WKHILUP¶VDVVHWVDQGOLDELOLWLHVWRFXUUHQW
market levels ± that is, the value one might expect to find on the open market. Without a
transparent and realistic insight into our own financial position, Goldman Sachs would not be
able properly to assess or manage our risk. It was mark-to-market accounting that spurred
Goldman Sachs to reduce WKHILUP¶V risk in the residential mortgage market near the end of 2006.

As a result of this firmwide discipline, Dan Sparks, then head of the mortgage department, was
able to tell senior members of the firm in an email on December 5, 2006, WKDWWKH³6XESULPH
market [was] getting hit haUG«At this SRLQWZHDUHGRZQPPWRGD\´2

For senior management, the emergence of a pattern of losses, even relatively modest losses, in a
business of the firm will typically raise a red flag. Concerned by increasing volatility and
repeated daily losses in WKHILUP¶VPRUWJDJHEXVLQHVVP&L, 'DYLG9LQLDUWKHILUP¶VChief
Financial Officer, convened a meeting RIWKHILUP¶VVHQLRUPRUWJDJHWUDGHUVDQGULVNPDQDJHUV
on December 14, 2006. At that time, Goldman Sachs had a net long exposure to subprime,
prime and other residential mortgage risk. It was agreed during the meeting that the firm should
reduce its overall exposure to the subprime mortgage market ± getting, in effect, ³FORVHUWR
home.´ To be clear, Mr. Viniar did not instruct the mortgage business to take a particular
directional view on the subprime mortgage market. Nor did Mr. Viniar prohibit the mortgage
EXVLQHVVIURPWDNLQJVKRUWSRVLWLRQVRUEHFRPLQJQHWVKRUW,QVWHDG0U9LQLDU¶VJXLGDQFHWRWKH
mortgage department was to not take a significant directional position -- short or long -- in any
direction and to do its best tRUHGXFHWKHVL]HRIWKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VRYHUDOOSRVLWLRQVLQWKH
subprime market.

In a December 15, e-mail to Tom Montag, then co-head of the Securities Division, Mr. Viniar
recounted the meeting of the day before, stating³Dan and team did a very good job going
through the risks. On ABX3, the position is reasonably sensible but is just too big. Might have
to spend a little to size it appropriately. 2QHYHU\WKLQJHOVHP\EDVLFPHVVDJHZDVOHW¶VEH
aggressive distributing things [i.e., reducing risk] because there will be very good opportunities
as the markets goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to
take advantage of them [i.e., opportunities].´4 In an email two days later, Dan Sparks updated
senior PDQDJHPHQW³:HPDGHSURJUHVVODVWZHHNEXWVWLOOPRUHZRUNWRGR«%HORZVKRZVULVN
reduction trade[s]´5

2
GS MBS-E-010930468 (December 5, 2006 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Tom Montag, et a.l) $OO³*60%6-E references are to
materials provided to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.)
3
ABX is an index that tracks the performance of subprime residential mortgage bonds.
4
GS MBS-E-009726498 (December 15, 2006 e-mail from David Viniar to Tom Montag)
5
GS MBS-E-009726143 (December 17, 2006 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Tom Montag, et al)

5
In an e-mail to WKHILUP¶V senior management on February 14, 2007, Mr. Sparks outlined the
efforts to reduce long risk that his department had commenced:

Over the last few months, our risk reduction program consisted of:

(1) selling index outright

(2) buying single name protection
(3) buying protection on super-senior portions of the BBB/BBB- index (40-
100% of the index).6

On February 22, 2007, Mr. Sparks sent an e-mail to several people on the mortgage desk urging
them to continue getting closer to home, including reducing short positions:

We need to buy back $1 billion single names and $2 billion of the stuff below ±
today. I know that sounds huge, but you can do it ± spend bid/offer, pay through
the market, whatever to get it done. It is a great time to do it ± bad news on HPA,
originators pulling out, recent upticks in unemployment, originator pain. I will
not want us to trade property derivatives until we get much closer to home as it
will be a significant distraction from our goal. This is a time to just do it, show
respect for risk, and show the ability to listen and execute firm directives.7

Attempting to reduce its overall risk to subprime residential mortgage-related securities meant
that the firm at various times would find itself net short, though not significantly so.

B. Concerns about Short Positions

It was well known that housing prices were weakening in early 2007. But no one knew when the
market would reach bottom and whether values would continue to fall, rebound, or at least
stabilize at levels where buyers of residential subprime mortgage-related securities would receive
their full interest and principal payments. The impact of subprime mortgage-related securities on
the housing market and broader economy was similarly unclear. In March 2007, Federal Reserve
FKDLUPDQ%HQ%HUQDQNHWROGODZPDNHUVWKDW³WKHLPSDFWRQWKHbroader economy and financial
PDUNHWVRIWKHSUREOHPVLQWKHVXESULPHPDUNHWVHHPVOLNHO\WREHFRQWDLQHG´8 Other policy
makers and economists repeated this assertion through the summer and early fall, while still
others took the reverse view.

Goldman Sachs continued to attempt to reduce its risk in the subprime market and to move to a
more balanced position, which at various times caused the firm to have a net short bias. At the
time, however, there was no internal consensus on the future of the subprime residential housing
market. On one hand, for instance, Josh Birnbaum, a managing director in the mortgage
department, believed very strongly that the firm should take a larger net short position. On the
other hand, there was a concern among some that the firm might be too short, as emails from the
time period reflect:

6
GS MBS-E-010989331 (February 14, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Tom Montag, et al)
7
GS MBS-E-010381411 (February 22, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Josh Birnbaum et al.)
8
Testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke before the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, March 28, 2007.

6
 x Gary CohnWKHILUP¶V3UHVLGHQWDQG&KLHI2SHUDWLQJ2IILFHU remarked in a
March 6, 2007 e-PDLOWKDW³$ELJSOXVZRXOGKXUWWKH0RUWJDJHEXVLQHVVEXW
Justin thinks he has a big trade lined up for the morning to get us out of a bunch
of our short risk[.]´9

x Dan 6SDUNVQRWHGRQ0DUFKWKDW³$VLGHIURPWKHFRXQWHUSDUW\ULVNVWKH
large risks I worry about arH«[c]overing our shorts. We have longs against
WKHPEXWZHDUHVWLOOQHWVKRUW´10

x On March 14, 2007, Tom Montag WROG/OR\G%ODQNIHLQWKDWWKHILUP³>F@RYHUHG

another 1.2 billion in shorts in mortgages ± almost flat ± now need to reduce
risk[.]´11

x On April 11, 0U6SDUNVUHFHLYHGDQHVWLPDWHRIWKHPRUWJDJHGHSDUWPHQW¶V

exposure to certain products and noted to Kevin Gasvoda, a member of the
GHSDUWPHQW³6XESULPHGRZQPPIURPVKRUWV",VWKDWULJKWDQGDUHZHWRR
VKRUW"´0U*DVYRGDUHSOLHG³<HV6XEprime has near zero loans and is short
some mez abx and $2B aaa abx[.] [T]he aaa short is painful . . . . Plan is to chip
DZD\DWFRYHULQJRQHYHU\FKDQFH´12

During this period, the mortgage department covered more than $2.8 billion in single-name short
positions. Even though these short positions proved profitable when viewed in isolation, this
meaningfully reduced WKHILUP¶VQHWH[SRVXUHWRVXESULPHUHVLGHQWLDOPRUWJDJHVE\VHYHUDO
billion dollars -- in effect, getting the firm closer to home. In addLWLRQE\0DUFKWKHILUP¶VQHW
long exposure to prime and other residential mortgages had grown as a result of meeting client
needs in the mortgage market.

C. Different Views In The Firm

In the spring of 2007, there was continued debate amongst senior managers about the direction of
the residential mortgage market.13 For instance, on March 14, Jon Winkelried e-mailed Mr.
Sparks, and others, indicating that the firm should be prepared for a downturn in the performance
of securities backed by prime loans and asked what it was doing to insulate itself from losses. 14
0U6SDUNVUHSOLHG³7U\LQJWREHVPDOOHU«We are also short a bunch of sub-prime AAA index
IRUMXPSULVNSURWHFWLRQ´15

9
GS MBS-E-009686278 (March 6, 2007 e-mail from Gary Cohn to senior management).
10
GS MBS-E-009718900 (March 8, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks).
11
GS MBS-E-009685739 (March 14, 2007 e-mail from Tom Montag to Lloyd Blankfein).
12
GS MBS-E-010952383-85 (April 11, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Kevin Gasvoda).
13
GS MBS-E-009718900 (March 8, 2007 e-mail from Daniel Sparks to Jon Winkelreid, et al).
14
GS MBS-E-009718239 (March 14, 2007 e-mail from Jon Winkelried to Lloyd Blankfein, et al).
15
GS MBS-E-009718239 (March 14, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Jon Winkelried, et al).

7
Richard Ruzika, a senior Securities Division partner, on the other hand, replied:

It does feel to me like the market in general underestimated how bad it could get.
And now could be overestimating where we are heading. . . . While undoubtedly
there will be some continued VSLOORYHU,¶PQRWVRFRQYLQFHGWKLVLVDWRWDOGHDWK
VSLUDO,QIDFWZHPD\KDYHWHUULILFRSSRUWXQLWLHV'DQ¶VWHDPLVZRUNLQJKDUG
(literally around the clock) so we have a shot at them . . . .16

$V0U5X]LND¶Ve-mail indicates, Goldman Sachs carefully monitored our short positions and
explored the possibility of increasing long positions and other opportunities in the mortgage
markets if market conditions appeared favorable. The firm even explored the possibility of
buying interests in, or pools of assets from, subprime originators. In a March 9, 2007 e-mail that
Gary Cohn subsequently forwarded to Lloyd Blankfein, Dan Sparks discussed potential
investments that the firm might make in subprime originators.17 The firm also continued to
respond to client requests to sell mortgage securities and submit bids on long positions. Various
bids were accepted by clients, and the firm took on additional long risk.

In the third quarter of 2007, the subprime mortgage market deteriorated further. As David Viniar
VWDWHGLQWKHWKLUGTXDUWHUHDUQLQJVFRQIHUHQFHFDOO³The mortgage sector continues to be
challenged and there is a broad decline in the value of mortgage inventories during the quarter.
As a result, we took significant markdowns on our long inventory positions during the quarter as
we had in the previous two quarters. However, our risk bias from that market was to be short and
that net short position was profitable.´18 The firm, however, did not amass a large net short
SRVLWLRQWR³EHWDJDLQVWWKHKRXVLQJPDUNHW´)RUWKHTXDUWHUWKHILUP¶Vnet revenues from
residential mortgage-related activities were less than 5% of its total revenues.

Some in *ROGPDQ6DFKV¶mortgage business began to argue that the firm should consider buying
more mortgage assets, believing that prices may have bottomed. For example:

x In an e-mail on August 20, 2007, Mr. Sparks told Mr. Winkelried (and others) that
³:HWKLQNit is now time to start using balance sheet and it is a unique opportunity
with real upside²VSHFLILFDOO\IRU$$$50%6´Mr. Sparks also said that he was
JRLQJWRGHYLVHD³SODQGHVFULELQJWKHRSSRUWXQLW\DQGSDUDPHWHUVLQFOXGLQJ
funding and risk) relating WREX\LQJELOOLRQV´19

x In an August 21, 2007 e-mail, Josh BirQEDXPWROG7RP0RQWDJDQGRWKHUV³7KH

mortgage department thinks there is currently an extraordinary opportunity for
those with dry powder to add AAA subprime risk in either cash or synthetic
IRUP´20

16
GS MBS-E-009718239 (March 14, 2007 e-mail from Richard Ruzika to Dan Sparks, et al).
17
GS MBS-E-009656302 (March 9, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Gary Cohn et al, forwarded to Lloyd Blankfein)
18
Goldman Sachs Earnings Conference Call dated Sept. 20, 2007, at 3.

19
GS MBS-E-011035212 (August 20, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to senior management)
20
GS MBS-E-009721274 (August 21, 2007 e-mail from Josh Birnbaum to Tom Montag, et al)

8
In late August, the mortgage department again purchased $350 million in triple-B ABX and
covered $150 million in single-name shorts. Without greater clarity on the direction of the
housing market, the firm sought to maintain a balanced position in the subprime mortgage
market. A mortgage presentation to the Board of Directors, dated September 17, 2007, shows
the subprime mortgage position on a notional basis and indicates a substantially balanced
position.21

D. End of 2007/Beginning of 2008

On November 18, 2007 Lucas van Praag, global head of Corporate Communications, sent an e-
mail to Lloyd Blankfein and Gary Cohn about a New York Times article suggesting that Goldman
Sachs profited on the subprime market collapse.22 Mr. Blankfein responded, ³Of course we
didn't dodge the mortgage mess. We lost money, then made more than we lost because of
shorts. Also, it¶s not over, so who knows how it will turn out ultimately.´23 Mr. Cohn qualified,
³:HZHUHMXVWVPDOOHULQWKHWR[LFSURGXFWV´24

A November 2007 document entitled ³How Did GS Avoid the Mortgage Crisis,´ prepared for
David Viniar in advance of earnings conference calls, summarized WKHILUP¶V position following
our prudent risk reduction efforts. After outlining the actions in late 2006 and early 2007, the
document states:

However, one should not be lead [sic] to believe that we went through this period
unscathed and somehow significantly profited from a µbet¶ on the downturn in
mortgage markets. The actions that I outlined led to significant write downs in
the value of our long mortgage inventory over the course of this year. We
mentioned during our second quarter conference call that a weak quarter in
Mortgages contributed to lower results in our FICC businesses. A better
characterization of the situation is that we effectively avoided greater losses by
taking these proactive steps and in fact during the third quarter we were able to
make money on mortgages as a result of our net short position.25

%\1RYHPEHU*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶QHWH[SRVXUHWRVXESULPHUHVLGHQWLDOmortgages was
balanced. 7KHILUP¶VSULPHDQGother residential mortgage exposure continued to be long cash
instruments of approximately $13.5 billion.

21
GS MBS-E-001793915-930 (September 17, 2007 presentation to Board of Directors at p. 6.)
22
GS MBS-E-009671378 (November 18, 2007 e-mail from Lucas van Praag to Lloyd Blankfein, et al).
23
GS MBS-E-009671378 (November 18, 2007 e-mail from Gary Cohn to Lloyd Blankfein, et al).
24
GS MBS-E-009671378 (November 17, 2007 e-mail from Lloyd Blankfein to Lucas van Praag, et al.)
25
GS MBS-E-009713204-07 (Goldman Sachs internal document, ³+ow Did GS Avoid the Mortgage CrisiV´

9
For much of 2007, Goldman Sachs and most other market participants, economists and policy
makers believed that the credit crisis was contained to the subprime mortgage market. During
this period, the firm continued market making and underwriting activities in residential
mortgages, which resulted in an increase in prime and other residential mortgage exposure.
Unfortunately, in 2008, it became clear that these other asset classes were deteriorating as well.
For the fiscal year ending November 2008, although profitable overall, the deterioration of these
asset classes was a meaningful contributor to tKHILUP¶VRYHUDOOQHWORVV of approximately $1.7
billion in residential mortgage-related products.

E. Increases in Value at Risk (VaR)

Throughout the course of our risk-reduction efforts starting in late 2006, the mortgage
department experienced periodic VSLNHVLQ9D5RU³Value at RLVN´9D5LVDrisk metric that
measures the potential loss in value of trading inventory due to adverse moves in the market over
a defined period of time. The key inputs to VaR are the size and type of positions in the
respective assets (both long and short) as well as the volatility of the underlying assets. Between
November 24, 2006 and February 23, 2007, daily VaR in the mortgage department increased
from $13 million to $85 million, predominantly from increases in volatility.26

Increases in VaR were the result of dramatic fluctuations in the mortgage market (which had a
corresponding effect on VaR), not an effort on the part of Goldman Sachs to take a large
directional bet on the subprime market. In fact, because of the volatility of the markets, the
increases in VaR occurred despite efforts by the firm to reduce our overall exposure to the
mortgage market.

In a February 14, 2007 e-mail, Dan Sparks ZURWH³2YHUYDUGXHWRPDVVLYHVSLNHLQVXESULPH

volatility and we are working with bruce on that. Over limit on cre loan scenario list but will
correct next week with large securitization pricing. Over limit on cdo risk but that will adjust as
PRYLQJSRVLWLRQVWRGHVNV%DGZHHNLQVXESULPH´27

A February 21, 2007 e-mail from Mr. Sparks to Jon Winkelried described the volatility in the
subprime market:

We are net short, but mostly in single name CDS and some tranched index vs the
some [sic] index longs. We are working to cover more, but liquidity makes it
tough. Volatility is causing our VAR numbers to grow dramatically.28

26
GS MBS-E-0RUWJDJH9D5&KDQJH4¶YV4¶
27
GS MBS-E-002203268 (February 14, 2007 e-mail notes taken by Dan Sparks)
28
GS MBS-E-010381094 (February 21, 2007 e-mail from Dan Sparks to Jon Winkelried)

10
That volatility continued into the summer of 2007, as Bill McMahon, then COO & Head of Risk
Management for the Securities Division, communicated to Gary Cohn and David Viniar in an
email on August 15, 2007:

The volatilities and correlations among our assets are really driving the swings in
var right now. Robert Berry >WKHILUP¶V&KLHI0DUNHW5LVN2IILFHU@sent out a
note last night indicating that the sensitivity of our var models to correlations
suggests that the var can swing between 140 and 160 without any changes in the
complexion of our trading books ± essentially, it is noise. The only solution is to
reduce the size of the books, which is what we are working on with mortgages
and credit trading.29

VI. 7KH(IIHFWRI*ROGPDQ6DFKV¶5LVN0DQDJHPHQWRQOur Profits and Losses During the

Financial Crisis

Given the deteriorating performance of the mortgage market in 2007 and 2008 and the
corresponding decline in the value of mortgage-related products, the best and most relevant proof
of whether Goldman Sachs had a large net short position is our actual revenues in mortgages.
7KHUHODWLYHFRQVLVWHQF\RIUHYHQXHVXQGHUOLQHVWKHILUP¶VRQ-going market making activities and
prudent risk management± not a massive proprietary, directional view of where the market might
have been headed.

7KHILUP¶Vmortgage-related positions had a relatively small effect on our net revenues or profits
for fiscal year 2007. The firm had net revenues of less than $500 million from our residential
mortgage-related products business in 2007. During fiscal year 2008, the firm had net losses of
approximately $1.7 billion related to our residential mortgage-related products business.

29
GS MBS-E-009778573 (August 15, 2007 e-mail from Bill McMahon to Gary Cohn and David Viniar)

11
 Firm Residential Mortgage Quarterly Net Revenues Compared to Total Net Revenues:
2007 ± 2008 ($ in millions)
$14,000

$12,000

$10,000

$8,000

$12,730 $12,334
$6,000
$10,741
$10,182 $9,422
$4,000 $8,335
$6,043
$2,000

$110 $553 $107 $170 $(130)

$0
$(294) $(1,219)
$(507) $(1,578)
$(2,000)
Q1 07 Q2 07 Q3 07 Q4 07 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08

Total Net Revenues Related to Residential Mortgages Total Net Revenues for the Firm

As Lloyd Blankfein and Gary Cohn explained in a letter to sKDUHKROGHUVRQ$SULO³7KH

firm did not generate enormous net revenues or profits by betting against residential mortgage-
related products, as some have speculated; rather, our relatively early risk reduction resulted in
our losing less money than we otherwise would have when the residential housing market began
to deteriorate rapidly«Although Goldman Sachs held various positions in residential mortgage-
rHODWHGSURGXFWVLQRXUVKRUWSRVLWLRQVZHUHQRWDµEHWDJDLQVWRXUFOLHQWV¶5DWKHUWKH\
served to offset our long positions. Our goal was, and is, to be in a position to make markets for
our clients while managing our risk within prescribed limitV´30

30
Goldman Sachs 2009 Annual Report, letter to shareholders.

12
Page 1 of 3