Apollo Command and Service Module Stabilization and Control System Design Survey
Apollo Command and Service Module Stabilization and Control System Design Survey
SD 68-869
Contract
NAS12-603
IL E
Criteria
Program,
Stability,
20 December
NATIONAL
Research
Cambridge,
DIVISION
12214
oF NORTH
LAKEWOOD
"This
document
was
Space
Administration.
behalf
of
the
United
information
contained
privately-owned
rights."
and
1968
PREPARED FOR
AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE
Electronics
SPACE
Guidance,
ADMINISTRATION
Center
Massachusetts
AMERICAN
BOULEVARD
prepared
under
the
Neither
the
United
States
Government
in
this
document,
DOWNEY,
ROCKWELL
CALIFORNIA
sponsorship
of
the
National
States
Government
nor
any
assumes
any
liability
resulting
or
warrants
that
such
use
CORPORATION
90241
Aeronautics
and
person
acting
on
from
the
use
of
will
be
free
from
Control
T--
SPACE
DMSION
Francis
or NORTH
$.
Curtis
H.
Carroll,
Jr.
-603
Electronics
Research
Technology
Cambridge,
Center
Square
Massachusetts
Request
P.O.
CORPORATION
Monitors
NAS12
NASA
ROCKW]_
Spenny
Technical
575
AMF._ICAN
for
copies
Scientific
Box
33,
of
and
College
02139
this
report
Technical
Park,
should
be
Information
Maryland
referred
Facility,
Z0740.
to:
SD 68-869
APOLLO COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
DESIGN SURVEY
20 December 1968
NASA/ERC
DESIGN
STABILITY,
CRITERIA
GUIDANCE,
Prepared
National
Aeronautics
Electronics
AND
NAS12-603
Prepared
Design
by
Survey
Approved
NORTH
12214
Administration
Center
Massachusetts
Contract
Project
Contract
Team
by
R.L.
uchon
Engineer
NAS12-603
Study
Contract
SPACE DIVISION
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
Lakewood
CONTROL
for
and
Space
Research
Cambridge,
SCS
PROGRAM
Boulevard,
Peterson
Manager
NAS12-603
CORPORATION
Downey,
California
90241
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
FOREWORD
This
report
control
system
objective
of the
the development
veys
are
is
projects
design
criteria
This
survey
of the
to document
and
will
the
be used
as
H.K.
survey
The
material
for
the
direction
of the
understanding
now connected
R.G.
Epple,
assistance.
The
and
experience
in identifying
suitable
in accordance
aid
gained
from
for
sur-
an
was
performed
specific
topics
this
study
Program
was
gathered,
Manager,
F.B.
Cauchon.
Major
sections
of Messrs.
M.F.
Madden,
E.J.
Watson
stabilization
for
monographs.
design
Engineer,
the efforts
CSM
design
of Work in NASA
Contract NAS12-603,
Control Design Survey, " for the NASA
Criteria Office.
under
Apollo
and is part
of the NASA
Design
Criteria
Program.
The
program
is to provide
a unification
of design
approaches
of space
vehicles
and their
major
components.
These
intended
NASA
a design
wrote
other
sections
of the
of the system
and critical
with
the Apollo
CSM/SCS,
B.W.
contractor's
Johnston,
and
designation
M. J.
for
prepared,
R.L.
documented
and
of the report
are
the
Knobbe,
and M.W.
report
editing
such
Stiles
this
and
Peterson,
as
as
well
the
results
Kishi.
aiding
in the
of the report.
Personnel
Messrs,
W.B.
Fours,
provided
report
as
and
Design
much
is
SD 68-869.
- iiiSD
needed
68-869
Project
of
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
CONTENTS
Page
Section
1.0
INTRODUCTION
Report
Organization
Recommendations
2.0
TOTAL
SYSTEM
DESIGN
SURVEY
System
Description
Design
Requirements
9
12
Problems
and
Changes
20
Conclusions
3.0
ATTITUDE
REFERENCE
Subsystem
Design
Description
THRUST
and
25
VECTOR
Design
33
Changes
35
Subsystem
CONTROL
39
SUBSYSTEM
Description
39
42
Requlrements
Problems
and
C onc lu s ion s
5.0
23
Requirements
Problems
Conclusions
4.0
23
SUBSYSTEM
ATTITUDE
52
CONTROL
Subsystem
Design
47
Changes
53
SUBSYSTEM
Description
53
58
Requirements
Problems
and
64
Changes
7O
Concl_.l sions
6.0
ENTRY
CONTROL
Subsystem
Design
Description
CONTROLS
Subsystem
Design
71
72
Requirements
Problems
Conclusions
?.0
71
SUBSYSTEM
and
77
Changes
79
AND
DISPLAYS
81
SUBSYSTEM
81
Description
90
Requirements
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
Section
Page
Problems
Conclusions
and
HARDWARE
94
101
Changes
DESIGN
PHILOSOPHY
103
104
General
Detail
Design
Configuration
Quality
Problems
Requirements
108
Control
If9
Assurance
Requirements
.
.
Conclusions
9.0
TECHNICAL
Requirements
CONTENT
120
.
130
131
133
SUMMARY
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIXES
A.
SCS
B.
ABBREVIATIONS
C.
NEW
HAND
CONTROL
DESIGN
AND
REQUIREMENTS
ACRONYMS
TECHNOLOGY
- vi
SD
68-869
137
147
151
SPACE
DIVISION
or
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure
Z-1
2-2
SCS
Functional
2-3
Apollo
Block
SCS
Evolution
3-1
Three
3-2
Two
3-3
Inertial
3-4
Three
Diagram
II Stabilization
.......
Single-DOF
2-DOF
Platform
4-i
Thrust
Vector
4-Z
4-3
SPS
SPS
5-1
ACS
5-2
Thruster
Engine
Gimbal
ARS
(Three
Attitude
II/GDC)
ARS
System
(Block
.
or
Four
Gyro
Mount
Mount
Functional
19
29
I/AGCU)
Gimbals)
Z9
35
ARS
35
Functional
.....
.
5-3
Arc
6-i
Entry
7-I
Displays
7-2
7-3
Controls
Functional
Translation
Control
7-4
Rotation
Control
7-5
Attitude
Set
7-6
7-7
Flight
Gimbal
7-8
Evolution
7-9
Main
8-i
Block
8-2
SCS
8-3
Electronic
8-4
Exposed
Suppression
Mechanization
Functional
Functional
Diagram
43
43
73
Diagram
82
Diagram
.
83
.
.
Panel
Controls
87
Control
Electronic
and
88
89
97
99
Displays
......
End
84
85
....
Panel
Interfaces
56
69
Director
Attitude
Indicator
Position/Fuel
Pressure
Indicator
II Contract
55
Diagram
Control
of SCS
40
Diagram
Orientation
Control
......
Control
Control
Control
Gyro
Gyro
ARS
Single-DOF
(Block
and
Attitude
Attitude
....
Items.
.
105
I13
i16
Assembly
Assembly
ll7
- vii
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
TABLES
Table
Page
l-1
Relay
3-I
Stabilization
16
Failures
and
Control
System
Performance
Z7
Requirements
3-Z
Subsystem
Tradeoff
3-3
Subsystem
Tradeoff
or
Greater
3-4
ARS
3-5
Attitude
Than
Requirements
Reference
4-I
Criteria
4-2
Block
II TVC
7-I
FDAI
Characteristics
8-1
Hardware
Environments
8-Z
for
Linear
Body
Physical
Evaluation
(No
Tabulation
(Reliability
0.999276
Through
Changes
System
30
Redundancy)
Equal
In-Flight
to
Repair)
36
.
Tradeoff
Small-Signal
Bending
(Block
46
.
49
92
106
111
Characteristics
- ix
37
If)
Stability.
Data
3O
SD
68-869
SPACE
I)IVISION
ov N()RTII
AMERICAN
i. 0
This
report
stabilization
areas
and
control
to provide,
first,
subsystems,
features
seems
which
presents
may
embody
they
tradeoffs
Thirdly,
lems
each
which
(those
areas
beyond
explored
the normal
presented
obtained
material
that
be
was
expected
herein
one
Apollo
able
To date,
unmanned
7 flight is so
to conservative
extensive
techniques,
use
qualification,
Honeywell,
Rockwell
what
are
researching
approxi-
25 persons
difficult at times
deficiency
or
evaluation
to
something
of any
SCS
performance
data
system
can
of state-of-the-art
under
and
prob-
length
of the Apollo
program,
problems
and in some
cases
acceptance
simulation
Inc.,
Corporation.
baseline.
significant
conclusions
it was
of this
and
it
are
avail-
attributed
components,
testing,
programs.
contract
be
include
The
to the
Space
as
well
SCS
as
is
Division
of
ORGANIZATION
Each
of the
whole.
by
specific
unique
of the experience
and
successfully
one manned
success
hardware-in-the-loop
manufactured
North
American
REPORT
design
of the
basic
where
type)
from
a design
eight
its integral
at a design
more
approximately
development
II
the design
requirements
time
and the various
arriving
report,
Block
or
development
Finally,
the unusual
the development
that no
Much
developmeat,
sophisticated
normal
and
interesting
development
that indicated
in the
recent
any
obtained
for this
into
system
a synthesis
was
is divided
for the
problems.
and in interviews
with
with the SCS
program.
complex
system.
Furthermore,
seven
years,
tends to obscure
the design
problems.
four
those
the material
if a problem
should
to solve
presented
In researching
assess
and
in finally
are
were
mately
300 documents
intimately
connected
report
complete
historical
changes
The
effected
with
of the Apollo
the report
describes
or which
evolved
with
considered
eight
The
of the
together
that were
arose
(SCS);!_
summary
mechanization,
Secondly,
specified
of the
survey
overview
functions,
appropriate.
were
initially
design
system
their
CORPORATION
INTRODUCTION
a design
an
R()CKWEIA.
major
SCS.
There
Section
2.0
*See Appendix
section
of
are
two
discusses
B for abbreviations
this
additional
the
report
corresponds
sections
system
total
to
that
while
the
discuss
Section
major
and acronyms.
1
SD
subsystems
the
system
as
8.0
discusses
68- 869
SPACE
the hardware
tion of the
changes,
tions
DIVISION
design
NORTH
AMERICAN
philosophy.
subsystems
and
tradeoffs,
conclude
or
and
with
ROCKWELL
Sections
their
3.0
through
requirements,
design
problems
a discussion
CORPORATION
and
7.0
evaluate
encountered.
of hindsight
or
discuss
the opera-
the major
Finally,
these
sec-
recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Two
this
study:
sets
of recommendations
(1) future
recommendations.
program
For
Firm
I,
the
hardware
the
Apollo
design
alternate
prevent
design
Although
be
sources
of procurement
The
use
tolerance
test
limits
The
7) indicates
use
density
functions
manufacturers
characteristics
Additional
provides
should
studies
are
Development
of a failure
identification
of single-point
is not altogether
Development
present
model
in simulations,
firmed
by
any
engineers
The
and
form
101
of a rigorous
nature.
probability
of this activity,
performance
to search
has
produced
some
physically
based
Apollo
upon
areas:
to assist
present
for
systems.
model.
unreasonable
it have
not been
flights.
-2SD
is
for
complex
slosh
in the
method
diagrams
successful
propellant
previous
design
use
following
low-g
of the
preference
some
part
accurate
predictions
the
for Spacecraft
be
of an
and
slowing
personal
methodology
failures.
of rr_any
and
to
functions.
analysis
problems,
from
In support
in the
the application
approaches
in combining
component
recommended
of
possible,
examined
should
density
start
design
programs
this rigor.
provide
probability
be
experience
convolution
study
obvious,
to establish
most
design
of mathematical
design
crew
analyses
Although
the
the
for advanced
should
for
of
that:
if this is not
provided
utilized.
(2) additional
of a supplier
be
results
in this fashion.
used
However,
Firm
specifications
items.
analysis,
the
before
state-of-the-art
to.
be
on
this seems
not conducted
procurement
of rigorous
and
established
development
problems
of the total system.
(Apollo
was
adhered
of tolerance
i,
be
Generally,
be
based
it is recommended
process.
program
approaches.
should
programs
requirements
source
reached
recommendations,
future
baseline
Multiple
were
68-869
The
results
con-
SPACE
DIVISION
Reexamination
so it can
put
less
vector
together
a premium
on
CORPORATION
control
(TVC)
The
with
and
long
the
long-life
way
such
methods
operation
needs
as
times
duration
the
found
same
to
bending.
extended
for
complex
of some
of equipment.
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concept
with
to be
body
to obtain
checkout
extended
design
sensitive
a better
parameters,
of criteria
reliability.
ROCKWELL
vehicle-parameter
the vehicle
Establishment
duration
made
Furthermore,
determine
vehicles,
AMERICAN
of the thrust
be
performance.
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68- 869
hardware
space
missions,
SPACE
DIVISION
or
2.0
This
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section
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sion
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and
subsequent
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SYSTEM
control
was
discussed
was
termed
system,
Block
as
reliability,
a
separate
for
the
and
includes
total
the
in
I and
June
the
system,
the
humidity
single-point
redesign
Block
system.
discus-
in
are
connectors,
termed
SCS
The
treated
requirements
the
total
such
are
problems
change
time
subjects
of
I electrical
major
that
1964was
function,
are
the
June
The
the
sections.
failures
1964;
the
redesigned
SCS
II.
DESCRIPTION
The
system
to
and
of
separate
etc.,
purpose
Block
The
prior
evolution
in
development
the
failures.
SCS
the
CORPORATION
SURVEY
and
changes.
change,
relay
and
assurance,
evolutionary
problems
original
on
reviews
the
requirement
and
design
described
quality
ROCKWELL
DESIGN
performance-oriented,
section
to
SYSTEM
are
control,
The
AMERICAN
the
subsystem
primarily
major
TOTAL
describes
each
configuration
section.
proceeds
NORTH
operation,
described
system
and
herein.
whose
primary
flight
between
thrusters.
the
in
primary
control
command
features
Individual
characteristics
system
design
sections
more
mode.
The
(CM)
The
is
SCS
to
also
the
of
detail.
purpose
module
of
back
the
SCS
up
as
report
is
the
provides
computer,
SCS
an
a
will
elaborate
analog
flight
functions
of
interfacing
astronauts,
total
the
equipment
and
the
spacecraft
Functions
The
control
SCS
capability.
navigation,
SCS
provides
service
the
module
control
the
manual
and
control
SCS
of
senses
display,
system
interface
(SPS)
visual
and
the
of
three
vehicle
and
the
the
control
also
the
SCS
automatic
rates,
three
performs
attitude
(RCS)
parameters.
the
are
body
-5SD
the
system
a
68-869
direct
PGNCS
all
of
maneuvers.
which
vehicle
The
and
provides
and
guidance,
system.
flight-control
SCS
flight
primary
signals
commands
the
backup
digital
jet
vehicle
body
uses
by
is
reaction
operation,
system,
except
analog
command
of
input
an
provided
which
between
manual
As a backup
the
PGNCS
the
is
displays
modes
generates
with
(PGNCS),
between
computer.
functions
spacecraft
primary
system
system
interface
and
Apollo
electrical
operations
The
control
control
propulsion
electrical
the
The
and
thruster
In
provides
command
the
utilized
attitudes,
flight-
for
SPACE
DIVISION
visually
displays
these
errors,
provides
direct
positions,
provides
generates
and
used
as
gains,
NORTH
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parameters,
control
setting
uses
display
display
and
pitch
the
and
vehicle
three
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(i.e.,
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vehicle
consists
of three
attitude
gimbal
angular
commands,
processes
to effect
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rotation
system,
necessary
and
of SPS
of desired
translation
flight control
all signals
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and
and
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or
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when
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control.
Mechanization
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(Figure
and
stabilization
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attitude
the controls
and
angles
control,
display
attitude,
signals.
control
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main
engine
jets
during
pair
Control
and
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is a photograph
an
through
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Three
for sensing
gyro
coordinates
mode,
automatic
display
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service
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later
in the report:
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angle
than
rate
coupler
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data,
unit
angles
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by
design
features
that are
the
of attitude
Euler
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for the
Figure
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angles
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display
by
the use
coupler
discussed
changes,
the attitude
of rate
(GDC),
data
Block
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68-869
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for translation.
provided.
equipment
by
Features
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detail
vector
control,
of the vehicle
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has
electronics,
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signals
to the electronics
for these flightreference
and the rotational
hand
controller
is accomplished
the use of the
control
provided
from
flight control
control,
for thrust
of flight director
provided
Design
entry
elements
attitude gyros
(BMAG).
are used in a rate mode
are
Each
major
flight control
information
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the attitude
entry
Display
backup
Electronics
to the crew.
for attitude
the
subsystem,
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electronics
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jets
the
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mode
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control
modes
are
reference
rate.
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for
system
by six body-mounted
information
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rotational
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control
displays.
capability
is provided
are used for attitude
spacecraft
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7SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
-8
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
Pseudo-rate
feedback
control
hold
of
and
limit
within
passive
cycles
the
particle
is hydraulic
range
working
clutch
fluids
Manual
was
not
R()CKWEI,I,
network
well
of
C()RPORATION
that
below
the
of
the
provides
the
reaction
extensive
control
Multiple
main
two
save
rate
for
sensor
jets
the
thres-
minimum
different
Tolerance
analysis
summations
of
mathematical
limits,
actuator
is actuated
thus
doing
through
away
with
to
(MTVC)
have
flight
- Early
manned
levels
possible
showed
and
(GP/FPI)
with
the
is
program
of the
SPS
SPS.
the
can
primary
takeover.
The
use
different
the
it
astronaut
now
failure
-
at
that
MTVC
control
in the
control
of
times
display
in
the
to
mission
space.
program
piece
convolution
thereby
engine
space
environment.
system
quantities
paneI
typical
motor,
simulations
this
display
control
main
electric
acceleration
engine
function
- The
Apollo
control
feasible
high
effectively
of
an
in a vacuum
However,
method
actuator
the
and
thrust
vector
considered
because
show
clutch
whereas
a magnetic
DESIGN
AMERICAN
capability.
Magnetic
flight
- A
attitude
yet
impulse
to
oF NORTtl
providing
part
The
probability
techniques
additional
use
of
mathematically
density
to
rigorous
functions
determine
through
design
confidence
in
the
test
system
operation.
RE QUIREMENTS
Requirements
The
satisfy
are
mission
presented
Mission
performance
design
requirements
that
Phase
Abort
system
must
Requirement
Safe
trajectory
tion for
Transearth
the
below:
flight
Total
and
orienta-
reentry.
midcourse
corrections
than
corrections
less
than
SD
three
whose
15 ft/sec.
68-869
RCS
total is
SPACE
I)IVISION
Mission
_:
NORTtl
:\.XIEII(:AN
R()CK\\EI,I,
(:(_I<P()RATION
Phase
Transearth
Requirement
injection
Delta
accuracy
degree
No
Entry
of one
rms.
range
control
requirement.
Block
I Design
June
Philosophy
From
early
1964,
the SCS
Apollo
proposal
landing
only
be
achieved
between
form
The
would
system
backed
spares.
able
to
The
detect
necessary
made
by
had
to meet
the use
thought
the most
proposal
be
with
not
the
The
control
to
on
the
the
solution
to provide
initial
a lunar-
lunar
primary
orbital
method
figure.
could
Despite
equipment
mean
of magnitude
as
to the problem
standby
of
This
(IFM).
the
order
The
encompass
maintenance
same
at
the
was
mean
the
of main-
redundancy
during
restored
reliability
parts,
conservative
and
the
the
in the
the
for
established
for
possible
simplification.
system
reliability
to
self-check
equipment
part
and
would
make
at
30
be
the
minutes)
because
correction
could
be
operation.
allocation
into
level
trajectory
and
control
functional
module
equipment,
level
n_idcourse
system
test
of
(estimated
small
to
and
complete
form
repair
whenever
throuzh
in-flight
to
extremely
initially
astronaut
stabilization
having
in
time
_'eliability
rules
of
basic
aid
of simple
checkout
the
black
box
or module
are
Design
anaIyses,
basis
significant
system
ground
Use
be
the
redundancy
The
system
Include
As
engineers,
that
the
the
torques
reliability
2.
NASA.
feasible
was
standby
crew,
with
malfunctions
after
when
of the
indicated
designed
up
The
eliminated
in
spares.
disturbing
0.995.
also
a high-reliability
design
was
reliability
the
II change
would
of in-flight
and
(MTBF)
replacement.
attitude
was
adopted
Hence,
Apollo
system
however,
Block
of flight control.
system
was
systen_
of onboard
method
system
failures
high
control
of reliability
time.
taining
the
through
efforts
mission
was
the
blaintenance
the primary
This,
concept
the best
time
was
indicated
flight control,
In-Flight
in the program
capability.
rendezvous
by
14-day
the
mission
system
obtain
design
the
circuit
prediction
and
use
of
possible.
high-reliability
parameter
control
methods.
10SD
were:
increased
wherever
derating,
was
68-869
and
stress
SPACE
DIVISION
A variation
anticipated
No.
that
1 was
felt
or
the
to
Maximum
isolation
5.
Mean
reliability
of
0.
605.
to
in-flight
reliability
trip,
the
44.4
lieu
of
redundant
the
l.
Block
the
II
Block
detect
task.
it was
take
to
locate
increased
humidity
the
installation
and
it
and
and
was
two
for
of
reliability
spares
up
in
weight
to
0. 825.
June
1964,
the
Block
I vehicles
redesigned
to
include
reasons:
the
it
was
in the
Control
System
a trained
technician
to
failed
feasibie
module,
a defective
element.
The
fixes,
boxes
furthermore,
more
difficult.
made
the
-11SD
had
the
the
Block
I earth
orbital
for
the
Block
II lunar
for
the
change
mission
predicted
was
to
technically
replace
requirement
removal
the
the
defined,
added
fault
sleeves.
achieve
Since
that
with
suit
required
being
for
For
example,
not unusuai
of
system.
for
in shirt
the
system
test
controls
spares
not
was
cause
end
subassembly
to
deleted.
less
than
deleted
although
to
II
the
subassemblies
in-flight
reliability
were
was
not an easy
laboratory
no
was
was
and
the
Near
pressure
spares
no-spare
circuits
Practicality:
of
concept
The
the
review,
requirement
is considerably
the
and
of
With
trace
replaceable
in
to 20 minutes
design
error.
interpret
however,
help
replaceable
out
weight
pounds.
mai_tenance
hours
or
to
component.
displays
equal
and
spares.
paths.
astronaut
in
human
to
decisions;
used
three
one
SCS
of
rule
members'
added:
mode
of
of
1964
redundant
on-board
control
In-flight
70
June
maintenance
requirement
additional
made
pounds
time
a level
required
was
the
of
test
to repair
the
0.995
At
decreased
At
1963
were
level
possible
time
or
rules
the
to
use
Maintenance
early
to
isolation
te st
4.
In
module
crew
capability
make
was
Ground
the
incidence
be
it
errors.
assist
their
and
should
semi-automatic
Fault
manual
was
the
of
because
human
to
minimize
judgment,
ground
isolation
with
make
utilization
a particular
these
Fault
would
CORPORATION
effected
designed
troubleshooting
program,
would
be
exercise
automatic
R()CKWEI,I,
was
equipment
should
malfunction
IFM
members
effect,
there
AMERICAN
participation
have
indicators,
manual
the
crew
to
in
that
evaluate
of
the
which,
was
astronaut
changed
activities,
It
in
oF NORTH
68-
869
in
SPA(:E1)I\I_ION ov NOICI'HAMERICANR()CKWEI,I.CORPORATION
Z.
II: the
Block
AND
of Block
and repackaging
eliminated
the
system,
circuits,
PROBLEMS
concept
II that made
the
need
the
SCS
the backup
electronics
to include
redundant
for in-flight maintenance.
CHANGES
Problems
There
the
SCS
were
four
that affected
ments,
the
Block
failures.
major
the
problems
system
I electrical
These
problems
as
encountered
a whole.
connectors,
are
in the
These
were
single-point
discussed
in the
development
humidity
failures,
following
of
requireand
relay
paragraphs.
Humidity
In the
trical
by
summer
condensation
of 40
These
resulting
to 70 percent
5 degrees
mental
F.
Apollo,
and
ECLSS
the panels,
trol of the
i.e.,
and
cabin
and
system
high
are
cold
couhl
be
panels.
pockets
through
orientations.
could
be
section
expected
of the
command
during
After
in and
by
the
The
the
or minus
environ-
module
point
surface
could
behind
with
temperatures
be expected
to cold
regard
the
were
of all
orientation,
the
that condensed
equipment
with
windows
walls
40 percent
of such
indicated
behind
to condensation.
approximately
the
(about
the umbilical,
4 to 5 hours
even
in the
atmosphere
dew
near
Analysis
around
atmosphere
connections
orientation
F.
environment
are beyond
the direct
conthe suit circuit or with a
Areas
structural
expected
fall to 60 degrees
caused
of 75 plus
to the
falls below
to spacecraft
humidity
maintained
limited
spots.
and
elec-
shorts
(ECLSS).
of equipment
bay,
experienced
to electrical
a temperature
parameters
is effectively
near
sensitive
spacecraft
surized
these
equipment
air may
moisture
unexpectedly
an
in front
especially
Condensation
possible
from
humidity,
traced
condensation
will occur.
With low
of warm,
moving
air, condensation
forward
particularly
flight of NLA-9
were
If the teI_perature
60 degrees
F),
and the absence
in the
Mercury
in corners,
or in protected
ECLSS.
Water
is removed
cleaner.
panels
the
failures
life support
control
interior,
vacuum
relative
On
control
The
cabin
of 1963
difficulties.
located
ECLSS
in the
pres-
operating
properly.
Based
ment
relative
on
these
factors,
humidity
The
SCS
equipment
new
requirement.
it was
requirements
for
Block
The
ground
I was
rules
decided
to 100
to change
percent
subsequently
for
the
modified
the change
spacecraft
during
were
to withstand
as
follows:
-iZSD
equip-
flight operation.
68 - 869
this
SPACE
DIVISION
Existing
in
in-flight
any
AMERICAN
maintenance
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
requirements
will
be
retained
redesign.
Existing
OF NORTH
package
envelope
dimensions
will
be
retained
in
any
redesign.
The
seals
nature
to
the
in-flight
of
the
electrical
spares
was
testing
during
the
very
to
was,
remain,
difficult.
qualification
form
Although
concept
made
requirements
took
connectors.
maintenance
Block
changes
the
The
testing
however,
Block
or
of
backpotting
this
technically
of
I system
flight.
factor
in
never
rubber
fail
change
BlockII
the
changing
did
The
the
adding
allowed
practicalities
actual
a major
and
the
humidity
in
humidity
design
concept.
I Connectors
The
through
SCS
equipment
small
spacecraft
ficulty
and
was
enclosure,
the male
and
pin
the high
experienced
removal
of the
removal,
and
an
alternate
of
an
original
The
usage
of
included
connector
body
connector
damage
the
and
source
and
slippage
The
as
the
retention
the
resupply
clip
rate
This
supply
ran
and
and
pin
the
by
and
was
unable
to
part
in
meet
the
to
an
prime
of
a vendor
was
the
impractical.
led
in
acceleration
caused
the
considered
connector
was
connectors,
investment
resulted
problem
who
and
However,
the
eventually
out
prob-
insertion
with
was
of
dif-
Other
crimping
considerable
procurement
failure
supply.
the
extremely
pin burrs.
considered.
of
dif-
equipment
pins.
during
experienced
was
because
It was
during
and
to the
Mating
of the
or bending
breakage
problems
procurement
breakage
schedule
spring
of
available
possible.
breakage
numerous
alternate
high
the
length
breaking
spring
interconnected
attached
enclosure.
and
of the connector.
design,
vendor,
equipment
of the mass
without
source
advanced
on the
half was
density
enclosure,
of
electrically
female
connector
retention
Because
I were
The
half was
because
the
for Block
connectors.
encountered
ficult to mate
lems
boxes
multipin
unexpected
contractor
resupply
who
was
not
manufactured
resupply
delivery
needs.
The
connector
through
or
tinuous
development
repackaging
change
on
the
the
of
to
Block
problem
purchase
standard
II
of
until
the
SCS
for
the
brought
connectors.
BlockIwas
a different
end
not
connector.
of
the
about
No
by
Block
the
problems
solved
by
Rather,
I program.
Block
have
II
a design
was
The
redesign
decision
been
reported
system.
13
SD
break-
there
68- 8 69
conand
included
in
a
this
area
SPACE
Single-Point
search
been
and
AMERICAN
discovery,
tedious
primarily
for trouble
date
for,
a long
consists
OF NORTH
and
job.
of having
areas.
elimination
The
process
designers
Examples
SCS
logic bus:
all G&C
mode
TVC
servo
for both
Entry
of single-point
of finding
continually
of single-point
failures
failures
single-point
search
SCS
power
servo
failures
the wiring
found
and
diagram
corrected
to
The
A
mode
and
completely.
power
SCS
reaction
are
ducted
does
and
generally
or
not make
analysis
stantially
grated
when
The
failures
total
system
effects
subsystem
whole,
The
spent
so that each
of detailed
the hardware
over
required
drawings
done
must
has
been
to see
conditions
Special
as it
can
ensuing
tests
a multiple
failure
be
states
are
con-
failure,
this level
of failure
analyzed
subsystem
could
of time
mode
to form
must
be
designed
schedule
committed
for manufacture,
is being
and
the
be
given
Although
these
of specification
in terms
The
result
many
redundancy.
- 1468-869
have
of
of the
constraints
SD
sub-
a total inte-
now
failures.
at the time
and
increases
in the problem
Consideration
been
because
analysis
combined
prin_ary
if what
modes
as complex
of course,
and
Although
consum-
its nominal
redundant
failure
sometimes
and
understanding
and
leave
time
i.e.,
is at least twice
mode.
A failure,
considerably.
have
modes,
normal
of the elements
[ailure,
should
this is seldom
a lack
after
switch
is difficult and
of two
and
would
successful.
subsystems
increase
failure,
primary
operation.
for single-point
permutations
the
failure
inoperative.
it is generally
several
of failures
to power
failure,
cause
power
the failure
system
of difficulty
system.
used
fail all
N IT'vC
by the designers.
a redundant
level
would
during
mode.
Generally,
that a single
is tedious,
The
types
mode.
would
consists
redundant
understood
to ensure
failure
switch
a single
inoperative
of single-point
subsystem
in either
known
single
to
jet drivers.
are generally
similar,
but the subsystem
would
be if it did not need
the redundant
occur
bus
failure
for MTVC:
control
its backup
in the
fail TVC
a single
the
control
identification
given
fail power
a failure
would
a single
to disable
rotational
would
of roll display.
drivers:
Rotation
ing.
switch:
amps
methods
mode
roll display:
three
as
CORPORATION
are"
I.
the
ROCKWEI.I,
Failures
The
has
I)IVISION
hours
the
as
well
is that
are
SPACE
The
ground
The
high
later
puts
desirable
space
on
of system
tractor
Filtors,
for use
throughout
based
Inc.
on
I and
several
size
Golden-G
factors
and
weight,
the
Golden-G
relays
of failure
caused
by
ducted
an
At
The
Block
on
of
process
it is highly
may
thoroughly.
be
Further,
of failure
system.
Program
of
C
The
in two
1966.
subcontractor
Another
the
modes
failures.
encountered
during
of malfunctions
establishment
concern.
However,
level
extensive
retained
From
of Block
number
testing
were
prior
not unusual
corrective
in mid-November
testing,
investigation
including
by
the
problem
with
or
relay
merits
and
used
was
was
existing
con-
Block
total
relay
repetitive
action
were
two
subcontractor.
January
relay
their
(4542)
impact
-15SD
and
The
68-869
were
number
with
This
there
analysis
failures
test.
The
in
for Group
performed
in qualification
used
malfunctions
1966.
and
in the
the vendor
II SCS
to an
relays
lots) during
by
occurred.
exclusively
for
no
failures
testing
problems
this overall
1966,
one
procedures
encountered
in the
to November
or
reliability
I relay
relays
(four
limited
module
then
4091
test purposes.
of appropriate
black-box
were
used
was
performance
double-throw
periods
relays
It was
choice
case-to-header-assembly
was
procured
subcon-
This
and
solderball
double-pole,
two-week
451
six Block
problem
a soldered
relay
SCS
its individual
research
not a serious
88 such
and
Each
on
of the
further
II.
initially
I program.
One
the
I program.
Block
were
resolved
Golden-G
sel.arate
Block
assurance
Extensive
from
are
lot acceptance
27
or
made-no
welded-header
There
Block
by
capability,
problems
evolved.
was
in the
performance
solderball.
a change
weld
II SCS.
the
that time
electron-beam
an
Thus,
selected
throughout
the quality
analyzed
modes
internal
to assure
SCS.
type
and
stress
of the design
fully conscious
was
early
Few
during
pattern
SCS
and
of the vendor.
failure
relay
including
practices
were
more
subsequently
and
and
the
reliability.
in the Apollo
Block
history,
July
to be deleted.
introduced.
so that a system
quickly
made
Experience
Failures
The
this
be
state
an
minimization
requirements.
of
the
it was
with
and
eroding
so that
rule
was
together
design
developed
modes
changed
ground
present
these
be
failure
should
importance
the
of handling
an
to ground.
this
systems,
from
example,
possibilities
fail-safe
Unfortunately,
are
For
short
caused
of failure
methodology
rules
not
CORPORATION
suffers
again.
would
of modern
themselves
the
Relay
some
ground
a premium
designers
and
class
capable
that
analyzed
generally
in the program
failures.
not appear
the
ROCKWELL
increase
switches
new
complexity
single-point
does
that
a whole
reliability,
at this point
total system
rule
the switches
a result,
AMERICAN
uncommonly,
of the
ground
OF NORTH
analysis
Not
states
original
As
failure
rules.
failed
with
DIVISION
and
and
normal
occurred
at
triggered
of those
failures
SPACE
at
this
since
time
1)IVISION
was
many
of
OF NORTtt
considered
the
SCS
subcontractors'
contractor
and
to
electronic
AMERICAN
be
of
systems
investigation
R()CKWEI,I,
major
concern
utilized
was
CORPORATION
to
these
monitored
characteristics
very
closely
are
summarized
in Table
by
the
both
the
1-1.
Relay
Mode
or
Test
Level
the types
These
of
i-i.
Failure
Number
I.
Program
Hence
distinctions
relative to the failures
were
and the test level where
they occurred.
Table
Failure
Apollo
NASA.
Failure
the
relays.
Block
of Failures
Block
II
Total
Mode
Low
normally
open
ii
21
27
contact
pressure
2.
Relay
hangup
3.
Low-insulation
4.
Miscellaneous
resistance
Totals
Test
i.
Level
Subas
a.
b.
2.
3.
sembly
Relay
Module
part test
test
14
17
Device
(pre-delivery)
a. Production
check
b.
Acceptance
Device
(post-delive
ry)
a.
b.
Qualification
Field
c.
Retrofit
cycle
Totals
21
-16SD
68- 8 69
27
SPA(:E
follows
The
:
I)IVI,SI()N
reliability
I.
relay
SCS
Program
failure
Based
on
relay
hours
The
four
rate
Block
the
hangup
128. 7 percent/1000
The
most
This
1000
relay
two
128.7
Thus,
relays
percent/1000
relay
failure
rate
14-day
missions
redundant
relays
significantly
The
i.
affect
relay
investigation
While
the
predictions,
requirements.
Design
prevent
The
and
of the SCS
mission
relay
Block
rates
of
total
rate
vector
II SCS
hours.
of 0. 1 percent/
plus
the addition
servo
failure
control
rate
is still within
critical
SCS
circuit
relay
device
to
circuits
rates.
hours,
one
predicted;
SCS
more
With
relay
the probability
is practically
rate
predictions
the original
will meet
is such
specific
based
estimated
failure
the system
that no
single
zero
and
current
failure
rate
reliability
relay
failure
will
success.
is fully acceptable
the
for
best
use
proven
state-of-the-art
in the Apollo
Program.
-17SD
68- 869
in
of failure
conclusions.
on
than
a pre-
reliability.
not met
represents
of
the
failure
SCS
II failure-rate
hours
relay
be
failure
the
in the
for each
failure
93. 31 percent/1000
percent/1000
can
the mission
have
level
(as established
failure
which
in the
of 0.47
relay
device
requirement.
in a critical
experience
hours,
redundancy
seven
not
Block
ratio of apparent-to-desired
every
both
was
in the thrust
percent/1000-hour
dicted
Apollo
best-estimate
is specified
rigorous
a relay
the predicted
added
the
in the
hours.
of 0. 47 percent/i000
redundant
126.81
1966)
assumed
failure
relay
device-level
increases
offsets
(May
prediction
hours.
as
hours.
recent
predictions
early
requirements
These
summarized
in 860, 000
the
specification)
devices.
be
hours.
percent/1000
reliability
(I()RPORATION
established
II SCS,
procurement
individual
may
failures
Block
is 0.47
II SCS
objective
SCS
0. l percent/1000
relay
on
R()CKWEI,I,
on the
rate
was
contractor
the
AMERI(b'kN
considerations
The
failure
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design
of
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SPACE
I)IVISION
<)_: NORTH
Subcontractor
screens
in-house
out low,
insulation
There
module,
or
be
relay
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testing
contact
force
from
of relay
inherently
better
manned
and,
when
space
and
low
process
at the device,
which
will
hangup.
for future
effectively
relays
relays.
change
level
the probability
Although
isolated
relay
no
and
open
(wet)
to be
R()CK'_VEIA_
module
normally
resistance
appears
reduce
AMERICAN
proven,
today,
the
the vendor
should
should
be
considered
applications.
Changes
The
Apollo
unmanned
flights
contract
flight was
and
one
completed.
was
made
manned
Significant
awarded
in November
in February
1966.
of 1961
Thus
flight have
been
highlights
of the program
far,
attempted
and
four
the first
unmanned
and
each
successfully
are
shown
in Figure
2-3.
The major
redesign
of the SCS occurred
in June 1964
vehicle
as well as the SCS.
The four initial unmanned
and affected
the entire
flights utilized the
Block
II.
I design;
flights
will
infeasible,
the Apollo
use
was
7 manned
the
Block
incorporated
II design.
into
TVC
redesigns
redesign.
because
of changes
in the
The
major
change
implementation.
vehicles
would
trips.
By the
for the various
the
summer
vehicles.
bility.
should
The
the
be
flight used
of
the
Manual
Block
I at
Block
vehicle
body
during
original
same
as
of 1964,
the
remaining
occurred
bending
first
the
thought
Block
I1
several
times
data.
SCS
program
was
the
Block
were
enough
changes
made
or planned
block of vehicles
was
considered.
In
was
the Block
divided
into Block
II vehicles
would
I and
have
Block
That
Besides
is, the
the backup
that time
i.
SCS
was
system
to be
used
designation,
when
the
other
PGNCS
changes
II
lunar-trip
The
underlying
concept
of this change
was
that the PGNCS
be considered
the prinaary
mode
of operation,
and the SCS
mode.
II
Apollo
program
concept
was
that all flight
the ones that make
the actual
lunar-landing
program
only
All
TVC,
which
was
the
same
time
as
system
the Apollo
spring
of 1964, there
systems
that another
In general,
II
Block
capa-
system
the backup
is not used.
made
to the
SCS
at
were:
In-flight
maintenance
concept
was
deleted
in
favor
of
built-in
redundancy.
The
electronics
better
humidity
were
repackaged
with
hermetic-type
protection.
-18SD
68-869
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for
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circuits
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used.
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concept
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functional
switching.
5.
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6.
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rotation
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translation
was
9.
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functions
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following
studies
an
effort
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SCS
more
The
Block
II
system
made
to
the
were
basic
design.
CONC
LUSIONS
The
program
primarily
of
Utilize
resort
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and
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by
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to
GDC
in place
gyros.
decided
which
to these
system
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similar
changes,
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currently
in
the
the
system
and
system.
retaining
flight
time
the
(This
analog
operations.
of
nature
problems
the
and
Small
original
did
system.)
changes
definition,
not
but
invalidate
encountered
the
during
the
conclusions:
control
signal
enclosures
electrical
alternate
a digital
than
a developmental
sealed
an
ac
analog
costly
since
built-in
standard
to
used
rate
In addition
a dc to an
from
in these
hermetically
were
desirable).
experience
result
Incorporate
lo
the AGCU
replaced
from
system
development
to date
was
complex
been
these
(BMAG's)
place:
to be
Changing
redesigned.
added.
capability.
the SCS
proved
lighting.
were
spring-restrained
to remove
rate
took
controllers
gyros
three
was
the AGCU
a higher
was
and
FDAI
Changing
I,
attitude
BMAG's
redundant
hand
integral
added.
Six body-mounted
of three
have
and
the
and
utilize
connectors
source
redundancy
of
or,
if
procurement
this
for
is
any
designs.
-20
SD
68-869
not
possible,
advanced
SPACE
DIVISION
Develop
OF NORTH
a failure
identification
The
as
the
Block
nectors
on
Block
on
Block
reliability
a maze
to
are
the
I system
The
problem
analyze
needed
system.
any
failure
by
to
system.
modes
the
assist
of
present
in
Similarly,
total
the
failures
of
circuits
brute-force
the
in
the
-21
process
that
it
Analysis
tools
68-869
the
reliable
standard
con-
design
limit
lends
almost
ensure
SD
as
will
systems
make
and
of
be
advanced
one
space
to
use
the
is
that
methods.
design
proven
than
complexity
subtle
assist
has
troublesome
single-point
The
and
to
redundancy
weight.
less
CORPORATION
failures.
built-in
less
been
ROCKWEI,I,
methodology
single-point
of
for
II has
of
of
design
Block
I.
analysis
of
II
AMERICAN
used
the
itself
to
impossible
and
methods
operation
of
SPACE
I)IVISION
3.0
This
This
section
subsystem
maneuvers
by
consists
generates
After
attitude
sidered
were
from
both
with
design
and
the
rate
of
the
way
is
This
section
inertiaI
drift
for control
is provided
The
(BMAG)
subsystem
that are
electronic
among
used
assembly
for
that
the
Euler
attitude
was
major
angles
change
backup
mechanizations
con-
systems.
which
The
the
mechanizations
platform
rate,
for
different
The
equipment.
use
requirements
discussed.
was
describes
subsystem.
reference
subsystem
consists
the
and
and
which
to
capability
reference
system.
gyros
an
tradeoffs
are
in
was
used.
control
(ARS).
quantities.
the
this
attitude
with
operation
subsystem
subsystem
The
principal
by
improved
solved
change
were
for
this
generated.
information,
In
whereas
in
DESCRIPTION
reference
attitude
the
subsystem
method
data
SUBSYSTEM
these
reference
reference
attitude
together
strapdown
this
was
I,
II
of
knowledge
subsystem
in
angles
this
and
body-mounted
sensing,
subsystem,
for
attitude
primary
navigation,
CORPORATION
SUBSYSTEM
attitude
backup
(The
rate
reference
probiem
the
a discussion
considered
Block
Block
and
Euler
the SCS
spacecraft.
guidance,
R()CKWEI.I.
REFERENCE
discusses
of strapdown
attitude
AMERICAN
ATTITUDE
provides
of the
the primary
both
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rate
mode,
the
The
capability
of
and
two
function
purpose
of
for
sets
the
of
a coupler
and
the
Apollo
three
unit
operation
of
subsystem
is
spacecraft
BMAG's,
that
Block
provide
control
one
generates
the
to
set
Euler
II
attitude
a backup
functions.
of
which
The
can
be
Angles.
Functions
As
operations,
a backup
the
attitude
functions
VehicIe
attitude
control
system
Vehicle
attitude
attitude
error
reference
subsystem
performed
errors
during
errors
needles
by
(in
body
coast
(in
the
spacecraft
are
coordinates)
and
to
thrusting
body
-23
for
subsystem
flight-control
to
provide:
the
vehicle
backup
phases
coordinates)
for
SD
68-869
dispiay
on
used
SPACE
I)IVISION
_v
NORTIt
A set of Nuler
angles,
reference
frame
with
for display
Total
roll
play
during
on
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needles.
into
These
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a
(about
stnall
describe
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attitude
the
(:()RPORATION
the orientation
of the vehicle
inertial reference
frame,
ball
command
Euler
module
angular
body
axes
angular
angles
set
R()CKWF_I,I,
stability
axis)
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entry
of
of
which
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Resolution
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which
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errors
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the
(treated
as
for
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are
the
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attitude
error
between
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vehicle
vehicle
vector
set
orientation
orientation.
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reference
electromechanical
Euler
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freedom
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scope,
original
alignment,
vertical
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been
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alignment
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navigation
wide
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angle
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in either
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Two
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sensors
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control
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orientation
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advantages
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original
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system
operation,
operational
is
mode.
mechanization
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control
sensors
created
designed
subsystem
version
a rate
does
manual
guidance
reference
midcourse
from
The
performed
early in the program.
to also include
horizon
and sun
local
program,
plexity
The
requires
within
design
tradeoff
was
envisioned
during
generator.
of three
purposes.
The
the
mode.
therefore
contained
alignment
angle
is comprised
miniature
rate integrating
gyros
with a single degree
the electronics
necessary
to allow them
to be operated
attitude
sensors
subsystem
these
Early
by
in
these
the additional
sensors
were
com-
deleted
subsystem.
Euler
angle
Apollo
generator
program.
display
coupler
gyro
coupler
(both
The
(GDC),
unit
analog)
present
while
(AGCU).
have
(Block
the
I[)
Block
This
con-
change.
body
rate
information
into
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information
from
is transformed
angles
These
stepper
motors
then physically
Attached
to these shafts are electrical
by
the
BMAG's
into Euler
electrical
stepping
- 24
SD
68-869
operating
rates
and
motors.
Euler
angles.
used
to
in
gPACE
(1)
transmit
these
monitor
(3)
provide
(2)
the
Euler
The
maneuver
between
of
highly
dependent
is
performed,
for
Design
Features
in
resolved
through
rate
loop
commands
were
motors
to
closed
of
rotated
to
signal
RE
and
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applied
to
null.
in
the
gyro
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but
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stepper
motor
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through
gyro
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amplifier,
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thus
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resulting
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modulated.
resolvers
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BMAG's
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of
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resolved
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the
which
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of
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angles
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entry
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rate
multi-axis
rate
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conjunction
Simultaneously,
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for
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body
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necessary
DESIGN
back
in
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rates).
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Small
rate
axis
written
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conversion
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specified
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commands
torquing
the
the
body
magnitude
maneuver
specifications
ball
transformation,
required
the
the
report.
CORPORATION
attitude
rate
when
upon
system
attitude
velocities
torquing
body
of
an
sensors,
and
this
three-axes
suitable
whether
involved,
of this
design
operated
exceeding
the
alignment
variables
as part
the
body-to-Euler
into
is
many
included
angular
to
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transformation
errors
accuracy
specifications
AMERICAN
the
Euler-to-body
system
The
angles
provide
angular
AGCU,
c_v N()RTtt
shaft
display,
small
or
1)IVISION
The
attached
to
conversion
capabilities.
subsystem
are
inertial
can
be
and
local
measured
stepper
pro,vide
QUIREMENTS
Requirements
The
follows:
Io
requirements
The
from
provide
needles.
The
during
small
ARS
during
reference
ARS
must
provide
a reference
which
large
rotations
of the
displayed
2.
must
both
The
reliability
life
of
150
all
body
mission
axis
provide
thrusting
allocation
phases.
In
for
display
angles
a frame
and
(both
vehicle
addition,
on
of reference
coasting
for
the
- 25
the
attitude
for
as
vertical)
and
ARS
must
error
the SCS
autopilot
phases.
ARS
was
0.
999276
hours.
SD
68-869
for
a mission
The
more
general
initially
accuracy
specified,
the following
are
ARS
requirements
given
error
in Table
allocations
Body
axis error
angles
the error
needles
to
Body
to
axis
error
3-i.
were
angles
Design
Requirement
One
ence
ing
with
vehicle
Since
velocity
then
(_V)
direction
might
frame
these
has
maneuvers,
and
must
while
The
be
measuring
by
pointing
the
This
was
+0. 5 degrees/axis
satisfy
the
angles
of an
reference
that allows
one
inertially
two
of one
means
platform
singulari-
pointing
alignment
for delta
is arbitrary,
to be pointed
points.
refer-
that measures
directional
the vehicle
of
of satisfy-
stabilized
omnidirectional
singularity
generation
orientation
are
has
for
is the
subsystem
necessarily
the
mode
reference
of the
true
aligned
selection
Two
in any
possible
solutions
for
system,
above
Block
along
two
with
solutions
I; however,
vehicle
the
axes.
of platform
avoiding
Block
The
alignment
its three-gimbal
for
II coordinate
problem
was
orientations
then
prior
to
vehicle.
on these
primary
degrees/axis
cosines,
or (Z) use a coordinate
measuring
the vehicle
body
reference
frame.
second
was
a proper
Based
and
considerations;
backup
subsystems
sequence
and
selection
provided
either
the
frame
handled
reference
control
utilized
singularities.
-- +0.5
made
still avoiding
primary
angles
A
angles
defines
a requirement
platform,
degrees/axis
must
Euler
angles.
CSM
a provision
which
gimbal
these
with
the
numbers
+0.5
to another.
The
measure
attitude
ties.
these
three-
for display
respect
this requirement.
physically
the
requirements
suitable
frame
From
as
Tradeoffs
of the
a set of data
to the
ball
total SCS,
budgeted:
the autopilot
Euler
angles
axis attitude
for the
reference
which
coordinate
the primary
the
and
systems,
would
provide
measuring
capability
or backup
ARS
a desire
a tradeoff
Euler
frame
as
of displaying
on
for compatibility
a common
was
angles
attitude
display
conducted
with
the primary
between
the
between
same
system.
information
(three-axis
This
from
attitude
ball).
A
this and
preliminary
the
other
review
required
of potential
functions
mechanizations
eliminated
that
systems.
- 26
SD
68-869
could
following
provide
candidate
SPACE
DIVISION
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NORTH
AMERICAN
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68-869
SPACE
i.
DIVISION
Strapdown
attitude
a.
Two
b.
Three
2.
2-DOF
Inertial
a.
,}v NORTH
gimbal
3-I,
The
results
The
values
numerical
3-2
indicates
Table
3-3
considers
spares)
If a
decision
reliability
the
decision
size
be
not
choice.
of
be
two
of
item,
aitd
that
spare
since
in-flight
figures
for
the
basis
of
be
used
From
are
not
(Block
28
be
since
then
the
be
the
essential,
3-2
systems
to
Table
e.g.,
it
in-flight
satisfy
an
3-3,
if
first
to
the
two-
the
were
not.)
SD
are
reliability
weight
I systems
are
3-3
was
maintainable,
the
enhanced
II
if
and
Table
would
Table
to
concept
would
satisfied,
3-3.
and
eliminated.
were
required
are
table,
requirement,
Table
from
Block
first
platform
be
requirements,
subsystem.
and
redundancy
the
flexibiiity
to
platforms
maintenance
3-2
subsystems,
platform
and
first
be
of
this
four-gimbal
increases
whereas
sufficient
must
redundancy
would
so
representative.
flexibility
with
four-gimbal
results
the
and
nonredundant
satisfy
operation
inertial
strapdown
maintainable,
the
the
3-2
the
be
designed
in Tables
felt to be
the
reliability
the
weight
platforms
The
then
Table
if
be
in
allocation.
on
since
upon
to
to desirability.
reliability
made
critical,
only
tumbling)
is provided
would
operation,
subsystems
the
subsystem
ment.
in-flight
the
would
volume
result
determined
then
for
of
subsystem
The
direct
tradeoffs
be
used
vehicle
summarized
were
regard
whereas,
gyro
are
inexact,
with
a key
based
study
position
to
to be
subsystems
mechanizations
to cost,
satisfy
are
eliminated,
free
four
gimbal
uncontrolled
of these
assigned
the
subsystems
weight
(the fourth
met.
while
However,
must
and
All
were
were
were
obvious
none
to
gyros
gyros
during
of each
of the tradeoff
Table
(inciuding
platform
3-3.
a relative
attitude
platform
tabulated,
values
to establish
while
and
(:()RPORATION
subsystems
a reference
requirements
The
3-3.
of freedom)
attitude
description
3-2,
ROCKWEI,1,
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platform
Four-gimbal
functional
Figures
{degrees
reference
maintain
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single-DF
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AMERICAN
68-869
and
requirevolume
designed
to
be
SPACE
DIVISION
oF
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
I
AUTO PILOT
ATTITUDE
HOLD MODE
GYRO TORQUE
COMMANDS
ATTITUDE
(BODY REF)
GYROS
(BMAGS)
THREE
SINGLE-DOF
MANEUVER
MODE
ATTITUDE ERROR
DISPLAY
EULERTO
CONVERSION
BODY
I'_
EULER
EULER
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BODY TO
GENERATOR
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J____
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EULERANGLES
Figure
3-1.
Three
Single-DOF
Attitude
Gyro
ARS
.._ THREE-AXIS
v
ATTITUDE DISPLAY
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I/AGCU)
MANEUVER
I
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ATTITUDE
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Two
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- Z9
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SD
68-869
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SD 68-869
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SPACE
I)IVISION
being
The
reliability
turned
on and
would
yield
The
_r: N()I<Ttt
AMERI(:AN
calculations
off;
however,
reasonable
did
not
it was
number
tradeoff
parameters
tradeoff
on
for
R()CKWEI,I,
include
felt
that
(:()RPORATION
the
the
reliability
effects
150-hour
of
equipment
mission
life
purposes.
of operation
and
flexibility
are
discussed
below.
Operation
The
freedom
they
The
allow
four-gimbal
any
practical
The
three-gimbal
ties,
(gimbal
or
which
The
three
single-DOF
gyro
attitude
periods
as
opposed
to four
disadvantages
be
and
periods
with
torqued
at vehicle
below
the
angle
generation)
other
the magnitude
rates,
systems
gyro
two
rate
was
in
the
of
of the
The
above
during
existed
major
the
system
subsystem
gyro
third,
available
subsystem.
(2) the
of the
degree
singularities
and
a function
resulting
Either
rated
were
of attitude
capability
considered,
singulari-
limitations,
alignments.
gyro
lie in the
of the maneuver
rate
the highest
drift rates
areas
rates.
of attitude
practical
subsystem
the two-free
the
is not only
provide
of the
not place
or tumbling
areas
no
between
in that lower
of this subsystem
two
the system
into gimbal
lock
of the reference
information.
that only
areas
orientations
has
the basis
in that it does
has
it also
on
spacecraft.
attitude
attitude
system,
of the
the highest
inherently
longer
subsystems
second,
while
platforms
the two-free
hold
and
permits
the
operation
is rated
rated
regions)
four-gimbal
accuracy,
and
on the vehicle
platform,
lock
separates
design
platform
limits
arbitrary
tumbling
a loss,
or degraded
three
operation
in the
gyros
must
is limited
accuracy
drift errors
but
well
(Euler
also
of
angle.
Flexibility
Flexibility,
future
as
operational
program
used
changes
here,
reflects
and/or
more
ability
of a subsystem
to meet
requirements
as
the
progresses.
The
subsystem
gimballed
at the
subsystem
top.
While
again
rates
this study
cosines
with the four-gimbal
subsystem,
must
be considered
for future
growth.
The
subsystems
ment;
the
demanding
accuracy
were
however,
the best
basis
and
not
the
operational
expected
low
for future
change
the
freedom
to improve
drift of the
and
the highest
did not
with
consider
ability
to do
of the twosignificantly
single-DOF
was
rated
-31
gyro
as
so
and
with
was
third
SD
the
four-gimbal
the use
of direction
does
exist
three-gyrofurther
adjusted
developto provide
in flexibility.
68-869
and
SPACE
I)IVISION
Study
Conclusions
Tradeoff
The
following
An
_,_. N()RTtt
conclusions
inertially
attitude
the
unacceptable
The
three
of view
solution
of all parameters
(i) accuracy
(normal
ence
provides
- in particular
volume
and
conditions
rates
(emergency
which
could
to the
and
four-gimbal
such
as
subsystem
subsystem.
to result
provides
subsystem
Its principal
with
in an
and
operation).
problem
vehicle
to maintain
only
satisfactorily
attitude
vehicle
subsystem
under
in terms
are
maneuvers
an
uncontrolled
(The
the best
limitations
gross
(2) inability
of high
perform
the
reference
associated
operation)
under
solution
a performance
are
gyro
to the
study:
penalty.
considered.
errors
the best
from
requirements
and
(:ORPORATION
this tradeoff
problem
single-DOF-attitude
compromise
from
platform
reliability
weight
R()CKWEI,I_
drawn
subsystem
point
However,
were
stabilized
reference
operational
2.
AMERICAN
the
refer-
tumbling
considered
emergency
conditions
was
the four-gimbal
subsystem.)
In addition
to this conclusion,
it was also recommended
that a hardware
design
study be initiated
on an
in-flight
feasible,
The
two-free
system
this
as the
resulted
axis
had
in the
of
resolver
to
be
Apollo
the
then
the
was
it
was
angle
to
Also
during
the
made
the
the
reference
complex
limitations
rates,
caused
subsystem.
the
three-gyro
subsystem.
accuracy
(The
most
drift
three-gyro
if
date.
operational
high
to utilize
angles.
felt
that
would
torquers,
The
be
greater
orientation
below
attitude
of E_ller
gyro
new
to
and
to the original
regulation.
changed
considered
addition
which,
at a later
subsystem
This
requirement
magnitude
decision
of 0. 5 degree
of the
maneuver
also
study
errors,
supply
rated
backup
was
in
platform
program
singularities)
subsequently
maneuver
maneuver
at
system
generation
the
power
was
This,
attitude
was
four-gimbal
into the
subsystem
of
considered.
During
cent
gyro
in a qualification
to be
phased
areas
decision
concept
be
studied.
(four
maintainable,
could
a maneuver
be
attainable.
and
torquer
performance
commensurate,
than
and
50
prior
accuracy
This
amplifier
degrees,
the
execution
for
that
if
subsystem
of
the
to
resulted
repeatability
requirement
assuming
to
equal
error
the
from
and
this
subsystem
required
would
required
1 per-
be
realigned
control
system
function.
error
This
would
be
assumption
the
study
compensated
later
it was
assumed
in the system
led to a proposal
that the
to one
total effective
degree
for in-flight
per
drift trim
3ZSD
68-869
hour
gyro
drift
or better.
of the gyros.
SPACE
PROBLEMS
DIVISION
AND
OF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWEI,I,
CORPORATION
CHANGES
Problem
Perhaps
the
the
development
larly
of
during
higher
system
only
ment
rule
was
not
only
axis
trim
basis,
then
the
of the previous
amplifiers.
Following
determine
anization
and
which
this
if
the
was
arrived
resulted
All
An
and
test
at
the
to trim
because
for
was
data
gyro
review
for
of
on
switch
was
torquer
to the torquer
final
only
the
placed
Block
between
the actual
the
above
individual
the
of the
undertaken
A
this
mech-
problem,
however,
at
that
astronaut,
deleted.
to
gyros
recently
align-
an
was
be
I program.
Cape
deleted
a
Kennedy
based
the torquing
problem
deleted;
the
was
for
invalidate
resolution
trim
the
on
stability
could
trimwere
established
to
(This
requirement
gathered
drift
trim
A
utilize
indicated
upon
would
limited
the
in-flight
in-flight
tasks
axis
the
could
with
studies
performed
of the
1 degree/
on
trim
(compatible
one
required
of these
were
degrees/hr,
computer.
in-flight
consuming
that
provided
the
foilowing
changes:
launch.
additional
the
time
conclusion,
in
trim
had
automatically,
digital
normally
results
if the trim
trim
requirement
that
30
upon
reliance
and
was
in-flight
required
axis
and
based
accomplished
required
The
impose
requirements
requirement
prior
to
upon
the
In fact,
time
be
particu-
amplifiers
unacceptable
sextant
which
studied.
ineffective.
to
which
telescope
then
did in-flight
also
results
torquing
were
and
in
problem,
torquing
7 degrees/hr
navigation
imposed
encountered
drift
and
capability
was
was
proposed.
were
and
problem
reference
gyros
expected,
trimming
then
the
a heavy
for performing
rule)
it was
the
design
The
imposed
scanning
Methods
was
performance
gyro
trimming
guidance
the
PGNCS
purposes.
ground
ARS
than
the
if
the
ground
backup
however,
using
system
maneuvers.
Since
in-flight
This,
e.g.,
the
characteristics
rate,
primary
significant
rotational
drift
respectively.
hr drift
to
most
amplifier
amplifier
was
connected
maneuver.
Time
constraints
a maneuver
initiation
of
were
and
the
the
time
maneuver.
established
interval
on
the
time
between
the
allocated
alignment
-33
SD
68- 8 69
to
perform
and
the
gP.\CE
1)IVISI()N
The
torquing
yaw.
amplifier
(This
larger
The
range
was
for the
Block
were
imposed
changes
cw N()R'I'It
error
budget
reference
I,_()CKWEIA,
(:()I_,PORATION
maximum
range
reduced
again
on
was
increased
II system.)
for
system
AMERI(:AN
and,
Certain
system
the ARS
in pitch
in fact,
other
and
became
even
specification
components.
was
increased
to allow
for
larger
the
Block
errors.
Changes
A
major
definition
number
design
study
of operational
PGNCS/SCS
ated.
In terms
from
and
attitude
the
deletion
An
of in-flight
additional
These
is given
and
should
concluded
be
made
could
be
most
driven
inertial
significant
addition
by
to the
were
either
combined
also
enumer-
equipment
of a simple
measurement
II
that a
change
set of single-
integrated
rate
unit (IMU)
outputs
gimbal
angles,
maintenance.
desired
changes
MIT,
the
AGCU,
equipment
replacement
of the three Block
tional set
of three
BMAG_s.
NASA,
following
study
to this equipment
of the
or
initiated
This
changes
changes
perhaps
which
BMAG's
was
MSC.
functional
deletion
displays
"caged"
NASA
Specific
of the ARS,
were
to the AI%S
by
and
system.
requirements
axis
change
performed
were
NR.
then
change
related
I spring-restrained
studied
sumnaary
in more
of these
to the
rate
detail
by
decisions,
AKS
gyros
was
the
an
addi-
by
representatives
related
to the
of
ARS,
below:
backup
ARS
in the
Block
rather
than
ment
was
with
an
all-attitude
II system,
the three
based
upon
i.e.,
capability
three-axis
single-axis
a strong
attitude
attitude
astronaut
would
be
maintained
ball display
displays.
This
preference
for
requirethis type
of display.
Tile design
computer
angle
problems
set,
and
to discourage
An
over
analog
associated
in conjunction
driving
and
schedule
tem
is given
angle
version
as
using
a possible
generator
for
the
considerations.
in Figure
with
the BMAG's
this method
Euler
a digital
with
(GDC)
Block
A
the Apollo
were
of such
the
a nature
Euler
as
solution.
mechanization
II backup
functional
ARS
was
based
description
3-4.
- 34
guidance
for generating
SD
68-869
selected
upon
cost
of this sys-
SPACE
DIVISION
oF
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
I
,_ AUTOPILOT
ATTITUDE HOLD
MODE
THREE SINGLE-DOF
ATTITUDE GYROS
_1 ATTITUDE ERROR
RATE
MODE
(BMAGS)
I DISPI_AY
I
J
v I AUTOPILOT
I
THREE SINGLE-DOF
ATTITUDE GYROS
(BMAGS)
BACKUP
RATE
_! BODY RATE
NORMAL
J DISPLAY
I
I
ATTITUDE
HOLD
FU_,I_ '_'_
ANGLE
MANEUVER
Ir THREE-AXIS
...lJ
ATT,TUDE
,SPLAY
EULER ANGLES
-I/ENTRY
MONITOR
'|
ROLL ANGLE
3-ENERATOR/
I L DISPLAY
Figure
3-3.
Inertial Platform
ARS
(Three
or Four
Gimbals)
MANEUVER
INERTIAL
SYNCHRONIZER
PLATFORM
ATTITUDE
ERRORS
EULERTO
BODY
(EULER AXES)_v
CONVERSION
ATT,TUOE
AUTOPILOT
ERRORS
(BODY)
ATTITUDE ERROR
DISPLAY
I
I
I
I
EULER
,...I
THREE-AXIS
ANGLES
v I
ATTITUDE DISPLAY
Figure
3-4.
Three
Single-DOF
Attitude Gyro
ARS
(Block II/GDC)
- 35 SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
The
six-BMAG
ence
to the
Block
operated
in which
The
in Table
System
displays
The
system
backup
is an
All
in the
to be
were
angles
for
rate
BMAG's
mode
II in prefer-
and
three
BMAG's
and
had
requirement
identified
all-analog
not meet
except
with
Block
System
- This
display
the
ing pulse
on
BMAG's
rate
of the
Euler
changes
systems
in Table
system
on three
3-5
which
are
indicated
are
tabu-
described
integrates
separate
the all-attitude
are
studied
below:
body
rates
attitude-display
capability
needles
required
of the
are
greater
is an
all-analog
a three-axis
of the
torquing
ball.
Block
- This
system
The
I type
capability.
is the
same
is mechanized
- This
system
rebalance
is an
loops
Table
which
generates
electronic
(BMAG's
This
in rate
is the
Euler
feedback
system
sensor
selected
3-4.
all-digital
around
ARS
except
version
Requirements
Block
TVC
that the
of system
B,
Changes
Block
II
30 /sec
50 /sec
Z5/sec
50/sec
5/sec
50/sec
rate
Roll
and
yaw
roll attitude
accuracy
Euler
includ-
the gyros.
requirements
manual
as System
requirements:
Pitch
loops
mode)
digitally.
Requirement
and
system
If.
generator
System
Entry
the
providing
in the generation
the various
this information
(GDC)
around
Entry
Block
ARS.
System
Rate
for
six of these
used
ARS
between
systems
does
selected
of three
gyros.
CORPORATION
the GDC.
there
The
- This
and
by
tradeoffs
3-5.
was
accuracy
information
areas
angle
of being
of sufficient
3-4.
ROCKWELL
I configuration
capability
The
for
configuration
rate
angle
lated
AMERICAN
spring-restrained
data
in Table
OF NORTH
display
No
r equirenaents
36SD
68-869
SPACE
I)IVISION
)F NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
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37
SD
68-869
SPACE
I)IVISION
System
- This
generator
- This
generator
motivated
The
the
result
sor
rate)
in changes
was
signal
was
ing upon
to provide
resolved
the
the Euler
design
and
The
the
secant
lunar
function
or
were
and
sensors
around
for
the
the
the
deletion
gyros.
torquing
error
these
The
the
Euler
contribution
of the horizon
torquing
signal
to the local
net
sen-
(orbit
mode.
appropriate
This
gyros,
vertical.
dependThe
and
the
of the
electronics
contained
from
angles
effect
in
was
that
motors.
this
change
the
the
transformation
AGCU
mechanization.
were
generated
in
effect
of
in
changed
varying
the
the
For
reasonable
in threshold
the
Block
feedback
gain
threshold
levels
inner-gimbal
level
was
found
angles,
to be
acceptable.
CONC
LUSIONS
Since
satisfactory
not
suggest
the
operation
during
any
the
cha_Iges,
and
not
(ORDEAL).
functions
stepper
due
to
from
did
was
later felt to be unjustifiable
this capability
was
deleted
from
mechanization
of
made,
and
local-vertical
to the
respect
of operation
to provide
sun
in the program
gyro
open-loop
from
body
to Euler
rates
was
deleted
Because
of the
manner
in which
these
system,
angle
changes
the deletion
a fixed
currents
module
angle
computer.
system.
In 1967, this function
was
again added
at the request
astronauts.
The NASA
provided
as GFE
the orbital rate drive
for Apollo
Euler
computer.
guidance
early
With
with
except
the
of the horizon
mode,
orientation
that the
guidance
system.
hardware.
this mode
required
other
C()RPORATION
except
the
as
occurred
a pseudo
within
the
into torquing
vehicle
requirement
for
the mechanization
same
the deletion
vertical
as
within
certain
however,
to actual
local
used
was
This,
gyrocompass
is the
to simplify
ROCKWEI,I,
same
is contained
of the ARS,
a desire
ARS.
is the
system
first of these
backup
AMERICAN
is contained
capability
evolution
by
system
capability
System
In the
_V NORTH
performance
spacacraft
there
are
of this
flights
no
and
subsystem
developmental
hindsight
suggestions.
38SD
68-869
has
been
problems
do
SPACE
I)IVISI()N
4. 0
This
the
section
SCS.
The
,,v
N()RTII
THRUST
VECTOR
discusses
TVC
subsystem
lunar
(LM
The
and
on
function
ground
lems
and
rules
and
the
the
subsystem
of the Apollo
propulsion
and manual
module
off (LM
of the present
the development
(TVC)
flight control
lunar
in establishing
with
control
module
service
both automatic
operation
used
associated
SUBSYSTEM
ON)
(',()RPORATION
SUBSYSTEM
vector
provides
of the service
provides
for
R()CK'_VEI,I_
CONTROL
the thrust
during
thrusting
The
present
TVC
module
AMERI(:AN
system
control
spacecraft
(SPS).
with the
OFF).
subsystem,
subsystem
of
the
requirements
design,
of this subsystem
and
are
the prob-
presented.
DESCRIPTION
Functions
The
Apollo
control--the
guidance
primary
and
the
backup
system,
backup
stabilization
has
modes
the backup
the
The
the
maneuvers.
SCS.
As
is to provide
These
orbit insertion,
abort.
uses
the
commands
of the
TVC
flight
mode
control
electronics
by
propulsion
primary
to generate
analog
performed
thrusting
of service
mode.
computer
uses
function
during
two
digital
mode
the
include
midcourse
earth
orbit retro,
and
and
navigation
whereas
and
spacecraft
thrusting
pointing
maneuvers
transearth
The
second
function
of the TVC
subsystem
is to provide
backup
control
for the engine
position
system.
injection,
both
primary
Mechanization
gimba[
The
TVC
commands
service
subsystem
consists
of analog
electronics
to generate
engine
and analog
electronics
to control
the positioning
of the
module
The
engine
ope ration:
i,
main
servo
Primary
compute
2.
Backup
engine.
system
mode
functional
accepts
commands
commands
from
diagram
from
is shown
in Figure
the following
the guidance
and
navigation
automatic
(SCS)
mode
commands
39SD
modes
68-869
4-i.
of
SPACE
DIVISION
_ li
or
NORTH
m m mi n
lim i
AMERICAN
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ROCKWELL
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40SD
68-869
SPACE
4.
The
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
Rotation
hand
compensation.
controller
commands
with
Rotation
controller
commands
directly.
backup
feedback
the
the
These
exact
form
integral
sensor
used
with
output
The
system,
major
which
assembly,
and
yaw
loop
spacecraft,
clutch,
the
transducer
velocity,
the
signals
pilot's
supplies
and
linear
rotary
an
The
engine
subsystem
the
sensing
angular
by
motor
containing
The
the
engine
mounts,
the
pitch
through
near
the
the
element
is geared
motion
signal
proportional
four
mounts
in turn,
inner-races
the
gimbal
throat
of
gimbal
are
the
and
the
or
and
4.5
ac
engine
ring
so that
the
combustion
the
or
to the
amplifier.
lead
screw,
A
velocity
angular
proportional
output
These
indicator
snubbers
in pitch.
to
shaft.
on
within
The
yaw
the
the
actuator
these values
to l degree
in
gimbal
travel is dictated
center
is
along
injector
-41
extension
center,
is 0 degrees
in yaw
and
centerline;
distortion
of the thrust
two
of
head.
of
the
the
of gravity
circular
orthogonal
the
inner-race
to the
spacecraft.
plane
chamber.
by pitch
travel.
position
spring
assembly
set
to
gimba[
respect
output
and
degrees
of the vehicle
gimbal
ball
signal
frame
by
servo
the
servo
actuator
to the gimbal
is limited,
bearings
to the
to clutch
an
the actuator
attached
are
mounted
to
the
to a magnetic-particle
to linear
supplies
position
with
to a recirculating
clutch
in yaw
of
forms
system
is controlled
input
structure
during
the firing of the engine
brings
yaw
and 2 degrees
in pitch.
This unsymmetrical
main
the
gimbal
of actuator
geared
electrical
null, which
is at the mechanical
I-I/2
degrees
in pitch from
the spacecraft
The
servo
position,
electrical
of a dc
travel
by variations
in the lateral
propellant
is consumed.
attitude
of which
actuator,
Engine
amplifier,
degrees
rate
of (i) using
is the SPS
elements--the
employing
between
angular
to 4.5
output
gimbal
actuator
transducer
displacement
go to the servo
display
panel.
actuator,
ac
a position
vehicle
networks;
consists
The
position.
of which
the
TVC
basic
electronics.
consists
output
converts
in the
be commanded
actuator
attitude
attached.
of three
systems
and
may
The
which
servo
rate
into the
and
and
the
of control
directly
module
the servo
position
compensation
and
rate information,
and (2) passing
it through
o the gimbal
servo.
The
rate feedback
mode
subsystem
consists
and
retraction
lunar
damping
attitude
configuration,
mode
CORPORATION
rate
of vehicle
of gimbal
vehicle
either
ROCKWELL
through
manual
the vehicle
and then
the
sum
pass
on the
The
controller
consists
of the
outputs
command.
combining
it with
some
compensation
is not
autopilot
depending
engine
rotation
hand
automatic
and
error.
DIVISION
gimbal
ring
coplanar
axes.
the
yaw
bearing,
and
Two
"thrust
struts"
The
ring
as
engine
intersects
SD
68- 869
itself
fits
the
engine
tie
SPACE
The
gimbal
yaw
ring
spacecraft
drives
engine
yaw
Design
Features
Three
Electromagnetic
2.
SCS
3.
Manual
An
TVC
main
been
The
module
the
are
gimbal
tracked
by
The
thrust)
the
In
during
program
attitude
indicated
control
of
astronaut
for
The
are
as
actuator
between
rotating
engine
and
the
gimbal
follows:
actuator
was
actuator
the
first time
thrust
engine
system
fed
is used
the traditional
in
of
fashion
rather
the
this
center-of-gravity
manner,
nozzle
form
to
the
particle
two
sets
of
oxidizer
than
in
a parallel
spacecraft's
The
The
environment.
consists
of
positioning
actuator.
that a magnetic
in a space
serial
excursions
to apply
hydraulic
of the
mission.
and
then
integrated
to
simple
is
be
possible
too
thrusting.
rate
heavy
and
center
and
attitude
a bias
signal
of
position
for
the
motion
is
large
to
with
allow
Simulation
damped
vehicles
attitude
were
control
studies
control
definitely
system
essentially
the
of
capable
redundant
to
SPS
manual
of
the
(Zl,
000
control
midway
light
feasible.
the
through
vehicles
Manual
satisfying
other
pounds
of
crew
modes
of
the
and
direct
TVC
offers
survival
thrusting.
REQUIREMENTS
This
the
section
Apollo
requirements
program
describes
TVC
by the
customer
used
to establish
the
than
accelerations
thought
attitude
for
large
angular
first
requirements
used
pitch
half-way
engine.
high
DESIGN
in
course
summed
vehicle
the
is
servo.
was
system
clutch
propellant
engine
results
during
engine
arm
The
about
to the
4-3.
clutch
rather
for a large
The
which
gravity
information
lever
TVC
particle
for Apollo
used
tanks.
manner,
ring,
at the
and
mode
engine
service
fuel
l web.
gimbal
mounted
bearings
integrator
of this actuator
had
the
are
yaw
I foot long.
and
particle
electromagnetic
on the
clutch
of
f:ORPORATION
swivel,
and
of the No.
the
actuator
4-2
features
I.
forces
The
which
is approximately
in Figures
design
and
ROCKWEI,I.
pitch
edge
head
bearings.
shown
the
at the inner
on its bearings
are
fittings,
between
the injector
and
AMERICAN
rod-end
half-way
structure
mounts
and
_v NORTH
actuator
about
between
the pitch
use
I)IVISION
and
the
relate
has
had
the
subsystem.
those
internal
design
The
requirements
requirements
internally
generated.
requirements.
to
body-bending
in
developing
parameters
good
data.
42
and
consist
of
The
ground
substantial
and
ground
rules
amountof
reflect
SD
those
68-869
the
rules
used
supplied
are
those
the
difficulty
SPACE
DIVISION
or NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
THRUST STRUT
PITCH
ACTUATOR
PITCH AXIS\
Figure
4-2.
SPS
Engine
Mount
YAW
ACTUATOR
PITCH AXIS
YAW
AX IS
+Z
Figure
4-3.
SPS
Gimbal
Mount
- 43SD
68-869
SPACE
1)IVISION
_,v NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWEI,I,
(:ORPORATION
Requirements
Customer
Requirements
The
basic
design
requirements
TVC
subsystem
are
as
follows:
1.
Maintenance
Z.
Satisfy
pointing
and
accuracy
Translunar
midcourse
b.
Transearth
c.
Transearth
The
following
apply
stability
of:
5.7
degrees
(30-)
injection:
1. 54
degrees
(30-)
midcourse:
5.7
degrees
(30-)
internally
to
nonlinear
corrections:
generated
satisfaction
of
requirements
stability
and
ground
rules
requirements.
Requirements
In
design
an
attempt
to
requirements
ment
the
linear
a.
generally
Internal
of
of
these
Angular
desired
illustrated
further
were
define
generated.
requirements
Control.
vector
AV
the
are
and
The
given
Pointing
that
basic
in
error
achieved
requirements,
ground
the
rules
next
(_@) is
at the
pointing
error
These
as defined
and
pointing
vehicle
of
ing
an
thrust
These
thrusting
the
internal
establish-
defined
termination
as
the
of
angle
between
thrusting,
as
ERROR
SCS
DESIRED
of the delta
achieved
vector
is independent
of the
here.
requirements
independently
Values
for
end
in
of
below:
AV
(SCS,
used
set
section.
/xV_
Note
apply
will
be
error
dynamics,
to
each
autopilot
channel
met
in the
requirements
presence
include
of
etc.)
initiation
of
from
(pitch
the
expected
all
control
the
ullage
and
error
system
yaw)
sources.
effects
maneuver
to
the
tailoff.
requirements
AV
attitude;
burn,
such
only
the
do
not
as
those
TVC
apply
to
other
involved
portion
in
of
the
errors
incurred
aligning
total
the
AV
budget
above.
- 44
SD
in
perform-
spacecraft
68 - 8 69
is
to
tabulated
the
SPACE1)IVISION_vNORTII AMERICANR()CKWEI,I,CORPORATION
Magnitude
burn
is
0.7
tainti
Control.
fps
(three
e s.
saturation)
for
phase
margin
range
of
These
not
Abort.
angular
rate
of autopilot
system
show
pitch
or
This
tude
listed
will
when
or
propulsion
have
over
the
uncer-
a minimum
the
in
angular
limit
linear
of
(non-
will
activity
detection
will
for
buildup.
from
any
com-
attitude
because
with
introduce
regard
to proper
attitude
did not
frequency
to an
as to interfere
with
sigma
stability.
converge
that would
if vehicle
at any
one
affect
tolerance
of vehicle
magnitude
met
of
which
converge
cycling
display
be
presence
rates
of such
failure
the
I0 seconds
motion
or
would
met
a three-sigma
within
(peak-peak)
Angular
(p-p)
at a frequency
Ground
of
V,
percent
below
l cps,
an
system
exceed
and
l cps.
not produce
of a degree
for
less
any
or
criterion
of a degree
Engine
should
delta
1.3
parameters
yaw
will not be
in monitoring
be
system
vehicle
or to cause
operation.
above
the
within
margin
and
Hunting
uncertainty
0 degree
to
instability
deg/sec
dynamics
one-fourth
of
be
system
gain
must
respect
Attitude.
accuracy
TVC
6. 0 db
tions specified.
In addition,
bination
of initial conditions.
Vehicle
will
exclusive
The
Vehicle
of 2.0
magnitude
maneuvers,
and
with
must
SM
all
the
mode,
requirements
conditions
system
of
backup
operation.
margin
tolerance
the
Requirements.
degrees
The
in
sigma)
Stability
30
Control
accomplished
Position.
a position
at any
The
limit
frequency
above
2 cps
SPS
cycle
engine
positioning
amplitude
below
2 cps.
servo
in excess
Limit
subsystem
of one-tenth
cycling
of any
ampli-
is unacceptable.
Rules
The ground
as follows:
rules
1.
System
stability
2.
Phase
3.
Maximum
4.
Roll-off
used
to establish
as
stabilization
gain
filter
shown
of
Table
bending
consistent
natural
in
these
internal
4-1.
modes
with
frequency
requirements
18
system
as
rad/sec
or
stability.
low
as
possible.
45SD
68-869
less.
are
SPACE
DIVISION
oF
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
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SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
Bending
oF NORTH
data
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
tolerances:
Frequencies
20%
50%
LM
OFF
25%
25%
data
the
will
least
which
Circumlunar-free
with
the
LM
SM
always
stability.
be
used
performance
injection
Shapes
ON
Time-critical
Mode
LM
Bending
yielding
CORPORATION
abort
at
the
extremes
of
exist
during
requirements
require
failure
return
takeover
without
mission
is
abort
ranges
transearth
shutdown
always
of
the
carried
out
modes,
not
SPS.
ON.
from
booster
failures
to
be
in
automatic
MTVC.
10.
MTVC
will be
control
ii.
1Z.
There
is
mode,
during
LM
Lunar
orbit
in
primary
affected
series
but
ON
TVC
occur
for
LM
is
injection(LOI)
mode
ON
for
LOI
SPS.
to
only
LOI
require
the
in
warrant
MTVC
with
V's
in the
LM
initiated
in
of
failures
the
automatic
primary
mode.
aborting
LOI.
takeover
OFF
are
guidance
and
flight.
takeover
initiated
is done
all CSM
power
delta
required
prior
for
during
V maneuvers
requirements
to
for
damp
the
the
modes.
Failures
transients
rate-damped
CHANGES
discusses
the
subsystem.
electromagnetic
propellant
mode
only.
section
the
that
MTVC
delta
MTVC
AND
the takeover
requirement
14.
This
the
no
Failures
during
and
shutdown
of
PROBLEMS
as
failures
13.
mode
of
{G&C)
MTVC
the
used
The
clutch
feed
evolution,
problems,
problems
actuator,
and
discussed
body
bending
changes
are
data
that
development
variations,
and
system.
Problems
Magnetic
Particle
The
difficulties
Clutch
Development
electromechanical
encountered
actuator
in
the
was
a problem
development
- 47
of
the
primarily
electromagnetic
SD
68-869
caused
clutch.
by
the
SPACE
The
characteristics.
cycle
principal
making
overheating
is
caused
but
subsequent
for
the
percent.
had
than
to
allow
There
clutch
gain
the
of
motor
speed,
lower
actuator
nonlinear
to
of
experienced
susceptible
new
design.
Bending
Data
the
upon
testing
latest
for
the
+15
mode
shape
were
of
I and
did
In
analysis
the
assuming
a first-mode
is
considerably
considered
and
to
attempt
primarily
changing
the
less
and
change
the
gear-
rotating
input
the
is
subsequent
that,
of
some
large
for
initial
requirements
that
Block
on
II
would
system
engine
condition
were
be
stability
has
excursion
because
SCS
the
of
changes
then
outside
the
problem
was
a lower
loop
and
have
these
for
actuator
there
thus
is
less
development
the
variation
performance
been
no
in
was
flight
body
factored
failures
outside
LM.
sensitive
The
the
As
the
or
problems.
to
the
body
set
design
deleted
was
At
510
II is
that
percent
a
was
modal
autopilot
and
No.
Table
original
bending.
frequency
bending
problem.
NASA
a result,
bending
body
a major
The
1965,
less
the
been
available.
April
plus
it
the
1965,
has
data
In
for
structure
frequency
bending
CSM
affect
of
data
data.
assumed.
not
the
an
by
then
nonlinear
changed
of
of
make
separated
that
of
design
changes.
bending
of
percent
spring
that
body
sets
CSM
of
loss
The
required
set
1965
tolerances
set
in
first
September
done
transient
rate
far,
gain
Variation.
various
the
limits
been
as
system
in
design
mission
The
estimate
Thus
variation
lists
based
not
during
the
in
I system.
has
great
a clutch
control
between
is
the
starting
low
burn
as
slower.
recover.
actuator
was
clutches
The
smaller
have
actuator
speed
for
resulted
or
has
however,
The
4-2
the
data
the
Body
Block
autopilot
problems;
bending
moves
to
I and
to
The
into
the
Block
the
engine
system
in
than
of
penalty
that
be
of
over-
percent.
the
slip
did
cause
The
for
could
the
This
The
a failure
the
50
another,
burns.
only
couId
to
The
capability.
prevent
capability
of
changes
rate
stability
changed
gain
the
not
nonlinear
limit
primary
SPS
decrease
a result,
overheating.
less.
the
actuator
variations
clutches.
The
decrease,
As
members
is
motor
A
the
output
generation
a new
and
vehicle
from
operation.
gain
nominal.
from
to
to
This
design
clutch
stationary
or
in
three
overheating
affecting
during
clutch
C()RPORATION
different
system
well.
hand,
for
prevent
given
other
of
ing
heat
the
as
percent
were
the
of
50
to
and
the
slightly
the
misalignment
burns
On
greater
thrust
ROCKWEI,I,
clutch
were
although
appear
with
gain
AMERICAN
with
the
effects,
actuator
interfere
heating
50
one
substantially
clutch
{)P NORTH
problems
nonlinear
The
and
not
I)IVISION
changed
time
for
the
reanalysis
design.
the
Boeing
structure
was
50
percent
the
15
Aircraft
into
a beam.
less
percent
Corr_pany
its
These
than
tolerance;
performed
component
the
parts
data
(set
1963
data.
No.
however,
48SD
III)
This
the
preliminary.
68-869
a modal
rather
than
indicate
variation
data
were
SPACE
DIVISION
oF
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
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68
- 8 69
'_
e
m
_
H
SPACE
DIVISION
In January
a TVC
1966
system
Evaluation
data
was
modified
introduced
vehicles
and
signal
at about
Block
I flight.
Thompson
the
No.
sets
cps
of
bending
have
be
of
the
sent
at that time.
value
formance
was
necessary
SCS
modal
and
Grumman
to
and
cps.
Z.90
Also
2.4
range.
autopilot
LM-
of
design
ON
2.76,
common
configurations
of
reassigned
this
at
time,
to
of
and
3.87
were
these
data
<_ere
to the
sets
pre-
per-
extent
data
used.
dominate
it
was
upon
was
the
for
decided
to
1968
the
articles
Thus
before
flight.
50SD
68-869
15,
2. 60,
CSM+LM
were
several
1.75
decided
103.
1966)
modes
indicated
thus
2.
modify
in the
module
CSM+LM
were
bending
to
lunar
December
for
two
of
flight
the
available
bending
summer
It
for
revised
data
first
subsequent
customer
system
frequencies
The
as
the
to their
of bending
revised
data
fabricated
met.
all existing
because
data
three
cps.
spacecraft
they
be
cps.
first
the
for
reduced
stiffness
1968,
with
changed
range
(Grumn_an
based
of
were
time,
it
the
unofficial
to
to accomn)odate
to 1.6
TRW
end
3.01,
n?argins
required
gains
data
of
were
\vere
for the
condition.
a design
the
all
was
Company
summer
to
were
in conjunction
designed
The
bending
required,
made
using
of
frequency
schedules
stability
of 1.0
1967.
the
to
set
a first-mode
modifications
system
were
determined
testing
another
of every
was
if
was
stability
loading
In
was
Block
components
traces
task
hardware
NASA/MSC
April
boxes
Modal
frequencies
new
cps.
electronic
that
Aircraft
at
although
rate-gyro
requirenlents
the
tron_
propellant
1 and
spare
in
however,
first two
that
of
relaxation
when
were
condition
quarter-full
This
NR
the
Boeing
data.
At
unstable
when
certain
adequate
fabricated
Revised
with
was
performance
in the range
forwarded
The
analysis
produced
existing
adequate
electronics
modal
indicated
a decision
degraded
frequencies
NR
and
if
to provide
The
to provide
half-full
2.
SCS
frequencies
were
used
thereafter,
data.
in the
the
1966,
soon
of bending
at KSC.
a body-bending
doubt,
data.
instability,
evident
analysis
were
to redesign
stack
probably
Considerable
bending
TVC
in agreement
Block
II SCS
made
on the
was
(TRW).
ON
was
the
data
to
Shortly
The
been
thereafter,
LM
which
that
I flight spacecraft),
cured.
in-flight
have
summer
The
checkout
cause
generated
any
Shortly
late
7 rad/sec,
was
indicated
would
17
IV).
during
instability
analytically
exhibit
CORPORATION
17 cps.
The
bending
analysis
at that time
had
mode
would
be in excess
of 30 cps.
Although
the
Ramo-Wooldridge
In
(set
the
ROCKWELL
that the
on the S-IB
stack,
mode
at the CM/SM
in the
did not
009
occurred
indicated
at approximately
that the free-free
test was
performed
tive of a free-free
AMERICAN
on Spacecraft
instability
of the
resonance
indicated
oF NORTH
to
Z. 86
bending
to
n_ake
three
the
the
separate
first
cps
Series
Propellant
The
for
service
oxidizer
rather
not
keep
about
pointing
engine
through
nozzle
tor.
the
the
position
The
addition
would
be
the case
cause
less
vehicle
requires
it.
the vehicle
space
An
spacecraft
attempt
spacecraft
was
design
four
with
provide
during
of the
engine
hardover
means
the
engine
I) to
signal
the
called
SCS
the
autopilot
engine
space-
in Block
generates
lower
travel
each
fashion
propellant
a bias
a stage
two
of the
during
degrees
autopilot
a slightly
Reduced
engine
deflection
limiting
has
and smaller
engine
deflections
on the
attitude
of gravity
of gravity
To
the
tanks,
in a serial
as well
center
of gravity.
of four
engine
center
II (nearly
of gravity,
of this loop
on
of the
center
and
the
laterally
in Block
center
without
effect
Thus,
but
motion
degrees
consists
is fed to the
at once.
lateral
two
for tracking
of the
storage
propellant
longitudinally
This
move
propellant
The
tanks
moves
consumption.
must
fuel.
all four
only
System
module
and
than
craft
Feed
to the
integral
integra-
gain
would,
than
furthermore,
failure.
That
is,
a stabilizing
effect on the vehicle
control
system,
produce
smaller
lateral loads and moments
structure.
made
was
to change
too
far
to a parallel
along
to warrant
feed
the
system
but the
change.
Tradeoff
tradeoff
that
affected
the
TVC
was
the
the electromagnetic
particle
clutch
actuator.
the
electromagnetic
particle
clutch
actuator
and
the
hydraulic
problems
tradeoff
sent
results,
results
results
Power
time,
result,
total power
higher
Space
ible with
which
has
have
power
than
than
requirements
The
environment
to be
contained
system
would
to maintain
in a reservoir
have
following
to be
the working
of the
electrohydraulic
vector
pressure.
are
is more
+300
SD
about
compatfluid
68- 869
control
1p.
time.
Furthermore,
and
are
As
of a working
a temperature
-65
system
operating
system
with
condi-
control
system
TVC
under
because
operating
system.
e[ectrohydrau[ic
absence
certain
today.
electrohydraulic
of the
repre-
system
of the thrust
500-second
The
and
performed
the normal
fluid between
-51
were
These
percent.
started,
electromechanical
provided
it
paragraphs,
electromechanica[
eIectromechanical
because
of 50
requirements
of the
with
between
considerations.
the program
During
versus
associated
tradeoff
system
tradeoff
for the
of the
the
variations
80 percent
that of the
space
the
requirements
than
Compatibility.
the
hydraulic
would
higher
if the
capability.
of more
the power
i00 percent
75 percent
higher
after
actuator
problems
make
in the
just
The
low-power
consists
gain
summarized
be modified
considerably
which
about
are
performed
The
for future
of clutch
Requirements.
are
operating
which
perhaps
of its inefficient
tion,
relevant
primarily
of a study
would
system
actuator
consisted
hydraulic
a
which
SPACE
DIVISION
Reliability.
the
hydraulic
ov NORTH
The
study
systems
over
AMERICAN
indicated
the
ROCKWELL
a slight
CORPORATION
reliability
electromechanica[
superiority
system.
reliability
growth
lies with the electromechanical
smaller
number
of subassemblies
in the system
of
Capability
of
system
because
of the
and its better
space
compatibility.
Growth
system
Potential.
is higher
missions
and
growth
the
would
of the
of a hydraulic
have
environment
growth
to be
than
potential
of the possibility
severity
potential
control
The
in view
environment
system
provided
is presently
of the
electromechanical
of extending
the duration
without
is less
to cover
major
favorable,
a more
of
changes.
since
severe
The
temperature
temperature
specified.
Changes
The
basic
design.
and
The
was
or
navigation
I system
The
primary
was
control
function
was
three
times
changed
with
and
was
for
of the
time
capability
ON
systelrl as
the
Block
II system
gains
the
Block
I system
once.
by
LM
welh
and
ON
capability
thrusting.
guidance
Block
only
its initial
LM
during
a backup
and
since
to have
of the
solely
LM
changed
stabilization
OFF
made
not
required
accomplished
At the
a system
a part
has
was
to LM
II system
made
problems,
vehicle
commands.
Block
TVC
initially
of vehicle
of the
computer
Block
was
method
steering
added.
of the
I system
the primary
guidance
data
configuration
Block
The
and
II redesign,
and
MTVC
mode
OFF.
Because
was
to the
The
manual
of the
con_pensation
the
body
TVC
bending
were
changed
TVC
subsystem
CONCLUSIONS
The
was
the
the
major
continual
summer
analysis
warranted
development
of 1968,
method
problem
variation
needs
were
in body
developed.
These
derived.
At the
of a less
with
data.
all analytically
to be
in the developFnent
encountered
bending
sensitive,
the
data,
Clearly
same
yet
time,
until late in
a more
more
hiKh-performing
subsystem.
- 52
SD
68-869
accurate
effort
is
TVC
SPACE
DIVISION
or
5. 0
This
section
subsystem
craft
during
or
on-off
rate
most
small
thrust
the
The
from
jets
subsystem
thrusting
be
Propulsive
low-limit
cycle
(ACS).
capability
of the
operated
force
rates
space-
service
in either
is provided
are
This
for the
the
by
maintained
16
by
rates
for navigation
to satisfy.
from
the
maintenance
with
thrusters
requirements
problem
without
of thermal
a minimum
sighting
The
has
damaging
control
the
of the
have
been
been
that of obtaining
engine.
spacecraft
Another
through
of fuel.
DESCRIPTION
ACS
is composed
the
the
is contained
of the
rotation
from
and
may
requirement
rotation
SUBSYSTEM
the
cycle
pulses
was
continuous
entry
mode.
and
control
flight control
subsystem
the manual
engines,
difficult
problem
except
The
SUBSYSTEM
attitude
phases
CORPORATION
feedback.
Low-limit
the
SCS
attitude
engine.
mode
hypergolic
the
ROCKWELL
CONTROL
backup
all mission
system
automatic
pseudo
the
AMERICAN
ATTITUDE
discusses
provides
propulsion
NORTH
and
translation
attitude
main
within
electronics
hand
reference
control
to fire in such
the
stabilization
necessary
controls,
subsystem,
panel.
a manner
The
as
rate
and
ACS
and
to accept
and
the
vehicle
system.
signals
attitude
configuration
causes
to control
control
command
error
signals
switching
service
module
It
from
signals
reaction
motion.
Functions
The
of failure
desired
ACS
_o
the
of the primary
to shut
i.
provides
Hold
down
following
control
the primary
spacecraft
attitude
signals
from
the
Provide
for
manual
general
system
or
functions
in those
as
a backup
instances
when
in case
it is
system:
within
a selectabte
deadband
using
error
ARS.
control
of spacecraft
attitude
in the following
configurations:
- 53SD
68- 869
SPACE
DIVISION
a.
Proportional
bo
On-off
ov NORTH
rate
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
commands
acceleration
commands
to the
RCS
solenoid
automatic
coils
Minimum
Co
d,
impulse
(R/C)
to the RCS
On-off
acceleration
to the RCS
Provide
for manual
Provide
hand
for automatic
Provide
override
manual
and
commands
cause
the
R/C
direct
switches
coils
c_mmands
in six
stabilization
ullage
coils
commands
for
directions
from
of the vehicle
to either
compatibility
(astronaut
appropriate
control
(T/C)
rate
logic
operation
hand
coils
from
direct
control
the rotation
automatic
translation
Provide
for manual
direct RCS
solenoid
from
solenoid
solenoid
the translation
4.
commands
direct
automatic
the automatic
between
commands
automatic
take
functions
or
and
precedence
to be inhibited)
Mechanization
simplified
in Figure
5-i.
reference
as follows:
to Figure
A
rate
rate
or
error
total
error
signal
signal
to the
exceeds
from
operation
of the pseudo
put
of the
switching
and
amplification
matic
coils
of the
amp,
by
the
RCS
with
amplifier.
threshold,
rate
the
switching
proper
driver
solenoids
routing
amplifiers,
in an
on-off
- 54
may
be
by
the proportional
the ARS.
signal
the magnitude
amp
With
a selected
error
is given
described
from
through
later
ACS
between
signal
rate
When
the
of the
arrangement.
difference
gyro
lag is described
after
RCS
ACS
is processed
summed
switching
the
rate
diagram
thruster
of the
as
the
the ARS
and
a fixed
operation
and
block
the ACS
is formed
the R /C
deadband
functional
depicts
the
signal
from
maximum
5-Z
5-1,
error
command
attitude
single-axis
Figure
The
minimum
to form
of this error
output
is turned
on
in this section).
the driver
is used
fashion.
The
The
selection
to actuate
output
SD
the
68-869
(the
out-
matrix
SPACE
DIVISION
ov
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
_I.H
I
_1
_z_
\-.
7"
m
___o
_
z
O
----_w--+
zJ
t,o
.<
<
g
D_
-0
QO
+
iI
t_4
+
- 55 SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
ov
NORTH
AMERICAN
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The
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57
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ACS
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their
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Parameter
Value
Requirement
atti-
0.
0. 2
Maximum
attitude
deadband
4.
4. 2
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for
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deadband
Roll control
and attitude
required
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AV
Propellant
minimization
minimization
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deadband
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0. 2/sec
Rate
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I/sec
l/sec
Propellant
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gain
Automatic
cycle
0.05/sec
limit
same
rate
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pulse
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rate
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68-869
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simulations
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were
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give
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and
and
paper
criteria
used
studies
a single-axis
and
the
simulation.
relative
analog
computer
of each
system
following
data
factors.
Criteria
Performance:
Ability
to provide
lowest
Ability
to provide
best
Ability
to provide
rapid
Good
control
turbance
under
limit
cycle
attitude
rate
accuracy
convergence
steady
and
varying
dis-
torques
Propellant
consumption
Authority
130
The
weighting
Points
I00
and
breadboard
for
large
errors
Adaptability:
Ability
to
outputs
and
Ability
to
sensors
compensate
jet
compensate
oi:
Ability
for
to
changes
in
sensor
perforn_ance
for
partial
failures
jets
accept
changes
in
control
parameters
Compatibility
2OO
with
mission
Reliability:
Parts
count
Number
3O
different
of
solenoid
actuation
Mechanization:
Weight
Power
V o him
62
SD
68-869
cycles
modes
of
SPACEDIVISION ov NORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
major
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evaulation
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poor
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were
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and
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requireessentially
emphasis
concepts
was
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placed
prototype
in the following
413
points
350
points
300
points
220
points
frequency
A
pulsing
reliability
and
concept
A was
adaptability.
refinements
pulse-width
was
and
discarded
in performance
with
yet
on
system
to
the
order:
discarded
This
on
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basis
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breadboard,
was
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even
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complex
adaptable.
The
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performance
performance
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error
possible
basic
The
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on
considered
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Error
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performance
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Error
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The
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emphasis
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and
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Lesser
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rated
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determined.
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ments
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convergence
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found
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impose
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prove
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requirement
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With
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reliability
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rate
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- 63
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for mechanization.
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68-869
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thrust
lunar
ascent
known,
for
known
service
navigation
(0.2
designed
were
vernier
during
the
the
provide
requirement
originally
engines
from
stability
0.0033
two
boost
designed
for
was
engines
during
requirement
greater
vehicle
100-pound
torques
about
no
in
described
arc
problems
successfully
hypergolic
control
rate
control,
two
been
been
Apollo
figuration)
and
first
encountered
problems
Impulse
The
were
problems
The
thermal
the
have
have
the
subsystem.
to
there
two
Minimum
The
discusses
control
68-869
jets.
of
SPACE
With
vehicle
the
was
redesign
(1)
advent
no
(2)
be
place.
the
thrust
adequate
accepted
and
the
cost
for
since
ducing
impulses
with
less
the
the
time
pulse
tion,
which
wound
system,
automatic
the
direct
actually
a
from
same
engine
small
that
cursory
meet
- roll,
a rate
change
were
available
was
voltage
it
an
of
parameter
variations
(which
was
from
taken
was
pointed
pulse
be
was
deternaine
that
be
the
sighting
single
could
made
using
engine}.
This
65
mechanization
The
it
on
could
the
lack
not
data,
at
obtained.
The
decision
closed-loop
which
under
only
for
available
investigation
SD
less
an
effects
test
revealed
68-869
least
mechanization
was
the
of
be
available
tolerance
the
subse-
maintained
the
required
was
be
designed
requirement
first.
impulse
etc.
closed-loop
based
was
occurred
temperature,
approach
cir-
valve
a minimum
while
in
poppet
This
the
reliability.
and
required
system
was
a
out
data
however,
the
affected
closed-loop
the
_nechanization
that
When
circuit.
until
produce
two
a voltage
when
special
valve
of
control
control.
whichever
would
the
induced
coil
elapsed,
decided
was
impulse
adversely
navigation
mated
by
consisted
hand
automatic
of
device
by
occurred
voltage,
and
scarcity
valve
action
the
extrapola-
operated
astronaut's
coil
supply
open-loop
to
coil
sensed
the
had
was
the
sensing
solenoid
voltage
minimum
the
meeting
study
the
this
on
system
small
jet
the
automatic
the
of
that
sea-level-to-altitude
a closed-loop
by
change
indicated
Because
the
transformer
in
data
that
the
and
of pro-
axis
a one-pound-
data
tests
automatic
of
time
pulse
from
to
the
of
definitive
deleted
problems
capable
case
test
sea-level
reaction
milliseconds
to
a closed-loop
resulting
(2)
increased
100-pound
produce
chamber
of
change
complex
recommended
pulse
20
which
that
plex.
the
review
at
more
which
was
with
feet squared,
satisfactory.
operated
independent
it
be
this
pulse
shown
until
be
energized,
latch
unnecessarily
was
an
the engines
slug
of
each
sharp
or
short
adequate
pounds
(1)
altitude
uncertainty
coil
and
to
held
50
It was
of 7 feet would
core--an
was
A
A design
quently
redesign
complexity,
of development
satisfied
believed
incorporated
follows:
coil
the
was
would
as
opened
Thus,
be
12, 500
pulse
the
a direct
used
to
engines.
second
extrapolation
the
moved,
was
small
and
coil.
actually
cuit
on
and
the
this
reduce
Recommendation
possibility
thrust
arm
at
and
engines
could
of about
a vehicle
eliminated.
the
pound
mechanization
operated
coils
one
Apollo
and
a slip in schedule,
manufacturer
but
operation
ACS
was
lower
the
surface;
Recommendation
mean
requirement
concept,
made
weight
hypergolic
and
of the
no
data
the
the
save
requirements.
a moment
jets
small-pulse
lunar
C()I{PORATION
deg/sec).
reaction
small
the
were
to
it would
than
with
0.033
on
jet system
of inertia
this
of
all
engine
less
impulse
than
At
for
meet
rate
rendezvous
land
system
redevelopment,
a moment
second
to
ROCKWEI,I.
recommendations
5-pound
sighting
engines
lunar
jet
in the design
navigation
orbit
because
engine
occurring
the
level
to
not accepted
AMERICAN
Two
5-pound
was
(,F NORTH
required
the
lower
would
of
longer
took
eliminate
and
I)IVISION
comopen-loop
of
esti-
data
that
,_P.\CE1)IVISION_,_,N()RTI! AMERI(:ANR()CK\VEI,I,C()RPORATION
a pulsewidth
always
be
was
used.
than
At
was,
this
chamber
this was
of
the
manufacturer
was
problem
cause
mixture
ratio
the
more
which
times
an
of
a precision
were
(4
percent)
rejected
because
chosen
"on"
capable
of
the
the
variation
that
is
had
the
lunar
a different
with
Thermal
It
the
spacecraft
tions.
of
plane
and
the
time.
requirement
that
and
test
the
This
data.
The
automatic
voltage:
in
of
first,
was
the
design
coil
for
a
lower
the
mechanization
variations
engine
redesign
the
explosion
are
identical
the
and
obtaining
an
effectively
supply
to
different
tests
had
voltage
cured
problem
the
now
the
and
is
explosion
reappeared
Apollo
propellant
are
and
in
engines,
will
under
to
testing
but
prevent
way
sun
line
is
not
and
maintain
may
be
Spin
stabilization
longitudinal
(roll) axis
several
reasons
why
pointing
requirements.
exceed
the
as
as
20
verify
then
angle
use
similar
this.
rotating
for
in
all further
is
the
spacecraft
part
to
duration
satisfy
of
mission).
about
control.
There
exceed
SD
68-869
of
this
thermal
spacecraft
- 66-
the
communica-
lunar-landing
might
to
required
appreciable
planned
the
the
the
stabilization
any
is
input
earth
between
for
days
disabling
of spin
flight
mode
attitude
by
thermal
uninterrupted
degrees
several
is achieved
this type
the
cycling
desired
long
and
for
that
thermal
solar
midcourse
attitude
requirement
the
even
transearth
desired
spin-stabilized
(which
approximately
translunar
thermal
YZ
control
felt
engines
maintaining
The
the
"latch"
of supply
to
and,
The
Problem
during
still
the
which
is
SM
Control
A means
while
that
however,
engines
fuel.
problem
of
widths.
pulse
investigated
performance,
duration.
due
pulse
safe
requirements.
inadequacy
pulse
small
involve
tolerances
mechanization.
were
marginal
to
to
by
a "minimum
rate
test
explosion
seemed
caused
at
the
incorporated.
assumed
year,
module
the
impulse
presently
been
This
designs
the
The
impulse
system
a one-shot
is a function
the
in
minimum
gave
for
and
an
explo-
and
it
valves
place
meeting
one-shot
longer
the
It
of
concern
eliminated
design
the
testing,
effects
oxidizer
took
on
incorporated
duration
which
voltage,
and
pulsing
two
that
was
minimum
problem.
placed
open-loop
only
fuel
However,
investigated.
cooling
rate
basis.
destructive
although
to
altitude
pulse
was
were
sighting
available.
of
and
width
on a tentative
nature
determined,
redesign
was
Several
problem
pulse
small-pulse
small
evaporative
the
engine
constraint
supply
and
become
the
during
clearly
mismatch
to
in
12 milliseconds
navigation
deg/sec
began
began
this
never
than
precise
The
to 0.04
appeared
while
was
operation
these,
data
occurred
delayed
Nevertheless,
width"
engine
problem
engine
program
not possible.
the
and
greater
if a single
relaxed
development
sion
always
milliseconds
therefore,
point
testing,
engine
that was
11.8
Obviously,
requirement
in
required
shorter
its
are
the angular
First,
it may
is influenced
pitch
and
yaw
(5) other
crew
by
achieve
an
about
the
even
mum
two
wobble
inertia
of greater
axis
motion
(roll),
and
sloshing
wobble
mass,
Recent
excess
low
using
is the
body,
sink
The
and
effects
and
mini-
cause
of
is not
stable
the propellant
is the
cause
of a
of initial vehicle
initial position
all contribute
presence
moment
vehicle,
energy
and
indicate
achieve
by
been
found
trol
system
would
that
to the
growth
sonable
duty
cycle.
to be
of the
results
for
any
of the
of the
simulations,
(Apollo
This
alternate
some
be
consumption
found
and
as
produced
slosh model
demonstrate,
solution
low
rede-
in
the
on
special
of
unrea-
it have
not
test is
the characteristics
of
the characteris-
system
duty
- 67
such
physically
to determine
fits within
control
structure
No
based
flights.
con-
to the problem
some
to
has
and
confidence
applied
predictions
7) to determine
which
spacecraft
discussion.
test is designed
results
control
consumption
is a very
and
with
these
of thermal
of the
Apollo
in
spin-up
Clearly,
propellant
model
has
of the previous
101
must
of
starting
angles
method
there
model
very
other
g slosh
level
should
propellant
will be
since
This
slosh.
after
digital
wobble
deg/sec.
redesign
tics of a higher
confidence
stabilization.
If this test
thermal
0. 009
no
thermal
low
in digital
by
shown
energy,
spacecraft
g propellant
and
however,
low
as
in terms
have
20 minutes
low
control
required
stabilization.
confirmed
planned
thermal
six degree-of-freedom
sloshing
than
as
stabilization,
is anticipated,
roll-spin
rates
that is acceptable
seem
validity
in less
yaw
spin
a closed-loop,
g propellant
of 20 degrees
would
RCS
a rigid
jets.
of one
would
problem
parameters,
torques
which
one-half
smallest
Apollo
angle.
mode
disturbance
studies
with
initial pitch
low
and
for
largest
in the wobble
slosh
the
In the
the
spacecraft
deg/sec)
second
stable
the
to
0. 007
about
dissipation.
errors,
from
to only
motion
regarding
In order
degree/second,
of about
10 degrees.
spin
problem
to spin
and
venting,
angle.
simulation
been
rate
torques,
steam
greatest
This
(Z) residual
spin motion.
impulses
is normally
growth
attitude
The
the
corresponding
is considered
anticipated
rate
sign
which
of energy
in the tank
large
than
The
machinery,
one-fourth
minimum
smoothly.
products,
it is necessary
a pitch
dissipation.
in the presence
etc.
in pitch
(producing
angle
of energy
field,
of about
to three
a disturbance
impulse
rotating
cycling,
roll motion
(4) aerodynamic
as
is maintaining
at a rate
the
cross
sloshing,
such
magnetic
thermal
about
However,
to start
(i) inertia
(3) propellant
constraints
roll axis
requires
as
torques
earth's
attigude
possible
factors
rates,
disturbing
motion,
vehicle
not be
such
unknown)
allowable
cycle.
SD
68-869
to the
budget
for
SPACE
Arc
Suppression
and
one
I)IVISION
of
Associated
load
for
arc
with
across
the
thereby
circuitry
will,
that
this
with
attendant
drop-out
Arc
be
this
against
The
arcing
than
20 volts.
The
the automatic
was
to place
direct
system
was
enabled
direct
system
was
not
solution
switch.
from
the arc
enable
because
at all times
available
(except
formulated
required.
was
incorporated
time
These
was
redesign
that
they
rather
the
be
in
wired
parallel
mechanization
tion,
impulse
the
induced
was
effects
the
standpoint
no
in
used
actuation
and
the
series.
such
Figure
cancelled,
coil arc
that
on
the
the
a manner
was
that
be
minimum
deterioration
on
suppression
after
were
direct
coils
the
undergoing
designed
in
phases
With
control
reliability.
were
SD
were
command.
series
were
this
opposing,
mechaniza-
minimum
negligible.
68
immediately
removed
solenoids
of
enabled
that arc
effect
possible.
and
the
impulse
coil and
the
coil when
designs
of the direct
the
the
system
characteristics
wiring
when
not an acceptable
direct
so
It was
of the
coil only
several
R.CS
coil,
coil
impulse.
the automatic
adverse
the
not be
up-stream
across
when
coil
the
direct
so that it would
an
on
of the
of minimum
removal
5-3
used
direct
direct
By
than
to
protection
that the
switching
direct
did prove
could
of the
had
impulse.
voItage
relay
following
the
a result,
suppression
problems
need
operation
to leave
As
version
minimum
decided
arc
in
in
be
and
highest
voltage,
hand,
circuitry
effect
circumstance
and
and
shown
resulting
It turned
all complex
time
for
valve
the
No
control
lower
this was
only
The
have
design
upon
to be
n_alfunctioned)
elapsed
fortunate
this
could
than
had
with
not
emergency.
such
were
at
and
direct
only
delay
designs
It
a
One
had
therefore,
enabled.
if it had
of an
to remove
was
fixed
It would,
to
simplified
the
of
suppression
the other
suppression
the astronauts
in case
on
rotation
coil.
direct
of
the
spike
5-3.
coils,
storage
unacceptable
at first decided
of
arc
part
which
coil
placed
The
in the
voltage
spike
time
limiting
fuel
required
limiting
Figure
for
automatic
engine.
required
considered
problem
energy
voltage
voltage
in
the
direct
voltage
the
amplifier.
shown
switches
the
drop-out
the
the
one
inductive
amplifiers
when
the
limit
driver
limit
or
driver
determined
but
drop-out
be
the limiting
It was
allowed
for
to
of the
suppression
also
given
direct
and
coil.
greater
is
and,
has
suppression
automatic
circuitry
circuit
to
of
to
the
valves-a highly
the
amplifier
increase
by
deIay
a problem.
the
impulse
tolerated
solenoid
of
suppression
course,
suppression
occurred
arc
designed
be
CORPORATION
represents
provided
of
minimum
therefore
could
arc
Any
of
the
was
value
of
coil
increase
be
stage
off.
two
valves
Protection
output
turned
ROCKWEI,I,
are
these
amperes.
the
is
engine
of
circuitry
across
valve
RCS
Each
several
AMERICAN
Solenoids
each
suppression
appears
the
RCS
oxidizer.
drawing
that
(,_: NORTH
68-869
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SPACE
DIVISION
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68-869
SPACE
I)IVISION
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AMERICAN
R()CKWF,
IA_ (X)lZP{)RATION
Switching
Early
side"
switching
between
in
tradeoff
switching
service
jets
the
fact
that
transistors
would
have
considered
switching
such
a failure
(group
more
to
chosen.
to
No
flights.
Change
s
The
commands
of
logic
was
translation,
primary
Translation
vehicle
given
complete
the
type
rotational
errors
to stop
this conflict
by
redesign
was
run
was
saved
was
desirable.
The
sensed
rotation.
thereby
inhibiting
by
insignificant
jet select
logic
was
and
would
the opposing
jets.
During
therefore
the
translation
both
and
rota-
rotation;
commands
have
resulted
jet select
logic
the Block
mission
It was
of
location.
The
logic.
the
coulct occur.
fuel.
that simplification
of
purpose
and
translation
for a particular
any
was
to provide
action
four)
in
The
the autopilot
This
and
(of
far
wasting
to determine
to
center-of-gravity
by
that
system
commands
both
fact
The
rotation
used
was
propellant
to the ACS
between
cause
the
the
quad
so
II redesign.
offset
were
jets,
resolved
propellant
the
the
one
simultaneous
It
valve.
occurred
jets were
transistors
ground-side
by
off
with
valve
supply.
isolation
made
for
NPN
and
shutting
Block
the astronaut
to opposing
propellant
acceptable
has
same
was
power
mission
the
between
by
made
conflicts
the
of conflict
directly
change
with
to resolve
cause
study
its
functionai
Since
power
hot
ground
however,
silicon
with
separate
by
if
to
required
switching
propellant
whereas
reliability
described
logic
conflict
to the jets
cause
(a short
switching,
high
dc
disabled
would
used
safe
currents
side
was
of
commands
in commands
much
be
to
significant
to the jets.
tion and
were
able
and
decision
means
hot
ground-side
ground
is
only
the
use
This
could
the
handle
To
spacecraft
the
could
to
switching
design
switches
by
failure
only
removal
be
the
"ground
to
length
of wire
exists
and
the
jet
solenoids
shorting
side
and
objection
is relatively
fail
favor
of ground-side
use
jet
4 jets)
designed
of
which
the
wires
ground
devices.
required
of
Apollo
time
desirable
of
disabled.
The
the
NPN
was
quad
was
at
were
these
if
side"
basic
A considerable
command
module
the
system
of a jet).
In
available
operation
of
fail"on"
used,
loss
between'_hot
The
criterion.
in the
any
to
made
solenoids.
fail-safe
amplifiers
switching
is
only
cause
was
were
RCS
module;
reaction
side
would
the
was
the
the
driver
the
the
studies
of
II
just how
of the electronics
was
removed.
CONCLUSIONS
Since
entirely
do
not
the operation
satisfactory
suggest
any
and
during
changes,
performance
the
spacecraft
there
are
no
- 70
of this
subsystem
flights
and
significant
has
developmental
hindsight
SD
68-869
been
problems
suggestions.
SP.\(:E
I)IVISION
_.: NORTlt
6.0
This
The
section
purpose
to the
primary
ENTRY
discusses
of this
the
The
control
except
system
Module
(CM)
reaction
jets
rather
contains
coupling
from
the
jet firings
when
The
major
controlling
development
problems.
procedures
The
to prevent
SUBSYSTEM
than
about
the
and
operation
only
problem
a runaway
(ECS)
is similar
that it uses
service
roll stability
to the
jets.
axis
reaction
The
so as
system
to reduce
yaw
axis.
of this subsystem
jet from
capability
the Command
module
discussed
of the SCS.
flight-control
system
the
roll axis
subsystem
backup
here
has
has
depleting
been
free
to do with
the
of any
operational
propellant
supply.
DESCRIPTION
The
entry
control
subsystem
control
command
system.
signals
It is
from
signals
from
the
attitude
signals
from
the
main
on-off
rotational
control
discussed
control
also
entry
CORPORATION
SUBSYSTEM
is to provide
of entry.
previously
I<OCKWEI.I_
CONTROL
subsystem
mode
AMEllI(:AN
commands
motion.
to
is
composed
of
the
rotation
the
within
the
electronics
hand
controls,
reference
control
contained
command
and
The
entry
module
stabilization
necessary
rate
and
subsystem,
panel.
the
and
to accept
attitude
error
configuration
control
reaction
switching
subsystem
jets
to
provides
control
vehicle
Functions
The
entry
normal
mission:
service
module
ation
(0.05
control
g), and
the aerodynamic
backup
torques
the
large
maintain
only
in roll for
rate
during
system
command
angles
damping
controlling
entry
on
by
and
in these
the
to 0.05
During
control
restoring
of attack
are
while
and
the
entry
control
to the CM
68-869
commands
the
second
module
system
rotation
direction
SD
prior
of providing
command
still accepting
and
control
the
deceler-
g drag
During
cause
lift vector
-71
hand
of a
to command-
relative
axes.
phases
drag
is capable
rotation
moments
axes
small
systen_
all three
sideslip
aerodynamic
subsequent
atnaospheric
subsequent
the vehicle
about
distinct
(parachutes).
accepting
module
two
portion
to sensible
system
the entry
aerodynamic
trim
prior
acting
and
to the primary
phase,
vides
recovery
torques,
to maneuver
and
(2) atmospheric
of the
control
operates
to deployment
RCS
subsystem
to
pro-
commands
SPACE
I)IVISION
_,V NORTH
AMERICAN
subsystem
provides
R()CK\VEI,I,
(:()RPORATION
Mechanization
The
entry
override
as
report
and
control
uses
block
the
driver
is functionally
The
the
system
same
options
described
amplifiers
operation
The
rate
signal
as
After
0.05
angle
of attack.
which
would
be
This
does
forcing
for manual
elsewhere
the ACS
in this
and
yaw
rates.
the
primary
Attitude
error
selectable
signals
deadband
attitude
When
error
turned
on
to fire and
switching
posed
reduce
using
are
DESIGN
the error
redundant
or
as
This
rate
reaction
sets
the
type
and
a fuel and
nitrogen
describes
the constraints,
yaw
firings,
and
roll motion.
through
a total error.
the driver
reaction
is a typical
jets
limit
hold.
control
of six engines
are
each.
hypergolic
as an
amplifiers
module
for vehicle
tetroxide
the
thereby
to 0. 05 g switching.
attitude
cooled
to zero
axes,
to form
of control
B)
ablatively
trim
jet firings
since
body
comnaand
and
to it the
motion
processed
threshold,
damping
yaw
these
signal
a rate-error
coupled
commanded
are
jets used
(systems
pound-thrust
by
with
is the design
yaw
than
subsequent
to cause
signal.
has
body
other
error
a fixed
as
term
minin_izing
removed
provides
module
on-off
hydrazine
are
exceeds
paragraph.
of roll commands
produced
rate
g positions.
to form
- the o used
g switching
to the
a manner
which
command
of two
engines
to 0.05
added
signal
in such
system
The
prior
0.5
is
coupling
is summed
control
error
rate
roll-yaw
subsystem
to reduce
by
be
and
is to minimize
axes
is saved
would
signals
about
which
and
rate
6-I.
that pseudo
in the post
hand
a gain
attempt
in Figure
in the following
in the presence
Propellant
rates
shown
rotation
the yaw
is achieved
except
reference
a tangent
in an
is shown
changed,
of this coupling
desirable
stability
the yaw
These
purpose
are
are
the
g switching,
by
the ACS
is described
from
commanded
allowing
as
systen_
the gains
the attitude
multiplied
is not
aerodynamic
same
system
from
The
control
configurations
signals
roll rate
rates.
the
of the
rate-command
sensed
entry
switching),
switch
The
signal.
comThese
reaction
jets
oxidizer.
REQUIREMENTS
This
used
control
of the
(by manual
is included.
are
same
diagram
system
removed
the
the attitude
system.
A
This
control
does
section
to define
system.
the performance
In most
the original
cases
requirements
of the present
the present
requirements,
Block
performance
in magnitude
- 72
- but
and
I! entry
control
requirements
in no
case
are
differ
they
SD
ground
68-869
rules
subfrom
restrictive.
SPACE
DIVISION
or
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
f-,
+[
E_
._/
v%
"x
J
+ ,
_o
L)
-73SD
68-869
SPACE
I)IVISION
_,F NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCK\VEI,I,
CORPORATION
Requirements
The
(prior
entry
to 0. 05
commands
entry
without
phase
and
and
out
be
capable
must
be
providing
of the mission
using
of holding
capable
rate
of accepting
damping
a single
RCS
data
summarize
rotation
at all times
system
the
entry
control
through-
(six jets)
system
Value
parameters
and
Requirement
2 deg/sec
Propellant
Maximum
8 deg
Propellant
Minimuna
4 deg
attitude
0. 5 deg/sec
Propellant
2Z. 5/sec
Lift-vector
deadband
Attitude
attitude
requirements.
Parameter
Rate
vehicle
of propellant.
following
defining
must
axes
the astronaut
running
The
subsystem
g) in all three
from
out the
their
control
minimization
deadband
Rate-to-aLtitude
Maximum
gain
commanded
minimization
hold
and
for preentry
minimization
orientation
roll rate
Design
Requirement
The
control
entry
control
system
for
of the mission
the
trajectory
landing
The
capability
so
initial
a safe
entry
could
the
separation
control
and
be
primary
that portion
and
the atmospheric
of the entry
module
as
(i.e.,
module
including
function
command
design
system
configuration.
service
module
reason,
An
switching
the
For
regarding
initial
on
the
the
ground
were
as
tradeoffs
jets
and
purposes
SCS
were
to adequately
landed
prior
entry
subsystem
phase
was
to
control
the
at a preselected
on-off
were
off,
the
of
system
as
thrust
and
utilize
sizing
of
the
with
ACS
for
devices
system
the
the
possible;
and
this
requiring
that
the
(nonthrottleable).
concerned
studies,
entry
to
control
control
therefore
these
was
concerned
wherever
chosen
an
primarily
rule
components
jets
configured
primary
studies
systena
reaction
be
location.
tradeoff
control
on-off
system
The
made
system)
prime
conceived
mission
to command-service
of executing
that the
initially
of the Apollo
site.
The
entry
was
phase
of the recovery
aborts.
provide
subsystem
the entry
subsequent
to deployment
following
Tradeoffs
with
jets,
following
the
and
their
assumptions
requirements.
74SD
methods
68-869
of
physical
were
SPACE
I)IVISION
,_v NORTH
Three-axis
control
dynamic
2..
Roll
control
from
is
prior
to
be
throughout
reaction
service
(:OI_,PORATiON
development
of
aero-
entry
jets
will
be
used
only
after
separation
module
independent,
will
required
required
module
the
Two
is
ROCK\VEI.I.
moments
Command
AMERICAN
redundant
available
systems
capable
of
of
meeting
reaction
jets
torque
and
being
isolated
and
propellant
propellant
storage
requirements
Each
RCS
means
be
system
and
by
Rate
and
attitude
(ACS
and
TVC),
of
and
and
will
these
be
will
of
aerodynamic
capability
The
sensors
operation
the
failure
by
electrical
detection
provided
be
the
for
available
jets
forces
requirement
module
of
capable
valves,
will
have
to
use
for
by
use
other
by
systems
the
entry
system
Limit-cycle
once
that
be
considered
control
will
propellant
is
in
build
pitch
up.
greatly
and
yaw
Thus,
reduced
essentially
the
stops
minimum-impulse
compared
to
service
requirements.
earliest
tradeoff
determining
the
conducted
reaction
after
jet
choosing
thrust
an
magnitude.
on-off
The
system
was
effects
considered
were:
Trajectory
control
Effects:
vehicle
the
effects
were
controlled
be
able
to
rolling
provide
the
rapid
the
response
maneuver
roll
a function
fixed.
of
reaction
Damping
Effects:
should
in
the
of
and
must
Failures:
certain
provide
rate
is
jet
angle
suitable
the
failures.
desired,
the
thrust
thrust
reaction
Thus,
jet
to
thrust
single
if
maneuver
may
angle
effecsystem
and
a low
becomes
strictly
roll
rate
is
produce
of
sideslip,
vehicle
rates.
be
critical
in
thrust
75SD
minimum
skipout
the
system
Two
Because
disturbances
the
be
prevent
ranging.
the
(2)
only
control
time
damp
RCS
entry
response
level
attack
can
to
adequate
adequately
site.
and
vector
vehicle,
roll
provide
and
to
landing
sensitivity
lift
deviations
and
angle
the
excessive
Aerodynamic
roll
Since
by
loads
a safe
entry
a preselected
(1)
consumption.
tively
provide
achieve
considered,
propellant
must
to
to
68-869
the
levels
the
event
must
jets
of
be
SPACE
1)IVISION
adequate
in the
system
of
50
with
meeting
the
used
formance
higher
was
values.
to
the
thrust
was
almost
It
was
of
100
optimum
be necessary
etc.
).
The
with
a view
economy.
major
required
environment.
levels
the
factor
turning
studied
was
was
not
methods
this
this
turnaround
problem,
The
Apollo
accommodate
the
the
necessity
to
(if
avoid
During
pose
to
end
of
deploying
on)
imposing
entry
removed
command
system
were
the
jettisoned
out"
mission,
li_is
before
situation
vehicle
by
dynamic
stable
wlnile
trim
the
the
is
the
launch
pressure
point
vehicle
was
of
designed
on
for
pressure
builds
stable
flight
- 76
SD
with
Since
the
68-869
crew.
not
the
crew
up.
command
if
and
ti_e
does
mission
forward
the
protective
design
system
to
from
requirement
escape
handling
for
boost
The
in
for)
stems
environment.
apex
Other
loads
dynamic
that
earth's
structural
normal
once
necessity
requirement
the
different.
require-
and
been
acceleration
in
axes
pressure
thrust
the
the
entry
their
the
means
in order.
is
enter
orientation
time
module
the
with
as
all
jets.
therefore
The
perform-
moments
the
during
this
requirement
the
jettisoning
"eyeballs
s,lfficient
to
that
attitude
sizing
expected.
and
was
This
forward
has
and
that
sizing
of
per-
(such
for
aerodynamic
forward
compatible
is
high
be
end
parachutes
normal
boost
has
to
aft
manner
abort,
possibly
module
loads
the
a
command
boost
from
in
shield
laeat
There
the
a
designed
module
in
from
reorient
Following
was
heat
values
fact
changes
was
chosen
the
various
capture
module
aft
the
eliminating
describing
apex
forward
capable
consumption
the
a high-dynamic
that
none
of
in
(or
the
were
possibility
apex
considered
The
undesirable
a problem.
forward
high
command
an
Under
optimum
3).
the
in
aborts.
economy
on
shield
perfor-
3).
with
the
thrust
around
in
obvious
performing
Before
of the
first.
still
be
the
future
thrust
overcome
to
for
command
aft
module
became
to
at
(condition
captured
factor
maneuver.
a discussion
atmosphere
orienting
soon
abort
pounds
based
of
any
of
their
investigated
level
in this
an
and
propellant
chosen
offset
value
considered
been
considered
was
to
same
enough
had
primary
were
cover
high
module
thrust
sub-
to
following
a propellant
70
that
consideration
following
the
command
However,
it
command
this
not
performance
to
and
margin
might
increases,
The
found
pounds
ance
inertia
for
From
about
and
to aft heat
(except
levels
control
rates
considered
thrust
also
entry
forward
conditions
was
insensitive
level
apex
were
above
level
The
tumbling
environments
requirements.
study.
toward
from
all
thrust
relatively
The
the
CORPORATION
failure.
large
pressure
performed,
optimum
in
system
ZOO pounds
performance
the
inertia
to
R()CKWEI,I,
to dannp
module
respect
simulations
standpoint,
ment
of a
in high-dynamic
levels
AMERICAN
required
forward
evaluated
value
event
be
the command
worst-case
of
may
reorient
Thrust
mance
_,v N()RTH
module
the
is
apex
the
launch
following
escape
an
SPACEI)IVISION OFNORTHAMERIGANR()(:KWEI,I,(:()RPORATION
abort,
would
the command
module
could
be unable
to turn the vehicle
Consideration
system
so
that,
made
unstable,
make
the apex
was
in the
forward
stabilizing
converge
the turnaround
aft heat
the
respect
Because
of the
tain condition
of the
mechanizations
on
the
command
The
final
launch
was
system
escape
feasible
following
abort,
over
utilizes
is to establish
a pitch
a weak
rate
launch
Another
error
be
early
signals
left in body
entry
axis
control
body
present
axes
by
result
was
or
of trim
axes
PROBLEMS
AND
for
of these
of aborts.
of the
the necessary
control
per
sub-
second
apex
for
forward
errors
whether
entry
for use
by
the
to fail in
which
would
in the guidance
system
decided
should
jet were
in instability
it was
attitude
steering
axes
if a yaw
result
However,
roll angle
none
the apex
vehicle
to trim
strakes
This function
is easily pronot cause
a loss of rate
that,
would
used.
on
entry
to determine
transformed
but
of 5 degrees
system
indicated
axes
were
in large
made
guidance
Studies
the use
if body
could
study
the
coordinates
subsystem.
tradeoff
generated
does
or
range
imparts
escape
to
the uncer-
rejected.
wings
point,
following
attitude
reference
was
only
jet cap-
secondary
and
canards
The
force"
showed
tumbling
vehicle
visual
dynamic
effectively
system
of
and,
and responsible
for
to use the trim axes.
CHANGES
Problems
The
system
only
were
problems
minor
encountered
in nature
and
had
to
would
reaction
and
including
deployable
module.
to eliminate
with
this approach
mechanization
command
the
of this maneuver
stable
as
a "brute
and
of vehicle
to determine
the
be
a manner
Simulations
within
the entire
sub-
could
oscillations
which
feedback
would
be
the primary
investigated
to eliminate
upon
This
aborts
well
the windows
criticality
were
to the
requirement
high-altitude
through
apex
decided
rates
and
control
not be
attitude.
that both
time
satisfactory
motor.
reorientation
system
crew
module
mechanizations
in such
would
engines
system
accomplished
Several
other
been
forward
discovered
ground.
had
shield
was
it was
attitude
references
would
a high-altitude
abort; and
with
This
entry
the
introduced
unstable.
the RCS
of the
capture,
feedback
condition
of operation
However,
forward
and
would
require
several
diverging
the command
module
around;
the
when
to a stable
forward
to a mechanization
of apex
approach
but, rather,
would
eventually
turn
made
given
case
turn apex
around.
in the design
of the entry
little impact
on
the
- 77SD
control
specific
68- 8 69
design
subof
SPACE
the
system.
runaway
Among
supply.
systems
completely
of propellant
use
be
able
redundant
exists
two
system
operating
able
propellant
to detect
runaway
jet in pitch
environment.
automatic
runaway
jet detection
or
It had been
determined,
however,
the presence
system
however,
data
from
not
tradeoff
was
drawn
consumption
rate
is absent,
there
preentry
during
since
on
also
result
astronaut
the high-dynamic
under
for
these
derivatives
authority
loss
avoided.
an
the need
and,
damping
control
of a
either
system
could be
conditions,
could
single
not be
to determine
cause
RCS
to 0. 05
or leave
the
it to the
at a time.
whether
pseudo
rate
it was
operation.
point
of view
highly
question
than
a lockout
for
in the
whether
to lock
sure
switching
not to provide
equally
con-
of propellant
to make
n_ode
decided
combinations
(as
The
undersirable
was
astronaut
rather
to provide
system
g), but
The
switching
switch
practical
from
derivatives
a single
for entry
moments.
However,
numerous
damping
to use
desirable
(prior
entry
II.
run
desirable
function
Block
decided
was
aerodynamic
were
it would
was
section)
during
implemented
and
be
or not
during
it was
that it was
of large
out pseudo
and
study
in the ACS
presence
since
the
The
probably
of entry
aerodynamic
described
rate
phase
to exceed
systems.
must
dictate
on
jet, if undetected,
would
yaw
used
and cause
tumbling.
While
these problems
were
being considered,
Spacecraft
009 (Apollo
i) was
flown.
Evaluation
of the telemetry
were
clusion
effects
or
considerations
the terminal
of destabilizing
the aerodynamic
in both
of a
propellant
a runaway
to whether
pressure
during
jet systems
therefore
as
providing
at a time.
encountered
These
and
doubt
the problem
independent
the parachutes
of the vehicle
considerable
was
reaction
its own
in parallel,
to deploy
(:()RPORATION
significant
has
the available
tumbling
there
are
each
being
ROCKWEI,I,
the most
are
up
before
in unrecoverable
However,
and
AMERICAN
perhaps
There
module,
If both
would
_v NOI,UFH
these,
jet failure.
the command
could
I)IVISION
as
pseudo
had
been
a lockout
catastrophic,
every
one
of them.
Changes
The
The
cross-coupling
to-drag
ratio
propellant
Block
first major
gain
from
second
II.
Since
was
in the
entry
changed
due
0. 5 to 0. 34.
consumption
The
requirements
change
would
major
the
were
used
instead
of mode
was
eliminated.
SCS
change
was
imposed
Without
have
occurred
on the
and
system
to a decrease
the
gain
was
in the
change,
the
in early
1964.
spacecraft
expected
liftentry
doubled.
redesigned
switching,
control
at the
as
subsystem.
the
time
a backup
interface
of the redesign
mode,
no
Functional
\vith the
switching
guidance
- 78
SD
68-869
for
ranging
was
system
SPACE
I)IVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWEI,I.
CORPORATION
CONCLUSIONS
Because
requirements
problems
of the
and
or
looseness
of the
the conservative
changes
which
occurred
entry
design
during
- 79
control
system
employed,
there
its development.
SD
68-869
performance
were
no
major
SPACE
DIVISION
7.0
This
ures
7-I
and
control
ment
the
This
and
the
spacecraft
the hand
and
flammability
SUBSYSTEM
have
may
be
outputs
and
display
and
The
design
the final
of the
The
displays
solution
spacecraft
principal
has
been
that an
and
and
developfractures
between
in the
represent
one
program.
DESCRIPTION
Functions
The
spacecraft
Control
Apollo
SCS
control
control
and
and
display
display
subsystem
provides
the following
functions:
Functions
Translation
Controller
Provides
i.
ation
manual
only)
principal
Initiates
sequencer
4.
tional
from
via
CCW
(CSM
along
Figure
proportional
via
combin-
the
three
switch
actuation
manual
yaw
spacecraft
mission
handle.
the
CMC
to the
actuation.
7-4)
body
switch
directions
soft stops
controller
multi-axis
in both
breakout
and
of the
to the
thrust vector
control
from
of the controller
handle.
acceleration,
in pitch
of spacecraft
directions
command
rotation
(See
manual
Provides
in both
abort
of simultaneous
motion
to the
control
motion
a CSM/S-IVB
Controller
angular
7-3)
axes.
Is capable
Provides
Figure
acceleration
rectilinear
Transfers
spacecraft
SCS
via CW
rotation
Rotational
Ii
(See
rate
commands
selection,
about
for
the three
(I. 5 degrees
or
direct
spacecraft
principal
travel
from
rotaaxes
neutral)
(10 degrees).
proportional
during
manual
- 81
SPS
engine
thrust
gimbal
vector
position
control.
SD
68-869
in
durability,
advance
could
Fig-
flight
to monitor
tradeoffs
so difficult
(see
controllers,
the astronaut
flight modes.
been
subsystem
the hand
for
controls
controllers.
cabling
significant
the
CORPORATION
SUBSYSTEM
provides
various
with
for
of flexible
control
necessary
during
associated
ROCKWELL
DISPLAYS
subsystem
cabling
the more
the
dial settings
flexibility,
design
AMERICAN
AND
discusses
7-2).
problem
NORTH
CONTROLS
section
instruments,
or
control
of
SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
LI..I
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68-869
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68-869
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SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
Figure
7-3.
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
Translation
- 84
CORPORATION
Control
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
or
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
o
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-85
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
Provides
the
or
NORTH
emergency
RCS
AMERICAN
angular
jet solenoids
via
ROCKWELL
acceleration
controller
CORPORATION
commands
emergency
directly
direct
to
switches
(ll degrees).
4.
Is capable
Attitude
Set
of simultaneous
Control
Provides
Panel
multi-axis
(AS/CP
selectable,
three
(See
axls,
actuation.
Figure
7-5)
spacecraft
inertial
pointing
signals
via thumbwheel
controls
and dial readouts.
are summed
with either the PGNCS
IMU
or SCS
CDC
attitude
signals
displayed
manual
Display
on
to produce
the FDAI
rotation
total attitude
attitude
maneuvers
error
to the
error
signals
needles
selected
These
signals
inertial
which
to allow
inertial
are
precision
angles.
Functions
Flight
Director
Provides
Attitude
an
Indicator
inside-out
display
to a selected
inertial
axis
appropriate
ball and
(FDAI)
frame
(See
of spacecraft
of reference
reference
Provides
a fly-to
the
mutually
0.05
three
g level
angular
yaw
Gimbal
entry
meter
S-IVB
redundant
Displays
and
Fuel
Displays
entry.
the
After
Pressure
Provides
signals
means
angular
rate
body
g, the displays
body
pitch
axis
relative to
needles.
about
axes
0. 05
Indicator
oxidizer
movements
fuel and
meter
movements
angular
position
a means
for
oxidizer
each
prior
of
tothe
provide
and
the
roll and
of the
yaw
on
of the
sets
the other
module
axes,
inserting
one
7-7)
of
set of
boost.
service
and
manually
on
Figure
boost.
pressure
during
- 86
(See
pressure
during
engine
gimbal
about the pitch
dual sets of meter
movenlents.
respect
three-
angular
position
via attitude-error
spacecraft
spacecraft
with
axes.
Position
redundant
_o
during
attitude
via a graduated
of spacecraft
perpendicular
rate about
Displays
i.
display
7-6)
indices.
Provides
a fly-to display
of spacecraft
an inertial reference
in all three axes
Figure
systems
one
main
on
propulsion
each
initial condition
for
both
pitch
SD
68-869
and
of the
command
yaw
by
SPACE DIVISION
Figure
oF NORTH
7-5.
AMERICAN
Attitude
Set
ROCKWELL
Control
CORPORATION
Panel
- 87 SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
ov
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
t2
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q.a
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O
t)
r-I
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et0
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wl
88
SD
68-869
SPACE DIVISION
Figure
7-7.
OF NORTH
Gimbal
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
Position/Fuel
CORPORATION
Pressure
Indicator
- 89 SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
ov
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
Mechanization
The
translation
specific
and
requirements
tion hand
rotation
listed
controllers
were
hand
controllers
in Appendix
imposed
A.
on
the
were
The
mechanized
requirements
contractor
by
to the
for the
NASA
at the
rota-
request
of the astronauts.
In particular,
the shape
of the hand
grip and the "feel"
characteristics
of the device
were
considered
to be significant
enough
to
warrant
this approach.
Design
Features
During
panel
the period
displays
separate
were
to separate
attitude
the
Since
and
the
this
from
the new
yaw
and
meter
the
type,
requirement
and
The
third
movements
flexi-
requirement
display
was
into an
established
to
fuel and
oxidizer
to display
of the Saturn
scales
were
with
to
more
indicator.
redundant
this interface
established
of this
position
a means
stages
instrument
provided
requirement
as
to provide
was
result
position
another
main
which
set gimbal
indicator
SCS
changed
the
booster
rules
imposed
boost
for both
from
vehicle.
the
SPS
pitch
a galvanometric
pressure
transducers
DESIGN
RE
The
and
second
the
instruments
a gimbal
period,
was
axis,
a new
I attitude
position
II design,
instruments.
and
display
to a servometric
was
Block
panel
the
and
separate
panel
same
gimbal
pressures
into
the
set control
During
utilize
Block
reviewed
the displays
bility in arranging
was
of the
QUIREMENTS
major
displays
requirement
by
the
customer
single
failure
or
ground
for Block
II are
on
summarized
the SCS
controls
in the
following
paragraphs.
Attitude
I.
Display
No
system
will
result
in a loss
of
the following:
Z.
a.
Gross
b.
Attitude
errors
c.
Attitude
rates
No
single
a rate
attitude
failure
command
thrusting
information
displayed
displayed
displayed
on the
on the
attitude
hold
on the
FDAI
FDAI
attitude-error
FDAI
rate
needles.
system
will
require
mode
sphere
to a]ign
the
maneuvers.
- 90SD
68- 8 69
needles
the
use
spacecraft
of
for
SPACE
No
_o
DIVISION
two
failures
attitude
will be
accessible
IMU
FDAI
ball will be
body
FDAI
SCS
be
Performance
The
maneuver
will be
desired
slowly
Direct
to be
Provides
computer)
readouts
will be
body
axes
axes,
aligned
the
monitoring
hence
ability
failure
capability
condition
with visual
information
the
with
the
directly
from
on an
FDAI.
displayed
and
the crew
given
closely
accurate
attitudes
and
crew
catastrophic
are
available.
angular
rates
is monitoring
manual
in Table
related
In most
will
auto-
attitude
of the
in holding
of IMU
FDAI
a minimum
to monitor
launch
necessitating
to monitor
vehicle
control
inputs
in relation to
is such
as
or minimum
can
during
gimbal
lock
and
be
AV
in
constraint
program
to
fuel
for Apollo
attitude
precludes
of
is desirable.
design
time
imposes
on vehicle
in detecting
abort
IMU-CMC
by comparing
information
91
readout
display
type
the Apollo
a basis
for manual
vehicle
motions
The
selection
7-1.
to the
cases
all-attitude
in minimum
pilot performance
maneuvers
Improves
(i. e.,
performing
are
emphasized.
for
visual
FDAI
spacecraft
errors,
where
when
the FDAI
and
of precise
maneuvering
maneuver
s
Either
roll will be
Improved
thrusting
of roll
entry.
system
The
considerations
itemized
as follows.
during
or
was
in a loss
phase.
at all times.
the
ball
attitude
requirements
attitude
angles,
for
reference
status.
attitude
when
and
allow
acquisition
conditions.
accept
functions
except
very
axis
result
entry
system
with
in all situations
requirements
moving
The
known
to minimize
a straight
attitude
functions
SCS
aligned
in entry,
attitude
the
of equal
or
displayed
matic
will
during
CORPORATION
axes).
except
All three
FDAI's
is to be
ROCKWELL
systems
use
prime
the
The
for
two
Since
the
AMERICAN
in the G&C
to the
spacecraft
NORTH
information
There
or
(command
precision
and
on a one-to-one
module
general
basis
SD
68-869
attitude
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
The
controller
will be
locking
on
it to a null.
the
rotary
provide
PROBLEMS
ROCKWELL
provided
The
motions
a visual
AND
AMERICAN
with
locking
of the
indication
CORPORATION
a means
of mechanically
mechanism
grip.
The
will have
locking
no
effect
mechanism
of its locked-unlocked
will
condition.
CHANGES
Problems
Listed
occurred
below
during
are
the major
the design
design
and
of the Block
development
II SCS
problems
controls
and
which
displays.
FDAI
Spacecraft
FDAI
with
thermal
arose
with
the
holes,
was
modify
the
FDAI
and
levered
of
design
FDAI
secondary
loss
of
ready
of
the
type
from
These
E/L
better
the
E/L
lamp
nominal
interfere
coldplate
with
pins,
obvious
and
impact
purposes
of
for
and
operation
spacecraft
Control.
in line-voltage
When
with
power
was
the
this
both
were
uniformity
factor
obtained
but
the
and
the
Display
electrolumi-
to
aerospacewith
reflections
of
light
NR
was
intensity
was
voltage
the
and
aberations
and
forced
It
supply
subcontractor
requirements.
when
as
withstand
control
integra[
encountered
the
canti-
required
to
vendors
with
resolved
tI
of
SCS
commercial
the
was
Block
use
with,
and
ruggedized
the
the
begin
length,
redesign
were
problems
ultimately
wiring
so that display
resulting
from
on-off
resulting
needles,
characteristics,
and
were
Lighting
a
the
not
supporting
The
needles
orienting
addition,
lamp
surfaces,
power
To
in
In
lighting
receive
face,
yet
the
II
support
suscepti-
front
and
redesign
slenderness,
implemented
lighting.
problems
its
face
maintainability
the
error
These
NR
requirements.
nearby
of
attitude
difficulties
of
to
for
Lighting.
(E/L)-type
consistency
to
structure.
access
testing.
instituted,
experienced
backplate
Because
Electroluminescent
nescent
was
rear
Block
to
vibration
from
its
new
need
coldplate.
Vibration.
was
at
the
the
a major
cantilevered
solution
the
of
feature,
support
the
vibration
environment.
redesign
development
presented
was
to
support
result
vibration
FDAI
pins
the
Needle
face
structural
The
the
backmounting
rear
the
provide
supporting
design
the
Since
to
coldplate.
through
add
panel
from
probIem.
need
During
instrument
coldplate
bility
the
Installation.
its
to
found
is
color.
change
the
that
higher
than
voltage.
variac
transformer
is part
lighting intensity
can be
operation
of this control
variations.
These
-94
of the
spacecraft
varied.
The current
surge
loads down
the ac inverter
voltage
variations
SD
68-869
cause
the
No
two
failures
attitude
There
will be
accessible
the IMU
FDAI
ball will be
The
be
ball
functions
Performance
The
The
known
desired
of rate
attitude
was
allow
acquisition
conditions.
Direct
maneuver
where
computer)
readouts
will be
body
axes
axes,
aligned
FDAI
are
the
the
with
crew
on
angular
the
from
an
FDAI.
rates
is monitoring
manual
in Table
related
available.
In most
accurate
all-attitude
to provide
will
auto-
attitude
attitudes
for the
selection
monitoring
of the
in holding
of IMU
motions
display
in minimum
design
time
FDAI
or
type
of
is such
as
minimum
during
gimbal
a minimum
control
inputs
in relation
for Apollo
attitude
precludes
imposes
to the
for manual
vehicle
The
7-i.
cases
the Apollo
vehicle
readout
is desirable.
a basis
the undamped
hence
directly
displayed
and
given
closely
emphasized.
and
information
performing
to
to
fuel
can
be
AV
lock
constraint
in
on
vehicle
Improves
crew
ability to monitor
catastrophic
failure necessitating
Provides
FDAI
spacecraft
errors,
when
pilot performance
maneuvers
visual
the
roll will be
ball are
indication
to be
maneuvering
of roll
entry.
for the
of precise
Improved
thrusting
i.
or
during
to control
The
considerations
itemized
as follows:
Either
ball (i.e.,
attitude
functions
for the
fuel and
in a loss
phase.
at all times.
attitude
when
angles,
reference
system
very
slowly
and
use
to minimize
in entry,
except
requirements
status.
with
axis
result
entry
system
aligned
requirements
maneuver
and
will be moving
SCS
in all situations
attitude
the
of equal
or
a straight
attitude
displayed
matic
will
during
axes).
except
All three
is to be
body
FDAI
the SCS
FDAI's
prime
Since
systems
for use
two
to the
spacecraft
in the G&C
information
capability
condition
with visual
to monitor
launch
abort
IMU-CMC
by comparing
information
-91
program
and
(command
precision
and
on a one-to-one
module
general
basis
SD
in detecting
68-869
attitude
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
O
...-i
r_
L_
I
DO
r'_
- 92
SD
68-869
5.
Provides
a convenient
commands,
with
6.
7.
via
angular
the
Provides
a means
Provides
a check
Provides
for
9.
Provides
a gross
Display
Attitude
command
performance
needles,
in direct
to PGNCS
cross-check
of executing
on
nonprogrammed
reaction
maneuvers
jet performance
via
rate
response
jet firings.
8.
and
of SCS
information.
to commanded
10.
monitor
recovery
concept
from
tumbling
indication
of entry
provides
a familiar
via
rate
information
flight path
angle
link to previous
pilot training
conditioning.
Controller
Two
identical
three-axis
command
pilot (right-arm
(left-arm
rest
An
devices
of the
rest
controllers
of left-hand
right-hand
MSC-irnposed
by
hand
specification
controlled
forces
2.
Controller
deflection
3.
Controller
axes
orientations
4.
Controller
axes
relative
Translation
Hand
factor.
one
for the
for the
pilot
the
design
details
of these
grip
form
versus
deflection
to soft stops
locations
actuation
and
curves)
hard
stops
to pilot axes
points
within
controller
Controller
The
for
limits
mode
translation
built-in
2.
(via torque
Control
system
deflections
One
and
one
specifying:
Controller
6.
seat)
supplied,
seat).
I.
are
The
hand
redundancy
controller
switching
for
will be
out
controller
of securing
controller
was
supplied
with
the
necessary
reliability.
connected
to the
system
without
provisions
its signals.
will be
it to a place
provided
with
of usage
- 93
or
a dovetail
to provide
storage.
SD
68- 8 69
a means
SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
The
controller
will be provided
with a means
locking
it to a null.
The locking
mechanism
on the
rotary
provide
PROBLEMS
n_otions
a visual
AND
of the
indication
grip.
The
of mechanically
will have
no effect
locking
mechanism
of its locked-unlocked
will
condition.
CHANGES
Problems
Listed
occurred
below
during
are
the major
the design
design
and
of the Block
development
II SCS
problems
controls
and
which
displays.
FDAI
Spacecraft
FDAI
with
thermal
Installation.
its instrument
coldplate
bility problem.
need
arose
the coldplate.
through
add
the
holes,
was
FDAI
result
vibration
of
the
loss
of ready
nescent
access
Vibration.
of
of E/L
nearby
attitude
testing.
of
Lighting
interfere
with
pins,
and
impact
purposes
were
When
the
implemented
To
begin
lamp
surfaces,
of this
for both
with,
with
the
Block
with
operation
spacecraft
Control.
in line-voltage
was
obtained
voltage.
variac
when
-94
II control
as
withstand
and
the
Display
electrolumi-
subcontractor
vendors
to aerospaceencountered
with the
the
reflections
was
supply
and
aberations
and
color.
forced
to change
It was
found that
voltage
is part
can be
control
These
to
of light intensity
transformer
lighting intensity
operation
of this
variations.
the
canti-
required
of integral
the SCS
uniformity
and
was
ruggedized
the use
characteristics,
and
length,
redesign
needles
Lighting.
lighting.
wiring
so that display
resulting
from
on-off
resulting
obvious
slenderness,
needles,
These
NR
tile
error
These
problems
were
ultin_ately
resolved
but NR
E/L
lighting power
and power
factor
requirements.
better
lamp
the nominal
the
yet not
supporting
The
experienced
difficulties in orienting
commercial
type requirements.
In addition,
problems
were
from
and
suscepti-
the coldplate
for maintainability
Because
the
instituted,
(E/L)-type
consistency
face
II
to support
to redesign
to receive
Block
vibration
from
structure.
new
the need
a major
at its rear
was
backplate
secondary
Electroluminescent
was
feature,
cantilevered
support
of the
coldplate.
vibration
environment.
redesign
development
presented
solution
FDAI
to the
support
was
design
pins
the
face
structural
The
the
backmounting
rear
the FDAI
modify
the
and
Needle
levered
the
to provide
supporting
design
panel
from
Since
with
During
is higher
of the
the
than
spacecraft
varied.
The
current
surge
loads down
the ac inverter
voltage
variations
SD
68-869
cause
the
rate
sensors
minimize
to oscillate,
the
spacecraft
dimmed
effect
of this,
operational
and
resulting
a
in inadvertant
resistor
procedures
not turned
was
reaction
put across
changed
jet firings.
the
variac
and
To
the
lights
are
off.
AS/CP
Drift.
During
thumbwheels
would
discs
were
Hand
Controllers
from
both
slowly
incorporated
Cabling.
have
cable
covering
resistance.
were
flexed
cables,
where
the
excessive
flexibility
from
actually
problem,
covering
phase.
to
Also,
Handle
and
development
cabling.
the
use
alternate
Shape
the
the
and
force
versus
time
period
commitments
customer
of the program.
had been
made.
of the
Strain
a major
originally
extremely
outer
relief
of
problem
in
envisioned
the
that
durability,
difficult.
may
prove
present
be
this
The
characteristics
is
during
during
a
to
design
of
significant
use
the
time
are
and
Solution
to
solution
controller
used
the
puncture
cables,
requirements.
Characteristics.
deflection
requirement,
and experienced
tinual iteration
of the design
be
is
of
to
their
subjected
and
or
the
flammability,
hand
controller
Force
design
stage,
the
have
been
movement
flexed.
not
material
emanating
of
Deletion
was
The
of
they
Constant
were
to
cables
Because
when
initial
proven
exposed
restrict
an
the
friction-type
had
no abrasion
when
applied
cracked
among
has
in
for
and
in
the
appear.
the
enclosures,
encountered
tradeoff
still
advance
cracks
set
mechanism.
with
cabin,
attitude
problem,
controls.
braid
which
materials,
specified
characteristics
design
shape
exit
subsequent
this
occurred
until
or
that the
support
module
checkout.
enough
not
found
preclude
transiational
cables
flexible
consequently
this
the
they
strains
it was
have
and
in the
command
and
tear
during
not
The
To
exposed
a Teflon
Other
nonflammable
either
and
drift.
problems
rotational
exposed
positions
to excessive
wear
testing,
Major
the
stowage
vibration
speciai
ground
test
period.
of the handle
a subjective
process
of evolution.
years
during
the middle
Con-
These
iterations
occurred
even after hardware
A belated
solution
was
the generation
by the
specifications
presented
in Appendix
A.
Changes
The
cycle,
the
SCS
from
Block
control
a
II
and
control
and
functional
system
display
display
subsystem
had
which
occurred
standpoint,
was
conceived
subsystena
(see
was
Figure
comprised
95
one
evolutionary
during
7-8).
of
major
The
eight
mid-1964
original
devices:
SD
68-869
when
Block
SPACE
Two
rotational
Two
translational
One
flight director
One
attitude
set/gimbal
One
velocity
change
devices
or
locations
within
features
reflected
This
from
the
Block
rotational
Two
flight director
One
gimbal
One
attitude
survival
II devices
system
I system,
to
and
module,
control
system
display
control
subsystem
panels
concept.
seven
The
devices:
final
the
autoits
vehicle
system
established
utilized,
their
either
display
for
i.e.,
meet
the
controls
and
effect
visually
and,
as
whose
crew
their
built-in
reactions
safety
relative
redundancy
concept.
was
(see
Block
generally
Figure
7-9)
II control
and
revamped
as a result
display
sub-
controller
attitude
position/fuel
set control
complement
each
was
device.
pressure
assigned
allowable
failure
rates which
before.
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system
were
permitted
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indicator
panel
as
was
well
as
Whereas
established
of 99. 99 percent
were
indicators
of hardware
I counterpart
for
control
to
to
controllers
translational
of
capability
and
primary
primary
G&C
the
criticality
I control
and
the
spacecraft
on
its Block
the
a
with
spacecraft
was
required
of displays
One
new
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the
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new
Block
II
was
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established
crew
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indicator
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as
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position
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performance
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number
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control
continued
criterion.
of the
system
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controllers
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reliability
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reliability
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requirement
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of 99. 5 percent,
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in terms
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would
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the individual
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rates
- 96
SD
68-869
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Figure
7-8.
Evolution
of
97,98
SOS
Controls
and
Displays
SD
68-869
LAMp
SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
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1",,,,,-
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- 99 SD
68-869
SPACE
The
may
be
DIVISION
functions
assumed
summarized
as
Functional
I.
oF NORTH
Block
switching
this panel,
66
Rotational
effected
(four per
axis)
type
to the
reaction
was
were
and
with
was
added.
soft stops
which
CMC
of the
direct
functions
vide
from
the
short-circuit
was
permits
spacecraft,
the SCS
axis
Attitude
display
However,
two
PGNCS.
three-axis
IMU
ball was
roll axis
Servometric
nometric
of the
manual
was
meter
meter
now
aligned
now
the
is now
angular
roll-rate
needles
rate
ranges
capability
were
were
and
and
the
the
on the
added
increased
during
and
the
axis.
galva-
reliability
panel.
The
68-869
The
attitude
vibration
SD
since
body
was utilized to
device.
The instru-
in roll to account
to eliminate
FDAI.
of the
for the
instrument
entry.
communica-
case
+x
to pro-
electronics
in the
spacecraft
control
CMC
accuracy
main
was
another
roll axis
substituted
to improve
- i00
were
the
the instrument's
with
were
required
foreshortened
to
is still retained
utilized
movements
rear-mounted
means,
spacecraft
and reduce
weight.
Electroluminescentlighting
better
illuminate
all readable
features
of the
ment
interface
commands
Also,
the push-to-talk
this device.
with
aligned
movements
to
trigger-
An
However,
resistors
spacecraft
are
rotation
via
Isolation
protection
FDAI's
control
inclined
added.
controller.
to assume
during
translation
commands.
tion switch
was
removed
from
RCS
control.
the translational
enables
were
_' switches
a nonsymmetrical
10 degrees.
switch
still
stops
"direct
or yaw
the original
added
"Soft"
for
from
was
another
IZ additional
the longitudinal
from
was
control
which
on
means,
the
In lieu of
mounted
However,
modified
communications
CMC
still effected
eliminated
via manual
and
at the
grip
jets through
Translation
devices
switching.
switches
axis
axes
added
form
push-to-talk
per
yaw
to 20 degrees
signal
the
display
elements
controller.
switch
and
hand
a symmetrical
forward
and
mode
spacecraft,
rotational
were
The
system
utilized
functional
of the
the
pitch
purposes.
II control
CORPORATION
panels.
breakout
in the
which
separate
control
with
redundant
Block
of control
panel
spacecraft
added
the
ROCKWELL
follows:
I control
various
by
AMERICAN
error
susceptibility.
SPACE
DIVISION
Gimbal
or
position
NORTH
AMERICAN
of the
now a separate
movements
are
service
ROCKWELL
module
instrument.
utilized--two
main
electroluminescent
maneuvers,
manual
Desired
gimbal
thumbwheels--these
The
attitude
spacecraft
now
a separate
output
input
signals
were
are
inertial
sine
the
Euler
of either
angles
and
between
angles
of the
to select
controls
II, these
incorporate
error
between
the
attitude
difference
Euler
through
is
attitude
Euler
commanded
the GDC
resolved
trim
this device
(Euler)
(I) the
the
S-II
and yaw
lock.
difference
In Block
result
Euler
inertial
functions
meter
axes.
is provided.
a means
However,
the thumbwheel
I, the
the AGCU.
commanded
still provides
is
delta-velocity
capability
and
In Block
SCS
trim
directions.
instrument
and
signals
the IMU
panel
pointing
For
gimbal
angles
are
thumbwheels
locks.
command
error
engine
set/control
inertial
mechanical
or
trim
system
movements
display
Scale illumination
lighting.
SPS
propulsion
]Four separate
servometric
each for the pitch and yaw
During
the boost phase,
the four meter
and S-IVB
fuel and oxidizer
pressures.
utilizes
CORPORATION
between
Euler
angles
angles
and
the
a Euler-to-body
rate
transformation.
Ball
Markings
The
indices
markings
used
Two
markers
the
miniature
indicated
+x
axis
and
suspended
in front
aircraft
the
symbols
of the 4-1/2-inch-dian,
to read
symbol
spacecraft
the
were
When
were
merged
and
syn_bol
no
longer
then
In addition,
the horizon
increments
per
astronaut
the
during
and
pitch
reentry
the
for entry
The
entry
the
circles
((_))and
to the body
+x
axis.
the
These
flight modes.
two
reference
were
of the
symbol
appropriate
roll control,
some
symbol
relative
a lubber-line-type
great
and
development.
former
spacecraft
used
deleted
and
axis
sphere
system
deleted.
indicated
to interpret
during
of the ball,
(_2f), were
stability
aircraft
used
eter FDAI
changed
graduated
symbols
utilized.
in one
degree
request.
CONCLUSIONS
Based
three
upon
conclusions
I.
are
Provide
Design
part
the experience
firm
hand
offered,
with
all concerned
specifications
controllers
of spacecraft
the Apollo
as
for
SCS
with
crew
plug-in
controls
the hand
personal
units
preference
so that
cabling
SD
displays,
controllers:
wiring.
- i01
and
68-869
items.
can
be
The
during
way
SPACE
DIVISION
Treat
hand
in the
spacecraft.
the middle
best
of the
provided
time
The
with
second
the hand
dures.
earlier
This
flights
the
and
period
items
of the hand
by
CORPORATION
minimizing
controller
of the program.
Since
requirements
nature
third
for
ground
design
personal
the
use
difficulties
subcontractors
crew
of this equipment,
conclusions
during
a problem
were
fragile
ROCKWELL
have
no
items,
specifications
are
customer.
controllers
was
as
is a result
the design
subjective
by
AMERICAN
controllers
first conclusion
of determining
because
oF NORTH
unmanned
the
that
are
extensive
emerged
and
thus
result
of difficulties
spacecraft
101
in controller
experience.
- I02
SD
68- 8 69
encountered
checkout
because
operational
procethe
SPACE
DIVISION
or
8.0
This
embodied
SCS
section
in
those
hardware.
NORTH
HARDWARE
discusses
basic
which
includes
ROCKWELL
DESIGN
the
disciplines
This
AMERICAN
the
PHILOSOPHY
hardware
cut
across
following
CORPORATION
design
the
entire
philosophies
complement
areas:
Reliability
Environments
Safety
Access
and
maintainability
Interfaces
Electrical
Thermal
Mechanical
Packaging
philosophy
Enclosures
Displays
Materials
and
finishes
Weight
Growth
Electromagnetic
Configuration
interference
control
- 103
SD
68-869
of
SPACE
Quality
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
assurance
Design
quality
Procurement
Control
controls
control
of fabricated
Training
and
articles
certification
of personnel
Testing
Development
testing
Qualification
testing
Acceptance
testing
Installation
checkout
Test
tolerances
GENERAL
The
control
general
system
1.
hardware
for
the
design
Apollo
features
spacecraft
system
may
The
physical
(See
Figure
One
control,
One
electronic
control
assembly
One
electronic
display
assembly
One
coupler,
One
servo
amplifier,
Two
gyro
assemblies
8-1
is
and
gyro
comprised
Table
reaction
of
jet,
the
be
of
Block
II
characterized
14
contract
engine
on-off
display
thrust
vector
- 104
position
SD
as
end-items
8-1).
and
stabilization
68-869
and
follows:
(CEI):
SPACEDIVISION ov NORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
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Figure
8-i.
Block
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- 105
End
Items
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SPACE
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The
are
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The
structures
for the
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welded
except
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housing
hermetically
mounted
provisions
assemblies
high-reliability
continuous,
individually
of system
by
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of hardware
electronic
nected
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electrically
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structures,
and
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isolation
ease
CORPORATION
flight director
attitude
cooled,
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translation
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for
gimbal
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attitude,
panel
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ov NORTH
containing
are
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connect
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volume,
power
The
display
panels
and
aluminum
structures.
piece
parts,
lighting.
resolvers.
The
meter
and
matrix
of the
flatpacks
and
servometric-type
*No coldplate
The
connections
to external
con-
wires.
electronics
significantly
reduce
are
system
requirements.
indicators
are electron-beam-welded
The
indicator
enclosures
house
movements,
incorporate
control
total system
which
panel
high- reliability
electroluminescent-type
houses
high-reliability
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107SD
68-869
electronic
dial face
electronic
SPACE
DIVISION
The
hand
or
controllers
tapered-wedge
hand
NORTH
grip
are
type
form
System
the
DETAIL
functions
addition
DESIGN
The
bility,
are
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The
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REQUIREMENTS
major
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CORPORATION
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AMERICAN
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brief summary
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access
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in the
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of the SCS
maintainability,
interfaces,
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for
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established
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philosophy
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assurance.
of these
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Reliability
The
bility
SCS
reliability
of achieving
goals
a lunar
were
landing
and
probability
of achieving
crew
survival
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there
was
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by
analytical
diagram
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reliability
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be
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attainable
The
elements
NPC
200-2
control
or
tests,
overall
or
NPC
As
were
and
completed
subsystem
were
parts
application
bility
engineer,
tests
prior
breadboard
subjected
to parameter
review
design
of confidence
designs
could
be
engineer,
that the
these
hardware
part
as
and
handling
part
and/or
processing
substantia-
verification.
All
of
utilization.
were
variation
and
to
result.
lot configuration
percent
rate
was
thought
requirements
assurance,
completed,
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conducted.
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packaging
failure
assigned
high-reliability
100
logic
of these
the desired
such
special
to part
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This
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serialization,
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element
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quality
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The
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reliability
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total path
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modeled
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specifications
200-3
individual
the
through
These
and
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contained
and
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were
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identifiable
in practice
specifications.
of system
required
until each
mission
in the event
no provision
The
so that,
return
a 99. 5 percent
production
108
stress
This
design
could
the
analyses
review
engineer
meet
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provided
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68-869
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so that a
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DIVISION
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performance.
checkout
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During
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to failure
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for Apollo
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SPACE
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considerations
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use
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118
SD
68-869
connector
transformers.
SPACE
7.
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- 119
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121
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SD
68-869
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SPACE
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- 123
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- 124
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- 125
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This
specify
could
many
of these
a normal
oF NORTH
data,
and
piece
etc.
sensitivity
process.
requirement
sensitivity
was
equations
and
combined
(convolved)
were
iterated
until the
be
met
SD
68-869
with
a probability
SPACE
The
obtain
sensitivity
circuit
second,
piece
and
The
equations,
values)
can
a system
form
series
or
obtained
equation
for the
This sensitivity
as follows:
using
path)
a computer
analysis
node
or
process
perform-
the
an
in
explicit
hardware
described
is quite
described
with
at nominal
having
equations)
is best
which
exact
of
(first-order
equations
without
loop
of build-
in terms
analysis
to
and
in terms
is that the
are
coefficients
first,
parts;
performance
parameters--having
(e.g.,
steps:
of piece
sensitivity
in theory,
with
in two
of performance
performance
(Taylor's
easily
CORPORATION
performance
(system)
for
attainable
of equations
performed
path)
expansion
block
ROCKWELL
in terms
path
reason
sensitivities
be
performance
by
performance
although
The
was
performance
(performance
primary
the building
practice.
AMERICAN
effort
block)
system
of a Taylor's
describe
analysis
hence
parts.
terms
oF NORTH
(building
to obtain
ing blocks
ance
DIVISION
enough.
in mathematical
Let
f (XI'
circuit
XZ,
'" ' X n ) be
a performance
equation
(1)
where
or performance
path
output
th
i
component
contributing
to
performance
of the
circuit
or
performance
path
and
i
f l
[ nominal
:
o
be
the
function
evaluated
at
its
nominal
value
(z)
where
subscript
denotes
nominal
value.
Hence
dZ
<<)
Of
dX I
dX g
'"
dXn
(3)
i
i=l
dX.
8<--_i1
- 126SD
68-869
and
1.
Xl
X Z
(4)
01-8-Xn" Xnlo
dxnxn
or
(5)
o
where
dZ
-Z
relative
error
of Z
sensitivity
relative
or
the PDF
of Z
of Z
to X.1 evaluated
at nominal
conditions
(dXi-_
error
of X.
or the
of X..
ldXi__
The
ministic}
or
terms
and
\-_i
as
such
a probability
are
the
let
are
must
be
of
random
variables
Y be
two
f(x)
x and
and
the
is
y,
It
will
mathematical
known
random
g{y),
(i.
by
(PDF}.
and
independent
by
are
quantities
represented
function
{5))
represented
functions
stochastic
(Equation
sum
and
are
density
summed
of
be
and
Form
noted
that
these
of
finding
deter-
terms
the
example,
individual
probability
the
not
distribution
For
whose
whose
are
frequency
convolution.
variables
respectively,
either
they
process
as
respectively.
e.,
values
density
stochastic
sum
Z=X+Y
is also
and
whose
a random
probability
variable
density
whose
individual
function
can
- 127
be
values
denoted
can
by
be
h(z).
SD
denoted
68-869
by
It is desired
SPACE
DIVISION
h(z)
h(z) is called
h(z)
For
ov NORTH
from
convolution
AMERICAN
the
PDF's
and
is normally
ROCKWELL
f(x) and
g(y).
CORPORATION
The
symbolized
process
for
finding
by
= fix) , g(y).
continuous
variables
this
is
written
in
integral
form
as
2
A
computer
culations
tolerances
meet
to make
tolerances)
yield
the
attained
of
by
based
on
confidence
a means
assist
those
who
this
"Acceptance
test
this
to
and
From
these
hardware
is,
the
out
rejected
in
can
masking
the
the
be
confidence
system
effect
of
which
been
of
one
bad
may
good--this
is
test
good
flight
ever
ready
instill
technique
would,
perhaps,
the
the
combined
equipment
the
uncertainty
equipment.
hardware
From
being
hardware
being
ascertain
the
a measure
of
offers
coined
represents
of the
predicted).
level
is
will
tested
and
the
test
this
PDF
eliminates
probabilities
fact,
was
items
convolution
and
In addition,
end
has
nec-
(manufacturing
(i.e. , the
generated
probabilities
quantities,
it was
errors.
measure
quantity
the cal-
predicted
the
that
the
being
effect,
In
is
judgment
Function"
hardware
of
read
program
quantitative
value
tester
was
completed
calculated
execute
accepted
probability
that
confidence
in
the
results.
An
shown
example
below,
tively.
U
can
and
However,
Density
of the
hardware.
any
and
was to establish
test
that the system
would
this guarantee,
tests
from
the
no
This
because
rejected.
accepted
make
a quantitative
one
and
in
percent.
process.
results
accepted
test
100
density
test
the
PDF,
and
must
Probability
probability
utilized
expect
Perhaps
of
whereby
in
data
of [nterchangeability
end-item
concerns
results.
make
effects
environment,
of the
could
major
level
aging,
for each
the
test
to store
To
for the
items,
rate
manufacturer
One
prepared
requirements.
allowances
of end
the rejection
was
above.
The goal of this program
end items
which
would
guarantee
all specification
essary
in
program
indicated
for the
Further,
0.04
(upper
may
to
be
better
uniform
assume
limit)
illustrate
PDF's
the
and
this
of
the
specification
L
-0.
05
point.
Assume
hardware
limits
(lower
and
for
the
good
limit)
- 128SD
68-869
f(x)
and
g(e),
as
tester,
respec-
hardware
to
be
SPACEDIVISION oF NORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
g (e)
r (x)
1
0.14
A=I.O
I
1
-0.08
When
convolved
Function
these
a(x)
shown
PDF's
yield
the
0.06"-x
-0.02
Acceptance
Probability
Density
below:
a (x)
-0.08
BAD LOWER _
_A_/_=_0//4_9/_5/4
corresponding
Items
Good
LJ=
/_
-0.05
,le_---A=
0.04
-lu
GOOD
CROSS HATCHED
The
0.05
0.122
0.06Wx
BAD UPPER
'-
AREA = ACCEPTED
NONCROSS
HATCHED
acceptance
and
AREA = REJECTED
rejection
probabilities
are
tabulated
Accepted
Rejected
Total
0.495
0.148
0.643
Bad
(upper)
0.020
0.122
0.143
Bad
(lower)
0.107
0.107
0.214
0.622
0.378
1.000
Totals
129
SD
68-
869
below:
measure
of confidence
level
unit
{accepted
may
is
be
calculated
good)
P{
as:
good
units
P {accepted
0. 495
accepted}
units}
0.769
0. 643
This
states
accepted
that there
are,
is a 76.9
in fact,
good
percent
probability
that
all of the
units
units.
PROBLEMS
Materials
Flammability
Initially there
teristics
in a
pheric.
The
and
The
flatness
materials
flammability
at pressures
testing
which
and
smear
more
under
did
above
ground
not meet
assembly
with
definitive
grease.
the two
during
electronic
conduction
grease-application
characatmos-
checkout
these
conditions
requirements.
of
was
the
was
The
and
had
was
been
to
to pro-
a better
application
clamped
that provided
clamp-down
sufficient
develop
of grease
the assembly
developed
not
solution
requirement
initial method
after
procedure
baseplate
coldplate.
flatness
The
surfaces
application
the
left
down.
for the
grease
pressures.
Life
The
1000
hours
based
on
original
the best
a typical
However,
small.
the
The
end-item
each
service
of ground
represent
contractor
materials
materials
of the
of thermal
between
Service
and
environment
was
thermal
a tighter
spaces
to
to measure
oxygen
spacecraft
good
application
to
a failure
Conduction
provide
vide
was
percent
solution
to change
Thermal
i00
estimates
subcontractor
lunar
ground
400
higher
proceeds
at the
checkout
conduct
for
the SCS
were
for
flight.
These
time.
which
has
between
power
is
and
values
hours
to
end
combined
400
item
systems
68-869
too
hours
level
SD
for flight
to be
lower
as
were
estimate.
proven
to
through
system
400
300
applied
subassembly
- 130
The
specified
is still a good
estimate
consumes
that
level
to
hours
mission
normally
considering
subsequent
then
and
available
14-day
1000-hour
selloff
life requirements
checkout
prior
assemblies
selloff.
tests
The
both
SPACE
DIVISION
or
NORTH
at the manufacturing
facility
that the
be
This
the
system
must
requalification
testing
formance
and
at the
qualified
process
is about
AMERICAN
one-half
degradations
ROCKWELL
launch
facility.
to a higher
has
begun
completed
CORPORATION
It became
than
specified
with
a goal
of 9500
with
no
evident
service
significant
life.
hours.
To
failures
or per-
date,
apparent.
CONCLUSIONS
The
occurring
following
during
conclusions
the
Establish
before
SCS
hardware
firm
baseline
the start
clude
many
system
This
provides
point
has
expect
reduce
provide
design
a house
configuration
surprises
usage,
during
and
hardware
current
and
design
better
and
vehicle
important
development
process.
what
requirements
This
configuration
life testing
fallouts
process:
performance
development
of confidence
passed
Provide
formance
functional
qualification
the
and
hardware
a measure
been
from
the more
design
of the
changes,
materially
Extend
summarize
will
control,
preand
costs.
to hardware
wearout.
reasonable
service
mortality
life one
can
as designed.
which
is at all times
to investigate
and
operational
the
initial operational
- 131
maintained
interface,
problems.
This
phases
68-869
per-
will minimize
of a program.
SD
in a
functional,
SPACE
DIVISION
or
9. 0
This
page
section
numbers
NORTH
TECHNICAL
provides
after
AMERICAN
each
CONTENT
a summary
item
ROCKWEI.I.
SUMMARY
listing
refers
to the
CORPORATION
of the
item's
report
location
highlights.
The
in the body
of the
report.
Environmental
and
hardware
performance
requirements
as
related
to
design:
Page
Total
system
Attitude
reference
Thrust
vector
Attitude
Entry
reference
Controls
Tradeoffs
and
jet
tradeoffs
clutch
data
of low-g
Magnetic
Tolerance
near-miss
incidents:
13
14
and
gain
how
solved
or
circumvented:
47
variations
48
variation
propellant
and
Pseudo-rate
Voltage
and
encountered,
bending
Attitude
Manual
51
actuator
failures
percent
concepts
26
decisions
75
connector
problems
Effect
and
electromechanical
size
Single-point
New
10
malfunction,
Body
90
subsystem
subsystem
Electric
50
74
decisions:
versus
Reaction
Unique
display
design
Reference
58
subsystem
maintenance
Hydraulic
Failure,
42
subsystem
subsystem
and
In-flight
subsystem
control
control
9, Ii0
25
hardware
66
slosh
that evolved:
57
feedback
gyro
TVC
coupling
clutch
25
unit
42
41
actuator
124
analysis
sensitive
one-
66
shot
- 133
SD
68-869
SPACE
Major
DIVISION
oF NORTH
design
changes
AMERICAN
and
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
evolution:
Page
Block
I - Block
18
II
48
TVC
redesigns
Manual
TVC
Major
design
changes
Establish
_'if
baseline
Incorporate
seals
Utilize
42
Obtain
firm
TVC
Qualify
systenn
Fflod
hermetic
analysis
methodology
20
52
vehicle
for
crew
52
data
personal-
i00
131
spacecraft
for longer
constraints
Block
with
design
perforn_ance
Deleted
again":
iten_s
house
Time
over
20
failure
specification
Provide
Unforseen
do
131
redundancy
of obtaining
preference
to
connectors
Less-sensitive
method
it
20
single-point
Better
had
requirements
built-in
initially
standard
Develop
one
service
131
life
restrictions:
on alignn_ent
I boost
abort
and
n_aneuver
requirement
times
33
in SCS
48
- 134
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
C_FNORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWEI,I_
CORPORATION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
Preliminary
study:
Module
2.
Linear
SD
4.
Propulsion
Stability
66-342
Attitude
(13
Thrust
Vector
System.
NR
Analysis
April
Reference
Study
Honeywell,
Stabilization
and
901-0594E
5.
CSM
Technical
6.
CSM
Master
(Feb.
SD
Block
for
62-1220
Apollo
(21 Sept.
II Backup
Apollo
TVC
Service
1962).
Autopilot.
NR
SD,
and
(2 July
Subsystem.
NR
SD,
Control
System
Sub-
196Z).
Procurement
Specification
1967).
Specification,
Item
Stabilization
A62-777A9(1)
Control
(25 May
End
SD,
System
1966).
contractor.
MC
of the
Control
Block
If.
Specification,
NR
Block
SD,
If.
SD
NR
64-1344B(May
SD,
1965).
135
SD
68-869
SD
64-1345
1968).
SPACE
DIVISION
o_, NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
APPENDIX
SCS
CONTROL,
CONTROL
TRANSLATION
The
I
HAND
Locking
control
device
equipped
locking
Actuation
shall
Figure
translation
nominal
A-I.
from
The
shall
require
be
a torque
6.0
An
position,
and
displacement
of the
control
At
The
the point
the handle
shall drive the
position.
The
switches
when
the handle
torque
be
as
handle,
handle
shall
in
measand
breakout
of switch
torque
actuation
toward
the,
be in an
of 15 i 5 inch-pounds
characshown
17 i Z degrees
5 inch-pounds.
is
spacecraft
wiring
end of a control
shall
shall be
lock
which
condition.
The
handle
motion.
points
displacement
nominal.
applied
ROTATION
displacement
shall be
displacement
required
position
to
(R/C)
control
control
motion
analogous
controller
shall satisfy
Controller
mechanical
commands,
locked
or CCW
force
actuation
of 15 i
inch-pounds
condition
rotation
in its design:
actuated
of translation
control
(center)
Figures
following
index-finger
switch
rotary
the null
shall
position.
l,
the
cable - Provide
an interface
with the
of a connector
installed
at the terminal
and
actuated
The
an
actuation
the internal
torque
on
full rotary
displacement
CONTROL,
REQUIREMENTS
incorporate
- Provide
inadvertant
- The
teristics
ured
DESIGN
with a visual
indication
denoting
mechanism
shall not lock out CW
Connecting
by means
cable.
(T/C)
translation
to prevent
CORPORATION
shall be
a center-pivot
operated
to the desired
vehicle
rotation
the following
requirements:
forces
A-2,
istics
in pitch,
istics
include
A-3,
- The
and
roll,
and
breakout,
torque
A-4
versus
represent
yaw
axes,
gradient,
grip
as
degrees
the
goal.
The
deflection
shown
in
required
and
- 137
SD
with
a design
respectively.
soft stops,
control
68-869
force
These
maximum
charactercharacterforces.
SPACE
I)IVISION
(}E.-N()RTtl
When
measured
in an
meet
the
force
A-3,
and
A-4
deflections
shall
as
at 10
Controller
are
to pitch
pivot
Controller
a.
axes
shown
Controller
axes
this axis
degrees
switch
Emergency
soft and
Hand
grip
Drawing
This
- The
resistive
finger
actuation
for
as
shall be
vehicle
axes
aligned
so that
at the control
hand
grip
- This
switch
switch
capable
press-to-talk
the forward
138
shall be
actuated
There
shall be
one
of each
control
switches
shall
be
travel
given
in Figure
shape
shall be
C
SK
(Apollo
as
provided
actuated
shown
Control
between
A-5.
on
Handle).
87987.
shall be
a hermetically
of switching
28 vdc
switch
be
centerline
axis.
shall be
They
Revision
to Honeywell
of the hand.
switches
polarity
axis.
angle
is ii0
positioning
- These
switches
normal
of the armrest
A-5.
in each
- The
normal
- These
control
desired
on
axes,
position,
of armrest
such
in Figure
for
stops
The
They
perpendicular
controller
installed
shall be
switches
is identical
load.
- The
the centerline
given
switch
A-6.
hand
pivot.
pilot labeled
to allow
mode
contact
yaw
encountered
in all axes.
in Figure
through
pitch
centerline
SD.-AE-000681,
Press-to-talk
momentary
at their
and
of each
hard
MSC
number
pilot axes
axis
provided
direct
shown
belo_
roll, and
shall be
obvious.
mode
travel
polarity
the
inch
pitch,
5 degrees
pivot
A-5.
the force
shall
in the increasing
soft stops
as
yaw
A-Z,
of Figure
location
de_rees
pulse
closure
in each
shall be
versus
between
at the control
are
of the yaw
and
at 11.
4.0
A-6,
position
Direct
stops
to the corresponding
axes
for
The
shall
of Figures
tolerances
A-5.
of hand,
versus
in Figure
the input
axes
relative
axes
relative
bo
- The
roll pivot
Controller
the force
requirements
total deflection
the hard
at palm
pivot,
direction,
displacement
in Figure
and
axes
pitch
displacement
the
- The
shown
degrees
force
{:{}RPORA'I]ON
in a decreasing
force direction,
55 percent
of the force measured
Control
be
I<{){'KWI%I.I,
increasing
versus
within
When
measured
not be less than
force
direction.
AMERI{'AN
shall
located
of the grip
SD
68-869
sealed,
into a 250
as
for
viewed
ma
index
by
SPACEDIVISION o_,NORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
the astronaut.
characteristics
I0.
The
press-to-talk
switch
actuating
force
and
a.
Travel
prior
b.
Travel
past
c.
Travel
to hard
d.
Torque
at
Torque
to reach
to switch
switch
actuation
actuation
stop
5 degrees
minimum
8 degrees
minimum
25 degrees
breakout
maximum
0. 2 pound-inch
minimum
hard
stop
I. 0 pound-inches
maximum
Locking
device
- A quick
release
locking
device,
which
with a visual indication
denoting
locked
condition,
shah
to prevent
accidental
activation
of the rotation
control.
Connecting
a connector
travel
shall be as follows:
cable
- Interface
installed
at the
is equipped
be provided
of
be provided.
li.
Mechanical
strength
- The control
shall withstand
without
significant effects,
the indicated
forces
applied
in the manner
and under
the conditions
stated below:
a,
Normally
(I)
(2)
(3)
or inadvertently
force
of 200
the pitch
of 150 pounds
an
of
axis
torque
Unlocked
of 200
the pitch
in any
and
yaw
yaw
pound-inches
axis
and
in either
and
the
direction
through
the
axis.
applied
about
through
axes.
forearm
and
forearm.
direction
applied
to the
of the pitch
to the
applied
the
in either
yaw
direction
axis.
configuration:
The
same
a(4)
should
inches
applied
parallel
direction,
parallel
130 pound-inches
about
applied
and
intersection
b.
axis
of the pitch
torque
configuration:
in either
intersection
about
(4)
pounds,
through
force
locked
forces
in
be
and
either
applied
torques
changed
to
read,
direction
in
either
about
direction
- 139
applied
as
"A
torque
the
in
pitch
about
{a)
of
axis
the
yaw
SD
above
300
68- 869
except
pound-inches
and
axis.
250
pound"
that
SPACE
DIVISION
ov NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
J.ALI
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Translation
Vertical,
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- 140
Displacement
and
In-Out
Versus
Motion
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Forces--
SPACE
DIVISION
or
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
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Figure
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Rotation
Control
Torque
141
Versus
Displacement
SD
68-869
(Roll
Axis)
POINT.
SPACE
DIVISION
oF
NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
70.
60
10
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Figure
A-3.
Rotation
Control
Displacement
(Pitch
14Z
Torque
Versus
Axis)
SD
68-869
SPACEDIVISION oFNORTHAMERICANROCKWELLCORPORATION
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Figure
A-4.
Rotation
Control
Displacement
(Yaw
- 143
Torque
Versus
Axis)
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
ICgtrrR_
DIRECT /40DE
STOP
All5
Figure
A-5.
Rotation
Controller
- 144
Roll
Pitch
and
Yaw
SD
68-869
Movements
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
CONTROLLER
ROLL AXIS
Figure
A-6.
Rotation
Control
- 145
Axis
Orientation
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
OF NORTH
AMERICAN
APPENDIX
ABBREVIATIONS
Automatic
ACS
Attitude
Control
AGCU
Attitude
Gyro
ARS
Attitude
Reference
AS/CP
Attitude
Set
AS/GPD
Attitude
Set/Gimbal
ATP
Acceptance
BMAGS
Body-Mounted
B/O
Breakout
B/U
Backup
CCW
Counterclockwise
CDR
Critical
CDU
Coupling
Display
CEI
Contract
End
CM
Command
Module
CMC
Command
Module
Computer
CSM
Command
Service
Module
CW
Clockwise
DECA
Display
Checkout
CORPORATION
AND
ACE
ROCKWELL
ACRONYMS
Equipment
Subsystem
Coupler
Unit
Subsystem
Control
Test
Panel
Position
Procedure
Attitude
Design
Display
Gyros
Review
Unit
Item
Electronic
Control
Assembly
147SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
OF NORTH
AMERICAN
DOF
Degree
ECA
Electronic
ECLSS
Environment
ECS
Entry
EDA
Electronic
E/L
Electroluminescence
EMI
Electromagnetic
EMS
Entry
Monitor
FACI
First
Article
FDAI
Flight
GA
Gyro
G&C
Guidance
and
Control
G&N
Guidance
and
Navigation
GDC
Gyro
OP/FPI
Gimbal
Position/Fuel
GSE
Ground
Support
IFM
In-Flight
IMU
Inertial
LM
Lunar
Module
LOI
Lunar
Orbit
MA
Mercury
MIT
Massachusetts
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
of Freedom
Control
Assembly
Control
Control
and
Life
Support
System
Subsystem
Display
Assembly
Interference
System
Configuration
Director
Attitude
Inspection
Indicator
Assembly
Display
Coupler
Pressure
Indicator
Equipment
Maintenance
Measurement
Unit
Insertion
Atlas
Institute
of Technology
148
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
MTBF
Mean
MTVC
Manual
NR
oF NORTH
Time
Between
Thrust
North
American
To
p-p
Peak
to peak
Pitch
Probability
Density
PDR
Preliminary
Design
Primary
Guidance,
Roll
R/C
Rotation
Controller
Reaction
Control
RJC
Reaction
Jet
Control
RJD
Reaction
Jet
Driver
S-II
Saturn
Second-Stage
S-IVB
Saturn
Third-Stage
SC
Spacecraft
SCS
Stabilization
SM
Service
Module
SPS
Service
Propulsion
SW
Switch
Tolerance
Review
and
Control
System
Rate
Gyro
Function
Navigation,
RGP
TAP
Corporation
Talk
RCS
CORPORATION
Control
Rockwell
Push
ROCKWELL
Failure
Vector
P/T/T
PGNCS
AMERICAN
Package
and
Analysis
Boost
Vehicle
Boost
Control
Vehicle
System
System
Program
- 149
SD
68-869
System
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
r/c
Translation
TM
Telemetry
TVC
Thrust
Vector
Control
TVSA
Thrust
Vector
Servo
Yaw
AV
Delta
AMERICAN
ROCKWELL
CORPORATION
Controller
Amplifier
Velocity
- 150
SD
68-869
SPACE
DIVISION
oF NORTH
AMERICAN
ROCKWELI_
APPENDIX
NEW
After
no
new
a diligent
innovation,
review
discovery,
CORPORATION
TECHNOLOGY
of the work
performed
improvement,
151
or
under
invention
this contract,
was
SD
68-869
made.