Chapter 01: Origin and Development of Sarvstivda

Abhidharma
The period or Abhidharma represent a period in Buddhist philosophy and thoughts.
During the first two centuries following the Buddhas parinirva, there was a move
towards a comprehensive and precise systematization of the teachings. The
philosophical systems that emerged from this refined analytical approach to the
doctrines are collectively called the Abhidharma. Both the Theravda and
Sarvstivda, the two major conservative schools had their own Abhidharma each
based on a distinct Abhidharma Piaka. The Buddha laid down the foundations of the
Abhidharma but it was actually compiled after the vinaya and stra. Its origin can be
traced back to the stra style and have its origin in the discourses.
The whole period of Buddhism can be roughly divided into three main phases: Early
Buddhism, Abhidharma, and Mahyna Buddhism.
Early Buddhism
The Early Buddhism represents the Buddhist discourses delivered by the Buddha.
Early Buddhism means Buddhism before the emergence of Sectarian Buddhism
(Abhidharma). During the period of early Buddhism, there was no other Buddhist
school, but only one Buddhist tradition. Even the word Buddhism is a later coinage;
the actual word for Buddhism is Dharma.
In early Buddhism, there were only Dharma and Vinaya. Then, the Buddhist monks
were called 'Samaa Sakya' 'a follower of the sage of the skyas' (kyamuni).
There was only one doctrine, one Sangha (fraternity). Some modern scholars called
it pre-canonical Buddhism. Pre-canonical Buddhism means Buddhism that existed
before the compilation of the Pli canon.
The Buddha himself has said that his teaching consists of two kinds of discourses:
ntrtha and neyrtha. Ntrtha means those discourses whose meaning does not
have to be drawn out; the meaning is clear, and not requiring any interpretation.
Neyrtha means the meaning of the discourses has to be drawn out.
For example, the Buddha says there is no soul (antman). But In the Bhrahra
Stra, the Buddha says that besides the five skandhas, there is a burden as well as
a burden-bearer. "Burden-bearer" is like tman (self). So we cannot understand that
stra in the literal sense. It must be understood as ntrtha. The meaning must be
clarified and interpreted. Some scholars do not understand the difference between
ntrtha and neyrtha. What are the literary sources that we make use of to
understand Early Buddhism? That is Stra Pitaka which is separated into five
nikyas.
Dgha Nikya: which contains the long discourses.
Majjhima Nikya: medium-length discourses.
Sayutta Nikya: a collection of discourses; anthology. Yutta means "put
together". A properly organized collection of discourses.
Aguttara Nikya: aguttara refers not to the content, but to text
arrangement. Anguttara means that the discourses are arranged in ascending
numerical order (1, 2, 3...)
Khuddaka Nikya: are small Nikya.
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As a Nikya, the Khuddaka Nikya is a much later text than the other four. But it
contains some of the most ancient texts like the Suttanipata.
There has been a Sanskrit Stra Piaka, called gama:
Drgha gama,
Majjhima gama,
Sayukta gama,
Ekottara gama (Aguttara is Pali term).
The Aguttara and Ekottara meaning is the same: numerically ascending order.
In Chinese, there is no Khuddaka Nikya. There are only four gamas. That
indicates that originally there were only four Nikyas and the Khuddaka Nikya is a
later addition. The Pli Nikya and the Chinese gama are almost the same. That
shows the antiquity of the Pli Nikyas.
We can say that the Stra Piaka is common to all schools of Buddhist thought
because it was completed before Sectarian Buddhism. The Stra Piaka is
commonly accepted by all schools of the Buddhist thought.
For example from the Pli Abhidharma Piaka: Kathavatthu is a book in the
Abhidharma Piaka. It was written at the Third Buddhist council, and it contains
controversies between different schools of Buddhist thoughts. Kathavatthu is a
series of debates, dialogues, within Buddhist schools on the controversy on
dhammas. Usually the controversy is between the Theravdin and another school of
Buddhist thought.
Up to now, we have defined one stage of Buddhist thought of Early Buddhism which
represents the early phase of Buddhism before the rise of Buddhist schools (before
the Second Buddhist council). Secondly, in order to understand early Buddhism, we
go only to Stra Piaka. Stra Piaka represents the earlier stage in the history of
Buddhist literature. Now, the Stra Piaka had been completely forgotten even in
Burma and Sri Lanka because they follow the teachings based on
commentaries/Abhidhamma, not based on Stra Piaka.
Buddhist books are written in Pli, Prakrit, Sanskrit and mix-Sanskrit. Mix-Sanskrit is
called Buddhist Sanskrit, the Hybrid Sanskrit. Now almost of Mahyna Stras are
from Hybrid Sanskrit. Pli, Pakrit, Sanskrit, mix-Sanskrit are used in India.
In the period of Abhidharma, new books were written. They are called Abhidharma
books. Hundreds of books were compiled to explain the Stra Piaka. There are the
commentaries, and also the sub-commentaries.
As a reaction against the Abhidharma, there arose a new school called Sautrntika.
Sautrntika means those who consider the Stra Piaka to be the authority even
though they did not totally reject the Abhidharma.
After the Muslims invasion of India, all the Buddhist books were lost, only a few
books remain. Fortunately, most of the early Indian Buddhist books were translated
into Chinese.
The Schools of Abhidharma
The schools of Buddhist thoughts can again be divided into two main groups:
Hnayna and Mahyna.
Hnayna: Hnayna is a general term for the large number of Buddhist schools.
According to the traditional account there have been eighteen Buddhist schools.
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Modern researches have shown that there had been all thirty Buddhist schools which
came under the term Hnayna.
What is the meaning of Hnayna? Hna means low, inferior, base, despicable.
Translation of small vehicle was wrong. If we take it as small vehicle, it might be
termed as Clayna. Cla is contrasted with mah. Hnayna is coined by the
Mahayanist in order to despise the other schools.
About a 100 years that elapsed after the Buddhas parinirva, important
development took place within the Sangha the first major schism took place where
the Sangha was split into two groups, namely into Sthaviravda and Mahsaghika.
According to the accounts of the schism presented in the Sri Lankan chronicles, the
Dpavasa and Mahvasa, the version differs substantially from the Northern
sources, Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanacakra. The schism in both these two
lineages occurred during the 2nd century after the Buddha's parinibbna.
The Sthaviravda were later supposed to have split into 12 sub-groups as
follows1. Sthaviravda
2. Mahissaka (Mahsaka)
3. Vajjiputtaka (Vtsputriya)
4. Dhammuttanya (Dharmottarya)
5. Bhadraynika (Bhadraynya)
6. Chandgrika (aagarika)
7. Samitya (Sammatya)
8. Sabbatthavda (Sarvstivda)
9. Dhammaguttika (Dharmaguptaka)
10. Kassapiya (Kyapya)
11. Sakantika (Sakrntika)
12. Suttavda (Sautrntika)
The Mahsaghika also split into a number of groups generally held at 6.
These are as follows
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Mahsaghika
Gokuhka (Kaukuika)
Ekavyohrika
Bahussutaka
Paativda
Cetiyavda

Of these total 18 schools, a majority did not flourish but went into oblivion. Among
the Theravda schools, the Sthaviravda, Samitya, Sarvstivda and Sautrntika
became fairly prominent. It is seen that there were differences regarding doctrinal
matters among the sects. For examples, almost all the Theravada schools other than
the Sautrntika developed their own scholastic tradition interpreting the Buddhas
fundamental teachings giving rise to new ideas. There were much divergent views
regarding the interpretation of fundamental concepts such as the nature of existence,
rebirth, karma, perception, pudgalavda by Pudgalavdins or Samitya and the tritemporal existence of dharmas of the Sarvstivda.
As time pass by, many of these schools lost their vigor. The Sarvstivdins rose to
prominence under the patronage of King Kanishka. Infact, Sautrntika and
Sarvstivdins led to further development of Buddhist thoughts by providing the
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necessary background for the development of Madhymika which arose as a critique

of the Sarvstivdins doctrine of tri-temporal existence of all elements. The
Sautrntika theory of inferential perception provided the background for Yogcra
Idealism. However subsequently the major division of Buddhism boiled down to two
and this is the division between Hnayna /Theravda on one side and Mahyna on
the other.
What is main difference between Hnayna and Mahyna? One tend to look for the
origin of Mahyna among the Mahsaghika school as there are certain ideas
which suggest that they are the precursor of Mahyna Buddhism. In religious
matter, what the Mahayanist says there is only one salvation, that is, the attainment
of Buddhahood. And one who aspires to become a Buddha is a Boddhisatva which
came to be elevated as the spiritual goal. The Mahsaghika made a very sharp
distinction between the Arahant and the Buddha. They held that the Arahant could
fall, but also held the view that it is relatively easy to become an Arahant and the
attainment of Arahantship is not the final goal. This is the basic difference between
Hnayna and Mahyna.
What the Hnayna say is that you can attain enlightenment either by becoming a
Buddha, or Pacceka-Buddha or Arahant. And the emphasis is more on Arahant.
According to Mahyna, the attainment of Arahantship is an egocentric, and selfish
kind of liberation because you work out your own individual liberation. That is the
accusation. The attainment of Arahant is not selfish idea. It is by eliminating from
selfishness that you become an Arahant. Therefore, it's hard to believe that the idea
of Arahantship is a self-centered idea.
These are the two main basic groups: Hnayna and Mahyna coming under the
schools of Buddhism. From doctrinal the point of view we can classify all schools of
Buddhist thought in India into three groups: Hnayna, Madhyamaka and Yogcra.
Hnayna means the bhidharmikas, according to modern research there are thirty
schools, because all Hnayna schools commonly had their own Abhidharma. There
was only one school which rejected Abhidharma, and that is the Sautrntika.The
Sautrntika Nikya arose as a reaction against Abhidharma. The Sautrntika says
that the Abhidharma is not the word of the Buddha, not Buddhabhsita, but the word
of the disciples (rvakabhasita). Sautrntikas are so-called because they accept
only the authority of the Stra.
The Abhidharma is the later addition, and a later development. Generally speaking,
except for the Sautrntika, all of the Hnayna is an Abhidharmika, because every
Hnayna Nikya has its own Abhidharma. Then what is common to all Hnayna
schools is that they accept Dharmavda.
What is Dharmavda? Dharma means the ultimate factor of existence. You analyze
the individual and the world into the number of basic factors. These factors are called
dharma. In other words, dharma means phenomena. If they are mental, they are
called nama-dharma. If they are physical, they are called rpa-dharma.
According to Abhidharma, the whole sasric process can be explained in terms of
nama and rpa dharma. Everything in the universe can be explained with reference
to these two categories whether animate or inanimate, living creatures, organic or
un-organic, living or dead. Ultimately, anything can be analyzed into dharmas, that's
why it is called Dharmavda.
According to Abhidharma, the principal is the notion that all the phenomena of
existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities
behind the manifest phenomena. These elementary constituents, the building blocks
of experience are therefore called dharmas. The dharma theory is not merely one
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among others in the body of Abhidharma philosophy but the base upon which the
entire system rests. It would be quite fitting to call this theory the cornerstone of the
Abhidharma.
Dharmas are final factors, ultimate factors; that's why they are called Paramrtha. All
dharmas are paramrtha, they are real in an ultimate sense. Everything is made up
of dharmas, therefore everything can be reduced to dharmas.
Living being is only a concept, they don't have ultimately existence, when we call
man, woman, God, deva, they are all concepts, as they don't have any real
existence. What really exists is nothing other than dharmas. Things exist only by
their concepts. Things like man, animal, and so on exist only by their concept, not in
the ultimate sense, that is basic of Dharmavda.
This so-called Dharmavdins is common to all Sectarian/Hnayna schools. There
can be different version from the Dharmavda, but the basic idea is the same.
Dharmavda is common to all Abhidharma schools, therefore, we can say all the
Hnayna schools are Abhidharmikas, all the Abhidharmikas are Dharmavdas.
The dharma theory was not peculiar to any one school of Buddhism but penetrated
all early schools, stimulating the growth of their different versions of the Abhidharma.
The dharma theory was repeatedly enriched, first by Abhidharmika commentaries
and later by exegetical literatures. The Theravada version receives less attention.
The Srvastivda version of the theory, together with its critique by the Mdhyamika
had been critically studied by a number of modern scholars.
Mdhyamika arose as a critical responds to Abhidharma. In their view, the dharma
are not real nor ultimate. They are devoid of its own nature (svabhva). None of
these dharma have any essence, and in that sense, they are empty. Dharmas are
dependent on each other.
The last stage of Buddhist thoughts is the Yogcra. From the doctrinal point of view,
they can be described as Vijnavda. Everything can be reduced to mind is
Vijnavda. In the history of Buddhist thoughts, we can distinguish the three
different stages. The first stage is represented by Dharmavda, the Hnayna. The
second is yatvda, that is Mdyamika. The third is Vijnavda, and that is
Yogcra. These are three main stages in history of development of Buddhist
thought in India. But outside India, Buddhism developed further in China, Japan,
Korea, and Tibet.
Now, we have located the Abhidharma systematization in the history of the Buddhist
thought. In our study of Abhidharma, we do not follow the traditional method of study
of Abhidharma, because the traditional texts followed by Burma and Sri Lanka, it is
assumed that there are only one Abhidhamma.
Abhidharma tradition is popular in Burma and Sri Lanka. Actually the study of
Abhidharma is due to the Burmese influence in 19th century C.E. There are two
things which came from Burma: Abhidhamma and Bhvan [meditation].
Actually the Pli commentators were well aware of other Abhidhamma. Therefore, in
the Pli commentaries we find references to many other doctrines of Abhidharmas
which had been criticized and rejected. According to traditions, the Abhidharma is
the word of the Buddha, which again there is no historical evidence to prove that the
Abhidharma is the word of the Buddha. If we follow the academic approach we must
also understand that the Abhidharma is the result of gradual evolution in the history
of Buddhist thoughts.

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The beginning of the Abhidharma can be traced back to the discourses of Venerable
riputra, who was well known for having an analytic mind. Venerable riputra was
in the position to explain the implications of the Buddha's word, therefore, if we refer
to two of his Stra, Dasuttara and Sagti in Dgha Nikya, both delivered by
riputra, in these two Stra you find analytical method. It is said that Ven. riputra
led the way for the Abhidharma.
The question whether Abhidharma is the word of the Buddha or not is irrelevant from
religious point of view, why? Because as long as the Abhidharma follows the early
Buddhist doctrine, that is the word of the Buddha, there is no problem. Abhidharma
is the result of attempt on explanation of the word of the Buddha by the Buddha's
own disciples. It is commentary to the words of the Buddha. Abhidharma seems to
unfold the implication of the words of the Buddha. So from the religious point of view
that question does not arise.
There have been many Abhidharmas, but now we only have mainly two: Theravda
Abhidharma extant in Pli and Sarvstivda Abhidharma extant in Chinese.
Abhidharma Piaka on the Sarvstivdin remains in Chinese including the
commentary Abhidharma Mahvibha stra.
History of the Sarvstivda
Although it is difficult to speak of the exact date of the founding of the Sarvstivda
school, its presence, as well as that of its rival the Vibhajyavda lineage in the
time of Emperor Aoka is beyond doubt. Since Aokas reign is around 268232
C.E., this means that at least by the middle of the 3rd century C.E., it had already
developed into a distinct school. Vasumitras Samayabhedoparacanacakra, a
Sarvstivda treatise, places the schools establishment at the beginning of the 3rd
century after the Buddhas demise.
The Sthaviravda remained united for a certain period of time. At the beginning of
the 3rd century, there arose some disputes, and it split into two schools:
1. the Sarvstivda, also called Hetuvda (theory of causes);
2. the original Sthaviravda which [then] changed its name to the Haimavda (snowy
mountain).
Emperor Aokas ascendance to the throne is established as around 270 century
C.E. Accordingly, if we follow the Sarvstivda tradition itself which gives this date as
116 years (or a hundred odd years) after the Buddhas parinirva, the date given by
Samayabhedoparacanacakra for the establishment of Sarvstivda would be around
the first part of 2nd century C.E. This tallies with the date of Ktyniputra (ca. 150
C.E.) who is credited by tradition with the effective founding of the school. The
earliest inscriptional evidence, however, was the Mathur Lion Capital which dates
from the beginning of the 1st century C.E. This inscription mentions the giving of alms
and donation of monasteries by the wife of the mahksatrapa Rjuvula to the
Sarvstivda community. His son, Sodsa, is also recorded as having given lands to
two Sarvstivdin monks, Arya Buddhadeva and Bhiku Buddhila. It appears that the
Sarvstivda as well as its rival camp, the Vibhajyavda, at first maintained its
position as the orthodox Sthaviravda. At this initial stage, the term Sarvstivda
was perhaps not specifically insisted upon.
The Sarvstivda remained the most powerful and influential school in north-western
India from around the beginning of the Common Era to about the 7th century C.E.,
initially established in Mathur and expanding in the north where Kasmira became its
center of orthodoxy. With its highly developed abhidharma doctrines, it was the
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leading Abhidharma school capable of repudiating the emerging Mahyna

philosophy as well as the pro-Mahyna tenets upheld by other schools of Nikya
(i.e., non-Mahyna) Buddhism. Around the 6th or 7th century C.E., its leading
position seemed to have been eventually replaced by the Samitya which had a
well developed doctrine of karma.
By around the earlier part of the 2nd century C.E., the Sarvstivdins seemed to
have more or less determined what they considered to be distinctively orthodox
Sarvstivda doctrines in contradistinction to the other contemporary schools. This is
represented by the encyclopaedic compilation of the Abhidharma Mahvibha
stra, the Great Commentary by the Sarvstivda orthodoxy in Kasmira.
Subsequently, however, within the broad Sarvstivda lineage itself, there still
appeared to be disagreement concerning many of these doctrines.
Sarvstivda versus Vibhajyavda
In spite of various doctrinal disagreements some of considerable importance
the various subgroups within the Sarvstivda school were united in their central
tenet of Sarvstivda. It seems to have been a genuine belief on the part of the
Sarvstivda that sarvam asti was what the Buddha Himself had taught. It became
a problem philosophically only when they came to be questioned by their
opponents as to the exact implication of their doctrine of sarvstitva.
As noted above, even after they had eventually articulated this doctrinal position
sufficiently to be established as a distinct school, they seemed to have continued to
assume the position of the orthodox Sthaviravda.
The working out of the implication of this thesis was still visible even as late as the
time of Abhidharma-nyynusr. The whole confrontation came to be zeroed
in/focused on the dispute between Sarvstivda versus Vibhajyavda. We are
dealing here, in this context, with these two opposing theses and not with the issue
of identification of the two broad sectarian lineages. As for the identity of the
Vibhajyavdins in the Mahvibhs, Yin Shun has made an excellent investigation.
According to him:
The Vibhajyavdins in the Mahvibhs were the continental schools generally
referred to as the Vibhajyavda comprising the Mahsaka, the Dharmagupta, and
the Kyapya which prevailed in the Kasmira region, particularly with the
Mahsaka as the main stream.
In the Abhidharma-koabhsya, the main opponents of the Sarvstivdins, the
Sautrntikas, belonging to the Vibhajyavda camp, propose that the Sarvstivdin
way of understanding sarvstitva is not the only possible one. Indeed, they consider
it to be a bad interpretation of the notion. For the Sautrntikas, one could say all
exists only in the following manner: Past dharma-s have existed; future dharma-s
will come into existence; present dharma-s are existing. Alternatively, one could also
say all exists in the sense in which the stra expresses itself: Everything that is
within the range of perception within the 12 yatana-s (and nothing more) can
legitimately be said to exist.
In this work, the Sarvstivda is represented by Vasubandhu as defining their
position as follows:

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Those who hold all exists the past, the present and the future belong to the
Sarvstivda. Those, on the other hand, who hold that some exist, viz., the present
and the past karma that has not given fruit but not those that have given fruit or the
future, are followers of the Vibhajyavda.
In Saghabhadras Abhidharma-nyynusr, a post Abhidharma-koabhsya
polemic in defense of the Vaibhika orthodoxy, an additional requirement for the
definition is noticeable:
It is only those who believe in the real existence of the three periods of time, as
discussed above, as well as of the three kinds of the unconditioned, who can be
considered as belonging to the Sarvstivda.
This same requirement is also found in the Abhidharmadipa:
Sarvstivda is so called because it accepts [the reality of] the three periods of time,
distinguished on account of activity, and the three reals [ the three
unconditioned]
The additional requirement seems to confirm our suggestion that even as late as the
time of Abhidharma-nyynusr, the orthodox Sarvstivdins were still struggling to
define themselves. According to the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, most of the early
Buddhist sects had accepted the doctrine of sarvstitva, even though they seem to
have disputed endlessly on what it really meant for them in each case. It seems
possible that even as late as the time of the Abhidharma-koabhsya and
Abhidharma-nyynusr, there were still some Buddhists, both within and without
the broad Sarvstivda lineage including some sections of the SautrntikaDarstantika who would accept the doctrine in a revised or different version from
that adopted by the orthodox Vaibhikas. It is perhaps because of this that
Saghabhadra felt it necessary to dissociate the Vaibhikas distinctly from the
others whom he could not accept as real Sarvstivdins in any sense.
In Abhidharma-nyynusr, he names them as follows:
Pudgalavdins, called by him the Superimposers or Additionists (Samropavdins)
on account of their acceptance of the reality of the pudgala in addition to that of the
dharma-s in the three times; Vibhajyavdins who accept the existence of only the
present and the past karma that has not given fruit; Ksanikavdins who accept only
the reality of the 12 yatana-s of the present ksana; Prajaptivdins who deny the
reality of even the dharma-s of the present; Vainsikas who hold that all dharma-s
are without svabhva, like empty flowers.
Sautrntikas, here referred to as the Ksanikavdins, are singled out by
Saghabhadra who denies that they qualify as Sarvstivdins, for their view differs
from the Vainsikas by just a mere ksana.
Proof of the thesis of sarvstitva in the Vijna-kya stra, Mahvibha
stra and Abhidharma-koabhsya
Arguments in the Vijna-kya stra. The author establishes the thesis of tritemporal existence on the basis of four fundamental principles commonly and tacitly
assumed by the Abhidharmikas partly on the authority of the stra-s and partly
from among accepted abhidharma tenets:

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I.

Two thoughts cannot be conascent, and a thought or thought concomitant

cannot know itself. It is said in the stra that a person can observe the craving
in his mind, etc. When one is making the observation, the observing thought
and the craving (i.e., the thought having the craving) observed cannot be
simultaneous, nor can the present thought know itself. The craving observed
then must be either past or future. Hence past and future dharma-s must be
existent.

II.

Karma and its retribution (vipka) cannot be simultaneous; the fact that a
karma which has become past can give rise to its retribution later proves the
existence of the former as a past dharma, i.e., an existent in its past mode.

III.

The Buddha has taught that consciousness necessarily has an object

(lambana): since we can have consciousness of what is past and future, past
and future dharma-s must be existent.

IV.

One can be endowed with (samanvgata) dharma-s which do not arise

presently: It is taught in the stra that someone in nirodhasampatti wherein
no mental activity arises is still endowed with mental qualities such as
moderateness in wishes (alpecchat), shamefulness (lajj), etc.; likewise, a
trainee is still endowed with the five spiritual faculties faith, vigor, etc.
even when he has an enwrapped or defiled mind. Accordingly, those which
are not present but can still be possessed must be existing as past or future
dharma.

Arguments in the Mahvibha stra

The arguments for the tri-temporal existence of dharma-s are put forth to refute
those who are deluded with regard to the intrinsic nature of the three times (adhvan)
denying the past and the future, and holding that what exists in the present are
the unconditioned dharma-s.
The first argument employs the Sarvstivda notion of
(samanavgama), a notion that suggests some doctrinal development:

endowment

One is endowed with a dharma when one, having acquired it, continues to possess
it. When a dharma has not been acquired and one continues in the state of not
possessing it, there is the non-endowment of this dharma. For the Sarvstivda,
this human experience presupposes the existence of past and future dharma-s. The
other arguments employ systematic logical disputation coupled with an appeal to
scriptural authority.
a. If past and future are non-existent, there would not be endowment and nonendowment of these dharma-s, just as there is no endowment and nonendowment of a second head, a third hand, etc., which are non-existent. Since
there are in fact the endowment and non-endowment, it is known that past and
future are existent.
b. The person who denies the past and the future must say in which temporal period
the fruit of a present retribution-cause exists past, present or future. If he says
past, then the past exists; if he says future, then the future exists; if he says
present, then it amounts to the proposition that a retribution cause and its fruit
exist simultaneously, which contradicts scriptural statements.

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If he says Its fruit is not within the three periods of time, then he is proposing
that there is no fruit, since a retribution fruit is not unconditioned (asaskta). And
if there is no fruit, then there would be no cause either.
Likewise, if the retribution fruit exists in the present, then he must say in which
temporal period that corresponding cause occurs past, present or future. If he
says past, then the past exists; if he says future, then the future exists; if he
says present, then it amounts to the proposition that a retribution cause and its
fruit exist simultaneously, which contradicts scriptural statements. If he says Its
cause is not within the three periods of time, then he is proposing that there is no
cause, since a retribution cause is not unconditioned (asaskta). And if there is
no cause, then there would be no fruit either.
c. If the past and the future were non-existent, then there would not be the facts of
leaving home (pravrajy) and receiving higher ordination, in accordance with
the stanza below:
If one holds that the past does not exist, there would not be past Buddhas. If
there were no past Buddhas, there would not be Leaving Home and receiving
Higher Ordination.
d. If the past and the future were non-existent, then it must be that Sangha
members practice false speech while possessing proper knowledge, in
accordance with the stanza below:
If [a Sangha member] holds that the past is non-existent and yet speaks of his
[ordination] age, He would be increasing, day by day, [both] his proper knowledge
and false speech.
e. The non-existence of the past and future implies that the present likewise does
not exist, since the present is designated in relation to the past and future. The
three times not existing, the conditioned would not exist. The conditioned not
existing, the unconditioned too would not exist since the latter is established in
relation to the former. The conditioned and the unconditioned both not existing,
then there would not be any dharma whatsoever, which entails that there is no
liberation and nirva a serious false view!
Arguments in the Abhidharma-koabhsya
The argument put forth by the Sarvstivda in the Abhidharma-koabhsya, by way
of both scriptural authority (gama a. and b.) and logical reasoning (yukti c.
and d.), are essentially similar:
a. For, it has been said by the Buddha: O bhikhu-s, if past rpa did not exist, the
learned noble disciple could not have become disgusted with regard to the past
rpa. It is because past rpa exists that the learned noble disciple becomes
disgusted with regard to the past rpa.
If future rpa did not exist, the learned noble disciple could not have become free
from delight with regard to the future rpa. It is because future rpa exists that
b. It has been said by the Buddha, Conditioned by the two [ sense organ and the
object ], there is the arising of consciousness

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c. Consciousness arises when there is an object, not when there is no object. This
is a fixed principle. If past and future [dharma-s] were non-existent, there would
be a consciousness having a non-existent object. Hence, in the absence of an
object, consciousness itself would not exist.
d. If past [dharma-s] were non-existent, how could there be in the future the fruit of
pure or impure karma? For it is not the case that at the time of the arising of the
fruit a present retribution-cause exists!
Sautrntika critique of the epistemological argument
The logical argument for the two requisites for the arising of consciousness object
and sense faculty is in conformity with what the Vaibhikas cites in b. as the
scriptural authority. The Vaibhikas insists on these twofold requisites. Accordingly,
if past and future dharma-s are nonexistent, then mental consciousness of them
would not arise, since one of the requisites (object) is lacking. But this contradicts
experience: We do have cognition (buddhi) of them, which proves that they are real.
The Sautrntika does not accept that a buddhi must have a corresponding existent
object. For him, objects of cognition can be either existent or non-existent. But even
when an object is non-existent, the principle (niyama) of the two requisites is not
violated. Sthavira Srilata, a prominent Sautrntika leader in Samghabhadras time,
explains:
This follows in accordance with the principle of inferring from a succession of causes
and effects. How? It is after having grasped a present [object] that [the mind] can
swiftly infer to and fro: It can infer that such and such an effect is produced by a past
cause of such and such a kind. This cause in turn arose from such and such a
cause, and so on, correspondingly up to the remote [past]. It is completely from a
process of inference that one has the vivid perception [of a past object] as if it were
present. Or, [the mind] infers that such and such a kind of cause in the present
moment can produce such and such a kind of effect in the future. This effect in turn
will induce the arising of such and such an effect, [in this way] correspondingly up to
the remote [future]. Although at this stage the object does not exist, it does not mean
that the jna is without the two requisites This is because causes and conditions
exist in the particular series, at the time when a particular knowledge qua cause
(hetu-jna) arises. That is: In the past there arose such a jna; through a causal
transmission, a jna having such and such a form is produced in the present
moment. Since the present jna has the past jna as its cause, this present jna
arises with an understanding that is like the previous one, having the very past object
(visaya) as its present lambana.
However, that lambana does not exist now. Yet, although non-existent now, it
nevertheless serves as the lambana. Hence one cannot say such a cognition is
devoid of the two requisites. The Sautrntika explains that he does not in fact object
to the proposition of all exist (Sarvam asti), provided it is properly understood in
accordance with the stra statement:
O Brahmins, all exist means no more than the 12 yatanas.
Or rather, one should say: past is that which was existent; future is which, given its
cause, will exist past and future will exist in this sense, not in the sense that the
present dharma-s exist as real entities. This amounts to defining the characteristic of
the existent as having arisen and not yet ceased. Saghabhadra objects to such a
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notion which for him amounts to the priori assumption that the past and the future do
not exist. Their proposition is invalid, for what has arisen and not yet ceased is just
another name for the present.

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