'M-iooii

DESTRUCTION
•F THE
GERMAN ARMIES
IN
WESTERN EUROPE
JUNE 6th 1 9 4 4 - MAY 3™ I94S

HEAD qUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GRDUP
OFFICE OF WE ASS/SrANT CN/EF OF STAFF, 6-2
APO B5S

SEP 251945- t* V?MJZ£s

\

I
\
 HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 655

DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

6 JUNE 19L.ii. - 9 MAY 1945

C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER PAGE

I INVASION: THE BATTLE OF

NORMANDY, 1
II ST. LO: THE BREAKTHROUGH
IN NORMANDY .... 6
III ENCIRCLEMENT AT ARGENTAN 8
17 BATTLE OF NORTHERN FRANCE .. 10
V THE FALL CAMPAIGN.. 12
VI THE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE 16
VII THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE ... 19
VIII OFFENSIVE TO THE RHINE:
9 FEBRUARY - 7 MARCH 1945 23
IX THE CROSSING OF THE RHINE 25
X THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR. 26-
XI DIVISIONS ENCOUNTERED ON THE
WESTERN FRONT FROM 6 JUNE 1944
TO 9 MAY 1945 28

EDWIN L. SIBERT,
Brigadier General, GSC,
A# C# of S#f G~2#
 NOTE

The following report is not intended to

represent a complete study on the campaign re­
sulting in the "Destruction of the German Ar­
mies in Western EUBOPE." However, it does re­
present the last report prepared by the Intel­
ligence Branch* G-2 Section* 12th Army Group,
on Enemy Operations, In it an attempt is made
to trace the broad outline of events leading
to the ultimate unconditional surrender of
GERMA.NY. Time alone can provide the material
with which a complete history of the campaign
in the West can be written, for it will be
months before all of the necessary documents
of the German Army, so essential for a full
comprehension of the reasons motivating enemy
action* are available for a complete study of
the defeat of the German Wehrmacht*
 CHAPTER I

INVASION: THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY

On 6 June 1944 the Allies landed fn NORMANDY and the

invasion of EUROPE had commenced. The Germans were manning
PRANCE at that time with 58 divisions. NORMANDY was being
held by five divisions and one brigade, and the area of
Northwestern FRANCE into which the attacking Allies were
driving—that area bounded on the east by the SEINE River
and the south by the LOIRE River—had 17 enemy divisions
including three Panzer-type composing the SEVENTH German
Army under the command of Generaloberst DOLLMAN. Of the
58 enemy divisions in Western ECJROPE at that time, ten were
Panzer or Panzer Grenadier, 17 were field divisions, 24
were limited-employment divisions, and 7 were field train­
ing divisions. This was the force available to the enemy
in the West to man the ATLANTIC WALL and throw any invasion
back into the sea.
Allied air interdiction had already practically iso­
lated the battle area from the rest of FRANCE. The bridges
across the LOIRE and SEINE had been under constant air at­
tack, and many had already been destroyed prior to D-Day,
thus hampering enemy movement. Of the nine railway bridges
across the SEINE between PARIS and the sea, eight had been
destroyed; and of the ten highway bridges which had been at­
tacked, five had been destroyed and one seriously damaged.
Thus, any reinforcement of the SEVENTH German Army from south
of the LOIRE or from the FIFTEENTH Army along the PAS DE
CALAIS was seriously hampered.
The blow was struok* Complete tactical surprise was
gained. RUNDSTEDT's G-2 was in BERLIN at the time, and even
after the initial landing had been made there was some ques­
tion in the minds of the enemy as to whether the invasion
had really commenced or whether it was simply a diversionary
effort. This question in the mind of the German High Com­
mand may have resulted in some hesitancy in ordering re­
serves brought from other parts of FRANCE. There was also
f$ar that another major landing might be made on the PAS DE
CALAIS, and the enemy failed to move any si&ftble body of
troops from this area until the breakthrough out of NORMANDY
and it was too late* These factors combined with the air
interdiotion of the SEINE and LOIRE bridges may well have
been the three most decisive factors in allowing the Allies
to successfully establish a bridgehead. Only one incident
marred the invasion* By a pure freak of coincidence the
enemy was holding anti-parachute exercises in the NEPTUNE
area at the time of the landing. The 6th Parachute Regi­
ment was in CARENTAN at the time and held out there against
American troops for one week preventing the link-up of our
forces in the ISIGNY-CARENTAN area with those between CAREN­
TAN and MONTEBOURG.
On the initial landing American forces on the right of
the Allied landing smashed into the 352 and 91 Infantry
Divisions, while the British and Canadian forces on the left
ran into 716 Infantry Division quickly followed by the 21
Panzer Division* The enemy had been holding 21 Panzer in
reserve to the southeast of CAEN, and when the landing was
made it was rushed into the battle to hold the city. The
12 SS Panzer Division (HITLER JUGEND) was to the east of

-1-
CAEN in the area around LISUEUX and was immediately rushed
into the battle in an effort to throw the Allies back into
the sea, with the 711 Infantry Division being engaged in
the fighting to the east of the ORNE estuary.
As the American drive continued to the north and CAREN­
TAN was wrested from the enemy on 12 June, elements of two
more enemy divisions came into the fight--243 Infantry Divi­
sion crossing the COTENTIN Peninsula from the COUTANCES -
LESSAY region where it had been at the time of tiie landing,
and 709 Infantry Division coming down from CHERBOURG in an
effort to prevent the capture of MONTEBOURG. During the
first week Panzer Lehr Division moved from the CHARTRES re­
gion to oppose the British forces around CAEN, and 346 In- -
fantry Division was moved over from the PONT L'EVE^UE area
against the British left flank.
By the end of the first week twelve enemy divisions
plus one independent regiment and one motorized brigade were
opposing the Allies. Of these, 352 Infantry Division al­
ready had been badly battered in the early fighting, while
the 91, 243 and 709 Infantry Divisions were attempting
vainly to slow the drive on CHERBOURG being made by VII US
Corps, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (GOETZ VON BERLICH-
INGEN)*was just starting to move into the CARENTAN area to
support 6 Parachute Regiment, having made a quick trip from
the THOUARS area, and the advance elements of 3 Parachute
Division were contacted north of CAUMONT as DOLLMANN started
to move troops from BRITTANY to counter the Allied build-up.
Trains with' anti-aircraft protection observed moving east
from M0RLAIX confirmed the belief that the entire 3 Para­
chute Division was destined for commitment. The 30 SCHNELLE
Brigade was also being engaged on the American front. Six
enemy divisions, three of them Panzer, had arrived in the
line against the British and Canadian forces where the enemy
was striving desperately to prevent a breakthrough into the
good tank country around FAIAISE. Of the divisions against
the British, 716 Infantry Division had been considerably bat­
tered in the initial landing, but was being backed by 21
Panzer and 12 3S Panzer, with Panzer Lehr, 346 Infantry and
711 Infantry completing the enemy order of battle.
At the end of the first week in NORMANDY the FIRST US
Army had taken 7,015 prisoners, and the morale of the enemy
troops was surprisingly low. Naturally the shock of the
invasion and the blow at being taken prisoner affected the
statements of the Germans, but the complete absence of the
LUFTWAFFE, lack of German artillery support as opposed to
the mass of US Artillery, the early appearance of our tanks,
and the early consolidation of our bridgehead and advance
inland had apparently all contributed to a wave of defeatism.
On 14 June the Germans, making a desperate effort to
stop the drive on CHERBOURG, threw in a desperate counter­
attack to recapture the cellars of the badly damaged village
of M0NTEB0URG. The 77 Infantry Division, the second to come
from BRITTANY, arrived from ST. MALO to come into the line
north of CARENTAN to attempt to keep our troops from cutting
the COTENTIN Peninsula. It was closely followed by 275
Infantry Division which arrived in the line in the MONTMAR-
UNE area the following day* This division had left ST.
NAZAIRE for the invasion area on D-Day but took nine days
to get to the front* It was detrained at FOLIGNY where it
lost all of its ammunition and supplies as a result of
Allied air bombing, and was then marched to the front, ar­
riving in a state of exhaustion. The enemy's build-up

-2-
showed signs of frantic haste as bits and pieces of divi­
sions were committed to the line as they arrived in the
area. The pressure was such that apparently the enemy was
unable to build up any reserve with which to mount a counter­
attack.

VII US Corps continued its drive to cut the Peninsula

and isolate CHERBOURG and by the 16th had reached ST.
SAUYER LE VICOMTE. By 2300 on the 17th the 9 US Infantry
Division had out through the 84 German Corps and the
CHERBOURG Peninsula by pushing to the coast at P0RTBA.IL,
and the stage was set for the drive on the port. Elements
of 353 Infantry Division arrived on the front and took over
the remnants of 352 Infantry Division which by this time
had been so badly out up that it was unable to operate any
longer as a division. Isolated in the area around CHER­
BOURG were approximately 30>000 enemy troops including
elements of the 77 and 91 Infantry Divisions which had been
split when our foroes cut the Peninsula, and the remnants
of the 243 and 709 Infantry Divisions. In addition to
these divisional elements there were another 4,000 troops
in CHERBOURG itself composed largely of naval personnel.

Thus, two weeks after D-Day the CHERBOURG Peninsula

had been cut, and the enemy had committed 19 divisions and
one brigade plus numerous miscellaneous units to battle.
Of these divisions, 12 were now committed against FIRST
US Army, and the enemy strength against SECOND British
Axmy had increased to 7 divisions, as elements of 1 SS
Panzer Division (Leibstandarte ADOLF HITLER) started to
arrive in the line after being transported from the GHENT
region.

The third week mas one of slow compression of the

enemy forces into CHERBOURG. By the end of the week
FIRST US Army had taken 17*899 prisoners and buried
3» 595 enemy dead. By the 26th the city and port had been
captured, and General Yon SCHLIEBEN and Admiral HENNECKE
captured. Von SCHLIEBEN revealed that he had ordered the
city defended to the last by the isolated groups of enemy
troops, even though the group which he was with gave up
after offering slight opposition. No new enemy divi­
sions were committed into action during the third week
although intelligence reports indicated that 9 SS Panzer
Division (HOHENSTAUFEN) was on the move towards the area
and already had elements west of PARIS, and that 10 SS
Panzer Division (FRUNDSBERG) was also on its way. Both
of these divisions had been rushed to the Russian Front
at the time of the Soviet breakthrough around LVOV. From
southern FRANCE came reports that 27© and 277 Infantry
Divisions were moving north, and 2 SS Panzer Division
(DAS REICH) was apparently attempting to make its way
north from the region of TOULOUSE but was being contin­
ually harassed and detained by the activities of the French
MAQUIS. 276 Infantry Division, before it was conmltted,
was forced to march 100 miles from LE MANS to the front,
all movement by rail or road being completely blocked by
the Allied Air Forces.

Six new enemy divisions arrived against the Allied

bridgehead during the fourth week of operations, three of
these being SS Panzer divisions. By 3 July a total of 25

-3-
divisions and one brigade had been committed by the enemy
against the NORMANDY bridgehead—a total which was nearly
half the number of enemy divisions in FRANCE and the LOW
COUNTRIES on D-Day, On 28 June, 2 SS (DAS REICH) Panzer
Division was committed against the British, and the fol­
lowing day in conjunction with 9 SS Panzer Division launched
the first serious enemy counter-attack since the landing.
This was followed the next day by more enemy efforts to
drive the British forces back, but the Germans lost 42 tanks
in the attempt. Elements of 10 SS Panzer Division were com­
mitted against the British forces on 3 July as the enemy
threw in an equivalent of nearly 8 Panzer divisions in an
effort to hold and compress the bridgehead. By 1 July all
of the CHERBOURG- Peninsula north of a line CARENTAN-ST.
SAUVER LE VICOMTE had been cleared of the enemy with the
oapture of the last Germans holding out in the CAP DE LA
HAGUE region. FIRST US Army had taken 44,917 prisoners and
buried 4,487 enemy dead by the end of the first month in
NORMANDY.
The following week saw Von KLUGE replace Von RUNDSTEDT
as the C-in-C WEST, and SS Obergruppenfuehrer PAUL HAUSSER
replaced the late Generaloberst DOLLMANN as the Commanding
General of the SEVENTH German Army, General DOLLMANN had been
killed in Allied air attacks. Two new divisions arrived in
the line in NORMANDY, 277 Infantry Division after a long and
tedious journey from southern FRANCE having had to follow a
circuitous route due to Allied air interdiction, and 5 Para­
chute Division moving eastwards from BRITTANY. American pres­
sure southwards on the COTENTIN Peninsula commenced and LE
HAYE DU PUITS was captured on 8 July, Enemy reaction was
prompt to the threat of the American forces to drive down out
of NORMANDY and 2 SS Panzer Division crossed the Peninsula to
the threatened area. At the end of the week, on 10 July,
Panzer Lehr Division also left its position on the front of
the SECOND British Army and crossed the front calling atten­
tion to its progress by no attempt at radio silence. Lehr
attempted to throw in its weight in the CAREKTAN area where
in conjunction with 17 SS Panzer Division it launched strong
but futile counter-attacks. In the fighting around CAEN
British forces encountered stiff resistance from 12 SS Panzer
Division, but by 9 July had thrown the HITLER JUGEND back and
captured the major portion of CAEN including the bridge across
the ORNE River intact, British patrols captured the first of
the enemy swimming saboteurs encountered in the Western cam­
paign as a German naval officer was taken prisoner while try­
ing to destroy the ORNE bridge, ROMMEL tried to buck up the
troops, according to prisoners* statements, by telling them
that great masses of troops and tanks were on their way to
NORMANDY and that the Allies would be thrown back into the
sea in 60 days.
With Allied preparations directed mainly towards building
up tanks and supplies on the beachhead for the big breakthrough,
progress was slow during the next two weeks, ST. L0 was
wrested from the enemy by 29 US Infantry Division after a
tenacious fight against 3 Parachute Division and the revamped
352 Infantry Division. The British drive southeastwards from
CAEN ran into stiff enemy resistance along the CAEN-LISIEUX
road. Two more ns* infantry, divisiona:arrived on the front
i* the foim of 271 and^f*%hjch had come fro® the
Western MEDITERRANEAN^ ' divisions moved into the
front between CAJN and CAUKONT where the Germans were desper­
ately trying to prevent a breakthrough, and were endeavoring

-4-
to extricate Panzer divisions from the line to be held in
tactical reserve. Enemy strength in the West had by this
time increased to 65 divisions, compared with $8 on D-Day.
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 CHAPTER II

ST. LP: THE BREAKTHROUGH IN NORMANDY

On 24 July all preparations were complete for the as­

sault in an attempt to break out of NORMANDY, Flights of
heavy bombers smashed at the enemy positions in the MARIGNY
area, and the following morning the tanks and infantry drove
into his line. Stiff resistance was encountered as the
enemy tried to hold the PERIERS-ST. LO road. By 27 July
enemy resistance had been broken and COUTANCES was captured*
The enemy's appreciation of the true situation was only grad­
ually dawning. Two more divisions started moving towards
the battle from the area of FIFTEENTH Army in the PAS DE
CALAIS. The 326 Infantry Division had moved into the line
in the CAUMONT area thus allowing 3 Parachute Division to
take over a smaller sector in attempting to hold our break­
through attacks in the ST. LO region. The enemy continued
to cling stubbornly to the salient that extended east from
LE HAYE DU PUITS to the VIRE, but the breakthrough was ac­
complished.
The Germans had delayed too long in bringing their
reinforcements to NORMANDY, BRITTANY had already been de­
nuded of troops. When the American armored columns struck
southwards out of NORMANDY towards RENNES there was no de­
fense in depth. The withdrawal from NORMANDY became too
hasty to permit any withdrawal to an organized line. The
high ground north of COUTANCES—an obvious defense posit ion-
was quickly compromised, and American armor was across the
SIENNE River south of COUTANCES before the enemy could react.
Good defensive positions along the SEE River south of AVRANCHES
and the SELONE at the foot of the COTENTIN Peninsula were lost
to the Germans in a similar fashion. With almost all of their
armor concentrated on the eastern end of the line against the
British and Canadian forces around CAEN, the enemy had lost all
opportunity to hold the Allies in NORMANDY and the front was
fluid. Another Panzer division arrived on the front as 116
Panzer (formerly 179 Panzer Training Division) was rushed in­
to the battle from the MANTES-GA3SIC0URT region, and the 84
Infantry Division was sent to the battle across the SEINE from
the FIFTEENTH Army. Thirty-two divisions now opposed the
Allies.
There was little opposition in the center of the BRIT­
TANY Peninsula as American armor swept westwards unchecked.
Sporadic opposition developed around RENNES but was quickly
overcome, and the Germans were forced to fall back into the
coastal fortress positions of BREST, ST. MALO, LORIENT and
ST. NAZAIRE. By 7 August the Germans had regained control
over their units sufficiently to mass a counter-attack with
five Panzer divisions in an effort to break through to AY-
RANCHES and cut the forces to the south off from their
source of supplies in the NORMANDY Peninsula. The attack was
launched by 116 Panzer, 2 Panzer, 1 SS Panzer, 2 SS Panzer
and 17 SS Panzer Divisions and succeeded in retaking MORTAIN,
but VII US Corps contained the attack and the German efforts
had been stopped* Allied air forces went to work on the
enemy Panzers in the MORTAIN area and the Germans suffered
terrific losses in men and equipment. By this time some
eight enemy divisions had been destroyed in the two months
since the Allies had landed on the Continent—77» 91, 243»
275» 352 and 353 Ififantry Divisions, 16 GAF Division and 5
Parachute Division* The 165 Training Division had been
-6-
sending a steady flow of reinforcements to the front and
was no longer considered capable of fighting as a unit.
With the battle raging at MORTAIN, the FIFTEENTH Army in
the PAS DE CALAIS had been summoned to send more reinforce­
ments for a "now-or-never fight" and 85, 89 and 331 In­
fantry Divisions and 6 Parachute Division made their way
into the battle area under great difficulties as the air
force constantly harassed all of their movements by day.
Two more divisions moved up from southern FRANCE as 708 In­
fantry Division left the NANTES area to try to stop the
American drive at MAYENNE, and 9 Panzer Division,having ar­
rived north from NIMES> was encountered at LE MANS.

-7-
 W. of Greenwich Greenwich

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GERMAN DISPOSITIONS PRIOR

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 CHAPTER III

ENCIRCLEMENT AT ARGENTAN

But even the frantic arrival of fresh blood on the

battle scene couldn't slow the Allied drive or prevent
the encirclement. American forces drove north to ARGEN­
TAN, and after a bloody battle, British forces finally
took FALalSE and drove south to complete the encirclement
on 19 August of the enemy forces estimated at nine in­
fantry and six Panzer divisions. The balance of the enemy
forces fled eastwards towards the SEINE in confusion, and
for several days there appeared a strong possibility that
a second envelopment movement by American armor driving
north along the west bank of the SEINE might trap another
substantial enemy force. Meanwhile, the American armor
continued to drive eastwards towards PARIS liberating DREUX,
CHARTRES and CHATEAT3NEUF. No appreciable resistance op­
posed our patrols probing towards PARIS.
The German Armies in the West faced a decisive defeat.
Only seven divisions remained in the FIFTEENTH Army which
had been pinned to the PAS DE CALAIS by the threat of another
Allied landing. Four were crossing the SEINE to the west,
48, 49 and 344 Infantry, and 17 Luftwaffe, to come to the
aid of the forces at MOiiTAIN. The Allies completed the en­
circlement at FALAISE-ARGENTAN and made the presence of these,
divisions more a burden on the Germans escaping across the
SEINE to the east. Trapped in the debacle at FALAISE were
the bulk of 84, 271, 276, 277, 326, and 363 Infantry Divi­
sions, and 1 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 2, 9 and 21 Panzer Divisions,
with elements of 2 SS, 12 SS, 116 Panzer and 89 and 331 In­
fantry Divisions also cut off in the pocket. Far to the
west, isolated from the battle and forming the first of the
fortress pockets, so characteristic of the German policy of
holding on to critical features to the very end to deprive
the Allies of their use, were the 2 Parachute, 343 and 366
Infantry Divisions in BREST, an! 265 Infantry Division and
a large assortment of Naval troops in ST. NAZAIRE and LORIENT.
To the south 16 Infantry Division (upgraded from 158 Training
Division) was trying to come in against the flank of the
THIRD US Army but was being engaged and held at the LOIRE
in the ORLEANS sector.
By 22 August the last of the enemy resistance in the
FALAISE-ARGENTAN pocket had ceased. The enemy had lost
60,000 to 70,000 in killed and captured, and enormous
amounts of equipment—guns, tanks, motor vehicles—had
been destroyed or captured. The balance of the enemy forces
was retreating in disorder across the SEINE. However, Von
KLUGE had been successful in withdrawing a considerable por­
tion of his armor before the FALAISE gap had been closed,
while the less mobile infantry had been sacrificed in holding
|the escape route open. All that week of August 20-26 the
enemy had been withdrawing lorces across the SEINE to the east
utilizing every available ferry and pontoon despite almost
continuous Allied air assault. At ^LbEUF elements of 344
Infantry, 6 Parachute and 17 Luftwaffe Divisions tried to
hold, but at MANTES-GA3SIC0URT the 79 US Infantry Division
was across the SEINE and enlarging their bridgehead despite
frantic efforts of 49 Infantry and 18 GAF Divisions to con­
tain it.
In PARIS only token resistance was offered to the ap­
proaches of the Allies from the west, spearheaded by the 2nd

-8-
French Armored Division and 4 US Infantry Division* A
week of fighting the French resistance forces in the capi-
tol had weakened the enemy*s determination to resist* After
a token show of resistance on the outskirts of the city
and in the PALAIS DE JUSTICE, elements of the 6 Parachute
and 48 Infantry Divisions, plus a considerable portion of
garrison troops, laid down their arms. PARIS was liberated
on 25 August, and the city went wild after four and one-
half years of German occupation.
To the south of PARIS the Germans fought stiffly to
prevent the THIRD US Army from crossing the SEINE, vigor­
ously defending communications centers such as MONTARGIS,
MELTJN and FONTAINEBLEAU, But all were taken by 25 August
and General PATTON's forces swept on towards GERMANY. Mean­
while on the southern flank Operation ANVIL had struck on
15 August and the American and French forces under General
PATCH were driving rapidly northwards along the RHONE Valley,
French MAQUIS forces were harassing the enemy throughout
Central FRANCE, and the Germans started to try to extricate
their forces in southwestern FRANCE through an ever-narrowing
escape corridor. By 26 August the number of enemy divisions
in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES had dropped to 48, as 84>
271» 276, 277, 326 and 363 Infantry Divisions and 3 Parachute
Division were dropped from the enemy order of battle as a
result of the mauling they had received in the FALAISE-
ARGENTAN gap. The SS divisions, too, had been badly hit
and 1 7 S3 GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN Division was moving to­
wards the METZ area to rest and refit.

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 CHAPTER IV

BATTLE OF NORTHERN FRANCS

The race across eastern FRANCE started. Enemy units

fleeing across the SEINE were soon moving along roads par­
allel to those used by the advancing British and American
forces.. 12th US Army.Group troops of the FIRST US Army
crossed the SEINE in other places north of PARIS and swift­
ly drove forward across the SOMME, ^ISNE and MEUSE, driving
the enemy before them towards BELGIUM and the German fron­
tier. On the FIRST Army front the first week of September
saw the Germans driven out of both MAUBETJGE and VALENCIENNES
and into a trap formed by two American columns converging at
MONS, trapping some 30,000 enemy troops from 20 different
divisions, with 6 Parachute, 245 Infantry, 3^8, 276 Infantry
and 10 SS Panzer Divisions yielding particularly large num­
bers of prisoners. The Germans tried to block our advance
across the MEUSE, resisting our cavalry patrols with small-
arms and mortar fire,but failing to prevent crossings at
LIEGE, NAMUR and on the right towards LUXEMBOURG.
To the south the THIRD US Army ran into heavier re­
sistance. Having swept forward south of PARIS, General
PATTON's forces had swiftly taken CHALONS SUR MARNE and
7ERDUN and sent reconnaissance troops into METZ, but there
the shortage of gasoline was felt and the forces had to be
withdrawn again. The enemy taking advantage of our in­
ability to pursue his beaten forces had started to build
up forces along the MOSELLE River with particularly deter­
mined resistance at THIONVILLE. Several attempts to cross
the River in the P0NT-A-M0USS0N area on 6 September were
repelled and enemy artillery laid down heavy fire on our
reconnaissance troops. At T0UL the Germans fell back on
NANCY as the entire southern part of the front of 12th US
Army Group started to solidify. The enemy was able to
rush in replacement units to form a line against our ad­
vances for the first time since the breakthrough out of
NORMANDY. South of the LOIRE the enemy hastened his acua-
fcion of southwestern FRAICCE under constant attacks from
French MAQ.UIS and in front of the drive of the SEVENTH US
Army up from the MEDITERRANEAN Coast. These efforts became
more frantic as it became apparent that not much time was
left to get the NINETEENTH Army through the BELF0RT Gap or
have it wiped out. In the West the seige of the fortress
of BREST went on unabated,with intensive fighting develop­
ing as General RAMCKE ordered the 2 Parachute Division to
fight to the last man in an effort to prevent the port from
being taken in usable condition by the Allies.
By 9 September the last of the 60 German divisions which
were occupying positions in the West on D-Day had been com­
mitted to battle as 719 Infantry Division moved into the
battle area from Western HOLLAND. In addition, three newly-
formed divisions were committed by the enemy in the METZ-
NANCY area, and two mobile divisions badly needed by the
Germans, who had taken such heavy losses in armor during the
battle of FRANCE,arrived from ITaLY as 3 and 1$ Panzer Grena­
dier Divisions were committed to the line to hold open the
BELF0RT Gap.

-10-
 By mid-September the greatest Allied problem in the
Western Campaign was not so much the Germans, as supplies.
The sweep across FRANCE from NORMANDY to GERMANY in five
weeks had far outrun the beaches and limited port facili­
ties of CHERBOURG. LE HAVRE had fallen, but was in bad
condition due to enemy demolitions and block ships. BREST,
originally an important consideration in Allied plans, had
been turned into a fortress by the enemy and Allied air and
artillery were still hammering the obstinate defenders.
British forces had taken ANTWERP but the enemy still con­
trolled both sides of the SCHELDT estuary and until that
was cleared the port would be useless to the Allies.
By 12 September the German frontier was crossed, as
1 US Infantry Division drove over the line south of AACHEN.
Resistance was initially light but stiffened as 49 Infantry
and 9 Panzer Divisions arrived on the scene. The city of
LUXEMBOURG was liberated and almost all of the Duchy was
freed except foi* the eastern fringes. On the northern part
of the FIRST US •rt-rmy front east of MAASTRICHT, enemy resist­
ance stiffened, and for the first time in nearly two months
the enemy held a continuous line along the entire 12th US
Army Group front. On the THIRD US Army front the enemy re­
luctantly yielded ground and continued to improve defensive
positions along the MOSELLil. NANCY was liberated, but enemy
resistance continued in the iORET DE H«YE to the west. By
19 September the enemy forces were disposed generally along
the SIEGFRIED LINE north of TRIER to AACHEN, and south of
TRIER along the MOSELLE River. The 12 Infantry Division had
arrived on the front from ilAST PRUSSIA to be committed in
the defense of AACHEN, while 36 Infantry Division* formed
from remnants, replacements and training units in DENMARK,
was committed in the TRIER area. The enemy at this point
started to throw into the battle improvised armor formations
in the form of Panzer brigades—ad hoc formations hastily
devised to meet the orisis and make up for the shortage of
available Panzer divisions. These units lasted only a short
time and, as they were cut up by Allied advances, were used
to fill in the gaps in the existing Panzer divisions, and
eventually became extinct.

-11-
 CHAPTER V

THE FALL CAMPAIGN

By 19 September the remnants of the German NINETEENTH

Army had arrived in the BEIFCRT Gap and linked up with the
FIRST German Army as a link-up was made between the Allied
forces driving north from the MEDITERRANEAN Coast with those
that had landed in NORMANDY. To the north the Allied air­
borne landing in the NIJMEGEK-ARNHEM area on 17 September
encountered heavy enemy resistance as II SS Panzer Corps,
controlling 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer Divisions, was encountered
by 1 British Airborne Division in ARNHEM, and Corps "FELDT,
with 406 z.b.V. Division, 47 Infantry and 6 Parachute Divi­
sions, was quickly thrown into the battle. All along the
line the enemy continued to pour men into the SIEGFRIED Line
in an effort to man it before the Allies could mount an all-
out effort to crack through the defense of the REICH. The
Germans paid particular attention to strengthening the AACHEN
area where the first large German city *i»s threatened with
capture, and the FIRST US Army appeared on the verge of
breaking through to the COLOGNE Plain and the RHINE. Another
new enemy division, 183 Infantry, which had been previously
reported on the Eastern Front, arrived in the line to bolster
the front north of AACHJiN. Heavy fighting continued in the
south, particularly around KETZ and LUNEVILLE, which the Ger­
mans recaptured after our forces had seized the town on 17
September. The enemy continued to patrol aggressively, even
pushing patrols west of the MOSELLE River. To the west all
resistance ended in BREST on 18 September, and General RAMCKE
and 36,388 other prisoners were taken. South of the LOIRE,
General ELSTER, leader of a force of 19*536 Germans, includ­
ing more than 700 officers who had been trying to make their
way from the BORDEAUX area back to GERMANY, found their way
blocked by the MA.QUIS. After being constantly harassed
from the air and ambushed from all sides, they decided to
yield to the NINTH US Army—-then in position along the LOIRE—
rather than be picked to pieces in a futile attempt to re­
turn to the Fatherland.
Along the SIEGFRIED Line facing 12th Army Group the
enemy massed a formidable array of armor to prevent any
breakthrough to the COLOGNE Plain, In the AACHEN-STOLBERG
area there were massed the remnants of seven Panzer divi­
sions, 1 SS, 2 SS, 12 SS, 2, 9, 116 and Lehr, two Panzer
brigades, 105 and 106, and nine infantry divisions, 12, 19,
36, 49, 183, 275, 347, 348 and 353; one parachute division,
5; and two mobilization divisions, 176 and 526. This indi­
cated the importance which the enemy placed at this time
on preventing any American breakthrough to COLOGNE, the
RHINE and the RUHR.
With furious fighting raging around ARNHEM on the
northern part of .the front, the enemy continued to pour
heavy reinforcements into the NIJMEGEN area with the in­
tention of forcing the Allies back west of the MAAS and
south of the WAAL Rivers. Two new training divisions—180
and 190—were committed to this battle; 361 Volksgrenadier
Division arrived in the area, and 9 Panzer Division left
the 12th Army Group front to move to the northern battle.
The enemy realized full well that the gage had been thrown
and that an Allied breakthrough across the NEDER RIJN at
ARNHEM would mean a sweep across the North German Plain.

-12-
The presence of II SS Panzer Corps at ARNHEM, apparently-
waiting for the air-drop, well indicated the enemy's ap­
preciation of our intentions. To the south the enany con­
tinued to pour infantry into the AACHEN area, obviously to
relieve the elements of the Panzer divisions engaged in
the area.for rest and refitting in GERMANY. The enemy's
attempt to build up a strategic army in reserve commenced
in earnest. In the AACHEN area 246 Infantry Division moved
into the line, having arrived from GERMANY, where it had re­
fitted after last being on the Central Russian Front, to re­
lieve elements of the 3S Panzer divisions which had been
fighting in that region.
During the last week of September activity along the
front of FIRST US Army was light, consisting mainly of ar­
tillery fire and patrolling. Enemy artillery appeared to
be building up north and northeast of AACHEN where the Ger­
mans were particularly sensitive to our patrolling. On the
THIRD US Army front to the south the Germans resisted strong­
ly all of our attempts to advance towards SAARBRUECKEN, and
a captured order revealed that the FIFTH Panzer Army was now
opposing General PATTON's forces. The "Ghost Division" (11
Panzer) which had fought a dogged defensive battle all the
way from the MEDITERRANEAN Coast through the BELFORT Gap,now
left the southern part of the front to move up north and op­
pose the threat to the 3^iAR, and 106 Panzer Brigade moved
down from the LUXEMBOURG area to oppose our salient towards
METZ. The en«my continued to make daily counter-attacks
consisting, mainly of 100-200 infantry and 10 to 20 tanks.

By the end of the first week in October the Germans had

definitely sealed off the ARNHEM penetration, and British
efforts to the north were being devoted primarily to attempt­
ing to extricate the remnants of the 1 British Parachute Divi­
sion from across the NSDER RIJN,where it had been cut to
pieces by the 9 and 10 SS Panzer Divisions. To the south,116
Panzer Division moved up from the AACHEN area to attack the
left flank of the Allied spearhead stretching north from
EINDHOVEN through NIJMEGEN. Another new infantry division
was thrown into the northern battle as 363 Infantry Division,
which had been badly mauled in the battle of FRANCE, arrived
at ARNHEM after having been refitted at WARN, GERMANY. Both
2 Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division had dropped out of
contact, and were to remain missing from the front until the
ARDENNES offensive over two months later. NINTH US Army
moved into the line on the northern part of the 12th Army
Group front and found the only enemy formation of divisional
size opposing it was 2 SS Panzer Division,which still had
some elements committed to the line north of AACHEN. Very
determined resistance still met all attempts to move forward
ia the AACHEN area, and prisoners from 246 Infantry Division
stated that an order had been received from the FUEHRER that
the city was to be defended to the last roan. The fighting
to the south centered around the fortress city of METZ,where an
intensely bitter struggle was being waged for FORT DRIANT,
which was being defended by 0CS School METZ—officer candi­
dates who had worked out all of their tactical problems over
the very terrain on which they were now fighting with great
skill. Elsewhere on the southern part of the front it ap­
peared that the enemy's tank replacements were on a day-to-
day basis when 4 US Armored Division captured an enemy tank
which had only 50 kilometers on its odometer.

-13-
 By 11 October the enemy's appreciation was that the
threat of a British breakthrough into the North German
Plains at ARNHRM had been averted and that the biggest cur­
rent danger was that of the American attack on AACHEN. Con­
sequently, a large amount of the enemy armor in the West
converged from both the northern and southern extremities
of the front on AACHEN to attempt to block FIRST US Ariqy's
penetration of the SIEGFRIED Line north of AACHEN. From
the north 116 Panzer Division moved south to the AACHEN area
and elements of 1 SS and 2 SS Panzer Divisions which had
sent some small battle groups to the ARNHEM battle, came back
down south to the AACHEN area. On the THIRD US Army front the
fighting continued to rage around METZ, but the enemy pulled
17 SS (GOETZ VON BERLICHINGEN) Panzer Grenadier Division out
of that area and left 462 z.b.V. Division and OCS METZ to
hold the town. A new division arrived on the front when 416
Infantry Division moved Into the line* having come from
DENMARK. By this shuffling of forces the enemy was trying
to fill the gap caused by the movement of 3 Panzer Grenadier
Division out of the line to head north* and by the attrition
of his infantry forces which had almost continually been in
the line since early September. Meanwhile, on the extreme
northern part of the front, the enemy's FIFTEENTH Amy in
Western HOLLAND was having difficulty in holding back the
drive towards the WAAL of the British and Canadian Armies
which were trying to get ANTWERP cleared.
Despite the enemy's determination to hold AACHEN* the
city was encircled by 16 October. lVro Panzer-type divisions
were rushed to the area to try to break through to the en­
circled garrison, but despite strong counter-attacks by both
3 Panzer Grenadier and 2 Panzer Divisions, the city fell on
21 October. Prisoners rounded up in the city revealed that
HITLER had ordered the city held at all costs and to the last
nan* but after the American ultimatum to surrender had been
ignored, the terrific air and artillery bombardment laid
down on the city weakened the will of the defenders to con­
tinue resistance. The enemy continued to build up strategic
reserves in rear areas, and continuous work was being done on
the area of the COLOGNE Plain between the ROER and RHINE
Rivers. The Germans were particularly sensitive to all of
our advances through the HUERTGEN FOREST, where bitter fight­
ing raged in the cold dank pine groves. It was becoming more
and more apparent that the Germans were counting heavily on
holding the ROER Dams, which controlled a sufficient volume of
water to flood the ROER River valley and interrupt any Allied
advance in that area. On the southern part of the 12th Army
Group front the enemy continued to resist tenaciously along
the MOSELLE and in METZ, with room-to-room fighting in prog­
ress in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ. The paucity of enemy forces avail­
able for the defense of AISACE-LORRAINE and the SAAR was in­
dicated by the rapid shifting about of forces between the
front of 6th Army Group, which was nassed in front of the
BELFORT Gap, and the THIRD US Army front in the METZ-NANCY area.
Save for the bitter ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN battle and the
hard fighting around METZ and AACHEN, the Western Front had
been mainly static since the American forces swept up to
the SIEGFRIED Line in the first week of September. The best
that the enemy had to offer had been small-scale counter­
attacks primarily in company strength* and only occasionally
in battalion strength. It was on 27 October that the enemy
struck back in some strength for the first time since MORTAIN.
With the FIFTEENTH Army in Northern HOLLAND being pressed
back to the WAAL, the Germans apparently felt the situation
in the north serious enough to launch a counter-attack in
the WEERT-LIESEL area directed at EINDHOVEN. Either the
enemy expected to relieve the pressure on the FIFTEENTH Army
or else anticipated a British attack towards the MAAS
and the RHINE and were making a spoiling effort# The attack
was made by two Panzer divisions, 9 and 15 Panzer Grenadier,
and had initial success due to the fact that 7 US Armored
Division was holding a long front.
*

During the first three weeks in October the enemy had

brought only one new division to the West, but during the
last week of the month three new divisional units arrived.
The enemy by now had succeeded in reorganizing his forces
and the German Armies in the West once again were a formid­
able opponent. After the German SEVENTH Army had been badly
smashed at ARGENTAN-FALAISE, the German FIFTEENTH Army, badly
depleted by trying to assist its western neighbor, was rolled
back north by the advance of the British and Canadian forces
along the PAS DE CAIAI3 and into the LOW COUNTRIES. From the
south the FIRST Army had sent its forces to the north to try
to prevent the break-out of NORMANDY, and when it became ap­
parent that the FIRST Army itself was in danger of being cut
off in southwestern FRANCE, made a dash to get through the
BELFORT Gap in front of the badly damaged NINETEENTH Army,
which had been retreating from the RIVIERA in front of the
drive of the SEVENTH US and FIRST French Armies. Thus, when
the Germans reached the WAAL-MAAS-SIEGFRIED LINE-MOSELLE-
BELFORT Gap line, they had one badly battered Army, the
FIFTEENTH, holding in the north. The SEVENTH, FIRST and
NINETEENTH could hardly pass under the name of Aimies, and
the FIFTH Panzer was in only slightly better shape.
The enemy had blocked our advance through the WEST WALL
and into GERMANY, a feat which was greatly facilitated by
the speed of our previous advance,which had strung our supply
lines to the limit and forced a necessary pause for regroup­
ing and arranging new supply facilities. The Germans had
also been assisted in the delays incumbent upon the opening
of ANTWERP as a supply port, delays brought about by stiff
German resistance in Western HOLLAND, by the clinging to
WALCHEREN ISLAND, and by the stubborn resistance around BRUGES
on the southern bank of the SCHELDT Estuary. The reorgani­
zation of the German Armies during September and October of
1944 was carried out in three distinct phases; First, to
halt the Allied advance and to man the WEST WALL, the enany
hastily formed battle groups from the broken divisions flood­
ing back to GERMANY from the battle of FRANCE, brought numer­
ous fortress battalions into the WEST WALL and rudied up
training divisions from Wehrkreise in Western GERMANY at the
expense of seriously damaging the Army's training system.
The second phase was one of completing training in the line
itself and of reorganizing these miscellaneous battle groups
and some of the fortress battalions into disciplined and con­
trolled divisions. During October established divisions or
newly-formed division staffs absorbed many of these units.
Battle groups and temporary divisions known only by the names
of their commanding officers began to be replaced by recog­
nized numbered divisions* The third phase was the withdrawal
from the line of a large part of the Panzer force for complete
resting and refitting. In disengaging these forces from the
line and still retaining sufficient strength along the front
to contain the Allied advance within reasonable limits, the
enemy was greatly aided by weather which was unfavorable
to Allied advance, and by Allied supply difficulties.
-15-
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Prepared by the Engr. Sect 12 th A. Gp from G.S.G S thomorphic

Miles 90 100 Miles
2758 t-1.000,000 Air Maps - Revised from G. S G S.
443Q / 600.000 Commun. Maps 4 T.IS. Report Mar. 1944 00000
Kilometers 20 10 160 Kilometers
?d by Engr. Reproduction Pet. tB^A Gp. U
 CHAPTER VI

THE NOVMBER OFFENSIVE

Early in November prisoners coming through the lines

began to mention the name of a new Panzer Army being for­
med in the West—the SIXTH SS—and it became apparent that
the enemy was massing the units which he was reforming into
one armored striking force. During the last week in October
269 Infantry Division arrived in HOLLAND from NORWAY, 361
Infantry Division reappeared on the THIRD US Army front,
and a reformed 91 Infantry Division, unheard of since it
was destroyed in NORMANpY, arrived in the line in the FIRST
US Army area. The first week in November saw only one new
division arrive as 18 Volksgrenadier was identified for the
first time, moving into the line to relieve the last of the
elements of 2 SS Panzer Division (DAS REICH),which went off
to join the balance of SEPP DIETRICH'S SIXTH SS Panzer Army
in the PADERBORN area.
Efforts of the FIRST US Army to get through the U0ERTG1SN
FOREST in early November met instantaneous enemy reaction,
and 28 US Division was promptly counter-attacked by 116 Pan­
zer Division on 4 November after it had launched its attack
towards the ROER River dams. Elsewhere on the front there
was little change. MAZIERES-LES-METZ was finally taken, but
the bitter fighting continued around the METZ fortresses.
On 8 November THIRD US Army launched its offensive towards
the SAAR, smashing into the FIRST German Army. The imme­
diate result of the attack was 1faat the enemy moved 11
Panzer Division from reserve back into the line. It was
quickly followed by a northward movement of 21 Panzer, 106
Panzer Brigade and 361 Infantry Divisions to the threatened
area. Heavy fighting raged along the MOSELLE as the enemy
evidenced determination to hold this defensive line. Two
new divisions moved into the front opposite FIRST US Army
along the front from AACHEN to TRIER as 272 Infantry Division
was recommitted and 212 Volksgrenadier Division was moved from
tactical reserve on the Russian Front into the lin#
in the TRIER area* relieving 36 Infantry Division which moved
on south to face the attack of General PATTON^s troops. Two
divisions in the rfest were destroyed during the first two
weeks of November as 64 and 70 Infantry Divisions were wiped
out defending the SCHELDT Estuary.
By the beginning of the third week of November the Ger­
mans realized that a major American offensive was underway
in the West. THIRD US Army troops were driving across the
MOSELLE eastwards from METZ, and on 16.November the NINTH
and FIRST US Armies jumped off in a drive towards COLOGNE.
When the northern attack was launched the enemy appeared to
be somewhat stunned by the intensity of the air bombardment,
which, reminiscent of the softening-up air blow at ST. L0,
had been laid on with both medium and heavy bombers. How­
ever, within two days the enemy reacted strongly and 9 Pan­
zer Division fought back stubbornly against NINTH US Army,
launching counter-attacks in platoon and company strength
supported by tanks. On the THIRD US Army front the enemy
fought a stubborn retreating action^with 25 Panzer Grenadier
Division, a new formation, arriving on the front to bolster
the sagging armor in the south. However, by 18 November the
Germans in the south had been badly beaten and commenced
large-scale and disorganized withdrawals to the north and
the east towards the SIEGFRIED LINE. METZ was encircled

-16-
despite the arrival of 21 Panzer Division from further
south on the front. Three more enemy divisions arrived
in the West during the week and the enemy was reaching deep
into the Reich to pull the new troops to tie battle, bring­
ing 26 Volksgrenadier Division from POSEN, 47 Infantry Divi­
sion from DENMA.RK, and 277 Infantry Division from GRAFENWOEHR,
all to the FIRST US Army front. Enemy strength in the West
had reached a total of 66 divisions—6 more than had been
present on D-Day. The enemy had brought 18 divisions to the
West in September, only 4 in October and 6 arrived in the
third week in November as it became apparent to the German
High Command that a big attack was in progress. All of the
enemy's tactical reserve had been committed to the battle by
18 November, but the SIXTH SS Panzer Army still lurked omi­
nously in the background. Visual reconnaissance had shown
heavy concentrations of troop trains moving into the GIE3SEN
area, and there was considerable training activity in the
OSNABRUECK region.
By the end of November intensely bitter fighting was
raging along the 12th Army Group front, centering around the
AACHEN area in the north where the enemy was stubbornly re­
sisting our efforts to reach the ROER River and its dams.
To the south the Gennans were pouring troops into the battle
to parry the blow of the iHIRD US Army towards the SAAR Basin.
On the southern flank 6th Army Group had opened its offen­
sive through the BEIFCRT Gap, and the NINETEENTH German Army
faced the alternatives of annihilation in the VOSGES or re­
treat across the RHINE. During the month the enemy had
brought 16 divisions to the Western Front—10 infantry, 5
Panzer and 1 Panzer Grenadier. Despite the critical situa­
tion that was developing for the Germans with casualties
approaching 100,000 for the "month, they had still not com­
mitted SIXTH SS Panzer Army* which loomed larger as a counter­
attacking threat to our forces crossing the ROER once that
river had been attained and its dams neutralized. There was
no question but that the enemy regarded the AACHEN offensive
as the most critical. During November, to counter any Allied
exploitation of the break in the SIEGFRIED Line in the
AACHEN area and to meet the threat to COLOGNE and the RUHR,
the Germans sent into the line in that area 5 infantry and
6 Panzer divisions. Some of these formed the SIXTH SS Panzer
Army, which had moved west across the RHINE into the imme­
diate area of the battle but had remained uncommitted. Into
the SAAR battle the Germans had rushed 3 infantry, 2 Panzer
and 1 Panzer Grenadier divisions. To the south, in a futile
attempt to stop a blow anticipated too late, the Germans
sent three infantry divisions and diverted P&nzer Lehr and 25
Panzer Grenadier Divisions from THIRD US Army front to op­
pose the attack of 6th Army Group toward the RHINE between
KARLSRUHE and BASEL.

Bad weather was hampering all of the Allied attacks at

the end of November* The NINTH US Army succeeded in-taking
LINNICH on 22 November, and FIRST UB Army captured ESCHWEILER
the same day. METZ fell to THIRD US Army on 20 November
after the encircled fortress city had been gradually reduced,
but isolated forts filled with die-hard Nazis continued to
resist. By the end of November THIRD US Army was closing up
to the SIEGFRIED Line on the northern part of its front and
was encountering opposition from MAGIN0T Line forts being
utilized by the Germans on the right flank. The enemy's
source of new divisions had apparently been strained, for
four of the divisions formerly opposing 21 Army Group moved
south, with 363 Infantry Division arriving in the NINTH US

-17-
Army zone from ARNHEM, 3 Parachute and 344 Infantry Divi­
sions moving into the HUERTGEN FOREST opposite FIRST IB
Army, and 245 Infantry Division moving from HOLLAND to the
6th Army Group area.

Throughout the first week in December very stiff fight­

ing continued in the north on the approaches to the ROER
River, with particularly bitter battles raging in the HUERT­
GEN FOREST, where the enemy was determined to keep our forces
away from the vital ROER Dams. Meanwhile, to the south,
THIRD US Army was making excellent progress in its drive
towards the SAAR despite the best that the enemy could do.
The Germans, in a desperate effort to keep our forces from
reaching an unmanned SIEGFRIED Line, threw in heavy counter­
attacks with the limited Panzer forces available and used
every possible device to hold the MA.GINOT Line forts as
outer defenses of the SAAR. The enemy fought back des­
perately to regain a bridge captured intact at SAARLAUTERN,
using tremendous volumes of artillery fire and even resort­
ing t o explosive laden tanks i n a n effort to block off t h e
bridgehead. Two new divisions arrived on the front during
the first week in December, 326 Infantry from DMMA.RK and
352 from MUENSTER, both being consultted on the front of
FIRST US Army, where attrition was heaviest and where the
enemy's build-up was greatest.

-18
 CHAPTER VII

THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

On 16 December the Germans launched their biggest of­

fensive since the beginning of the campaign in Western
EUROPE, By taking full advantage ct adverse weather condi­
tions which restricted Allied reconnaissance, and by rigidly
applying radio silence, the enemy had skillfully regrouped
his forces. Simultaneous attacks were launched at five
places along a seventy-mile sector of the Western Front.
The skill in regrouping and launching the simultaneous at­
tacks achieved a high degree of surprise. The element of
surprise was heightened by the enemy's disregard of terrain
in selecting the points of attack, and he threw armored
farces into sectors considered ill-adapted for the use of
tanks. The Germans1 intelligence concerning our disposi­
tions was, as usual, excellent. The attack was directed at
a part of the line held in the north by two divisions seeing
their first action—the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions —
and in the south against two divisions which had recently
seen much action in the HUERTGEN FOREST and were in a quiet
sector of the line for rest and rehabilitation—the 28 and
k Infantry Divisions. 9 US Armored Division was backing up
the line, but like the first two mentioned divisions, had
yet to see action.
To maintain surprise as long as possible, the German at­
tacks in many areas were initially light and had the appear­
ance of reconnaissance in force. It was not until the night
of 16-17 December that the Germans showed their hand com­
pletely and utilized airborne forces, making the greatest
air effort since NORMANDY. The enemy had now thrown all of
his available reserves into the battle. Supplies had been
accumulated over a period of time. The transport of gasoline
was given highest priority on roads in enemy hands to assure
that the striking Panaer forces had abundant supplies. There
was no question, however, but that the enemy counted heavily
on the surprise of his offensive resulting in the capture of
our supplies to sustain his attacking forces.

The enemy's offensive into the ARDENNES was launched

along two principal axes. On the north SEPP DIETRICH'S
newly-formed SIXTH SS Panzer Army was committed to action
for the first time as a unit. It was composed of the elite
of the SS armored formations, spearheaded by 1 SS Panzer
Division (Leibstandarte ADOLF HITLER), 2 SS Panzer Division
(DAS REICH), 9 SS Panzer Division (HOHENSTAUFEN) and 12 SS
Panzer Division (HITLER JTJGEND). This Army was given the
mission of driving through MALMEDY to LIEGE, to cut off the
FIRST and NINTH American Armies from the Armies to the south
and to secure a position along the MEUSE. Quo9 this was ac­
complished,, the German pl&a envisaged a continuation of the
drive towards ANTWERP to wrest this vital port from the
Allies and to cut off tne British and Canadian forces in
HOLLAND from the r&st of the Allied forces. SEPP DIETRICH'S
northern flank ioi- nis initial drive was protected by the
ROER Dams, which the Germans continued to hold despite stren­
uous efforts on our part to capture them. The Germans were
wall aware of the fact that we couldn't risk sending the
NIMH Army across the ROER River to strike at their flank,
and capitalized on this protection. The southern drive was
made by MANTEUFFEL *s YIF'M Panzer Army, spe&rheaded by the
2nd Panzer Division. Its mission was to drive straight
through to the MEUSE at DIHANT and NAMUR and hold the
southern flank of the drive. On the extreme south of the
drive the German SEVENTH Army attacked into LUXEMBOURG at „
BCHTERNACH in an effort to recapture the capitol of the
Grand Duchy,
On 18 December the enemy continued to try to get through
to MAXMEDY from KESTERNICH but was repeatedly thrown back by
the FIRST US Army. To the south, spearheads of 1 SS Panzer
Division managed to get through to STAVELOT, where they en­
countered determined opposition from 82 US Airborne Division.
The enemy made considerable gains around ST. VITH, but was
unable to capture this vital road junction as quickly as he
would have liked because of the brilliant battle waged by 7
US Armored Division, To the south the enemy succeeded in pene­
trating to the west between BASTOGNE and HOUFFALIZE, and cut
off BASTOGNE from the south by crossing the ARLON-BASTOGNE
road. By 21 December enemy Panzer units had penetrated to
SAMREE, LAROCHE and MARCOURT, but all efforts of 12 SS Pan­
zer Division to capture MAI.MEDY had been frustrated. Heavy
attacks were being launched by 116 Panzer Division against
beleaguered BASTOGNE, but 101 US Airborne Division success­
fully threw them back with heavy losses to the enemy. In
LUXEMBOURG the Germans captured ETTLEBRUCK, but were heId
slightly to the south of the town and their penetration to­
wards the city sealed off. On 22 December II SS Panzer
Corps, with 2 and 9 SS Panzer Divisions, finally succeeded
in wresting ST, VITH from 7 US Armored Division which fell
back to the northwest to gain better defensive positions.
A force of 20 tanks of 1 SS Panzer Division was trapped in
LA GLEIZE and wiped out. To the south tbe Germans pushed
their southern spearhead to ROGHEFORT but failed to budge
BASTOGNE. By 23 December 12 SS Panzer Division gave up the
effort to get through to IviALLIEDY from the RUTGENBACH-WA.IMES
area and 1 US Infantry Division followed up their withdrawal,
II SS Panzer Corps, having pushed through ST. VITH and find­
ing their way to LIEGE blocked by our forces containing 1
SS Panzer Division at STAVELOT, started to swing south to
work further to the west before striking northwestward again.
Clear weather blessed the front on 23 December and the Ger­
mans started to take terrific casualties in motor transport
and equipment as NINTH US Air Force planes started to comb
the area searching for all movement by daylight. The enemy
turned to night attacks, particularly around BASTOGNE, where
the frenzy of the efforts to take the city was stepped up as
4 US Armored Division started its drive north from ARLON to­
wards the encircled city.
By the end of December the German preoccupation with
BASTOGNE had cost him the initiative in the ARDENNiiS offen­
sive. Unable to break through in the north to MA.BJEDY;
stopped at STAVELOT, and deprived of the vital communica­
tions center of BASTOGNE, the German drive to the west had
been channelized into secondary roads which were hampering
his supply problems to the extreme. It is impossible to
separate the roles of stubborn Allied resistance and enemy
logistic difficulties in upsetting the enemy breakthrough
timetable. It is also impossible to distinguish between
supply difficulties occasioned by inadequacy of transport
to carry the gasoline and ammunition on the one hand, and
the failure to clear sufficient roads on the other. After
25 December, though, it was clear that the enemy was unable
to advance, and timt his supply difficulties had become
tremendous.

-20-

/
 The enemy continued to pour troops and equipment into
the battle throughout the month. On 24 December 9 Panzer
Division, which had been held in reserve up until this time,
tried to continue the attack with a westward thrust through
VAHA, with strong efforts to drive westwards being mounted
between HOTTON and LAROCHE. On the southern part of the
front 560 Infantry Division threw strong attacks against
BASTOGNE from the east, while from the south elements of 5
Parachute Division, supported by Panzer Lehr Division, sought
to broaden the corridor between BaSTOGNE and ARLON. Concen­
tric attacks against the city were launched from all direc­
tions on 24 December, with 15 Panzer Grenadier Division com­
ing in from the west. On Christmas Day the elements of 1
SS Panzer Division pocketed at LA. GLEIZE were wiped out.
Fierce fighting raged at ftjANHAY, and 116 Panzer Division was
stopped between MARCHE and HOTTON. The enemy's furthest
spearhead to the west, that of 2 Panzer Division, which the
day before bad succeeded in cutting the CINEY-DINANT road,
was finally and decisively smashed and mopped up, as the
bulk of the division was caught at CELLOS out of gasoline.
The fighting was particularly bitter around BASTOGNE on
Christmas Day, and 101 US Airborne Division took a heavy
toll of the tanks and infantry of 15 Panzer Grenadi er, Pan­
zer Lehr and 26 Infantry Divisions. To the south, 4 DS
Armored Division, driving north from ARLON, was rolling back
the other grenadier regiment of 15 Panzer Grenadier Division.
On 26 December II SS Panzer Corps, with DAS REICH and H0HEN-
STAUFEN, moved into the MANHAY region to launch strong attacks
to the northwest. For the next four days the enemy tried
desperately to continue the momentum of his drive, but the
way was blocked and the drive to the northwest definitely
stopped. By 30 December the forces in tne north went over
to the defensive.
BASTOGNE was relieved on 26 December. The Germans, hav­
ing lost the battle of BASTOGNE, concentrated their efforts
on keeping the corridor through to BASTOGNE from the south as
narrow as possible and on blocking our efforts to drive north
to HOUFFALIZE—a drive which threatened to cut off all Ger­
man forces to the west and turn the ARDENNES offensive into
another Nazi debacle* For the next two weeks the Germans de­
voted their efforts to blocking on the north while building up
their forces to the north of BASTOGNE in an effort to keep
the THIRD US Army from breaking through* During the first
week in January the enemy on the northern flank of the AR­
DENNES salient was being gradually forced back through the
difficult terrain over which the Germans fought for every
defensible feature. Both to the east and west of BASTOGNE
the enemy threw in all available forces in an effort to stop
the advances towards HOUFFALIZE. Three of the four divisions
of SEPP DIETRICH*s SIXTH SS Panzer Army turned south from
their attempts to drive to the northwestward and were thrown
in to assist the FIFTH Panzer Army in holding around BASTOGNE.
Meanwhile, on the southern part of the front, the enemy
launched his Alsatian offensive, as 21 Panzer and 25 Panzer
Grenadier Divisions tried to drive southwestward from the
HAGENAU region in an effort to cut off STRASBOURG from the
north, and the German NINETEENTH Army attempted to break out
of the COLMAR pocket.
During the second week in January enemy operations were
primarily concerned with the salvage of the armored and motor­
ized elements of the FIFTH and SIXTH SS Panzer Armies at the
expense of the infantry divisions in the ARDENNES salient.
This was carried out under great difficulty, for while the
weather was not the best possible for Allied air operations,

-21
the fighter bombers nevertheless were operational a large
part of the time*giving the enemy no respite* The Germans
lacked freedom of maneuver toeaauae of the constant Allied pres-
sure, and a new menace to the Keich loomed up in the East
as the Russians launched their winter offensive. The first
indications that the enemy couldn't hold the Russians with
the forces available in the East oame less than a week after
the Soviet forces jumped off on their winter offensive. The
711 Infantry Division,which for some time had been held in
reserve on the HOLLAND front, was identified by the Russians
on the Eastern Front in the third week of January*

In the ARDENNES the enemy concentrated his efforts pri­

marily on preventing the THIRD US Army from driving back in­
to HOUFFALIZE. On both the northern and southern extremes
of the ARDENNES salient west of BASTOGNE,the Germans re­
luctantly yielded ground as they were forced back aoross the
SALM River and gave up ST. HUBERT to the south* However, by
15 January the FIRST and THIRD US Armies had converged on
HOUFFALIZE, and the Germans commenced to fall back slowly on
ST* VITH, counter-attacking continually* On the southern
part of the front the enemy continued to defend successive
river lines as the THIRD Army forces advanced first to the
WILTZ and then to the CLERF Rivers. The enemy was losing
1,000 prisoners a day, and his Panzer forces were heavily in
demand, not only te plug the line in the ARDENNES, but also
to assist the German forces in ALSACE which had sucoeeded in
making some gains towards STRASBOURG from the north and south
and could well use Panzer divisions to assist in their ex­
ploitation* The demands of the Russian Front, too, were be­
coming more pressing as the Soviet forces made sweeping gains,
mauling German Panzer divisions in the process and increasing
the demands made by the German High Command on the Western
Front for Panzer reserves*
On 23 January the FIRST US Army drove back into ST. VITH
and the Germans in the north were back to within a few miles
of their start line* On the south THIRD US Army reached the
OUR River and the periphery of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses.
SIXTH SS Panzer Army had by now left the front on its way to
the Eastern Front, and although the enemy was still being ag­
gressive in ALSACE, he had, generally speaking,gone over to the
defensive along the entire Western Front. By the end of the
first week in February the enemy had pulled back into the
SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, utilizing the terrain, villages as
hedgehog positions, and every available device for defense.
Some of the outer defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE were found
to be unmanned. The enemy strongly contested the advance of
FIRST US Army towards the ROER Dams, but was unable to stop
the momentum that had been gathered. By 3 February the URFT
River had been reached, and the enemy was forced again and
again to reconmit Panzer divisions of the FIFTH Panzer Army
despite desperate efforts to get this only remaining armor
in the West out of the line to rest and refit before the big
Allied offensive for the RHINE opened. The Alsatian offen­
sive ended during the last week in January, and the Germans
started wholesale withdrawals from that front to send divi­
sions to the Eastern Front and to return 7 Rtrachute Division
to HOLLAND and its parent FIRST Parachute Army.

-22-
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 CHAPTER VIII

OFFENSIVE TO THE RHINE: 9 FEBRUARY - 7 M&RCH 1945

The battle of the ARDENNES was over by the first week

of February. The Russian offensive in the East had assumed
such proportions that the Germans went completely to the de­
fensive in the West. There was little alternative, inasmuch
as the FIRST and THIRD US Armies, following the enemy out
of the ARDENNES, were keeping the Germans under constant pres­
sure, and despite desperate efforts the enemy was unable to
extricate any of his Panzer divisions from the line to rest
and refit, although RUNDSTEDT was sure that the date for the
opening of our RHINE offensive was not far off. RUNDSTEDT
had already sent fifteen divisions to the Eastern Front. He
knew that there would be little reinforcement available from
ITALY or NORWAY because of transportation difficulties, and
could well have used the 100,000 men lost in the ARDENNES.
By 10 February the threat which had been constantly
facing our forces when they crossed the R0ER River was re­
moved. After extremely stiff fitting around GMUEND, the
Germans were forced back to the R0ER Dams. Aware of the
fact that they could no longer hold the dams and thus threaten
our forces to the north waiting to cross the river and drive
on COLOGNE, the enemy decided to blow the dams, flood the
river, and thus delay our attack for a week or two. On 10
February, as our forces drove up to the approaches of the
dams, the Germans blew the outlets and flooded the river.
All movement on the NINTH and FIRST US Army fronts was ef­
fectively stalemated for the period as the flooded river
prevented the continuation of the drive to the east.
t

In the EIFEL, THIRD US Army, giving the enemy no respite,

continued its drive into the SIEGFRIED Line. Over 30 enemy
divisions were now contained by the aggressive defensive
being waged on 12th Army Group front, and although RUNDSTEDT
was constantly pulling out his Panzer divisions, the continued
attack forced them back in as the OUR, SAUER and PRUEM Rivprs
were crossed. Elsewhere along the front, the German NINE­
TEENTH Army was finally driven out of the C0LMAR pocket, and
all possibilities of a flank attack towards STRASBOURG eli­
minated. Enemy movement during the second week of .February
was eastward and northward from the EIFEL as the Germans
tried to build up mobile reserves on the COLOGNE Plain to
oppose the coming attack* *

On 9 February the FIRST Canadian Army launched the open­

ing drive southeastward through the REICHSWALD towards WESEL.
The result was to immediately attract divisions which had been ^
waiting for the attack towards the RHINE in the COLOGNE Plain.
Both 15 Panzer Grenadier and 116 Panzer Divisions moved north
to face the attack of the Canadians and British, and 8 Para­
chute Division moved north from the R0ERMAND area to fall in
line with 7 Parachute Division, which was just returning from
the Alsatian battle. The pressure of the THIRD US Army
through the EIFEL continued to contain German divisions an­
xiously trying to break loose for the northern battle. Dur**
ing the third week in February the city of PRUEM was taken
and the pressure increased on BITBCJRG, one of the vital cen­
ters of communications in the EIFEL. In the SAAR-MOSELLE
triangle, a limited-objective attack by 94 US Infantry Divi­
sion started to turn into a rout as 11 Panzer Division re­
ceived a hurry call to report to the COLOGNE area and moved
out, leaving the badly battered 416 and 256 Infantry Divisions

-23-
to hold. The enemy was using a deliberate economy policy in
the West. Having exhausted considerable reserves of gasoline
and ammunition in the ARDENNES, the Germans were doing their
utmost to conserve these critically short items in prepara­
tion for the coming defensive battle. German artillery fired
on a considerably reduced scale, and on some days was almost
totally inactive along the ROER River front, where the flooded
river gave them temporary security. In the EIFEL, tanks and
self-propelled guns were used from dug-in positions to con­
serve gasoline.
On 23 February the main assault for the RHINE jumped off
as NINTH US Army smashed across the ROER River with one corps
of FIRST US Army initially protecting its flank. The assault
ran into stubborn enemy resistance, with machine-gun and ar­
tillery fire delaying the initial bridging attempts. The enemy
had succeeded in getting the bulk of 9 Panzer Division to
the battle area and it was rushed into the fight. 11 Panzer
followed suit, although it had taken a beating from our Air
Forces en route from the TRIER area, and some of its ele­
ments had never succeeded in getting out of the EIFEL. By
the time the offensive was launched across the ROER, the
THIRD US Army had pinched out the EIFEL bulge, cleared the
SAAR-MOSELLE triangle, and seized bridgeheads across the
SAAR.

By 25 February DUERiSN had been captured, the PRUEM and

NIMS Rivers had been forced and the German line west of the
RHINE was in imminent danger of disintegration. BITBURG was
captured on 28 February, and TRIER fell on 1 March with the
added advantage of an intact MOSELLE bridge which some negli­
gent enemy demolition squad had failed to destroy. The
NINTH US Army snashed through enemy resistance in its drive
towards the RUHR, capturing MUENCHEN-GLADBACH and continuing
towards NEUSS, despite the fact that Panzer LEHR, 15 Panzer
Grenadier Division and elements of other divisions which had
been opposing the British-Canadian drive through the REICHS-
WALD had turned to face them. After initially heavy re­
sistance, the FIRST US Army crossed the ERFT River—last
barrier before COLOGNE and the RHINE—and swept southwards
towards EUSKIRCHEN, which was captured on 4 March. By the
end of the first week in fwarch the Germans were in full re­
treat and withdrawing their forces across the RHINE. Three
of the five German Armies west of the RHINE had been severely
crippled. In the EIFEL the German SEVENTH Army had been
smashed relentlessly back by THIRD IB Army, while on the
COLOGNE Plain the%FIFTH Panzer and FIFTEENTH Annies had been
cut to pieces. In the north FIRST .Parachute Army was moving
eastward across the RHINE, battered. By 13 March 125,000
prisoners had been rounded up in the West since the British
opened their offensive on 9 February.

-24-
• .

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Reproduced by E«gr. R»pfo. D«t. 12 A Cp.

 CHAPTER IX

THE CROSSING OF THE RHINE

COLOGNE fell on 5 lifer eh, and the FIRST US Army turned

south to drive down the RHINE. On 7 March 9 US Armored
Division, driving down the west>bank of the river, found
the railway bridge at REMAGEN still intact upon its arri­
val, and promptly took the opportunity to drive across the
river and establish the first bridgehead over the RHINE.
The same day resistance on the THIRD Army front disinte­
grated. 4 US Armored Division broke loose and sm§shed
through to the banks of the RHINE and MOSELLE by 8 March#
The enemy in the EIFEL was cut to shreds and all signs of
organized resistance started to disappear as THIRD Army
rounded up some 40,000 prisoners.

The Germans poured troops to the REMAGEN area in an ef­

fort to contain the American bridgehead, but, despite a con­
tinual arrival of reinforcements, they were not only unable
to hold the bridgehead but were forced to gradually give
ground. Very heavy fighting raged for the KOELN-FRANKFURT
autobahn, and around HONNEF and HONNIGEN at the extremes of
the bridgehead. Meanwhile, on 13 March THIRD US Army opened
the offensive into the PALATINATE by driving across the
MOSELLE River into the mountainous terrain of the HtJNSRUECK.
The remnants of the German SEVENTH Army, which had fallen
apart in the EIFEL, attempted to put up some defense along
the MOSELLE, but only in the vicinity of TRIER were the Ger­
mans sufficiently able to take advantage of the terrain to
put up even a holding action. 4 US Armored Division broke
loose to reach BAD KREUZNACH. On 18 March KOBLENZ fell, and
the following day ST. WENDEL, in the heart of the PALATINATE,
was taken. On 19 March alone THIRD Army took 18,000 priso­
ners, and the destruction of the German SEVENTH and FIRST
Armies was nearing completion. The enemy divisions still in
the SIEGFRIED Line along the SAAR facing the American SEVENTH
and FIRST French Armies started a hurried exit as General
PATTON's forces started driving down on them from the north.
KAISERSLAUTERN fell on 20 March, and the RHINE was reached
and MAINZ and WORMS taken on 22 March.^ The SAAR-PALATINATE
had been cleared and some 150,000 prisoners taken in ten
days* time.
German strategy had become completely one of improvisa­
tion. All German forces had been driven east of the RHINE,
but only the FIRST Parachute Army in the WESEL area had pos­
sessed sufficient time to rest and bring up reinforcements.
The REMAGEN bridgehead had attracted all other available
divisions in the West and kept the enemy from building up any
force on the east bank of the RHINE.
On 23 March THIRD US Army crossed the RHINE. The 5 US
Infantry Division crossed the River south of MAINZ, while
two days later the 87 US Infantry Division crossed south of
KOBLENZ, followed by 89 ^3. Infantry Division. On 23 March,
too, the British and Canadian forces and NINTH US Army, with
the aid of an airborne landing, crossed the river in the
W^SEL area, and the RHINE barrier had been breached from
EMMERICH to KARLSRUHE.

-25-
A, JO

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 CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR

On 26 March the FIRST I® Army opened its offensive out

of the RIMAGEN bridgehead. Despite the effort of the enemy
to contain the bridgehead with one-half of the Panzer divi­
sions and one-fifth of the infantry divisions in the West, 9
US Armored Division broke through the enemy ring and started
to drive southeastwards to link up with the THIRD US Army,
Meanwhile, to the south, DARMSTADT had been captured on 25
March and 4 US Armored Division had driven to the HANAU -
ASCHAFFENBURG area. Stiff enemy resistance was encountered
there, with elements of three of the divisions which had been
practically destroyed in the PAIATINATE offering stubborn op­
position. On 28 March FIRST and THIRD US Armies linked up,
and together formed one giant spearhead in the FRANKFURT gap
pointed at KASSEL.
The encirclement of the RUHR took one week. On 23 March
the NINTH Army drove across the RHINE in the north and the
FIRST Army broke out of the REMAGEN bridgehead. By 31 March
3 US Armored Division had driven north to the PADERBORN area,
where the first pitched battle since the break-out at REMA.GEN
occurred against SS troops and tank crews from the BIELEFELD-
PADERBORN tank depots. The resistance of this ad hoc unit,
known as SS WESTPHALIA, was broken in three days, although
the unit continued to fight until wiped out in the HARZ
pocket. On 1 April the RUHR pocket was closed at LIPPSTADT
by the meeting of 2 US Armored Division driving east from
the DUESSELDORF area, and 3 US Armored Division coming from
the south.
Army Group B, with the bulk of the FIFTH Panzer and
FIFTEENTH Armies, and elements of FIRST Parachute Army, in­
cluding a total of six corps and the major elements of 17
divisions plus some 100,000 flak troops, had been encircled
in the RUHR. The Germans were given no time to organize
their defenses for a pocket battle. Initially, attempts were
made to break out at S0EST, with 116 Panzer Division driving
from inside the pocket and SS WESTPHALIA from the BIELEFELD
area, but all attempts were futile. Two of the parachute
divisions from FIRST Parachute Army offered strong opposition
to attacks southwards towards the RUHR River, but were event­
ually pushed back. On the southern flank, the strongest re­
sistance was on the southeastern periphery where Panzer Lehr,
3 Panzer Grenadier and 9 Panzer Divisions, under Corps
BAYERLEIN, tried to hold.
Field Marshal MODEL*s forces in the RUHR were able to
hold out less than 18 days. By 18 April all organized re­
sistance had ceased and the last of the 325>000 prisoners
were being rounded up.
Meanwhile, with Army Group B encircled in the RUHR, the
best that the Germans could place against the eastward drive
of 12th Army Group were quickly formed battle groups and
divisions hastily grouped under newly-organized Armies. On
3 April KASSEL, G0THA. and 0HRDRUF were taken, and the main
headquarters of 0KW in THURINGIA overrun, with many valuable
files captured. EISENACH fell on 6 April, and the end of
the first week of the month saw 231»000 prisoners taken by
12th Army Group alone. On 10 April HANNOVER and BRUNSWICK
were captured, and the following day 2 US Armored Division

-26-
retched the ELBE at MA.GDEBURG. Resistance developed in
the H/lRZ Mountains, and prisoners told of a newly-formed
EIJSVENTH Army which was to hold the HAHZ area as a cen­
ter of resistance.
Prisoners during the third week of April were being
taken by 12th Army Group at the rate of 100,000 a day as
German resistance in the West crumbled completely. On 16
April, the day that THIRD US Army reached the frontier of
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 180,000 prisoners were taken by the Army
Group, a figure which contrasts with prisoner hauls for the
entire Western Front of 344*000 in September, 109,000 dur­
ing the November offensive, 81,000 in February, 349*611 in
March. That was the start of the debacle. In the six weeks
from the first of March 1,200,000 prisoners had been taken
on the Western Front: 750,000 by 12th Army Group in the
first 16 days of April.
On 19 April the HARZ Mountain region was encircled, and
eventually over 50,000 prisoners were taken from the area,
marking the end of the ELEVENTH German Army, one of the
shortest careers of a German Army in the field. Banzer Divi­
sion CLAUSEWITZ attempted to infiltrate through NINTH US
Army to reach the HARZ, with a faint possibility of recaptur­
ing HANN0YER, but after initial successes the division was
smashed. On 25 April Russian forces met those of 12th Army
Group at T0RGAU. FIRST and NINTH US Armies entered on a
stage of inactivity, waiting for the Russian forces to close
with them, while THIRD Army drove southeastwards across the
REGEN and DANUBE Rivers. 6th Army Group completed its drive
through the BLACK FOREST, and cleaned out the Mountain REDOUBT
around SALZBURG.
By 9 May, when the war officially ended, principal ac­
tivity on 12th Army Group front consisted of rounding up
Geimans fleeing from the advancing Russians. The German
Armies opposing 21 Army Group in the north had surrendered,
those in ITALY had capitulated, and it remained only for a
formal act to ratify an accomplished fact. Thus, eleven
months and three days after invasion, and three months to
the day after the preliminary assault through the SIEGFRIED
Line toward the RHINE, the German Army laid down its arms
in unconditional surrender.

***

-27-
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STANDARD
 CHAPTER XI

DIVISIONS ENCOUNTERED ON THE WESTERN FRONT

FROM.6 JUNE 19it.ii. TO 9 MAY 1915

Division Alpen Partly formed div. Early Apr 45 in

VTURTTEMBERG, Absorbed by 2 Mtn and
212 Inf Divs.
BARENTHIN Proht Div Apr 45 in NW GERMANY.
Pz Div Von CLAUSEWITZ Middle of Apr 45 W of ELBE.
Division DONAU Apr 45 in S. GERMANY, known as "Shadow
Division".
Div ERDMANN Prcht tps in VENLO area in Oct 44* Re­
named 7 Prcht Div.
Div HAMBURG Partly formed div. Late Mar 45 in
RUHR. Absorbed by 180 Inf Div.
Div Von HOBE Staff with misc. units. Late Apr 45
in S. GERMANY.
Div Von HUETTEN Middle Apr 45 on ELBE.
Div KOSSUTH Late Apr 45 in 3. GERMANY.
Pz Lehr Div Encountered in NORMANDY. Badly
mauled. Retreat across FRANCE. Re­
formed Sept-Not. Counter-attacking
in Upper SAAR Valley late Nov; mauled
again in ARDENNES. Committed area
CLEVE; REMAGEN Bridgehead. De­
stroyed in RUHR pocket.
Div POTSDAM Middle of Apr W of ELBE. Destroyed in
HARZ pocket.
Div R&SSL$R PALATINATE Mar 44* Renamed 616 Div
z.b.V.
Pollc e Div RAUTER Middle of Apr in HOLLAND.
Div SCHARNHORST Middle of Apr W of ELBE.
Div TETTAU Div staff controlling misc. tps in
HOLLAND since early Oct 44. Left
for East Front in late Jan. Prob­
ably renamed 604 Div z.b.V.
Div WALTHER Controlled misc. units in VENLO area
in Oct 44. Dissolved.
1 SS Pz Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Badly
battered. Reformed in WESTPHALIA in
Oct. In Dec ARDENNES. Left for
East Front.
1 GAF Tag Div Middle of Sept-middle of Oct in BEL-
FORT-BESANCON area. Absorbed by
other diva.

-28-
2 Naval Div Apr 45 NW GERMANY.

2 Mtn Div Late Jan 45 COLMAR pocket. Reformed

after being practically destroyed.
Early Mar MOS&LLE. Severely beaten.
Apr 45 S GERMANY*

2 SS Pz Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Reformed

in WESTPHALIA Oct-Dec after having
been badly battered. In Dec ARDENNES.
Left for East Front.

2 Pz Div 13 June, NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket.

SEINE. WEST WALL. After being badly
cut up, reformed in BITBURG area Nov-
Dec. ARDENNES. Cut up again. Heavy
losses in BITBURG area. DARMSTADT.
BAYREUTH. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

2 Prcht Div BRITTANY. Middle of Sept 44 destroyed

at BREST. Reformed in HOLLAND. Feb
in ARNHEM area. WESEL bridgehead.
Destroyed in RUHR pocket.

3 Pz Gr Div Late Aug in E FRANCE. Oct AACHEN.

Badly mauled and reformed. ARDENNES.
Battle of the ROER River Dams.
REMAGEN bridgehead. Destroyed in
RUHR pocket.

3 Prcht Div NORMANDY. Destroyed in MORTAIN

pocket. Reformed in HOLLAND. Dec
DUEREN. ARDENNES. Badly battered.
Reformed. Early Mar severely mauled
W of RHINE. REMAGEN bridgehead. De­
stroyed in RUHR pocket.

5 Prcht Div Destroyed in NORMANDY. Reformed in

HOLLAND. ARDENNES. Badly battered.
Reformed. Mar 45 severely beaten W
of RHINE. Destroyed in HARZ pocket.

6 Prcht Div Late Aug W of PARIS. Retreat through

BELGIUM to MAAS. Destroyed. Reformed
in HOLLAND. Oct-Nov along MAAS. WESEL
bridgehead. NW GERMANY till end.

6 SS Mtn Div Counter-offensive in HARDT Mountains

early Jan 45. Mar 45 TRIER sector.
Early Apr destroyed in Central GERMANY.

7 Prcht Div Former Div ERDMANN. VENLO area Nov-

Dec 44. ALSACE counter-offensive Jan
44. WESEL bridgehead Feb. N0R1HWEST
GERMANY to the end. *

8 Prcht Div Took over units of 606 z.b.V. Div.

Early Feb 45 in ROERMOND area. WESEL
bridgehead. NW GERMANY to end.

9 Inf Div ARDENNES. Badly battered. BITBURG

breakthrough. FRANKFURT. Destroyed
W of NUERNBERG early Apr.

9 Pz Div Middle of Aug W of PARIS. Badly battered

E of PARIS. Reformed. NIJMEGEN in Sept.
Oct. VENLO. Nov AACHEN. ARDENNES. RE­
MAGEN bridgehead. Destroyed in RUHR pocket.
-29-
9 SS Pz Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Battered.
Retreat through BELGIUM and HOLIAND.
ARNHEM. Reformed Oct-Deo in WEST­
PHALIA. ARDENNES. Severely beaten.
Left for East Front.

10 SS Pz Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Battered.

MDNS pocket. ARNHEM. Reforming in
HOLLAND and WESTPHALIA Oct-Dec.
Counter-offensive in ALSACE middle of
Jan* Left for East Front.

11 Pz Div Covered retreat up RHONE Valley from

S FRANCE in Aug 44. E of NANCY in
Sept to Nov. Reformed. SAAR-MOSELLE
triangle* Jan. Feb battered W of
COLOGNE. RMAGEN bridgehead. Area
PIAUEN. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

11 Naval Div W HOLLAND Apr 45.

12 SS Pz Div NORMANDY. Battered. Retreat FRANCE-

BELGIUM. Reformed in WESTPHALIA Oct-
Dec 44* ARDENNES. Battered. Left
for East Front.

12 Inf Div AACHEN area middle of Sept to middle

of Dec. Badly battered; reformed in
line. ARDENNES. Badly mauled. Re­
formed. Feb W of C0IX)GNE. Destroyed
in RUHR pocket.

15 Pz Gren Div Aug—Oct LORRAINE. VENLO-AACHEN area.

ARDENNES. WESEL bridgehead. NW
GERMANY. BREMEN.

16 Inf Div Retreat from S FRANCE. Sept-Dec

VOSGES Mts. Severely mauled in COLMAR
pocket. BITCHE. Destroyed in BLACK
FOREST.

16 GAF Div Destroyed in NORMANDY.

16 Naval Div Apr 45 in HOLLAND.

17 SS Pz Or Div 10 June. Practically destroyed in

NORMANDY. Reformed in E FRANCE.
Sept-Nov METZ area. Nov-Mar LORRAINE-
SAAR. Retreat across S GERMANY into
ALPS to the end.

17 GAF Div In Aug 44 destroyed in battle for SEINE,

18 GAF Div In late Aug destroyed on SEINE N of

PARIS.

18 Inf Div Nov-Dec 44 EIFEL. ARDENNES. EIFEL.

COBLENZ. Absorbed by 26 Inf Div
early in Apr 45.

19 Inf Div Sept 44-Mar 45 LORRAINE-SAAR. De­

stroyed in PALATINATE Mar 45.

21 Prcht Div Apr 45 HOLLAND.

-30.
21 Pz Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Sept-Dec
LORRAINE. Counter-offensive in Upper
AISACE early Jan 45. Left for East
Front.
25 Pz Gren Div Middle of Nov-middle of Dec LORRAINE.
Counter-attack in Upper ALSACE in Jan.
Left for East Front.

25 SS Gren Div Apr 45 S GERMANY.

26 Inf Div Middle of Nov in EIFEL. ARDENNES.
EIFEL-RHINE* REHaAGEN bridgehead.
Destroyed in HaRZ pocket.

30 SS Inf Div Oct-Dec BELFORT-BESANCON area. Dis­

solved, Mar 45.

30 Mob Brig Destroyed in NORMANDY.

34 SS Gren Div HOLLAND Feb 45 to the end.

36 Inf Div TRIER area middle of Sept. Nov

LORRAINE-SAAR. HARDT Mtns, Jan-Mar.
NUERNBERG. AUSTRIA.

38 SS Gren Div Apr S GERMANY. AUSTRIA.

47 Inf Div E of SEINE. Destroyed in MONS pocket.

Reformed in DENMARK. DUEREN middle
of Nov. Badly beaten and reformed.
Jan Upper ALSACE. Apr WURTTEMBERG.

48 Inf Div Middle of Aug V/ of PARIS. LORRAINE

from Sept until destroyed there middle
of Nov. Staff controlling misc. units
destroyed in BLACK FOREST Apr 45.

49 Inf Div Late Aug 44 SEINE. AACHEN middle of

Sept. Destroyed in Nov.

59 Inf Div Early Sept CHANNEL Coast. BRUGES.

Oct S of MAAS. Badly battered. Re­
formed. Jan-Mar ROER River. Destroyed
in RUHR pocket.

62 Inf Div ARDENNES counter-offensive. EIFEL.

REMAGEN bridgehead. Destroyed in
RUHR pocket.

63 Inf Div Apr 45 HOLLAND

64 Inf Div Early Sept 44 N FRANCE. BRUGES.

Destroyed in BRESKENS area Oct 44.

70 Inf Div Early Sept 44 GHENT. Destroyed on

WALCHEREN Island Oct 44.

77 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY.

79 Inf Div ARDENNES counter-offensive. EIFEL.
Badly battered. PALATINATE. S.
GERMANY.

-31-
84 Inf Div Early Aug 44 NORMANDY. Almost com­
pletely destroyed in MORTAIN pocket.
Reformed. Oct 44-Mar 45 REICHSWALD.
Severely mauled in Canadian attack
on CLEVE. Reformed. NW GERMANY.

65 Inf Div NORMANDY. Badly battered. Reformed.

"Lower MAAS River Battle" Oct-Dec.
Dec-Feb ROER River Dams. Absorbed
by 3 Prcht Div Feb 45.
89 Inf Div. NOHflANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Destroyed
3 of SEINE Sept. Reformed. N EXFEL
Oct 44-Feb 45* REMAGEN bridgehead.
Destroyed. Staff controlling misc.
units destroyed in BLACK FOREST, Apr 45.

91 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY. Reformed.

JSIFEL late Oct. Absorbed by 344 Inf
Div late Nov.
106 Inf Div Apr 45 area KARLSRUHE. Destroyed in
BLACK FOREST.

116 Pz Div NORMANDY. ARGENTAN-FALAISE gap.

AACHEN. ARNHEM. Counter-attack
against SCHMIDT early Nov. Reformed.
ARDENNES. Battered. Reformed. CLEVE
Feb. Reformed. Destroyed in RUHR
pocket.

136 Inf Div Sept 44 ANTWERP-MAASTRICHT area,

4. «troyed.

148 Tug Div S WPB middle Aug 44. FRANCO­

IS ALPS.

157 Tng Div S FRANUjs. , ddle Aug 44. FRANCO-

ITALIAN ALib.

159 Inf Div Retreat from Bay of BISCAY. Very

heavy losses. Reformed.Sept-Nov
BESANCON-BELFORT. Upgraded from
tng div to inf div. COLMAR pocket.
S of COBLENZ Mar. Destroyed on
THIRD Army RHINE bridgehead.

166 Inf Div Late Mar. 45 Central GERMANY. De­

stroyed in HARZ pocket.

167 Inf Div Late Deo ARDENNES. Severely beaten

in EIFEL. Destroyed in Central
GERMANY late Mar 45.

172 Div NR Destroyed WIESBADEN-FRANKFURT late

Mar 45.

172 Div z.b.V. Apr 45 NW GERMANY.

176 Inf Div Upgraded from z.b.V. div late Nov 44.
ANTWERP-MAASTRICHT area early Sept 44*
ROERMOND area Oct 44-Mar 45. De­
stroyed in RUHR pocket.

-32-
180 Inf Div Upgraded from 180 Trig Div in Nov 44.
Sept 44-Feb 45 E of .MAAS River.
WESEL bridgehead. Decimated. Re­
formed. Destroyed in RUHR pocket.

183 Inf Div Sept 44-Mar 45 ROER River. Destroyed

in RUHR pocket.
189 Inf Div Upgraded from Tng Div in Nov 44. Aug
44 S FRANCE. Sept 44-Nov 44 VOSGES
Mtns. COLMAR pocket. Severely beaten.
Reformed. Apr S GERMANY.

190 Inf Div Upgraded from Tng Div in Nov 44. E of

MkAS River, Sept 44-&iar 45. Destroyed
in RUHR pocket.
198 Inf Div S FRANCE middle of Aug. VOSGES Mtns
Sept-Nov 44. COLMAR pocket. Bat­
tered. Reformed, Mar PALATINATE.
S GERMANY.

212 Inf Div TRIER area Nov 44-Mar 45. PAIATINATE.

3 GERMANY.

226 Inf Div Sept N FRANCE. DUNKBRQUE to the end.

242 Inf Div Destroyed in S FRANCE Aug 44.

243 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY.

244 Inf Div Destroyed in S FRANCE.

245 Inf Div Early Sept N FRANCE. Oct-Nov S of
MAAS River. N ALSACE Dec-Feb. Re­
formed in HOLLAND. Apr 45 NW GERMANY.

246 Inf Div Oct 44-Jan 45 AACHEN. Severely bat­

tered. EIFEL Feb. PALATINATE Mar.
S GERMANY Apr.

256 Inf Div HOLLAND S of MAAS River Oct-Nov.

Dec 44-Jan 45 N ALSACE. Feb SAAR-
MOSELLE triangle. Battered. S
GERMANY.

257 Inf Div Dec 44 HARDT Mtns. HAGUENAU area

Feb. April S GSRaiANY.

265 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY. Elms in

LORIENT and ST. NAZAIRE*

266 Inf Div Elms destroyed in NORMANDY, bulk of

div destroyed in BREST and CROZON
Peninsula.

269 Inf Div Nov 44 VOSGES Mtns. COLMAR pocket.

Left for East Front Jan 45.

271 Inf Div Battered in NORMANDY. Destroyed in

MORTAIN pocket.

272 Inf Div NORMANDY. MORTAIN pocket. Destroyed

Aug-Sept N FRANCE. Reformed. EIFEL
Nov 44-Mar 45. REMAGEN bridgehead.
Destroyed in RUHR pocket.

-33-
275 Inf Div Virtually destroyed in NORMANDY,
Reformed. AACHEN area Sept-Nov,
Remnants absorbed by 344 Inf Div.

276 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY. Reformed.

Jan ARDENNES. Mar EIFEL. Destroyed
in Central GERMANY.

277 Inf Div NORMANDY. Destroyed in MORTAIN

pocket. Reformed. Nov EIFEL. RE-
MAGEN bridgehead. Absorbed by 272
Inf Div late Mar.
319 Inf Div Bulk of div on CHANNEL ISLANDS for
entire campaign. Elements in ST.
MALO.

325 Inf Div NW GERMANY Apr 45.

326 Inf Div NORMANDY. Destroyed in MORTAIN
pocket. Reformed. Dec EIFEL. Jan
ARDLkNiS. Battered. EIFEL. RE-
MAGEft bridgehead. Destroyed in
Central GERMAKY.

331 Inf Div Middle of Aug NORMANDY. MORTAIN

pocket. Virtually destroyed W of
SEINE River. Elements in HOLLAND
from Oct on.

338 Inf Div ^A'te 44 S of PARIS, Sept-Nov

liELFORT area. Virtually destroyed.
Reformed. • COLMAR pocket. Battered.
Mar 45 KREFELD area. Destroyed in
RUHR pocket.

340 Inf Div Late Nov 44 ROER River. ARDENNES.

EIFEL, REMAGEN bridgehead. De­
stroyed in RUHR pocket.

343 Inf Div Elements in NORMANDY. Bulk of div

destroyed at BREST and CROZON
Peninsula.

344 Inf Div Destroyed S of SEINE late Aug 44.

Partially reformed. Nov ROERMOND.
Units taken over by 606 z.b.V. Div.
Dec misc. components at DUEREN.
Destroyed.
346 Inf Div NORMANDY. CHANNEL ports. Severe
losses. HOLLAND S of MAAS. Re­
formed. Nov Lower MAAS. Apr
AkwHEM area.

347 Inf Div N FRANCE late Aug. Sept S of AACHEN.

Remnants absorbed by 275 Inf Div. Re­
formed. SAARBRUECKEN area Nov 44-
Mar 45. Destroyed in THURINGIA.

348 Inf Div Severely beaten in N FRANCE and BELGIUM

Sept 44. AACHEN. Left Western Front
late Sept.

352 Inf Div Destroyed in NORMANDY. Reformed. Dec-

Feb EIFEL. Remnants absorbed by 9 Inf
Div« Apr 45 S GERMANY. Destroyed in
BIACK FOREST.

-34
353 Inf Div Virtually destroyed in NORMANDY.
Sept AACHEN area. Remnants ab­
sorbed by 275 Inf Div. Reformed.
EIFEL Oot. Dec ROER River. De­
stroyed in RUHR pocket.
361 Inf Div Late Sept NIJMEGEN. Oct-Jan LORRAINE.
Battered. Reformed. Apr HOLLAND. j
363 Inf Div NORMANDY. Destroyed in MORTAIN
pocket. Reformed, Oct ARNHEM. Dec- ,
Mar ROER River. Destroyed in RUHR
pocket.
404 Div z.b.V. SAXONY Apr 45.
405 Div z.b.V. Dec 44-Apr 45 BADEN. Renumbered 719
Inf Div Apr 45# Destroyed in BLACK
FOREST.
406 Div z.b.V. Oct-Feb GELDERN area. EIFEL. Mar
ROERMOND. Destroyed W of RHINE River.
409 Div NR Apr 45 S GERMANY.
413 Div NR Apr 45 Central GERMANY. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
416 Inf Div 3AAR-M0SELLE triangle Oct 44. Severely
beaten there in late Feb. Partially
reformed. S GERMANY to the end.
462 Inf Div Upgraded from Div NR. Lived and died
in METZ area Sept-Nov 44.
465 Div NR April 45 S GERMANY.
466 Div z.b.V. WESTPHALIA Mar 45. Destroyed in
Central GERMANY.
467 Div NR S GERMANY May 45.
469 Div NR Apr 45 Central GERMANY.
470 Div z.b.V. May 45 NW GERMANY.
471 Div NR NW GERMANY Apr 45.
476 Div z.b.V. Mar 45 W of COLOGNE. Destroyed in -
HARZ pocket.
480 Div z.b.V. Apr 45 NW GERMANY.

490 Div z.b.V. April 45 NW GERMANY.

526 Inf Div Sept-Oct AACHEN. Units absorbed by 4
347 and 89 Inf Divs.
553 Inf Div Early Sept 44 NANCY. LORRAINE. Vir­
tually destroyed Nov 44. Reformed.
Jan S of KARLSRUHE. Mar MANNHEIM.
Destroyed in BLACK FOREST.

559 Inf Div Sept 44 LORRAINE. Virtually destroyed

there Nov. Reformed. SAAR counter-
offensive. Jan-Mar PALATINATE. S
GERMANY. Destroyed in BLACK FOREST.

-35-
560 Inf Div ARDENNES counter-offensive. Severely
beaten. EIFEL. Destroyed in PAIATI-
NATE Mar 45.
604 Div z.b.V. Jan 45 HOLLAND. Left for East Front.
606 Div z.b.V. Dec 44 R0ERM0ND area. Units taken
over by 8 Prcht Div Feb 45•
616 Div z.b.V. Formerly Div RAESSLER. Apr 45 S
GERMANY.
650 Russian Div Also known as 2 Russian SS Div. Apr
45 S GERMANY.
70S Inf Div Aug 44 LAVAL. MORTAIN pocket. Severely
beaten. Reformed. VOSGES Mtns Nov-
Jan. Destroyed in COLMAR pocket.
709 Inf Div Destroyed CHERBOURG Peninsula.

711 Inf Div NORMANDY. CHANNEL ports. Severely

bea,ten. Reformed. HOLLAND S of MAAS
River. Left for East Front Jan 45.
712 Inf Div N FRANCE early Sept. ANTWERP. Bat­
tered. Reformed. Oct 44-Jan 45
HOLLAND. Left for East Front.
716 Inf Div Virtually destroyed in NORMANDY. Re­
formed in S FRANCE. Retreat up RHONE
Valley, Sept-Nov VOSGES Mtns. Bat­
tered. Reorganized. COLMAR pocket.
Heavy losses. Reformed. S GERMANY
Apr.
719 Inf Div Early Sept ALBERT CANAL. HOLLAND S
of MAAS River. Battered. Reformed.
SAARLAUTERN area Deo 44-Mar 45. Vir­
tually destroyed. 405 Div NR renamed
719 Inf Div. Destroyed in BLACK
FOREST.
805 Div NR Upgraded from z.b.V. Div. FREIBURG
area Feb-Apr 45. Renamed 352 Inf
Dir.
905 Div NR Upgraded from z.b.V. div. BADEN-
BADEN area Feb-Mar. E PALATINATE.
Absorbed by other divs late Iter 45.
FUEHRER ESCORT BRIG Encountered in BULGE. Badly beaten.
Left for East Front in late Jan.
FUEHRER GREN BRIG Encountered in BULGE. Badly beaten.
Left for East Front in late Jan.
Fz Brigades: 105, Sept-Oct on all parts of front from
106, 107, 108, 109, VOSGES Mtns to ARNHEM. AH destroyed
111, 112, 113 or absorbed by Pz divs except 106 Pz
Brigade which fought in ALSACE until
Feb and then went to COLOGNE area.
It was destroyed in RUHR pocket*
***

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