Ruperto Taule vs. Secretary Luis T. Santos and Gov.

Leandro Verceles
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

Facts: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)

of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of
the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in
Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the
election of its officers. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of
Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) as Chairman with Provincial
Treasurer and Provincial Election Supervisor as members. When the group decided to
hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer
and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded
with PGOO as presiding officer. Thereafter, Ruperto Taule was elected as President of
the FABC.

On June 19, 1989, Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to Luis
T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of
the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted. Secretary Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of
the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes as violation of Department of Local
Government Circular No. 89-09 which provides the guidelines for the conduct of the
elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial,
regional and national levels.

Taule contends that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC,
the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is his theory that under Article
IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials.

On the other hand, it is the opinion of the Secretary that any violation of the guidelines
as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon
the Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay
Councils?

Ruling: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the
organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly
elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their
respective members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
conducted by their own respective organization.

However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain
any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. It is a well-settled principle of
administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft
of quasi- judicial powers. There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision
expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local
Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers
of the katipunan ng mga barangay.

Although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance"
by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or
check. This is compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local
governments which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned
or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even
the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing

circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced.
Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local
governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG
Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.

Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by
respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18,
1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The
respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving
officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.

Hon. Jejomar C. Binay and the Municipality of Makati vs. Hon. Eufemio Domingo
and the Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Facts: On September 27, 1988, the Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60
which provides an ongoing burial assistance program to qualified beneficiaries of
bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) a month, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the
amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief. Resolution No. 60 was referred to
respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on
its preliminary findings, COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.The disallowance was predicated
on the grounds that:
(1) no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained
under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare,
etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; and
(2) subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public
purpose, i.e., that the disbursement should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the
majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few

individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or property shall be
spent or used solely for public purposes.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause?

Ruling: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of
their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as
empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for
the safety of the people.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."

In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60 and the
alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."

Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its
exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." In the case

of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. Thus, it
is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate
the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited

number of persons. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying
paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers.

City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City vs. Hon. Judge
Vicente G. Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: The City Council of Quezon City approved Ordinance No. 6118; Sec. 9 of which
provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined
by competent City Authorities. After declaring Section 9 of the ordinance null and void,
the aforequoted section was not enforced by city authorities until seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting
the City Engineer to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.

Pursuant to this, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. that Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing
with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance for being contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.

The City government argues that the taking of the property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for
the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall
deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

On the other hand, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. stresses that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it
refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property." It also points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use
but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.

Issue: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Ruling: The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for
the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate

private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order
and of promoting the general welfare.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not

covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. The petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied
powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory
basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal
interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.

Felicidad Villanueva, et. al vs. Hon. Mariano Castaneda, Jr.

G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987

Facts: In November 7, 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted

Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants
and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the vicinity of the
public market of San Fernando, Pampanga (particularly along Mercado Street in a strip
of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls
commonly known as a talipapa). The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in
Civil Case No. 2040, where the CFI of Pampanga, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
that prevented the petitioners from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. While the case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place
and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No.
218, series of 1961. Thereafter, the CFI decided and held that the land occupied by the
petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore
could not be the subject of private occupancy.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the
place; in fact, they and 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or
space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to the municipal government. In
January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to
restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Vicente
A. Macalino acted on the petition as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of San
Fernando and issued a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal
engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place.

The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them
by virtue of contracts they had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961
insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with them and the other
petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they
saw they are paying daily fees.

Issue: Whether or not the contract of lease entered into with the municipal government
valid?

Ruling: A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of
lease or any other contractual undertaking. Indeed, this point was settled as early as
in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, decided in 1915, where the Court declared as null
and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person.
Justice Torres said in that case: According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for
public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the
squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by said towns or provinces. The said Plaza Soledad being a
promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or
exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it.

In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion
of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of
man.Echoing Rojas, the decision said: The City of Manila does not have any power or
authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question, forming
part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the
contract, as it was not within the commerce of man. Any contract entered into by the
City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires.

Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, where the Supreme
Court declared: There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for
the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures
constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties
of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in
general They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even
leased by the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first
place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the
strength of their alleged lease contracts. Considering that even before Civil Case No.
2040 was decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted
Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public
plaza of the municipality.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by
the police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause.
This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority
was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of
1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every
contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act
will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.