CONSTI2 Digest Batch 1

GONZALEZ VS MARCOS
[G.R. No. L-31685; July 31, 1975]
CASE REQUIREMENTS: Standing
PONENTE: FERNANDO, J.
PETITIONER: Ramona A. Gonzalez
RESPONDENT: Imelda R. Marcos, as Chairman of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines, Father Horacio de la Costa, I. P. Soliongco, Ernesto Rufino,
Antonio Madrigal, and Andres Soriano, as members thereof
RULING: CFI of Manila GRANTED the motion of respondents to
dismiss the case filed by petitioner; SC DISMISSED the appeal of
petitioner to review the lower courts dismissal of the case.
FACTS:
1. An appeal for certiorari from an order of dismissal by the CFI of
Manila was submitted by Gonzalez (petitioner).
2. Gonzalez raised the validity of the creation in Executive Order No.
30 of a trust under the Cultural Center of the Philippines, having as
its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as
donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be
collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future with the
Board of Trustees to be appointed by the President. The Board of
Trustees has as its Chairman the First Lady, Imelda Marcos.
3. It was alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from
the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New
York a loan of $5 million as well as $3.5 million received from
President Johnson of the United States.
4. In an order of dismissal by Judge Jose G. Bautista of a suit for
prohibition filed in CFI of Manila, stress was laid on the funds
administered by the Center as coming from donations and
contributions, with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the
absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that
could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general
public.
5. On March 5, 1970, the motion of respondents to dismiss this
appeal by certiorari was granted. A pleading was submitted to SC
12 days later, where it was contended that Executive Order No. 30
represented the legitimate exercise of executive power, there being
no invasion of the legislative domain. In this exhaustive motion to

dismiss, the point was likewise raised that petitioner did not have
the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of the
executive order in question, as the funds held by the Cultural
Center came from donations and contributions, not one centavo
being raised by taxation.
ISSUE/S:
a. WON the lower court erred in holding that the petitioner does not
have the required standing or personality to file the case.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. SC held that the lower court did not err in viewing that the
petitioner does not have the required interest in the case at bar.
There was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary
interest." It was pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an
outcome was unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President
of the Philippines came from donations and contributions NOT by
taxation." It is to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal
learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit.
Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were
involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail
the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon.

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PEOPLE VS VERA
[G.R. No. L-45685; November 16, 1937]
CASE REQUIREMENTS: Standing
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.
DOCTRINE: The rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

6.

7.

PETITIONER: The People of the Philippine Islands; HongKong &

Shanghai Banking Corporation
RESPONDENT: Jose O. Vera, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and Mariano Cu Unjieng
RULING: CFI of Manila CONVICTED Mariano Unjieng and DENIED
his motions for reconsideration; US Appellate Court DENIED motion for
reconsideration of private respondent; SC DENIED motion for
reconsideration or new trial of private respondent and REMANDED the
case to lower court for the EXECUTION of judgment; CFI of Manila
suspended the trial for the granting of probation; SC DECLARED Act No.
4221 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
FACTS:
1. On October 15, 1931, a criminal case was filed with the CFI of
Manila against Unjieng, with HSBC intervening in the case as
private prosecutor.
2. On January 8, 1934, CFI convicted and sentenced Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs
and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC.
3. On March 26, 1935, CFI modified the sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7
years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the
judgment in all other respects.
4. Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and 4 successive
motions for new trial which were denied and final judgment was
accordingly entered on December 18, 1935.
5. On November 24, 1936, SC denied the petition subsequently filed
by the Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment.

8.

9.

On November 27, 1936, before the trial court, Unjieng filed an

application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of
the defunct Philippine Legislature. Unjieng states in his petition
that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he
has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in
the future.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to Unjieng. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition alleging that Act No. 4221,
assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV
of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said
Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces.
On April 19, 1937, the private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition on elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec.
1, Art. VI, Constitution).
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion
with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the
judgment of SC in said case and forthwith to commit Unjieng to
jail in obedience to said judgment.

ISSUE/S:
a. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings (focused on standing).
HELD/RATIO:
YES. SC held that the set aside HSBC People of the Philippines
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General is a proper party in
the present proceeding.
In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been
presented not only by the State but also before the trial court by the private
prosecution (HSBC). Hon. Jose O Vera declined to pass upon the question

CONSTI2 Digest Batch 1

on the ground that the private prosecutor (HSBC), not being a party whose
rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question.
1. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution (HSBC) has no
personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of
Unjieng, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in
the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties
to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a
court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention
of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions.
2. The People of the Philippines is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present
action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that
the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

CONSTI2 Digest Batch 1

FLAST VS COHEN
[No. 416; June 10, 1968]
CASE REQUIREMENTS: Standing
PONENTE: WARREN, C.J.
PETITIONER: Florence Flast
RESPONDENT: Cohen
RULING: THREE-JUDGE COURT DISMISSED the case due to the
lack of standing of the petitioner; US DICTRICT COURT REVERSED
the previous decision of the Three-Judge Court
6.
FACTS:
1. Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin the allegedly
unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and II
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
2. The seven appellants filed their complaint as federal taxpayers.
The appellees, who are charged by Congress with administering
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, were sued
in their official capacities.
3. The main issue of the appellants' complaint was that federal funds
appropriated under the Act were being used to finance instruction
in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and
to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in
such schools. Such expenditures were alleged to be in
contravention of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment.
4. Appellants' constitutional attack focused on the statutory criteria
which state and local authorities must meet to be eligible for
federal grants under the Act. Title I of the Act establishes a
program for financial assistance to local educational agencies for
the education of low income families. Title II of the Act establishes
a program of federal grants for the acquisition of school library
resources, textbooks, and other printed and published instructional
materials "for the use of children and teachers in public and private
elementary and secondary schools."
5. While disclaiming any intent to challenge as unconstitutional all
programs under Title I of the Act, the complaint alleges that federal
funds have been disbursed under the Act, "with the consent and

7.

8.

9.

approval of the appellees" and that such funds have been used and
will continue to be used to finance "instruction in reading,
arithmetic and other subjects and for guidance in religious and
sectarian schools" and "the purchase of textbooks and instructional
and library materials for use in religious and sectarian schools."
Such expenditures of federal tax funds, appellants alleged, violate
the First Amendment because "they constitute a law respecting an
establishment of religion" and because "they prohibit the free
exercise of religion on the part of the appellants . . . by reason of
the fact that they constitute compulsory taxation for religious
purposes."
The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that appellants lacked standing to maintain the action.
District Judge Frankel, who considered the motion, recognized that
Frothingham v. Mellon, provided "powerful" support for the
Government's position, but he ruled that the standing question was
of sufficient substance to warrant the convening of a three-judge
court to decide the question.
The three-judge court received briefs and heard arguments limited
to the standing question, and the court ruled on the authority of
Frothingham that appellants lacked standing. Judge Frankel
dissented.
From the dismissal of their complaint on that ground, appellants
appealed directly to the present court.

ISSUE/S:
a. WON the petitioner, as a federal taxpayer, has a standing to sue the
Government against its spending program.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The Court held that Flast has the legal standing as federal
taxpayers to maintain the present action.
1.
2.

In ruling on standing, it is necessary to determine whether there is

a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to
be adjudicated.
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it.
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a

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3.

taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality

only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and
spending clause of Art. I of the Constitution. Secondly, the
taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the
precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.
Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the
challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations
imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power. When both nexuses are established, the litigant
will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the
controversy, and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a
federal court's jurisdiction.
The taxpayer appellants in this case have satisfied both
nexuses to support their claim of standing under the test
mentioned above. Their constitutional challenge is made to an
exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, to spend for the
general welfare, and the challenged program involves a substantial
expenditure of federal tax funds. The Court believes a taxpayer
will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in assuring that they are not
breached by Congress.

CONSTI2 Digest Batch 1

FRANCISCO VS HOR
[G.R. No. 160261; November 10, 2003]
CASE REQUIREMENTS: Standing
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.
DOCTRINE: Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
PETITIONER: Atty. Ernesto Francisco; Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., its Officers and
Members
RESPONDENT: House of Representatives represented by Speaker Jose G.
De Venecia, the Senate, represented by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon,
Representative Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Representative Felix William B.
Fuentebella
RULING: SC AFFIRMED the legal standing of most of the petitioners,
GRANTED some motions by interested partied to intervene in the case, and
BARRED the second impeachment complaint filed by respondents.
FACTS:
1. On November 28, 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes.
4. On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice ruled that
the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted
to dismiss it for being insufficient in substance.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed

with the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were
filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section
5 of Art. XI of the Constitution that no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
Atty. Francisco, alleged that he has a duty as a member of the IBP
to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment. He pleaded for the Court to exercise judicial review
to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Speaker De Venecia submitted a Manifestation asserting that the
SC has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the
HOR from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases.
Sen. Pimentel, Jr. filed a Motion to praying that the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court to try and decide impeachment cases, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
a. WON the petitioners have the legal standing in the case at bar.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. SC held that Francisco has the proper legal standing and that
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. possesses legal interest to intervene.
1. Concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators, when specific requirements
have been met, have been given standing by the SC. In the case of a
taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement

CONSTI2 Digest Batch 1

of an unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. SC opted to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

2. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the

courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
law authorizing intervention. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco
in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging
that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members
of the House of Representatives is successful," SC found the requisites
for intervention had been complied with.