People V Dino
People V Dino
People V Dino
Date:
February
Plaintiff-Appellee:
People
Defendant-Appellant: Roberto Dio y Romero
Ponente: J. Labrador
of
18,
the
1948
Philippines
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila finding appellant guilty as accomplice in the crime of
qualified theft and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than 3 months and 11
days of arresto mayor, nor more than 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties imposed by law, and to pay the costs.
Facts:
On June 20, 1946, Roberto Dio was employed as a driver of the US army at a
station in General Depot, APO 75, Quezon City. At above 11:30 PM, he brought to the
670th Medium Port, South Harbor, Manila, a truckload of articles, all unloaded from
the truck by the gang employed by the US army.
Afterwards, he drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was nearing an
M.P. checkpoint, a colored guard approached the truck and found 3 boxes loaded,
each containing 10 caliber .30 army rifles. The guard brought Dio to the checkpoint
where a US army lieutenant, upon seeing the 3 boxes, asked Dio if he had loaded
them, but the latter said he did not. The lieutenant went to the foreman and his gang
employed to unload the articles at the Medium Port, but all of them denied having
loaded the boxes. Later, Dio confessed that 4 persons helped him put the boxes on
board and he was instructed to bring them out of the area.
Appellant was subjected to an investigation and signed a written statement
(Exhibit A), declaring that he was stopped by 4 men who loaded the boxes in the
truck and told him to bring them out of the area, while they were to meet him after
he had passed the checkpoint, and consented to bring the articles because he had
been told that the men would answer therefor and would give him a certain share in
the articles.
The trial court held that the boxes could not have been loaded in the truck
without Dios consent, and if such consent was really obtained through fear, he
could have given an account thereof to the checkpoint guard; the lower court refused
to believe appellants explanation and found him guilty as already indicated.
Dio contends that: (1) the trial court erred in accepting Exhibit A as a
voluntary confession, secured without violence or fraud; (2) that it erred in finding the
3 boxes of rifles were found by the guard in the truck of the accused; (3) that it erred
in not giving credit to Dios testimony; (4) that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty and sentencing him.
The investigator who took the statement, Exhibit A, testified in court, and he
declared that the statement was taken in the presence of many people, and that it
was sent after to the assistant provost marshal (APM) for signature under oath. It is
difficult to believe that Dio was coerced in view of the presence of many spectators
during investigation. If he had been forced to sign the statement, he could have
immediately informed the APM of this fact. The claim that the statement was made
involuntarily by the appellant is therefore, DISMISSED.
The claim that the boxes were found on the way and were loaded in the truck
by the guard with the Dios help is contrary to the latters own statement, Exhibit A.
This court finds that the trial court did not err in refusing to believe such claim for
being contrary to the lieutenant's testimony and to the facts of the case. Dios
testimony was not corroborated by any other witness or circumstance sufficiently
proved at the trial.
The court sentenced Dio for the crime of qualified theft. However, the
evidence submitted fails to show that the articles were those entrusted to Dio for
transportation in the truck driven. In fact, the articles delivered to the depot appear
to have been unloaded and the 3 boxes were placed aboard when it had already left
the depot and was on its way to the checkpoint. There was no elements of
confidence involved, Dio being a mere laborer when he took part in taking away
the loot from the depot. The crime committed is therefore, not qualified but
simple theft.
Two other points remain to be considered: the degree in which the crime was
committed
and
the
extend
of
the
participation
of
the
appellant.
Issues:
Whether or not the crime of simple theft was consummated.
Held:
NO. This court believes that in order to make the booty subject to the control
and disposal of the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the MP
checkpoint, but since the offense was discovered and the articles seized after all the
acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the final
control and disposal of the looters, the offense cannot be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard.
Trial court found appellant guilty as accomplice in the consummated crime.
However, this court found that the offense committed was only that of frustrated
theft, the passing of the truck beyond the checkpoint away from the control of the
guards being essential to the complete consummation of the crime, it is evident that
appellant participated, not as an accomplice, but as a principal, having himself
carried the articles in the truck, and the act of carrying the articles through the
checkpoint being an indispensable part of the complete execution of the offense.
Conclusion:
Petitions DENIED. The judgment appealed from is MODIFIED, and appellant is
found guilty as principal of the crime of frustrated theft, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of not less than 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor, nor
more than 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.