Alfonso Montebon Vs - The Director of Prisons: Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, Supra

ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso Montebon on behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, a
prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar petition was filed with this Court by
Felicisima Santiago in the name of the same prisoner (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons,
77 Phil., 927), a petition which was denied by us in a decision promulgated on January
30, 1947. The ground of the first petition was the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's
three convictions for estafa. The present application contests the validity of the
prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine
Executive Commission under date of June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his
(prisoner's) maximum aggregate sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled
by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still had over five
years to serve. The commissioner of Justice's recommitment order was made by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the
Board of Pardons having been abolished, the powers, duties and functions thereof shall
henceforth be assumed and exercised by the Commissioner of Justice.
Issue: Won the recommitment order valid during the Japanese Occupation?
Held: The petition is denied without costs.
Ruling: Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid and
binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague Convention and the
theory of jus postlimitinii on the international Law. That the legal truism in political and
international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid." The reason underlying
requirement is thus stated in William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or
do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be
preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property
regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,

petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.
Facts: Locquiao spouses executed a deed of donation propter nuptias written in Ilocano in
favor of their son, Benito and his soon-to-be bride, Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the
agreement, the donation consist of 4 parcels of land, one male cow and 1/3 of the conjugal house
of the spouses Locquiao. The marriage took place on 1944. The spouses died on 1962 and 1968,
respectively leaving their 6 children as heirs. With the permission of Benito, Romana, one of the
heirs took over the possession of the donated lands and cultivated it. When her husband got
sick, her daughter, Constancia took over the position in cultivating the land.
Meanwhie Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut leaving the old title cancelled.
Later, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana,
executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among 3 out
of the 12 parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and
other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement
that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao,
have already received our shares in the estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations
and conveyances, and that for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to
the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner
Romana, confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the
properties covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated.
Subsequently, disagreements among the heirs surfaced leading to execution of deed of
compromise agreement. Benito, although not directly involved, signed the agreement. Sometime
in 1983, Constancia filed for the annulment of the agreement. The lower court dismissed
the petition. This lead an ejectment case raised by Benito in favor of Constancia. Petitioners
Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the annulment of the donated and
registered land against respondents Benito and Tomasa. Petitioners alleged that the issuance
of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that
the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation
did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document
itself or in a separate public instrument.
Issue: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether acceptance
of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the acceptance
appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred by prescription and laches.
Held:
- 1st Issue: To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners
rely mainly on the Certification that there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V.
Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of
the document was not available. The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged
inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The mere absence of the notarial
record does not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission and
neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence
of the falsification of the document. The failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the
deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating
the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference in
the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the previous donations
made by the spouses in favor of some of the heirs. Benito was not allotted any share in the
deed of partition precisely because he received his share by virtue of previous donations. His
name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with respect to one parcel of land which is the
eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same one-third (1/3) portion of conjugal lot
of their progenitors included in the donation propter nuptias.
Similarly, Marciano
Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the deed of
partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
- 2nd Issue: No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason
of marriage are those made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses. The distinction is crucial because the two
classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the
formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made
in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that acceptance is not necessary to the
validity of such gifts. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the
form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403,
paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned
thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129,
express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The
fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a
well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. Thus, the Old Civil Code was in
force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the
validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted
the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. Even if the provisions of
the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same.
As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under
the New Civil Code.
- 3rd Issue: It is barred by prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners action, which
was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred. Even following petitioners theory that the
prescriptive period should commence from the time of discovery of the alleged fraud, the
conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was
registered and the transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have
constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that
registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world
of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is now settled
that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly registered through
fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the
action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation that led to the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or notice of
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held barred Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of
the following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the
donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in 1973 and the information
must have surfaced again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as
petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the
opportunity to question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have
done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in
dispute at the time. But she did not make any move. She tarried for 11 more years from the
execution of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution." The same doctrine has been
asserted in numerous other cases.

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ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,

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