Coast Artillery Journal - Oct 1939
Coast Artillery Journal - Oct 1939
Coast Artillery Journal - Oct 1939
JOURNAL
GUNNERS' INSTRUCTION
oj;
oj;
oj;
oj;
oj;
oj;
~
oj;
oj;
.... "T": ........•.
...... -
• -.
~
~
PAMPHLETS ~
+
:t; New Subject Matter, New IllllStralio1/S, ComfJlele-Official ~
oj; +
~
~
Fo< all em' Mtill"y
435-310 (Examination
Q'gan' ",tions. Fully moets
for Gunners).
,h,
Used for instruction
"qu'"m,uts
in a number
of T,aining R'gulations
of RO. T.e. units .....
~:.:..
>1- .,.
>1-
>1-
NUMBER GUNNERS' INSTRUCTION PAMPHLETS PRICE .,.
,.
:t. I. 2nd Class Gunner, Antiaircraft Artillery (Except Searchlight Battery) $0.65 t
~ II. 2nd Class Gunner, Antiaircraft Artillery (Searchlight Battery) 0.50 t
~ II I. 1st Class Gunner, Antiaircrait Artillery (Except Searchlight Battery) 0.65 .;.
:t IV. 1st Class Gunner, Antiaircraft Artillery (Searchlight Battery) 0.40 t
:t V. 2nd Class Gunner, Fixed Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.55 t
oj-< VI. 1st Class Gunner, Fixed Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.50 .,.
oj; .,.
oj-< VII. 2nd Class Gunner, ~[obile Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.65 t
~ VIII. 1st Class Gunner. ~[obile Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.75 ~
; IX. Expert Gunner, Antiaircraft Artillery 1.00 £
..,., X. Expert Gunner, Fixed Artillery 1.00
oj; .,.
or, XI. Expert Gunner. ~IobiJe Seacoast Artillery 1.00
:t XII. Submarine ~Iining 1.25 t
~ ============:=============================== ~
:t; These pamphlets recently have been revised and brought up.to-date. They cover the instruction of all
:t: 2nd Class, 1st Class, and Expert Gunners of Antiaircraft. Fixed and Mobile Artillery. t
:t Invaluable for the training and instruction of Coast A rtillerT personnel. Each enlisted man of a submarine .,.
~ mine detachment should ha\'e a copy of "Submarine Mining." f
~ The above prices
discount
are retail (postpaid) for single copies. To ORGANIZATIONS
of 20% will be allowed on any order regardless of number.
of the military
F.O.B. Washington,
establishment
D. C.
a t,.
......
oj-<
,.~
x+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+++++~~~~~+~+~~~+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+++~~f~
COASTARTILLER
JOUR L
FOUNDED IN 1892 AS THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY
CONTENTS
Opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in articles are solely those Of]
[ the authors and are in no sense official. They should not be considered as
those of the Chief of Coast Artillery or any branch of the \Var Department.
~"litJi"'h.('a bi-montmv Ii\'" the Unitr-d States Coast ..i:rtillery A1"soe]itltion. :Md]tt:1ri313n~1 pxeeu.tive offices. 1115 RHYenteent1~. ~trf~f.t, X.\\"."
Iltushh'lgh:m.1D. (t "Terms: $4J.JO I~er year. (Coast _.\rtillt:"rr Association ]n€']nlJt.r~,$3.00 per ye~rj Si~~lB cnpies .75c. E...
o ntered as 8~('~nd:
~~a~~mattEl" at 'Vashington~ D. C.; additional entry at R](~hmond~Va., under the Act m: M3.rClll i..'! 18i!.l. QopyrJl,g;ht,1.f'tl9~by the"[ D]teo.
~tatE-3 Coast Artillery Assflciation.
* * * * * * * * * detensive organization and so on. The term . ant-
aircraft artillery defense" or "AAA defense," rdel)
(Q all elements of the antiaircraft artillery organllJ_
tion proper, to include the AA ;\rtillen'. intelli<Yenc
THE ARTllLERY.PURSUIT service, the gun and searchlight organization, and
~ r
* * *
capabilities. These misconceptions have grown our of un-
justified conclusions drawn from the results of various
* * * * * * *
combined exercises and demonstrations. These con-
clusions, it is believed, have been based upon insufficient
data or upon results so seriously affected by lack of suitable
By
training of the participating units, or b:' other extraneous
causes, as to render quite unwarranted the drawing of as- Captain Arthur B. Nicholson
sumptions of a general nature.
In this discussion, the term "antiaircraft defense" refers
to all elements of an antiaircraft defensive organization,
Coast Artillery Corps
and includes pursuit aviation, the interception net, facili-
ties and observers, all elements of the antiaircraft artillen'
* * * * * * * * * *
388 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
hope of a greater chance for destruction before the bomb objective might well prove to have been more expensive
release line was reached, is an example. to the attacker than to the defender. A modern bambino:-,
Such a perfect defense is obviously desirable as an ideal plane costs in the neighborhood of a quarter of a million
toward which to develop, but as a practicable objective it dollars. It is obviously not necessary to destroy a great
is too high a goal. many planes in order to make the cost to the attacker too
Our former acceptance of the assumption that such great. In war, the cost factor would be of less importance,
effectiveness of defense was virtually attainable has been but the months of time and extensive manufacturing ef-
largely responsible for the dearth ~f major advances in fort required to replace the lost bombardment plane
antiaircraft defense. Technique has been steadily and would remain. To replace a substantial part of a modern
greatly improved but there has been little to compare with bombardment force might well involve more difficulty
the strides made in the power of the air offensive in the and tactical and strategical injury to the attacker than
last few years. There has been little striking-out along the loss of the destroyed objective would cause the de-
new lines, and this is imperative if the challenge of the fender. The fact that the attacker sustained few losses
multiple-plane bombardment attack is to be met effec- before bombs were dropped, in proportion to those lost
tively. We have tagged along for far too long. As an im- on the withdrawal, might well prove but sorry consolation
portant exception to this generalization there may be for the fact that a major part of his force was gone.
mentioned the successful operation of the aircraft inter- Major General E. B. Ashmore, commander of the
ception net and the blackout of civilian communities in the London Air Defence Area, in his AA Bible, Air Defence.
Fort Bragg exercises last fall. has this to say:
The failure to deal with the problem is largely charge- "No measure of any kind, whether bombing enemy
able to a tendency to develop technique at the expense of towns and aerodromes, or defensive arrangements in this
tactics. In the past, when a difficulty faced us, our first im- country, are going to insure that no bombs will fall on
pulse often regardless of the real nature of the problem, London. What the defences can and should do is to take
has been to invent a new mechanical device to solve the such toll of the enemy that he will find bombing too
problem for us. Problems of tactical disposition have com- expensive, and will therefore stop his attacks."
monly been approached from a too narrow mathematical And again, in referring to the last attack of the war bv
and mechanical viewpoint. Although mathematical hit German aircraft upon London, during the night of Mav
expectancy factors and effective ranges are absolutely 19, 1918, when, out of between thirty and forty attacking
basic in any consideration of tactical dispositions, they are planes, ten were lost and only thirteen reached London:
by no means the only important aspects of such problems. "This was a typical example of what a hard-hitting de-
Our technical advances have been tremendous since the fence can accomplish. No scale of defence, however great,
World War. The development of such devices as the di- can secure complete immunit:, from bombing; but by
rector has been of such importance as to make nearly all suitable arrangements the attacker may be made to suffer
the difference between success and failure in the hitting of such casualties that his efforts will die out."
a target. But extremely valuable as they are, mechanical The Air Corps estimates that a 50% reduction in the
devices will not solve the problem of the multiple-plane efficiency of the attacker is accomplished by the mere
major attack. Nor will any prospective technical develop- presence of any effective AA defense at all. He is forced
ments, or the subdivision of the limited number of bat- to adopt formations unfavorable to accurate bombing, the
teries available into a greater number of smaller fire units, accuracy of his bombing itself is seriously impaired by
nor even the concentration of the defense close about the the defensive measures he must adopt, he is prevented
objective, succeed in preventing a considerable part of the from making "trial shots," he is forced to employ a far
attacking planes from reaching the bomb release line. It greater force to insure destruction than would otherwise
is time for the defense to face this fact squarely. be required.
Two attitudes have contributed equally. The first has On the other hand, for the defender to secure a diminu-
been the tendency to believe that if our defensive mission tion of the remaining 50% reduction in the attacker's
is to be accomplished all planes must be either turned efficiency to prevent any bombing whatever presents a
back or shot down before they drop their bombs. The problem in diminishing returns. After attaining a
second, the too-common belief of bombardment com- degree of defense efficiency at which it becomes seriouslv
manders that they can successfully accomplish their mis- unprofitable for the enemy to attack, the defender attains
sions by shielding incoming planes by flying their with- small further gains. in effectiveness only at the cost of in-
drawing planes under them at lower altitudes. Both ordinately great, and eventually wholly impracticable,
attirudes would be justified if the successful bombing increases in the defensive organization.
of anyone objective would, by itself, win a war, or even In this discussion, the conception of the type of defen-
seriously affect its outcome. This, of course, is not the sive organization to be sought is predicated upon the
case. basic idea of the "Limited Aim." Such a defensive or-
If, however, the defense is strong enough to destroy a o-anization must be at once able "to take such toll of the
large part of the attacking force, the bombing of the ~nemY that he will find bombing too expensive, and will
1939 DEFENSE AGAINST NIGHT BOMBARDMENT 389
therefore stop his attacks," and-it must be practicable contact in every way with the defending forces, or to
of realization. reduce the time of such contact to the absolute minimum.
No antiaircraft artillery defense, organized under our The only practicable means of providing the necessary
tactical doctrine as taught to date, can fulfil these require- reserve of concentrated striking power, is in the use of
ments if subjected to heavy bombardment night attacks. pursuit aviation as an integral part of the defense of ob-
jectives of vital importance.
STATIC DEFENSE AND MOBILE RESERVE
DEFENSE POWERS AND CAPABILITIES
The employment by bombardment aviation of any
method of attack-such as the flight or squadron meth- There are no serious weaknesses nor problems material-
ods-whereby multiple targets are presented to the AA ly difficult to solve in the field of cooperative daytime
artillery simultaneously and in rapid succession within a defense by pursuit aviation and AA artillery. In day-
narrow sector, presents a problem practically impossible light, pursuit normally can, and will, tactically dispose
of effective solution by the antiaircraft artillery acting itself so as to accomplish its most effective work in areas
alone. entirely outside, and well in advance of the zones of
This difficulty is rooted in a principle as old as war- action of the AA artillery. The problem of mutual inter-
that no defense can succeed which does not have the ference is thereby eliminated. Reasonably effective day-
power to place a concentration of force, normally in the light work by pursuit can be expected. Whether or not
form of a tactically mobile reserve, in support of a point it succeeds in shooting down a substantial part of the
or sector threatened by a powerful attack. attacking force, it can be expected to considerably disrupt
Such power is not possessed by a defense composed of an attack before it gets started, perhaps breaking it up into
AA artillery alone, nor will it probably ever be. Anti- disorganized individual attacks which present a relatively
aircraft artillery does not possess tactical mobility in the simple problem to the AA attillery. Consequently no
defense of a rear area objective. Speeds of aircraft being further discussion of this phase is necessary here.
what they are, it is not within the realm of practical pos- Nor do there appear to exist serious problems in the
sibility, to move AAA batteries to positions in concen- more purely technical aspects of shooting down a given
trated support of a threatened sector, once the direction of target. The pursuiter, once he gets to close quarters, may
attack becomes definitely known. Since it is impossible be able to shoot down the bomber. The antiaircraft
to anticipate the direction of an attack with reasonable artillel!', for its part, is tactically disposed to cover that
accuracy, AA artillery must be emplaced so as to provide part of the bomber's course during which the sighting
an all-around defense and, once the attack begins, must operation is being performed and during which the bomb-
defend as best it can from the positions in which it finds ing plane cannot maneuver if the bombs are to strike on or
itself. near the target. In consequence, maneuvers by the bomb-
A minor concentration in the direction of probable er in the effort to escape AA artillery nre can be expected
routes of approach may have limited application in certain to be of materially less benefit than is often supposed to
situations, but a bombardment commander about to at- be the case.
tack an objective strongly defended will be much more Although, in general, the same considerations apply to
interested in a route of approach which will expose his the illumination of the approaching bomber by search-
force to the least amount of fire, than he will be in terrain lights, maneuver can present a much more serious problem
considerations. Accordingly, obvious routes of approach to the searchlight unit. If the gun battery is to open fire
are more likely to be avoided than used, if such action upon the target at the beginning of the bombing run,
gives promise of avoiding effective fire. it is necessary that the searchlights illuminate the target
In an infantry position defense, the defending com- well in advance of this point, while the bomber is still
mander will never, except in the most abnormal cases, be free to maneuver. Accordingly, sound tactics dictate that
able to establish a defensive position so uniformly strong the lights be kept dark until the target has reached such
that a powerful enemy will not be able to concentrate close range that it can be picked up within a few seconds
decisively superior force at a given point. Such a defense after the lights go into action and before the target can
of an infantry position, if it could be established, would be execute extensive maneuvers. A target which maneuvers
rightly condemned as a most wasteful use of force; in the during the entire approach before the searchlights go int;)
case of antiaircraft artillery, it is inconceivable that such action and until the last moment before the beginning of
amounts of force would ever be available for the defense bomb sighting, might avoid illumination until the latter
of anyone or single group of objectives. half of the bombing run, in which case the time of recti-
The difficulty facing the antiaircraft artillery in bring- linear flight available to the gun battery for fire might be
ing adequate force to bear is further pointed up by the fact insufficient to allow of shooting it down. However, the
that the object sought by the attacking forces in a major use by searchlight units of detectors of the types under-
bombardment attack is not the defeat or destruction of the stood to be now in advanced stages of development in the
AAA forces, but a swift penetration and equally swift major countries of the world, which eliminate completely
withdrawal. The attack strikes not at the defending all prediction time for the searchlights, will render ma-
forces, but at the object defended, and strives to avoid neuver of no effect in escaping illumination.
390 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOl'R0:AL Septelllbf:f- Octobf
T
Nor are defending searchlights the critical bottleneck in searchlight batteries handicapped b:' lack of adegu:ml
the handling of multiple-plane :macks. The work of the Hying hours.
1St \Ving, GHQ Air Force, and at least one AA regi- The total number of Hying hours available throughout
ment since 1934, has demonstrated that a trained search- the year, in single-plane missions, to this battery has
light unit, although manning obsolete sound locators and averaged approximatel:' 733h hours per year for the five
old searchlight control equipment can, under both favor- years from 1934 to 1938. Of this, about 60%. or forty to
able and certain unfavorable weather conditions, illumi- fift:, hours. was used during the period of intensive train-~
nate more planes of a squadron method of attack up to ing for target practice. the remainder in preliminary basic
15,000 feet than the guns of the normal AAA defense can training and after-season refresher drills.
engage. In direct prep:1tation for the multiple-plane advanced
Insofar as the apparentl:' contradictor:' results of other practices of 1935. approximatel:' fifty-five plane hours of I
exercises are concerned, it is most unwise and even dan- formation Hying were used. This comprised attacks by the I
gerous to predicate estimates of the efficiency of defense squadron method by from four to six planes a night overl
to be expected on the part of a first class power, upon the a period of approximatel:' a week immediately preceding
results heretofore attained b:' the searchlights, the three advanced practices.
It appears that in general, these results can be attributed This amount of training. both upon single-plane and
to the fact that the highly specialized training necessary formation Hying, is the minimum requirement of a search,
for efficienc:' in multiple-plane work was not available to light battery during the period immediately preceding a
the participating units prior to the exercises. It is abso- colllbined exercise or tactical inspection. if the results
lutely imperative that such preliminary training be made attained by the searchlights arc to have any significancc~
available to participating searchlight units if effective other than as an index of the state of training of the bat-
work is to be expected. tery.
The searchlight battery of the regiment above referred Such training would be very easy to obtain if all
to has been fortunate, in recent years, in having had avail- searchlight units were located close to Army air fields.
able nearby the facilities of the 1st Wing, GHQ Air where purely incidental Hying could be made use of. and
Force, and in having had the hearty cooperation of Gen- is probably less than would be obtained after a short
eral H. H. Arnold, recent 1st Wing Commander, and period of active service in wartime.
his successors. The searchlight advanced practices held in 1935 and
No less credit is due the cheerful, wholly/ voluntary co-
'
1937, while suppl:'ing reliable data on the practicabilitv
operation of the. 40th Division Aviation, California Na- of illumination of the planes of a multiple-plane attack.
tional Guard. The pilots of this organization have Hown were conducted at altitudes below 15.000 feet. Furthcr
largely on their own private time and have. since 1934. work is necessar:' at the higher altitudes.
supplied from 25% to 30% of the total Hying hours The fields of technique and materiel do not contain
available throughout the year to the battery, except in major obstacles without present or immediately pros'
19,6. when the:' supplied a majority of the total. Their pective solution. Serious and fundamental difficulties.
help was especiall:' valuable during the "off season," by however. remain in other fields.
Hying the occasional missions necessary to keep the bat-
LI~IITATIONS UPON ILLU:\IINATION
ter:,'s efficiency from dropping off too greatly. and in
toning them up before maneuvers. So long as it is necessar:' to give the target sufficienth
Personal contact and informal requests will find other good illumination to allow of accurate fire from the ground
National Guard units onlv too glad to cooperate with under all conditions. two serious difficultie~ remain inter-
DEFENSE AGAINST NIGHT BOMBARDMENT 391
. posed. These will, furthermore, remain almost equally searchlight operator actl1all~. see the target when "Aicked,"
formidable, no matter how accurate the detector used for and thereafter keep it in the beam by sight.
position-finding may be, so long as illumination is re- The all-important fact must not be lost sight of, that
quired. the paramount difficulty lies not in illuminating the tar-
Of these, the first and most serious is moonlight. Bright get, nor in the amount of light that penetrates the haze
moonlight gives bombardment its most favorable condi- and actually reaches the target. The ruling consideration
tions and the defending artillery one of its worst handi- is the ability of the searchlight operator on the ground
caps. It is to be accepted as normal that a bombardment actually to see the target, once it is illuminated.
commander will prefer and seek bright moonlight nights Future detectors ma~' give enough accuracy to permit
for an attack. Not only is navigation simplified, bur the continuous illumination of a target by tracking on data
objective itself is easier to locate. alone, even though the operator be completely blinded by
On the other hand, the effect of moonlight upon illumi- haze, smoke or moonlight. It is doubtful however, that
nation and visibility. are objectionable to AA searchliahts.
n these will produce accurac~' sufficiently high to permit
The lack of a dark background against which to con- effective, unobserved, "blind" gunfire, without illumina-
trast the illuminated target not only greatly increases the tion of the target. For the near future, at least, effective
time required for the original "pickup," bur it also de- functioning of the instruments of the gun battery will
creases the range at which it can be made. This impedes continue to require that their operators be able to see from
the success of continuous "carry," on the part of the the ground a well-illuminated target, bright moonlight
searchlight crew, and reduces the efficiency of illumination and ground haze notwithstanding.
to such an extent as to markedly increase the difficult)' of 50 long as the observer remains on the ground, these
getting accurate data on the target by instruments. Yet extremely serious difficulties remain. If, however, he is
nights of bright moonlight are those on which bombard- located, not on the ground under the haze, but in a pur-
ment attacks can most certainly be expected. suit airplane one, two, three or four thousand feet under
The second major difficulty is caused by ground haze. the target will the difficulties be as serious? Obviously not.
Irs effects are materially more injurious than those of
POSSIBILITIES OF PURSUIT AVIATION
moonlight, but its occurrence cannot be predicted at the
objective by the attacker with such certainty as moonlight, The question will at once be raised-"How great will
nor does it occur with such regularity and frequency. be the adverse effect upon the sound locators of the noise
Consequently it is placed below moonlight as an obstacle of the pursuit planes at altitudes a few thousand feet lower
under general service conditions. A ground haze so light than the approaching bombardment?"
as to be indistinquishable to the high-flying bombardment The answer to this is definite. The adverse effect will
can, by its diffusion and reflection of light back upon the never be serious, provided listeners are reasonablv ex-
searchlight crew, make it most difficult to detect from the perienced and the pursuit planes properly controlled and
ground and to follow continuousl~' a high target, even do not fly at unreasonably low altitudes. An experienced
though it be well illuminated. listener can distinguish with little difficulty the peculiar
At present, such are the inherent inaccuracies of the sound of a high, twin-engined bomber through the noise
sound locator, even with the best of crew training, that of a lower, single-engined plane, unless the lower plane is
, the most that can be expected from sound locator data so low as to drown out all other sound entirelv.
alone are frequent "flicks" by the light as it follows along The results of various exercises in the p~st few vears
the course of the plane. For continuous, uninterrupted il- justifies this statement that negligible interference will be
lumination after the "pickup" it is necessary that the caused b~, pursuit, when properl~. handled.
392 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
Almost the only important historical example of sus- bomber closely, can help the scout pilot to get into touch,
tained effective, cooperative work between searchlights even if the target is not actually illuminated."
and night pursuit aviation, is that of the London Air The object of the searchlight work should not be to
Defense Area, and of the British No. 151 Squadron and indicate the approximate position of the target by the in-
searchlights manned by the Royal Engineers on the West- tersection of two or three searchlight beams, unless there
ern Front in 1918, described by General Ashmore in the are no sound locators available at all. The object should
book previously mentioned. General Ashmore has the be to track the target as closely as possible, with beams
following to say about this: laid upon the most accurate locator data possible to ob-
"A thick belt of searchlights was formed close up to the tain.
line from the north of Arras to the road running east from With only reasonably effective locator work, the error
Amiens, the searchlights from Abbeville moved up there of the bea~s will be limited to plus or minus three de-
early in September, and No. 151 Squadron went forward grees. The beams will indicate, not the approximate loca-
to Vignacourt. tion of the target, but very nearly its exact location, fre-
"Success was immediate and striking; between the 13th quently "£licking" it, and a great deal of the time so
September and the end of the month the squadron, close as to make it faintly visible in the fringe of light at
working in excellent cooperation with the AA guns the edge of the beam.
and the searchlights, destroyed fourteen bombers and put "Flicks" may not be visible to the operator at the distant
an end to the enemy's activity in that part of the line. light, who needs not only bright illumination and good
"Our pilots carried through the twenty-six decisive contrast, but sees only light reflected from such surfaces
combats without themselves receiving a scratch from the of the plane as are approximately perpendicular to his line
enemy, striking testimony to the excellence of the meth- of sight. The latter fact is responsible for the frequently
observed occurrence of bright "flicks," unseen by the
ods employed.
light operator, which are nevertheless plainly visible to
"The searchlight crews were quite capable of lighting
observers located with reference to the angles of reRection
the bomber without exposing the fighter. A bomber held
from the wing surfaces. Those with experience in search-
in a strong concentration of beams is rendered very help-
light work are familiar with such occurrences, and have
less. The crew can hear nothing but the sound of their
often seen a target, 10,000 to 15,000 feet above them,
own engines; the effect of the brilliant light reflected from
faintly visible in the fringe of a beam, yet missed by the
every surface of the machine-is so dazzlirig that it is
searchlight operator, for whom the illumination was not
practically impossible to see anything. The fighter can
bright enough.
take up his attack position unseen and unheard; the first
Pilots who have flown for AA searchlight training are
the bomber knows about it is the passage of the bullets
familiar with the fact that they are usually flicked many
through the fuselage."
times before they are definitely "picked up," by lights
With reference to the general question of the effective- whose locator data are good but whose operators, owing to
ness of pursuit at night, a report by Captain C. L. Chen- haze, moonlight, angles of reflection or other causes, are
nault, U. S. Army, retired, upon Sino-Japanese hostilities unable to perceive the illumination.
in China, states that the effectiveness of the Russian A pursuit pilot, however, located two or three thousand
pursuit was far greater by night than by day, in fact so feet under the target, is in perfect position to take ad.
great as to result in the prompt discontinuance by the vantage of all such "marginal" illumination, particularly
Japanese of night bombing. The Russian pursuit pilots when such hindrances as moonlight or ground haze se.
took position beneath the bombers, thereby silhouetting verely limit visibility from the ground.
them against the sky, from which position they could It is absolutely essential that the beams be continuously
see their target while remaining comparatively invisible laid upon data provided by a reasonably well-trained
themselves, and could consequently attack in relative locator crew. It is not believed to be essential that the
security, although not with such impunity as if the bom- target plane be continually illuminated by beams con-
bardment gunners had been blinded by searchlight glare. trolled visually from the ground, provided that the beaml
To quote General Ashmore again: are laid upon reasonably geod locator data.
"Intimately connected with these tactics was the action No data, based upon the results of thorough, planned,
of the searchlights. We have seen how searchlight beams, cooperative tests, conducted in this country bv units thor-
following a bomber closely, can help the scout pilot to get oughly trained in the type of work being undertaken, ar~
into touch even if the target is not actually illuminated. yet available either to confirm or refute this. In view,
Indeed, many scout pilots at one time held that the search- however, of the pressing need of a means both of rein.
lights should stop short at this, and that any attempt forcing the marked weaknesses of night AAA defens1
actually to illuminate the bomber would only end in the against multiple bombardment attacks, it is most urgenl
expos~re of the fighter machine. As the sear~hlight work that an intensive program of cooperative training bi
improved, it was found to be far better to hold the bomber inaugurated, with the idea of securing reliable informatior
in the beam, even after combat had been joined." upon which future tactics can be based.
Note that phrase "searchlight beams, following a In any such program it is absolutely essential that pri
1939 DEFENSE AGAINST NIGHT BOMBARDMENT 393
mary emphasis be placed upon adequate and thorough does the program merge into a type of training directed
training of the searchlight unit before the holding "test" toward the solution of the particular problems presented
phases. Only when the results attained in such test phases in this program.
rest upon a basis of adequate unit training is the drawing
RECOM}.IENDED
TRAININGPROGRAM
of conclusions warranted.
\Ve have discarded the idea that "a million men will Basic Period-6 weeks
spring to arms overnight," as impracticable to produce 2 Drills each week of 2 hours each drill-4 hours a week
even the non-technical branches of a modern army. Just Altitude of Plane: 4,oc:x>-7,000feet
somuch less justified is the attempt of difficult AA search- rIst 4 weeks-Any Type. Total Plane
light work, requiring highly trained specialists, by units Hours: 16
to which adequate training has not been available.
Moreover, it is absolutely essential that such test pro-
T v 0f PI ane
,pe 1l Next 2 weeks-Bomber.
Hours: 8
Total Plane
grams be in no sense competitive. They must be conduct- Total Plane Hours Basic Training: 24
ed, if their results are to be worth anything, purely as a
laboratory experiment, with every operation being per- Training of this period to grow out of, and be merged
formed exactly as desired by the controlling head, with with, preliminary work on such devices as the binaural
only one fundamental object in view, the good of the training instrument and the Cowen loud speaker device.
service as a whole. Locator and searchlight sections to be grouped within
a few hundred yards of each other during this phase, for
COOPERATIVE
TRAININGANDTESTPROGRAM more efficient instruction and supervision.
The program outlined below includes a period of pre- Plane to fly smooth, easy courses, always within easy
liminary training which will bring a relatively untrained range of the sections.
unit, or one which has been out of training for some time. Plane to fly always with running lights on. When
to a state of proficiency such as to warrant its entering
errors of data are seen to have narrowed down to small
upon the more advanced stages. limits, the units can be considered ready to proceed to the
The average searchlight unit, after a winter layoff or Intermediate Phase.
similar period of a few months without direct training INTERMEDIATE
PERIOD
with planes, will require the whole period of basic traiping
if proficiency is to be expected. If the searchlight unit has, 3 Weeks
within the week or two immediately preceding the pro- Units to occupy normal sector positions.
gram, completed its regular annual target practices with Planes to fly without running lights.
good results, the first seven weeks of the program can be
1st Week
eliminated. Training can begin with the second week of
2 Bombers
the intermediate period. It would be possible to eliminate
another week, except for the fact that at least two weeks One Side of Other
of training of a simpler nature upon the tracking of bom- Sector Side
bardment through pursuit should be allowed the unit Altitudes ............ 10,000 feet 12,000 feet
before it enters upon the higher altitude, multiple-plane 4 Drills of 3 Hours Each.
phases. Total Plane Hours (Bomber) -24
During the intermediate period, drill upon two bomb-
ers, each confining its flying to separate halves of the pla- 2dWeek
toon sector, is introduced. This will accustom the men at 2 Bombers-2 Pursuit
an early stage to disregatd flying in other patts of the Altitudes One Side of Other
sector, and is primarily designed to save time and expedite Sector Side
training. With only one plane available the personnel of Bombers ........ I I ,000 feet 13,000 feet
the disengaged side of the sector are out of range and idle Pursuit ......... 10,000 feet 10,000 feet
a considerable part of the time. 4 Drills of 3 Hours Each
Methods of training suitable for the artainment of the Bombers Pursuit
required degree of proficiency were described in an article Total. Plane Hours 24
("Training of the Antiaircraft Searchlight Battery") in
the COASTARTILLERY JOURNAL,May-June, 1936. These JdWeek
or comparable methods, adapted for the types of materiel 3 Bombers-3 Pursuit
available, will produce the state of training required. 1st Half
It must be emphasized that the training program out- 2 Drills of 3 Hours Each.
lined here is designed primarily for the purpose of bring-
ing the standard of general training up to the point of pro- Altitudes Left Center Right
ficiency required for advanced types of AA searchlight Bombers 10,000 feet 14,000 feet 12,000 feet
work. Only in the latter part of the intermediate period Pursuit . 9,000 feet 9,000 feet 9,000 feet
394 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
2d Half
2 Drills of 3 Hours Each
Bombers 12,000 feet 16,000 feet 1+000 teet
Pursuit I1,000 feet I 1,000 feet I 1,000 feet
Bombers PZlTsuit
Total Plane Hours 36 36
ADVA1'\CED PERIOD
2d Half
2 Drills of 3 Hours Each.
Flight 111ethod of A ttack by 2 Flights at
4o.Second Intervals ,
Bombers 16,000 fect 20,000 fcet 18,000 feel
Pursuit 15,000 fcct 15,000 fcct 15,000 feet
Born bers Pursuit
Total Planc Hours 72 72
SAFETY REQUIRE~IE1'\TS
. -
- --. -
396 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
FOR~L\L TEST PROGRA~I tween different routes on successive nights involving the:
I Week same problem. Then all elements of the defense are faced
1st Day with problems of equal difficulty, and the results and data
-MONDAY attained are not complicated by the intrusion of unknown
Shakedown Drill elements of differences of abilil:\'.
2 Bombers-2 Pursuit 2dWeek
3 Attacks-2 Hours (Intermediate)
One Side of Other lvfoNDAY
Sector Side Shakedown Drill, as for 1st W uk
Altitudes
Bombers . 15,000 feet 14,000 feet
Pursuit . 13,000 feet 13,000 feet TUESDAY AND THURSDAY
Bombers Pursuit 2 attacks each night-4 attacks in alL
Total Plane Hours 4 4 Bombardment in Squadron Stagger Formation, or other
at the option of the Bombardment Commander.
2d and 3d Days Formation Tee Lights to be Used by Bombardment
TUESDAY AND THURSDAY Altitude of lowest element of Bombardment Formation
I Bombardment Squadron 9 Planes 20,000 feet
I Pursuit Flight " 9 Planes Altitude of Pursuit Flight-19'000 feet.
FLIGHT METHOD OF ArrACK
Searchlights to concentrate initially on the rear planes
of the bombardment formation, moving progressively
4 Attacks each night-Time-2 Hours from rear to front.
Bombardment to Use Formation Tee Lights It is not contemplated that a formation phase be held
Pursuit to Operate below Bombardment with pursuit flying above bombardment, unless the bom-
Altitudes Left Center Right bardment commander deems it safe to flv formation at
Bombers 16,000 feet 20,000 feet 18,000 feet night without formation lights. Obviou~ly there is no
Pursuit Is,ooofeet Is,ooofeet 15,000 feet problem if bombardment carries formation lights with
Bombers Pursuit pursuit flying above.
Total Plane Hours (both nights) 36 36
3d Week
4tbDay A Repetition of the First Week but Held in Dark of Moon
FRIDAY
In all parts of the test phase the method of attempted
I Bombardment Squadron 9 Planes illumination should be alternated between successive at-
1 Pursuit Flight 9 Planes tacks of each night. On the first attack, pickups and con-
FLIGHT METHOD OF ATTACK
tinuous illumination should be tried. On the next, lights
should follow data alone, with no effort to illuminate the
4 Attacks-Time-2 Hours plane continually through visual direction by the operator,
Pursuit to operate above bombardment and so on for alternate attacks.
No.Formation Tee Lights to be Used by Bombardment The pursuit pilot should make four radio reports to the
Altitudes Left Center Right ground:
Bombardment 1. "Contact"-the moment he sights his target.
1st Plane 16,000 feet 20,000 feet 18,000 feet 2. "Interception"-when he has reached a position
2d Plane 15,500 feet 19,500 feet 17,500 feet underneath the target from which he could launch
3d Plane .... 15,000 feet 19,000 feet 17,000 feet an attack, were it not for safety restrictions.
Pursuit 3. "Dropped"-after he has followed the target for at
All Planes ... 21,000 feet 21,000 feet 21,000 feet least thirty seconds beyond the point of "Intercep-
Bombers Pursuit tion."
Total Plane Hours 18 18 4. "Lost"-if, before he has followed the target for
thirty seconds beyond-.the pgint of "Interception,"
In this problem, with pursuit operating above bombard-
he has lost sight of it for at least ten seconds.
ment, formation tee lights should not be used by bom-
bardment, and it becomes nec(!ssaryto prescribe a Soo-foot The pilot should not confine obtaining information
altitude differential between successive planes on each solely to the data prescribed above, but should report on
route, to obviate the danger of collision. all phases of his observation. As to "dropped" for example.
In all problems that involve attacks on more than one while it is not planned that the lights illuminate longer
route within the sector at one time, both in the test and than the period prescribed, if succeeding targets approach,
in the training phases, altitudes should be alternated be- the pursuit pilot tracking a given bomber should follow as
1939 DEFENSE AGAINST NIGHT BOMBARDMENT 397
long as practicable within reason, reporting afterwards objectives located within a few miles of each other. All
upon the visibility of the target after the lights had these objectives can be defended with the aid of an aircraft
dropped it. The possibility of continuing to follow a tar- interception net, by a pursuit force no larger than tnat
get by exhaust glow, "sky-lighting," or other means after necessary for the defense of any one. To insure such
illumination has ceased, is important. econom;' of force at night would require only the pro-
The program proposed will produce results of definite vision of sufficient additional searchlight defense to cover
scientific value on what can be expected of pursuit avia- the area.
tion and AA searchlights working in cooperation in the In contrast, the extension of an AAA defense to cover
dose-in defense of vital objectives. nearby objectives would require multiplying the gun bat-
In considering this training program preliminary to teries of the defense in addition to the searchlights, and
the test phases, two things must not be lost sight of- would permit not such economies as in the case of pursuit.
first, that the time necessary to bring untrained men to For such objectives, the mere provision of searchlights
the proficiency required is little (if any) longer than to work with pursuit might well prove to be the most
that necessary to train an infantry soldier; and second, economical and efficient solution. Then the gun batteries
than an organization once attaining this state of training would be released for more effective employment else-
can be kept up to par indefinitely thereafter by no more where.
than four or five elementary drills a month. Experience It appears highly improbable that enough searchlights
gained through work with the 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force, will ever be available to permit building up a ring some
during Wing Maneuvers in the fall of 1935, shows this to thirty-five miles in radius about a single objective. Nor
be the case. does it seem that such employment of searchlights would
The future issue of improved types of location devices be either practical, efficient, or an economical use of force.
may greatly simplify the problem of tracking a bomber May not the answer be found, rather, in the disposition
through attacking pursuit. On the other hand, these de- of such searchlights as are available in a comparatively
vices may accomplish little in that direction, great as close-in defense of the objective? The extreme vulnera-
their efficiency may be in the location of a given target. bility of the illuminated bomber to the unilluminated
Determination of their capabilities in this field can be ac- pursuit plane, as contrasted to its defensive strength in
complished only by future test. the daytime, would seem likely to render the ten minutes
But in the meantime the problem should not go un- of combat time considered necessary by day, largely super-
solved because future materiel promises to be superior to fluous by night.
that on hand. Superior as future instruments undoubtedly For objectives of such paramount importance as to
will be, the present sound locator is adequate, with proper necessitate the best possible defense, both the artillery-
training, to solve this problem ~n a reasonably satisfactory pursuit team and the searchlight-pursuit team may prove
manner, at any but extremely high altitudes. to be the answer to the major multiple-plane attack.
An antiaircraft defense of a vital objective, employing Against this type of attack the AAA, acting alone, has
pursuit aviation, can be made highly effective at night no present prospect of coping adequately.
even when there is poor ground visibility caused by bright
The enemy's knowledge that pursuit will operate over
moonlight or ground haze.
searchlights will prevent him from adopting such methods
FUTURE TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS as the Flight or Squadron Methods of Attack, for these
What direction can the trend of probable future de- tactics leave widely separated planes extremely vulnerable
velopments in AA defense tactics be expected to take? to pursuit attack. The alternative-attack in defensive for-
Certainl:' not the elimination by pursuit aviation of the mation at night~renders bombardment more vulnerable
AAA as a defensive weapon of importance. Entirely to AAA. Such formations are easy for searchlights to
aside from this question, there will probably always exist find; they require formation tee lights, facilitating dis-
many important objectives which cannot be effectively covery by pursuit; and they have little, if any, increase in
defended by pursuit aviation, and others so important as defensive strength.
to require the strongest possible defense-both AAA and No football team which uses only one method of attack
pursuit. Furthermore, the progressive improvement in the can have much success against an alert opponent, who
defensive power of bombardment may result in the serious adapts his counter measures to meet an unvarying and
curtailment of the effectiveness of daytime pursuit, leav- foreseeable condition. The smart quarterback mixes them
ing the AAA as the principal weapon of daytime defense. up-the time has come for the antiaircraft defense to
This would reverse the present conception of pursuit as learn to mix them up.
a weapon effective only during daylight and not at night. An enemy who never knows whether he is going to be
On the other hand, there are localities-such as im- greeted by gun-fire or effective night pursuit is going to
portant industrial areas-which contain many separate be easier to handle.
By Major General H. Rowan-RobinsonJ British Army
The greatest aerial maneuvers ever seen in Great Britain flying below 4,000 feet was permitted within seven miles
were carried out in August. Thirteen hundred aircraft of London Bridge. At night, aircraft flew, with certain
participated-an increase of 50 per cent over the numbers precautionary exceptions, without navigation lights.
engaged in previous exercises. There were also in play on Ground defenses were under the operational control of
the defenders' side 110 guns, 700 searchlights, 100 bal- the Air Officer Commanding the Fighter Command. Of
loons, a net-work of observers, and, for one night, a gen- these defenses th~ antiaircraft guns unfortunately were not
eral blackout. able to play much part owing to lack of visibility. The
These figures represent resources that could conveni- searchlights suffered from the same cause; but it was noted
ently be mobilized and by no means all that could have that the efficiencv of their sound locators enabled them to
been made available in war. follow enemy raiders even in the clouds, so that they were
The general idea was that two Powers were at war. often able tC:illuminate them when they did emerg~ from
Westland consisted of the large part of the center, east their cover even for a moment.
and south of England; and Eastland was born in imagina- The duty of the observer groups, which were so situ-
tion of the waves of the North Sea. The two main ob- ated that any airplane could be seen or heard by at least
jects of the exercises were, firstly, to afford combined train- one post, was to report the position, height and. numbers
ing to aerial, military and civii forces engaged in the de- of raiders. These reports were intended primaril)~ to fur-
fense of Great Britain; and, secondly, to apply a serious nish a basis for the decisions of the Command as to the
test to that defense. sending up of fighters-from what airdromes, in what di-
The raiders were drawn from airdromes near the 'south- rection, to what height and in what numbers. In fulfilling
ern and eastern coasts of England, and consisted of 500 this function they also gave a warning to the public in
bombets, which flew 100 miles over France or out to the general of the strength and direction of air raids during
North Sea and then turned to deliver their attack. their progress and the "all clear" on their conclusion.
The aerial defenders consisted of three groups. The These groups proved most successful, every raid being
principal group comprised the fighters which were to inter- spotted and traced to the end. The sound locator sections
cept the raiders-ready by day on their airdromes to scale were also of great assistance in this respect.
the heavens at a moment's notice; and, by night, on Balloons were available only for London. They strength-
patrol over the area illuminated by searchlights. The en the defenses there greatly, both by preventing low
second group contained the bombers, which represented flying-a matter of particular importance in bad weather
the offensive side of defense. The third group was formed -and by reducing the distance in vertical height in which
of reconnaissance aircraft whose main task was trade-pro- guns and fighters have to execute their tasks. In the ma-
tection, but which were also expected to chase any bomb- neuvers, however, for the safety of the raiders, they were
ers viewed, less with the expectation of catching them employed only in small numb~rs and at heights tl;at did
than of forcing them to an uneconomically high speed that not exceed 2,000 feet, in very bad weather even being
would reduce their range. close-hauled. They were distributed spacially over the
Aerial operations were unrestricted, except that no whole area to be defended and not employed, as they
were in the Great War, as an "aerial stockade." Where
there were no balloon barrages, the bombers were able to
descend to the very tree tops in order to make sure of
{It seems hi9hl~ ~oubt~ulmat me their targets.
The blackout, which extended over twenty-seven coun-
best o~ men an~ machineJ coul~ ties, was organized only for a single night and on thar
night only for four hours-12 midnight until 4 A.M.
when, in any case, some eighty per cent of the inhabitants
eOu bea-t me shain ot opuations are likely to be sleeping in darkened houses.
The blackout was not a success. The great lines of
continue~ OOu weeks an~ monms communication were shown up--the roads by the forward
or side lights of motor vehicles; the railways by streaks of
400 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptember- October
light shooting through the curtained windows of that serious measurers may be taken against
the cars; the rivers b~' navigation lights and by those who hil to obev them. In the fourth
the reAected glare of the searchlights. These in- place, the results of th~se new measures will be
dications afforded unmistakable clues ro the posi- studied, and a dennite attempt made to soh-e
tions of objectives. ivforeover, London, as it was the problem as to how the incessant work nec-
shuttered into darkness, left what appeared ro essary in war can be carried out without dis-
aerial observers as a number of scattered, well- closi;1g important objectives ro the enemy.
illuminated villages which in bct were industrial \\l e may now return ro our main theme-ri1e
areas in operation or other busy centers-the very raiding and the counterattack. The weather
targets of which the observers were in search. was abominable. Over the North Sea, storm;
Piccadilly Circus for instance was marked down elsewhere, low clouds and driving rain. Inter-
with cer~ainry. Again, whereas millions of people vals of good visibility were both rare and short.
cooperated with the airmen battling gallantly These conditions bvored the assailants. The
with the elements, there were thousands of care- advance made in navigation
~
and in blind AvinlY
/ ::>
less people, who b~' neglecting darkening orders since the Great \Var enabled the pilots ro keep
gave further assistance ro the raiders in the dis- a sound direction without the assistance of
covery of objectives. The causes of this bilure landmarks; and the clouds in which the\' were
have been noted by the authorities and the next hidden kept them shrouded from the \;iew of .
operations of this nature will, in consequence, be the defenders until such time as they/ milYht ::>
staged very differentl~', In the nrst place they choose to emerge ro the assault of an objective.
will take place during the early hours of the night They were spotted indeed, and their course
when rowns are normally illuminated and when traced; but for the most part, except when the
people who wish to carr~; out their ordinary duties atmosphere momentarily cleared, they escaped
without an outward display of light will have ro interception. Raids were very numerous and
cover their windows completely with some sub- were made in small groups ~f from three to
stance unquestionably opaque. In the second twelve aircraft, in order that the whole of I
place, they will be executed on a small scale in Westland might have experience of attack'i
small and separate localities, each locality in a Eleven raids occurred in the nrst forty minutes
particular area being observed on a particular of the war, and each night more than a hun-
night, thus enabling individual bults ro be cor- dred raids were delivered over the south and I
rected. In the third place, it is likely that much southeast of England. Against a hundred
more stringent instructions will be issued and groups of raiders, about sixty patrols of inter-
cepting craft would be launched. In spite of
A frollt ,'ieU' of the British the weather the operations were pushed on
3.7.illch alltiaircraft gUlI. both sides with zeal and resolution, both on
1939 AIR MANEUVERS OVER GREA T BRITAIN 401
the ground and in the air. Valuable lessons were learn- may be inclined to relapse into its former inertia.
ed; the raiders in particular showed remarkable skill in It is onl)' natural indeed that this sudden chanae
~ from
profiting by the cloud-conditions. But many difficulties the dark and perilous days, not a ye:lr P:lst. when London
were encountered apart from the weather and, as is usual -the greatest center of communication, the largest, rich-
on maneuvers, there was much unreality owing to the est, and most vulnerable city in the world-lay defense-
needs of safety and of training. For instance, machines less at the merc\' of the aerial invader, should have had a
intercepted and presumed to have been shot down, were somewhat unbaiancing effect on British minds. But, actu-
not made casualties because such procedure would have ally, progress though marked in ever:' department, has
entailed a loss of useful experience to pilots. Again, it still far to go before the demands of defense can be con-
was not possible to adequately portray the offensive side sidered as met. A large number of Britons, after 900 years
of the defenders' strategy. In Great Britain this is the of immunity from invasion, have not even now full:'
more important side. It is recognized that a large number realized the peril to which their countr:' is exposed. The
of hostile raiders will unquestionably evade the defenses proof of this statement lies not onl:' in the failure of the
and strike home. The policy is therefore to compel the black-out already mentioned, but also in the lamentable
enemy to stop raiding and to adopt a defensive attitude by deficiencies still existing in all branches of Air Raid Pre-
an assault on the military targets of vital importance in his cautions. It is to be hoped that the success of the raiders
homeland. Notwithstanding the great advance in the in the recent maneuvers will have an effect at once enlight-
<Juantity and the quality of British fighters, the bomber is ening and sobering, and that it will bring home the fact
still the dominating weapon-the weapon of two thirds that Britain is still an exceedingly vulnerable country, re-
of the Roval Air Force. Yet its effects could hardly be <Juiring, if its defense is to be satisfactorily achieved,
rendered ~isible on maneuvers in assaults on an imagi'nar:' much continuous and devoted work, intelligent research,
E:lStland Power. :ll1d personal sacrifice.
On the whole, results were distinctly disappointing to The opinion on the results of these exercises expressed
the defenses. That, however, may prove a blessing in dis- in this paper is not the official view, but that of the bulk
guise. Of late, a spirit of excessive optimism has been of the press reporters. The commander of the defenses in
growing in Great Britain. The recent increase in speed a broadcast statement at the conclusion of maneuvers is
:ll1d fire-power of the new fighters, such as the Spitfire, reported to have said:
has seemed to place the bomber completely at their
I am satisfied with our progress, and I confidently
merc:' when intercepted. ivloreover, antiaircraft guns of
believe that serious air attack on these islands would be
greatly enlarged power and range are being produced in
brought to a standstill in a shorr space of time. I should
considerable numbers, and antiaircraft gunnery is showing
like to leave you with a feeling of quiet confidence in
a vast improvement over previous performan'ce. There is
considerable progress to be observed, to~, in the sphere our defense organization, while not neglecting wise
of Air Raid Precautions. And all these advances are being precautions to minimize the effects of such attacks as do
loudly boomed by the ivlinisters concerned. As a conse- aet throuah
~ ~ .... Successful defense depends mainlv
quen~e, the public is regaining its confidence to such an on what happens to the enem:' when he is intercepted.
extent that, unless some salutary corrective is applied, it I can confidently say that I am satisfied in this respect.
402 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
\Vh:lt we bve been doing is ro work row:lrds in- The r:liding air force srood up splendidly ro the stresses
cre:lsing inrerception to the 100 per cenr which is our of srorm over the North Se:l, in exercises that bsted
gO:l!. sevenry-two hours. Bur whether the best of m:lchines :lnd
He W:lS thinking, no doubt, th:lt the defense h:ld to men c~uld bear the str:lin of operations in such conditions
suffer from exception:ll we:lther conditions; th:lt m:lny of conrinued over weeks and monrhs without grave loss in
the s:lfety prec:lurions oper:lted in bvor of the :lss:lil;nrs; efficiency seems highly doubtful. British raiders will be
and th:lt no serious v:llue could be :ltt:lched on m:lneuvers exposed ro no such handicap. for it is certain that in :lny
ro the :leri:ll striking force which forms the b:lckbone of gre:lt conflict they will find :In :lily possessed of airdromes
our defensive system. in close proximity ro hostile borders.
I
All these bctors :lre indeed import:lnr and must be The second poinr is this: Although in the srormy con-
weighed in the b:lbnce. Ivloreover. whenever conditions ditions which prevailed during the m:lneuvers, the raiders
improved, :lS they did rowards the close of the exercises, would almost cert:linly have met with marked success. it
the :ldv:lnr:lge in b:ltrle p:lssed :It once ro the defenders is almost equally cert:lin th:lt they would have suffered
who were able ro dispby their full strength effectively- heavy losses. if not complete defeat. h:ld they been flying
fighters. se:lrchlights. guns. under clear skies. Even if the science of forec:lsting we:lther
The b:lbnce between offici:ll optimism :lnd the judg- were br more advanced than in bct it is. it is h:lrdly prob-
menr of unprejudiced bur less well-informed observers :lble th:lt the most determined :lggressor could so guide his
m:l)' perh:lps best be stmck in s:lying that where weather political activities th:lt they should reach their gre:ltest
conditions are unbvor:lble for defense as they so often :lre height in an act of war at the precise momenr when a
over the British Isles. the raider has still rl;e advanrage. deep depression promised a long period of Sl:Orl11cloud
There C:ln therefore be no p:luse in ardenr rese:lrch for de- over the British Isles.
vices that n1:1Ysrop him. nor in additions ro strength of a Some have been banking hitherto on high prospects of
direcrly defensive n:lture. unril, in good weather or b:ld. success from a single overwhelming blow. On the other
he is at the mercy of the defender. The powers tending to hand. if one is whole-heartedl~' devoted to the preservation
defeat :lir raiding are steadily growing. If they are conrinu- of his own country. is he likely to risk its whole furure in
:lIly re-inforced in spirit and n1:1tter. they will rob of its operations which depend for their results on the vagaries
m:lgic the most effective weapon ever pbced in the hands of the weather? This is debatable. even though he may
of an aggressor. have made exhaustive preparations and possesses :In ap-
Three other relevanr poinrs may be raised in conclusion. parenr su periority of strength.
felt cle3r down to the bst m3n in line. This necessity reconstitute a command to anything like its former ef-
for ]e3dership 3nd the mor31e that springs from it makes ficiency after heavy losses. \Vben a unit receives thirt)'
us realize th3t in this machine 3ge machines C3nnOt win or fort)' per cent repbcements, it takes quite a while for
:llone. Tbeir direction 3nd control must be hun13n. As it to get back anything like its old group feeling.
:llwavs, it will be the army with the best le3ders, and But once morale is strong within a unit it will carry it
ther~fore with the most c~urageous, ]0)'3], and devoted far. \Vhen they have been in battle for days and nights,
men, th3t will be victorious. when the enemy bas dealt out heavy casualties, men, if
only they have morale, will yet go on again when the
IT IS THE :NIORALE OF THE GROUP
signal comes. They will go to the very limit of their
?VIORE THAN OF THE INDIVIDUAL
endurance.
The m3SS may 3nd :llways will cower at the sight of And that is another tbing that should be writ in large
the pbantom Death. But the discipline of tbe leader letters on the walls of our schools: It is the last five per
dominates that borror by creating a still greater horror- cent of exertion that often wins the battle. In France, it
of disgrace. For it is the morale of the group--of the com- was not the first attack, or the second, or the third, but
pany, the batt3lion, 3nd even of the higher units-that is that last straggling fourth attack which did the work.
the re3lmorale. In the group you can inculc3te an esprit T rue, that last push made only twO or three hundred yards
de corps, 3 dash, that you cannot in tbe individuals. A and it was only made by a tenth of the command. But it
man will do more for Company A tban he will for him- made the enemy believe we still had a punch left and he
self; be will do more for the group tbat knows and banks withdrew. It was tbus at Bbnc Mont when the 2d Di-
on him, for those who will know him for a br3ve man or a vision attacked the Germans east of Reims. It was the bst
coward, tban he will as 3 lone fighter ~
or as a fiuhter
b
effort of all that did the work. :NIost men thought it un-
:lll1ong a group of str3ngers. That is wby it takes time to called for and impossible to make but they drove forward
just the same.
We must remember what was known ages ago. It is
this: Battles are won or lost by remnants-remnants of
"Ill Frallce, it was /lot tbe first attack, or tbe secolld, or third,
but the last struggling fourtb attack which did tbe work."
battle the sympathy of a man for himself and everybody "How many men have you?" he asked.
under him has to be put aside, unless conditions actually "About sixteen hundred," said the colonel. "My losses
are so bad that his unit is incapable of the job it is ordered are eight hundred or so."
to do .. "You are pretty well off," said the staff officer.
But when the troops have given all that you could ex- "What do you mean, I'm pretty well off! Let me tell
pect of them and more, they should be relieved if it can you one thing, and you put it right down in your note-
possibly be done. And here we have the other side: At book! These men have been fighting three days and three
Cantigny, half the officers of one regiment were killed or nights and they have been successful. But five of them are
wounded, and about one-third of the men. The available not worth now what one was worth when we came in.
enemy opposing us was many times our number. We had There are three other regiments that have had their sleep
the wounded and dying among us and there was little to right along and almost no losses. It is an injustice not to
eat or drink. The men were getting shaky from fighting relieve my men tonight."
and fatigue. The colonel told the brigade commander that They were relieved that night.
the regiment should be relieved that night because there
NfoRALE MEANS BUILDING SOLIDARITY AND CONFIDENCE
were three other regiments that had suffered compara-
tively small losses. Things had become normal and the Solidarity and confidence, essential to morale, cannot be
men needed sleep, food, and rest. They had accomplished improvised. They are born of mutual trust between leader
what they went after, they had been in three days and and led, which makes for pride and unity in an organiza-
nights, and there were those three other regiments that tion. And from unity comes in turn the feeling of force,
could go in. The general sent a staff officer down to look the force that gives to the attacking men the courage and
around. confidence, the domination of the will over instinct, even
408 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septelllber -October
in the greatest danger. It is this which finally leads to time for subordinates to be prepared for their parts. Fail-
victory. ure to do this was frequent in the AEF. Troops often saw
CoiIfidence means just that. Hannibal, to inspire his rolling barrages move off toward the enemy before they
noops with confidence, explained to them before each knew anything about the hour of attack or their objective.
battle as much of his plan of action as he could without Such failures kill morale. Troops have little confidence
making it possible for treachery to injure him. All com- in their so-called leaders after these things happen a few
manders should do that: give enough of the plan of action times.
so that the troops can appreciate what the whole idea is. Another main morale destroyer is orders to do the im-
H you tell your men what you are going to do, that the possible. What could be more disheartening than to be
job is going to be a hard one with many losses, but that ordered to take an objective twenty kilometers back of
nevertheless the job is going to be done, then, when gas the enemy's line when you and your whole command
comes down or perhaps some airplane bombs, your men know that a gain of even five kilometers will take every
will realize that you foresaw these difficulties. So they ounce of energy left in your troops. A leader must be
keep on in spite of them. But if you just give them frag- reasonable in his expectations and give objectives reason-
mentary orders without any explanation at all, their con- ably obtainable. It is best to say, "We hope to get So-and-
fidence will be much less and they will be much more So [the objective twenty kilometers away]; but by to-
surprised when things go hard. This is especially true if night we will get to that ridge. You can do that, and you
subordinate commanders are afraid to go beyond the will do it." And they probably will. But if you say
wording of their orders. "twenty kilometers" instead of "that ridge," knowing all
It is also well for a commander to give some warning the time there isn't a chance of getting there in a week,
to his troops of what may happen in a defense. In fact, or perhaps in the whole war, don't blame anyone but your~
it is the best protection against infiltration and surprise. self if most of your troops are satisfied to clamber into
The Germans infiltrated by finding some little place more the first big shell hole and stay there. Every front line is
or less unguarded and sending in a company, a regiment, largely composed of individuals or groups of two or three
or maybe a brigade, often secretly during the night, to who can get into a hole and stay there if morale fails.
get behind our elements. Then, when fire suddenly came There aren't any second lieutenants waving their swords
from the rear of the American, French, or British forces, and urging them on in modern warfare. If your troops
they were inclined to escape in a hurry. In their imagina- don't want to advance, they won't. What you have to
tions they would often think that ten times their own do is to get them in an attitude of mind of w;nting to ad-
numbers 'were in their rear. At Blanc Mont, however, we vance. That attitude must be there, in their minds, before-
expected infiltration and it came. But the troops were told hand. And ordering the impossible is no way to put it
about it ahead of time, and told, too, that we would pinch there.
the enemy out because they could not infiltrate as many
BUILDING MORALE BY DIRECT CONTACT WITH MEN
men as we had. Then infiltration didn't worry anybody
particularly. The division was well organized and disci- The ways of building morale available to a leader are
plined with high morale, and we simply placed two or manifold. Some I have already indicated; many are too
three organizations on the Hank or rear to hold off the in- well known to need comment. One or two, however,
filtrating enemy. stand out in my mind.
Another time, after forcing the crossing of the Meuse For one thing, the commander who is also a genuine
River near Dun-sur-Meuse, a battalion attacked up a leader will be certain to mingle often with his men so that
hill. The hilI was shaped something like a shoe bottom up. he may be known to them. He must be in the front lines
Three companies had a hard time getting up the main frequdntly, and particularly when there is hard fighting.
hill in the fog. The fourth company, acting as a combat He must also see that hot food and supplies reach the
patrol, got farther out than it was intended to go and went troops whenever possible; and he must make the most
up against the heel of the hill, which was a little higher thorough preparation for every contingency he can fore-
than the rest of it. This company got clear to the top of see. He must continually show an interest in and sym-
the heel against light resistance, and found itself some- pathy for his men and for their well-being. That is the
what in rear of the main German position. In the main only way to build up loyalty and confidence-morale-so
position, -the Germans facing the other three American that his command may be proud of its reputation.
companies heard the fighting back on the heel and im- A leader must also exhibit knowledge, energy, and res-
mediately retreated. As a matter of fact, they had a olution. He must punish those who deserveit as examples,
superiority of two to one and a splendid defensive po- but never in anger. And he must reward those that merit
sition. Here was a caseof surprise by accidental infiltration, reward. If he does these things, then, when the signal
but the enemy troops lacked the morale to stand a threat- for an attack goes up, and later when his command is
ened envelopment. It takes "The Xth Legion" or some more than wearied and more than decimated, his troops
other finely disciplined organization to hold its morale in will keep on attacking and the number of those who try
such situations. Such units have confidence in each other. to avoid battle will be small.
All such warning orders should be issued in plenty of In combat itself the leader must be where he is most
1939 MOULDING MEN FOR BATTLE 409
needed. and this place common sense will dictate. It is to the morale of his oro-anization.
~
alwavs best, however, to err on the side of being well up These are a few of the things that leaders can do to build
amo~g the troops and taking personal command in morale. It is also possible, though not always, to restore
emergencies rather than staying too far back with the idea morale in a unit that from one cause or another has lost it.
of keeping in touch with the higher command. Only by Perhaps I can best use another \\Todd \Var example to
such forward contact can the commander be of any real show this.
use as a leader. This keeps morale at its highest. During the lvIeuse-Argonne attack progress was halted
One particular morale builder sadly neglected in the for a time. In some organizations the men were in a pretty
early stages of the \Vorld \Var was the value of immediate low state and it looked as if they might have to be taken
recognition after any heroic action by an organization or out for the rest of the war-as some whole divisions were.
an individual. I had once a very nasty order to give, as But it was announced instead that if they captured a
commander of a regiment. Vie had made two or three certain objective they would be reinforced and that none
raids but all had come back empty-handed-the Germans of the units would be withdrawn. After a man has been
had been pulling back at night and putting Out intelli- beaten three or four times, you have to give him a taste of
gence posts in the daytime. But down from the French victory. So these troops were given a few easy jobs to re-
Army commander came the same old order again: "Nfust store their morale and put the idea in their minds that they
have prisoners." High command thought the Germans weren't completely downed. One night, soon afterward.
were shifting troops to the British front for a drive. they took Aincreville and took it with bayonets and
So I had to tell the major in command of the advance without artillery preparation. They seemed astonished that
battalion. "We are going to get prisoners tonight. You they could do it. The next day they took Doulcon, more
will send an officer, with not less than flve nor more than or less by surprise. and then a few other little towns. \Ve
"Now, his mental and Pbysical powers are tried for long bOllI'Saud days, and
in sllcb a test, be bas bllt tbe resoillte/Iess of bis OW/I beart to sllstaill bim."
flft)' men, who will go into the enemy's line and not knew they could take them if they had the cor:fidence-
come back without prisoners." if they knew they were going to be backed up. Soon they
That was a pretty hard order. The major asked for began to feel they could win for sure, and you saw guite
volunteers and an intelligence officer. Lieutenant George a different air about them, even within a few days. \\Then
B. Redwood, volunteered. He took five men and went it came time for them to get orders to cross the ?v[euse
nearly to the enemy's third line, got four prisoners and River, they knew they could do it and they did do it re-
brought them back. Within three days the French had markably well.
paraded the whole division and given the raiding group The attempt to restore confidence must be made
the Croix de Guerre. Recommendation was immediately through a succession of little steps. As Foch says, you have
made for the Distinguished Service Cross. Redwood was to "playa new tune." If you get licked at one thing two
killed at Cantigny about two months afterward, but he or three times, don't try it again. At Blanc ?\IIont, General
hadn't received his DSC. It was awarded after his death, Gouraud said, "I am going to order the AA and BB
but it was of no good to him then nor did such delay add Corps to attack on the right and left of the American 2d
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
Division, but it is m)' impression that since they have given to commanders on the spot, according to their rank
been three times repulsed on the same terrain by the same and experience, and that commanders should be perfectly
enemy and are themselves unchanged, the chances are that willing to assume the responsibility of asking themselves
they will not go far." (and acting in accordance with the answer): What
would my superior do if he were here and knew the
ivloRALE OF THE LEADER HIUSELF
circumstances that I know? Of course, for not complying
Up to this point I have written mainly of the morale of or delaying compliance with orders the subordinate has
troops and not so much of the morale of the leader him- the burden of proof that ordinary judgment and reason
self. As a general thing, of course, if an organization has dictated it. Sometimes this is a hazardous thing to do, but
high morale there is little question but that the leader has there are frequent cases where proper leadership requires
it too. The troops get it mainly from their commander. it. Always, however, the superior issuing the orders
But there are a good many things that can adversely affect should be at once advised. Any officer receiving an order
the morale of even high commanders, and some that can that he believes to be given under misapprehension as to
destroy it completely. Approaching or actual physical or conditions with which he is himself cognizant, must im-
mental breakdown is naturally a most important item mediately inform his superior of these conditions. If he is
in this regard. afraid to do so, he either lacks confidence in himself or in
You will find in general that when commanders were the true leadership of his superior.
relieved in the AEF they were not relieved after the first A division commander in France was ordered at about
day's attack, but after the second or third day, when they I :00 p.m. to cross the Meuse River and the Canal de
were suffering from fatigue, lack of sleep, and perhaps l'Est at 4:00 p.m. on the same day. He had been on the
nervousness as to what the enemy would do next, or lack spot for some time, and informed the staff officer who was
of confidence in their own troops. One division command- issuing the instructions in the presence of the corps com-
er, talking to a corps commander, pounded on the table mander, that he had reconnoitered the crossing of the
and said his division was not going to make an attack the Meuse for fords and crossing places and for enemy po-
next day. But it did attack the next day and did good work. sitions with forces up to two companies in size; that the
The division commander had lost confidence. He didn't ravine was full of enemy machine guns and that the
know how much his troops could still do or even what enemy's artillery was in force behind the heights of the
their condition was. Meuse within two kilometers of the river; that he be-
Another regimental commander was down in the lieved the crossing might be accomplished at 7:00 p.m.
mouth because he had not been made a brigadier when after dusk; but that from his experience on the spot, he
he had good reason to expect it. I happened to take over the thought an attack at 4:00 p.m. would not only lack sur-
brigade he was in, and the division commander called my prise but would probably fail. The staff officer, however,
attention to him. So I told him, "Higher authority has stated it was so important to cut the Mezieres-Metz rail-
warned me you are in a depressed condition and that it is road that the daylight attack should be made. The time
affecting your regiment. We are going into battle in two was so short that only fragmentary orders could be given.
days and if you can't brace up and get a little more spirit One brigade did not receive its orders because the mes-
into your regiment, I will relieve you and you will never sengers to it were killed, and did not move at all. The
get another command. But if you can buck up and put other brigade attacked. The commander of the leading
the spirit into your regiment that should be there, if I battalion was killed and some two or three hundred officers
can do it, I will have you made a brigadier." That man and men were casualties by the time the troops took cover.
came to himself and his regiment did splendid work. It At 7:00 p.m. the attack was resumed as the division
lost nearly forty per cent in killed and wounded at commander originally recommended, and it was success-
Soissons. A few days later he was made a brigadier. ful. In this case, the commander on the spot was over-
In the AEF commanders from corps down to regiments ruled by the judgment of a staff officer unfamiliar with
were relieved for various causes. Some assumed authority local conditions but authorized by a higher commander-
that belonged to higher commanders, or were improperly very properly-to give any necessary orders. Though this
critical of them, or even disloyal. Others reported their was a splendid staff officer, I do not believe, had the
commands unfit for combat because they were tired or higher commander himself been present, that he would
discouraged themselves. Still others kept to their dugouts have taken the same action.
when critical conditions demanded that they be up with It does the morale of leaders great harm to be con-
their troops in order to take immediate and effective ac- stantly feeling that the axe may fall at any time for no
tion against panic or defeat. Fearing what higher author- good reason. Mature judgment should be used in relieving
ity might think instead of using the proper common sense commanders for inefficiency. Every commander is bound
and initiative of a leader probably wrecked more com- to have under him a certain number of mediocre officers
manders than any other one thing. who will improve reasonably under proper instruction and
Higher authority generally gave plenty of latitude to guidance. Besides, trading one mediocre officer for another,
subordinates-but they often failed to use it. The princi- as may often happen, is a bad trade. Nothing is gained,
ple to go by here is that considerable latitude should be much is lost.
1939 MOULDING MEN FOR BATILE 411
CONCLUSION It is the mind that wins battles, that will always win
Because of our slow system of promotion and the lack them, that always has won them throughout the world's
of real selection in our army, we will go into any future history. The spirituality, the moral quality of war, has
war with the higher command filled with men as a not changed. Mechanics, modern arms, all the artillery,
whole too old. The command of armies and even corps, gas, tanks, aircraft, etc., invented by man and his science,
and some higher staff positions, may be efficiently held will not make an end to this thing, so lightly considered
by older officers-General Pershing told me he would at the moment and called the human soul.
prefer division commanders not over fifty. No calling other than the true military profession so
Time is a vital element in war, and war is a ruthless excites brain activity. It is preeminently the calling of
thing. Individuals may have to be sacrificed.The sorting action, at the same time diverse in its combinations and
out to obtain the best leaders in our next war must be changing according to the time and locality in which it is
done early, and without fear, favor, or affection. The put to practice. No other profession is more complex or
younger officers,both line and staff, should be selected for more difficult, since our own has for its aim and reason
higher command according to their success in battle- the instruction of men to overcome by training and en-
without waiting too long. These are the men who have the durance the fatigue and perils against which the voice of
confidence of their subordinates, who know how to keep self-preservationis raised in fear-in other words, to draw
their troops supplied, bring them into battle under the from nature what is most opposed to this nature.
most favorable conditions, direct them well in battle, Our army school system is most excellent and gives all
take greatest advantage of success, and minimize the ef- the technical and theoretical knowledge needed for a
fects of setbacks; men not afraid to take the initiative due higher commander or a higher staff officer. The right
in their position, always loyal to their superiors but not kind of tactics is not improvised. It asserts itself on the
afraid of them either. Watch should be kept also for the battlefield in the presence oathe enemy, but it is learned
leader who may never have had a military education but before the enemy is encountered. But studies of the
is nevertheless a natural leader. Only thus can we find causes of success or failure in battle, other things being
the leaders that will instil a high morale.. approximately equal, show that true leadership was pres-
Never for a second should it be forgotten that combat ent or absent,. and that resolution-not easy to teach in
is the objective, the cause of being and the supreme mani- schools--<>ftenfailed just too soon.
festation of armies. Every measure that departs from that We must also learn to distrust mathematics and ma-
thought-that relegates it to the middle ground-is fataL terial dynamics as applied to battle principles. We must
All the resources accumulated in time of peace, all the learn to beware of illusions drawn from the target range
tactical evolutions, all the strategical calculations are but and the maneuver field. For there we deal with the calm,
conveniences, reference marks to lead up to it. Funda- settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier; in short
mentally, man is the potent force. He is the incomparable with an intelligent and tractable man-instrument, and
instrument whose elements, character, energies, senti- not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled,
ments, fears, desires, and instincts, are stronger than all distrait, excited, restless being, who is the fighting man
abstract rules; than all bookish theories. The inspirations from general to private in war. It is this differencethat re-
that reveal and mark the great strategists, the leaders of quires morale, and the true leadership that creates it. This
men, form the imponderable element, the divine part. is the thing of highest importance in the conduct of war.
\ t:J\
Recruits in a recreation ~0011/
peruse a military magazine
t"
)
Here is one of tbe numer-
OilS Soviet tanks
tI' Searcbligbt units tbat
accom pan)' tbe field amI)'
;-
t A group of machine-
gUl/l/er motorc)'clists
(
A close-fill of the turret
Medium artiller)' is towed
by personnel-carrier I of a tank
prime movers t
A gas decontamina-
tion squad in action
•
OF THE
"These principles 3re immuC3ble," our T r3ining Regu- no surprise to find that this st3tement seems to 113vebeen
btions st3ted in ]9::], 3Eter listing for the time the derived from 1vbrsh3l lvbrmont's dictum th3t "general
nine principles of W3r: The Objective; The Offensive; principles fot the conduct of armies are not very numer-
M3SS; Economy of Force; 1vfovement; Surprise; Simplic- ous, but their 3pplic3tion gives rise to 3 great v3riet)' of
it.\'; Security; 3nd Cooper3tion. How does 3 principle be- combinations, which it is impossible to foresee and to
come immut3ble 3nd just eX3crly how C3n a principle be lay down as rules." Strangely enough, the simple prin-
determined in 3n 3rt in which controlled experiment3tion ciples mentioned were not to be found listed or discussed
is impossible? In the C3se of the principles of W3r, some in the regubtions. So General Fuller turned to the cor-
evidence is 3V3ilable. respondence of Napoleon and from this study deduced
Ivbjor Gener3l J. F. C. Fuller, of the British Army, six. Napoleon, incidentally, always refused to make a
re!3tes th3t in 1911 he becllne convinced that W3r might statement of his principles. "If I were to write the prin-
bre3k out 3t any moment 3nd so st3rted to prepare himself ciples of war," he said, "their simplicity would be 3ston-
for the inevit3ble struggle. He turned to Field Service ishing."
Regu!3tions (British) 3nd found the st3tement th3t "the In February, 1916, Genera] Fuller published an anony-
principles of W3r 3re neither very numerous nor in them- mous article in the Journal of the Royal United Services
selves vcr)' 3bstruse, but the 3pplic3tion of them is dif- Institution on "The Principles of V'l3r with Reference to
ficult, 3nd C3nnot be m3de subject to rules." F3mili3rit)' the Campaigns of ]914-15'" By this time his principles
with the methods of "writing" regu!3tions should C3use had grown to eight in number and he m3rched them all
»»»»»»»»»»»»»»««««««««««««««
Y3.eind acIAeAenee to ((fL~J J
0& wall, Puu eoti molz.e e..aueu tAan
tlleMCJ.n J eo.w.a1uliee o.Jl, Uupidibf
»»»»»»»»»»»»»»««««««««««««««
w\\'ard the decisive poim of the \ Vodd \ Var which he
claimed, and proved by his principles, was the \Vestern
From-rather J brge poim. The innocem reJder gains
By
the impression thJt General Fuller's principles were a kind
of devil's JdvocJte Jnd---chJrJcteristic
reasoning-hJd
of much human
been dredged up to prove a thesis of
Major Thomas R. Phillips
~ which he \\'JS Jlready convinced.
\Vhen a new edition of British Field Service Reaub-
COAST ARTILLERY CORPS
o
tions WJS published in 1920, GenerJI Fuller's principles
, appeared therein, with J slight modificJtion. The SJme
principles, with one JdditionJI, were copied imo United lIIustrat~d by Hobart Britton
States Army T rJining Regubtions in 1921, Jnd it WJS Jt
this time thJt this pJrticubr set of principles becJme im-
mutable. This must have been news to the originJI
3uthor. He hJS cominued his studies Jnd restJted his
principles.
But the immutJble principles disJppeJred from our
regubtions in 1928. However, they still are to be found,
no\\' six in number, with corolbries, in currem British
Field Service Regulations. The)' Jlso JppeJr, seven in
number, in In AmericJn officiJI text on strJteg)', pub-
lished in 1936, Jnd strJngely enough, this set WJS copied
from British regubtions of 1924' In the text on strJtegy,
the:' no longer Jre principles; their stJtus hJS been re-
o duced to thJt of ideJs,
So the immutable principles of WJr seem to be highly
420 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Octobel
mutable and their mutations are quite amusing. Not the tical maneuvers, the mass of one's forcesupon the decisiv(
least of the peculiarities of the principles of war is that point of the field of battle, or upon that of the hostil(
other armies have discoveredentirely different sets. French line which it would be the most important to over-
regulations, for example, list but three: Impose your will come.
on the enemy; conserve .vour liberty of action'' and econ- Jomini, at 1east, h ate
d h courage to state his funda-
omy of force (in the sense of the ~ost effective distribu- mental principle.
tion of means between diverse missions).
According to Xenophon, "the art of war, in the last Foch wrote a book entitled The Principles of War. He
. h f d listed four such principles: economy of forces; freedom of
resort, Is teart 0 guar ing one's liberty of action." This
unquestionably was a basic rule of conduct for a small action; free disposal of forces; security; and perhaps a
. d f fifth, by adding "etc." to his four principles.
force m constant anger 0 being surrounded by a larger
enemy. Ten thousand Greeks hunted by a many times Freedom of action, fre.edisposal of forces, and security,
more numerous foe in hostile Persia could not have been look very much like three ways 'of stating the same id~a,
guided by a better. It also illustrates the genesis of most and this, in turn, appears to be the idea of Xenophon's
so-called principles of war. It provided the solution of lone principle. The military student, bemused by Foeh's
a definite military problem, that of the Ten Thsousand. fame and hoping for enlightenment in this book will not
But what pertinence does this principle have for a force find it. Foch, when he commanded the Allied Armies,
whose liberty of action is assured by a continuous front forgot all of his principles of war and strategy, but at-
such as existed in the World War ~r the Spanish Civil tacked everywhere, winning the World War by a series
W ar.? Th e canditions 0 f these conflicts quite obviously of soldiers' battles.
pr~vi~ed for it an~ the principle r~quired no positive ap- American military thinkers have been content to accept
phcatl0n. So too, If General Fuller s study of Napoleon's their principles second- or third-hand until recently a
campaigns and the principles he deduced from his study writer in the Command & General Staff School Review
were accurate and objective, it could be said of them that of 1I1ilitary Literature attempted to deduce some real
they provided exceJIent guides of conduct for Napoleon principles.1 He first cleared the ground by extensive re-
-but not for us. Our problems differ from his. His search into logic and definitions of science, art, and prin-
formulx cannot solve them. Dependence on catchwords ciple, and so on. The term "principle" was always used
deduced from a study of his campaigns serves only to by the older military writers to mean a guide or rule of
prevent us from solving our own present military prob- conduct. It is defined in half a dozen ways, but in mili-
lems. tary writing it has not been used in a scientific sense as
Soldiershave always sought a philosopher's stone in the meaning a fundamental or basic truth, although justifica-
form of principles of war which they needed only to fol- tion erroneouslywas given to this meaning when our own
low to find the road to victory.. Military writing is Training Regulations called the principles they announced
sprinkled with assurances from the great a~d near-great immutable. Our new investigator, however, was looking
that "there has existed, in all time, some fundam~ntal for principles of war that were principles in the scientific
principles on which the good combinations of war sense.
repose." Prince Hohenlohe states that there are five He finally came to the conclusion that "the one funda-
axioms that must always be observed in war. And Na- mental and reliable principle to be used as a guide in war
poleon, by whom everything military is proved, wrote is simply that the effective employment of combat power
that "the principles of war are those which have directed to gain unity of effort is determined by these factors, viz:
the great commanders whose great deeds have been hand- the object, the means available and opposed, the character-
ed down to us by history"-which sounds very much istics of the theater, and the probable consequences of
like passing the buck. Jomini, the expounder of Na- failure." Continuing, we find that the object is deter-
poleon's methods, claims, "that there exists a funda- mined by the effect desired, the means available, etc., etc.
me~tal principle of a~lthe operations of war, a principle (same list); that the objective is determined by the ob-
whlCh ought to preSIde over all combinations in order ject, the means available, etc., etc.; that the correct move-
that they be good." ment is determined by the same elements. In fact, he
Jo~ini' s fundamental and single principle, in brief, comes to the conclusion that in addition, security, control,
consIsted: timing, organization, and allotment of forces are all deter-
(I) In carrying by strategic combinations the mass of minded by the object, the comparative means, the charac-
the forcesof an army successivelyupon the decisiveplaces teristics of the theater, and the probable consequences oj
of the theater of war, and as much as possible upon the failure.
communications of the enemy, without endangering its These are principles to end all principles and perhap!
own; the last word now has been said. There can be no doubt
(2) In maneuvering in such a manner as to engal;e the of their universality. Apply them to pie-making, fOI
maIDmass of the forces with fractions onlY of the hostile example. The one fundamental and reliable principle fm
army;
.'''Field Service Regulations of the Future:' Re'l.'ieu' of JIilitan
(3) In directing equally, on the day of battle, by tac- LIterature, June and September. 1936. -
1939 \X'ORD MAGIC OF THE MILITARY MYSTICS 421
making pies depends upon whether you want a pie, the the author ot "Field Service Regulations of the Future."
kind of pie ~.'ou want, the materials in the kitchen, your This is an unproved deduction or assertion, a white rabbit
difficulties with the oven, and what vour husband will pulled out of the hat, and raised to the status of a prin-
sa" if it is a failure. Have your wife" try that recipe on ciple. The consequences of failure, in italics, is fastened
\'~lJr cook; but it is just as helpful to the cook as these like a tail to each of the ten statements of principles. \Vhv
principles of war are to the soldier. are the consequences of failure an essential component of
This set of principles could have been simplified further the principles of war? The author does not explain, he
without great effort to read: the object (or objective, or merely declares it. \Vhy not add the consequences of
security, etc.) depends upon the situation and the conse- success, or the probability of failure, or several other im-
quences of failure. Perhaps the author intended his re- portant considerations?
search to end in this manner. These principles have a \Vhat if we assume that a general, educated by this re-
certain utility; it would be hard to violate them since they searcher, wins as many battles as Napoleon? For the next
do not furnish a guide of any sort and they fit perfectly century soldiers will study his battles and writings to
~apoleon's definition when he said, "The military art find his secrets of victory. They will find embalmed in
is an art which has principles that can never be violated." his works the statement that e'vec:,thing-timing, con-
Thus their greatest usefulness may be to furnish alibis for troL organization, etc.-depends upon the consequences
defeated generals. This is not a new function for prin- of failure. The great man advises regard to the conse-
ciples of war. As the Austrian generals said of Napoleon quences of failure in every undertaking. Preoccupation
after he had defeated them in Italy, "It is not possible to with the consequences of failure could lose the next war.
disregard, as much as this man, the most essential prin- \Vhat if Napoleon had advised: Base every decision on
ciples of the art of war." the situation and the consequences of failure? One sus-
Our American researcher comes into conRict with pects that there would have been fewer (and longer) wars
~ farshal Bugeaud. "There are few absolute principles," and fewer battles. The consequences of failure in war are
the latter wrote, "but still there exceedingly severe and it is easy
are some. \Vhen you try to lay to quail at the prospect of failure.
down a principle concerning war, But against this prescription of
at once a great number of officers, caution can be set a quotation
thinking they are solving the from the greatest of military prag-
question, exclaim, 'Everything de- matists, Napoleon. He said, 'The
pends upon circumstances, you general does not accomplish great
sail according to the wind.' But if things, except as he knows how
,'ou do not know beforehand what to concentrate himself completely
arrangement of sail agrees with on one purpose and marches with-
what wind and what course, how out regard to consequences to-
can you 'sail according to the ward a single object." Or again,
wind'?" Our researcher has im- "The poorest choice in war is al-
paled himself squarely upon Mar- most always the most timid, or if
shal Bugeaud's objection. His one wishes, the most cautious."
principles (if they are principles, One's own difficulties are seen,
and that may be doubted) are so but not those of the enemy. It
fundamental that they simply are was to the probability of failure
a directive to sail accordinO" to cir- that Napoleon directed his atten-
t>
cumstances; as such, they are use- tion and he often computed his
less as guides of conduct and have probabilities mathematically. He
no. place in "Field Service Regu- attempted to fight without regard
latIons of the Future," or any to consequences, but with the
other time. \Ve should, however, probabilities in his favor. After
extend our thanks to this student these thousands of vears of talk
f~r having deprincipled the prin- and speculation, it is"to be doubt-
CIples of war. Perhaps they now ed that anyone has deduced the
wdl be retired from regulations principles of war, in a scientific
and texts back into theoretical sense, correctly. What have been
treatises where they belong. A called principles are unproved de-
characteristic common to dlmost ductions, nothing more. They
all alleged principles of war can never can be anything else be-
be found in the list proposed by cause controlled experiments in
422 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptember- 0 ctober
war cannot be made to verify them. Unquestionably there of Large Units states categorically that your will can be
are principles of war and necessarily they are true, and imposed on the enemy by acting defensively or offen-
those which were true yesterday will be true tomorrow sively.
under like conditions. But the' value of this affirmation The principle of the offensive was raised to an article
should not be exaggerated for many of them will be with- of faith in France before the W orId War. Its greatest
out application to the milirary problems. of tomorrow. expounder was Lieutenant Colonel Foch, later to become
Every new war poses new military equations and the Generalissimo of the Allied Armies. He heaped scorn on
formula: of the solutions advances from algebra to calcu- the "ancient processes," the "old fencing," and the "an-
lus, from little units alone in the middle of a continent tiquated methods" of maneuver of the eighteenth cen-
to masses stretching from sea to sea, from the ground to tury and glorified the war of "no victory without fight-
the sky. The principle of the lever has little application ing." "No strategy," he declaimed to his students at the
to the principles of electricity. Many of the principles Ecol~ de Guerre, "can henceforth prevail over that which
applying to Napoleon's wars have only a distant relation aims at ensuring tactical results, victory by fighting. The
to wars of today. One of Napoleon's great principles was last word of offensive or defensive fighting will be there-
concerned with the "unity of the line of operations." Few fore: the troops in movement, that is, attacking." Always
readers will even know what he meant by those words. the offensive, anywhere, everywhere-the headlong of-
Principles of permanent universal application would be fensive. "Hence the idea of shock composed of two
such elementary abstractions as would apply with equal terms: mass and impulsion." The impulsive force was
accuracy to a football game, a boxing match, or a battle. morale. With enough morale the shock became irresisti-
These have no utility in regulations. Regulations should ble. Then, too, he computed and proved mathematically
be guides or prescriptions for conduct involving definite that the increased rate of fire of modern firearms increased
organizations, weapons, means and methods, and appli- the relative power of the offensive over the defensive, an
cable to situations accurately visualized. As weapons and interesting example of sophistic reasoning.
conditions of war change, regulations should be modified Only a great man could have exerted such tremendous
and doctrines innovated. influence on a national doctrine. Lieutenant Colonel
Should we state, then, that principles of war have no Emile Mayer's description of his instruction at the Ecole
place in military study? Not at all. The theory of war, de Guerre explains part of the reason: "And here sud-
according to the greatest of all military theorists-Clause-denly (succeeding Lanrezac) rises a vibrant voice which
witz-should be a study and not a doctrine; it should not tosses out tumultuous and sibylline words. Their esoteric
be embalmed in a regulations. He adds that it is impos- obscurity is traversed by Rashes. Unexpected images are
sible to endow the art of war with a body of positive doc- thrown out. One feels transported into a superior and
trine that will always serve as a guide or rule of conduct ideal world. Armies dash. The conceptions of general-
for those who command. The military genius will always issimos meet in conflict. The boldness of genius carries
operate outside the accepted doctrine. away the circumspection of wisdom. With will, one is
Study on a theoretical basis will produce familiarity sure to seize uncertain victory and attach it to one's flag.
with war and encourage inventiveness. It should form It suffices to will.
the spirit of future leaders. Those soldiers who learned "The auditor is overthrown. He admires, ravished h\'
the principles of war by combining the initials of a set of the train of hot, passionate, and communicative convic-
principles into an easy word for remembrance, like a child tion, which carries him far from the dross of clothing and
in kindergarten, know nothing of the principles of war. shoes, from police of barracks, far from the supply of
The only theories of war valid for any individual are those forage, far also from the professor who talks on subjects
which he has evolved or accepted from his own study. He matter-of-factly; on the utility of the advance guard and
will have no need for a memory trick to retain them. the choice of the line of resistance."
Catchwords mumbled by parroters will have one certain Joffre was a convert. At the outset of the war French
result: they will be wrongly applied. A military illiterate combat orders carried the injunction, "The enemy will be
with an open mind will find a better solution to the prob- attacked wherever found." The world was treated to the
lems of war tomorrow than the half-educated soldier who incredible and pitiful spectacle of 329,000 Frenchmen
believes that war can be conducted by rules or regulations. killed in the opening month and twenty-five days of the
ATTACKING THE OFFENSIVE war during which the principle of the offensive was un-
disputed. In the last four months and eleven days of the
No more solidly established and more earnestly pro-
moted alleged principle of war can be found than that war, during which the fighting of a larger number of
of the Offensive. It was included in General Fuller's French divisions was almost continuous, 163,000 French
original list, copied into our 1921 Training Regulations, were killed, a death rate of about one-fifth of the opening
and appears as an idea in our officialtext on strategy. phase. More than 200,000 men were killed uselessly trv-
"Decisive results," reads our Field Service Re(!ulations ing to follow a theory arrogated to the status of a principle.
(paragraph 380) "are obtained only by the offensive." French military writers now speak of the strategical
The French Regulations for the Tactical Employment offensive as a principle, but are careful to deny any great
1939 \\,'ORD MAGIC OF THE MILITARY MYSTICS --123
\ irrue ro rhe racrical offensive. Roughl~, defined. the offensive also has lost manv wars. \\'ho remembers the
,rrJrecrical
- ::>
offensive means little more than an offensi\'e "Fabian" polic~' of Quintus Fabius ~faximus against
Jim or intention in the operations as a whole. Since the Hannibal? He pursued tactics of "masterly inactivity,"
means of strateg~' include economic, moral. and political destroyed the resources of the countn' around Hannibal's
war, as well as military operations, a military defensive .-\rnn:•• and harassed him constant!v, hut refused ro ficrht.
:J
Fabius resigned after his SIX months' dictatorShit de- pelled to do so." Napoleon habitually fought offensively.
pressed by the clamor of the people for positive ion, B:' limiting one's self to a selective examination of Na-
and his policy was abandoned. His successor toO' the poleon's battles to deduce the principles of war, as did
offensive and the greatest disaster a Roman Arm:' had ever General Fuller initially, one might be led to presume that
suffered-Cannx-was the result. there is some magic in an offensive principle. Actually.
Napoleon's offensive against Russia. in 1812. conven- Napoleon's offensives were warranted and successful be-
iently is forgotten by the public-relations-men of the offen- cause of superior mobility. superior generalship. and the
sive. The Grand Army of 600.000 men invaded Russia resulting surprise. Superior generalship, superior mobil-
and remained on the ~ffensive all the way to Moscow. ity and surprise can also make the defensive decisive.
with the Russians retreating before them. they returned, Unquestionably the offensive has outstanding advan-
30.000 only, the Grand Army destroyed by the Russian tages particularly in initiative and morale. over other
defensive. The defensive was decisive. the power of Na- forms of combat when conditions of relative power, time.
poleon ended. and his eventual downfall onl:' a matter of and place warrant its adoption. But there is no magic in
tIme. the offensive, per se, and the sooner it is denuded of the
The successful defense of Verdun was a victory for the halo which surrounds it. the saner will be the conduct of
French. a defeat for the Germans. In 1vbrch, ;917. the war and the less likelv the useless deaths of hundreds of
Germans, aware of the prospective Nivelle offensive on thousands of young n~en entrusted to militar:' leaders.
the Western Front. withdrew to the Hindenburg line.
HIDE-A/'.:D-SEEK WITH THE DECISIVE POli':T
\Vhen the French offensive finallv was undertaken on
April 17th. dislocated by the Ger~an withdrawal. it was The principle of the objective disappeared somewhere
a disastrous failure, a victory for the Germans and led to along the bypaths between the discontinuance of prin-
mutiny in the French Arm~' and widespread defeatism in ciples of war in training regulations and their resurrection
France. The entrv of the United States into the war that as ideas in the official text on strategy. But in this text
April bolstered French hopes sufficiently to save the can be found its substitute, "the fundamental law of
1939 WORD MAGIC OF THE MILITARY MYSTICS 425
strategy," in capitals: "BE STRONGER AT THE DE- to destroy them feeling sure that the accessorieswill then
CISIVE POINT." That sounds like a reasonable ad- tumble down themselves."
monition, although one is tempted to ask if any com- But Napoleon did not always follow his maxim. In
mander knowingly ever would be weaker at the decisive Italv, Carnot wanted him to march on the Austrians in
point. It likewise sounds very much like Sir Frederick Miianese territory, since their army was the principle
Maurice's statement written in 1~1: "The great prin- force (the decisive point) of the adversaries. This was
cipleof strategy is to concentrate the largest possible force the center of gravity of the resistance and if this was
at the right moment at the decisivepoint." Are generals broken the rest would make peace and the war be brought
reallysuch morons as to need such advice? to an end. But if Napoleon devoted his entire attention
But just where is the decisive point? The problem of to the Austrians, the Sardinians would be able to ma-
being stronger should be simple if it could be located. neuver independently and threaten Napoleon's communi-
Turning to the text on strategy for help, one finds, "In cations. To guard the communications against the Sar-
addition to providing for the maximum concentration dinians would require a large force and weaken Napoleon
against the enemy's weakest point, etc." By inference, so that the remainder of his force would be insufficientto
therefore,the enemy's weakest point is the decisivepoint. cope with the Austrians. '
Butin another place one finds, "As to the question of strik- Consequently, he turned against the weaker enemy,
ing the enemy as hard as one can in the most vulnerable the Sardinians, and destroyed them first. Following this
place, there can be no question." That is all the help the he was able to turn on the Austrians with his entire
text gives to apply the fundamental law of strategy. It is strength. He won the war, but he violated his own
obvious,without argument, that the weakest point is not maxim, van der Goltz's pontification, and our officialtext
necessarilythe most vulnerable place and that neither on strategy, which reads, "It must be remembered that
of these, necessarily,are decisivein every situation. the main operation is all important.... Successin the
Foch had a different idea about where the decisivepoint main operations will more than compensate for small de-
wasto be found. He wrote, "The same applies to attack- feats elsewhere."
ing; it must be conducted, as far as possible, not against a On this occasionNapoleon chose the weaker enemy as
line or a front, but against one point; I may add, against the decisive point, reversing his usual procedure. One
a point which ought not to be taken at random, but in would think that the common sense of any general equal
general against a salient or wing, because the attacking to such a decision,but such optimism fails to take account
force may, in that case, make the most advantageous, the stranglehold of copybook maxims on little minds.
that is, the most complete, use of the numerical superior- In the World War the main armies of both contenders
icyof the numbers it possesses." were on the Wetsern Front. According to van der Goltz,
It is interesting to find Clausewitz derive a contrary the Western Front automatically became the decisive
conclusionfrom the same argument. In the "Summary point for both belligerents. The French, defending their
of Instruction to the Prince," he writes: ''The parry acting own territory, necessarily held the Western Front to be
on converginglines, unless he has a most decisivesuperior- the decisive area, regardless of any strategical indications
icy of numbers, will lose by battles all the advantages to the contrary. The British generals were of the same
which the enveloping movements have gained for him. opinion. They resisted to the best of their ability the
... Besidesthis, the principle just stated of concentrat- pressure brought upon them by the civilian heads of the
ing as much as possible at the decisive point, is opposed British government to detach forces for operations at the
to the idea of enveloping strategically." • Dardanelles or Salonika. Haig had been brought up on
Van der Goltz's search for the decisive point seems to von der Goltz, whose book, The Conduct of War, had
lead him in the'same direction as Clausewitz. He wrote, been published in England in 1899' With reference to a
"A portion of the fighting force will always be considered letter from Kitchener that the British Army then being
as intended for decisive combat, and this we may define raised might be better used to cooperate with Italy and
as the enemy's Main Army. This at the same rime con- Greece, Haig told Sir John French: "I said that we ought
stitutes the enemy's power of resistance. It is evident that to divide our military force, but concentrate on the dedsive
if the main army is beaten first, then the remaining point which is the frontier against the German main
weaker groups will still be less able to count on victory. army. With more guns and ammunition and more troops
... Hence it follows that the primary objective, against the allies were bound in the end to defeat the Germans
which we must direct all our efforts, is the enemy's main and break through."
army. This, the first principle of the modern conduct of The same unswerving adherence to a maxim, the same
war.... From this first principle of the modern art of inability to think, was shown by Robertson. He wrote to
Warfollows the second, which is, if possible to unite all Haig: "My views are known to you. They have always
the availableforces for the decisivecombat." been 'defensive' in all theaters but the West. But the
Napoleon supports this conception: "There are many difficultyis to prove the wisdom of this now that Russia is
fine generals in Europe, but they see too many things at out. I ~onfess-I stick to it more because I see nothing
the same time: I see only one, namely, the masses. I try better, and because my instinct prompts me to stick to
426 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
it, than because of any good argument by which I em they had thought it through. The initial attack on .France,
support it."2 A pitiful admission, in truth. the principal enemy, was justified on the ground that Ger-
They had read von der Goltz and Napoleon, but they many had sufficientsuperiority of force to win quickly in
had not read Frederick the Great. Unable to think their France. After the initial failure to defeat the main enemy
problem out for themselves, they could have found an and the apparent hopelessnessof a favorable outcome on
.applicablemaxim in his words. He, too, had faced war the Western Front, Germany should have turned to the
:against coalitions and on more than one front. His con- east and eliminated Allied detachments. This policy was
elusion can be found summed up in the words, "When not pursued until Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed
one cannot hope to vanquish the principal army of the direction of the German Armies. With their access to
enemy, it is necessaryto seek to destroy its detachments." power, the defeat and elimination of Roumania and Rus-
Even Clausewitz could have furnished them a useful hint. sia followed in rapid succession.Italy was rendered help-
He wrote, "We may, therefore, establish it as a principle, less by the terrific defeat of Caporetto in October, 1917.
th:.ltif we can conquer all our enemies by conquering one Ludendor£Fs strategical problem then was whether to
of them, the defeat of that one must be the aim of the continue and eliminate Italy, or to mass the forces re-
whole war." But the "if" contains the essenceof Clause- leasedin the east and finish with France and Britain on the
witz's principle. Western Front. It was essentially a question of whether
The Allied strategical problem was just as simple as the means were sufficient to destroy the main Allied
that. There never was a time, until the American Army Armies. But the problem was complicatedby the necessity
reached France in large numbers, that the British and of eliminating the Allied Armies before the Americans
French had enough force in France to vanquish the Ger- arrived in numbers to overturn German superiority. In
man Army. Frederick's maxim applied. Since the Allied the spring of 1918, Germany had two hundred divisions
strength was insufficient to overcome the enemy's main on the Western .front, twenty-five more than the Allies
army, they should have attacked his detachments. The could muster. Eight)' of these divisions were training
advantages to be gained by the elimination of Turkey, a during the winter for the spring offensive.One can hardly
German detachment, were tremendous. It would have criticize Ludendorff for his opinion that a disposable ma-
stopped the fighting in Asia Minor and Palestine, which neuvering force of eighty divisionswould be ample for a
continued to the end of the war. It would have opened break-through and the finish of the war.
communications with Russia and probably would have Actually, German superiority was only in the ratio of
kept them in the war to the end. It would have prevented eight to seven. Ludendorff had not counted on the slow
the entrance of Bulgaria into the war on the German rhythm of great modern battles. The French and British
side. had time to bring reserves from the entire extent of the
The civilians,notably Winston Churchill, in the British Western Front and from Italy and finally to stop the
government saw this, and over the protests of the soldiers, German offensives.The offensiveof March 21, 1918, just
ordered the Dardanelles expedition. The expedition was a missed success. The British were debating withdrawing
failure, due to half-hearted military support and civilian to the channel ports. But the German soldiers, on short
interference, as well as to military incompetence in plan- rations for a year, stopped in great numbers and plundered
ning and conduct. Russia remained blockaded, Turkey the captured British food depots. Two days lost in this
continued in the war, and Bulgaria entered on the German fashion allowed the French to solder the break between
side. the French and the British and the war was saved.
The continuance of Turkey in the war provided a pre- Viewed from the platform of hindsight, it would be
tence of justification for continued British operations in difficult to state that Ludendorff's decision was wrong.
Asia. Altogether they poured more than two million Success just missed his grasp as it had that of the Ger-
men, about equally divided between combatants and non- mans in 191+ Had he chosen to attack Italy and eliminate
combatants, into these side-shows. The British had po- that Allied detachment, it is difficult to foreseehow long
litical reasons which justified, from their point of view, the operations would have taken and how many troops
this indefensible diversion of force. The war ended with would have been required to remain in Italy. Before this
British soldiers in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia, operation was completed the Americans might have at-
and Mesopotamia. The mandates recognized possession rived in France in great enough numbers to have made
as nine-tenths of the law. It was British good fortune that a favorable decision impossible there. Ludendorff may
the Americans replaced the manpower which the British have made an incorrect decision, but at least he saw his
had diverted for purposes of conquest in Asia and saved whole problem. The same cannot be said for the British,
the war with the two million men we sent to France. In who did not reason,who followed a maxim, and who had
effect, the United States provided the men for the British not read enough maxims.
conquests in Asia. Franco in the Spanish Civil War was faced with a
The German situation posed the identical problem, but similar strategic dilemma in 1937. The Loyalists held a
section in the north of Spain along the Bay of Biscay.
'Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-18, by Field lfarshaI Sir \ViIliam But the Loyalistmain army was in eastern Spain stretching
Robertson, Bart., GCB, GClfG, KCVO, DSO. Page 255, Yolume
II. from the Pyrenees to the Mediterranean. But Franco
1939 \,\'ORD MAGIC OF THE MILITARY MYSTICS 42'
had insufficient trOOps to defeat the main arm~'. He to establish a maneuver doctrine in the American service
therefore turned and eliminated the detachment in the aher the \\'orld \Var.
north, releasing enough soldiers so that he was able to At T elissu, in ~ lanchuria in 1904, three Japanese di-
undertake his decisive offensive in Aragon in the spring visions opposed an approximately equal force of Russians.
of 1938. Application of the strategy of the British gen- Two of the Japanese divisions had attacked the Russians
erals of the \Vorld \Var would have led him to continue to and had driven them back on the main position. The
fight a hopelessly even contest along the principal front. third Japanese division was well out on the left flank and
This is an ancient argument, but new, of course, to located so that it could move quickly on the Russian rear
aenerals whose military education was gained on the polo bv a wide envelopment, and cut off the on Iv line of re-
field, at the hunt, or in fashionable drawing rooms. t:eat along the railroad to the northwest. Instead, this
Polybius blames Hannibal's choice of the principal enemy division joined with the divisions making a frontal at-
as his first objective for his failure to conquer the world. tack and aided in pushing the Russians back along their
"Ir may be affirmed with confidence," he wrote, "that if line of communication. The Russian line of retreat passed
he hal first tried his strength in other parts of the world,
and had come at last to arrack the Romans, he could
scarcely have failed in any part of his design. But now,
as he beaan
o with those with whom he should have ended,
the people that was the first object of his conquest was
the last also which he had the power to invade."
The antonym of the decisive point is a fearsome catch-
word, "defeat in detail." For a hundred years, genef31s
with that terror-inspiring phrase in mind, massed their
troops into human steamrollers. When they fought suc-
cessfully it was only to push their opponent back on his
own line of communications. A plan for a turning move-
ment or a wide envelopment could be defeated instantly
by recourse to the potent phrase. It nearly defeated efforts
dispersed to live off the country, and assembled for com- ciples). or reaffirmed those of others by his own study.
bat. ~lodern armies assemble to live, easily supplied in unfitted for the higher conduct of war. It requires t e
masses by railroads and motors, and fire power forces profound understanding gained in their formulation to
them to disperse to fight. The "principles" are an expla- apply them to new problems.
nation of how it was done, perhaps a hundred, perhaps It is evil to approach war with fixed ideas; that is,
two thousand years ago. Their chief utility is to save us without an open and flexible mind, but It IS certain to
moderns from thinking through our own problems. lead to disaster to aproach it with the inapplicable form-
Foch relates that when ~1arshal }..rac~/1ahon took of- ula: of the past. \Vhen the subaltern (later General) von
fice as President of the French Republic he demanded, Verdv du Verno is arrived on the battlefield of N achod
"\Vhere are the regulations?" And as there were none to confr~nted by the difficulties which were present, h~
tell him what to do, he was lost. Poor old regulations, cudgeled his brain, searching his memory for an example
adds Foch, they are moron-guides which encourage mental of principle which would furnish him with a line of con-
indolence; it is not sufficient to learn regulations. It is es- duct to adopt. Nothing inspired him. "To the devil," he
sential to learn how to think. said, "with history and principles! After all, what is the
And so with the principles of war and all the other real problem?" and promptly he made his decision.
catchwords that soldiers live b~', learned or parroted, they And so today. New problems demand new solutions. It
are a mirage and point to the wrong path. The militarv is for us to state the new problems and formulate the new
student who has not devised his own theories (or prin- solutions. "After all, what is the real problem?"
•
I
Illustrated by
Heward Williamson
)r1'
;1'
....
..-' .
a tough
the ramparts of Vicksburg. This is accurate if the war
be thought of in the light of European precedent, and
only Untrue when we remember that for the Union mere
?nick who saw diat a.
victory was equal to defeat. It should not be forgotten
~hat a soldier's work is incomplete until he has decisively ca&)al't~maf1. was of1.l~ af1. iH.taf1.-
mRuenced the political situation, and the double victory
of 1863 did not achieve this result. A year after Gettys-
burg and Vicksburg-a year that had seen the Chatta- t't~maf1. witlt q. ~etachable legs
nooga battles and the better half of the titanic Atlanta
432 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
field. They might still gain their essential point by de- polel?nic arm when the Mine Run campaign closed OUt
fault. The task that faced the North at the opening of I 86}, with its demonstration that the most serious part
1~ was infinitely more difficult than anything it had of the war was still to be fought. The reaction of an ordi-
yet accomplished. It was required not only to achieve nary commander to this failure was that cavalry, haVing
military victory (though this was an indispensable pre- become an arm useless for heavy fighting, should k
liminary) but to achieve it in a manner that involved turned into a kind of military police force, charged with
the extinction of Southern morale and the prevention of convoying trains and doing picket duty for the rest of
that guerilla conflict which most European observers the army. This had been Hooker's reaction after Chancd-
considered as certain to follow the operations of the field lorsville: and Meade inherited it from him. It took some-
armIes. thing more than an ordinary commander; it took, I say,
In this sense both Vicksburg and Gettysburg were in- a commander on the edge of genius, to throw all received
decisive. They damaged, but did not slay the Confederate ideas out the window and start afresh from the concept
spirit. If Pemberton had been less a ninny, the one that a cavalryman was only an infantryman with four de-
would not have been lost; if Lee had not made one of tachable legs.
his rare errors, if Stuart had not been absent and Long- This was Sheridan. He pronounced a bill of divorce-
street sulky, the other might have been won. The ment between the cavalryman and his horse, a thing un-
Southerners reasonably felt that a comparatively minor heard of since true cavalry was born and the Goths came
change in the conditions of either conflict would have riding across the steppes.
reversed the results. They went on fighting in the expec- The basic doctrine was not altogether novel, and per-
tation that the law of averages would provide both changes haps not even independently original with Sheridan.
in another combat. The battles that broke their hearts as John Buford, for one, had held the idea and might have
well as their heads did not come till later; and these pushed it farther had he not been debarred by death from
were named Chickamauga, Yellow Tavern, Cedar Creek, becoming more than a subordinate commander whose
Five Forks. originality was limited to the tactical field. It was Sheri-
The first was Thomas' battle and affected the western dan's special merit that his precise and orderly brain
theater of war alone. But the other three have four ele- evolved a harmonious and logical structure from the
ments in common. Each took place in that Eastern pied- various elements he found already existing. It was his spe-
mont on which the attention of the people on both sides cial accomplishment that through his treatment of cavalry,
of the strife was riveted, and thus yielded the maximum not as a separate arm wir.h peculiar disabilities, but as a
moral effect; each was the crowning act of a campaign; kind of fast-moving foot soldier, he achieved the only
in each, cavalry, the special and favorite arm of the South, pure offensive to be found in the Civil War.
was deeply engaged; and in all, the Union commander For Lee, a master of the tactical attack, always de-
was Philip Henry Sheridan. veloped his successes out of the strategic defense, against
With Sheridan there triumphed in these battles not enemies moving in, with lengthened communications,
only the Union army. There triumphed also an entirely across ground he intimately knew. In both the battles he
new, purely American doctrine of war, of the use of the fought during advances he was beaten. Grant and Sher-
mounted arm-an idea that had been struggling dumbly man, who might have possessed parts of the same brain
for expression since Richard M. Johnson's Kentucky under two different skulls, exactly reversed Lee by acting
riflemen made razor-strops of the skin from Tecumseh's on the strategic attack but tactical defense. They aimed to
legs after the Battle of the Thames. It was a doctrine that place armies in positions where the enemy must hit out
could not possibly have been framed south of the Po- at them. Both failed (Cold Harbor, Kenesaw Mountain)
tomac, in spite of the fact that the Confederacy entered when they violated this principle. Thomas was strictly a
the war with an aristocracy habituated to the saddle and counter-puncher, waiting for an enemy advance, which he
with considerably more than its proportionate share of parried with one hand while knocking out his opponent
the cavalry officersof the old army. with the other. Only Stonewall Jackson approached Sheri-
In fact, it was a doctrine that could hardly have been dan; and there is more than a verbal coincidence in the
born in the mind of a cavalryman at all. For cavalry of- fact that Stonewall's men were known as "the foot cav-
ficers, North and South, were so imbued with the history alry" while Sheridan's were cavalry who fought on foot.
and tradition of their arm as to be incapable of perceiving At the time of the great winter conference of 1863-
that the advance of mechanical science had deprived this 1864on military affairs, with Lincoln and the army leaders
history and tradition of all meaning. They continued to present, nobody was thinking of getting a man of genius
think in terms of the days when the infantryman's gun or a new doctrine of cavalry. It occurred to nobody that
was ineffective beyond a hundred yards and could be defeat of its mounted arm might have a ruinous effect on
fired at most, twice while the cavalryman was crossing the morale of the Confederacy; though for both political
that distance. They thought of Murat and regarded the and military reasons everyone seems to have agreed tha~
charge of the gallant six hundred as an example of cour- they could not afford to have Stuart riding circles around
age and not as one of stupidity. the Army of the Potomac any more. In other words, th(
The Northern cavalry service had clearly failed as a Na- views of the conference were negative. The decisiv(
1939 LITTLE PHIL - PART I 433
campaign of the war was approaching. and it was impor-
rant to get something more than a minimum ~'ield from
the human and mechanical power the Union cavalry pos-
sessed.
The best way to do this was a change in command. For
Pleasonton, then commanding the cavalry corps. had been
given a thorough trial and he was simply not good enough.
But who would be better? The three divisional com-
manders in the corps were Buford, Gregg and Kilpatrick.
II
Who was this Sheridan? Practically unknown in the
East. he had flashed only once across the front pages of
war history-when he stood in the captured rifle pits at
Kilpatrick was a hard fighter but a still harder rider. The the foot of Missionary Ridge, and lifting his whiskey
men knew him as "Kill-cavalry." for he normally arrived flask toward the rebels on the towering summit, shouted
at the scene of action with horses'blown and panting. men "Here's how!" before he drank the toast. As the last
dropping from the saddle with weariness. Gregg was just drops trickled down his gullet a shot from a big gun up
the sort of mercurial leader Grant most distrusted-per- there threw dirt all over him. "I call that damned ungen-
haps the best of them all when swinging to victory. per- erous!" cried Sheridan. "I'll take those guns for thad"
haps the worst when things went wrong. Custer and and flinging the empty flask up the slope he started after
Wesley Nferritt were too junior. Grant asked for old Gen- it-the beginning of that increclible charge up a moun-
eral Franklin, whose talents he held in an incomprehen- tain like a mansard roof.
sible respect, but the others frowned him down and there Army circles knew slightly more about him. They
was a silence till General Halleck cut the knot with the knew him for the hero of the fighting at Perryville where
suggestion, "How would Sheridan do?" he had held his division all day against overwhelming
"The very man!" cried Grant. and that night a tele- rebel attacks. and in the evening put on a counterstroke
gram was dispatched for Sheridan. that tore Bragg's line to pieces. He had done well at
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
Chickamauga where, though his division had been one captaincy and was quartermaster of Southwestern Mis-
of those carried from the field, he rallied it in time to come souri, that is, effectively buried. Grant and Sherman were
back and cover Thomas' retreat. At the dreadful battle of already generals, the former already a famous general;
Stone River he had done surpassingly well; had slowed Thomas had an independent command and McClellan
and then halted the Confederate attack of the first day and more military authority than any American since George
formed the anchor of Thomas' line. In the dramatic mid- Washington.
night council of war he stood with Thomas against re- But at this juncture Sheridan caught his tide. Quarter-
treat, and even asked permission to lead the counter that master business brought him frequently to the head-
eventually won. quarters of the western armies where he met and was
Most of the rest was gossip that drifted up by word of liked by Gordon Granger, then a brigadier of several
mouth through junior officers, for Sheridan was the months' standing. Granger's old regiment, the 2d Michi-
youngest division commander in the armies of the West, gan Cavalry, had gotten into bad shape since he moved
belonging to a later generation than most of the high com- upstairs. He wanted an officerto straighten the command
mand. That gossip would tell, for instance, how he came out, and the name of the young quartermaster, who was
to West Point, a tough little Mick of a store-clerk from running his department like a clock, naturally suggested
Ohio, poor as Job's turkey, with a chip always on his itself.
shoulder; how he wrangled during drill with Cadet Granger put the matter up to Halleck, then command-
Sergeant Terrill, and after trying to jab that student of- ing the west. That formalist, who had already been im-
ficer with a bayonet, had challenged him to a fist fight pressed by the neat way Sheridan ran his freight schedules
behind the buildings, coming out of the encounter with and his fastidious paper work, gave the promotion his
a black eye and a year's suspension; how he had been blessing. This was how Sheridan, whose nearest approach
graduated in 1853, an undistinguish'ed thirty-fourth to mounted action had been muleback operations in the
among fifty-two, and was ordered to Fort Duncan, Texas, 4th Infantry, came to be pitched into the Corinth cam-
as a lieutenant of infantry. paign at the head of a.regiment of horse. He was to be a
There again he fell on stormy weather, which can per- lieutenant-general before he received his colonel's com-
haps be traced to the fact that all his life long Sheridan mISSIOn.
was a picturesque and vivid swearer, while the colonel in Fortune rode with him on his first mission, a detached
command was equally noted as a God-fearing man of the one to hold Boonville, Missouri, with eleven companies
Puritan type. There was as much disagreement as there of his own regiment and the 2d Iowa, about 759 men all
can be between a very junior lieutenant and a very senior told. Most might not consider it fortune, however-Con-
colonel, with petry persecutions on one side, petty sabo- federate Chalmers came down to shoot up the place on
tage on the other. Sheridan finally escaped via a requested July 1, 1862 with 4,000 men. Sheridan had chosen a po-
transfer to the 4th Infantry, then on duty against the sition where his Ranks were covered by a pair of swamps,
Yakima Indians in the Pacific Northwest. and the artack was canalized into a narrow front where
The country was ill-explored, the Indians almost in- his dismounted riRemen waited, but the disparity in
veterately hostile, and young Lieutenant Sheridan was numbers was so great that by noon things began to look
very much on his own in leading detachments out to deal grim.
with them. But in that hard service he found himself. He Sheridan summoned a trustworthy officer, Captain
displayed a perfect passion for topography; never went out Alger; gave him ninety men, armed with Colt "revolv-
on an expedition without taking surveying instruments ing carbines"; told him to go by a circuit and fall on the
along and mapping every inch of the country he covered. enemy's rear, shooting for all they were worth from the
Two other details of this period have survived, interesting saddle, making a racket whether they hit anything or not.
in view of his later career. Lieutenant Sheridan formed the Now, says Alger, who has told the story, he understood
habit of requisitioning all the mules he could lay hands on why his colonel had spent half the previous night poring
and mounting his infantrymen on them for movements over maps of the region. In the heat of that conRict,
up to the scene of action; and in dealing with the Indians, among the ceaseless attacks, Sheridan gave him road di-
he displayed a wonderful gift of blarney, could always rections as dear and pretise as though he were telling a
talk them out of hostile intention if he could get them to man how to find the post office. Alger rode off with his
pow-wow before the shooting started. ninety; made his circuit, and charged the rebel rear with
Much of this, however, was not to be dredged from guns banging. At the same time Sheridan threw forward
memories and records till the young lieutenant was his own dismounted men in a countercharge against the
famous. The service papers lying before Lincoln, Halleck,
Confederates, who were mostly still in the saddle.
and Grant at that winter conference would have stated
only that Lieutenant Sheridan was ordered east at the out- There is one thing about mounted cavalry. If it once
break of war, arrived late because of the distance, and was gets started going either forward or back, it is very diffi-
assigned to the Herculean labor of auditing the accounts cult to stop. Chalmers' men had started going back when
left in confusion by the ornamental Fremont. A year Alger struck. Sheridan's charge kept them going with
after the war began he had only attained promotion to a doubled speed, and in half an hour the four thousand
1939 LITILE PHIL - PARTI 435
had left the seven hundred fifty in possession of the field Sheridan was, in fact, inclined to view the cavalty com-
and the enemy wounded. mand as a demotion. He was due to take over a corps in
It was an outstanding feat of arms in a campaign that the western armies and liked service there, among the
had very little outstanding about it. The young com- free-and-easy veterans who turned out on parade to bleat
mander was given a temporary brigadier's rank and was at an officerwhen they considered his behavior sheeplike,
sent by Grant to Buell a month later, when Bragg's in- or offered him chewing tobacco as a special delicacy when
vasion of Kentucky caused the Army of the Cumberland they liked him. The Army of the Potomac, he under-
to ask for help. Sheridan was taken from his two regi- stood, was more strait-laced in discipline. He doubted his
ments of horse to arrange the defense of Louisville, which ability to give satisfaction under the conditions. Grant
he did so well that he was placed in charge of one of the eyed him ruminatively, puffing cigar smoke, and was ulti-
new divisions of infantry in the campaign that led to mately delivered of the remark that the new Chief of
Perryville. While ex-Cadet Sergeant Terrill was being Cavalry would have pretty much of a free hand on one
killed at the head of his brigade in one part of the line condition-that he keep Jeb Stuart out of mischief.
that day, Sheridan in another was the heart of the Union Sheridan's face cleared at once, and two days later he was
defense, the best man on the field, winning his step on the riding down to inspect his new command.
ladder that had now brought him to Chief of Cavalry in There were 10,000 effectives in three divisions, com-
the Arm" of the Potomac. manded by Gregg, Torbert (a new man come up through
"
the ranks to replace Kilpatrick, who had gone west to
III
join Sherman), and Wilson. The last was another of
There is a certain amount of mystery in how Grant Grant's surprise appointments-the youngest man so far
came to assent so enthusiastically to the nomination for the to bear stars on his shoulders, an engineer of the West
most important cavalry command in the nation of a Point class of 1860, who had been a kind of secretary and
young man whose ten years of active service had included personal inspector-general to Grant in the West, but who
only four months with cavalry, and those at the head of a had never led troops. The men looked strong, healthy,
single regiment. The commander-in-chief did not know smart-Sheridan has recorded his pleased surprise at
Sheridan well. He had seen him in action as a general their appearance-but the horses were the merest flea-bait.
officer only during the week or two of the Chattanooga It did not take the inquisitive new commander long to
fighting, and the most favorable reports on Sheridan came discover the reason for a state of affairs that would be
from men Grant was rather inclined to distrust-Buell, pardonable only at the close of a long and hard campaign.
Rosecrans, Halleck.
The cavalry were doing picket duty for the entire army,
The choice is perhaps explained by a remark of Grant's round a circuit of sixty miles, besides having the standing
long later: "No man ever had such a faculty of finding assignment of furnishing heavy escorts for every provision
things out as Sheridan. He was always the best informed train and every column of infantry that moved on the
man in his command as to the enemy." This is full of il- roads in back areas. Sheridan went to Meade with a de-
lumination, not only on Sheridan, but also on Grant's mand that his corps be concentrated as a fast battle wing
own theory of the employment of horsemen in a world of the main army and relieved of drafts for the service of
where they had been banished from the battlefield. He security.
evidently thought of the arm as screen and counter-
Meade's concept of cavalry was that which had grown
screen, whose function was to conceal the movements of
up in the Army of the Potomac. It was not thought out
one's own forces and to acquire information about those
at all; it was imposed on the army from outside, by the
of the enemy. Sheridan's preternatural activity, physical
pressure of Mosby's lightning jabs and Stuart's long rides
and mental, his deep interest in and knowledge of
around the rear; and it was essentially defensive. The
topography, his ability at questioning prisoners ("That
commander was horrified by Sheridan's demand. "What
there man, he'll talk the eyes right out of your head,"
will become of my trains, my flanks, my moving col-
said one of them) -these things impressed Grant as the
umns?" he asked.
proper equipment of a cavalry leader.
Yet both Grant and Halleck had misgivings when the Sheridan: "If you let me use the cavalry as I wish you
man arrived in Washingron on April 4, too late for any need not :worryabout trains or flanks. As for the infantry,
change to be made before the opening of the campaign. it ought to be able to take care of itself on the roads."
Grant particularly, as he confessed later, "formed a very Meade demurred, filled with the engineer's distrust of
unfavorable impression." Seen in a drawing room Sheri- new ideas that could not be expressed in figures and Sheri-
dan was a "most extraordinary figure. His chest was large dan had to develop his theme. The infantry, he said, were
and full, his legs short and small, and his arms so phe- about to attack the enemy's infantry; why then, should
nomenally long that his hands reached down below the our cavalry stand on the defensive against the Confed-
level of his knees." Above this was a small head, bearing erates'? If our mounted men be concentrated the enemy
little bright eyes like those of a bird and a face that re- will dare just one more of those long raids-his last. For
gistered doubt both about his own ability and the wisdom a concentrated cavalry corps will then face him from a pre-
of accepting the new appointment. pared position across his line of retreat, or alternatively,
436 THE .COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
deliver 10,000 meIl at any desired spot on the enemy rear was granted two weeks more in which to assemble his
at any time desired. men and to rest their horses before reveille on the third of
"It is the business of cavalry to fight cavalry," Sheridan
May blew the opening of the Hammering Campaign.
went on, "and if there is no cavalry there to fight, to at-
Two of Sheridan's divisions led the two columns of in-
tack the enemy's infantry in their most vulnerable point."fantry acrossthe Rapidan that morning. Division Torbert,
Warming with his own logic he demanded thrice the by Meade's orders, was held back to guard the reat-a
normal equipment of artillery for his horse, as much artil-
perfectly proper employment for the nimblest troops of
lery as infantry would have. Cavalry used as he meant to the army by Meade's ideas. Though Sheridan could hard-
use it would be seizing positionsbehind the enemy, points ly have agreed, he forebore any protest at the time.
vital to that enemy, which he would fight like the devil to On the 5th the Battle of the Wilderness broke among
regain. Cavalry mobility was a means to the end of ar- the tangled thickets south of the stream. Only two of the
riving at an effective point for an infantry battle- three big Confederate corps reached the field that day.
At this point Sheridan had parted company not only On Lee's left, Ewell, with ground and good tactics in his
with Meade but with Grant also. The latter's theory of favor, held Warren and Sedgwick around Wilderness
cavalry was different from that of either Meade or Sheri- Tavern amid appalling losseson both sides. On the Con-
dan, but he possessed a brain so habituated to following federate right A. P. Hill did not get his men up quite so
the essential through mazes of side issues as to resemble a
soon, and when he did arrive, found Hancock's II Corps,
mechanical instrument. The registering .dial of that ma- with the best battle-captain in the Union army, facing
chine reported to him that Sheridan was proposing to sub- him. The fighting went ill for the Confederates; Hill lost
mit the rebel cavalry to the novel experience of being at-ground, men and morale, only dosing night saved him
tacked. This chimed with his own idea of cavalry as a from a break.
service of information and anti-information. He decided But out of that partial defeat Lee drew a battle plan for
the argument about concentration in Sheridan's favor, the second day as perfect as a painting by Leonardo.
but as for the extra artillery-no, not at present. The de- (Map I.) Longstreet arrived during the night with the
cision accurately reflected Grant's questioning middle- third big corps. While Ewell held on the Confederate left
ground attitude at the time. and Hill slightly retired in their center, this fresh corps
was to work round Hancock's flank and strike, crushing
IV Hancock's corps and the line behind him against the
The inquiries and arguments took two weeks. Sheridan anvil of HilI and Ewell. Stuart, who had also just arrived
with the rebel cavalry, was to
ride round Longstreet, throw
out a wing to menace the
Union supply trains around
Fredericksburg, then turn in
behind Longstreet against the
Federal rear. Like Leonardo's
greatest work the plan went to
pieces through the shifting of
the foundation on which it was
painted. As expected, Han-
To FAEDER!CKSeUR-G
cock attacked again the next
........
morning, rushing Hill back till
Longstreet came in on his
flank. The Union division of
General Matt was swept away,
men coming back through the
woods all disorderly, some with
weapons and a few without.
But they came past Hancock
himself. He rallied them in
CATHARPJN person, shouting "Halt here!"
till a brigade from his own re-
serve and a divisionfrom Grant
_ UNION
reestablished the line. Under
~ CONFEDERATE
the increasing pressure he took
I .
"" 0 2 . .
3 .. up the retrograde indeed, but
SCALE IN MIL£S
slowly, in good order, with
Map 1: The Wilderness-May 6,1864. no real gain to the attackers.
1939 LITTLE PHIL - PARTI 437
~- ---------
~
--=-~
SCALE: IN MILE:S
I
l
Sheridan, who had been well forward toward Winches- munications; and Fitz Lee reported that Averell was
ter, accordingly retired to a position near Halltown, where holding the Potomac crossings in trenches, so well sup-
he could cover both Harper's Ferry and the northbound plied with artillery that crossing would be a bloody busi-
roads that lead past it on the west, and dug himself in. ness, probably could not be achieved at all without infan-
(Map 4-) There was a river on either wing, when Early try support.
came up, he inspected the place, and decided it was too In short, Sheridan had used the mobility of his cavalry
strong to be forced, too good to be flanked. as he proposed before the Wilderness-to seize and fortify
There is more than one way to handle such a situation, a series of positions that severely constricted the scope of
and Early worked out an excellent method. He left a di- Confederate operations. Adventures beyond the Potomac
vision on Sheridan's front, strongly fortified; moved the had been rendered impossible to Early. But unless his
main body of his infantry up to Shepherdstown, and army could adventure there, it had no purpose; could not
flung Fitz Lee out ahead to see what he could do about affect the main campaign physically or morally. It could
passing the Potomac. If Sheridan advanced against the only go home; and when Grant started the Deep Bottom
fortified division Early would come back and fight the offensive, Lee called in Longstreet's Corps. It was Sep-
Union leader on ground of his own choosing, but he con- tember when they crossed the mountains through the
sidered it more likely Fitz Lee's threat would force the ripe crops, and the northern elections rushing on apace.
Army of the Shenandoah to retreat. The day Longstreet reached Richmond Grant sent his
Nothing of the kind happened. Sheridan remained commander in the Shenandoah the famous two-word tele-
coollywithin his lines. Wilson's cavalry division held the gram:
South Mountain passes; Merritt's knifed in between the "Go in."
detached division and Early's rear, feeling for his com- (To be concluded)
KITCHENER AND GALLI POLl
By H. A. DeWEERD
liThe Empire believed him to be resolute, selF-reliant, creative and lion-hearted. II
The war efforts of democratic countries are frequently Gallipoli, is the prime villain of the tragedy. Such views
marred by bitter controversies between political and mili- tend to overlook the leading role played by Lord Kitchener
tary leaders. Unless the lines of responsibility and au- in this disaster. An attempt will be made in the follow-
thority in such states are clearly defined and respected ing paragraphs to set down his contributions to the
by both parties, these quarrels are almost inevitable. Often Dardanelles failure.
they arise from the vagaries of civilian officials or from Kitchener was ill-prepared to take over the duties of
the narrowness and inelasticity of professional soldiers. War Minister in 1914, but he did so out of loyalty to
The history of the Civil War and of the World War Mr. Asquith. He had been out of touch with affairs in
makes it clear that statesmen and soldiers in democracies England for many years, and his chief interest was always
at war must somehow manage to cooperate effectively- with the Empire in the east. At the outset of the war,
or risk disaster. Nowhere is this lesson more clearly however, he made two remarkably accurate forecasts. He
revealed than in the campaign on Gallipoli. held that Germany would invade France by way of Bel-
No other campaign in British history has aroused more gium, and that the war would last for years. Both of these
-controversy. The military and political stakes on the views went counter to the prevailing military doctrines
Balkan board in 1915 were incalculable. An Allied victory held in England and France, and, after events vindicated
at the Dardanelles coupled with proper diplomatic pres- his views, Kitchener enjoyed the prestige which attends
sure might have led Bulgaria, Roumania, and Greece to successful prophecy. He did not share the optimism
attack the Central Powers. Turkey would have .been which pervaded the British and French staffs after the
forced out of the war. A thrust at the naked flank of battle of the Marne, but went ahead with a huge military
Austria-Hungary might have led to a peace by negotiation program designed to make a decisive intervention in
in 1916. The military problems involved in an attempt France possible in the later stages of the war. He planned
to force the straits were not insoluble. The British Em.: to raise and equip 70 British divisions. When the so-
pire possessed sufficient military resources to attain this called "Race to the Sea" ended in the establishment of a
objective in 1915, but the stroke failed. The Central trench line from the North Sea to Switzerland, it ap-
Powers gained an accession of strength through this fail- peared that Kitchener would have time to raise his armies
ure; Bulgatia joined the German coalition, and the war behind the security of a defensive line in France.
was prolonged. Responsibility for the failure at Galli- Up to this point in the war, Kitchener had acted with
poli must be placed primarily at the door of Britain's war prudence and with remarkable foresight. Singleness of
administrators. purpose had been one of his outstanding characteristics
Britain's statesmen in 1915 have all been repeatedly in the Soudan and South Africa. Once having decided
catalogued. There was a scholarly, compromising, some- that Germany was the principal enemy and France the
what timid Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith. The Foreign main theatre of operations, his course was clear. Every-
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had all the Prime Minister's thing not essential to this program should have been
.qualities without his honesty. At the head of the Royal subordinated ruthlessly. Had he rigidly adhered to this
Navy was an eloquent, slashing, eccentric opportunist, program, he would have spared England a bloody re-
Mr. Winston Churchill. He was suppotted by an erratic verse in the Near East and would have added greatly to
and brilliant professional adviser, grown old in the ser- his reputation.
vice, Lord John Fisher of Kilverstone. But by far the But Lord Kitchener was a c-Qmpletenovice as far :.IS
most important military figure in the cabinet in 1915 was War Office administration was concerned. He distrusted
the War Minister, a High Church field marshal whose officers who had not worked with him in Egypt or
military reputation was gained entirely on colonial expe- South Africa, and he would not take advice from anyone
ditions, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. he did not know. The territorial divisions, fourteen in
Parliamentary commissions have attempted to deter- number, were quietly shelved, and he completely ig-
mine the causes of the Gallipoli disaster. They have nored the elaborate machinery of the imperial general
.assessed the responsibility of various individuals. Their staff. Had a mere politician been war minister, he would
Iindings were not unanimous, and the controversies have been forced to rely on the general staff; but Kitch-
.arousedwill probably go on for centuries. A large number ener was a soldier in a politician's job, so he ran the
of critics feel that Winston Churchill, who guided the British war machine single-handed. He soon met with
navy into an attack on the straits and who assisted in con- difficulties and finally with a major disaster.
vincing Kitchener of the necessity of a military effort on Lloyd George's War Memoirs have exposed Kitchener's
1939 KITCHENER AND GALLI POll 445
difficulties In providing mUnitIons of war. Great as his Then, suddenly, there came a request from the Rus-
efforts were, he was not able to adapt England's immense sians, who were being hard pressed in the Caucasus, for
industrial resources to a war program. In the military an English diversion against the Turks which might re-
sphere, too, embarrassments piled up. Inter-allied and lieve their armies. Kitchener replied at once saying that
imperial considerations made demands on Kitchener he could no nothing effective. He knew that the Darda-
which he could not resist. Unsupponed by sound staff nelles was the only area in which a diversion would have
advice, he was drawn protesting and unprepared into a instant effect upon the Turks, but he declared that Eng-
major campaign outside the decisive theatre of operations. land would not be ready "for anything big" for some
The steps by which he brought England to the brink of time to come. This disposed of a land and water attack on
disaster were apparently so natural and inevitable that the Dardanelles.
they may be repeatedly studied with profit by American ~Ir. Churchill, however, was eager to trade old battle-
politicians and soldiers. ships for a new world, and he resolutely committed the
navy to an attack on the straits. Admiral Carden's plan
II
was accepted by the British \Var Council in language so
The year 1915 dawned auspiciously for the Allies. extraordinary that good soldiers winced at the slight cast
Joffree had ambitious plans for an offensive in France and on the prime purpose of infantry, i.e.-taking and hold-
had committed Sir John French to this program. The ing territory. The Admiralty was instructed "to prepare
oceans had been cleared of German cruisers, and Lord for a naval expedition in February, 1915 to bombard and
John Fisher was engrossed in a naval plan for attacking take Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its ob-
the Baltic coast of Germany. Kitchener was bringing jective." Kitchener approved the plan because he in-
troops to Europe from India and Australia and was using terpreted the silence of the professional naval advisers to
Egypt as a training ground for these forces. It was hoped mean that they concurred in the wisdom of the under-
that the Russian "steam roller" would be in a condition taking. The attack was to be broken off in case unexpected
to function in the spring of 1915' If Italy could be in- resistance was encountered.
duced to join the Entente powers, the German situation The naval attack, which seemed to promise so much at
would be distinctly unfavorable. the outset, soon found the going difficult. Yet it was con-
AEGEAN
SEA
<:>
f
19 29
SCALE IN MILES
sula? What is to be done in case of reverse? How will the force was concentrated on the spot.
contemplated operations effect the military program al- 3, Operations on a large scale in Asia were not to be con-
ready agreed upon in France? Instead, Kitchener rang the sidered.
bell for Sir Ian Hamilton one morning in March and 4. Once the force was landed there could be no turn-
ing back.
told him he was to command an army which was being
sent to help the fleet at the Dardanelles. When he left England, Hamilton carried with him only
Sir Ian Hamilton was Kitchener's old comrade of Kitchener's instructions, a pre-war report on the defenses
South African days, his so-called chief of staff at Pretoria, of the Dardanelles, and an inaccurate map of Gallipoli.
a man of wide military experience. His arm had been At this point Mr. Churchill ceased to be the chief
shattered by a Boer bullet on Majuba Hill. He had fought author of England's woes, and Kitchener took over the
with distinction in South Africa and had observed grande responsibility for a campaign in which the army and not
guerre in Manchuria, along with Pershing, Max Hoff- the navy was destined to play the leading role. Until he
mann and others. His temperament was of the sanguine received Hamilton's wire of March 18, after the latter had
type, and he was remarkable even among British officers inspected the Turkish defenses of Gallipoli from the
for his boldness and personal courage. No one could in- crow's-nest of the cruiser Phaeton and had seen the navy
terpret Kitchener's half sentences or unexpressed wishes suffer heavy losses during the afternoon engagement in
with greater exactness. He had brought the Boer War to the narrows, Kitchener seemed to feel that the role of the
a conclusion by defeating General De La Rey at Roodewal. army would be a purely subsidiary one and that Turkish
On this occasion Kitchener's instructions were simply resistance would not be great. By this time he had come to
"git going." regard the war in the west as a stalemate, and he did not
When Kitchener told Hamilton on March 12 that he expect the forthcoming French offensive to succeed. His
was to command the army at the Dardanelles, he expected strategic instincts told him to seek out a flank of the enemy
him to bow, leave the room, and make a start. But Hamil- coalition, but he was not ready in January, I9IS, when the
ton's knowledge of the Turks and the terrain was ex- Russian request came. Now that the navy needed a lift,
ceedingly limited. He could not go off without a word and while it still appeared likely that a coup at the Darda-
as he had done at Roodewal, so he asked questions. Kitch- nelles would force Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria into the
ener was curt at first, but gradually he became expansive. war on the Allied side, he decided to risk improvising an
Hamilton's troops were to be the Anzacs under Birdwood, expeditionary force out of scraps of England's man-
a French contingent from Tunis under d' Amade, the power. Such a force could be spared without compro-
naval division under General Paris, and finally the 29th mising operations in France, and might, with luck, prove
(regular) Division under Hunter-Weston. On paper this decisive in the Near East. Then came Hamilton's wire of
was a force of nearly 80,000 men. As Kitchener went on, March 18.
he seemed to be defending himself in an argument. He After having seen broad belts of Turkish wire at Bulair
said that nowhere could these forces be as effectively ap- and Cape T eke, and having seen the Irresistible, Gaulois,
1939 KITCHENER AND GALLIPOLI 447
Ocean, Bouvet, and Inflexible sunk or badly mauled on Millerand asked if there was any plan. Kitchener said not
the afternoon of March 18, Hamilton wired: much of one; only plan to occupy heights on GalIipoIi over-
looking narrows. Sir John French hoped no more troops
I am being most reluctantly driven to the conclusion that would be sent. Kitchener said none, there were already 67,000
the straits are not likely to be forced by battleships as at one men available down there.
time seemed probable and that, if my troops are to take part,
it will not take the subsidiary form anticipated. The German gas attack at Ypres on April 22-23 gave
the British staff another opportunity to warn against a
Apparently this wire did not alarm Kitchener or change
weakening of the forces in France. Two days of tense
his views, for he replied in bold, clear terms:
waiting. Then the army of Sir Ian Hamilton was flung
You know my view that the Dardanelles passage must be
on the beaches of Gallipoli.
forced and that if large military operations on Gallipoli Penin-
sula by your troops are necessary to clear the way, those As is so often the case with large-scale operations, the
operations must be undertaken after careful consideration of first news from the peninsula after the landing was good
local defenses and must be carried through. and bad. The troops had landed with heavy losses at
some points, and with practically no loss at others. Un-
When this message arrived, the British admiral had
fortunately the principal landing at "V" beach near the
concluded that he could not get through without the aid of
ruined fort of Sedd el Bahr sustained a costly check and
all of Hamilton's troops. Accordingly Kitchener's strong
no advance was possible until late the second day. When
wire was looked upon as a definite order to proceed with
at last the full weight of Hamilton's troops could be
an operation which had not been envisaged when Ham-
directed against Achi Baba, it encountered an enemy re-
ilton left England. Thus, quietly and without taking his
enforced by Liman von Sanders, who courageously de-
military associates into his confidence, Kitchener com-
nuded Bulair while warships and transports were still
mitted England to a second major campaign and created
feinting an attack on that area. The British troops, fight-
for himself the task of supporting two armies in widely
ing by day and transporting wounded and supplies at
separated theatres. Because the military direction of the
night, did all that high-spirited volunteers could do under
war was vested in his single person, this decision passed
circumstances of incredible confusion to wrest a victory
at the time almost without notice. No one raised a ques-
from an intrepid adversary. But the limits of human flesh
tion as to the relative importance of the two operations.
and spirit were reached. Hamilton's forces were brought
The unforeseen but natural result was a constant conflict
to a halt short of their objective.
of demands from France and Gallipoli. Tom between
these demands, Kitchener fell upon a series of tortuous Liman von Sanders, quick to take advantage of this
pause, launched a series of vigorous counterattacks which
half measures which led to a chain of heartbreaking fail-
ures. shook the British and the French, but which failed with
heavy losses. Then, on May 6, the reorganized Allied
III
army took the offensive again in a determined effort to
By giving his approval to large-scale operations on Gal- reach the high ground before the Turkish army was well
lipoli, the British War Minister began to desert the simple entrenched. These attacks were made on a three-mile
and secure military program which he set up at the begin- front by 20,000 troops. 18,500 rounds of shell, principally
ning of the war. Yet his situation was by no means des- shrapnel, were fired in support of these attacks. A gain
perate or hopeless. He could still have saved himself and of only 600 yards was made at the cost of 6,500 casualties.
England. His duty in the new situation was simple but Night fell on May 9 with the coveted positions still in
painful. He had to suspend offensive efforts in France, the hands of the Turks. The initial stroke had failed.
give prior claims to the Dardanelles army, and let the With the failure of this attempt Kitchener's hopes of
British staff in France say what they pleased. Kitchener an easy victory passed away. After that date success
did not believe in the success of their projected operations could only be achieved by a prompt and large scale re-
anyway. In South Africa he had shown himself capable enforcement of the army on Gallipoli and by the employ-
of any kind of military brusqueness. He once answered ment of artillery on a scale comparable to that on the
the request of a column commander for reenforcements Western Front. On the heels of this disappointment
by taking half his command away from him. But some- came news of the dismal .failure at Aubers Ridge where
how in 1915 he seemed to be afraid of hurting the feelings the British First Army sustained I I ,000 casualties with-
of the French staff, so he compromised and tried to carry out gaining a yard of German trenches. On May 17
out offensive operations in both France and Gallipoli. Hamilton wired that to attain his objectives he required
Slowly the embarrassment of Lord Kitchener's position at least two new corps or an ally. Then, to add to Lord
became apparent. He was fastened upon a rack and every Kitchener's distress, a political crisis developed and the
day the agony of his position increased. Events forced government was overthrown.
him from one error to another. The Western Front ad- Hamilton's request of May 17 arrived in England in
vocates in England and France soon began to tighten the the midst of a tense and complex political situation. Lord
screws. At an inter-allied council at Chantilly on March John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, had resigned with a
29 the Dardanelles matter was discussed. Sir Henry Wil- flourish and, in spite of all entreaty, had sullenly headed
son reports: for Scotland. His dramatic resignation broke down the
..l48 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
goyernment. Churchill, who was publicIy held responsi- Kitchener hurriedl~' sent out Generals Byng, Fanshawe,
ble for Fisher's resignation and the failur~ of the navy at and :Maude. So, after it was too late, Hamilton had a
the Dardanelles, was removed from the Admiralty and group of strong, energetic commanders. These blunders
relegated to the Duchy of Lancaster. Colonel Repington were so elementary that even a politician could see through
took this occasion to publish his famous "Shell Scandal them.
Letter" in the Times, and Kitchener found himself under IV
heavy political fire. Mr. Asquith, however, did not dare With the failure at Suvla Bay the Gallipoli campaign
to leave him out of the cabinet when it was reconstituted. was l~st. It dr~gg~d on fo~ months. absorbing troops,
The net result of this confusion was that Hamilton's re- supphes, and shIppmg, but It was WIthout meaning or
quest of May 17 was not formally considered by the new significance. Bulgaria, sensing this, drew doser to the
Dardanelles committee of the cabinet until June 7, German camp and openly prepared to attack Serbia. The
A decision was made on that date to reenforce Hamilton British offensives in France failed to produce results Com-
with three divisions and to replace valuable naval units patible to the losses sustained. The army in France felt
with "blistered" ships and monitors. Between May 17 that their success had been compromised by the drain of
and June 7, however, the Turkish positions were ap- the Dardanelles operation. The forces at Gallipoli, it
preciably strengthened. Deep trenches were dug by both might be argued, could have succeeded had they been
sides, and operations took on the form of those in France. allowed to expend the high explosive shells which were
In these circumstances Kitchener did not wish to commit "wasted" in France. A heavy fire of criticism was di-
the new troops to the costly business of piercing Turkish rected at Lord Kitchener. His self-confidence withered
trench lines. A plan was formulated for a surprise landing and he became confused. He even went so far as to ask
at Suvla Bay. Troops for this operation were organized advice from Sir Henry Wilson, a man he had hitherto
into the IXth Army Corps. Their movement was to be despised. He could not make up his mind to evacuate
supported by an attack from Anzac toward Sari Bair and Gallipoli. Instead he adopted a policy of drift and waited
by a holding attack at Helles. The stroke was set for for something to happen. According to Wilson:
August 6th.
Kitchener's attitude is that we can't get out of the Darda-
New blunders by Kitchener diminished whatever n~lleswithout appalling disasters there and all over the East,
chances the IXth Corps might have had. Hamilton asked WIthout some success.... I asked him if he proposed to go
repeatedly for rugged, fighting officers to lead the new on to Constantinople, and he said, "By God no! By God no!
forces. Operations on Gallipoli called for great stamina, I have been let into the thing, and never again. Out I come
drive, and hardiness. He asked for Generals Bruce Ham- the first moment I can!" He realizes that it is bleeding him
white and dreads the whole thing, but favours further opera-
ilton, Rawlinson, Byng, and Horne, but Kitchener said tions ending in success and then withdrawal.
these men could not be spared in France. Since Lieuten-
ant General Sir Bryan Mahon, commanding the 10th The man who used to speed his train beyond the range
(Irish) Division, was the only officer with that rank in of safety in South Africa now took every measure possible
charge of a division, Kitchener felt that the IXth Corps to delay the decision to evacuate. Meantime Sir Ian Ham-
commander had to be senior to him. Had he been willing ilton dangled on the end of a wire at Imbros.
to replace Mahon, who had trained the 10th Division, it During the period of drift misunderstandings occurred
would have been possible to have selected a younger between Hamilton and Kitchener. Although Egypt was
officerfor the IXth Corps. Not having the heart to replace a separate command under General Sir John Maxwell, the
Mahon or hurt his feelings, Kitchener appointed Sir War Minister expected Hamilton to look upon the forces
Frederick Stopford to the command of the IXth Corps. in Egypt as his own. When the latter tried to act on this
Stopford had a long, non-fighting record in India. Ham- assumption, Maxwell always had some good excuse to
ilton protested but loyally agreed to do his best with what prevent a large transfer of troops from Egypt to the Dar-
was sent. danelles. Had Kitchener wanted Hamilton to draw on
On August 6 the new divisions were landed at Suvla Egypt, he should have placed both areas under one com-
Bay almost without loss. The only enemy forces in the mander. In time of war it is better to order than to ask
immediate vicinity were two gendarmerie battalions. Local for troops. Soon Hamilton and Kitchener were quarreling
surprise was complete; the attacks at Anzac and Helles over such simple matters as numbers of effectives. The
were made on schedule, and success at first seemed certain. War Minister became deeply concerned over unofficial
But Stopford showed astonishing lack of energy. Troops reports on the Dardanelles operation. He allowed the
were allowed to loiter around the beaches and in the foot- celebrated "Murdock letter" to be circulated in England
hills without securing the high ground. The enemy com- neatly printed on the stationery of the Committee of Im-
mander described the inactivity of the IXth Corps after perial Defence. This letter sharply criticised the British
the landing as "incomprehensible." Hamilton ultimately headquarters staff. When Hamilton loyally defended
replaced Stopford with General de Lisle, who said that General Braithwaite, Kitchener's own choice for his chief
the want of grip shown throughout the higher command of staff, he signed his own recall. On October 17 the in-
at Suvla was worse than he dared put on paper. evitable wire arrived saying:
After the Suvla operation failed with very heavy losses, Though the Government fully appreciate your work and
1939 KITCHENER AND GALLIPOLI 449
the gallant manner in wInch you personally have struggled 8, 1916. One can only wistfully conjecture as to what
to make the enterprise a success in the face of the terrible might have happened if the original landing had been
difficulties you have had to contend against, they, all the
same, wish to make a change iu command, which will give as carefully planned and executed. Thus, the British
them an opportunity of seeing you. army closed the ill-fated campaign with two difficult but
brilliantly executed movements.
New commitments were made necessary for England
by the intervention of Bulgaria. The Salonika force V
drained strength from the army on Gallipoli. Even in this Lord Kitchener's contributions to the Gallipoli disaster
circumstance Kitchener could not make up his mind to were unique. His position in the cabinet was both politi-
evacuate. General Sir Charles Monro, Hamilton's suc- cal and military in character, and this enabled him to ig-
cessor, sent in a strong recommendation for evacuation, nore the general staff in England and to carty out a per-
placing the probable losses in such an operation at forty sonal military program. He alone had the power to trans-
per cent of the effectives. This wire jarred Lord Kitch- form the lagging naval attack into a major effort by the
ener into a brief spasm of action. He wired General army on Gallipoli. As a consequence his personal re-
Birdwood, who was in local charge on Gallipoli: sponsibility for the military debacle must be regarded as
You know the report sent in by Monro. I shall come out complete. The assumption of large-scale operations on
to you; am leaving tomorrow night. I have seen Captain Gallipoli meant the abandonment of his simple and safe
Keyes, and I believe that the Admiralty will agree to make program of building up the British army for a decisive
a naval attempt to force the passage. We must do all we can
to support them. Examine carefully the best position for campaign in France. His strategic instinct for seeking a
landing near the marsh at the head of the Gulf of Xeros, so flank of the enemy coalition was sound, but he allowed
that we could get a line across the isthmus, with ships at both his hand to be forced. Once committed to the operation,
sides. I absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which he lacked the courage to suspend offensive operations in
I think would be a grave disaster and would condemn a large France. This made it impossible for him to provide the
percentage of our men to death or imprisonment.
necessary margin of strength to win at Gallipoli. His
"This," said Winston Churchill, "was the true Kitch- choice of subordinate commanders for the Suvla thrust
ener. Here in this flaming telegram-whether Bulair was was bad, and he advertised this by sending out the re-
the best place or not-was the Man the Empire believed quired men after the failure had occurred. He rather in-
him to be-resolute, self-reliant, creative, lion-hearted." consistently considered the troops in Egypt as belonging
But Kitchener no longer had the power to bring off the to the Gallipoli army but maintained Maxwell in the
brave stroke intended. He lamely wired the next day position of an independent command. Once failure was
that he had changed his mind. apparent, he did not consent to evacuation of the peninsula
The obvious blunders of Kitchener in the administra- until after three and a half months of delay and drift.
tion of the Gallipoli campaign caused widespread demand Thus, at every step in the campaign, he demonstrated a
for his removal from office. Prime Minister Asquith, as singular inability to make the right decision at the right
usual, compromised by sending him off to examine the time.
situation at first hand. After having visited Gallipoli, The vacillating and tortuous conduct of Lord Kitchener
Salonika, and Athens, Kitchener agreed in principle to in the Dardanelles affair destroyed whatever remained of
the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla but urged the reten- his influence in political circles. He was stripped of the vast
tion of Helles. On December 7 the British cabinet ap- powers he enjoyed early in the war. Lloyd George took
proved this decision. Immense care and foresight in the over the control of munitions, and Sir William Robertson
preparation for the evacuation made it possible to with- assumed control of the strategical direction of the war.
draw from Anzac and Suvla on December 20 almost Kitchener retained only those functions performed by the
without loss. Kitchener's relief was immense. On De- War Minister in time of peace. Such was his station when
cember 23 Sir William Robertson, who had been brought he undertook his mission to Russia in June, 1916. From
from France as the new Chief of the Imperial General this journey he did not return. His soldier's death at the
Staff with greatly augmented powers, recommended the hands of the enemy caused England to forget his failures,
complete evacuation of the peninsula. Equally astonish- and in the succeeding years the long sweeps of the north
ing success attended the evacuation of Helles on January Atlantic have slowly washed away his shortcomings.
"Are there :111:' questions. gentlemen?" travel through unleased cornfields or along private roads.
The chief umpire from Third Corps Area Headquarters And still others with the yellow "quarantine" insignia
had finished his final instructions to the two hundred or of correspondents were tr.ving to find om what was hap-
more umpires before the opening of the Fourth Battle of pening so that the folks back home would know who had
Bull Run and had poised the usual rhetorical question. won the war.
But something was not understood. A heavy voice, backed The participants reached the obvious conclusion that
by the insignia of eagles, asked: "How are we to know no one but the umpires could have won this theoretical
when hostilities are to cease?" war of maneuver.
The chief was slightly nonplussed, but cleared his The Third Corps phase of the First Arm~' Maneuvers
throat and answered: "That has been covered, but I shall pitted the "Blues" consisting of 16,000 National Guards-
repeat it for those who did not understand. A neutral men of the 28th and 29th Divisions, reinforced by the
telephone' will Ay between the lines trailing red-and- 213th Coast Artillery (AA), Pennsylvania National
white streamers." Guard and the 260th Coast Artillery (AA), District of
The assembled umpires first chuckled, then remembered Columbia National Guard, a provisional air group, tank
their militarv training, and silently correct the mental battalion, and an engineer bridge train, against the 5,800
aberration of the chief. Regular Arm)' men of the provisional streamlined di-
Frankly, though, to the individual soldier in the open- vision called the "Blacks."
ing phase of the First Army Nbneuvers at Manassas from The 28th Division, of the Pennsylvania National Guard
August 14 to 17, it appeared that anything was liable to and the 29th Division from Nfaryland, Virginia and the
Ay up and down between the opposing lines. Officers with District of Columbia, were each organized with two bri-
white armbands and hatbands of umpires were hopping, gades of infantry and one brigade of field artillery, with
running and jumping between the lines of combatants. engineer. medical and quartermaster regiments. This was
calling off the war or penalizing the over-zealous. Others essentially the bulky, slow-moving, foot-plodding, in-
with the green bands of claim agents were prohibiting fantr:' division of World Vl:1r days. built up for a war of
position.
The enemy, on the other hand, was a hard hitting,
highly mobile force of combat teams, furnished with some
of the Army's new motorized equipment and the faster
firing weapons. \Vith armored cars for scouting, recon- visions org:ll1ized highly mobile division reserves, each
naissance and combat, with high-speed tanks capable of loaded on thirty trucks. These reserves consisted of two
[ravelling fifty-five miles per hour, and with some horse companies of infantry and two batteries of 75'S. These de-
cavalry and horse-drawn field artillery in addition to the tachments made flanking raids, and counter-attacks against
motorized artillery, infantry and cavalry, this highly mo- the tanks. They blocked the roads with the trucks at all
bile Black division harassed the flanks of the Blues. It angles and fired dismounted from the woods and walls,
worried the staff G-2'S almost to distraction, captured out- and succeeded in counterbalancing the lightning attacks
posts, a whole medical battalion, and a whole brigade and high-speed maneuvers of the motorized division.
staff. \Vith the agility of a fencer this compact organizJ- There was no doubt that the hit-and-run tactics of the
tion thrust and parried, Jttacked and counter-attacked, highly mohile provisional Regular division was very de-
first to the right, then to the left, until the umpires stopped moralizing to the communications and supply of the
the war. larger, slower divisions. But when contact was actually
. On the opening dJY of the maneuvers the Black motor- made and maintained, the machine guns :1l1d fire power
Ized brigade and mechanized force moved from its base of the infantry and field artillerv came into their own,
a,t Quantico so fast that the 12 Ist Engineers and the J03d tanks and arm'ored cars were disabled and outflanked, and
~'~gineers had difficulty in stopping them with demo- the force with the greater numbers won. This poses the
htlons, tank traps, road blocks, mines and concertina wire. old problem: Which is better, a small, fast man, or a
Before the umpires ruled that they had been stopped after slow, heavy man? And the answer depends always upon
five hours of fighting, the 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) whether the contest is running or wrestling.
had pushed sixty-five tanks across Broad Run, into the Both of the Coast Artillery (antiaircraft) regiments
a.reJ of the Blue corps. The umpires then rearranged the had a fixed mission during the maneuvers, thJt of the pro-
Illles so that the troops would fight on property which had tection of the rJilheads. the 2 13th was Jt Nfanassas, and
been leJsed. the 2 16th Jt Gainesville. The shortJge of equipment
To meet this speedy attJck both the 28th and 29th Di- placed strict limitations on the employment and function-
452 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptember- October
2:]0 A.~1. Battery B was in position, after a second trip
Tbe foreigl/ military attacbes sbowed keel/ il/terest il/ tbe progress of tbe mal/eUI'ers.
ation, and will be mutually supporting with maximum table of organization for an antiaircraft regiment in peace-
distances between platoons of 1,500 yards." Again the time the 260th would have got along much better than
regiment was hindered by the lack of eguipment, although with the forty-nine vehicles actually present. Particularly
not by a lack of imagination; why couldn't we assume or missed were the 7 i'i-ton 6 x 6 prime movers, only two of
simulate a few machine guns and searchlights in a theo- which were on hand instead of the twelve allotted. With
retical war? In spite of this limitation, one of the'batteries the increase of guns to twelve, and of machine guns to
brought in two prisoners and a motorcycle on the first sixty the presence of prime movers will be a prime neces-
day of the war, unshaven and unsung fugitives from an Sit)'.
armored car sguadron. The 260th was not the only organization at the ma-
The communication system of the 260th functioned ex- neuvers whose eguipment was deficient. Throughout the
tremely well during the maneuvers. The regiment laid area very little modern eguipment was noted. The guns
about 158 miles of wire. The searchlight battery had sixry- of the antiaircraft regiments were old; the guns and
miles of wire out to the various platoon and observation mounts of the field artillery regiments were the old type
posts, for although there were only four lights the positions hybrid 75's; there were practically no antitank guns,
were changed nightly and the outer advanced positions either '5o-caliber or 37-mm.; there were no new automatic
were manned as observation posts. riRes; there was such a deficiency in aircraft that all planes
In moving into a new position there is an extremely were regarded as hostile so that the antiaircraft would get
heavy load upon the searchlight battery, the service bat- a chance to fire at something.
tery and the headguarters battery during the first few Even with our claim of producing automobiles and
days. Some of this could be obviated by having short wave trucks in the greatest numbers and in the best guality,
radio sets for communication to the outer searchlights and there was lack of transportation for the motorized troops.
the advanced observation posts, and by having the various Troop movements Iud to be on by shuttle system, so that
batteries do much of their own hauling during the initial the available trucks made several trips. In the batter)' of-
phases. Probably with the 154 vehicles allowed by the ficers' critigue after "Cease Firing" had been given, the
45-4 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
chief complaint was: "Why can't headquarters leave our up at Gainesville, and started turning out 17 x 19 inch
assigned trucks alone? Why do we have to furnish trans- maps at a rate of 4,000 per hour. Soon even the captains
portation for everybody else in the maneuver?" had a map apiece.
In spite of these criticisms, the most striking part of the The health and safety record of the troops on this
maneuver was the mobilization on Saturday, August 5th, training and maneuver period probably never has been
and the demobilization on Saturda:,', August 19. With equalled. In spite of the fact that 21,000 men were moved
well planned march tables I ,700 trucks in sixty-six con- in trucks; that hundreds of trucks, tanks, and motorcycles
voys of from four to forty trucks each poured into the were chasing over narrow, dusty, back roads; that new
maneuver area, unloaded their equipment and personnel, problems of messing, water supply and sanitation had to
and the training period commenced. be met; there were very few severe accidents or sicknesses,
In spite of the large number of recruits in the National and no fatalities. Part of the credit for this goes to the
Guard regiments, the battery organization and training military police, part to the medical organizations, and part
progressed at normal speed. The individual soldier, with to the increased education of the American in the problems
his American adaptability, soon learned to sleep in wall- of personal sanitation.
or pup-tents, to eat out of a mess-kit, and to obey orders. A number of problems could not be or were not solved
Discipline has never been as strict in the Guard as the during this Fourth Battle of Bull Run. No gas was used
Regular Army instructors would like to have it; there and no gas masks were issued; there was no actual contact
remains always a rugged individualism which cannot and between the opposing sides, and hence no bayonet work
should not be curbed. For example, camouflage discipline or personal combat. Prisoners were taken, but were im-
was difficult to maintain because the soldier could not mediately returned after being fed and kidded about their
understand why he should not read his Sunday paper, re- plight. There were no grand charges of infantry and cav-
move his khaki shirt, take the same path to the latrine, or alry; there was no far-flung antiaircraft intelligence serv-
remain stationary when planes were overhead, particularly ice; units remained at their starting strength; there were
in a war which was purely theoretical, and in which the no killed, wounded and missing.
planes were probably friendly anyway. It evidently takes
One of the greatest limitations was the lack of leases to
a few live shells to convince the American private of the
land owing to growing crops. Several times the claims
need for camouflage discipline.
agents stopped hostilities so that the combatants could be
During the maneuver all types of communications were
returned to the limits of the "playing field." The Bill of
tested: commercial and service telephones, teletype, tele-
Rights guarantees the American farmer the right to deny
graph, short and medium wave radio, fast motorcycles,
the army the use of land, even for maneuvers essential to
foot messengers, and even homing pigeons. Code was
the de;elopment of the national security. Although
used in calling various regiments and stations; conversa-
75,000 acres were leased man:,' a desirable plot was with-
tions were usually carried on without using the proper
held because the farmers remembered the missing
names of organizations. The communications seemed to
chickens of the Battle of 1903, Many of the Regular Army
work quite well, although they could have worked better.
umpires complained that the war games were so well
Although flash messages cluttered up the lines of regi-
planned and so restricted as to territory that thev took
mental and battalion headquarters, when an airplane was
little account of the situations that momentarily de-
headed toward a certain battety it usuallv was seen by the
veloped..
local spotters and fire had been opened before the me'ssage
got through. However, there were a number of conclusions reached.
The need for pure water in large quantities was soon The main mission was the intensive training of large
evident in the Manassas-Gainesville area. Advanced de- groups of soldiers. The battalions seemed to be well
tachments of the engineers dug eleven wells, the water trained in their tactical duties, and their smaller staffs
being tested and pumped to gravity tanks. As no limitation seemed to function well. This could not be said for the
was placed on water, the consumption was about 800,000 larger staffs, which bogged down, particularly after dark-
gallons per day, or forty gallons per man, this of course ness, fog and bad weather had grounded the observation
being excessive for a simulated war. Among the new planes. Because of the high speed division opposing the
equipment was noted a mobile purification and filtration Blues, information was often stale and useless before it
unit from the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir. This took rould be used, and the time factor to get orders to the
the muddv water of Little Bull Run, filtered and chlori- lower echelons and to execute orders, was longer than the
nated it, ;nd pumped it out at I IO gallons per minute. situation allowed.
Large stainless steel and porcelain-lined tank trucks of 1\10torization allows a greater freedom and a wider
capacities up to 3,000 gallons were supplied from this unit front to the offense, and limits the defense. The defense
and its "ooo-gallon portable water-tower. must have some means of local protection with power
At the beginning of the training, in spite of the fact weapons for all command posts, particularly for the lines
that the maneuver had been planned for months, there of suppl:," and communication on the flanks and in the
was a shortage of good maps. The 121StEngineers brought rear. This was seen in the 260th Coast Artillery when
down a 3-ton multilith machine from Washington. set it part of the few available machine guns had to be used for
1939 MANASSAS MANEUVERS 455
local =>around defense, a mISSIOn which the antiaircraft were attached to staffs, and all secured a different t~'pe of
should not have to accomplish. Distant searchlights and training. Teamwork was developed between the three
outlying guns must be given protection, and not have to components of the Army, and members of all components
supply their own. This is a problem of organization. respected the others after "two weeks of intimate daily
The American Army should take a lesson from foreign contact."
powers and have more large scale maneuvers. Few of our The senior officer, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum,
officers see in peacetime anything larger than a b:malion summed up the results most succinctly: "These m:.t-
in action, certainly few have seen a division working as a neuvers were the best tactical exercises in which American
unit since the \Vorld \Var. There is a lack of tr:lined co- troops have ever engaged in peacetime. However they
ordinated st:.tffs for the larger organizations, partly due to proved that the Army needs more men, more officers,
a large personnel turnover, and partly due to the lack of more equipment and more training."
training. Nbp problems are not enough-the time bctors At II: 30 A.~1. on AugllSt 17th the umpires waved the
for the execution of orders, the accuracy of information, white Rags that signalled the end of hostilities and green-
:1l1dthe problems of terrain and movem~nt, are vastly dif- banded claims agents of the Judge Advocate went forth to
ferent in practice than on a map. \Ve must have better appease the farmers who claimed broken fences and scared
trained and more permanent staffs in the divisions :lI1d the cows. The yellow-banded correspondents hied their last
armIes. dispatches, and 16,000 Nation:.tl Guardsmen and attached
Eight hundred and seventy-three Reserve officers were two-week soldiers returned to their homes, hoping that
attached to the participating units for the period of the they had helped prove something of beneht to the Ameri-
maneuvers. Some of these were given commands, many can Army and the American people .
History of Army much less arduous and considerably more efficient pro-
ceeding; although she shared the disadvantages of the
A lexander of not having enough deck space to load a
Mine Planters complete group of mines. She was a single screw vessel,
which made her difficult to maneuver in the mine held.
Submarine mining received a new impetus in 1909, At
By Warrant OFFicer Henry L. Jones that time four 16s-feet twin screw, steam-powered mine
planters, the General Schofield, Ord, Frank, and Mills
were built for the Coast Artillery Corps. These vessels
were assigned COstations on the East Coast. However,
The new streamlined Diesel electric mine planter when they were commissioned, two somewhat smaller
Ellery lV. Niles, which arrived for station in the harbor mine planters, the Ringold and Armistead which had
defenses of San Francisco in the summer of 1938, is a far previously been stationed in the East were assigned CO'sta-
cry from the old steam rug General Alexander which was tions on the West Coast.
the hrst vessel used for mine planting in San Francisco The A rmistead and Rinf!.old arrived in San Francisco
harbor. from New York in 1910, a-frer a 15,oob mile voyage via
The General A lexander was rurned over co the Quaner- the Straits of wfagellan. The Armistead took station in
master Corps by the Corps of Engineers in 1906 and was the harbor defenses of San Francisco and the Ringold in
assigned co duty in the harbor defenses of San Francisco the harbor defenses of Puget Sound. The Armistead's
as a Quartermaster rug. As there was no mine planter principal advantages over the Barrett were her increased
1939 HISTORY OF ARMY MINE PLANTERS 457
T be last word ill mil/e plal/ters, tbe streamlil/ed Ellery W'. Niles.
deck space and greater stability owing to her greater size. though they were designated warrant officers, Army ivIine
Her twin screws made her much easier to handle in the Planter Service, they were divided into five grades: master,
mine field. The capacity of her hoisting apparatus also chief engineer, first mate, assistant engineer and second
made multiple-cable laying a much less laborious job. It mate.
was now possible for the first time to plant a complete At Fort ivIonroe, a school was established under the
group of mines in one operation in the harbor defenses of direction of Captain Henry F. Grimm, Coast Artillery
San Francisco. Corps, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy,
In 1918 came a change in the personnel that manned to train candidates for the warrant officer grade, in naviga-
army mine planters. Formerly, deck and engineer officers tion, seamanship and marine engineering.
were licensed civilian ships' officers and both deck and In 1920, nine new 172-foot twin-screw steam-powered
engine room crews were civilian employees. The com- mine planters were built and the number of ships in the
manding officer, a Coast Artillery officer, was assigned service increased to twenty. But this increase was short-
from the harbor defense in which the mine planter was lived for in the subsequent reduction of the army in 1921
stationed, and the planting section consisted of soldiers of the number was reduced to seven mine planters and one
the Coast Artillery Corps. cable ship. Only three of the new ships were retained in
This mixture of arm:' and civilian personnel working the service, the Bell, Baird and Harrison. The remainder,
in the close proximity necessary aboard ship caused endless with the exception of the Frank which is now stationed in
friction, especially among the deck and engineer officers. Hawaii as an inter-island transport, were turned over to
These men who had come from the merchant service, the U. S. Coast Guard and the Lighthouse Service.
without military training, were in many instances unable Coincident with the reduction of the service, the navi-
to adjust themselves to the routine and discipline of the gation school at Fort ivIonroe was discontinued. To fill
military service. vacancies in the deck and engine departments after the
To remedy the condition, the grade of warrant officer, supply of graduates of the school was exhausted regula-
Army Mine Planter Service, was created in July, 1918 and tions were issued permitting enlisted men of the Coast
the deck and engineer officers were given this r:ll1k. Al- Artillery Corps to take competitive examinations for as-
-
458 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptember- October
sistant engineer and second mate. This regulation was station two-way communication system with selector lo-
changed in 1936 to permit licensed officers of the arm)' cated in the pilot house. It makes ~ommunication possible
transport and harbor boat services and merchant marine throughout the ship and for a distance of approximately
to take the examination. 700 yards from the ship. \Vith this equipment, the plant-
The latest ship in the service the Ellery IF. Niles, ing officer can maintain two-wa:' communication with the
which replaced the Armistead, is the first ship of its kind entire mine planting flotilla throughout planting and
ever built. She is a combination mine planter and cable picking-up operations. Ex-mine commanders, who have
la:'er; 185 feet in length, with a 35-foot beam, and dis- all at some time nearly burst a lung trying to get a yawl
places 1,200 tons. She is powered b:' three Diesel engines
bOJt Jlongside will reJdil:' appreciate the worth of this
driving two 560-horsepower direct-currenr motors, which ..
lI1novanon.
are controlled directly from the bridge. The instantaneous
response of the engines together with the wide range of In many ways the Niles, with its multiplicity of gad-
speeds offered by direct-current motors enables her to gets, is as great an improvement over the Armistead type
maneuver much more efficiently than the older types of as these were over the old Alexander. But those older ones
mine planters. still remain in the service and are still efficientl:' planting
Another outstanding improvement is the loudspeak- and picking up mines and doubtless will continue to do
lI1g system installed on the Niles. This consists of a 17- so for some "ears to come.
The early artillery of Rome was less perfect than that of their widest. The "bowstring" is fastened to the ends of
Greek armies, but in time the artillery of the legion these arms.
reached a hio-hto
state of efficiency.
•
The Romans separated To lay the piece for direction, simply turn the frame on
their weapons into three groups: arrow-throwers, light its pivot. In laying for elevation, the lower end of the
stone-throwers, and heavy stone-throwers.
prop is moved up or down the trail, thus raising or low-
The arrow-thrower, or catapult, is pictured. It accom- ering the rear end ~f the trough, to which the prop is
panied Caesar in his campaigns against the savage tribes hinged. The piece was fired by engaging the bowstring
of Gaul and Germany.
in the trigger-block. T uming the reel-handles pulled
The frame A con~isted of two horizontal blocks with' back the block until it seated into the deep cut near the
four mortised uprights. The outer twO openings con- rear of the trough. (A small horizontal pin retained it.)
tained tightly twisted rope-skeins BB which gave propel- The arrow was placed in the trough, with its notch en-
ling power. This catapult is of the torsion type. The gaged in the bowstring. Striking the trigger with a mallet
skeins are held and adjusted by the large lock-nuts CC at released the bowstring from the trigger-block, and the
top and bottom of the frame. The trough 0 through the arrow sped through the center of the frame.
center opening of the frame, is attached by a hinge at that
The weight of the catapult was about 8S-pounds. It
point. The trough holds a trigger-block and trigger E.
could be easily handled and operated by two men.
A stronO''='
cord is attached to the rear of the trig~er-block,
from which point it O'oes to and around the reel F at the The projectile it discharged was a 26-inch arrow, weigh-
'=' ing one-half pound. At a range of 400-yards it was accu-
rear of the trough. The pedestal mount is fitted with a
pivot, which carries the frame. From the rear of the rate and velocity enough to kill a man even though in
mOUnt extends a trail G. The prop H is hinged to the armor.
under side of the trough and rests on (but is not attached Its handiness, light weight, range and power, made the
to) the trail. Two stiff arms (II) are thrust through the catapult a formidable weapon to the rude Gallic tribesmen
rope-skeins, the force exerted tends to keep them spread when the:' tried to withstand the legions.
The Convention Committee has announced its final telephone and radio to antiaircraft headquarters from an
plans for the Convention to be held in New York, Octo- extensive net of civilian listening posts. The warning serv-
ber 12 to 15. ice will be established over a wide area and will cover all
The high points of the meeting which we told you possible routes of the pursuit planes which will take off
about in the preceding issue of the JOURNAL have been from Miller Field and the bombers who will come from
amplified and are shown in the program below. But, still Mitchel Field. These ships will head for the Fair with
further events are planned, which will be announced at the mission of dropping illuminating flares over Fountain
various zero hours during the Convention. Lake before the antiaircraft forces can get their lights and
The dinner-dance, scheduled for Saturday night, Oc- guns into action. The Fair management is giving this
tober 14, undoubtedly will be the largest and most color- show thorough cooperation and it should be of tremend-
ful Coast Artillery party given in recent years and should ous interest to even the most seasoned and hard-boiled
long remain in the memory of all who attend. It will be antiaircraftsmen, not to speak of the general public who
held in the amply large club quarters at the top of a will be on hand in numbers up to a quarter of a million.
Park Avenue skyscraper. The story of the show goes on the air through the mikes
Reservations already have been made by an exception- of one or more of the important broadcasters.
ally large number of officerswho are coming from consid- Convention Headquarters will be established and re-
erable distances. The great group of officersof the Regular main open at all times during the convention at the Hotel
Armv, National Guard, and Reserve units located in the Piccadilly, just off Times Square at 227 West 45th Street.
metr~politan area who have expressed their intention of Here the most advantageous living arrangements may be
attending insures a brilliant and striking event. made. The low rates extended to our members are:
It looks very much as though visiting Coast Artillery- Single room, with bath .
men will completely take over the New York W odd's Double room, with bath (double bed) ..
Fair on the night of the 15th. That day has been desig- Double room, with bath (twin beds) ..
nated Coast Artillery Day. At a spacious headquarters
(open from morning to night) conveniently located on Meals will be served to wearers of Association con-
the Court of Peace, a complete service of information, vention badges at a comfortably reduced rate. The Hotel
maps, and guides will be maintained. Details of an in- Pennsylvania has agreed to give a discount of 25% to
formal luncheon will be available at an early hour, and our members from their standard rates of: single room
those who are interested in joining that party may get di- with bath, $3'50 to $8.00 and double room with bath,
rections by calling at Fair Headquarters in person or by $5.00 to $10.00.
telephone on the morning of the 15th. Please note these special hotel arrangements, for other
New antiaircraft materiel will arrive at the Court of popular hotels may not have space available except on
Peace early in the afternoon and will be displayed and reservations made well in advance. The Hospitality Com-
demonstrated by National Guardsmen. At 4:30 P.M., mittee is organized to take care of all visitors, but the
following a Coast Artillery band concert, the public and earlier you make your reservation-either direct with
our convention visitors will learn the details of the first hotels or the committee-the easier will be the task for all
blackout and air raid to be staged within New York City. concerned.
This performance is scheduled to take place at the Fair Transportation to Fort Totten from New York will be
just after nightfall. Addresses at this meeting will be given available Saturday morning, subject to reservations made
by distinguished guests including Major General Sunder- by guests upon registering up to TOO P.M. Friday. The
land, Chief of Coast Artillery, and the Mayor of the trains of the Long Island Railroad from the Pennsylvania
City of New York, Honorable Fiorello H. LaGuardia. Im- Station that arrive at Bayside between 10:00 and II:30
mediately thereafter, the combined Army, Navy, and Saturday morning will be met by transportation from
Marine detachments stationed at Camp Washington will Fort Totten. Public buses run regularly from the Main
parade in honor of the Association. Street Station, Flushing, of the BMT and IRT subways,
From then on, antiaircraft units of the National Guard direct to Fort Totten, at a fare of ten cents.
and Regular Army are going to be busy getting equip- From the program you will see that the committee has
ment into positions in readiness for what promises to be left a goodly share of time open for your sight-seeing and
a most spectacular show: the complete blackout of the pleasure. There is no doubt that;"the combined attractions
Fair's brilliant illumination. The blackout will be pre- of Fair and Convention will provide a very full and most
ceded by air raid warning messages which will come by outstanding week-end for all visitors. You are urged to reg-
1939 THE CONVENTION PROGRAM 461
isterat Convention Headquarters in the Hotel Piccadilly, 2:30 P.l\!. Display of antiaircraft equipment, by 62d
or elsewhere as shown in the program, at the earliest mo- to Coast Artillerv-Parade Ground, Fort T ot-
ment in order to receive badges. These will serve as the 5:00 P.M. ten. Tour of post and old fortifications.
countersign for all formations other than those for which T30P.l\f. Reception to tviajor General A. H. Sunder-
tickets will be issued upon registration. There will be no land, Chief of Coast Artillery and President,
registration fee and no charges for listed events except U. S. Coast Artillery Association. Rooms of
those indicated on the program below. Building Trades Employers Association-
If you have not already returned the coupon sent you 25th floor, 2 Park Avenue, New York.
by mail, please do so at once. No Coast Artilleryman 8:30P.M. Dinner-da~ce, 25th Floor, 2 Park Avenue.
will regret attending the Convention. Dancing begins at 10:30. (Charge, dinner
Let's all go. and dance: $2.50 per person.)
PROGRAM Sunday-October 15
U. S. COAST ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION CONVENTION
Coast Artillery Day-Wor/d's Fair
October 12-15, 1939 10:30A.l\L Opening of Convention and antiaircraft head-
NEW YORK quarters at Fair, Court of Peace. Registration.
Inforn.:ation service. Fair maps. Guides. De-
Convention Headquarters-Hotel PiccadillY--227 West
tails of informal luncheon.
45th St.-open continuously for the period of the Con-
vention. 2:00 P.l\f. Arrival of 212th Coast Artillery at Court of
Peace. New antiaircraft equipment to be set
Thursday-October 12-Co/umbus Day up for display and demonstration. To be
II:OO A.l\f. Registration at headquarters. Recording of followed by selection of positions for search-
to reservations. Issuance of badges and tickets. lights throughout Fair and for guns and ma-
midnight Distribution of programs, maps, and data. chine guns around Fountain Lake..
No meetings. Time free for Fair visits. 4:00 P.M. Band Concert, Court of Peace, 62d Coast Ar-
Friday-October 13 tillerv.
4:30 P.M. Address-Major General A. H. Sunderland.
5:00 P.l\f. Registration-244th Coast Artillery Armory,
"Antiaircraft Defense."
u5 West 14th Street.
Address-Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia.
5:30P.M. Reception for visitors-244th Coast Artillery "Civilian Cooperation with Antiaircraft
Armory. Greetings and welcome by: Defense."
Colonel Charles S. Gleim, commanding Speakers introduced by Colonel Avery J.
244th Coast Artillery and President, Cooper.
Manhattan Chapter U. S. Coast Artillery
5:00 P.l\f. Retreat Parade, Army, Navy, and Marine de-
Association; and
tachments, Court of Peace. In honor of Major
Brigadier General William Ottman, com-
General A. H. Sunderland.
manding Coast Artillery Brigade, New
York National Guard. 5:30 P.M. Occupation of positions by antiaircraft units
Evening open for informal entertainment. for blackout and firing, Fountain Lake.
8:00 P.l\f. Air raid alert, over loud-speaker system and
Saturday-October 14 broadcast, following receipt of warning mes-
10:00A.l\1.Registration at Ft. Totten, Bayside, Long sages from civilian listening posts throughout
Island-Post Theatre. western Long Island and Borough of Rich-
10:30A.M. Association l\1eeting, Fort Totten, Post The- mond.
atre. (Program to be supplied by National 8:01 P.M. Blackout and air raid by bombers and pursuit
Secretary.) ships equipped with illuminating flares. To
1:00P.M. Reception and luncheon-Fort Totten Offi- be fired upon by guns and machine guns of
cers' Club, under auspicesof 62d Coast Artil- antiaircraft units.
lery (Cost 50c). 9:30 P.l\f. Departure of antiaircraft troops.
-------------------------
-----------------------------.------------
llilllllllllllllmlllllllllllllmlllllllllllll!llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll!lIIlmlll1II1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111II111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111II11111111111111111111111111111
eoa~t a'Ltille'LVBOa'Ldnote~
mllllllllllllllllllll111ll11111111ll111ll11/1II11111l111ll111ll111111111111I111111111111111I111111I/11I1111I11111I11/11111111/1111111/111111I/11/11111111111I111111I11111111I111I11111111111111111/11111111111I11111/1II111111/IIIIIIIIIIIIIIWIII/1//lllll11ll/11111111111111II11II1111111111/l/IIIIII/IIIIIIII//I/IIIII/IIIIIIIIIIIIII/lm
General. Since the publication of the July-August issue practices and on Coast Artillery Board I1rings.
of the COAST ARTILLERYJOURNAL, the Board has been (2) As in the case of the 3-inch gun formula, an
engaged in studying all available 1939 target practice important characteristic of the new machine-gun for-
reports and comparing the results with thos'e of 1936, mula is that the primary index of the proficiency of a
1937, and 1938. Data extracted were used in the prep:lra- I1re unit is the ratio of hits per gun per minute actually
tion of Training lvlemorandum No.1, Insrructions for attained to the number of hits per gun per minute con-
Coast Artillery Target Practice-I 940. Numerous other sidered normal, or "par," for the particular slant range
subjects studied by the Board during the past two months. at which I1re was conducted. This it is believed pro-
because of their secret or conl1dential nature, cannot be vides the simplest and yet most satisfactory means of
reported at this time. judging relative performances of various I1re units. A
slight bonus has been added for higher-than-average
NEW SCORING FOR1\IULAE FOR ANTIAIRCRAFT lv[A- target speeds.
CHINE GUN ANDSEARCHLIGHTTARGET PRACTICES(PROJ- (3) Unlike the gun formula, the machine-gun
ECT 1158). The Coast Artillery Board has for some time formula offers no inducement for I1ring at any particular
been engaged in a study of the feasibility of modifying slant range or altitude. In other words, the normal
the present scoring formulae for antiaircraft machine-gun expectancy curve coincides with the scoring (par val ue)
and searchlight target practices in a manner similar to that curve at all slant ranges. To insure thorough training
recently done in the case of antiaircraft guns. The simpli- at all normal ranges, Training lv[emorandum No. 1-
l1ed formula for 3-inch antiaircraft guns was discussed at 1940, will, it is expected, prescribe certain range and
length in the March-April, 1939, issue of the COAST altitude bands for certain courses of each practice. Since,
ARTILLERY JOURNAL. It has been in effect throughout with the advent of the intermediate caliber automatic
the present target practice season and appears to be serving cannon, the primary mission of the machine gun has
its purpose well. The new machine-gun and searchlight become that of providing for the close-in defense of the
formulae, developed along similar lines, have recentlv area or installation defended, the majority of such
been approved by the Chief of Coast Artillery and will, courses will be limited to slant ranges of less than 1,000
it is expected, be published to the service in Training yards.
lV[emorandum No.1, Instructions for Coast Artillery (4) The same formula and the same scoring curve
Target Practice-I 940. Important characteristics of these (Figure I) will be used for both caliber .30 and caliber
formulae are discussed below. .50 machine guns. While there may be a considerable
a. Formula for machine-gun target practices. difference in the scores made with the two weapo:1s,
(I) The new formula for both caliber -]0 and cali- comparison of individual practices will be valid never-
ber .50 machine-gun target practices is: theless. Furthermore, the scoring of both calibers on
the same basis will permit of a comparison of these
r HGM
---
H'G'M'
] . t Ile score
where C IS weapons not possible heretofore.
(5) The scoring curve, Figure I, assumes a rate of
for each course, S • the :>
O'round speed in miles per hour, I1re of 600 rounds per gun per minute. It is recognized
and HGlvf the hits per gun per minute attained on the that by the use of special bolts, springs, or other non-
course. H'G'}..1' is taken from the curve, Figure I, standard equipment it is possible to attain a rate con-
usinO'
~ averaO'e
~ slant range .~
as argument.
~ This curve is siderabl:' in excess of this "normal" value. p:micularly
a "normal expectanc:' curve," based on previous target in the case of the caliher .30 gun. Training lvfemoran-
1939 COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES 463
H++
. I
,Hi
,.1: I.
- I
-
, I
t
:l
T -, , ,
- .
- .
- . .
- .
-
.
-
-, + I
-
-
-
-
I
-+
it-tlli= _- .L _
dum No. 1-1940 will include a prohibition of this under fire at maximum range. A limiting curve is
practice, since a higher rate attained by any such means shown on Figure 3. This limiting curve shows, for vari-
obviously would give an unfair scoring advantage to the ous altitudes, the horizontal range from the objective at
~re unit concerned. If and when a higher rate of fire is which pick-ups must be made if yinch antiaircraft
considered desirable, it is felt that the development of guns, normally disposed, are to take the target under
suitable materiel therefor should be a function of the fire at or near maximum range. It will be noted that the
Ordnance Department and not of the using service. horizontal range to the point where the pick-up must
b. Formula for searchlight target practice. be made decreases as altitude increases.
(I) The new formula for searchlight practices is: (3) Experience has indicated that the difficulty in
C=[20 +~ +~]
20 tp
[R,o-R Rs + 12]
L where C IS
making quick pick-ups (and hence making pick-ups
well forward of the outer ring of lights) increases con-
siderably as altitude increases. To offset this difficulty
the score for each course,S. the ground speed in yards and to ~ncourage the use of high altitude targets a se~-
per second. tp the pick-up time in seconds (but not less ond curve has been drawn, successive abscissae of which
than one second), R p and R L horizontal ranges in thou- have been decreased as altitude increases. This latter
sands of yards from the objective to the pick-up point curve then becomes the scoring curve.
and the outer ring of lights, respectively. R," is taken (4) Thus the primary index of performance on an)'
from the curve, Figure 2, using altitude at pick-up as an one curve is the ratio of distance of actual pick-up be-
argument. yond the outer ring of light to a normal, or "par." value
(2) In arriving at this formula the Coast Artillery of this distance as determined from past performances
Board concluded that the primar~' consideration in de- at a corresponding altitude.
termining the effectiveness of a searchlight platoon (5) While the time of pick-up is not of primary im-
was whether or not it picked up and illuminated the portance as long as the target is illuminated at sufficient
target early enough to permit gun batteries to take it ranae
~ to accommodate the guns, it should carry ., some
464 THE COAST ARTILLERY
, ,
JOURNAL September-October l
~'rH ' :+
, -HH-',
t t 1
'1
t -
- ,
-
-
r. t-
,
-
. q
I
1
'+hb
,.-
.. ~
0iBl, ,
',-
,
I
,
-1-"{m~~f
~
u. _=_ ~.~:~F~~~HV~it#~
-1:. }-T= ,~~~-~~~~~~m
[I.f-,
..wi)
F14 1,
I
,
"
=
I 1,;.l.J.,
L
t
_ -:'.
"l -- ,
, -+ ..
...
.-
_U LLLL ,L
-9 G
__ ..
1_ .. 12 I .. I-i:= '(l"!
weight. The term wltp is included therefore to en- the vapor lock but were of themselves subject to failure.
courage quick pick-ups. likewise the term S. /20 is in- Chrome plating of the gasoline lines, the use of b:lffies,
cluded to encourage high t:lrget speeds. the rerouting of the g:lsoline lines, :lnd modific:ltion of the
(6) No carry component :lppears in the new for- carburetors :lnd fuel pumps :III helped but did not cure
mula. It is felt that the problem of c:lrrying :I target the trouble at h:llts. He:lt:lt the fuel pump W:lSthe un-
once it has been picked up should present no difficulties delying cause of the v:lpor lock :lnd from the basic design
even to an indifferently tr:lined organiz:ltion :lnd that, of the engine the fuel pump could not be moved from the
therefore, no credit should be given for this p:lrt of the hot exhaust manifold side of the engine.
course. In June, 1939, the Hercules Engine Company devel.
oped :I left-Iund drive (cool side of engine) for the fuel
VAPOR lOCK-ANTIAIRCRAFT PRUdE ivfoVERS. As :I pump :lnd sent their engineer to Fort Monroe, Virginia,
result of a number of reports from the using service con- to install it on one of the Clydesdale trucks. The tests of .
cerning oper:ltion:ll troubles experienced with 7 ~.ton this equipment were conducted by the Motor Transport
Clydesdale prime movers for 3-inch :lntiaircraft guns, the Officer, Fort ivfonroe, and observed bv members of the
QU:lrterm:lster General Ius been experimenting with CO:lst ArtillerT BO:lrd. The new driv~ uses the conven-
various me:lns for improving field performance of these tion:ll AC me~hanical fuel pump by incorpor:lting :I carn
vehicles. The chief difficulty appe:lrs to have been c:lused on the shaft between the distributor and the :lir compres-
by vapor lock, which has frequently occurred in w:lrm sor. This shaft revolves 10 per cent bster dun the con-
weather or under heavy load. In cool weather, when ventional c:lm shaft :lnd thus the added advant:lge of more
the vapor lock is not present, the oper:lting personnel pump strokes for :I given engine speed is g:lined. The
have fou~d thes~ trucks to have capabilities far beyond installation of this unit is ver)' simple; it can be accom-
any prevIOus eqUipment. plished in the field by :I mechanic with simple hand tools
To remedy this condition various expedients have been in about four hours.
tried with more or less success. Electric fuel pumps cured On the recommendation of the Holabird Quartermaster
1939 COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES 465
, '
I I
I I , I
\ I \ \,
, I , I
,
I I \
, ,
, , ,, ..
I
, I
, I
, ,
, I
• ;
"
I
,: I
: r '+' I; " " ,
I
It!
I' !
"
I
I i
, ! I
I I i ! I
, , , , I
, I , ,
'I
, I I !,
, , ;
,
,
,,," . ,, , ,
1
"
I
, ,
t I,
---;-r
,
, I I I ! i I I I I I' , I , '-,
,,
I: I I
... , I
i' ," , .,1 I I
, "
-"+' '
_.L'
1 i +;! I ) I t I I
I
\, +S
I ,
I ,
-r I , , I ""r
'
+ \ \ I i j I
- I , I
, I I I
: ~I
, ,
, ,
,
I I
I ' ..
I'
Depot and the AC fuel pump engineer, the fuel lines 1,800 r.p.m. Due to soft ground, it was frequently neces-
were simplified and rerouted. Under the new arrange- sarv to winch the trailer Out of the sand. The test W:J.S
ment a line passes from the right-hand tank to a tee on cOl~tinued until the water temperature and oil viscosity
the left-hand tank via a frame member. Another line stabilized. Then the vehicle W:J.Shalted for frol11 two to
leads from this tee on the outside of the frame to the fuel five minutes and the test resumed. These were the :J.p-
pump-a short piece of Rexible line being incorporated proxim:J.te conditions under which vapor lock troubles had
therein adjacent to the fuel pump. This line is shielded been experienced.
from stones where it passes under the fender. Another Results of the tests were generally satisfactory. Without
line leads from the fuel pump across the top of the engine the new fuel pump and with gas lines in their original
to the carburetor. All lines are as shorr as possible and locations, vapor lock occurred frequently. After the new
are free from kinks. Generall.', speaking, the problem is pump was installed and the gas lines rerouted no trouble
one of keeping the pump and V:1Cl1umline as cool as was experienced from this cause.
possible.
A report of results thus far obtained has been for-
The test given this equipment is brieRy as follows: The
warded to the Quartermaster General. It is expected that
truck was loaded with eight tons and a seven-ton trailer
load was towed. The course selected for the towing was similar installations will be applied to selected prime
a sandy fill, the pull being such that the driver was rarely movers (Clydesdale) assigned to various organizations so
able to shift from first direct, in which gear the speed of (hat performances of these modified vehicles under a
the truck is about 33h miles when the engine turns up variety of operating conditions may be carefully studied.
-----..,
466 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
11111I11111I111I1111I1111I11I111I111I111I11111I1111I11111I111I111111111I11I1111111111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlllIIll!111111!llllllllllllllllllllllllllllm
German AA Artillery
Just before the outbreak of the current European \Var
the antiaircraft artillery of German~' appeared to have
been reorganized.
The antiaircraft was to be divided into two parts-mo-
The purpose of the Association shall be to promote bile units to operate with the field army, and a combination
the efficimcy of the Coast Artillery Corps by main-
of mobile and fixed portions to protect the zone of the in-
taining its standards ,wd traditions. by disseminating
professional knowledge, by inspiring greater effort to- terior. The designation "light" and "heavy" battalion
wards the improvement of materiel and methods of was to be discontinued and all gun battalions were to have
training and by fostering mutual understanding. re- the same composition. Here is a tentative outline of the
spect and cooperation among all arms, branches and new organization.
components of the Re~//lar Army. National Gllard,
Each regiment consists of three battalions. The regu-
Organized Reserves, and Reserve Officers' Training
Corps.
larly constitllted regiments are numbered from I to 6<j
and the battalions are indicated by Roman numerals. B:lt-
tal ions Iand II are gun battalions and III is the searchlight-
OFFICERS sound locator battalion.
},,'IAJOR GENERAL A. H. SUNDERLAND B:lttalions I and II each consist of six batteries: three
PRESIDENT heavy, two light and one searchlight batter)'.
The three heavy batteries each contain three platoons;
COLONEL AVERY J. COOPER two he:lvy and one light platoon. Each heavy platoon has
\'ICE-PRESIDENT two 8.8-cm. guns and each light platoon h:ls two 2.o-cm.
MAJOR AARON BRADSHAW. JR. guns.
SECRET.~R)' -TREASURER The two light batteries have five platoons e:lch: four
gun platoons of three 2.0-cm. guns each :lnd one search-
ADDITIONAL l>IEl>IBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COU:-;CIL light (60-cm.) platoon of four searchlights.
COLONEL H. K. LOCCHRY The searchlight battery consists of five platoons: three
COLONEL C. C. DAWES platoons each having three Iso-cm. se:lrchlights and two
COLONEL E. C. \VEBSTER platoons e:lch having three sound locators.
COLONEL E. \V. THOl>ISON The III (searchlight) Battalion consists of three bat-
LIEUTENA:\'T COLO:\'EL R. Nf. PERKI:\'S teries. Each batter)' h:ls six platoons: three searchlight
L,EUTENANT COLO:\'EL J. P. HOGAN platoons each with three Iso-cm. se:lrchlights :lnd three
MAJOR MILO BRI:-';KLEY sound locator platoons each having three sound locators.
All of the 3.7-cm. guns which formerly were used in the
light antiaircraft battery, are to be used b)' the sep:lrately
constiwted regiments numbered from 70 to 99 and these
The Coast Artillery Journal are to be stationed at several points in Germany for de-
:\IAJOR AAROX BRADSHAW, JR., Editor fense of the zone of the interior. These regiments now
The JOUR~AL prints articles on subjects of have one gun battalion only.
professional and general interest to officers of all The total number of guns of these battalions are to be
the components of the Coast Artillery Corps in
order to stimulate thought and provoke discussion. the same as the mobile units but the ratio of lights to
However. opinions expressed and conclusions drawn heavies is not known. The fortification regiments (one
in articles are in no sense official. They do not re-
flect the opinions or conclusions of the Chief of b:ltt:llion each, only) are org:lnized in the same manner
Coast Artillerv or anv other official or branch of as the permanent separate regiments.
the War Depa~tment ..
Type and Characteristics of Equipment:
The JOUR~AL does not carry paid advertisin~. The heavy anti:lircraft weapon is the 8.8-cm. gun with
The JOURNAL pars for original articles upon
publication. Manuscripts should be addressed to a range up to 9,000 meters and vertical range up to 5,000
the Editor. The JOURNAL is not responsible for meters. The maximum pitch of the tube is 850• The
manuscripts unaccompanied by return postage.
tube is nearly five meters long and the projectile has an
(Please 111m 10 ragi' -I6S)
--
468 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptelllber- October
News and Comment knowledge of the higher conduct of war. The representa_
I COl/til/lled from I'llge -/(6) tives of the Home Civil Sen'ice detailed to the one-vear
initial velocity of 820 meters per second. The maximum course come from any of the ministries-the MinistrY of
rate of fire is twenty-five rounds per minute. The 8.B-cm. Health, Ministn' or Labour, the Admiralty, and so' on.
gun weighs eight tons. The rapid fire 2.o-cm. and the A former comn~andant of the College, Ai~ Marshal Sir
3-7-cm. guns weigh approximately 1500 pounds and have Arthur Longmore, KCB, DSO, has said in this connec-
a rate of fire up to 200 rounds per minute and a range of tion that the training of civil officials in the school "is very
3,000 meters. valuable, not only to the Imperial Defense College, but
Two types of searchlights are used, the 6o-cm. and the to the officers themselves. Officers at the College want to
I so-cm. The 6o-cm. searchlight is 1')0 millon ondle- get the outlook of the Civil Servant on all our problems,
power and the 15o-cm. is over one billion candle-power and they can give them something in return of the Serv-
and is said to have a range of 13,000 meters. The antiair- ice outlook. You will find that many of the Civil Servants
craft is completely motorized. A heavy batter:' has twent:,'- who have been trained at the Imperial Defense College
three main vehicles and the light battery thirty-five, while are now in ver:' responsible positions at their own
the searchlight battery has forty-two vehicles. These num- Ministries where they are coming up against defense
bers are exclusive of trailers and motorcycles .. All cannon- problems all the time-sometimes active defense, some-
eers are armed with a riRe and are train~d in its use. times passive defense. Nearly all of them are used in some
such very u:eful capacity afterwards."
l' l' l'
l' l' ..,.
Imperial Defense College
Employment of AA Artillery Against Ground
The I~perial Defense College of Great Britain, which
Objectives
corresponds roughly to our Army War College, has a
(Digest from an article by General Rudel in the Vol-
capacity of thirty-six students, but in practice has never
kischer Beobachter, 22 July, 1939, and La France Mili-
filled more than thirty-two vacancies owing to the limits
taire, 10 August, 1939.)
of size of the building housing the college.
The allotment of students is as follows: Antiaircraft defense opposes an invincible rampart of
diverse obstacles to enemy aerial attack from whatever
Navy 6 captains
direction it may come. But in the frame of an antiaircraft
Army 6 lieutenant colonels or
defense organi"'zation, antiaircraft artillery has the chief
colonels
role. This statement is confirmed by experience in Spain.
Royal Air Force .... 6 wing commanders or
Compared to the aviation elements, artillery was the
group captalOs
principal force of the Condor Legion. An antiaircraft
T erritorials 1
artillery group, with five heavy batteries (88-mm.) and
Home Civil Service .. 6
two light batteries (2o-mm. and 37-mm.) and a light
Indian Army 3
antiaircraft column were included in the troops of the
Australia 2
Condor Legion. The antiaircraft troops in the ranks from
Canada 2
1936 to 1939 included 128 officers and 4,717 men.
South Africa 2
In Spain the antiaircraft artillery was used in extremel:,'
New Zealand , 2
difficult geographical and climatic conditions but was able,
The official announcement of the Imperial Defense Col- nevertheless, to prove its fighting efficiency.
lege gives its main function as "The training of a body of The first battery debarked was used at Seville and
officers and civilian officials in the broadest aspects of Im- Madrid against Red aerial attacks. This organization was
perial strategy." Broadly speaking, the course offered so successful that thereafter the Red aviators kept out of
comprises the following: the radius of action of the Condor Legion batteries. On
(1) Studies of the higher direction of war, strategic the occasions that Red aviation obtained a temporary air
and administrative. superiority, German antiaircraft artillery caused severe
(2) Study of organization of the fighting forces, civil losses, and amply proved its effectiveness in the domains of
home defense, and of the inRuence of politics on the con- materiel, traininj?;, and combat.
duct of war. The motors of the artillery met all the exigencies of the
(3) Study of the economic, social, industrial, and situation. Long marches beyond all expectance were made
financial resources of the nation. successfully. Even at Bilbao and Teruel, in spite of serious
(4) Study of questions of foreign policy and relations difficulties due to terrain and low temperatures, the artil-
with foreign powers. lery was always in place and read;' to work.
(5) Visits to important naval, military and air estab- At Bilbao a new and unexpected problem was pre-
lishments, the Port of London, and railroad and industrial sented to the antiaircraft artillenr• The Spanish cOrps
centers. with which the Condor Legion was operatin~ lacked ar-
It is interesting to note that the Government of Great tillery to prepare the attacks against the hei~hts and forti-
Britain deems it neceSS:lrvthat
•
civilian officials aet
t:>
practical fied mountain positions. Therefore the aviation and the
NE\\'S AND COMMENT 469
ll1ti.lircraftartillei-:--of the Condor Legion replaced the The results attained in the record practices are tabulated
hf;ht and heavy artiHef:'-that was lacking. This is cer- below:
r;inh not the role of rhis artilIeiT, but it was :mlibble Organization Holes
iorthis purpose since no Red aviation was seen. BI 8.33
The employment of antiaircraft artillery against ter-
fu ~~
restrialobjectives caused no difficulty for the personnel CI 5.13
knew its arm welL It was successful against both distant Cz 4,50
lnd close objectives, against Red artillery and against Red
AI 4,33
tanks. Because of its fire-power, one heavy antiaircraft Az Target shot down
battery was able to replace from three to six normal bat- Average 5-9
teriesof field artillery. The moral effect produced by the
Jntiaircraft batteries was particularly great because of the The above percentages compare favorablv with those
surprisewhen the fire reached the enemy. The approach normally attained by Regular Army organi~ations. Half
of projectiles was imperceptible owing to their high of. these practices were fired at about 9<X>-milsangular
muzzlevelocitv. heights and they were held in the mornings when the sun
The enemy' were never able to hold against the fire of was directly in front of the firing line. Speeds of the plane
the antiaircraft batteries, although they fought bravely. varied as much as fort:' miles per hour on consecutive
As for the light batteries, they were used with success courses. All firings were on crossing courses_ The total
against machine-gun nests, tanks, and the loopholes of training of each organization prior to record practice
shelters. The decisive success of the antiaircraft artillery averaged less than three hours.
against terrestrial objectives at Bilboa resulted in subse- l' l' l'
quently giving it preference in this employment. It fought
Czech Maginot Line-From Inside
with almost all the Spanish brigades at Madrid, Jarama,
Brunete, Belchite, T eruel, and Lerida. It supported the The growth of those steel-and-concrete boundary bar-
Moroccan and the Navarrese Corps in this manner in riers, the French Maginot Line and the German times
Catalonia. Line, has resulted in much free speculation as to their ulti-
Thanks to this performance and success in battle, mate value in war. In point of fact, very little is known
General Rudel concludes that German antiaircraft artil- about these fortifications and what information is released
lery has shown its worth in Spain, has proved the high is clearly of the inspired "official" variety designed to
quality of German materiel, and has demonstrated its ex- bolster home morale or inspire fear in a potential enemy.
cellent instruction as well as the high spirit of its serving But the fall of Czechoslovakia last autumn brings in
personnel. its train some interesting revelations regarding the Czech
l' l' l' frontier fortifications that had been designed to repel a
German attack. In as much as Czech national defense
R.O.T.e. Machine Gun Firings ideas had been heavily influenced by French policy and
By Captain John E. Reierson, C.A.C. subsidies, it was natural to expect that from the Czech
Students from Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Massa- fortifications one might learn much about the Maginot
chusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Line. Here is what one German officer reports on the
New Hampshire, Pittsburgh and Maine attained out- Czech border defenses.
standing results in their machine-gun firings during the This officer-Colonel Biermann of the Reich's Engi-
1939 camp period at Fort Monroe. These students ac- neers-discussed his findings in a recent number of the
complished more in less time with machine guns than German Engineer Quarterly. He remarks, in opening,
aO\' untrained group of men that I have ever observed. that after seeing the vast girdle of works that surrounded
The only preparations for the firings were about twenty Czechoslovakia and calculating the immense manpower
mi,nutes'drill and two and one-half -hours of preliminary necessary to hold them, one might well wonder if the
~nngs on sleeve targets. No ammunition was expended on Czechs had not run counter to the principle that fortifi-
balloons. cations should economize in personnel in order to release
The conditions under which the firings were held were troops for a war of maneuver.
far from ideal. The guns had to be so located that the After this bit of preliminaf:'T headshaking, Colonel
renter of the field of fire was never safe which necessitated Biermann gets down to business to describe the various
~ring from unfavorable sectors. All courses were divided types of works that made up the Czech "Maginot" Line.
owinl?to interference from fishing boats, other shipping As the German troops streamed across the border thev
and airplanes. Slant ranges averaged approximately I, 100 found that the fortifications grew progressively stronger
Yards. Ranges for the various courses were varied. The as they penetrated the countrv. There were some excep-
spee? of th~ plane varied from I IO to 150 miles per hour. tions to this rule, which will be discussed later. The bor-
~l/tl:1g the firin<;sin the mornings the sun was directly der outposts on the roads consisted in rhe main of con-
10 line with the -gtms and this m;de spotting difficult 3S crete-wall barricades, loopholed for rifle fire. Extendino-h
fewof the tracers could be seen. halfway across the road, alternarely right and left, these
470 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septe1JJber-Octob~
barricades were designed to slow down traffic which was major assistance from other European powers.
to be halted altogether by a final road barrier that ex- There appears to have been only one item lacking U.
tended wholly across the highway. the little country's national defense system: Time. And
On the little-traveled country and farmroads, lengths of that desperate need, the Czechs mav well echo Na-
of steel rails imbedded in concrete were supplemented by poleon's dictum: "Ask me for anything--except time."
improvised vehicle-delaying arrangements. There is no i' i' i'
mention of road mines, although Colonel Biermann says
National Defense in Australia
that many bridges were destroyed. There was little evi-
Unsettled conditions in the Orient have convinced the
dence along the highways of blockhouses or pillboxes
Australian citizen that it is high time to look to his de-
from which fire could be brought to bear upon the barri-
fenses in time of peace rather than to hastily improvise in
cades; apparently there had not been time enough to con-
struct these. time of war. The Commonwealth of Australia, it is inter-
esting to note, spends more on armament than any other
In the Bohemian Basin, light fortifications extended in
portion of the British nation with the exception, of course,
a line of outposts and showed evidence of hasty prepara-
tion. These outposts, of which Colonel Biermann esti- of the mother country. The 1937 defense budget of
Australia was approximately sixty million dollars; five
mates some 2,000 were prepared, were designed primarily
years previously it had been sixteen millions.
for shelter against rifle fire and shell splinters.
, About one-third of the budget is devoted to the Navy
Behind the outer line of light defenses, the Germans
came upon the medium fortifications known as "ear" for modernization and new construction. Several destroy-
ers and torpedo boats are being laid down in Australian
posts, so called because of a pair of concrete flanges (ears)
yards, a new departure for the Commonwealth. Within a
visible when approaching the works frontally. Behind the
ears were loopholes for machine-gun and antitank fire. short period of time Australia will have the following ves-
Because of this peculiar construction the pillboxes could sels afloat: 5 cruisers, 4 service-type ships, 2 destroyers.
12 motor torpedo boats, and 1 survey ship. The construc-
fire only to the flanks; very few had provision for frontal
fire and then only when situated on a reverse slope secure tion of a capital ship was rejected by the Australian gov-
from long-range observed fire. In areas of tactical impor- ernment on the grounds that such a vessel would take too
tance the ear-post groupments were stiffened by heavy long to construct and that the large money outlay could
works sited among the pillboxes. be far better invested in smaller type vessels more suited
Along some sections of the Czech-German boundary to the special defense problems of the Commonwealth.
northwest of Moravia the heavy works were the only line In the department of air defense it is interesting to
of defense. As in the case of the ear posts these were de- note that a few years ago there was sharp disagreement as
signed to furnish only flanking fire, but their armament to the proper function of an air corps in Australia. One
was, of course, much heavier. faction advocated a huge air force to the detriment of the
Colonel Biermann estimates that the heavy works ground arms, basing its contention on the theory that the
could withstand the fire of guns up to about twelve-inch air arm was the best method of defense for the Common-
caliber. The roofs and walls were of reinforced concrete wealth. The issue was decided at a general election and the
up to eight inches in thickness. Here he observes that nation overwhelmingly decided in favor of a policy of
the tactical principle seemed to differ from the French balanced defense with somewhat of a bias toward a strong
doctrine of meeting the enemy with weakness that grows naval policy.
progressively stronger. In the Moravian valleys the Hence the present doctrine of the Australian Air Force
Czechs expected to give an invader the stiffest of resist- is chiefly cooperation with the Navy and Army. The fol-
ance from the:;very beginning. lowing is the order of priority of wartime missions for the
Royal Australian Air Force:
At keypoints in the Moravian position several fortifi-
1• To fight and destroy enemy aircraft
cations were combined in one massive strong point that
2. To scout seawards in search of raiders
was proof against the heaviest metal. The roofs and walls
3, To assist and supplement the various fixed defenses
approximated eleven feet in thickness; the turret armor
4- To provide aircraft for naval cruisers and for the
averages twelve inches.
troops in the field
Colonel Biermann's verdict is that in October, 1938,
5. To take independent offensive action in special cir-
one could only say with respect to the Czech forts:
cunlstances
"Everything still incomplete." The defensive belt could
i i i
hardly be called a continuous front and a penetration in a
few weak spots would have resulted in a collapse of the German Naval Views on Coast Defense
entire system. But, had the European political situation A retired German naval officer recently commented on
given the Czechs additional breathing space-then, says the worth of coastal fortifications in the" Werhtechnische
Colonel Biermann, that would have been another story. Monatshefte. This officer, Fregattenkapitan a. D. Rehder.
In fact, he judges that given another year in which to has this to sav:
prepare-say until this October-the Czechs could have "After the' Great War, the opinion was frequently ex-
held out behind their fortifications long enough t9 justify pressed that the day of heav.'; battleships was over, and
1939 NEWS AND COMMENT 471
that their problems could be equally well, and at the same with a percentage of tracer ammunition to point out
time more economically solved by heavy bombing air- errors of direction and the difficult\, •
of lavino--on
::>
a Heetino-
h
planes. This same untenable opinion is now finding its object which passes closely overhead.
waY into considerations regarding coast fortresses, where -The UnitedServicesReview-Aug. 31, 1939.
ir is imagined, on grounds of econom~" that heav:' artil- .,. .,. .,.
ler\' can be dispensed with. Nevertheless, as the rearma-
m~nt of coasts throughout the world shows, this heavy Wartime News Photography
.1rrillervcontinues to be the backbone of coast defense; it During the 1v1anassasphase of the First Army Maneu-
isof c~urse, supplemented by medium, light and antiair- vers this summer the acquisition of newspictures under
craftartillery. Minefields will make it more difficult for an wartime conditions received a test from two enterprising
enemy to approach the coast, while hawser, net and baulk photographers representing a pair of Eastern dailies. The
boomswill safeguard the lighter fighting vessels and sub- two newsmen accompanied the troops not only for the
marinesin harbor. purpose of taking pictures but also to find out just how
"In the future, as in the past, it can be taken that little photographic impedimenta was necessary when
coast fortresses will have superiority over ships. In their operating with troops in the field..
layout thev will differ from those built hitherto in that, In addition to miniature cameras the photographers
i~stead of 'presenting an extensive frontage, they will be carried field darkrooms utilizing daylight developing
characterized by depth, and their land front will be pro- tanks. The entire assortment of cameras, seven additional
rected by special forts, field fortifications and prepared lenses, chemicals, bulbs, Hashguns, and film, were carried
machine-gun nests. in two 18-inch fiber cases. The bulb and flashgun equip-
ment was held to a minimum owing to its bulk and the
"Ships have normally a limited life, and have therefore
impracticability of carrying such items in wartime. Under
to be replaced. The life of coast defense fortresses is a
bad light conditions high-speed lenses (t: I '5) compen-
great deal longer. In their design, it will not only be
sated for the lack of flashguns.
necessaryto consider present requirements, but to take as
Pint thermos bottles carried chemicals while two larger
long a view as possible of future developments in coast de-
bottles carried water. The use of thermos bottles enabled
fensearmament and in the measures necessary for its pro-
the phot;ographers to secure temperature control of the
tection. The main condition for success lies in the smooth
liquids in spite of the summer heat.
cooperation between the navy, the air force, and the
Pigeons, borrowed from a homing-pigeon club, carried
armv."
.,. .,. .,. developed film to the newspapers two hundred miles
away.
Warding Off Low"Flying Aircraft The equipment bore a similarity to that carried by cor-
The static light batteries of the antiaircraft division's respondent photographers when operating in Ethiopia,
will be in training through the summer. This artillery Spain, and China.
.,. .,. .,.
is a new idea and is specially designed to ward off low-
flying attack and danger from the dive-bomber. In the Back Numbers
recent air exercise hedge-hopping tactics were tried out The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade has no
with considerable success, and our French allies think that back numbers of the COASTARTILLERY JOURNALprior to
the "vol rase," as they call it, may not be the least of January I, 1939, in its official file. Since a complete file
menacesfrom above... of JOURNALS would l;>einvaluable for reference, it is hoped
This AA gun is in effect our old friend the Bren gun that officershaving no further use for back numbers will
on a super scale and fires a 2-lb. shell. Being such, sub- be willing to donate copies.
calibrepractice is the best method of preliminary instruc- . Anyone who is willing to donate back numbers is re-
tion for untrained personnel, the real Bren mounted on quested to write to the Commanding General, H.s.C.
the AA gun and the handling of the latter accurately re- A.B., Fort DeRussy, T.H. Arrangements will be made
produced. In this way a towed target can be fired at, for shipment at no expense to the donor.
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY \
MAJOR
Chief of Coast Arti/Jer)'
GENERAL A. H. SUNDERLAND
•
Exemtiz'e
COLONEL JOSEPH A. GREEN
Materiel and Finance Section Organization and Training Section
LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. B. HODIES, JR. LIEUTENANT COLONEL D. D. HINMAN
~IAJOR J. T. LE\X'IS MAJOR AARON BRADSHAW, JR.
MAJOR S. L. MCCROSKEY CAPTAIN J. E. HARRIMAN
~*************************** .
I
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade
BRIGADIER GENERAL FULTON Q. C. GARDNER, COII/II/dnding
LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. M. S. SKENE, Chief of Staff
MAJOR F. A. MACON, Adjfltant General & S-l
LIEUTENANT MILAN G. \X'EBER, Acting 5-2 & Gflnner)' LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. H. LINDT, S-3
LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. R. BEHRENS, 5-4 & JI7 ar Plans
CAPTAIN I. H. RITCHIE CAPTAIN \X'. H. KENDALL
Com. and Engineer Officer See. Ath. Officer
CAPTAIN S. E. \X'HITESIDES, JR. LIEUTENANT W. A. CALL
Chemicall/'?arfare Officer Ordnance Officer
COLONEL H. C. MERRIAM
Comll/anding Harbor DefellSes of Pearl Harbor
COLONEL CHARLES K. \X'ING COLONEL \X'. D. FRAZER
COII/II/anding 64th Coast Artiller)' (AA) COII/II/anding Harbor Defenses of Honolllill
By Lieutenant il1ilan G. Weber
During the past few months the First Army maneuvers absent on duties incident to the First Army maneuvers in-
have dominated the training activities of the district and cluded one officer, forty-eight enlisted men and ooe
have provided an extremely busy and highly instructive civilia'n ordnance machinist. Captain Norman A. Cong-
period for all Coast Artillery personnel in New England. don, who had been scheduled for participation in tbt
The district commander, Colonel Smith, was G-2 of maneuvers was in the station hospital recovering from an
the I Corps, and his adjutant, Major Chaplin, was adju- operation.
tant general of the same corps, for the duration of the The lower or west parade ground at Fort Banks has been
maneuvers. raised and leveled. It now presents an excellent appearanQ
and is more in keeping with the rest of the post.
HARBOR DEFENSES OF PORTLAND AND PORTSl\fOUTH
On Friday evening, August I Ith, a farewell dinner
The general exodus of enlisted men detailed for the was given to Master Sergeant Lee M. King, 9th Coast
maneuvers made the defenses rather forlorn looking with Artillery, on his retirement after thirty years' service.
so few men left. "Maneuver widows" predominated.
HARBOR DEFENSES OF LONG ISLAND SOUND
The clean-up after service practice and in preparation for
the annual ordnance inspection is under way. By Captain Frank T. Osten berg
Major Imperatori has returned from the hospital and is During the last three months Fort H. G. Wright has
again on duty. been a beehive of activity. The 11th Coast Artillery
Major Hudgins was ordered to Walter Reed and left moved to Fort Adams, Rhode Island, and to the First
this station to report to the hospital on August 7th. Army maneuver area; the post was preparing for the ar-
Staff Sergeant Harry J. Dawe has arrived in Manila and rival of the National Guard; the constructing quartet-
is assigned to the harbor defenses of Manila and Subic master was starting the new construction; and the IIth
Bays, Fort Mills. Coast Artillery was reorganized. Numerous inspectors
HARBOR DEFENSES OF BOSTON
and visitors arrived and departed in connection with these
activities.
By Colonel Monte 1. Hickok O.R.C. and C.M.T. Camps: On June 8, 1939, lieu-
On July 21st Battery A, 9th Coast Artillery finished its tenants W. Bruce Logan, Lafar Lipscomb, Jr., George T.
record practice with the excellent score of IS0' Wind and Weitzel and Francis M. McGoldrick and a detachment
weather were mild during the entire mine season and of forty-nine men of the 11th Coast Artillery left on the
conducive to good work on the water. Portable radios D.S.M.S. Greene for Fort Adams, for temporary duty in
solved inter-boat communication. This innovation obvi- connection with the aRC and CMTC. This detachment
ated the necessity of transmitting reports and messages was joined b;' the band on July 6th, 1939. All except
by voice. Lieutenants Logan, Weitzel, and McGoldrick-who
- A portable radio was placed on the bridge of the mine went to Plattsburg for the maneuvers-returned to Fort
planter and each of the small mine boats was furnished H. G. Wright by boat on August 10, 1939,
with an individual set. All sets were tuned to a given Reorganization: On July I, 1939, the 11th Coast Artil-
wave length, allowing an officeron the planter, or L-boat, lery' was reorganized in compliance with orders from the
to easily control, instruct, and direct all of the small boats War Department. Headquarters Battery, Battery A, B.
operated. Much valuable time was saved in mine plant- and C became Headquartets Battery, I I th Coast Artil-
ing and orders were transmitted with accuracy. The sets lery; Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion; Battery A, B.
were obtained through the courtesy of several officerswho and C; Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion; Battery D and
loaned their privately owned instruments for the practice. E. There was no change in the band. Headquarters Bat-
After hours of regular duty the portable radios furnished tery was reduced from 195 men to 80 men, each battalion
much entertainment for the detachment sent out in small headquarters battery' has 20 men and each line batten'
boats to guard the mine field. Every' thirty minutes the:' 104 men.
tuned in with a shore station for any reports or necessary National Guard: On July I, 1939 the 242d Coast Ar-
instructions. tillen', Connecticut National Guard, commanded b\
The contingent from the Harbor Defenses of Boston Lieutenant Colonel Russell Y. Moore, arrived for tw<J
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 475
Colonel Earl C. JI7ebster commanding tbe 243d Coast Artillery, Rbode Island National Guard and bis staff passing
ill re/'iew before GOI'ernor JI'/illial11H. Vanderbilt of Rbode Island on Visitors Day, at Fort H. G. JI'/rigbt, i\Tew York.
• weeks' tr:lining. Brig:ldier Gener:ll Willi:lm F. L:ldd, Ad- them during the last week and only the 6-inch battery was
jmant Gener:ll of Connecticut, four St:lte st:lff officers :lblc to fire its target practice.
and seven Reserve officers received tr:lining with the regi- On July 29th the Rhodc Island Nation:ll GU:lrd was
ment. replaced by the 24 Ist Coast Artillery ?vhss:lchusetts N a-
;vfajor \Villi:lm Hesketh, unit instructor, accomp:lnied tion:ll Guard, commanded by Colonel Harry A. Skinncr.
the regiment :lnd ?vhjor Russell T. George, unit instructor Six Reserve officers received training with the regiment.
I of the 243d CO:lst Artillery, Rhode Island National Lieutenant Colonel Berthold Vogel, unit instructor, ac-
Guard, m:lde the :lnnu:l1 field inspection of the 242d. comp:lnied the regiment to camp but left on July 3 Ist for
The Honor:lble Raymond E. B:lldwin, Governor of the m:lneuvers. wfajors Russell T. George and Harry W.
Connecticut, W:lS a guest of the 242d on Visitors' D:lY, Lins, conducted the annual field inspection of the 24 Ist.
and W:lStendered :l review :lnd inspected the regiment. Colonel Emmanuel Lombard, militarv attache, French
Governor Baldwin W:lS accomp:lnied by his staff. ?vhjor Army, observed the training of the 24 I~t Coast Artillery
General J:lmes A. \Voodruff, First Corps Are:l com- and visited the posts of Fort H. G. Wright and Fort
, mander, accomp:lnied by Colonel Pierre V. Kieffer, Na- Michie.
tional GU:lrd Officer, First Corps Arc:l, Lieuten:lnt John whjor General James A. Woodruff, accompanied by
). Stark, ADC, and whjor Gener:ll Morris B. Payne, Con- Colonel Benjamin F. Miller, Chief of St:lff, and Lieuten-
necticut N:ltion:ll GU:lrd, in comnund of the 43d Di- ant John J. Stark, ADC, inspected the 24 Ist.
vision, inspected the 242d CO:lst Artillery on July 13. The Mass:lchusetts National GU:lrd had an extremely
Gener:ll P:lyne was tre:lding on bmili:lr ground, which successful camp completing all t:lrget practices with a
brought bck memories of the time in December, 1917 few days to spare. However, to the members of the regi-
when as a m:ljor he helped org:lnize the 56th Artillery ment the camp's ending was a sorrowful one as this is
for service overse:ls. Gener:ll P:lvne is :l Sen:ltor in the the last c:lmp Colonel Skinner will attcnd as their com-
Connecticut Legislature. / manding officer. Colonel Skinner retires for age on ?vfay
The Connecticut N:ltion:ll GU:lrd h:ld :In extremely I I, 1940, having cntered the military scrvice in I~6. He
successful c:lmp, firing :lll their :lssigned t:lrget pr:lctices. is the only veteran of the Spanish-American War remain-
On July IS, 1939, the Connecticut N:ltion:ll Guard W:lS ing in the wfassachusetts National Guard. We aU wish
r~placed by the 243d CO:lst Artillery, Rhode Island N:l- Colonel Skinner peace, contentment, and a long lifc, with
tlonal Guard, commanded by Colonel Earl C. Webster. the realiz:ltion of :l job well done. wfav he catch all the
Brigadier Gener:ll Herbert R. Dean, Adjut:lnt Gener:ll of fish he wants ..
Rhode Island, nine St:lte staff officers and eight Reserve First Army i\1aneuuers: On August 1st, Captain
officers received tr:lining with the regiment. Charles E. Dunham, Lieutenants Yale H. \Volfe and
~vfajors Russell T. George :lnd Ellsworth Young, the Fr:lnk F. Tenney, :lnd Battery C, 11th CO:lst Artillery,
~nit instructors, :lccompanied the regiment. Major Wil- with attached personnel, numbering 293 enlisted men
lIam Hesketh, m:lde the annu:l1 field inspection of the left for Plattsburg Barracks, for dut)' with the First Army
241d. maneuvers. Thc detachment took up duties as army
The Rhode Island regiment h:ld excellent firing weather militac:' police company, First Army; police and billeting
during the first week. However "old man fog" was against detail; telephone orderlies, :lnd duty with contact um-
476 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Oc/abet
pires. The movement from New London to the maneuver as Bennington and Ticonderoga proved of great interest
area was made by truck. and instruction to the men fortunate enough to be se-
On August 3d: Captains John -:VI. }"foore and Andrew lected for the trip. The regiment provided personnel for
Samuels, Jr. and Lieutenant 1-Iaurice J. Palizza, left for the post guard of Fort Adams in the absence of the 2.d
Plattsburg with 74 enlisted men for duty as Headquarters Battalion, 13th Infantry.
Company, I Corps. Captain James T. Barber and Lieu- The erection of a new boathouse at Fort Adams, ~_
tenant William V. N. Grace, left for Saranac Camp with placing that damaged by the hurricane, is still progr~
75 enlisted men for duty as Headquarters Company Pro- ing. The building, located ashore, instead of on piling as
visional Corps. heretofore, will receive mine yawls via a marine railwav
A detachment of 19 enlisted men of the 1Ith Coast thereby simplifying many operations, including the elim~
Artillery and Ordnance Detachment left on August 7th nation of the old "heave ho"; as, in the new structure, a
for the maneuver area. power winch will draw the yawl to the Hoorlevel.
We look forward to the return of the troops on or about September will see the annual submarine mine training
September 1st. period of the 10th Coast Artillery. The command looks
Quartermaster Activities: The constructing quarter- for better weather this year than in 1938, when the hurri-
master has begun work at Fort H. G. Wright and Fort cane disrupted operations shortly after the planting of the
Michie. Buildings are being salvaged, foundations laid; test group.
a utility storehouse has been moved to its new location
Technical Sergeant Harry Ebbert, Ordnance, joined
and the old oil tank on our dock has been sold as scrap
early in September from the Savanna, Illinois Ordnance
Iron.
Depot.
Staff Sergeant Andrew Skvancek, Jr. has arrived from
Fort Mills. Sergeant Lylas W. Lynch has arrived from The month of September marks the departure of First
Fort Kamehameha. Sergeant Shadwell, Battery A, for the tropics, with station
Six Reserve officersare receiving training at Fort H. G. at Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. First Sergeant Shadwell
\Vright under the Thomason Act. has been a popular president of the Fort Adams NCO
Recruits for Foreign Service: Fort H. G. Wright has club since the last election. We wish him a pleasant trip
been designated as a casual center for recruits enlisted at and continued success at his future station. He will be re-
Springfield, Massachusetts, for foreign service. The re- placed by First Sergeant Dominic Miglino from Fort
placements are shipped to Fort Slocum as soon as there Randolph.
are accommodations for them there. Private William D. O'Neil, Battery A has been de-
tailed as a student at the Coast Artillery School, (Electri-
HARBOR DEFENSES OF NARRAGANSETT BAY cal Course), beginning September 15, 1939,
By Captain Virgil M. Kimm
HARBOR DEFENSES OF NE\V BEDFORD
In company with other Coast Artillery regiments the
By Captain Charles N. Branham
10th Coast Artillery took another step in its growth
toward a full active regiment. On July 1st, the Head- New Bedford was host to three visiting warships last
quarters Battery, 10th Coast Artillery gave place to an summer. Following the Portuguese destroyer Tejo came
active firing battery, Battery A and a Headquarters and the D.S.S. Leary in time for the local celebration of the 4th
Headquarters Battery. of July. The Leary was followed by H.M.S. Penzanct.
The month of July saw the annual Fort Adams C.M. The visits of these warships were occasions for numerous
T. Camp become active. There was visible the usual line- official and social affairs in which civic, militarv, and
/
up of suitcase-carrying "cits" being transformed into naval organizations in the vicinit:, participated and co-
awkward-looking soldiers, and then later developing into operated. The expressions of appreciation by the com-
the smart appearing "Reds," "Whites" and "Blues" who manders of these warships for the many courtesies extend-
provided the principal interest on Governor's Dav. The ed to them and their officersand crew~ while in port, and
camp, all factors considered, was one of the most ~fficient the pleasant memories of those whose privilege it was to
ever conducted at Fort Adams. The newly-opened officers' welcome them, are real evidences of the value of such
club provided a nightly gathering place for the officersat- good-will visits.
tending the camp. Almost all of the evidence of the severe damage caused
In August, the 10th Coast Artillery provided personnel by the 1938 storm has been removed, and in many in-
for the First Army Maneuvers, supplying telephone stances, pre-hurricane facilities have been removed. So
operators for the umpire group and administrative person- much so that a common remark of casual visitors now is
nel for the casual camp. The 400-mile ride from Fort to the effect that, "Well, I see that the storm didn't hurt
Adams to the maneuver area via such historic battlefields vou n1uch!"
Harbor DeFenses of Puget Sound
COLOI\'EL JrUIES H. Cu I\' I\' II\'G H ..U I , Commandino l:>
An important and interesting activit~, during the past and amiairccaft armamem which added great interest to
months was the recent test of the Seattle area aircraft the momh's traininCT.
warning service. One hundred and forty-four observers Thirt:, officers of" the 529th Coast Artillery (AA)
were used, a large number (64) of whom were emplo~'ees Organized Reserves, arrived from Oregon for a two-week
of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company. In ad- training period. Other visitors included the mine pia mer
dition, fourteen other sources of information were used in- Niles from Fort Scott and two Nav\' submarines, the
cludinCTrhe National Forest Service, the National Park Perch and Stingray ..
::>
Service, the Coast Guard, the \Vashington State Highwa~' Lieurenam and ~Irrs. R. J. Lawlor have left for Fort
Patrol and others. The cemer was in Seattle in a room ~Ironroe and the Coast Artillervr School. His command,
provided by the Puget Sound Power and Light Company, the mine plamer Bell, now at Fort Scott, is to be turned
whose officials, as did all others concerned in the test, gave over to one of our new arrivals, Lieurenallt L. C. Ratcliffe.
unusual cooperation and assistance. The photog'raph Other new arrivals are Lieutenallt and Mrs. Thomas
shows the planing board and other equipment used in ~Ifimin, from Fort Douglas. During the next month we
the test. This was all manufactured locally at Fort look forward to the arrival of three officers, ivfajor A. F.
Worden. Englehart, from Hawaii, who is to be executive, Lieuten-
The test was a great sllccess in every way; the Rights ant F. T. Berg from Panama, and Lieutenant Odom, now
were carried out as scheduled and each Right was picked on graduation leave from \Vest Point.
I up by a large majority of the observers concerned. Great At this time of the year the most popular sport is fish-
ing for trour and salmon. It is well known to all who have
interest was shown by civilians and the information center
been stationed here that Fort V.,Torden is a fisherman's
was full of imerested spectators a good deal of the time.
paradise. The salmon run is at its height and the entire
Special attention was devoted to publicity. A press release
area in front of the wharf is full of small boats trolling back
W;IS issued before the test and two radio broadcasts were
and forth .
. made, one by Captain ~Ifyers and one b~' Captain ~Ifc- Other activities included a dance at the club for each
Craw, before and during the exercises. group of Reserve officers and for the National Guard, as
The annual C.M.T. Camp closed on July 30. For the well as man)' private parties and picnics at old Fort T own-
first time at Fort Worden, the trainees fired both seacoast send.
PlOl/illg board alld equipmellt llSed ill Seal/Ie area lL'amillg sen'ice test.
Corregidor
BRIGADIERGEXERAL ""'ALTER K. WILSON, C01JJ1l1imJing
COLONEL FREDERIC A. PRICE, Exeat/ire
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. B. PATTERSON, Ad;1Ital1/ General & 5-1
UEL'TENANT COLOXEL E. O. HALBERT. 5-2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. E. COTTER, 5-3
CAPTAIN P.-\t:L W. COLE, 5-4
COLONEL R. P. GLASSBURN, COLONEL WILLIAM C. KOENIG
COlllmcl1lding59th Coast Artillery (HD) Commanding 60th Coast Artillery (AA)
COLONEL WILLIS SHIPPAM LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. B. CRAWFORD
Commanding 91s1 Coast ArtiJ/ery (P5) (HD) Commanding 92d Coast Artillery (P5) (TD)
By Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Phillips
This command has been engaged in the garrison train- Grant. Colonel Price is the new president. With him, on
ing period since June first. Gunners' instruction occupies the board of governors, are Captain Conzelman, Captain
the attention of the troops while schools and conferences Elmes, and Captain Amoroso.
furnish additional activity for the officers. The 23d Infan- The officers of the harbor defenses were treated to a
try Brigade (PS), from Fort McKinley, dared the tour of inspection at Nichols Field and Fort McKinley
weather-man long enough for each of their battalions to on June 22d and 23d. A most instructive demonstration
spend a few days at Corregidor in antiaircraft and anti- was staged at Fort McKinley by the 23d Infantry Brigade
marinecraft firing with small arms. The rains finally made and the 4th Chemical Company. A battalion problem in
good their threats and sent down a series of showers that the defense, an attack problem, and demonstration firings
made the infantry camp site look like a memento of "Sun- with chemical mortars were conducted by troops. Follow-
nv France." Once these showers were over, the sun came ing these events, the 14th Engineers exhibited their skill
o~t and treated us to an extra month of dry (and extra by throwing pontoon and assault bridges across an arm of
hot) season. Following which, the typhoons staged a be- the Pasig River.
lated entrance in July but, nevertheless, managed to pour 59TH COAST ARTILLERY
down enough rain to lack onl:' one quarter of an inch of
breaking the all-time record for anyone month. By Major Louis H. Thompson
The Grant reached Manila on her July trip without On July 19th Colonel George Ruhlen relinquished
untoward event, other than being one day behind schedule command of the 59th Coast Artillery to Colonel Robert
owing to typhoon weather. The leaving of the Grant was P. Glassburn. Colonel Ruhlen and Major James T. Camp-
a sad one for the garrison owing to the sudden death of bell, both of whom have served for the past two years with
Major Kenneth C. Bonne:', who died in Sternberg Hos- the 59th, returned to the States on the July 24th transport.
pital on July 20th. The command mourns the loss of a A farewell dinner dance was given by the officers and
faithful officer. ladies of the regiment at the Corregidor Club on July 8th
On the Fourth of Jul:', the 59th and 60th Regiments in honor of Colonel Ruhlen and Major and Mrs. Camp-
made a trip to Manila to take part in the Independence bell. All members of the regiment regret the loss of these
Day Exercises, arranged for the occasion. Acting United two able and efficient officers and we send with them our
States High Commissioner J. Weldon Jones, delivered best wishes for success and happiness in their new duties.
the principal address after the troops of the Department, During the two years that Colonel Ruhlen has been in
together with representative units from the Philippine command the regiment has gone to new heights of
Army, had passed in review before the department com- achievement both in artillery firing and athletic suptem-
mander, Major General John H. Hughes. acy.
Bowling is the principal sport as long as the typhoons Captain William L. McNamee, former commanding
blow. Two staff teams struggled with the officers' teams officerof Battery A, who has been on leave of absence and
from the regiments but failed to get better than second in detached service since June 7th, also sailed on the July
the duck pin league. The ladies of the staff, did better 24th transport.
and won their section of the duck pin league. Basketball Lieutenant Leland R. Drah returned to the United
men are warming up by interbattery games in preparation States via Suez on July 3d. Captain Harold A. Brusher.
for some fast work in the inter-regimental and inter-post who has been on detached service at Camp John Hay dur-
games to follow. ing his tour of dury in the Philippines, sailed on July 24th
A diversion from the indoor training occurred early in for the United States.
June when one of the Bilibids slipped away from a sentry In addition to Colonel Glassburn, Captains Norman B.
and caused a general search with all units combing the Simmonds and William B..Short arrived on July 19th for
brush for the missing prisoner. dury with the regiment. Captain Simmonds was assigned
New officers were elected bv the Corregidor Club at to command Battery A at Fort Mills and Captain Short
the annual meeting, immediately after the arrival of the to Battery E at Fort Drum.
1939 COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 479
::-Vfaster
Sergeant Oscar Younce, who retires with over satisfactorily. Air missions for tracking were scheduled
thirty years' serviceon August 31, 1939, heads the list of several times each month in hopes that range sections
the departing noncommissioned staff. On July 14th could get some pre-season experience. However, every
Headquarters Battery gave a farewell dinner for Sergeant mission but one was rained out. The searchlight battery is
Younce, at which time various speakers, including Colo- undergoing a complete tuning up under Captain Arnold
nel Ruhlen, extolled the long and honorable service of D. Amoroso, 60th Coast Artillery who hopes to hold a
Sergeant Younce, who in turn gave some excellent and target practice this November and another one next
sound advice to the younger soldiers of the battery. In- l'vfarch.
cluded among other departing members of the noncom-
91STCOASTARTILLERY
(PS)
missionedstaff are First Sergeants Cason and Dwyer, and
StaffSergeant l'v1essick. By Major V. P. Foster
The inter-battery duck pin tournament ended on July Gunners' instruction for enlisted men and troop schools
3d with the Ordnance detachment winner of a close fin- for officers have been conducted during the past two
ish with forty-nine points won to twenty-three points months.
lost. Battery B was second with forty-eight wins and The regiment lost two field officersand one captain last
twenty-four losses. The 59th regimental duck pin team month-Major Arthur L. Lavery, regimental adjutant,
took the decision and the American title from the 60th who left en route to his new assignment with Organized
Coast Artillery team by winning five out of nine games. Reserves, 2d Corps Area at Buffalo, New York via
Europe; Major Benjamin Bowering, 2d Battalion com-
60THCOASTARTILLERY
mander who left on last transport, assigned to duty with
By Major Allison W. Tones Organized Reserves,7th Corps Area at T opeh, Kansas;
The Grant brought Captain Girvelle L. Field and Cap- and Captain Lee A. Denson, Jr., who commanded Bat-
tain Howard E. C. Breitung to the 60th on July 19th. tery D, 91st and who subsequently became regimental
Captain Field was assigned to Battery D, but Captain adjutant is assigned to duty as student at Arm\' Indus-
Breitung was, at least temporarily, lost to us, being as- trial College, Washington: .
signed to Fort Wint and command of the Trainee Camp The last transport brought to the 91st a former officer
of the Philippine Army. On her outgoing trip, the Grant in this regiment-Major Valentine P. Foster, who is as-
took two of our old timers who had spent their entire signed to 2d Battalion and as regimental adjutant.
tour with the 60th: Captain J. T. Wrean and Lieutenant Spurred on by its supremacy in the regimental volley-
John W. Romlein. The loss of these old-timers leaves a ball tournament, Battery A-Captain Newman, com-
holethe newcomerswill have to work hard to plug. Cap- manding-defeated the 92d Coast Artillery (PS) to
tain W rean goes to Mississippi State College and Lieu- capture the post scout volley ball championship, 1939,
tenant Romlein to the 51st Coast Artillery, Fort Monroe. The ducks flew south and in every other direction dur-
A paper transaction gave Major Delbert Ausmus to the ing the scout duck pin tournament which was launched
60th, but he stays on his present duties at Fort Wint. early in May. Competition was keen and close matches
The regimental softball series ended just in time to featuring exceptional individual and team performances
beat the rainy season, Battery F defeating Battery E in a earmarked the entire tournament. Battery E-Captain
tie playoff. Rousseau, commanding, took the lead early in the race
The inter-battery duck pin tournament found Battery and kept toppling over all opposition to finally wi\} the
B on top of the heap. Softball and duck pins ended the top-notch position.
fight for the regimental commander's trophy, won again Hardened by the first rate competition in the inter-
this year by Battery A, with Battery D a strong second. battery duck pin tournament, the 91st led by able, veteran
In the inter-regimental duck pin match the 60th drop- bowlers Sergeants Juntilla and Macadaeg, won the scout
ped a tough one to the 59th, losing 5 points to 4 on the post duck pin championship, 1939, by sweeping five out
final night of play. of eight matches.
In the officers'duck pin league the 60th team got off On July 17th, the inter-battery ten pin tournament be-
to a shaky start with a team largely composed of new gan and at present, at beginning of second half, last
bowlersbut finished with a strong sprint that just missed year's champions, Battery G-Captain Luce, command-
3d place. ing-seems quite determined to hold an already comfort-
The inter-battery ten pin tournament is now under able lead. However, with Batteries C and D flying close
way with inter-battery basketball just around the corner. behind, the top-flight G Battery topplers may see a set
Teams seem more closely matched than usual and compe- back. Batteries E, A, B and Headquarters Battery follow
tition should be hot. in order. -,
During the period May 24-July 24, the 60th Coast The loss of mainstays, due to departure on the July
Artillery concentrated on care and maintenance of ma- transport, was keenly felt by the 91st officers' duck pin
teriel a~d armament which consumes a great deal of team. However, led by able toppler Captain Caluya, the
time during the rainy season. Gunners' instruction and 91st fought to third place in the post-wide officers'duck
officers'schools got under way and are now proceeding pin tournament. The officers' ten pin team faced an un-
480 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se pfember- October
expected reverse through loss of high scoring 1.fajor extra matches. Battery D won the play-off. The Guard
Lohmann--out with an injured knee. Battalion held third place.
On August 1st, the inter-battery basketball league had The 92d lost to the 91st in the inter-regimental dud
a "fire-works debut." The batteries this year have plenty pin tournament, but Corporal Calora, Battery D, 9zd
of fast, capable newcomers and should have no difficulty made the high single game score of 147,
in producing teams which will draw capacit:, crowds at In the officers' duck pin bowling, the 92d officers Won
the two g:'mnasiums. the championship by defeating Staff B in the play-off of a
At present the 91st regimental boxing team, made up first place tie.
mainly from last year's squad, is undergoing a prelimi- The inter-battery ten pin bowlers started July 25th and
nary period of intensive training for the boxing season to as usual Headquarters Battery team started strong, taking
open early in September. every game so far. The inter-battery basketball tourna-
ment has just opened. During the past several years, Bat-
92D COAST ARTILLERY (PS) tery C always won the championship without much com-
By Captain Olaf H. K yster, Jr. petition but it is believed that there will be a different
story this year. Battery A has a promising team which
The past two months have been devoted to gunners has the championship look.
instruction schools for officersand enlisted men, and prepa- The 92d Regiment was pleased to welcome Major and
ration for secondary assignment target practices with cali- Mrs. W. C. Braly and their nephew Bill Braly to Kindley
ber-.30 machine guns. Field. tvfajor Braly has been on dut:, since 1934 as an
The inter-battery softball tournament was completed ROTC Instructor at the University of California. H~
June 22d and Battery C won without losing a single begins his second tour of dut:, at F~rt Mills as executiv~
game. The final standing gave battery C the first place and adjutant of the regiment.
with no defeats. The Guard Battalion tied with Batten' The regiment regrets the departure on the last transport
B for second position .. of two officers and families, Major 1vfcMorrow going on
In the inter-battery bowling tournament, the duck pin duty with Organized Reserves in Minnesota, while Lieu-
series was completed June 28th. Batteries C and D were tenant Cordes went to the 52d Coast Artillery, at Fort
tied for first place so that it was necessary to play three Hancock.
ATHLETICS
WIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII111111I11I111111I11I11I1111I11I1111I11I111I11I1111I11111I111I111I111I111111I11I1111I11I1111I11I1111I1111111I11I11I11I11111111I111111I111I1111I111111I11111I111I111I1111111I11I11I11I11111111I111I11I11I111I11I11I11I1
DOCTOR H. A. DEWEERD,is professor of history at Denison WfAJORTHOMASR. PHILLIPS, Coast Artillery Corps, is 3
University, Granville, Ohio. In the spare time that he prime favorite of JOURNALreaders. This is attested b\'
manages to salvage from that job, he is editor of the the fan mail that his contributions inspire. He is Sta-
lournal of the American Military History Institute. tioned at Fort Leavenwortl~, where he is an imtruCtor
of of of
in the Department of Tactics, the Command and Gen-
eral Staff School. .
MAJOR GENERALHANSON E. ELY, U. S. Army, retired,
of of of
has had a forty-year military career that is known to
every American soldier. As commander of the 3d FLETCHERPRATTis the well.known New York historian
Brigade (2d Division) and later of the 5th Division he and a frequent contributor to The JOURNAL.
demonstrated that he was a fighting leader of fighting of of of
men. For personally organizing and directing the at-
W[AJORGENERALHENRYROWAN-ROBINSON, CB., C.Nf.G ..
tack on Vierzy on July ,8. '9,8, he won the DSC
O.S.O., will be recalled as the author of "Strategy in
For demonstrating "rare qualities of leadership"-the
the Mediterranean" March-April, '939. COAST ARTIL-
words are from the citation-he was later awarded the
LERY JOURNAL. This well known British soldier and
DSM. General Ely lives at Washington.
author has written many magazine articles and a num-
of of of
ber of books that deal with military affairs. His latest
\VARRANT OFFICER HENRY L. JONES (first mate, Army book. Imperial Defence: A Problem in Four Dimen-
wfine Planter Service), is a native of California. His sions, is receiving serious study by those interested in
experience at sea mns back over thirty years and he has the current wartime problems of Great Britain. Gen-
filled every deck post on shipboard ranging from ap- eral Rowan-Robinson has held the posts of chief artillery
prentice to master. During the World War he was instructor :ll1d second-in-command The Roval Militarv
executive officer of several supply ships and troop trans- Academy, Military Governor of Libau, an'd Inspecto~-
ports of the U. S. Navy, relinquishing active duty in General of the Iraq Army. Although now on the re-
'9'9 with the rank of lieutenant commander, U.S.N. tired list of the British Army, it is understood that
R.F. After service as chief officer of the Army trans- General Rowan-Robinson is engaged in the training of
ports Antigone and Presid-:nt Grant (now the Repub- the forces now being formed for the current European
lic) he was appointed a warrant officer, AMPS, in '921. War.
ivfr. Jones is a graduate of the Seamen's Church Insti- of of of
tute of New York and the Nautical School of Califor-
COLONEL EARL W. THOl\ISON, Coast Artillery Corps Re-
nia. At the moment he is stationed at Fort ivfomoe.
serve commands the 9,6th Coast Artillery (AA),
of of of which has its headquarters at Richmond, Virginia. Af.
CAPTAIN ARTHUR B. NICHOLSON,Coast Artillery Corps, ter service during the World War he has been active in
is a native of Michigan. Appointed a second lieuten- Reserve affairs for the past two decades. He has served
ant, Coast Artillery Corps, in 1923, all his subsequent active dury periods at FortS Eustis, H. G. Wright, and
service has been rendered with that arm. He is a gradu- Monroe, and also at the office, Chief of Coast Artillery.
ate of the Coast Artillery School Battery Officers' In the recent Nfanassas maneuvers he served on the
Course, '931, and the Air Corps Tactical School, '9)9. staff of the 260th Coast Artillery, District of Columbia
Captain Nicholson holds the degrees of B.S.E. (CE.) National Guard. In civil life Colonel Thomson is I
and M.S.E., University of Michigan, '932. He is now Professor of Physics at the Vnited States Naval Acad-
on duty with the 52d Coast Artillery. Fort wfomoe. em~', Annapolis, Maryland.
800 lVll S
the steady pounding of artillery from the Spanish hills just
across the narrow Bay? For the hill-studded semicircular
shore just opposite is only 10,000 yards away. A good ten
miles of its length lies within this distance so that hun-
dreds if not thousands of good gun positions command
the Bay, the naval harbor, the town, and the fort itself at
a range of 12,000 yards or less.
It may be possible, of course, to capture this vital area
across the Bay and thus deny it to an enemy, but any
sortie to accomplish this is liable to encounter, against a
stout enemy, difficulties comparable to those of Gallipoli.
It is not a job that can be done out of hand by a couple of
battalions. It would take thousands of troops to get that
ground and hold it against a vigorous opposition. And
there is one other weakness-Gibraltar has no suitable
ground for an airdrome and the nearest Spanish held is
not hve minutes' flight away.
GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. By But the Rock itself, Mr. Garratt thinks, can probably
G. T. Garratt. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., hold out against any attack simply as a fortress. It could
1938. 351 Pages; Maps; $2.50' also "to some extent ... be used as a submarine base,
I
The Rock-the great Rock-the ancient symbol of and could cooperate with the Atlantic fleet to make the
impregnability-is probably impregnable as a fort, but Straits impassable for enemy surface ships. The Spanish
that is all. It can defend itself bur can do little else. This civil population would have to be expelled, and most of
is only one of the many Nlediterranean facts that NIr. the remainder expatriated."
Garratt seems to prove in his excellent book. And it is The Rock should be held for these uses, he believes,
the chief burden of his history, a most readable account and though its continued occupation by Britain is espe-
of Gibraltar and the great sea to its east from the time, cially offensive to a new and military Spain, no considera-
\ many centuries ago, when the Rock was named. In 710 tion can be given now to surrendering it to the nation
A.D. a Persian freedman, T ariq-ibn-Zeid, commander of from whose ground it rises. "Great Britain," he writes,
an army of Berbers, invaded the region of the Rock. Soon "cannot merely look on the future of Gibraltar as a matter
it gained the name, Jebel-Tariq, which is Moorish for of strategy. Even if the key of the Mediterranean will
Tariq's Mountain, and time has gradually corrupted this hardly turn the lock, we should be at some pains to
named to Gibraltar. choose our successor. There have been, at various times
l Today, as Mr. Garratt says writing as a Britisher, "The in our occupation of the Rock, good and valid arguments
physical grandeur of the Rock, added to vague memories for restoring Gibraltar to Spain, but there are none for
of sieges and battles, makes it seem the concrete emblem surrendering it under duress to be controlled by some
of our power. To millions on the Continent, Gibraltar other non-Spanish power."
is the great and rather arrogant symbol of British Im- Mr. Garratt also suggests, in considering the whole
perialism. " problem of the inland sea, that Britain defend NIalta like
/ It is still a symbol, to be sure, but in reality it is little Gibraltar, defend Cyprus as an"air and naval base, defend
I else than a symbol. Its guns do not by any means fully the Suez Canal area, withdraw all heavy warships from
command the Straits of which it is the guardian. On the the Mediterranean, and operate upon that sea only with
I African shore now stand stout batteries of German-em- light types of ships. During the World War the few
placed coast artillery which have a better sweep of the submarines of the Central Powers that operated in the
fifteen-mile-wide passage than the guns of the fort. The Mediterranean did tremendous damage. A single U-boat
functioning of Gibraltar depends, moreover, too much "sank 500,000 tons of shipping including 2 war vessels,
f upon the thousands of employees who live outside the 5 troop-ships, 125 steamers, and 62 sailing boats." In all,
fOrt at night and enter it by day to go to work. The fort nearly half of the ships lost by the Allies were sunk in the
may be proofed from bombs, and shelters may be made Mediterranean Sea, and by a very few hostile ships. For
ready for these people in the town, but can their morale this reason, if for no other, it will be best for Britain to
endure through air attacks? Or, worse yet, can it stand withdraw her major ships.
486 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
"
;:
Calahan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. To keep the cost within reach of
all, the manufacturer has worked
~
26<) pages; 29 illustrations, charts and designs; glossary; "".s
out a plan whereby the outside of
$yX). the ring is 10k. gold over a sterling 0
stability, speed, sea-kindliness, good behavior and char- Blue Sapphire .. 31.50 13.50 24.50
Topaz 31.50 13.50 24.50 "
acter. But, as he points out: "it is impossible to have all Garnet 31.60 14.00 24.60
"
Ameth"t 32.00 14.50 25.00 ""
desirable characteristics in one boat, and they must exist Gre-en "Tourmaline 34.75 17.00 27.75
Emerald 28.50 13.50 21.50
only in the correct proportions." / B1ood,tone 28.00 11.00 20.50 ~
Onyx 2i.50 10.50 20.00
The motorboat owner will complain that the book is The same design furnished in 'i
devoted almost exclusively to sailboatS; and the novice miniature for ladies.
that the lack of enough diagrams makes some explanations PRICES ON ApPLICATION.
SUPPLIES Wallenstein,
others.
Pappenheim, Nfansfeld, Cordoba, and
CAPTAINR
Ritchie, 1. H.
Kendall. Wm. H.
1ST LIECTENANT
Weber, :\L G. (Aide)
t't1LtlXEL
LIErTE"AXT
~~~~]:-i~'B.
COLO"EL Patterson. C. G.
('OLOXE1..
Walker. E. B.
BRlt";ADIER GEXERAL
IYilson. W. K.
MAJORS
Campbell. A. H.
::\l<bol>. W. R.
Finll'~'. C. R. Kushner. G. L. Crews. L. R.
ploCmc sector Corum. D. R. LIEI'TE"A"T COLOXEI.~ COLOXEL Kohn. J. P.
::IlAJORS Pl'rkin>. R. M. Priee. F. A. MeCullough. S.
COLO"EL Jackson. A. M. M~\d~~~:
~'.~. ''s.~'.
~~~ii~. LIEl'TEXAXT COLOXEL~ Stillman, E. H.
~larsb, c. T. Adams. X.L.
~ackin. R. X. 2n LIE1:TEXAXTS Dalao, E. B. (PS) CAPTAIXS
Atlantic Sector Dptwiler. H. P. Dougan. ~. D. ::II.~JORS Halbl'rt. E. O. lIlilll'r. A. D.
Fort DeLesseps, O. Z. Bottoms, M. Rowe. P.~. Armstrong,:\L G. COIIl'r. C. E. Stennis. W. K.
Boughton. R. W .• Jr. Pl'ndll'ton. H. E. Stubb>, G. H.
1.IEI'TEXAXT C'OLOXEL Seott, "'. 1\'. Bai1e~'. J. R .. Jr. Me~orris, IY. L. ~AJORS
~f'aman. E. C. CAPTAIXS Kelly.J.P ...\. Ruth.rford, D. J. 1ST LIEI'TEX_~NTS
::IIeglea.~. G. CAPTAINS Hafer. J.B. Ball. W.H.
Thompson. :l.I. R.
DpichplI1lllnn. ::II.K. Payick, J. J. Dingeman, R. E. Crawford. G. H.
Krisman.1L J. ::IIeCarthy, W. J. CAPTAIXS Edi80n. D. D.
Bartlett, L. "'. Herstad, J. O. Lawton, IY. S. Smith. J. W. (PS) Glassburn. R. D.
Roth. A. ::IIart.lino, P. (PS)
Elias. P. Ban •• J. C. ::IIartin, D. D. Mellnik. S. M.
Bowman. O. D. Spayer. P. R. Cole, P. W. Peterson. A. C.
Gregor~'. E. ::II. Bl'lardi, R. J. 1ST LIErTEXAXTS
Bailp~'. D. J. Ebp~',F. W. 1ST LIErTExAxTS 2D LIEl'TEXA"T
Hain. R. W. Roy, P.A. Dayi", John H .. Jr.
Ra~'mond. ::II. B. :l.1oor•. R. F.
~iter. F. F. Kauffman, R. K.
Koseiplniak, A. A. Furph~', F. L.
::IIiUer. R. L. Wilkins. G. R.
Lppping. A. J.
Holst. J. J. 2D LIEI'TENAXTS
X~'.,D. B. 2D LIEt'TEXAXT
DuyaU,H.H. S~lenglpr. H. M. (Aide)
Gambpr. J. F. Eyans, B. S., Jr.
Edwards. P. IV. Yarnall, K. L.
IVilgon. A. E. J ano,,"ski. R. A.
IVright, IV. L. Jordan, R. E.
""'eisemann, H.
Simon, L. A.
Gifford, J. R.
OTHER SCHOOLS
~HE OOMMAND AND CAPTAIXS GERMAN GENERAL THB NAVAL WAR THE AIR CORPS
GENEB.AL STAFF Robinson, J. S. STAFF SOROOL OOLLEGE TACTICAL SCHOOL
SCHOOL Cunningham. F. J.
::IIunford, T. 1\'. Student Student Instructors
Staff Dunham, 1\'. H. J.
Wolff. C.lII. CAPTAIX QAPTAIX MAJORS
LIE!:TENANT COLONEL Cassid~', J. F. LowU,J.R. Starr, R. E. Epling, F. G;
B.nit.z, E. 1If. Cary,M.G. Ricker, G. W.
Kane.F.B. ARMY WAR COLLEGE THE ARMY INDUS.
Instructors Spalding, A. C. TRIAL OOLLEGE THE INFANTRY
Smith, P. ::'feC. Instructor SCHOOL
LIEl'TENA"T COLO"ELl'i lIIeLean. Donald St...ff
llI.y.r, G. R. EUerthorpe, D. S. LIEl'TENANT COLO"EL Instructor
Hockl'r, C. E. Tredennick. D. C. Carrington, G. DeL. ::IIAJOR
Ostrom, C. D. Y. Berry, R. W. Students Hastings, F. H. LIEl''l'ENANT COLONEL
Smith, D. H. Turley, R. K, Jr.
llIAJORS Dayis, W. V. LIEl'TEXAX'l' COLONELS' Students
Irvin., W. W. Xelson, P. B. Ruddell. J. C. MASSACHUSBTTS
P~illip8, T. R. Chamberlain. E. IV. Foote, W. C. ;lIAJOR INSTITUTE OF
Wllson,J. H Tarrant, L. K. Townsend, J. R. TECHNOLOGY
llIi1burn. B. L. ~AJORS
1ST LIEUTENAXT Bnltman, H. F. K CAPTAIN Stndents
Stndents Perry, W.A. Handwerk. ::.r. C. Denson. L. A., Jr~
IVarren, W. H. 1ST LIErTExANTS
Rutlf'dge. P. W. Jefferson, L. IY. Mitchell, E. C.
H.. keth. William Russell, S. C.
Jpffords. W. Q .. Jr. CAPTAIXS
Patrie.k. G. A •. Badger. G.1II.
Flory, L.D.
Burnell, X. A .. 2d
Lemnitzer. L. L.
Barbe ...., Edward
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-October
NATIONAL GUARD
OFFICE CHIEF OF Captain W. H. Pap<>nfoth,:.lajor J. L. Craig. ::\Iajor H. H. Blackwell, :Major H. S.• Johnson Major A. L. Bullard.
NATIONAL GUARD 197th (AA 1. Concord, 244th (TDl. XewYork. 246th (HD). Roonoke, 263d (HD). Colum. 20Bth (AA). LittlE'
BUREAU Xew Hampshire- Xpw York Yirginia bia, S. C. Rock. Ark.
::\Iajor J. G. DevinE'. Lt. CoI. F .. .\. Hau,,'. I.t. CoI. S. F. Han'kins, Colonel E. P. :\'oyes. :Major G. R. Owens.
Washington, D. C. 211th (..1...1.), Boston, 212th (AA). XE'wYork, 246th (HD). Lynch. 214th (A.-\), States. 206th (AA), Heleno,
::IIass. XE'WYork burg. Va. boro. Ga. Ark.
1.1. CoI. J. P. Hogan LL CoI. B. Vogel. CoI. L. L. Pendleton. 1.1. CoI. C. J. Herzer. Lt. Coi. F. L. Hoskin". )lajor P. F. Biehl.
::\lajor A. V. Winton 241st (HD), Boston, 245th (HD). Brook. 213th (AA). Allen. 265th (HD). Jackson. 250th (TD), San Fro.
::\fass. lyn, X. Y. ton'n. Pa. ville. Fla. cisco. Calif.
COAST ARTILLERY )fajor R. E. De::\1erritt, )lajor A. h Parmelee. Lt, CoI. Reinold ::I1elberg, Captain F. C. :McConnell, ::IIajor Kenneth Rowntr ..
NATIONAL GUARD 241.t (HD),Fall River, 245th (HD). Brook. 213th (AA), Allen. 202d (AA). Chicago. 249th (HD), Salem.
REGIMENTS :.lass. lyn, X. Y. ton'n, Pa. Illinois Oregon
Lt. Col. R. E. Phillips. Captain S~'lvan Berliner, Lt. Col. E. Villaret. :Major A. A. Allen, ('aptain F. F. Scheimer.
Instructors 242d (HD), Bridge- 19t\th (AA), Wilming. 260th (..1...1.), Wash. 203d (AA), Carthage, 248th (HD), Ol)'mpia
port, Conn. ton, Del. ington. D. C. ::IIissouri \Vash. '
::IIajor H. \Y. Lins, )fajor R. T. George, Lt. Col. H. W. Stark, Lt. Col. J. deB. Walbach, Lt. Coi. Kenneth ~IcCatt)'. Lt. Co1. W. E. Duvall.
240th (HD), Port. 243d(HD),Providence 261st (HD), Wilming. 252d (TD), Wilming. 203d (..1..\). Carthage, 251st (..1...1.). San
land. )faine Rhode Island ton. Del. ton, X. C. ::IIissouri Diego. Calif.
::\Iajor V. W. Hall, ::IIajor E. Young,
240th (AA), Rock. 243d (HD). Providence
land. i\Iaiue Rhodehland
ORGANIZED RESERVES
lst CORl'S AREA 2d CORl'S AREA 3d CORPS AREA 4th CORPS AREA 5th CORPS AREA 6th CORPS AREA
Major L. E. Schoonmaker, Colonel A. Gilmor Colonel R. B. Cocroft Colonel Clifford Jones. ::\Iajor W. R. ::\faris, Lt. Col. R. T. Gibson,
Boston, Mass. Colonel C. W. Baird Lt. Col. F. E. Emen', Jr., Knoxville, Tenn. Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Illinois
Colonel L. P. HorsfaU, Lt. Col. W. C. Washington Fort )lonroe. Ya. Lt. Co1. C. R. Jones. Lt. Coi. ~L ::\1. Kimmel, Colonel J. S. Dusenbury.
Hartford, Conn. Lt. Col. F. M. Green Colonel A. G. Frick, Atlanta, Ga. Cindnnati. Ohio Lansing, Mich.
Lt. Col. F. C. Schofield, Major O. B. Bucher, Philadelphia. Pa. Lt. Co1. E. H. Freeland, ::\fajor X. Boudreau. Colonel C. D. Ppirce,
Providence, R. 1. Xew York, K. Y. ::IIajor F. L. Christian, Jacksonville. Fla. Indianapolis, Ind. lI1i1waukee, Wis.
Colonel C. B. Meyer, Colonel H. LeR. "-fuller, '\'ashington, D. C. )fajor G. A. Gillette, Col. G. W. Easterda~'.
Portland, Me. \Vilmington, Del. Colonel T. ::\f. Chase. Jackson. )IiSR. Detroit. )lich.
Lt. Co1. ,V. ~'L Cravens, Richmond. Ya. Captain A. P. Sulliyan,
Schenectad~', X. Y. Major C. D. Hindle. Columl)ia, S. C\
:Major A. L. LaYery, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Buffalo. X. Y.
..
sacra.meuto High School, S&cramento, Oalif. Capt. J. H. Pitzer Capt. A. ?II. \\'ilson, Jr.
Lt. Col C. S. Done~'
f' ILK Arm~' Rec;uiting Office. San Francisco, Calif. ASSIGNED TO DUTY WITH AIR CORPS
o onel Lewis Turtle 1't Lt. E. "'. ?lIoore, Randolph Field, Texas.
f' I L S. Arm)' Rec~uiting Office. Reattle, Wash. 2nd Lt. S. C. Farris, Parks Air College, E. St. Louis, III.
o on~1 f,. B. :lfagruder, 2nd Lt. T. W. Davis, 3d, Parks Air College, E. St. Lonis, III.
f'] (. K Army Recruiting Office. Xew York, N. Y. 2nd Lt. Wm. J. Fling, Parks Air College, E. St. Louis, III.
o on~I K. B~ Lemmon, 2nd Lt. D. R. Boss, Spartan School of Aeronautics, Tulsa, Okla.
I teLl' S. Army Recruiting Office, Omaha, Xebraska 2nd 1.1. A. J. Kinney, Spartan School of Apronantics, Tulsa, Okla.
-. 0•• Octaye DeCarre, 2nd Lt. F. H. Foerster. Jr .. Spartan Sehool of Aeronantics, TulSll. Okla.
It Cl. S. Army Recruiting Office, De" ?lIoines, Iowa 2nd Lt. A. L. Eyans, Jr., Spartan School of Aeronautics. Tulsa, Okla.
-. o!. F. Kemble, 2nd Lt. S. F. Hudgins, Spartan School of Aeronautics, Tulsa, Okla.
It ('ll' K Arm)' Reeruiting Office. Harrisburg, Pa. 2nd Lt. J. T. \Valker, Spartan Sehool of Aeronautics. Tulsa, Okla.
-. "0. Carl J. Smith. 2nd Lt. D. K. :'<Ickerson. Spartan School of Aeronantics, Tulsa, Okla.
II . l'. K Army Recruiting Office. Xpw York. X. Y. 2nd Lt. J. L. ?lIcBride, Ryan School of Aeronautics, Ltd., San Diego. Cal .
. aJor E. L. Barr 2nd Lt. D. K. \Vhite. Ryan Sehool of Aeronauties, Ltd .. San Diego. Cal.
. Fort Slocum, N. Y. 2nd Lt. \Vm. D. Chadwiek, Jr .. Alabama Institute of Aeronantics.
~laJor A. W. Waldron Tuscaloosa. Ala.
II . Fort Slocum, X.
aJor H. H. Slicer
t. 2nd Lt. C. Lentz. 2nd, Alabama Institute of Aeronautics, Tuscsloosa, Ala.
2nd Lt. P. D. "Wynne, Jr .. Alabama Institute of Aeronantics.
Fort Slocum, "S. Y. Tu~ealoo~a. Ala.
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Se ptember- OClob
~lld LL 1... "-. H~ndri("k:o'. Dallas .-\,-i8tioll SC'hool and .\ir Collegt... l~t Lt. A. P. Tabeor. _\berd~n ProvinE' Ground. )old.
l>811a~. Texa:s 2<1 Lt. C. L. Rt>~i:'otE"r .• \bt'rdt't:""ll Pro\-lll~ Ground • .:\ld.
2nd Lt. T. P. "9right. Dallas Aviation Sr-hool and .\ir ColleE't'. Dalla:", Tex.
2nd Lt. J. T. Killg:-.ley, Jr .. Dallas A\"iation School and Air Collegt'. DETAILED FINANCE DEPARTlIlENT
na1!a~. Te.x8~ )tajor C. S. De-nn)-, Fort Jay. X. Y.
2nd I.l. R. E. Grt't'r. Grand C.nlral Flying 5<hool. Glendal •• Calif.
2nd Lt. X. J. ~1("Gow8n. ChiC'81:'O~("hool of .-\l"rollauti("~. Glen\-iew, IlL DETAILED J. A. G. D.
2nd 1..1. P. H. Lehr, Chic8,1:'OSchool of Aerollautics. Glenview. Ill. Captain J. "Y.
Huyssoon,
GffiT2't'town (;nivt"Tsity Law School, \\-a~hington. D. C.
2nd Lt. C. J. LOll~. 3rd. Chi(,,8g'O School of .:\t'ron8uti('~. Glen v h."w. Ill.
2nd l..t. .J. G. Pickard. Chiesgo S('hool of AerOIl8uti('s. Glenview, Ill .. 1<1I.t. C.• 1. Hau<k .• Jr.
2nd Lt. "'m. T. Smith. Chic8irO S<."hoolof Aeronautic!'. Glenyiew, Ill. Gt"Orgetown L"uh'ersity Law School, "-s:-.hin21on, D. C.
2nd Lt. J. D. Garcia. Lincoln Airplane aud Flyill£ S('hool. Lincoln. Xebr. hI Lt. C. R. Bard.
2nd I.l. R. B. ~Iiller. Park., Air Coll.ge. E. 51. Loui,. Ill. Cnivt>T:"ity of Yir~ini8. Charlotte~\'iIl(>. Ya.
2nd Lt. E. O. ~1t'81s.Park~ .Air Colle!:€',E. St. Louis, Ill. 1st 1.1. F. P. Corbin, Jr.,
2nd Lt. C. J. Hackett, Parkl'!- .\ir Collf"ge, E. St. LOlli&, Ill. Columbia Cui,"., Xew York. X. Y.
.1111",111".1',1111111,1'111"",1"11,,,1,1"1.,1,,1"1"'1"""1""'1"""""""1""1"1"""'1'1'IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII'II'I'IIIII'UI."I'IIIIII'II'IIIII'I1'11111'1'11'11111111111"'1""'1""""""1"111111111111'111'11111111111111111"11
L U r. a
I u 0 u
II Wid
or In A rms au B0 An impassioned, informed and
timel)' plea that America may be
H
U
II U 0 read)' and disciplined; that not U
I
I
U
lJ B0 again shall we wage war like Ha
}. By a ~ "fighting fools." lJ
I- (CO_'",h",Of~:~~:'::~::il:;~fW",CO""') II FIGHTING I
1 ° This latest book from the pen of UU Btl
D
n
1
I.
I.
Major
telligent
Dupuy is the only aid to an in-
and professional understand-
tl
tl
E FOOLS
t; ing of the war in Europe, 0
C 0 BY
1;
1, B The 41 simple and attractive maps 0 JANIES E. EDNIONDS
f (drawn by expert artists) will help t1
& you to get the technical picture of any B Brigadier Gener:tI. National
f1 potential battlefield quickly and accu- tl Guard of ,he United Stale.r
r.r. rately. B~
br. .
The book contalOs not on y t e maps
I h ~
II
Reviewing Fighting Fools)
The COAST ARTILLERY JOUR-
rD of every civilized and semi-civilized
0
0
NAL says: "A book well
r. nation of the world, but also the de- 0
C ~ worth reading by all who are
1.
[. tailed strengths of the various powers. ~1I
[.
not wishful thinkers. It is
r; Especially helpful and timely are written by a man who knows
f the analyses of the various air forces B his subject and how to weave
1, and their time-distances from critical 0 the military policy of our
f points. ~ country and the country's
general political policy into
rb To get the correct military slant on Bt1 a complete fabric. And then
r what's happening in the world, read I:1
picturing the world he shows
f H
II
how rightfully we are en-
titled to the name Fighting
f WORLD IN ARMS Fools."
1
~r; Hom/>ome/y bmmd I" B",kw" I
ti E
BsI:1
CONTENTS:
GENERAL Drill for Vehicles in Single Column or Line
THE SOLDIER WITl-IOUT ARMS Drill for Vehicles in Mass Formation
General Company Drill
Positions FORMATIONS OF THE BATTALION AND
Steps and Marching REGIMENT
THE SOLDIER WITH ARMS General
General The Battalion
Manual of Arms for the Rifle The Regiment
Loadings and Firings CEREMONIES
Carrying the Automatic Rifle Reviews and Presentations of Decorations
Manual of the Pistol Escorts
Manual of the Guidon Parades
Manual of the Color Standard Inspections
Manual of the Saber Funerals
DRILL FOR FOOT TROOPS EXTENDED ORDERS
The Squad General
The Platoon Rifle Squad
The Company Rifle Platoon
DRILL FOR UNITS \,\'ITH ANIMAL DRAWN Company
Weapons, Squads, Sections and Platoons
CARTS OR PACK ANIMALS
DRILL FOR UNITS WITH MOTOR CARRIERS SIGNALS
General General .
The Squad and Section Whistle Signals.
The Platoon General Arm.and.Hand Signals
The Company Additional Arm.and.Hand Signals for Weapons Un
Arm-and.Hand Signals for Motor Vehicles
DRILL FOR MOTOR AND WAGON UNITS
General APPENDIX
The Single Vehicle Ceremonial Parades