Philosophy Compass 1/2 (2006): 144153, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00015.

Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

Martin Lin
University of Toronto

Abstract

Some of Spinozas most well-known doctrines concern what kinds of beings there
are and how they are related to each other. For example, he claims that: (1) there
is only one substance; (2) this substance has infinitely many attributes; (3) this
substance is God or nature; (4) each of these attributes express the divine essence;
and (5) all else is a mode of the one substance. These claims have so astonished
many of his readers that some of them have surely concluded that they must not
know what Spinoza means by substance, attribute, and mode. In this article
I shall try to explain how Spinoza understands the basic ontological categories
denoted by these expressions.

1. Introduction
Some of Spinozas most well-known doctrines concern what kinds of beings
there are and how they are related to each other. For example, he claims
that: (1) there is only one substance; (2) this substance has infinitely many
attributes; (3) this substance is God or nature; (4) each of these attributes
express the divine essence; and (5) all else is a mode of the one substance.
These claims have so astonished many of his readers that some of them have
surely concluded that they must not know what Spinoza means by
substance, attribute, and mode. In this article I shall try to explain
how Spinoza understands the basic ontological categories denoted by these
expressions.

2. Substance
The category substance has been called upon to play a wide variety of
theoretical roles. For example, substances are said to be (a) the ultimate
subjects of predication; (b) independent beings; (c) the things which persist
through changes; (d) the explanatory grounds of things; (e) true unities; (f )
the essences of things; and (g) the answer to the question, What is Being?
Although Spinozistic substances arguably play many of these roles, Spinoza
does not define substance in terms of any of them. Instead, he defines it as
that which is in itself and conceived through itself (1d3).1 That is, he
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defines substance in terms of self-inherence and conceptual

independence.The first step, then, toward understanding Spinozistic
substance is understanding Spinozas account of inherence and conception
and how, correlatively, he understands self-inherence and conceptual
independence.
Leibniz, always an astute reader of Spinoza, notes an obscurity in Spinozas
definition of substance.2 The definition admits of two readings and it is not
clear which reading Spinoza intends. On the first reading, the definition
says that something is a substance just in case it exists in itself or is conceived
through itself. On the second reading, the definition says that something is
a substance just in case it both exists in itself and is conceived through itself.
Consideration of other Spinozistic doctrines, however, reveals that Spinoza
intends the second reading. Indeed, for him, inherence implies
conception.As Don Garrett points out, Spinoza infers from the definition
of substance and the definition of a mode that which is in another,
through which it is conceived that everything is either a substance or a
mode (Garrett 15 16).That is, he denies the possibility that something
could exist in itself and be conceived through another. In other words, if x
inheres in y, then x is conceived through y.
Having noted that inherence is a sufficient condition for conception, our
next task is to understand Spinozas notion of conception, and more
specifically, how he construes the conceived-thorough relation (as in x is
conceived through itself).As Michael Della Rocca (Representation 34) has
persuasively argued, Spinoza thinks of conception as explanation.This can
be seen in 2p7s where Spinoza says that in perceiving effects through their
causes we are explaining the order of nature. Spinoza often uses perceives
and conceives interchangeably, so we can equally say that in conceiving
effects through their causes we are explaining the order of nature. Della
Rocca also points out that in 1a5, Spinoza writes:
Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood
through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept
of the other.

Here Spinoza treats the concept of the one does not involve the concept
of the other as a paraphrase ofone cannot be understood through the
other.Thus x is conceived through y just in case x is understood through
y. If we say that explanation is what generates understanding, then we can
also say that x is conceived through y just in case x is explained by y.
Both conception and inherence are also related to causation for Spinoza.3
First of all, Spinoza believes that if x is caused by y, then x is conceived
through y.This can be seen from his argument for the claim that, because
substances are conceived through themselves, they must be self-caused as
well. His reason for holding this is stated in 1a4: Cognition of an effect
involves and depends on cognition of its cause. (This is, on the face of it,
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146 . Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

an implausible claim. Intuitively, it would seem that one can think about
many things without having any concept of their causes. For example, a
doctor might think about a symptom without having any concept of it
cause.A full account of Spinozas understanding of 1a4 would reveal that
it can accommodate many of the apparent counterexamples to it,4 but such
an account would, unfortunately, fall outside the scope of this article. Suffice
it to note that Spinoza lays it down as an axiom.) That is, our ability to think
about a thing depends upon our ability to think about its causes. But if a
substance had an external cause, then, by 1a4, in order to think about that
substance, we would also have to think about its cause, or, what is the same
thing for Spinoza, we would have to possess the concept of its cause. Spinoza
here seems to think that if we cant think about something without possessing
the concept of its external cause, then its not conceived through itself.And
so, if a substance had an external cause, then it would not be conceived
through itself. But substances are, by definition, conceived through
themselves. So, they must be self-caused.
2.1. GOD

We have seen that Spinozistic substances are self-caused, conceived through

themselves, and self-explanatory.These features of substance are importantly
related to Spinozas metaphysical rationalism. Metaphysical rationalism
consists in a commitment to the claim that everything has a cause or reason.5
There are no brute facts.There is a sufficient reason or explanation for
everything.As we have seen, Spinoza understands a substance to be something
that is self-caused and self-explained. Spinoza further believes that metaphysical
rationalism entails that at least and at most one substance exists (1p14) and
that this substance necessarily exists and is absolutely infinite (1p11), and
consequently that this substance is God (according to Spinozas definition,
God is an absolutely infinite substance) and that all else inheres in this
substance that is, all else is explained by, caused by, and conceived through
this substance. So, from the claim that there is a cause or reason for
everything, it follows, according to Spinoza, that there is one thing which
is the cause of reason for everything. Many philosophers are likely to suspect
that such an inference commits a quantifier scope fallacy (like inferring from
the claim that all things aim at some good to the claim that there is some
good at which all things aim). But Spinozas reasoning involves no such
fallacy.
Here is Spinozas argument.6 If a substance didnt exist, there must be a
cause or reason for its nonexistence.This cause or reason must either be
internal to the substance in other words, it must follow from the nature
of substance or external to the substance either another substance or a
mode of another substance. Now Spinoza believes that no two substances
can share an attribute.This is because if they did, it would not be possible
to distinguish them, and so their non-identity would be a brute fact, which
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Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza . 147

is ruled out by Spinozas metaphysical rationalism.7 As we have seen, Spinoza

believes that effects must be conceived through their causes. (1a4) But two
things that dont have an attribute in common have nothing in common,
and so one cant be conceived through the other. (1p2) Causation entails
conception. (1p3, which follows from 1a1 and 1a4.) So if one thing cant
be conceived through another, then it cant be caused by it either. So, no
substance can create or destroy another substance. (1p6) The mode of a
substance cannot prevent another substance from existing because effects
are conceived through their causes and substances arent conceived through
modes. (1d3) But if nonexistence of a substance were caused by a mode
then the nonexistence of a substance would be conceived through a
mode.We have thus ruled out every candidate for being the external cause
of the nonexistence of a substance. So if there is a cause for the nonexistence
of God, then that cause must be internal to the substance or follow from
the very nature of God. How can a nature prevent the existence of its
exemplifications? It can do so if it is contradictory. For example, the nature
of a square circle prevents its own exemplification because it is constituted
by incompatible properties. Spinoza claims that it would be absurd if the
nature of an absolutely perfect being were incoherent.8 So we have ruled
out all possible causes for the nonexistence of God.This being so, if God
didnt exist, this would have to be a brute fact. But Spinozas metaphysical
rationalism denies the possibility of brute facts. So it is impossible that God
not exist. In other words, God necessarily exists.9
2.2. MONISM

We have seen why Spinoza believes that at least one substance, God,
necessarily exists. But he also believes that no other substance exists. (1p14)
His reason for believing this is his commitment to the claim that no two
substances can share an attribute. (1p5. See section 2 above for a brief
discussion of this commitment.) Since God is an absolutely infinite substance
(1d6), he is not limited in any way. (1d2) If there was an attribute that he
didnt possess, he would be ipso facto limited. So, God possesses all attributes.
If there was a substance other than God, it would have to share an attribute
with God. But no two substances can share an attribute. So, there cannot
be any substance other than God.
3. Attribute
In 1d4, Spinoza defines an attribute as that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of a substance.There are many serious interpretative
issues surrounding Spinozas understanding of the attributes. In this article
I shall focus on the question of what if anything distinguishes an attribute
from a substance.
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148 . Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

There is considerable textual evidence that suggests that attributes inhere

in and are conceived through themselves. Given Spinozas definition of
substance as that which is in and conceived through itself, this would appear
to entail that every attribute is a substance. Many commentators (e.g., Curley
1618, Gueroult 48, Loeb 1606) have accordingly concluded that attributes
are substances and God is the substance that is composed of all substances
constituted by single attributes. If this were correct, we could see Spinoza
as a bundle theorist about substance. Every substance, on this interpretation,
would be a bundle of attributes and every individual attribute would be a
bundle with a single element and hence a substance. Call this the substantival
interpretation of Spinozistic attributes.
But this interpretation seems to contradict Spinozas monism doctrine
(stated in 1p14), which says, Except God, no substance can be or be
conceived. If God exists and God is a being with infinitely many attributes
and every attribute is a substance, then, far from being the only substance,
God must be only one substance among infinitely many others.
Louis Loeb has responding to the objection, by proposing an interpretation
of 1p14 according to which it reads:
1. Except God, no substance can be or be conceived which is not a
constituent of God.
According to Loeb, because every attribute, in addition to being a substance
in its own right, is also a constituent of God, the existence of infinitely many
substances is compatible with the monism doctrine expressed in 1p14.There
are a number of problems with this response. First of all, could Spinoza
reasonably believe that he could successfully communicate (1) by writing
what he did in 1p14? It is not a natural reading of the text, and only by
subtle and detailed consideration of many Spinozistic texts and doctrines
could (1) ever appear to be a possible reading of 1p14.Thus, if we are to
accept Loebs response, we must also accept that Spinoza formulated one
of his most important doctrines in a very careless way.
Another difficulty is that a similar strategy is available to the opponent of
the substantival interpretation. For example, the opponent of the substantival
interpretation could propose the following reading of 1d3:
2. For all x, x is a substance just in case x inheres in and is conceived
through itself and is an object.
The anti-substantivalist assumes that attributes are not objects. (This
assumption does not beg the question against the substantivalist in any
important way.The proposed interpretation is merely intended to
demonstrate that the anti-substantival interpretation does not contradict the
text on at least one plausible reading.) Attributes cannot then be substances,
even if they inhere in and are conceived through themselves.This move
puts the opponent of the substantival interpretation in a stronger dialectical
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Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza . 149

position than its supporters. First, the text itself suggests this reading. Here
is the text of 1d3 in full:
By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that
is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which
it must be formed. (my emphasis)

The expression another thing (alterius rei) creates the implicature that 1d3
pertains only to things or objects ( just as the statement John lives in New
York and I have another friend who lives in DC creates the implicature
that John is a friend). Since attributes are standardly not conceived of as
things or objects, they do not fall under the definition of substance. So,
while the interpretation of 1p14 proposed by Loeb is not one that Spinoza
could have reasonably hoped to communicate, the proposed interpretation
of 1d3 is arguably forced upon us by the text.
Second, the substantival interpretation requires a more radical revision in
our understanding of Spinoza.The proponent of that interpretation must
claim that Spinoza is not really a substance monist and that his apparent
commitment to monism is the result of leaving implicit a qualification that
is not obviously suggested by any explicit textual material in 1p14.The
opponent of the substantival interpretation need only claim that 1d3 is
restricted to things, which is already strongly suggested by the text.Thus,
the opponent of the substantival interpretation has a more conservative
response to the textual evidence.10
4. Mode
Spinoza introduces the term mode in 1d5:
By mode I understand the states of a substance, or that which is in another
through which it is also conceived.

And in 1p25c, Spinoza tells us that the finite particular things that populate
our world are modes.Thus, it would appear, shoes, ships, cabbages, and
kings are all modes.These two claims that modes are states of a substance
and that concrete particulars are modes are together very puzzling. How
can shoes and ships be states of a substance? Common sense tells us that they
are objects, not states. Such puzzlement is only deepened when we consider
the Cartesian heritage of the term mode.
Spinozas metaphysical vocabulary is largely borrowed from Descartes.
Indeed, substance, attribute, and mode are Descartes names for what
he takes to be the fundamental ontological categories. For Descartes,
substance denotes ultimate subjects of predication, which are, for him,
independent beings. Attribute denotes the unchanging features of a
substance, which constitute its essence. Mode denotes the changing and
accidental properties of a substance.This meaning is closely related to the
meaning of the word in ordinary Latin which can be translated by way
or manner.
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150 . Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

According to the standard view, Spinozas term mode denotes properties

of substance, just as it does in Descartes idiom. Hence, particular things are
properties of the one substance. Curley has famously criticized the standard
view, and argues that modes cannot be properties.A number of considerations
lead Curely to this conclusion. I shall discuss two of them.The first
consideration that supports this claim is that modes are individual things and
are thus of the wrong logical type to be related to substance in the way that
Cartesian modes are related to substances.That is, individual things cannot
be predicated of a substance. For this reason, the standard view attributes a
nonsensical doctrine to Spinoza. But, Curley argues, once we correctly
understand Spinozistic inherence, we will not be tempted to saddle Spinoza
with a nonsensical doctrine. He claims that Spinozistic inherence should be
understood as causal dependence and not as predication. So, although
Spinozistic modes inhere in substance (i.e., are caused by it), they are not
predicated of it.
The second consideration is that modes of extension are the contents of
modes of thought, i.e., ideas. Spinoza says that all ideas affirm their contents.
In other words, all ideas are beliefs. But properties are not objects of belief.11
To see this, consider the following sentence: Idea i affirms being red.
Sentences of this form are nonsensical.This observation supports Curleys
negative thesis that modes are not properties. It also forms part of the basis
of his positive claim that modes are facts. Only something with a
propositional structure could be the object of an affirmation. Modes of
extension are objects of affirmations. So, modes of extension have
propositional structures. Facts also have propositional structure, so they are
excellent candidates for being modes of extension.As noted earlier, Spinoza
says that particular things are modes. So, on Curleys interpretation, the
modes that are particular things must be something like singular facts, not
concrete individuals like cabbages and kinds.12 Although Curleys claim that
modes are not properties has been widely discussed in the literature, this
second consideration has received little or no attention.This is unfortunate
because it is one of the more compelling considerations in favor of Curleys
interpretation.
Against Curley, Bennett claims that such an interpretation credits Spinoza
not only with silently depriving mode of half the meaning it had in
Descartess idiolect and in the Latin language generally, but with positively
implying that he has not done so (93). Bennett thinks that instead of
identifying modes with particular things, Spinoza means to claim that what
we normally treat as particular things must be treated by fundamental
metaphysics as properties of a single substance. On Bennetts interpretation,
all truths about, for example, modes of extension such as Mount Everest
is tall can be paraphrased by something of the form the extended substance
is G. It might appear that it would be more precise to say that such
statements can be paraphrased by something of the form a region of the
extended substance is G. But this is unacceptable. Regions of space cannot
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Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza . 151

be substances.There is only one substance but there are many regions of

space. But neither can regions of space be properties. Sentences of the form
there is property of being a region that is G cannot express the same facts
as sentences of the form there is a region of space that is G. For example,
while it is a theorem of a tendentious but coherent metaphysical theory that
it is possible for a region of space to exemplify the property of being a tall
mountain,13 the idea that a property can exemplify the property of being a
tall mountain is unintelligible. But Bennett argues that his interpretation
does not require Spinoza to quantify over regions.The very same limitations
that regions are intended to introduce can be expressed with adverbs such
as here and now. So instead of saying something of the form a region
of the extended substance is G we can simply say something of the form
the extended substance is G here and now.14
James Van Cleve offers yet another interpretation of Spinozistic modes
according to which modes are the entities which come into existence as a
result of a substance (or another mode) exemplifying a property.15 According
to this view, Spinozistic modes are like dents, wrinkles, or fists.A dent is
an entity that comes into existence when some object, a can for example,
is dented.A wrinkle is an entity that comes into existence when, for example,
a carpet is wrinkled.And a fist is an entity that comes into existence when
a hand is closed.This interpretation is able to take account of two factors.
One is that Spinoza claims that modes are particular things.The other is
that the word mode both in the Cartesian metaphysical vocabulary that
Spinoza adopts and in ordinary discourse denotes something adjectival.
Fists and dents are clearly particular things.And there is also clear sense in
which fists and dents are states of hands and cans respectively, and so there
is a clear sense in which they have an adjectival relation to them. Curleys
interpretation succeeds in making sense of modes being particular things,
but cannot explain why Spinoza would depart so radically from both
Cartesian and ordinary usage without clearly indicating that he has done
so.The traditional interpretation defended by Bennett makes Spinozas use
of the word mode continuous with Decartes and ordinary usage, but
cannot explain why Spinoza does not deny the existence of particular things
apart from God.Van Cleves interpretation thus has an advantage over both
of its rivals insofar as it easily accommodates both considerations.
In order to fit all of the texts, however, the Van Cleve interpretation must
be modified in at least one important respect. In 1p28d, Spinoza says that
the cause of a finite mode is another mode. In 2p9d, Spinoza paraphrases
1p28d by saying that finite modes are caused by God insofar as he is affected
by some finite mode.This suggests that God is a mode insofar as he is affected
by a mode. But it also suggests that the mode by which God is affected is a
property.And so both God insofar as he is affected by a particular mode
that is, insofar as he exemplifies some property is a mode and the property
that he exemplifies are modes.That is, this text suggests both the Van Cleve
interpretation and the traditional interpretation defended by Bennett. But
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152 . Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza

there is no reason why the traditional interpretation and the Van Cleve
interpretation cannot be both right. Modes are defined by Spinoza things
which inhere in and are conceived through substance. It is very natural to
suppose that both entities like dents and properties inhere in and are
conceived through substance.The category of mode would then comprise
both properties and objects-exemplifying-properties.
What then can we say in response to Curleys observation that modes of
extension are the objects of affirmations and so must have propositional
structure as facts do?We can take on board Curleys claim that modes are
facts if we allow that facts supervene on modes as they are depicted by the
Van Cleve interpretation. Once we have substance and all of its modes, all
the facts are fully determined. For example, the fact that the hand is closed
supervenes on the fist.The fact that the fist is pounding the table supervenes
on the mode which results when fists exemplify table-pounding-ness. Since
the facts are nothing over and above the modes, ideas represent and affirm
facts in virtue of representing modes.
Notes
1

All citations from Spinoza are from Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl
Winter, 1925) (G hereafter). Most English translations are from Edwin Curley ed. and trans., The
Complete Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), with occasional
modifications. In citations from the Ethics, I use the following abbreviations: the first numeral
refers to parts; p means proposition; c means corollary; s means scholium; e.g. 4p37s means
Ethics, part 4, proposition 37, scholium.
2 G. W. Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt. 7
vols. Berlin, 187590; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978, vol. 1, p. 139.
3 My discussion here is indebted to Garretts Conatus, and Curleys Spinozas Metaphysics.
4 See Della Rocca, Representation (5760) and Garrett, Imagination and Perception, for helpful
discussions of how Spinoza can accommodate some of the apparent counterexamples.
5 Spinoza explicitly commits himself to metaphysical rationalism in 1p11d2, where he writes,For
each thing there must be assigned a cause or reason both for its existence and its nonexistence.
6 Spinoza gives four arguments for the existence of God. Here I shall focus exclusively on the
argument given in 1p11d2.
7 We might wonder, as Leibniz did, why there couldnt be two substances that shared an attribute
but were distinguished by other attributes. For example, why couldnt there be a substance a that
was F and G and substance b that was G and H.They would be distinguished by as possession of
F and non-possession of H and bs possession of H and non-possession of F.The full response to
this objection requires more exposition than would be possible here. But Spinozas response can
be suggested by noting that Spinoza believes that each attribute must be sufficient for distinguishing
the substance to which it belongs from every other substance (this follows from 1d4 and 2d2).
In the scenario described above, G is not sufficient for conceiving of either substance as distinct
from the other. For this reason, Spinoza would deny that the scenario describes a possible situation.
See Della Rocca,Spinozas Substance Monism (1722), for an illuminating discussion of this issue.
8 This is not clearly so. For example, recall the famous problem of the coherence of omnipotence:
can God create an object so heavy that even he cannot lift it? I believe however that Spinoza has
interesting grounds for believing that the nature of an absolutely perfect being is coherent. See
Della Rocca,Spinozas Substance Monism (2233), and my Spinozas Arguments, section 6.
9 See my Spinozas Arguments for a fuller treatment of this argument as well as a discussion of
Spinozas other arguments for the existence of God. See also Garrett, Spinozas Ontological
Arguments, 198223 for a related but interestingly different interpretation of those arguments.
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10

Of course, a full defense of the anti-substantival interpretation of Spinozistic attributes would

require a separate treatment of all the texts upon which the substantival interpretation rests. Such
an exercise falls outside of the scope of the present article.
11 For a discussion of this feature of Spinozistic ideas, see Della Rocca, Power of an Idea, and
my paper Spinozas Account of Akrasia.
12 I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
13 Such a theory would be a varient of the field metaphysics that Bennett develops and attributes
to Spinoza in his Study (212).
14 Yitzhak Melamed has noted in his Spinozas Metaphysics of Substance, that a fascinating but
unjustly neglected Spinozistic text, Spinozas Compendium of the Hebrew Grammar, provides important
evidence for the standard interpretation according to which modes are properties. In that work,
Spinoza analogizes the grammatical categories expressed by nouns, adjectives, and participles to
the metaphysical categories of substance, attribute, and mode. Because participles are verbal
adjectives, this text seems to suggest that modes are properties.
15 Van Cleve articulates this interpretation in passing in his Problems from Kant (212).

Works Cited
Bennett, Jonanthan. A Study of Spinozas Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1984.
Curley, Edwin. Spinozas Metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1960.
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20032.
. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.
. Spinozas Substance Monism. Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Ed. J. Biro and O. Koistinen.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002, 1137.
Garrett, Don. Imagination and Perception. Necessity and Nature in Spinozas Philosophy. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2006.
. Spinozas Conatus Argument. Spinozas Metaphysics: Central Themes. Ed. J. I. Biro and
O. Koistinen. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002, 12758.
. Spinozas OntologicalArguments. Philosophical Review 88.2 (1979): 198223.
Gueroult, Martial. Spinoza I: Dieu (Ethique, I). Paris:Aubier-Montainge, 1968.
Lin, Martin. Spinozas Account of Akrasia. Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming).
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(forthcoming).
Loeb, Louis. From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.
Van Cleve, James. Problems from Kant. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.

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