Order Denying Motion To Dismiss
Order Denying Motion To Dismiss
Order Denying Motion To Dismiss
reports on Plaintiffs medical condition, which all parties agree was a legitimate public concern.
Though items of genuine public interest in a public figures life may legitimately extend, to
some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and to facts about
him, which are not public . . .[t]he extent of the authority to make public private facts is not . . .
unlimited. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652D cmt. h (1977). The limits on disclosing
private facts are anchored to common decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press
and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the
feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the exposure. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has shown the publication of his private medical records may breach
these limits and, thus, are not a matter of public concern. Plaintiffs medical records were not
publically available; he did not consent to their use; and federal and state medical privacy laws,
though not directly applicable to Defendants, signal that an individuals medical records are
generally considered private. Separately, the circumstances surrounding the obtainment of
these medical records are in dispute. If Schefter secured Plaintiffs records unlawfully,
Defendants may not be afforded First Amendment protections that could otherwise apply in
publishing these records. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515 (2001) ([T]his Court upheld
the press right to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen
by a third party. . . . It also left open the question whether, in cases where information has been
acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may punish not only the
unlawful acquisition, but also the ensuing publication.). Taken together, it is unwise to
dismiss these counts at this stage of the litigation.
Finally, Defendants request for attorneys fees under Floridas Anti-SLAPP statute, see
Fla. Stat. 768.295, is denied. Assuming the statute applies, this suit plainly has merit since
two of its original three counts remain.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, at Miami, Florida, on this 29th day of August
2016.