Process Safety - Recommended Practice On Key Performance Indicators
Process Safety - Recommended Practice On Key Performance Indicators
Process Safety - Recommended Practice On Key Performance Indicators
Process Safety
Recommended Practice on Key Performance Indicators
Report No. 456
November 2011
Table of Contents
In addition to the Appendices above, a supplement to this report is available which lists over sixty examples
of Process Safety Events (PSE) and will be updated with new examples from companies. It can be down-
loaded from the publications section of the OGP website (http://www.ogp.org.uk)
Disclaimer
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither the OGP
nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume
liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use
is at the recipients own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer.
The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms.
Copyright notice
The contents of these pages are The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. Permission is given to reproduce
this report in whole or in part provided (i) that the copyright of OGP and (ii) the source are acknowledged. All other rights
are reserved. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the OGP.
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Disputes arising here from shall be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
1 The need for
process safety KPIs
Definition
Across the global oil & gas industry, this reason, this document is focused Process safety is a disciplined
framework for managing the
considerable effort has been focused on KPIs to prevent such releases;
integrity of operating systems and
on the prevention of major incidents. however, much of the guidance can processes handling hazardous
The International Association of Oil & be applied to other aspects of process substances. It is acheived by
Gas Producers (OGP) has previously safety and asset integrity. applying good design principles,
published Asset Integrity the key to In response to a number of major engineering, and operating and
managing major incident risks (OGP incidents such as the disasters in maintenance practices. It deals
Report No. 415, December 20081) with the prevention and control of
2005 at the US Texas City Refinery
which provides advice on how to events that have the potential to
and the UK Buncefield oil terminal, release hazardous materials and
implement an asset integrity manage- the downstream oil industry has been energy. Such incidents can result in
ment system for new and existing developing improved process safety toxic exposures, fires or explosions,
upstream assets. It also includes KPIs. Recommendations provided by and could ultimately result in serious
preliminary guidance on monitoring organisations such as the UK Health incidents including fatalities, injuries,
and review, including how to establish & Safety Executive (UK HSE)2, the property damage, lost production or
lagging and leading Key Performance US Chemical Safety and Hazard environmental damage.
Indicators (KPIs) to strengthen risk Investigation Board (US CSB)3 and the
controls (barriers) in order to prevent
Asset integrity
Independent Baker Panel4 reinforced
major incidents. This report is intended Asset integrity is related to the
the pressing need for improved KPIs. prevention of major incidents. It is an
as a companion document to Asset This resulted in significant efforts by outcome of good design, construction
Integrity the key to managing major the American Petroleum Industry (API), and operating practice. It is achieved
incident risks and describes the practi- the Center for Chemical Process Safety when facilities are structurally and
cal implementation of a KPI system. (CCPS)5 and others to develop and mechanically sound and perform the
The terms process safety and asset publish guidance on KPIs for compa- processes and produce the products
for which they were designed.
integrity are both used throughout nies to manage process plant risks and
The emphasis in this guide is on
the petroleum industry, often syn- prevent unintended loss of hazardous
preventing unplanned hydrocarbon
onymously. From the definitions given materials. To ensure the upstream and other hazardous releases that may
here, there are small differences in industry benefits from these efforts, this either directly or via escalation
scope as asset integrity can include all OGP guidance builds a framework result in a major incident. Structural
structures in facilities and is not limited and definitions based on a recent failures may also be initiating causes
to processes handling hazardous sub- ANSI/API standard on Process Safety that escalate to become a major
stances. However, it is clear that for Performance Indicators for the Refining incident.
the oil & gas industry the emphasis and Petrochemical Industries (Recom- Major incident
of process safety and asset integrity is mended Practice RP 754)6 as well as
An incident that has resulted in
to prevent unplanned releases which guidelines on metrics published by UK multiple fatalities and/or serious
could result in a major incident. For HSE7, CCPS8,9, and OECD10. damage, possibly beyond the asset
itself. Typically initiated by a
hazardous release, but may also result
from major structural failure or loss of
stability that has caused serious
damage to an asset (note this is
intended to incorporate terms such as
Major Accident as defined by UK
HSE11).
OGP 1
1.2 Leading & lagging KPIs
Major incidents rarely result from a cheese are management system model below represents the failure of
single cause but rather by multiple procedures, physical engineered several prevention barriers resulting
failures that coincide and collectively containment or other layers of protec- in an LOPC event. In our industry there
result in an exceptional event with tion designed to prevent incidents. are sophisticated controls to detect an
severe consequences. This relationship In this guidance we are primarily LOPC event and mitigate its conse-
between sequential failures of multiple interested in Loss of Primary Contain- quences but holes in these escalation
risk control systems is illustrated ment (LOPC) of hazardous material, barriers can also align and serious
in Figure 1 using the Swiss cheese which is the predominant cause of harm can result from a fire, explosion
model (after James Reason, 199012 major process safety incidents in our or other destructive incident.
and 199713). The same principles industry. Barriers can have weak-
underpin other similar approaches nesses, depicted as holes in the Swiss
such as the bow tie model or layers cheese. The alignment of holes in the
of protection analysis (LOPA).
Hazards are contained by multiple
protective barriers or risk control
systems. The barriers represented
here by individual slices of Swiss
ie rs Hydrocarbons or
v e ntio
Pre
ie rs
b arr Leading indicators
a tion maintain barrier strength, i.e. activities
LOPC event
Lagging indicators
measure barrier defects (holes),
events and consequences
Major incident
or other consequence
2 OGP
This model can also be used to Due to the emotional and reputational
distinguish two important types of KPI. impact of incidents that harm people
Recording the number of LOPC events or the environment, companies previ-
or actual consequences where one ously focused most of their attention on
or more barriers fail simultaneously lagging KPIs by recording workforce
is a lagging indicator. The term injuries or spills to the environment.
lagging indicator may also be used to This reactive mode of monitoring and
measure the number and size of holes review is important. However, a strat-
in the barriers to assess the extent egy of waiting for incidents to happen
of weaknesses, defects or failures then learning lessons afterwards is
in the risk control system. Whereas insufficient when aiming to eliminate
monitoring the strength of the barrier major incidents. In contrast, the combi-
by measuring the companys nation of leading and lagging KPIs to
performance in maintaining robust risk assess barrier strengths and weak-
controls is a leading indicator. nesses provides the opportunity to be
In this guidance, lagging indica- pro-active, i.e. more predictive and Near-miss events
tors are generally retrospective and focused on prevention. The pro-active a KPI gift!
outcome based whereas leading approach should include KPIs that
A good example of a KPI which is both leading and
indicators are usually forward-looking assess hard technical barriers such lagging is the reporting of near miss events. Near
and input based. In principle, most as engineering design or maintenance misses include those events with consequences that do
LOPC events will have no actual and inspection as well as soft barri- not meet the companys criteria for recordable incidents
consequences but are still failures ers such as training and competence such as a spill of less than one barrel. Near misses also
or safety culture and behaviour. provide simple observations of an unsafe condition with
and therefore lagging outcomes, but
no consequences. These are recognised as events which
low consequence LOPC events also For each critical barrier, the UK had the potential in other slightly different
provide leading information when HSE recommends a dual assurance circumstances to result in consequences that would
predicting the likelihood of major approach in their guide on develop- have been recordable, particularly high potential
incidents with serious consequences. ing process safety indicators7. This events where a major incident would have been a
Thus the terms leading and lagging approach uses a combination of realistic worst case scenario. Therefore, near miss
are generally useful but companies one leading input KPI to test barrier events provide leading information on the likelihood of
need to be aware that some indica- strength and correlate with one actual incidents and also provide lagging information
on barrier weaknesses. Near miss investigations can
tors can provide both retrospective lagging output KPI to track any
contribute significantly to continuous improvement of
and forward-looking insights. A good defects in the barrier. In this report, asset integrity and process safety, whether used to
example of a type of indicator that we provide guidance on use of both identify barrier weaknesses or as a warning of a
can be either leading or lagging is a lagging and leading KPIs, including potential catastrophe.
near miss. use of dual assurance.
OGP 3
2 Establishing
corporate and
facility KPIs
Tier 1
ing
indi
LOPC events of
c
ato
greater consequence
rs
Tier 2
LOPC events of
Lea
lesser consequence
ding
indi
Tier 3
atoc
rs
Tier 4
Operating discipline & management system performance indicators
4 OGP
The four tiers are expressed as a dent triangle shown in Figure 3, based
triangle to emphasise that statistically on insurance claim work in 1931 by H The continuous improvement
larger data sets are available from the W Heinrich14, and refined in 1969 for cycle
KPIs at the lower tiers. This approach safety by Bird & Germain15. The concept of continuous
mirrors the now-familiar personal acci- improvement, whether at corporate,
business or facility level, is a
fundamental process for any structured
Figure 3: Occupational safety HSE-MS, which provides the
indicator pyramid framework to address Process Safety
(PS). There are many versions of the
continuous improvement process
including the Plan-Do-Check- Act
Fatalities cycle, as applied within ISO guides
and standards. The cycle illustrated
here places emphasis on improving the
management system (including legal
Recordable injuries compliance, company standards and
local procedures) by addressing
process safety risks through planned
controls which are implemented within
First aid incidents and near misses day-to-day operations. KPIs,
particularly the more leading Tier 3
and 4 indicators, underpin the three
steps to monitor operational
Management system failings/audit findings performance, enable internal and
external reporting and then finally
review outcomes to determine how to
revise the management system and
embed the continuous improvement.
Such a cycle can benefit both local
Tiers 1 and 2 are more lagging and Tiers 3 and 4 provide more leading and corporate management through
cover asset integrity major and less measures. The indicators are intended use of leading indicators focused on
severe incidents. For consistency with to be much more specific to a com- barriers and lagging indicators
API RP 754 definitions, an incident is panys own management system and focused on operational performance.
referred to as a Process Safety Event often will be specific to a particular HSEMS
(PSE). The Tier 1 and 2 indicators are activity (e.g. drilling) or to an indi- Reviews
fully defined with the intent that these vidual asset, facility or plant. While PS risks
with upstream specific guidance is pro- challenging, OGP will not benchmark
The continuous improvement cycle links
vided in Section 3. OGP has adopted such data initially but will encourage
three OGP guidance reports. Report
PSE at these two tiers to enable bench- sharing of company experience and
No. 210 relates to development of HSE
marking. Companies may decide to good practice using these two tiers. management systems16, the starting
collect event data beyond the scope Further information and guidance on point for the cycle. Report No. 415
or thresholds defined but should report Tiers 3 and 4 with upstream specific describes how the HSE-MS addresses
any such data separately from their examples is provided in Section 4. asset integrity risks, barriers and
aggregate corporate reporting of PSEs procedures for E&P operations1. This
to OGP (see Section 3.6). report continues the cycle by providing
guidance on KPIs, their reporting and
review.
OGP 5
2.3 Corporate versus facility KPIs
Asset integrity KPIs are established data against industry averages to communicate and engage
by companies to meet three primary and by sharing lessons learned with their stakeholders, but one
needs: with other companies. In section important channel is through
1. Internal monitoring and review 3.6 we outline steps being taken regular, typically annual,
of performance related to the by OGP to promote benchmark- reports often called sustain-
management system and other ing and learning based on the ability or corporate citizenship
actions to strengthen process KPIs in this guide. reports. Through the recent
safety barriers and reduce 3. Provide transparent disclosure revision of the publication
incidents. KPIs are fundamental of performance to stakehold- Voluntary Sustainability Report-
to continuous improvement, as ers such as employees, local ing Guidance for the Oil &
illustrated on the previous page. communities, investors, govern- Gas Industry, IPIECA together
2. Assess whether the measured mental and non-governmental with API and OGP have jointly
performance on process safety organisations, and the general endorsed the process safety KPI
meets or exceeds industry public. There are many framework for both upstream
norms by benchmarking KPI opportunities for companies and downstream reporting17.
Process safety KPIs to meet the three performance, although some may be address specific but critical safety risks
needs above will vary across a com- consolidated at corporate level to test for groups of operations with similar
panys organisation from an individual management system controls imple- activities, equipment and environments
facility up to the corporate level. At mented across the whole company. can be analysed. Typically this would
the corporate level, data and other Care must be taken to avoid over- mean that different additional KPIs are
information should be selected care- whelming operations with corporate employed for activities such as produc-
fully to be representative of the whole KPIs and then relying solely on tion, drilling or pipeline operations,
organisation when compiled and these KPIs because measures may either offshore or onshore. Further, at
consolidated to generate meaningful be overlooked for important control the facility level, KPIs can be focused
KPIs. The Tier 1 and 2 KPIs are recom- barriers that are critical to local on more leading KPIs within Tiers 3
mended here for consolidation at operations. Thus, as illustrated by and 4 to locally assess specifically
company level for corporate reporting Figure 4, it is important that additional designed technical barriers such as
against all three needs listed above. In data is collected at lower levels of the alarm systems, procedural barriers
contrast, Tier 3 and 4 KPIs are more organisation so that performance to such as start-ups, or people barriers
appropriate for monitoring facility such as competence assessment.
6 OGP
2.4 Identifying critical barriers and selecting KPIs
Selecting effective indicators is a Figure 5: six step approach for selection and review of KPIs
challenge, particularly leading Tier 3
and 4 KPIs which aim to pro-actively
improve process safety at the facility Step 1
level. This requires companies and Ensure management ownership and establish implementation team
their facilities to develop knowledge
and understanding of the most critical
risk control barriers, whether the
barriers are facility-specific or apply Step 2
to groups of similar facilities or even Establish industry Tier 1 and Tier 2 KPIs to assess company performance
apply across the whole company.
An approach to identifying appropri-
ate barriers and selecting indicators
has been provided by the UK HSE in
Step 3
Confirm critical process and integrity barriers to prevent major incidents
a guide on developing process safety
indicators7 and further developed in a
CCPS book on process safety metrics9.
Based on these, a 6-step approach is
Step 4
recommended, as shown in Figure 5
Select Tier 3 and Tier 4 KPIs to monitor critical barriers at facilities
and detailed overleaf.
Step 5
Collect quality data, analyse performance and use to set improvement actions
Step 6
Regularly review critical barriers, actions, performance and KPI effectiveness
OGP 7
Ensure management Establish industry Tier 1 and Confirm critical process and
ownership and establish Tier 2 KPIs to assess company integrity barriers to prevent
implementation team performance major incidents
Ownership of the KPIs by senior KPIs need to be selected which are It is important to determine and annu-
management is essential to ensure relevant to the operations of the ally confirm the risk control barriers
that the data is reviewed at a level company and reflect its performance which are critical for prevention of
where continuous improvement actions in managing major incident risks. major incidents and to ensure that KPIs
can be agreed and actioned, includ- The recommended Tier 1 and 2 PSE are in place to measure the effective-
ing investment, prioritisation and lagging KPIs in Section 3 provide ness of these barriers. At facility or
resource deployment decisions. KPIs consistent measures that provide base- corporate level, there are three types
that do not result in actions to improve line data on industry and company of inputs which can be used together
performance are not just a waste of performance, and facilitate trend to help identify weak or critical bar-
effort, but can mask true performance. analysis and benchmarking. Depend- riers. These inputs are illustrated in
Therefore a first step is to establish ing on the nature of operational risks, Figure 5 and discussed below.
a team typically bringing together companies may choose to build on Pro-active input relies upon
operational and safety expertise with and supplement the recommended identification of hazards and
management at facility, business and KPIs by separately collecting addi- risks which could lead to a
corporate levels, as appropriate. tional data, for example on structural major incident. Information can
The KPI implementation team needs integrity failures which do not involve be drawn from recent Process
to have clear lines of accountability an LOPC. In general, while Tier 1 and Hazard Analysis (PHA) and other
within the companys management 2 PSEs provide baseline performance risk assessments related to asset
structure and should coordinate the information, the number of events integrity/process safety, which
implementation of the next five steps recorded is unlikely to be statistically will include the barriers identified
as an integral part of managements sufficient or specific enough to assess to manage the risks. Pro-active
safety review cycle. barrier strength and drive continuous input confirms which barriers
improvement, and this is a key reason are in place to control the most
for implementing Tier 3 KPIs. Typically, important process safety risks and
Tier 1 and 2 PSEs are established with the management system elements
the standardised definitions within to maintain and improve those
and across companies. These two barriers.
KPIs should be retained year-on-year Reactive input is based upon root
to provide a consistent record of a cause investigation of major inci-
companys performance. dents and high potential events or
demands on safety systems that
Figure 6: Inputs to identify critical barriers could, in other circum-
iv e stances, have resulted in
r o act itigate an actual incident. The
P m d
o l s to ds an ) review of root causes
r A
ont zar PH
l t i f y c d ha ZOP, should be mapped
er na ing
, n
Ide entifi g. HA
e
against both hard
Ext l e arn KPIs
de riers, e
id (e.
risk
s
-wi
technical and soft manage-
s tr y ol bar ractic
u
Ind contr od p ment system barriers to identify
o
risk and g those that are most critical to
future incident prevention based
r d on past incidents, or to identify
za
Ha the need for new barriers where
gaps exist. Such a review can
also be supported by evidence
from process safety, asset integrity
and occupational safety audit
e ed findings. At a more detailed level,
ctiv ntifi nts
Rea s ide ncide s reactive input identifies the holes
r i
rrie grity even
t ce
ba
ak t inte entia
l u en in barriers.
e
W asse pot
n seq External input takes account of
m
fro d hig
h
Co experience and best practice risk
an
control systems shared in the oil
& gas or other industries, often as
a result of past major incidents.
Learning from others can highlight
critical barriers and often suggests
KPIs which can be considered in
Step 4.
8 OGP
Select Tier 3 and Tier 4 KPIs Collect quality data, analyse Regularly review critical
to monitor weaknesses in performance and set barriers, actions, performance
critical barriers at facilities improvement actions and KPI effectiveness
Companies should select and imple- It is essential that the effort to collect It is important to confirm that process
ment appropriate Tier 3 and Tier 4 and analyse KPI data is not just safety KPIs remain focused on the
KPIs which will generate statistically about counting the score but rather most important barriers to prevent
relevant performance data that is it becomes an integral part of the major incidents. While some KPIs,
specific to the critical barriers identi- continuous improvement cycle within particularly the Tier 1 and 2 measures,
fied in Step 2. Because they need to the HSE-MS. In order to have confi- are intended to be implemented and
reflect different operational activities dence in the analysis it is valuable to established for long-term review of
and management systems of the facili- establish quality assurance processes performance, other KPIs may be used
ties, there is a very wide choice of Tier to verify the accuracy, consistency for a few years and then evolve to
3 and 4 KPIs. In Section 4, example and completeness of the collected provide more detailed information
KPIs are provided which may provide data. Trending, correlations and other on barrier strength. It is therefore
useful starting points but companies statistical analysis should then be per- recommended that the implementation
will usually need to tailor and evolve formed which takes into account the team revisit Steps 3 and 4 to ensure
their Tier 3 and Tier 4 measures as quality as well as the inherent repro- that process safety barriers and Tier
some barriers are strengthened and ducibility of the KPI. The performance 3 and 4 KPIs are regularly reviewed,
other weaknesses are identified. data, highlighting meaningful change, typically annually, as part of manage-
should be transparently communicated ments review of safety actions and
to management for review resulting in performance. KPIs should be removed
improvement actions as input to the or replaced if they do not provide
continuous improvement cycle (see information that enables performance
Section 2.3). improvement or if they monitor a
barrier which is no longer critical to
address.
For example, a facility may choose to
establish a leading Tier 4 KPI to record
the number of scheduled inspection
and maintenance tasks which are
overdue. Over 2-3 years the indica-
tor may show that performance has
improved and is satisfactory. However,
Step 3 may confirm that the inspection
and maintenance remains a critical
barrier. In this example, the facility
may then decide to improve the effec-
tiveness of its leading KPI by collecting
statistical data on the number and
categories of safety critical findings
from the already tracked inspection
and maintenance tasks. Using the
dual assurance approach, the data
could then be correlated annually with
data on PSEs or other events related
to inspection and maintenance with
the aim of identifying priorities for
improvement of the barrier.
OGP 9
2.5 Data collection, communication and review
The aim of asset integrity KPIs is to
help prevent major incidents that
are generally the result of multiple,
simultaneous barrier failures. As such
incidents do not occur very frequently,
it can take a very long time to gather
statistically relevant data on major
incidents alone. Therefore, systems
need to be implemented for consistent
collection and analysis of data and
related information on more than just
major incidents. Companies should
Clarify the scope of the KPI. The
consider the following for each KPI:
scope should clarify which activi-
Engage all parties who will be ties are included for reporting.
involved in the data collection Communicating the data is important.
In Section 3, further information
and review process to ensure that If the data is communicated well it
is provided on the E&P activities
there is common understanding of will quickly highlight relevant trends
included for Tier 1 and Tier 2
the importance and value of the and changes to promote management
reporting. Companies may decide
data, and commitment to regularly review and action. If communicated
to widen the scope of a KPI, but
submitting a complete set of data badly, the presentation of the data
should ensure that the data system
which has been checked for may mask performance information
can separate out information
accuracy. and or even misdirect management
which is beyond the guidance
attention. Regular reporting typically
Establish a clear boundary for in Section 3 in order to preserve
includes a combination of graphical
the facility, business or company consistency for benchmarking
output to show trends, tabulated data
which lists all discrete assets purposes.
and interpretative text . The concept of
which will collect data. IPIECA has
a dashboard can be effective, espe-
provided guidance on developing
cially when automatically populated
a reporting boundary, and recom-
from an electronic database or plant
mends applying the operational
control system. Typically a dashboard
approach for collection of Tier
combines and highlights asset integrity
1 and 2 data. This approach
together with related operational data
is based on collecting data
to quickly show change using traffic
from reporting units which are
lights, dials, or other icons. For larger
assets operated by the company
organisations, it will be appropriate to
(irrespective of the companys
communicate the data to various levels
ownership in the company or joint
of management by consolidating data
venture). Companies should clarify
in different views and degrees of
whether any assets operated by
detail. Figure 7 illustrates how different
a contractor on the companys Ensure that the definition of the dashboards may be stacked in a
behalf are to be included. KPI is clearly understood and is data system to serve the various needs
not ambiguous. For a new KPI, of an organisation.
a period of pilot testing may be
necessary. There will always be
cases where there is debate about
inclusion of data and therefore a
mechanism should exist to provide
additional guidance, when
required. The set of examples
included as a supplement to this
report20 provide a useful reference
on determining whether an event
should be reported based on the
definitions in Section 3.
10 OGP
Having communicated the process Examples of other inputs can include: Safety culture surveys or behav-
safety KPI data in a timely manner to High-level management system iour based safety findings
the right audience, the most important or specific process safety audit Benchmarking data from OGP or
final step is to put the data to work findings other associations
and strengthen the risk control barriers Summary of investigation out- Shared good practices from peer
in the management system. For this to comes and implementation of companies
be part of the continuous improvement lessons learned from Tier 1 and 2
cycle, regular review of the data is Proposals for new or modified or
incidents, or high potential events eliminated KPIs
required, typically with a full annual
review and several interim progress Responses to major incidents
While not all of these inputs may be
reviews. While the review can focus elsewhere in the industry
relevant, it is nevertheless important to
on asset integrity performance, it is Overview of plant reliability and use such sources of existing data and
good practice in the annual review to correlation with process safety information to support interpretation
broaden the range of inputs so that the KPIs and decisions based on the process
KPIs are not reviewed in isolation. Changes to staffing levels, safety safety KPIs. The annual review should
critical competencies, training, also link to the other data needs of the
demographics company which will normally include
Impact of major start-ups/shut- external/public reporting to stakehold-
downs, new developments or ers or regulators and also submission
acquisitions of data to enable benchmarking
against industry performance norms or
Regulatory compliance perfor-
comparison with peers.
mance or changes
Corporate
Business unit
Facility
Shift
OGP 11
3 Tier 1 and Tier 2
Note: Non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot water, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air) have no
threshold quantities and are only included in this definition as a result of their potential to result in one of the other consequences.
12 OGP
3.2 Consequence levels and material release thresholds
To determine whether an LOPC event recognise that at least one barrier has
Primary containment
Definition
is a recordable PSE at the Tier 1 or failed, there was potential for serious
Tier 2 level it is necessary to collect consequences and that there is an A tank, vessel, pipe, truck, rail
and analyse data on the conse- opportunity to learn. For this reason, car, or other equipment designed
to keep a material within it,
quences of the unintended release, as an LOPC event is also recordable if the
typically for purposes of storage,
detailed in Table 1. If the LOPC causes material is hazardous and the amount separation, processing or transfer
actual harm or damage a fatality released is significant in terms of of gases or liquids. The terms
or injury, or a fire or explosion then potential consequences. To determine vessel and pipe are taken to
the level of consequence is relatively whether the LOPC is a recordable PSE include containment of reservoir
straightforward to determine. In the at either Tier 1 or 2 level, tables of fluids within the casing and
case of fatality or injury, the severity release thresholds for different catego- wellhead valving to the surface.
criteria are aligned with standard ries of material are included in RP 754
Loss of Primary Containment
industry practice for reporting occupa- and summarised in Appendix B.
tional safety performance in the E&P
(LOPC)
A release from a Pressure Relief Device
industry, including the annual data An unplanned or uncontrolled release
(including a flare) is not considered of any material from primary
submission to OGP. Most companies a recordable PSE unless the amount containment, including non-toxic and
also internally capture data on fire of release exceeds a Tier 1 or Tier 2 non-flammable materials (e.g. steam,
and explosion damage. While the threshold and the release also results hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed
direct cost thresholds of $25,000 for in one of four actual consequences CO2 or compressed air)
Tier 1 and $2,500 for Tier 2 in Table listed in Table 1. Of these, liquid For drilling operations, any unplanned
1 might appear low consequences for carryover and discharge to a poten- or uncontrolled release to the surface
upstream operations, it is important to (seabed or ground level) should be
tially unsafe location are relatively
capture these events because further included.
straightforward to apply. The conse-
escalation barriers have failed to quence public protective measures Secondary Containment
prevent ignition of the LOPC and would only apply to onshore facilities An impermeable physical barrier
cause property damage. When an with public receptors which could be specifically designed to prevent release
LOPC falls below the criteria for Tier 1 potentially exposed to impact from into the environment of materials that
or Tier 2, the event may be reported the release. The consequence of an have breached primary containment.
for company internal reporting using a on-site shelter-in-place may be a more Secondary containment systems
Tier 3 KPI (i.e. a near miss or demand include, but are not limited to, tank
difficult consequence to apply for
on a safety system). For convenience, dykes, curbing around process
offshore facilities, and some onshore
the definitions of consequence pro- equipment, drainage collection systems
facilities. In this situation, a company into segregated oily drain systems, the
vided in the previous sub-section have should interpret an on-site shelter- outer wall of double walled tanks etc.
also been summarised in Appendix B. in-place as a complete or partial
When an LOPC event happens but evacuation of the workforce off the
there are no or low actual conse- facility. Mustering alone does not
quences in terms of harm to people or constitute a criterion for a Tier 1 or
property damage, it is still important Tier 2 PSE.
to to record the event in order to
OGP 13
The material categories used in RP lists represent a common international released should be classified based
754 are based on the classifications basis for use in these KPIs. The UNDG on boiling point and flash point. To
within the United Nations Recommen- lists are comprehensive in terms of promote consistency and for conveni-
dations on the Transport of Dangerous pure chemicals however for hydro- ence, the tables in Appendix B have
Goods (UNDG)19 commonly used in carbon mixtures, such as crude oil or been supplemented with examples
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs). fuels, the UNDG classifies flammable of hazardous materials common in
While these classifications differ from liquids in terms of their physical production and drilling operations for
some of the other hazardous material properties. Whenever possible, when each of the RP 754 material catego-
classifications used by the petroleum determining whether an LOPC is ries.
industry in some countries, the UNDG Tier 1 or Tier 2, the hydrocarbons
3.3 Normalisation
Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSEs can be convenient, easily obtained factor for
reported as normalised rates to aid both KPIs. This factor enables OGP
comparability over time and between to calculate a Tier 1 and 2 Process
facilities or companies. As there is no Safety Event Rate (PSER) for annual
uniformly applicable normalisation upstream benchmarking and ulti-
factor for process safety/asset integrity mately to benchmark across the entire
indicators based on facility configura- petroleum industry with API and other
tion, a general consensus was reached associations. The rates are calculated
to use worker exposure hours (as as follows:
used for personal injury rates), as a
14 OGP
3.4 Applicability to Upstream Operations
The Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSEs are limited to report such events using Tier 3 extraction using refrigeration
to drilling and production activities KPIs and in particular to iden- processing)
because of the inherent potential for tify, investigate and learn from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
LOPC consequences as described in any such events that had high and Gas to Liquids (GTL)
Table 1. The following list describes potential for a major incident, operations
those operations that are included such a blowout preventer activa-
Flow-lines between wells and
as drilling and production activities tion on a high pressure well).
pipelines between facilities
for the purpose of reporting. This list Production for this guidance covers associated with field production
is aligned with the OGP Health and petroleum and natural gas production operations
Safety Incident Reporting System operations, including administrative
Users Guide18 which is updated Oil & gas loading facilities, includ-
and engineering aspects, repairs, ing land or marine vessels (trucks
annually. maintenance and servicing, materi- and ships) when connected to an
Drilling includes all exploration, als supply and transportation of oil or gas production process
appraisal and production drilling, personnel and equipment. It covers
wireline, completion and workover Pipeline operations (including
all mainstream production operations
activities as well as their adminis- booster stations) operated by
including:
trative, engineering, construction, company E&P business
Work on production wells under
materials supply and transportation pressure Production excludes:
aspects. For this guidance, Tier 1 Production drilling or workover
Oil (including condensates) and
and 2 PSEs are recorded only when
gas extraction and separation Mining processes associated with
LOPC occurs when operating in hole
(primary production) the extraction of heavy oil tar
because this is consistent with the prin-
Heavy oil production where it is sands
ciple of including only those activities
connected to the process. inseparable from upstream (i.e. Heavy oil when separable from
steam assisted gravity drainage) upstream operations
For drilling operations, Tier 1 and Tier
production Secondary heavy oil processing
2 PSEs are excluded for:
Primary oil processing (water (upgrader)
Drilling/workover/wireline opera-
separation, stabilisation) Refineries
tions when not in hole (during
site preparation, rigging up, site Primary gas processing (dehy- Tier 1 and 2 PSEs are not required to
restoration, etc.) dration, liquids separation, be reported for exploration (except
sweetening, CO2 removal) drilling as noted above), construction,
Loss of circulation, loss of drilling
mud, well kick or underground Floating Storage Units (FSUs) and and other unspecified activities as
blowout unless there is an associ- sub-sea storage units listed in the OGP Health and Safety
ated LOPC of material (e.g. gas, Gas processing activities with the Incident Reporting System Users
oil, other fluids or mud) released primary intent of producing gas Guide18.
above ground or above sea-bed liquids for sale;
or onto the rig floor. (Note that it Secondary liquid separation
is good practice for companies (i.e., Natural Gas Liquids [NGL]
At joint venture sites and tolling operations, the company should encourage the joint venture or tolling operation to consider applying Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSE KPIs
OGP 15
3.5 Applicability to Upstream Activities
All activities related to drilling and pro- Marine transport operations,
ductions operations (as detailed in 3.4 except when the vessel is con-
above) are applicable to PSE report- nected to the facility or process.
ing, including related facility start-up Truck or rail operations, except
or shut-down operations, related when the truck or rail car is
brown-field construction activities, connected to the process for the
or decommissioning operations, and purposes of feedstock or product
events resulting from sabotage, terror- transfer, or if the truck or rail car is
ism, extremes of weather, earthquakes being used for onsite storage;
or other indirect causes.
Vacuum truck operations, except
Events associated with the following connected to the process, e.g.
activities fall outside the scope and onsite truck loading, discharging
shall not be included in data collection operations or use of the vacuum
or reporting efforts: truck transfer pump;
Routine emissions that are allow- Activities resulting in LOPC from
able under permit or regulation; ancillary equipment not connected
Office, shop, warehouse, or to the process (e.g., small sample
camp/compound building activi- containers). The exclusion includes
ties (e.g. resulting in office fires, fuel/oil leaks involving trucks or
spills, personnel injury or illness, other vehicles or other mobile
etc.); equipment not considered part of
the process
Activities leading to personal
safety incidents (e.g., slips, trips, Quality Assurance (QA), Quality
falls) that are not directly associ- Control (QC) and Research and
ated with onsite response to an Development (R&D) laboratory
LOPC; activities (except pilot plant activi-
ties, which are within scope for
PSE reporting);
Onsite fuelling operations of
mobile equipment (e.g., pick-up
trucks, diesel generators, and
heavy equipment).
The term process for production and
drilling operations includes facilities
such as production equipment (e.g.,
separators, vessels, piping, heaters,
pumps, compressors, exchangers,
refrigeration systems, etc.), drilling
equipment above ground, storage
tanks, ancillary support areas (e.g.
boiler houses and waste water
treatment plants), onsite remediation
facilities, and distribution piping under
control of the Company.
At joint venture sites and tolling operations, the company should encourage the joint venture or tolling operation to consider applying Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSE KPIs
16 OGP
3.6 OGP Data Collection
With the issue of this report, OGPs The collection of process safety KPI
general aim was to identify a small data is fully integrated with OGPs More help
number of KPIs that were reliable, existing health and safety data col- Determining whether an event is reportable as a Tier 1
clearly defined, implementable across lection process. Collection of offshore or Tier 2 PSE can be complex and definitions open to
interpretation. For this reason, OGP has developed a
the upstream oil & gas industry, and and onshore Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSE
supplement to this report that lists over 60 example
ideally aligned with the downstream data commenced in 2011 (for 2010 events with interpretation. Over time, OGP intends to
petroleum industry. data). The initial intent is to review and update the list with new examples to aid interpretation
The annual OGP benchmarking validate the data received to ensure of the PSE definitions. The supplement can be
collection of health and safety data sufficient consistency and accuracy. downloaded from the publications section of the OGP
now includes the Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSE Subject to sufficient confidence in the website20 (http://www.ogp.org.uk).
KPIs detailed in this guide, which are validity of the first one to two years
aligned with API RP 754. OGP also of data collection, the data collected
will be integrated into OGPs annual Companies have the option to provide
recognised the need for companies to
public report on health and safety additional information on the catego-
adopt leading indicators. Therefore,
performance indicators for the E&P ries of material released and whether
this guide also promotes the use of Tier
industry worldwide. the events occurred during normal
3 and Tier 4 KPIs within companies.
operations, start-up, shutdown or other
Numerical Tier 3 or 4 data is not cur- The process safety data collection is
circumstances. Companies are also
rently requested by OGP as these KPIs based on numbers of Tier 1 and 2
able to provide a detailed description
will be specific and appropriate to a PSEs recorded by companies, sepa-
of any PSE, including causal factors
particular companys safety controls rately reported for production and
and lessons learnt, that either involved
and management system and thus drilling activities, and sub-divided into
or had the potential to result in fatali-
unlikely to be comparable to those of offshore and onshore data.
ties.
a different company. In future years, The data is also broken down to
as the data collection process matures, Further details of the data collection
understand the consequences that
OGP will encourage companies to process, including instructions, defini-
determined the PSEs, including:
share process safety lessons learned tions and templates, are now available
the proportions resulting in harm in the annually published OGP Health
and best practices related to both to people (injuries and fatalities)
leading and lagging KPIs through and Safety Incident Reporting System
workshops and similar processes. damage to property (fires and Users Guide18.
explosions)
releases of hazardous materials
(from primary containment or pres-
sure relief device discharge)
OGP 17
4 Tier 3 and Tier 4
Tier 3 and Tier 4 indicators are systems and automatic distributed As noted previously, barriers can
primarily designed for monitoring control systems be assessed using a combination of
and review of risk control systems (i.e. escalation controls such as detec- leading and lagging KPIs. Tier 4 KPIs
barriers), especially at the operational tion, shutdown and blow-down are leading and monitor operational
level. Barriers may be hard physical systems activity to maintain or strengthen
barriers or soft human barriers. As a barrier; whereas Tier 3 KPIs are
mitigation controls such as deluge,
shown in the Swiss Cheese diagram more lagging and record the number
secondary containment and
(Figure 1), hard barriers are intended of actual or near miss failures of a
automated emergency systems
to block or respond to LOPC events barrier. In this context, Tier 3 indica-
and may include: Soft barriers are typically management tors are also considered leading when
prevention controls such as system-related, such as procedures used as predictive KPIs with respect to
engineering design of containment and processes, or workforce-related, more severe consequences character-
such as training, competence, behav- ised by Tier 1 and Tier 2 PSEs.
iours and culture.
18 OGP
Tier 3 KPI example: Safe Operating Limit Excursion Figure 7 Storage Tank Example of Safe Operating Limit KPI
This KPI monitors process parameter deviations that
exceed the Safe Operating Limit (SOL) applicable to
specific operations at a facility. This includes different
operating phases including start-up, shutdown and normal Safe Operating Limit (SOL) or high level shut down
operation which may have different SOLs for the same
equipment. Figure 7 shows the relationship between High level alarm
Normal Operating Limit, High/Low Alarm Limits, and the
SOL (or equivalent High-High Level Shut Down) system. Normal operating limit
Reaching the SOL represents the point beyond which
troubleshooting ends and pre-determined action occurs to
return the process to a known safe state. The
Low level alarm
pre-determined action may range from manually executed
operating procedures to a fully automated instrument
based control system.
The Tier 3 KPI counts each event or condition resulting in
an SOL excursion (i.e a recorded exceedance of the SOL in duration, material in the tank and, following investigation, each excursion should be counted separately. A process
a specified time period). A company may want to record root causes of the SOL. A single initiating process event or condition that hovers near the SOL value for one piece of
specific data or information about individual SOL condition may result in a number of SOL excursions for equipment may result in multiple excursions that should be
excursions, including operational phase, excursion different equipment (e.g. site-wide failure of a utility) and counted as a single event or condition.
OGP 19
4.3 Selection of Tier 3 and 4 KPIs Selecting leading and
It is important to choose Tier 3 and 4 As noted earlier, it is recommended lagging KPIs for dual
KPIs which operators and engineers that facilities determine which barriers assurance
recognise as meaningful and appli- which are most critical for manage- While Tier 4 indicators are clearly leading, it has been
cable to the specific barrier systems ment of major incident risk then select noted that Tier 3 indicators can be considered as either
in place at the facility. The indicators suitable leading and lagging KPIs for leading or lagging depending on how the data is used,
selected should provide actionable each critical barrier. Care must be e.g. a level alarm going off frequently could be a
leading indicator of the potential for Tier 1 or 2 events
information which directs activities to taken to avoid overwhelming staff with
or a lagging indicator of maintenance not having been
further improve barrier strength and too many metrics, and therefore com- performed on schedule. Equally, Tier 2 indicators can
addresses identified weaknesses. panies are encouraged to be selective be considered leading relative to Tier 1 or lagging
CCPS has provided a comprehensive and focus KPIs on barriers which are relative to Tiers 3 and 4.
selection of possible KPIs for each of either important in terms of mitigating For each critical barrier, those few of highest concern to
20 management system elements5. major risk or because there are known the company or facility, a good practice is to identify
This list of KPIs was updated in 2010 weaknesses in the barrier that need to one leading KPI at Tier 4 level and one lagging KPI
in their guidelines on process safety be addressed. from a higher tier. These two matched KPIs can then
be used in combination to assess the performance of
metrics9. In RP 754, API has also It is important to view risk control the selected barrier. This approach is called Dual
suggested 10 Tier 4 KPIs6 and UK barriers and KPIs used in the context Assurance by UK HSE7 and links a lagging and leading
HSE has illustrated their dual assur- of the overall management system and pair of indicators that can be correlated to statistically
ance concept by providing a selection continuous improvement. Risk control test whether a specific barrier is getting weaker or
of possible leading and lagging barriers are generally equivalent stronger.
indicators for 9 common risk control A simple example of dual assurance would be a leading
to management system elements or
barriers7. Table 2 provided here is Tier 4 KPI to monitor the percentage against plan of
sub-elements; therefore it is advis- completed tests on a facilitys alarm system linked
updated from OGP Report No. 4151 able to align barrier names with the with a more lagging Tier 3 KPI which monitors the
taking into account these references terminology of the companys own number of alarm system failures (recorded from
and also illustrates the dual assurance management system. As the system testing, near misses or any actual Tier 1 and 2 events).
approach advocated by UK HSE7. improves over time, the KPIs should In combination these two KPIs provide data to assess
be reviewed regularly and subjected whether the ongoing maintenance and testing regime
to their own continuous improvement of safety critical alarms is sufficiently effective to
ensure that any holes in the barrier are monitored and
cycle to ensure that effort is main-
minimised to an acceptably low level.
tained on strengthening those barriers
which are most critical for prevention
of major incidents.
20 OGP
Table 2: Examples of risk control barriers and associated dual assurance Tier 3 and 4 KPIs
OGP 21
Table 2: Examples of risk control barriers and associated dual assurance Tier 3 and 4 KPIs
22 OGP
Appendix A
With reference to the six tables in Appendix B, the flow chart recommends four
questions to ask when determining if a LOPC or PRD activation is recordable as a
Process Safety Event (PSE) for the purpose of OGP benchmarking.
1
Was the event the result of an
LOPC or PRD discharge from part of a No Event is not OGP recordable but may be
production or drilling process? (See Sections 3.4 reportable by the Company as part of a
and 3.5 and definitions in Appendix B) broader or different KPI
Yes
2
Did the event (LOPC or PRD activation) Yes
result in an incident with any of the harmful or
damaging consequences listed in Table 1?
No
3
If LOPC, as noted in Table 2, did the Event is OGP recordable by the Company
amount of the material released exceed any Yes as a PSE and should be classified as
threshold in Tables 4-6? either Tier 1 or Tier 2
No
4
If PRD
activation, did the
material release (either directly to
atmosphere or via flare or other destructive Yes
device) exceed any threshold listed in Tables
4-6 as well as any of the four
consequences in Table
3?
No
OGP 23
Appendix B
Table B1 (of 6): Thresholds for LOPC resulting in actual harm or damage
24 OGP
Table B2 (of 6): Thresholds for LOPC material releases
OGP 25
Table B4 (of 6): Non-Toxic Material Release Threshold Quantities for LOPC
26 OGP
Table B5 (of 6): Toxic Material Release Threshold Quantities for LOPC
OGP 27
Table B6 (of 6): Other Material Release Threshold Quantities for LOPC
Moderate Acids or Bases includes: 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) 500 kg (1,100 lb)
None None or or
diethylamine (corrosion inhibitor) 10 bbl (Cat.7) 5 bbl (Cat.7)
28 OGP
Appendix C
OGP 29
Key Performance Indicator (KPI) Mitigation Offshore work
Information or data that provides evidence of a A barrier which limits consequences, generally by All activities and operations that take place at sea,
companys performance in managing its key risks, which limiting escalation, but which does not prevent the initial including activities in bays, in major inland seas, such
in this guide are those risks related to asset integrity event. as the Caspian Sea, or in other inland seas directly
and process safety. KPIs may also be referred to as connected to oceans. Events involving transportation of
performance metrics. Near miss people and equipment from shore to the offshore loca-
An event or chain of events that has not resulted tion, either by vessel or helicopter, should be recorded
Lost Time Injury (LTI) in recordable injury, illness or physical damage or as offshore.
A fatality or lost work day case. The number of LTIs is environmental damage but had the potential to do so in
the sum of fatalities and lost work day cases. other circumstances. Onshore work
All activities and operations that take place within a
Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) Number of employees landmass, including those on swamps, rivers and lakes.
The number of lost time injuries (fatalities + lost work Average number of full-time and part-time employees Land-to-land aircraft operations are counted as onshore,
day cases) per 1,000,000 work hours. involved in exploration and production, calculated on a even though flights may be over water.
full-time basis, during the reporting year.
Lost Work Day Case (LWDC) Pressure Relief Device (PRD)
Any occupational injury or illness, other than a fatal Number of fatalities A device designed to open and relieve excess pressure
injury, which results in a person being unfit for work on The total number of Companys employees and/or Con- (e.g. safety valve, thermal relief, rupture disk, rupture
any day after the day of occurrence of the occupational tractors employees who died as a result of an incident. pin, deflagration vent, pressure/vacuum vents).
injury. Any day includes rest days, weekend days, leave Delayed deaths that occur after the incident are to be
days, public holidays or days after ceasing employment. included if the deaths were a direct result of the incident. Primary containment
A LWDC is a recordable incident. For example, if a fire killed one person outright, and a A tank, vessel, pipe, truck, rail car, or other equipment
second died three weeks later from lung damage caused designed to keep a material within it, typically for
Loss of Primary Containment by the fire, both are reported. purposes of storage, separation, processing or transfer
(LOPC) of gases or liquids. The terms vessel and pipe are taken
Occupational illness to include containment of reservoir fluids within the
An unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material casing and wellhead valving to the surface. Note that
from primary containment, including non-toxic and Any abnormal condition or disorder, other than one
resulting from an occupational injury, caused by primary containment for a specified material may
non-flammable materials (e.g. steam, hot condensate, comprise a vessel or pipe that is inside another vessel
nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air). For drilling exposure to environmental factors associated with
employment. Occupational illness may be caused by that is also designed as primary containment for a dif-
operations, any unplanned or uncontrolled release to ferent material; for example, a heating tube is primary
the surface (seabed or ground level) should be included. inhalation, absorption, ingestion of, or direct contact
with the hazard, as well as exposure to physical and containment for fuel gas or fuel oil, even though the
LOPC is a type of event. An unplanned or uncontrolled tubes may be inside a firebox which is in turn within an
release is an LOPC irrespective of whether the material psychological hazards. It will generally result from
prolonged or repeated exposure. Refer to OGP/IPIECA oil-water separator.
is released into the environment, or into secondary
Report No. 393, Health Performance Indicators (2007).
containment, or into other primary containment not Process
intended to contain the material released under normal
operating conditions).
Occupational injury Facilities used in drilling and production operations in
Any injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation, the oil & gas industry. This includes rigs and process
Major incident etc. which results from a work-related activity or from equipment (e.g. vessels, piping, valves, boilers, genera-
an exposure involving a single incident in the work tors, pumps, compressors, exchangers, refrigeration
An incident that has resulted in multiple fatalities and/ systems) and includes storage tanks, ancillary support
or serious damage, possibly beyond the asset itself. environment, such as deafness from explosion, one-time
chemical exposure, back disorder from a slip/trip, insect areas (e.g. boiler houses and waste water treatment
Typically a major incident is initiated by an LOPC event, plants), on-site remediation facilities, and distribution
but may also result from major structural failure or loss or snake bite.
piping under control of the Company.
of stability that has caused serious damage to an asset.
(note this definition is intended to incorporate terms such
Officially declared
as Major Accident as defined by UK HSE). A declaration by a recognised community official (e.g.
fire, police, civil defense, emergency management) or
Medical Treatment Case (MTC) delegate (e.g. Company official) authorised to order the
A recordable incident involving injury or illness that has community action (e.g. shelter-in-place, evacuation).
required management and care of the patient above
and beyond first aid, but not severe enough to be a
reportable fatality or lost work day case or restricted
work day case.
30 OGP
Process safety Recordable Material release threshold quantity
Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing A type of event or incident, including an LOPC or an The weight of gas, liquid, or solid material released
the integrity of operating systems and processes occupational injury or illness, or other outcome which from an LOPC which, if exceeded, results in the event
handling hazardous substances by applying good design has been determined to meet or exceed definitions, crite- being recordable as either a Tier 1 or Tier 2 PSE. The
principles, engineering, and operating and maintenance ria or thresholds for inclusion and classification in data threshold quantities are described more fully in API/
practices. It deals with the prevention and control of provided to OGP (or other agencies or stakeholders). The ANSI standard RP 754 (see Reference 6) and follow the
events with the potential to release hazardous materials broader term reportable is often used to indicate the UNDG classification system.
and energy. Such releases can result in toxic effects, fire, wider range of KPI data collected within the company
explosion, and could ultimately result in serious incidents for local or corporate use, of which only part will also be Total Recordable Incidents (TRI)
including fatalities, injuries, property damage, lost recordable. The sum of fatalities, lost work day cases, restricted
production and environmental damage. work day cases and medical treatment cases.
Restricted Work Day Case (RWDC)
Process Safety Event (PSE) Any work-related injury other than a fatality or lost United Nations Dangerous Goods
A Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) from a process work day case which results in a person being unfit for (UNDG)
that meets the Tier 1 or Tier 2 definitions in this guide. A full performance of the regular job on any day after the
PSE is a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) and is record- occupational injury. Work performed might be: A classification system used to evaluate the potential
able. For the purpose of recording a PSE: hazards of various materials when released, which
an assignment to a temporary job is used by most international countries as part of
Drilling facilities are considered to be part of a part-time work at the regular job the product labeling or shipping information (see
process when operations are in-hole. Reference 19).
working full-time in the regular job but not
Land or marine vessels (trucks and ships) are performing all the usual duties of the job
considered to be part of a process when physically
Where no meaningful restricted work is being per-
Unsafe location
connected to a production facility. An atmospheric pressure relief device discharge point
formed, the incident should be recorded as a lost work
day case (LWDC). This is a recordable incident. or downstream destructive device (e.g. flare, scrubber)
Process Safety Event Rate (PSER) discharge point that results in a potential hazard, such as
The number of process safety events per 1,000,000 Secondary containment the formation of flammable, toxic or corrosive mixtures
(1 million) work hours (production and drilling work at grade level or on elevated work structures, or ignition
An impermeable physical barrier specifically designed to
hours only). of relief streams at the point of emission.
prevent release of materials into the environment that
Production have already breached primary containment (i.e. an
LOPC). Secondary containment systems include, but are
Work-related injury
Petroleum and natural gas producing operations, not limited to: tank dykes, curbing around process equip- See occupational injury.
including their administrative and engineering aspects, ment, drainage collection systems into segregated oily
minor construction, repairs, maintenance and servicing, drain systems, the outer wall of double walled tanks, etc.
materials supply, and transportation of personnel
and equipment. It covers all mainstream production Tier
operations including wireline. Gas processing activities
One of the four levels of the OGP framework for asset
with the primary intent of producing gas liquids for sale
integrity KPIs as described in this report, which is in
including;
turn based on the API/ANSI standard RP 754 (see
secondary liquid separation (i.e. Natural Gas Reference 6).
Liquids [NGL] extraction using refrigeration
processing) Third party
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Gas to Liquids A person with no business relation with the Company or
(GTL) operations contractor.
OGP 31
Appendix D
List of Acronyms
ANSI LTIF RP
American National Standards Institute Lost Time Injury Frequency Recommended Practice
LTI PTW
Lost Time Injury Permit To Work
32 OGP
Appendix E
2. UK HSE. 2010. Reports and recommendations arising from the Competent Authoritys response to the Buncefield
incident. Available from UK HSE at http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/response.htm
3. US CSB. 2007. BP Texas City Final Investigation Report. Available from US CSB at
http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID=20
4. BP. 2007. The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Report Available from BP at
http://www.bp.com/bakerpanelreport/
5. CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety). 2007. Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, American Institution of
Chemical Engineers. (via John Wiley & Sons) at: http://www.aiche.org/CCPS/Publications/Print/index.aspx
6. API. 2010. ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754: Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petro-
chemical Industries, (First Edition, April 2010). Available from API at: http://www.api.org/Standards/new/api-rp-754.cfm
7. UK HSE (Health and Safety Executive). 2006. Step-By-Step Guide to Developing Process Safety Performance Indica-
tors (Health and Safety Guide HSG254). Available from UK HSE at http://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/psmetrics.aspxCCPS.
2008.
8. Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics, American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Available from CCPS at
http://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/psmetrics.aspx
9. CCPS. 2010. Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics, American Institution of Chemical Engineers. Available from
CCPS at: http://www.aiche.org/ccps/publications/psmetrics.aspx (via John Wiley & Sons) OECD. 2008.
10. Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators Related to Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response
for Industry (2nd edition), Organization for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) Environment,
Health and Safety Publications, Series on Chemical Accidents No. 19, Paris, 2008. Available from OECD at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/57/41269710.pdf
11. HMSO. 1999. The Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 743.
See UK HSE http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/background/index.htm and available from Her Majestys Stationary Office, London,
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/743/regulation/2/made
12. Reason, James. 1990. Human Error, Cambridge University Press. ISBN-10: 0521314194, ISBN-13: 978-0521314190.
13. Reason, James. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Hants, England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd
15. Bird Frank E., Germain George L.1969. Loss Control Management: Practical Loss Control Leadership, Revised Edition,
Det Norske Veritas Inc. (U.S.A.), 1996.
16. OGP. 1994. Guidelines for the Development and Application of Health, Safety and Environmental Management
Systems, OGP Report 210, http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/210.pdf
17. IPIECA/API/OGP. 2010. Oil & gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary Sustainability Reporting (2nd Edition) at
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/oil-and-gas-industry-guidance-voluntary-sustainability-reporting-0
18. OGP. 2010. Health and Safety Incident Reporting System Users Guide 2010 data, OGP Report 444,
http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/444.pdf
19. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), ECE/TRANS/202, Vol. I and II (ADR 2009),
European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), 2009.
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/adr/adr2009/09ContentsE.html
20. OGP. 2011. Upstream PSE Examples, OGP Report 456sup, http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/456supp.pdf
OGP 33
London office: 209-215 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NL, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7633 0272 Fax: +44 (0)20 7633 2350
Brussels office: 165 Bd du Souverain, B-1160 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0)2 566 9150 Fax: +32 (0)2 566 9159
Web: www.ogp.org.uk E-mail:reception@ogp.org.uk A company limited by guarantee Registered in England, No. 1832064