Decision On The Mark Jiminez Case
Decision On The Mark Jiminez Case
Decision On The Mark Jiminez Case
respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be
issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002] temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine respondent in its Hold Departure List.[4]
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of
MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO,respondents.
the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.: The Facts
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
serve his full term in office. classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
protection. purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. [73]
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have
favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused- against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings
are multifarious.The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives
the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any
of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more
by law. reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering
it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been
power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow. Court with additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and Counter-
Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea
3. Not a Flight Risk? for bail.
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its
stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted,
the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is
process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for and strength in his legal reasoning.
Extradition.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring,
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has
at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this
after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our Extradition Law requires to
accordance with the guidelines in this Decision. be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits,
not a circuitous cop-out.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding basic
freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We believe that this charge is not only
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision
unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
-- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this potential extraditees.
Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already
stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest warrant,
but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the Summation
RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail,
both of which were separately filed by the parties.
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the
lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has 1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the
patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that
may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition heard. A subsequentopportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be
intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may nature of extradition.
proceed therein.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the
reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise
is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of the way, lest
person would escape again if given the opportunity.
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably
Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the and international cooperation.
affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons 10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a)
there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May
23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in
the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The
bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of
principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate
speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United
each case.
States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
SO ORDERED.
fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. with Justices Melo and Santiago writing separate Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., joins in the concurring opinion of 17, 2000).
Justice Carpio. [10]
Annex E of the Petition.
Bellosillo, J., see Separate Opinion.
Puno, J., see Separate Opinion. [11]
Annex M of the Petition.
Vitug, J., see Dissenting Opinion. [12]
Quisumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of Justice Puno. Annex O (certified true xerox copy) of the Petition.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see Dissenting Opinion. [13]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 3, 2002, upon receipt by
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., join in the Separate Opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago. this Court of respondents Counter-Manifestation. Earlier, on September 3, 2001, this
Carpio, J., see concurring Opinion. Court received petitioners Memorandum signed by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez and State Counsel Claro B. Flores. Filed on August 23, 2001 was private
respondents Memorandum signed by Attys. Mario Luza Bautista, Nick Emmanuel C.
Villaluz and Brigette M. da Costa of Poblador Bautista and Reyes.
[1]
Rollo, p. 74. [14]
Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[2]
Id., pp. 122-125. [15]
During the Oral Argument on August 14, 2001, the Court asked the parties to
[3]
Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan. discuss three issues: 1) the propriety of the filing of the Petition in this case before this
Court; 2) whether Mr. Mark Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before the
[4]
Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125. issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and 3) whether the procedure followed by
[5] respondent judge in issuing the warrant of arrest and granting bail was correct.
322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000.
[16]
[6] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on
November 29, 1995. [17]
Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
[7] Department of Justice v. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, and Nelson
In Civil Case No. 99-94684.
Marquez, CA-GR SP No. 61079, promulgated on May 7, 2001.
[8]
The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned by Justice [18]
Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 4-5.
Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, [19]
Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 215, 219,
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Sabino R. de Leon Jr. Dissenting were Chief Justice January 30, 1982; citing Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 April 11, 1972.
Hilario Davide Jr.; and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, [20]
Artemio V. Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637,
and Panganiban writing separate Dissents. January 22, 1999.
[21]
[9]
Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide; and Justices Malonzo v. Zamora, GR No. 137718, July 27, 1999, citing cases.
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes and De Leon [22]
289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998, per Martinez, J.
Jr. Dissenting were Justices Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Buena and Santiago,
[23]
190 SCRA 31, 38, September 24, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
[24] [39]
Philippine National Bank v. Sayo Jr, 292 SCRA 202, 232, July 9, 1999, per Id., p. 545.
Davide, CJ, citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, April 18, 1999; Defensor- [40]
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, January 27, 1993; Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA In line with the Philippine policy of cooperation and amity with all nations set forth
in Article II, Section 2, Constitution.
130, September 1, 1994. See also Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, 347 SCRA 128, December 6, 2000; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora , [41]
The United States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada: In the
GR No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001. Matter of the Extradition of Charlie Atong Ang, a fugitive from the country of the
[25]
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 37, citing Macondray & Co. v. Philippines, [the court] has denied Mr. Angs motion for bail, per petitioners
Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446, July 16, 1937; Roldan v. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12, October 18,
1939; Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, September 21, 1931; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. [42]
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162, September 30, 1976; People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. [43]
126, November 29, 1922; Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, February 28, Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23, 1903.
1957; Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364, January 31, 1956. [44]
See footnote no. 41, Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; Rollo p. 19; Manifestation dated
[26]
Last Whereas clause of PD 1069. June 5, 2002.
[45]
[27]
See Whereas clause of PD 1069 and preamble of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Persily, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J. Intl L. 407
(Summer, 1998).
[28]
Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p.68. [46]
Ibid.
[29]
In Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court defined fugitive [47]
from justice as one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment or who, after being 39 CJS 875, citing People v. Blair, 33 NYS 2d 183, 190, 191; Amerada Petroleum
charged, flees to avoid prosecution. Corporation v. Hester, 109 P. 2d 820, 821, 188 Okl. 394.
[48]
[30]
Bassiouni, supra, p. 21. Id.; citing Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 S.W. 2d 767, 165 Tenn. 447.
[49]
[31]
Id., p. 67. Petition for Extradition, pp. 2-3; Rollo pp. 49-50.
[50]
[32]
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., pp. 19-20. Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 3; Rollo, 124.
[51]
[33]
Supra, p. 392, October 17, 2000, per Puno, J. In the questioned July 3, 2001 Order (p. 4; Rollo, p. 125), respondent judge
admitted that the Annexes of the Petition for Extradition had been received by the
[34]
Coquia, On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty, The Lawyers Review, court a quo on May 25, 2001; yet, in its Order dated May 23, 2001 (Rollo, p. 74), it
August 31, 2000, p. 4. already set for hearing the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
[35]
See Bassiouni, supra, p. 546; citing 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910). [52]
See 9, PD 1069.
[36]
Supra. [53]
Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, p. 87; citing 1 L.
[37]
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra. Oppenheim, International Law, (8th ed., 1955), pp. 952-53.
[54]
[38] 280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997.
Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157.
[55] [66]
Id., p. 381, per Panganiban, J. Coquia, On the Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty, supra; citing Kelso
[56] v. US Department of State, 13 F Supp. 291 [DDC 1998].
247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.
[67]
[57] It states: If the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the Requesting
IbId.; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994. State, the Requested State may surrender the person as expeditiously as possible
[58]
Prima facie finding, not probable cause, is the more precise terminology because without further proceedings.
an extradition case is not a criminal proceeding in which the latter phrase is [68]
1, Art. VIII, Constitution.
commonly used.
[69]
[59] 5, Art. VIII, Constitution.
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted
[70]
to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98.
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial [71]
Private respondent argues that the following cases -- In re Michell, 171 F. Rep.
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not 289, June 30, 1909; United States v. Kirby, Brennan and Artt, 106 F. 3d. 855,
February 27, 1997 and 158 F. 3d. 462, October 9, 1998. Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 460 F.
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Supp. 915, March 14, 1977; and 554 F. 2d 1, April 6, 1977 -- should be treated as
[60]
De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per examples of special circumstances. In our view, however, they are not applicable to
Fernando, J. (later CJ). this case due to factual differences. Hence we refrain from ruling on this argument of
[61] Jimenez.
18, Art. VII, Constitution.
[72]
[62] 324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J.
Paretti v. United States of America, 122 F. 3d. 758, May 6, 1997.-
[73]
[63] Id., pp. 700-702.
Garcia v. NLRC, GR No. 110494, November 18, 1996; Paat v. Court of Appeals,
[74]
January 10, 1997. The US request for extradition was dated June 16, 1999; and yet, to date, more
[64] than three years later, the Petition for Extradition is still languishing in the trial court.
See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 536, March 20,
1993.
[65]
Ibid. See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473, March 11, 1999.