Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951
FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Llorente and Yumul for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto M. L
uciano for respondent.

D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of
a violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal,
insisting upon purely legal points.
The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:
That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer, had bee
n placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations in th
e Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila. It
appears furthermore, from the testimony of Clerk of Court Baltazar and Fiscal D
e la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic violations, that the accuse
d had been permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases
against offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the Court for action, w
ithout passing through the regular clerk. On the day in question, Felix Rabia, t
he complainant herein, appeared and inquired from the accused about a subpoena t
hat he received. He was informed that it was in connection with a traffic violat
ion for which said Rabia had been detained and given traffic summons by an Ameri
can MP. The accused after a short conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and i
nformed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal having found
such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no
lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the party
concerned. This was done by the accused and after the signing by Felix Rabia th
e matter was submitted to the Court, which granted the petition for dismissal.
According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National Bureau of
Investigation, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a fine
of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same could be reduced because he had no
money, and that the accused informed Rabia that he could fix the case if Rabia
would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed. This charged was de
nied by the accused.
The pertinent portion of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in co
nnection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any of
fer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through th
e mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than the value to the penalty co
rresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an
act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he sha
ll suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph. . . .
As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of
the offense are: (1) the accused is a public officer within the scope of Article
203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused received by himself or thru
another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or
promises has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime or any
act not constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise
of the functions of the public officer.
There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning
of Article 203, which includes all persons who, by direct provision of law, popu
lar election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the perfo
rmance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in sai
d government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subo
rdinate official or any rank or class. That definition is quite comprehensive, em
bracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the
purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law
of public officers between officer and employee .
Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding him
as a public officer, expounded and discussed several grounds arranged under the
following hearings:
a. The doctrine of the temporary performance of public functions by a laborer shou
ld not apply in defendant s case.
b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance by wh
ich he may be considered a public official.
c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation and de
limitation of the functions of his appointment came from another source.
After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are unconvinc
ed. The law is clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny validity to the vi
ew entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court that, for the purposes of punishing
bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to constitu
te a person a public official. This opinion, it must be stated, was followed and
applied by the Court of Appeals because the accused, although originally assign
ed to the preparation of summons and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instanc
e to prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases.
And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it opine
d1 that a laborer in the Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer of money o
rders was a public officer within the meaning of Article 203 of the Revised Pena
l Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe money is just a
s pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanen
t officials.
The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of Appeals said
this petitioner received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed the money) in consi
deration of his fixing Rabia s case, and thereafter he fixed it by filing a motion for
dismissal, which was approved in due course.
In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated tha
t our pronouncements under the first sufficiently answer petitioner s propositions
 elaborated in several parts of his brief, revolving around the thesis that sinc
e he was a mere laborer by appointment he may not be convicted, because the prep
aration of motions for dismissal is not surely the official function of a labore
r. Enough to recall that although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this d
efendant was on several occasions designated or given the work to prepare motion
s for dismissal. He was consequently temporarily discharging such public functio
ns. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, monetary rewa
rd, he certainly guilty as charged.
Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of the C
ourt of Appeals is affirmed in toto. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., co
ncur.