Unexploded

Ordnance
(UXO):
(UXO)
An Overview
October 1996
 CONTENTS

Section Title Page

FOREWORD ii

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1

2.0 OVERVIEW OF UXO 1

2.1 Types of UXO 1

2.2 Encountering UXO 4

3.0 UXO SAFETY AND REPORTING PROCEDURES 4

3.1 Safety Procedures 4
3.2 Reporting Procedures 5

4.0 UXO RISKS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS 5

4.1 Risk Factors 5

4.2 Risk Assessment Initiatives 6

5.0 UXO MANAGEMENT, CHARACTERIZATION, AND REMEDIATION 6

5.1 Management Options 6

5.2 Remediation Options 7
5.3 Characterization Technologies 7
5.4 Excavation Technologies 9

6.0 DECISION-MAKING FACTORS 9

REFERENCES 11

Appendices

Appendix A Glossary of UXO Terminology A-1

Appendix B Format for Reporting Unexploded Ordnance B-1

i
 FOREWORD

This document has been prepared for the Federal Advisory Committee for the
Development of Innovative Technologies in cooperation with:

Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
U.S. Army Environmental Center
Bureau of Land Management
PRC Environmental Management, Inc.

The Federal Advisory Committee for the Development of Innovative Technologies is comprised of representatives from the
Western Governors' Association, Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Interior.

ii
1.0 INTRODUCTION The following types of UXO are those most likely to be
encountered on active DoD sites and FUD and BRAC sites:
Millions of acres of property in the United States
Small arms munitions
contain unexploded ordnance (UXO), most of which is
a result of weapons system testing and troop training Hand grenades
activities conducted by the Department of Defense Rockets
(DoD). This property includes active military, formerly Guided missiles
used defense (FUD), and base realignment and closure Projectiles
(BRAC) sites. The risks posed by property containing Mortars
UXO could be great depending on the types and Projected grenades
amount of UXO present and how the property is or may Rifle grenades
be used. Submunitions
Bombs
Those who use and manage property with UXO, as well
as those responsible for making decisions regarding the
Ordnance is color-coded during manufacturing for identifica-
property, need information on the risks presented by
tion purposes. However, color markings cannot be relied upon
UXO, options for eliminating or reducing the risks, and
to identify UXO markings can be altered or removed by
factors to be considered in the decision-making process.
weather or exposure to the environment. Instead, other
This document summarizes the characteristics of UXO,
features should be used to identify UXO. The following
safety procedures to be used on property that contains
sections describe the basic features and characteristics associ-
UXO, UXO risks and risk assessments, options and
ated with each general type of UXO. Additional information
technologies for reducing the risks, and factors that
can be found in Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures
should be considered in the decision-making process.
Points of contact and references are listed for additional (U.S. Army 1994).
information on UXO, risks, and remediation, and a
glossary of terminology used in this document is Small Arms Munitions
provided as Appendix A.
Small arms munitions contain projectiles that are 0.5 inches or
less in caliber and no longer than approximately 4 inches.
2.0 OVERVIEW OF UXO
They are fired from various sizes of weapons, such as pistols,
carbines, rifles, automatic rifles, shotguns, and machine guns.
DoD defines explosive ordnance as any munition,
Generally, the shell casings of small arms munitions are made
weapon delivery system, or ordnance item that contains
from brass or steel. Although the hazards associated with
explosives, propellants, and chemical agents. UXO
these UXO are much less than for other munitions, unexploded
consists of these same items after they (1) are armed or
small arms munitions may explode if thrown into a fire or
otherwise prepared for action, (2) are launched, placed,
struck with a sharp object such as a nail. Figure 1 illustrates
fired, or released in a way that they cause hazards, and
various small arms munitions.
(3) remain unexploded either through malfunction or
design.

A person's ability to recognize a UXO is the first and

most important step in reducing the risk posed by a
UXO hazard. This section presents information on the
most common types of UXO and how it may be found
in the field. Figure 1. Small Arms Munitions.

2.1 Types of UXO Hand Grenades

In the past century, all shapes, sizes, and types of Hand grenades are small explosive- or chemical-type muni-
explosive ordnance have been used in the U.S. for tions that are designed to be thrown at short range. Various
weapons system testing and troop training activities. classes of grenades may be encountered as UXO,

1
including fragmentation, smoke, and illumination grenades. the rockets reach a predetermined distance from the target.
All grenades have three main parts: a body, a fuze with a pull Caution: Do not approach--proximity fuzing may activate,
ring and safety clip assembly, and a filler. Figure 2 shows causing the rocket warhead to explode. Also, fired rockets may
typical grenades. still contain residual propellant that could ignite and burn
violently.

Guided Missiles

Guided missiles are similar to rockets (see Figure 4); however,

they are guided to their target by various systems. Some are
wired-guided, and others are guided by internal or external
radar or video. Guided missles are usually stabilized by fins
controlled by internal electronics. Internal proximity fuzes are
Figure 2. Typical Grenades. used in guided missles, which makes approaching them
extremely dangerous. Also, fired guided missles may still
Fragmentation grenades are the most common type of grenade contain residual propellant that could ignite and burn violently.
used. They have a metal or plastic body filled with an explo-
sive material. When the filler explodes, the body of the
grenade or a metal fragmentation sleeve breaks into small,
lethal, high velocity fragments. These grenades use a burning
delay fuze that functions 3 to 5 seconds after the safety lever is
released.

Other grenades may be made of metal, plastic, cardboard, or

rubber and may contain explosives, white phosphorus, chemi-
cal agents, or illumination flares, depending on their intended
use. Most use a burning delay fuze that functions 3 to 5 Figure 4. Guided Missile.
seconds after the safety lever is released, but some are activated
instantly when the lever is released (smoke grenades). Projectiles

Projectiles can range from approximately1 inch to 16 inches in

Rockets diameter and from 2 inches to 4 feet in length. Projectile fuzes
can be located in the nose or in the base, as shown in Figure 5.
A rocket uses gas pressure from rapidly burning material Like rockets, projectiles may be stabilized during flight by fins
(propellant) to transport a payload (warhead) to a desired or bands fixed around the circumference of the projectile.
location. Rockets can range from 11/2 to more than 15 inches
in diameter, and they can vary from 1 foot to over 9 feet in
length. All rockets consist of a warhead section, a motor
section, and a fuze. They are unguided after launch and are
stabilized during flight by canted nozzles at the base of the
motor or fins attached to the motor. Figure 3 shows the typical
components of a rocket.

Figure 3. Parts of a Rocket. Figure 5. Typical Projectiles.

The warhead section of the rocket is the portion that produces Mortars
the intended effect; it can be filled with explosives, toxic
chemicals, white phosphorus, submunitions, riot-control agent, Mortars range from approximately 1 inch to 11 inches in
or illumination flares. Fuzes may be located in the nose of the diameter and can be filled with explosives, toxic chemicals,
rocket or internally between the warhead and motor. The white phosphorus, or illumination flares. Mortars generally
fuzing on rockets can be impact, time-delay, or proximity have thinner metal casing than projectiles, but use the same
fuzing. Impact fuzes function when they hit the target. Delay types of fuzing and stabilization. Figure 6 shows various types
fuzes contain an element that delays explosion for a fixed time of mortars.
after impact. Proximity fuzes are intended to function when

2
 Submunitions

Submunitions include bomblets, grenades, and mines filled

with explosives or chemical agents. They may be antiperson-
nel, antimateriel, antitank, dual-purpose, incendiary, or
chemical submunitions. Submunitions are typically spread
over a large area by dispensers, missiles, rockets, or projectiles.
Each of these delivery systems disperses the submunitions
while still in flight, scattering the submunitions over an area.

Submunitions are activated in a variety of ways, depending on

Figure 6. Typical Mortars. their intended use. Some are activated by pressure, impact, or
movement or disturbance. Others are activated in flight or
Projected Grenades when they come near metallic objects. Some submunitions
contain a self-destruct fuze as a backup. The self-destruct time
The most commonly used projected grenade is the 40 millime- can vary from a couple of hours to several days. Warning:
ter (40mm) grenade. This grenade is also among the most Submunitions are extremely hazardous because even very slight
commonly found UXO items. The 40mm grenade is about the disturbances can cause them to explode.
same size and shape as a chicken egg, as shown in Figure 7. It
contains high explosives and uses a variety of fuzes, including Some types of submunitions require stabilization to hit the
some of the most sensitive internal impact fuzing systems. target straight on. Stabilization can be provided through an
Because of their relatively small size, 40mm grenades are arming ribbon, parachute, or fin assembly. Figure 9 shows a
easily concealed by vegetation. They are extremely dangerous variety of submunitions.
and can explode if moved or handled.

Figure 7. 40mm Grenades.

Rifle Grenades

Rifle grenades look like mortars and range from about 9 to 17

inches in length. They may be filled with high explosives,
white phosphorus, riot-control agent, illumination flares, or
chemicals that produce colored screening smoke. Rifle
grenades are fired from standard infantry rifles. They have an
opening at the far end of a tube near the fin assembly that
allows the rifle grenade to be placed on the barrel of a rifle. Figure 9. Typical Submunitions.
Rifle grenades rely on impact fuzing, which is located on the
nose or internally behind the warhead. Figure 8 shows various
types of rifle grenades. Bombs

Bombs range in weight from 1 to 3,000 pounds and in length

from 3 to 10 feet. Generally, all bombs have the same compo-
nentsa metal container, a fuze, and a stabilizing device (see
Figure 10). The metal container, or bomb body, holds the
explosive or chemical filler and may consist of one piece or
multiple pieces.

Figure 8. Rifle Grenades.

3
 UXO cleanup already conducted, and the types of ordnance
used. For example, UXO such as dispensers, missiles, rockets,
or projectiles may still contain submunitions, or those
submunitions may have been scattered across a large area. If
any UXO is found, one should assume that other UXO is in the
area.

3.0 UXO SAFETY AND REPORTING

PROCEDURES

UXO, whether present in an area by design or by accident,

poses the risk of injury or death to anyone in the vicinity. To
lessen the danger of UXO hazards and to help prevent placing
others at future risk, certain precautions and steps should be
taken by anyone who encounters UXO.

"IF YOU DID NOT DROP IT, DO NOT PICK IT UP!"

Figure 10. General Purpose Bombs.
3.1 Safety Procedures
Bombs use either mechanical or electrical fuzes, typically
located in the nose or tail section, either internally or A person can lessen the danger of UXO hazards by being able
externally. Mechanical fuzes are generally armed by some to recognize the hazard and by adhering to the following basic
type of arming vane. The arming vane operates like a safety guidelines (NAVEODTECHDIV 1994):
propeller to line up all the fuze parts and thus arm the fuze.
The fuzes may be configured as impact, proximity, or delay 1. After identifying potential UXO, do not move any closer to
fuzes. it. Some types of ordnance have magnetic or motion-sensitive
proximity fuzing that may detonate when they sense a target.
Bombs are stabilized during flight by fin or parachute Others may have self-destruct timers built in.
assemblies attached to the rear section of the bomb. These
assemblies often detach from the bomb after impact. 2. Do not transmit any radio frequencies in the vicinity of a
suspected UXO hazard. Signals transmitted from items such as
2.2 Encountering UXO walkie talkies, short-wave radios, citizens' band (CB) radios, or
other communication and navigation devices may detonate the
UXO.
UXO is found in the environment in many different ways
depending in part on the specific type of ordnance, when
3. Do not attempt to remove any object on, attached to, or
and where it was deployed, how it was deployed, and
near a UXO. Some fuzes are motion-sensitive, and the UXO
activities that may have taken place at the location since
may explode.
deployment. For example, UXO can be at the ground
surface, can be partially buried, or can be fully buried. In
4. Do not move or disturb a UXO because the motion could
fact, UXO may be found at depths in excess of 30 feet
activate the fuze, causing the UXO to explode.
below the ground surface. Ordnance stabilized by para-
chute may be completely buried, but the parachute may
5. If possible, mark the UXO hazard with a standard UXO
appear at the surface.
marker or with other suitable materials, such as engineer tape,
colored cloth, or colored ribbon. Attach the marker to an
UXO may also be found fully intact or in parts or frag-
object so that it is about 3 feet off the ground and visible from
ments. All UXO, whether intact or in parts, presents a
all approaches. Place the marker no closer than the point
potential hazard and should be treated as such. In addition,
where you first recognized the UXO hazard.
the UXO casing may have deteriorated depending on the
type of material used, the length of time since deployment,
and the elements to which it was exposed. UXO that has 6. Leave the UXO hazard area.
deteriorated presents a particular hazard because it may
contain chemical agents that could become exposed. 7. Report the UXO to the proper authorities (see Section
2.2).
UXO may be encountered as an isolated munition or as one
of many in a given area. The density and type of UXO in 8. Stay away from areas of known or suspected UXO.
an area depends on the intensity and proximity of troop This is the best way to prevent accidental injury or death.
training and weapons testing activities, the degree of UXO

4
 UXO SAFETY WARNINGS 4.1 Risk Factors

The following factors influence the degree of acute risk

M When you see UXO, stop. Do not move closer.
associated with UXO, particularly in terms of the likelihood of
M Never transmit radio frequencies (walkie talkies, an encounter and the likelihood of detonation:
citizens' band radios).
Factors Affecting the Likelihood of an Encounter
M Never attempt to remove anything near a UXO.
Amount or density of UXO on the property
M Never attempt to touch, move, or disturb a UXO. Depth of the UXO
Size of the UXO
M Clearly mark the UXO area.
Current and potential property use
M Avoid any area where UXO is located. Accessibility of the property
Topography
Vegetation or ground cover
3.2 Reporting Procedures
Soil type
Any UXO discovered in the field should be immediately Climate
reported to site Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel.
If EOD personnel are not present at the site, the military Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Detonation
provost marshal or local law enforcement agency should be
notified. The appropriate authority should initially be notified UXO fuze type and sensitivity
by telephone, with a written report submitted later to document
Activities of individuals frequenting the property
the UXO hazard. Ideally, the exact location should be noted
along with the type, condition, estimated size, and distinctive
These factors are interrelated and cannot be evaluated singly to
features of the ordnance. A sample reporting format is shown
assess risk. Each of the factors is discussed below.
in Appendix B.
Density of UXO. The greater the number of UXO in a given
4.0 UXO RISKS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS area, the greater the possibility that a person will encounter
UXO. Conversely, a low UXO density decreases the possibility
All sites that contain UXO present some degree of risk. that a person will encounter UXO. Density is mainly deter-
Furthermore, many UXO sites are not marked or identified. mined by the type and quantity of ordnance used in a particular
Use caution in all areas that are suspected of containing UXO. area. For example, areas with submunitions may have a higher
Do not rely on warning signs and physical barriers. UXO density than areas with other types of UXO. Density can
also be affected by soil type and climate, as discussed later.
UXO risks may be evaluated in terms of three main compo-
nents or events: (1) UXO encounter, (2) UXO detonation, and Depth of UXO. Individuals are usually more likely to
(3) consequences of UXO detonation (PRC 1996b). The first encounter UXO that is on the ground surface or is partially
component, UXO encounter, considers the likelihood that a buried than UXO that is fully buried. For buried UXO, the
person will come across a UXO and will influence the UXO likelihood of an encounter depends on the activities conducted
through some level of force, energy, motion, or other means. at the site. Activities that could disturb the subsurface UXO
The second component, UXO detonation, is the likelihood that include shallow digging, trenching, plowing, and construction,
a UXO will detonate once an encounter has occurred. Risk among others. Furthermore, UXO that is buried above the frost
factors associated with these two components are discussed line may eventually migrate to the surface (see climate).
below in Section 4.1.
Size of the UXO. The size of a UXO influences whether it will
The third component, consequences of UXO detonation, be seen. Because large UXO is more visible than small UXO, a
encompasses a wide range of possible outcomes or results, person would be more likely to see and avoid contact with large
including bodily injury or death, health risks associated with UXO.
exposure to chemical agents, and environmental degradation
caused by the actual explosion and dispersal of chemicals Current and potential property use. Property use that in-
nuclear materials to air, soil, surface water, and groundwater. creases the number of individuals on a property increases the
Generally, UXO risk evaluations take a conservative approach likelihood of a UXO encounter. For example, UXO is more
and assume that the consequences of UXO detonation are
serious injury or death. Section 4.2 provides additional details
on current risk assessment initiatives.

5
likely to be encountered by a person on property used for UXO. These efforts include (1) conducting risk assessments at
recreational purposes (such as hiking, hunting, or camping) specific military bases, (2) developing a standardized
than on property used for grazing or as a wildlife preserve. In methodology to assess occupational and residual risks in areas
general, the larger and deeper the area disturbed by property containing UXO (Mulvihill and others 1996), and (3)
use activities, and the greater the force associated with those developing a methodology for ranking ordnance and explosive
activities, the greater the likelihood that a UXO will be
waste sites based on life cycle cost and public risks
encountered and detonated.
(QuantiTech 1994). The results of any site-specific risk
Accessibility of the property. The accessibility of an area will assessment effort, however, are limited by the amount and
affect the number of people who would enter the property and reliability of data available about the site.
encounter UXO. For example, an unfenced area near a road
would be more accessible than a remote, fenced area, The first step in determining site-specific risks is to conduct a
increasing the likelihood of an encounter with UXO. site assessment. Typical site assessments involve collecting
existing information on such factors as soils and geology,
Topography. Topography also influences the number of terrain, vegetation, climate, and current and predicted land use.
people likely to access a site, as well as the amount and type of The assessment may also require a visual inspection or sam-
property use. People are more likely to enter flat property near pling of soil, water, or air. The results are used to determine
populated areas than remote property with a rugged terrain. In
whether risks can be readily managed or whether more detailed
addition, topography influences where UXO may concentrate.
UXO is more likely to migrate to valleys and depressions study and analysis is required.
through surface water movement and soil erosion.
If more detailed study and analysis is required, a site evaluation
Vegetation and ground cover. Heavy vegetation and ground is conducted to assess the level of risk posed by the site and to
cover may conceal even large surface UXO; however, it may make an informed risk management decision. Information is
also limit access to an area, preventing potential UXO collected on the types of munitions used in the area, materials
encounters. associated with those munitions, and the environmental setting.
The information collected is more specific than that collected
Soil type. Soil type influences the depth to which UXO may during a site assessment. The results of the site evaluation are
penetrate as well as whether the fuze will activate. Some fuze used to estimate the overall risk, determine whether a site-
types require a substantial impact before they will activate. If
specific response is required, and evaluate the effectiveness of
the munition lands in mud or fine soil, the fuze may not
activate as designed. Site conditions such as these may in turn response options for a specific risk.
increase the likelihood and density of UXO. Some soils are
also more easy to penetrate than others, and as a result, UXO in 5.0 UXO MANAGEMENT,
soft soils may be found at greater depths than expected. CHARACTERIZATION, AND
Climate. Climate affects the surface migration of UXO, the REMEDIATION
visibility of UXO, and the migration of buried UXO to the
surface. Climates with heavy precipitation and high winds are Several options and technologies are available to manage,
more likely to cause UXO to migrate through surface water characterize, and remediate property containing UXO so that
movement and soil erosion, and snow cover may conceal the hazards and risks are reduced or eliminated. The
surface UXO. Finally, climate affects the depth of the frost line applicability of the options and technologies depends on
and freeze-thaw cycles. In general, the colder the climate, the various factors such as type and density of UXO present, depth
deeper the frost line and the greater number of UXO that may of UXO, topography, land use, and degree of risk posed by the
migrate to the surface. Similarly, the greater the number of
UXO. In addition, existing technologies are being improved
freeze-thaw cycles over an extended period of time, the sooner
UXO may migrate to the surface. and new technologies are being developed to increase the
effectiveness of UXO characterization and remediation. The
UXO fuze type and sensitivity. In very general terms, following sections discuss management options and
magnetic and proximity fuzes are considered the most remediation options, and UXO characterization and excavation
sensitive, and pull-friction and pressure-type fuzes are technologies.
considered the least sensitive (Lantzer and others, 1995). The
fuze sensitivity, together with other factors such as whether the
fuzes are armed and the fuzes location on the munition 5.1 Management Options
influence the likelihood of detonation.
Management options provide a means of reducing immediate
Activities of individuals frequenting the area. The activities risks by controlling potential encounters with UXO. However,
of individuals in areas containing UXO, combined with the they do not eliminate the risk because the UXO remains in
fuze type, may increase the likelihood of detonation. For place. Management options include restricting property access,
example, UXO with impact fuzes would more likely detonate limiting property uses or activities that can occur on the
in areas of heavy excavation than in wildlife areas. property, conducting community education and awareness
programs, and conducting surface sweeps for UXO. These
4.2 Risk Assessment Initiatives
options are typically used as a readily available, proven method
DoD is undertaking several initiatives to assess risks posed by of addressing risk when UXO charaterization and removal
cannot be conducted in a safe, efficient, or cost-effective

6
manner. Two management options commonly used include
restricting access to the property and limiting the activities that
can occur on the property.

Restricting access. Access to areas containing UXO can be

limited by installing fencing or barriers to reduce the number
of people who may enter the property and encounter a UXO.
This option might be applicable as a short-term measure,
particularly for remote property that is not used or for property
with extremely rugged terrain.

Limiting activities. Activities that can take place on property

with UXO can be limited through deed restrictions or through Note: * If construction will occur, the presence of UXO must be determined
to a depth of 4 feet below the planned excavation depths. Any UXO should
other means. For example, a deed restriction may prohibit
be remediated to those depths.
property development or may prohibit excavation and other
earthmoving activities. In addition, notices of prohibited
activities and UXO warning signs can be posted throughout the 5.3 Characterization Technologies
area. A typical warning sign may state "Danger--UXO. Do
Not Enter." This option might be applicable for private Once a remediation depth is selected, the appropriate technolo-
property. gies can be implemented to characterize UXO. The technolo-
gies available to detect and characterize UXO vary in terms of
5.2 Remediation Options the types and depths of UXO they can detect, the topography
for which they can be used, and their overall effectiveness. The
Unlike management options, remediation options reduce risks various technologies currently in use are discussed below.
from UXO by removing all or some of the UXO present in an
area. DoD policies and procedures regarding remediation of Magnetometry. Magnetometry, which involves the use
DoD Ammunition and magnetometers and gradiometers, is designed to locate buried
Explosives Safety Standards (DoD 1995). The standards ordnance by detecting irregularities in the earths magnetic field
specify procedures for UXO characterization and control at caused by ferrous (iron-based) materials in the ordnance.
active installations, UXO remediation of property that is to be Gradiometers typically consist of two magnetometers config-
transferred or leased to another entity, and remediation of FUD ured to measure the spatial rate of change in the magnetic field.
sites. There are numerous types of magnetometers, many of which
were developed to improve detection sensitivity under varying
DoD procedures for remediating property with UXO include soil conditions. The components of a typical magnetometer
the following steps: include a detection sensor, a power supply, a computer data
system, and a means to record the locations of detected
Determine the ultimate land use anomalies. More advanced magnetometers incorporate a
Determine the boundaries of the areas to be navigation system, such as a differential global positioning
investigated and remediated system (GPS), to determine location. Magnetometers can be
Determine the type of known or suspected UXO hand-held, man-portable, towed by a vehicle, or mounted on
Define the locations and depths of UXO aircraft. Figure 11 shows a man-portable system.
Remove or neutralize the UXO
Document the process
Provide continued surveillance of areas where UXO
is above the frost line but below the remediation
depth

In cases when site-specific planning is not possible, DoD

policies and procedures specify remediation depths based on
land use. The remediation depths listed in Table 1 are to be
used for interim planning. Although the table provides
guidance on remediation depths, remediation to those depths
does not assure that all UXO has been removed. Residual
UXO may exist.

Figure 11. Typical Magnetometer System

7
The effectiveness of magnetometers depends on their sensitiv- and receiving units, a power supply, a computer data acquisi-
ity, the distance between the sensor and UXO, the amount of tion system, and a means of recording locations of anomalies.
ferromagnetic material in the UXO, background magnetic More advanced systems typically incorporate a navigation
noise, and site-specific soil properties. For optimal perfor- system such as GPS to determine locations. Most EM induc-
mance, magnetometers must be placed close to the ground tion systems are man-portable units consisting of a small,
surface. Recent technology demonstrations of commercially wheeled cart to transport the transmitter and receiver, a back-
available magnetometry technology showed that hand-held pack containing the systems electrical components, and a
and vehicle-towed magnetometers detected between 50 to 83 hand-held data recorder. Figure 13 shows a typical EM
percent of the ordnance present (PRC 1996a). The number of induction
false alarms generated for each UXO item detected (false system.
alarm ratio) was 10 for the 50 percent detection rate and 4 for
the 83 percent detection rate. Airborne magnetometers
showed little or no capability to detect UXO.

Ground Penetrating Radar. Ground penetrating radar (GPR)

has been used for many years as a remote sensing technology. Insert Figure 12 (photo)
The main elements of any GPR system are the transmitter unit,
the receiving unit or antenna, the control unit, and the display
and recorder unit. The transmitter produces short pulses of
electromagnetic energy that are directed toward the ground.
As the energy pulses travel into the ground, buried objects Figure 13. Typical EM Induction System
reflect the signals back to the receiving unit, where they are
recorded and processed into an image. Figure 12 shows a EM induction systems are most effective in detecting metallic
typical GPR system. objects near the soil surface. The performance of EM induction
systems depends on the distance between the transmitter-
receiver assembly and the UXO and the size of the UXO. For
optimal performance, the assembly must be positioned close to
the ground. Like magnetometers, EM induction systems
experience high background magnetic noise levels when they
Insert Figure 11 (photo) are used to survey areas with high concentrations of surface
ordnance fragments. EM induction systems evaluated during
recent technology demonstrations were capable of detecting
between 11 and 85 percent of the ordnance present. The
corresponding false alarm ratio for these EM systems were 13
and 5, respectively (PRC 1996a).
Figure 12. Typical GPR System
Infrared Sensors. Infrared (IR) sensor technologies can be
Many environmental factors significantly affect the ability of used to identify objects by measuring their thermal energy
GPR systems to produce accurate images. Important factors signatures. UXO on or near the soil surface may have a
include the density and type of vegetative cover, water content different heat capacity or heat transfer properties than the
of the vegetation and soil, and topography. For optimal surrounding soil; theoretically, this temperature difference can
performance, the antenna should be positioned perpendicular be detected and used to identify UXO. For optimal perfor-
to the ground and the soil should be dry. In general, GPR is mance of IR sensor technologies, a sharp thermal contrast must
not effective in saturated soils and wet areas because water exist between the UXO and its surroundingsusually the soil
absorbs GPR energy. Of nine GPR systems evaluated during surface. IR sensor results also depend on the type and density
recent technology demonstrations, none of the systems could of vegetative cover, weather conditions, time of day, and
effectively detect UXO, primarily because of the wet clay soils specific size and properties of the UXO. In practice, IR sensor
at the test site. For the systems that detected ordnance, the technologies can be used to detect UXO located on an
detection rate ranged from 1 to 5 percent of the ordnance unvegetated soil surface. However, they have shown a minimal
present. The false alarm ratio was 28 and 3, respectively (PRC ability to characterize UXO.
1996a).
Multiple Sensors. Combining two or more sensor technologies
Electromagnetic Induction. Electromagnetic (EM) induction into a multisensor approach has been demonstrated to improve
can be used to detect both ferrous and nonferrous metallic UXO detection and characterization. For example, during
UXO. EM induction systems transmit electric current into the technology demonstrations of commercially available sensor
soil to detect metallic objects. The systems measure either the technologies, magnetometers combined with an EM sensor
secondary magnetic field induced in metal objects or the were capable of detecting between 65 to 72 percent of the
difference between the electrical conductivity of the soil and ordnance present. The false alarm ratios were 9 and 21,
the electrical conductivity of buried objects such as UXO. respectively.
Components of an EM induction system include transmitting

8
Other Technologies. Other technologies are currently being extraction. Vacuum excavators use high-speed air to penetrate
developed for detecting UXO, but have not been successfully and dislodge the soil, a vacuum to extract the dislodged soil, and
demonstrated. These include nuclear technology, acoustic sensors, a conveyor belt to transport the soil away from the excavation.
and biological sensors. Nuclear technology is based on the premise A vacuum excavator evaluated during recent demonstrations of
that some chemicals in explosive compounds respond in a unique commercially available excavation technologies was capable of
way, such as emitting gamma particles, when exposed to radiation. excavating to 3 meters below ground surface in soft, silty soil.
However, nuclear technology cannot penetrate soils well, and if the
soils have been treated with fertilizers, the number of false alarms The use of mechanized systems is generally faster and more
may be high (Heckelman 1995). Acoustic sensors transmit sound efficient than the use of only manual systems. In addition,
waves through the soil; the sound waves then bounce off or echo mechanized systems offer a higher degree of worker safety
back from any object encountered in the soil. However, acoustic because the machine separates the UXO and the operator.
sensors cannot discriminate UXO from other objects, and the Mechanized systems operate less efficiently in remote areas, in
relatively long wave lengths used by the acoustic sensors cannot areas with muddy or saturated soils, or in areas with shallow
detect small UXO. Finally, dogs (biological sensors) are being water tables. Mechanized excavation methods may require that
trained to detect vapors given off by explosives in munitions, but additional UXO detection activities be conducted to confirm
they cannot detect UXO more than 6 inches below the ground target removals and increase the probability of removing the
surface. After 16 months the vapors from UXO lessen such that UXO.
detection by smell is not an effective detection option (Heckelman
1995). In 1985, DoD estimated that the cost to mechanically excavate
UXO to 0.5 meter below the surface may range from $35 to
5.4 Excavation Technologies $450 per item cleared, based on an economic model for clearing
1,000 acres of hilly terrain with medium overgrowth
(NAVEODTECHCEN 1985).
Historically, the UXO excavation phase primarily involved manual
methods that were very labor-intensive. Research and development
Remote-Controlled Systems. Remote-controlled UXO
efforts over the last 20 years have focused on increased mechaniza-
excavation systems include telerobotic and autonomous systems.
tion to improve efficiency and enhance operator safety. The
In general, the capabilities, effectiveness, and implementability
effectiveness of any excavation technology, however, depends on
of remote-controlled systems are the same as those for mecha-
the effectiveness of the technology used to detect UXO. If a
nized systems. The primary difference is that the operator of a
detection system generates a high number of false alarms over a
remote-controlled system remains outside the immediate hazard
large area, that area will require otherwise unnecessary excavation.
area. Of the three categories of UXO excavation methods,
This is further discussed in Section 6.0.
remote-controlled systems offer the highest degree of safety.
Available UXO excavation technologies are grouped into three
Remote-controlled systems typically include a navigation and
categoriesmanual methods, mechanized systems, and remote-
positioning componentusually a GPS. However, GPS satellite
controlled systems.
signals can be obstructed by tall trees and dense vegetation,
limiting the systems accuracy and applicability. GPS can be
Manual Methods. Manual UXO excavation methods are
integrated with an inertial navigation system to increase the
performed entirely without mechanized equipment. Standard
capability of the navigation system.
manual excavation methods include using shovels and other digging
tools to excavate soil and expose potential UXO targets. Manual
Remote-controlled excavation systems evaluated during recent
excavation methods require that additional UXO detection activities
technology demonstrations had difficulty exposing small targets
be conducted to confirm target removals and increase the
in fine, silty soil. In some cases, the remote-controlled systems
probability of removing all UXO present. Manual methods work
required the use of man-portable UXO detection systems to
best for near-surface and shallow subsurface UXO. They are also
search the excavated soil for UXO targets. In addition, the
more effective in excavating small UXO (such as small arms
process can be relatively slow. For example, one system
munitions and grenades) than large munitions (such as bombs).
demonstrated excavated only five ordnance items per day. The
Manual methods present significant safety risks to workers. In
equipment operates best in relatively flat grassy or unvegetated
heavily vegetated areas, vegetation should be removed to increase
areas where the equipment can be easily maneuvered (PRC 1994
worker safety.
and 1996a).
In 1985, DoD estimated that the cost to manually excavate UXO to
0.5 meter below the surface may range from $140 to $315 per item 6.0 DECISION-MAKING FACTORS
cleared, based on an economic model for clearing 1,000 acres of
hilly terrain with medium overgrowth (NAVEODTECHCEN 1985). Various parties are involved in decisions regarding the manage-
ment, remediation, and use of property containing UXO. For
Mechanized Systems. Mechanized UXO excavation systems active installations, DoD personnel make decisions based on
include the use of excavators, bulldozers, front-end loaders, and specific guidance and policies. However, some property that
other heavy construction equipment. Historically, backhoe-type contains UXO will be transferred or leased under the Base
excavators have been the most commonly used mechanized system. Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act, and many FUD sites
have already been transferred and converted to different uses.

9
For BRAC sites, Restoration Advisory Boards (RAB) provide by the cost estimates for JPG ($4,000 per acre versus $1.4
input in the decision-making process. FUD sites, on the other million per acre). The ordnance impact range at Fort Meade in
hand, may have been transferred decades ago and may be Maryland, which covers about 7,600 acres, has been transferred
managed, owned, or operated by a variety of entities, including to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for use as a wildlife
other federal agencies such as the Department of Interior or refuge, and most of the impact range at Fort Ord, California,
Department of Agriculture, state or local government, com- may be transferred to the Bureau of Land Management for use
mercial enterprises, and the private sector. as wildlife habitat.

DoD is developing a Range Rule that identifies a process for The effectiveness of characterization and excavation technolo-
appropriate response actions on military ranges that (1) have gies is also a limiting factor. Although many characteriztion
been taken out of service and put to new use, (2) are FUD systems are capable of detecting and locating UXO, they are
sites, and (3) are slated for transfer outside of military control generally unable to discriminate between ordnance and
under the BRAC program. The process has six basic phases nonordnance items. This inability to discriminate increases
range identification, range assessment, range evaluation, site- excavation due to false alarms. The effectiveness of excavation
specific response, recurrent review, and final range close-out. technologies is generally limited by (1) the excavation depth
that can be achieved compared to the depth of the UXO present
Two primary impediments to efficient and effective clearance and (2) the time required to excavate one item compared to the
of UXO are (1) cost and (2) the current lack of efficient and number of items that must be excavated. Furthermore, the
effective UXO characterization and excavation technologies. environmental impacts from UXO clearance could range from
A 1993 BRAC report to Congress states, With current minimal to significant depending on the amount of vegetation
technology, the cleanup of UXO and explosives residues is a that must be removed, the depth and areal extent of
labor intensive, dangerous, and expensive process (DoD remediation, and the excavation method used. Results could
1993). Although costs typically range from $3,000 to $7,000 include loss of wildlife habitat, soil erosion, and loss of flora
per acre, they are significantly influenced by how the land will and fauna species, among others. All of these factors, coupled
be used and the extent of contamination. For example, the with those discussed above, must be considered and balanced
estimated cost for cleaning up Kahoolawe Island, a 28,800- against potential risk and the degree of risk reduction that could
acre former Navy ordnance impact range in Hawaii, is $400 be achieved. As UXO characterization and excavation tech-
million, or approximately $14,000 per acre (Heckelman 1995). nologies improve, the effectiveness of remediation should
The extent of contamination is great, and the island will be increase, and the time required for remediation, the cost of
reused for cultural, historical, archeological, and educational remediation, and the environmental impacts from remediation
purposes. Mobilization costs will also be high for any work should decrease.
conducted on the uninhabited island.

In 1994, the Army estimated that the cost to clean up about POINT OF CONTACT
53,650 acres at Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG) could range
from $216 million for limited public access (or about $4,000 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology
per acre) to $7.8 billion for unrestricted use (or about $1.4
million per acre). However, the estimated value of the land is
Division
$25 million for unrestricted use (Heckelman 1995). The value UXO Countermeasures Department
of the land for limited public access would be far less. Code 50B22
2008 Stump Neck Road
The cost to clean up property for use as wildlife habitat Indian Head, Maryland 20640-5070
(limited access) is far less than for other uses, as demonstrated

10
 REFERENCES

Department of Defense (DoD). 1993. 1993 Report to the President from the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

DoD. 1995. DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards. Chapter 12. Real Property Contaminated with Ammunition,
Explosives, or Chemical Agents. DoD 6055.9. March 1.

General Accounting Office (GAO). 1995a. Military Bases: Environmental Impact at Closing Installations. GAO/NSIAD-95-70.
February.

GAO. 1995b. Unexploded OrdnanceA Coordinated Approach to Detection and Clearance is Needed. GAO/NSIAD-95-197.
September.

Hanson, J.V., T.D. Evans, R.A. Hevenor, and J. Ehlen. 1992. Mine Detection in Dry Soils Using Radar. U.S. Army Topographic
Engineering Center Report No. R-163. March 17.

Heckelman, K. 1995. Unexploded Ordnance and Explosive Residuals on Military RangesIs the Remediation Cure Worse than the
Ailment? May 12.

Lantzer, Major N., and others. 1995. Risk Assessment: Unexploded Ordnance. Point paper prepared for NAVEODTECHDIV.
August.

Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). 1995. Demonstrator Performance at the Unexploded Ordnance Advanced Technology Demon-
stration at Jefferson Proving Ground (Phase I) and Implications for UXO Clearance. Prepared for Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Environmental Security. IDA Paper P-3114. October.

Mulvihill, R.J. and others. 1996. Unexploded Ordnance Risk Assessment Framework. Presented at UXO Forum 96. April.

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (NAVEODTECHCEN). 1985. Range Clearance - An Economic Model,
Final Report. Indian Head, Maryland. May.

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV). 1990. Range Clearance Technology Assessment
(Revision 1), Final Report. March.

NAVEODTECHDIV. 1994. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures. Technical Manual 60A-1-1-15. April 4.

PRC Environmental Management, Inc. (PRC). 1994. UXO Advanced Technology Program at Jefferson Proving Ground (Phase I).
U.S. Army Environmental Center Report No. SFIM-AEC-ET-CR-94120.

PRC. 1996a. Draft Technical Report for Controlled Site Phase II at Jefferson Proving Ground. Prepared for NAVEODTECHDIV.
June.

PRC. 1996b. Unexploded Ordnance Assessment of U.S. Military Ranges in Panama: Empire, Balboa West, and Pina Ranges.
Prepared for Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan Agency. April.

PRC Inc. 1995. System/Design Trade Study for the Navigation of the Airborne, Ground Vehicular and Man-
Portable Platforms in Support of the Buried Ordnance Detection, Identification, and RemediationTechnology. U.S. Army
Environmental Center Report No. SFIM-AEC-ET-CR-9503. March.

QuantiTech, Inc. 1994. OEW Site Mitigation Prioritization, Final Report, Version D. Prepared for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Huntsville Division. Technical Report 93R004vD

U.S. Department of the Army (U.S. Army). 1994. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. Field Manual No. 21-16. Fleet Marine
Force Manual No. 13-8-1. August.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 1995. Sensor Technology Assessment for Ordnance and Explosive Waste Detection and
Location. March 1.

11
 APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF UXO TERMINOLOGY
(2 pages)
 APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF UXO TERMINOLOGY

antimateriel: Designed to cause deterioration of or damage to selected materiel.

antipersonnel: Designed to kill, wound, or obstruct personnel.

antitank: Designed to be used against tanks.

arming device: A device designed to perform the electrical and/or mechanical alignment necessary to
initiate an explosive train.

caliber: The diameter of a projectile or the diameter of the bore of a gun or launching tube. Caliber is
usually expressed in millimeters or inches.

casing: The fabricated outer part of ordnance designed to hold an explosive charge and the mechanism
required to fire this charge.

dispenser: An item designed to be mounted, but not permanently fixed, on aircraft to carry and eject
small ordnance.

electromagnetic induction: Transfer of electrical power from one circuit to another by varying the
magnetic linkage.

explosive: A substance or mixture of substances that can undergo a rapid chemical change generating
large quantities of energy generally accompanied by hot gases.

fragmentation: Term applied to ordnance indicating that it is primarily intended to produce a fragmen-
tation effect.

fuze: 1. A device with explosive components designed to initiate a train of fire or detonation in ordnance.
2. A nonexplosive device designed to initiate an explosion in ordnance.
fuze, delay: Any impact fuze incorporating a means of delaying its action after contact with the target.
Delay fuzes are classified by the length of time of the delay.

fuze, impact: A fuze in which detonation is initiated by the force of impact and that usually functions
instantaneously or after a short delay.
fuze, proximity: A fuze wherein primary initiation occurs by remotely sensing the presence, distance,
and/or direction of the target through the characteristics of the target itself or its environment.

fuze, self-destruct: A fuze designed to burst a projectile before the end of its flight.
gradiometer: Magnetometer for measuring the rate of change of a magnetic field.

ground penetrating radar: A system that uses pulsed radio waves to penetrate the ground and measure
the distance and direction of subsurface targets through radio waves that are reflected back to the
system.
illumination: Term applied to ordnance indicating that it is primarily intended to produce light of high
intensity. Such ordnance usually contains a flare and may contain a parachute for suspension in
the air.

incendiary: Any flammable material that is used as a filler in ordnance intended to destroy a target by
fire.
magnetometer: An instrument for measuring the intensity and direction of magnetic fields.

materiel: All items necessary for the equipment, maintenance, operation, and support of military activi-
ties without distinction as to their application for administrative or combat purposes; excludes
ships or naval aircraft.

A-1
munition: 1. Ordnance. 2. Any and all supplies and equipment required to conduct warfare.
ordnance: 1. Military weapons collectively, along with ammunition and the equipment to keep them in
good repair. 2. Explosives, chemicals, pyrotechnics, and similar stores, e.g., bombs, guns and
ammunition, flares, smoke, napalm.

projectile: An object projected by an applied force and continuing in motion by its own inertia, as a
bullet, bomb, shell, or grenade. Also applied to rockets and to guided missiles.
propellant: An agent such as an explosive powder or fuel that can be made to provide the necessary
energy for propelling ordnance.

smoke: 1. Filling for ordnance such as bombs, projectiles, and grenades. 2. Term applied to ordnance
indicating that it is primarily intended to produce smoke of the types or colors specified.
unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise
prepared for action, and that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a
manner as to constitute a hazard, and that remains unexploded by malfunction, design, or any
other cause.
warhead: That part of a missile, projectile, rocket, or other munition that contains the explosive system,
chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage.

white phosphorous: A chemical that when exposed to air, burns spontaneously, producing dense clouds
of white smoke.

A-2
 APPENDIX B
FORMAT FOR REPORTING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
(1 page)
 APPENDIX B
FORMAT FOR REPORTING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

TO: (EOD Personnel or Other Appropriate Authority)

FROM: (Name, Organization)

RE: UXO Encounter

1. Time of Encounter: (Date and time)

2. Location of Encounter: (Global Positioning System coordinates, if known)

3. Individuals Present: (Names, organizations)

4. Condition of Ordnance: (Buried, partially buried, fully exposed)

5. Type of Ordnance: (Grenade, projectile, rocket)

6. Estimated Size of Ordnance: (Length, width, height)

7. Distinctive Features: (Shape, color, markings)

8. Nearby Structures: (Names, types, and distances from ordnance)

B-1
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