2006 Legal Ethics Case Digest

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter,
the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been
convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we
held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the
practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case,
however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that
this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo, the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy
of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After
the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with
different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against
the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre
with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of
Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks
by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that
the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification
of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the
offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation
is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein,
complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as
attorney by representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6
months. The governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.

Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent
conflicting interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of
the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer
is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when
the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect
the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired
through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse
interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers representation of both sides
of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from
honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the
practice of law.

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of the
outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter contained derogatory and malignant
remarks which are highly insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of
appearing before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as the first one. The court was
thus offended with his remarks.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his
letters addressed to the court.

Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they
constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty
to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of
justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest court, the
Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice,
to which his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be
justified nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended
the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Thus, ATTY.
NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

Heirs of Herman Rey, represented by ARACELI Vda. DE ROMERO vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr.
A.C. No. 6192 June 23, 2005

Facts: Atty. Venancio Reyes is counsel for Heirs of Herman Rey for which they are intervenors in a civil
case involving multiple sale of a piece of land. There were three buyers however, and to settle the case,
they had agreed to a Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement, dated June 16, 1995, was

signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her husband, then by complainants and their counsel,
Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R.
Credit Enterprises, Inc. and by herein respondent. Later, the RTC which houses the records of the case
was destroyed by fire, thus The complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case,
which was granted by the RTC of Bulacan. The documents attached to the motion were the basis for the
reconstituted records. Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the copy
submitted to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her husband, complainants, and that of
their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte. After a lapse of two (2) years from the date of the Compromise
Agreement, V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. still has not complied with its obligation toward complainants.
Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc.
for such failure. Atty. Reyes filed a motion for the case was premature. Later he raised the issue that the
Compromise Agreement was not valid since it was not signed by Veronica Gonzales. Hence, the RTC rued
that the Compromise as unenforceable. Thus, herein, complainants filed this administrative case against
Atty. Venancio Reyes Jr. charging him with willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar. IBP investigating commissioner found him guilty of violation of his oath.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Venancio Reyes is administratively liable.

Held: Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath,
they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act
not merely as the parties representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty
to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. In assailing the legality of the Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He
maintains that he should not be faulted for raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his clients
interests. The records show, however, that his actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and doublespeak.
Atty. Reyes is one of negotiating panel in the compromise agreement. He impressed upon the parties and
the trial judge that his clients were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and
conveniently, he repudiated it by falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it. True, lawyers
are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients. However,
their fidelity to their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the
expense of truth and justice. In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus: While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must

do so only within the bounds of the law Thus, herein, Atty. Venancio Reyes, was ordered suspended for 1
year.

JESUS M. FERRER vs. ATTY. JOSE ALLAN M. TEBELIN

Facts: Ferrer obtained the services of Atty. Tebelin in a case against Global Link as a result of a vehicular
accident through the falut of Global Links driver. Ferrer paid Atty. Tebelin P5, 000.00 as acceptance fee
and gave him all pertinent documents. However, Ferrer filed an administrative case against Atty. Tebelin
alleging that the said lawyer abandoned his case. However, Atty. Tebelin expressed his willingness to
return the money and denied having abandoned the case. However, during the proceedings, herein Ferrer
died. Atty. Tebelin was nowhere to be found in his given address.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tebellin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant.

Held: The court held that Atty. Tebelin may still be held liable despite the death of the complainant. The
death of a complainant in an administrative case notwithstanding, the case may still proceed and be
resolved. As in the case of Tudtud v. Colifores, the court ruled that The death of the complainant herein
does not warrant the non-pursuance of the charges against respondent Judge. In administrative cases
against public officers and employees, the complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses. Hence, the
unilateral decision of a complainant to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as
in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its
administrative supervision. This Court also finds respondent, for ignoring the notices of hearing sent to
him at his address which he himself furnished, or to notify the IBP-CBD his new address if indeed he had
moved out of his given address. His actuation betrays his lack of courtesy, his irresponsibility as a lawyer.
This Court faults respondent too for welting on his manifestation-undertaking to return the P5,000.00,
not to mention the documents bearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective of his
reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retaining lien, immediately turn
over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Thus, the court suspended Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin from the practice of law for Two (2) Months and is
ordered to return to complainants heirs the amount of P5, 000.00, with legal interest.

JUDGES; UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING JUDGMENT , A VIOLATION OF RULE 70 SECTION 11 OF

Facts: Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary conference in a case for forcible
entry, he, as plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to submit their respective position papers and
evidence. Two months from the submission of their position papers, complainant personally went to the
Court to verify the judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to file a motion for rendition of
judgment which was duly received by the court on August 6, 2001 but still no judgment was rendered on
December 27, 2001 when the complaint was filed. Hence, complainant Petallar charged Judge Juanillo
Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of Surigao del Norte of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 & Canon
3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as Rule 140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of
the Rules of the Court for undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry.

Issue: Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in rendering judgment.

Held: Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties had
filed their respective position papers as early as February 2, 2000. thus, respondent had until March 4,
2000. Had there been circumstances which presented him from handling down his decision within the
prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from the Court for an extension within
which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decisions within the period fixed by law
constitutes serious violation of Article III, section 16 of the Constitution. Judges must perform their
official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. A judge cannot
by himself prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of
extension granted by the court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

COMPLAINTS FOR DISBARMENT; FORMAL INVESTIGATION

Facts: Respondent Atty. Sorongon had been the counsel of complainant Mercedes Nava for years. The
former informed her of his intention to withdraw as her counsel in two of her cases due to a stroke that
paralyzed his right body but proposed to be retained in two other criminal cases with lesser paper works.
He filed his withdrawal on December 4, 1996 and was granted by the court. Complainant alleged that
while she continuously paid for the respondents services, the latter represented other clients with hostile
interests and cases filed against her. Complainant cried that respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in
filing a formal complaint for 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22 against her. She sent a letter to respondents
expressing her disbelief and reminding him of his ethical and moral responsibility as a lawyer.
Complainant prayed that an investigation be conducted regarding this unfortunate actuation and
deplorable behavior as well as respondents double standard attitude.
Thereafter, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a resolution suspending respondent from the
practice of law for one year considering his clear violation of the prohibition against representing
conflicting interest.

Issue: Whether or not a formal investigation is mandatory in complaints for disbarment.

Held: In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement. The court may
dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and
the question raised is simple. Similarly, if no further, factual determination is necessary, the court may
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleading on record.
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the
Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it out rightly dismisses the case. If, however, the
Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte
investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR

Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and respondent Atty.
Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against the latter and Villarin. She also
submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were
married in May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint within 10 days but they
failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents
unserved with notation moved, same as when served personally. Complainant was required anew to
submit the correct, present address of respondents under pain of dismissal of her administrative
complaint. She disclosed respondents address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten
letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be disbarred. The
Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent
Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the resolution
requiring comment was never deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro.

Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit relationship with another
woman are grounds for disbarment.

Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to complainant,
carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence was not
sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding
is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled
to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint against Atty. Villarin
was referred back to the IBP.

VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO FILE

Facts: Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse
decision was rendered against complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at their behest. The
Court of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but Atty. Ocampos was granted a 90-day
extension. The extended period lapsed without an appellants brief being filed, hence their appeal was
dismissed. The dismissal was not challenged, but complainants filed a complaint contending that
respondent violated his duty to inform them of his failure to file appellants brief and of the dismissal of
the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the clients interests.

Held: A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters
interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellants brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge
of such responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional which states:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not justify his failure to exercise
due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every case deserves full attention, diligence, and competence
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.
Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of record is under obligation
to protect the clients interest. If a party has a counsel of record, a court does not recognize any other
representation in behalf thereof unless in collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal
substitution of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he in fact filed
a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional
responsibility.

Legal Ethics Case Digests Imposition of Proper Penalty

Posted by Magz

Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto Lirios

Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the complainant in a prosecution for Falsification of a Public
Document (Art. 172, RPC) which was tried and decided by Judge Aniceto Lirios of the MTC of
Naval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the accused, Pablo Suzon, and sentenced him to a straight
penalty of 7 months imprisonment and imposed a PhP 1,000 fine. Dadizon questioned the
punishment meted by the said judge, alleging that the straight penalty of 7 months is way below
the penalty provided by law. Judge Lirios defended his decision, stating that he had to appreciate
the mitigating circumstance that Suzon was already 70 years of age.

Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three (33) years, respondent should have known that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of a prison sentence in the minimum and
maximum term for offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or the special laws. The offense
committed was Falsification by a Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document punishable
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for a penalty of imprisonment of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
days to 6 years) and a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Respondent Judge
appreciated one (1) mitigating circumstance (old age), which is merely an ordinary mitigating
circumstance. The imposition of a straight penalty of seven (7) months by respondent Judge is
clearly erroneous. While a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every
erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or
abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It is true that a judge may err in
fixing the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence. However, the unawareness
of or unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and
graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action from reprimand to removal. Every judge should
know that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum. And when
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Aniceto Lirios was fined in the amount of PhP 5,000 and issued stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely by the Court.

Legal Ethics Case Digests Grant of a Motion for Reconsideration

Posted by Magz

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending before respondent
judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration after the
case had been dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the
Preliminary Conference. She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of

Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in
violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the
fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality
and with intent to cause an injury to complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion

Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought
to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal issued by
respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is
obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of
the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for
reconsideration subject of the present