European Journal of Political Research 45: 787810, 2006 787

Political participation and three theories of democracy:

A research inventory and agenda

JAN TEORELL
Lund Unversity, Sweden

Abstract. This article proposes an agenda for political participation research aimed at
providing empirical answers to questions derived from normative political theory. Based on
a threefold distinction between responsive, participatory and deliberative models of democ-
racy, the article first distinguishes three conceptions of political participation: as influencing
attempts, as direct decision making, and as political discussion. Second, it is argued that each
of the three models is associated with different desired consequences of political participa-
tion: equal protection of interests, self-development and subjective legitimacy. Third, a pro-
cedural standard is identified from which to evaluate the mechanism generating the three
types of participation. By analogy with theories of distributive justice, this mechanism should
be sensitive to incentives but insensitive to resources. The empirical questions thus implied
are finally drawn together into an integrated agenda for future participation studies.

The study of mass political participation has grown into one of the most
important subfields of political science. Originating in the early American
election studies of the 1950s, the proliferation of primarily survey-based par-
ticipation studies has reached a global scale in the last decade (see, e.g., Brady
1999; Dalton 2000; Norris 2002). Although usually inspired by normative con-
cerns, however, the field remains surprisingly loosely coupled to normative
theories of democracy. The classic reference is a simplistic notion of partici-
patory democrats urging more participation, as opposed to realist demo-
crats, who allegedly take no interest in levels of participation at all (see, e.g.,
Parry et al. 1992: 45; Norris 2002: 5). Others, like Verba and Nie (1972) in
their seminal study of participation in America, raise both normative and
empirical questions at the outset, but in the end exclusively deal with the
empirical ones leaving the suggested connection to normative theory unex-
plored. Verba et al. (1995) no doubt improved upon earlier studies by explic-
itly appealing to a normative view of the participatory process as undistorted
representation. As pointed out by critics, however, this view excludes other
important notions within democratic theory (Mansbridge 1997).
In this article, I argue there is more to the connection between normative
theory and empirical research on political participation than these examples
suggest. I shall thus be addressing the more general tendency that normative
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MA 02148, USA
788 jan teorell

and positive theories of democracy grow out of literatures that proceed, for
the most part, on separate tracks, largely uninformed by one another (Shapiro
2002: 235). The purpose, simply put, is to tighten the strings connecting the two
literatures on one specific theme: political participation. To this end, I explore
the existing field of empirical participation research in the light of a new
theoretical framework. Normative democratic theory plays a double role in
this framework: it suggests what questions are important to ask and it provides
the standards needed to evaluate the empirical findings. By identifying the
blind spots left by participation research in the past, I propose an agenda for
how it should be conducted in the future. Although methodological issues will
be noted in passing, I concentrate on the questions that need be answered.
In the normative realm, I focus on three models of democracy: responsive,
participatory and deliberative. While the varieties of modern democratic
theory no doubt go beyond this simple threefold division (see, e.g., Held 1987),
my argument aims to show it fruitful enough to balance the cost of generality.
The discussion is organized into three different themes: the conceptualization,
the causes and the consequences of political participation. I conclude with a
summary of the empirical research agenda suggested and a discussion of
possible reversed feedback from empirical results to normative theory.

Conceptions of political participation

What types of human activity fall under the category political participation?
I shall argue that the answer to this conceptual question depends on which
normative model of democracy to which one adheres. According to some
extreme elitist versions of democratic theory, such as Schumpeter (1942) and
Sartori (1987), the role of citizens is limited to that of voting their leaders out
of office. These theorists adhere to what Riker (1982) termed a liberal model
of democracy, a view with three defining constituents: citizens only hold mean-
ingful preferences over the personnel of government; these preferences are
only expressed indirectly through a system of representation; and are consid-
ered to be fixed and exogenous to the democratic process itself. With such a
thin conceptualization of participation, little is left for empirical investigation.
As we shall see, however, by altering each of the three conditions in turn, three
models of democracy ensue with conceptions of political participation richer in
empirical content.

Participation as influencing attempts

Consider the definition of political participation given by Verba and Nie (1972:
2): Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens
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that . . . aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of

government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government per-
sonnel. This is the conception of participation as influencing attempts. It has
almost entirely dominated the empirical field of participation studies. The two
large cross-nationally comparative studies of participation in the 1970s
adhered to it (Verba et al. 1978: 46; Kaase & Marsh 1979: 42). So did the two
large-scale studies in Britain and America in the 1990s (Parry et al. 1992: 16;
Verba et al. 1995: 37). Textbooks and review articles confirm that this definition
has become the received view (Nagel 1987: 13; Brady 1999: 737738).1
What this definition adds to the narrow elitist view of democracy is to allow
citizens to express their preferences over the choices made by government
personnel that is, over policies (Miller 1992: 78). Participation is an instru-
mental act through which citizens attempt to make the political system
respond to their will. Participation is a mechanism for representation, writes
Verba (1996: 1), a means by which governing officials are informed of the
preferences and the needs of the public and are induced to respond to those
preferences and needs. In other words, system responsiveness to citizens
needs and preferences is the key normative issue being addressed. Although
this is what Riker (1982) referred to as populist democracy, I prefer to term
this the responsive model of democracy. This is more in keeping with Dahls
(1971: 2) strategy to reserve the term democracy for a political system one
of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost
completely responsive to all its citizens.
Drawing on classics such as Dahl (1956) and Downs (1957), most attention
within this model has been paid to party competition in general elections as a
means to bring about responsiveness (Miller 1983). Social choice theoretical
accounts distilled from all mediating mechanisms have also been proffered
(Elster 1986: 104112).The key contribution of Verba and Nie, then, was to add
another variety of citizen activity that could be conducive to responsiveness
namely political participation beyond voting and campaign activity (Verba &
Nie 1972: 2). In keeping with the elitist notion, however, participation is still
only considered as an indirect action vis--vis the policy outcomes. Thus, the
citizenry does not directly determine the outcomes themselves. Similarly, no
reference is made to the origins of the preferences and perceived needs upon
which citizens act. Relaxing these two conditions in turn brings us to the other
conceptions of participation.

Participation as direct decision making

From an etymological point of view, the term participation, in its democratic

context, refers to the act of taking part in person in the decision-making
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process (Sartori 1987: 113). This is also the meaning assigned to the word by
adherents of the so-called participatory model of democracy (Pateman 1970:
6771). Political participation, according to Gould (1988: 259), for example, is
characterized by direct and immediate involvement in the process of decision
making by the individuals concerned. Thus, in this process, the authority of the
individuals is not delegated to some representative but is exercised directly by
them. Or, in Barbers (1984: 151) words: [P]olitics in the participatory
mode . . . is self-government by citizens rather than representative govern-
ment. In contrast to seeing participation as an attempt to influence decision
makers, then, what participatory democrats have in mind is participation in
direct decision making (Nagel 1987: 19). However, this definition should not be
interpreted as an argument to abolish all representative institutions. What
participatory democrats suggest is instead to widen the opportunities for direct
participation by providing new arenas outside the traditional representative
system, mostly in small-scale settings. In her classic defence of the participatory
model Pateman (1970) almost exclusively deals with decision making in the
workplace, whereas Gould (1988: 260) speaks of local political institutions that
have the power to decide local issues. Thus, the point is to make citizens more
involved in solving community problems, even if this take place within a larger
framework of a representative democracy.

Participation as political discussion

The so-called deliberative model of democracy presents a challenge to the

view that peoples preferences are fixed and exogenous to the democratic
process (see, e.g., Habermas 1996; Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Bohman &
Rehg 1997; Elster 1998b). Whereas participatory democrats seem to remain
silent on this issue, advocates of both the extreme elitist and the responsive
models share the view that the aim of democracy is to aggregate individual
preferences into a collective choice (Miller 1992: 7578). Both Rikers liber-
alism and populism, then, lack a normative standard from which to evaluate
the process through which individual preferences are formed. To provide this
is the purpose of the deliberative theory of democracy.
Theorists of deliberative democracy argue over what should count as
deliberation. One point of controversy is whether deliberation is required to
be collective or could be carried out individually, weighing reasons and argu-
ments in a mental dialogue (Fearon 1998: 61). Another disputed issue is
whether deliberation is a way of making decisions or simply the process
through which individual opinions are formed. Elster (1998a: 8), for example,
defines deliberation as decision making by means of arguments, whereas
Chambers (1996: 171; emphasis added) claims it to be directed not so much
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at the decisions taken but at the formation of opinion which precedes deci-
sions. By defining participation within the deliberative model as political
discussion instead of deliberation, I believe both these contested issues can
be resolved (for a related argument, see Conover et al. 2002: 2325). As
argued by Fearon (1998: 63), while it makes sense to say, I deliberated on
the matter, it does not to say, I discussed the matter with myself. Since to
participate is to engage in some kind of collective endeavour, defining delib-
eration as discussion is more adequate as a concept of participation. More-
over, if we define deliberation as political discussion (i.e., as a process of
opinion formation rather than a procedure for decision making), we can
avoid blurring the line separating deliberative and participatory models of
democracy. This blurring partly stems from the fact that most forms of direct
decision making provide opportunities to take part in political discussions.2
The point in defining deliberation as political discussion is that discussions
aimed at forming opinions may occur even if no collective decision is to be
reached.
In sum, participation according to the responsive model is defined as an
attempt to influence those who have a say in government. According to par-
ticipatory democrats, by contrast, participation is to have a say in government
oneself. The deliberative model, finally, defines participation as a way of
finding out what to say. By defining participation in these three ways, a first
set of empirical questions drawn from democratic theory ensues. These ques-
tions are simply related to the level or amount of participation in a given
democratic polity. The more participation of each type that can be found, the
more satisfactory the result when evaluated from any of the three normative
perspectives. In order to avoid the perennial question of what level of par-
ticipation should then count as satisfactory, at least three comparative
yardsticks could be applied: comparing the amount of different types of par-
ticipation in the same polity, and comparing the amount of the same type of
participation in either different polities at the same time or in the same polity
over time.

Consequences of political participation

The three models of democracy, however, are not only probably not even
primarily interested in the levels or amount of participation. We can derive
a further set of empirical questions by interpreting each of the three models as
a best result theory of democracy. A best result theory holds that fair terms
of political participation are those that are likely to produce the most desirable
result (Beitz 1989: 20). This view of democratic theory is outcome-oriented. It
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involves a consequentialist approach to the evaluation of political participa-

tion in which a social state can be judged in terms of whether some desired
consequence of participation is attained. The three models differ, however, in
what particular consequences they prefer. Put differently, they offer different
arguments as to why political participation is desirable. The responsive model
prefers system responsiveness, leading to equal protection of interests at the
individual level, whereas the participatory model demands self-development.
The deliberative model, I shall argue, is concerned with the legitimacy of the
democratic system itself.

Influencing attempts and equal protection of interests

Advocates of more participation as influencing attempts generally view elec-

tions as too weak in transmitting information from citizens to the political
system. At the polls, the ordinary citizen must choose from bundles of policy
positions predetermined by the political parties. Some of these may reflect
their own views, but others may seem more remote. Moreover, institutional
constraints generally impair the formation of new parties potentially capable
of better incorporating the full set of policy views of citizens. When taking
part in other forms of political activity such as contacting officials and protest
behaviour, by contrast, citizens may express their views on one issue at a
time. The information thus transmitted could be much more specific and
targeted directly towards the actors responsible for dealing with the issue. In
this way, political participation conceptualized as influencing attempts should
make the system more responsive to citizens needs and preferences. At the
individual level, this means that citizens strengthen the protection of their
interests.
This outcome-oriented evaluative criterion is given its fullest account in
Verba et al.s (1995) volume on participation in America. Their title, Voice and
Equality, is suggestive in this regard. On the one hand, they are concerned with
voice: what preferences and needs are being transmitted to the political
system through acts of political participation? On the other hand, they assess
whether this voice is consistent with a principle of equality: are the activists
representative to the general public in terms of the preferences and needs they
transmit to the system? If not, the preferences and needs of each citizen are not
given equal consideration. Taken together, these two facets form a picture of
the degree of distortion in the participatory process. The more such distortion
there is, the more imperfect is the protection of citizens interests (Verba et al.
1995: esp. Chapters 68, 16).
There are three notable features of this evaluative criterion. First, the
requirement of democratic responsiveness adds something to the idea that
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elected officials should be attentive to any influencing attempts (cf. Manin

et al. 1999: 9). This additional element is expressed in Verba et al.s concern
for whose preferences and needs are expressed through participation. Suc-
cessful influencing attempts are a necessary but not sufficient condition of
democratic responsiveness. What remains is the requirement that the pref-
erences and needs expressed through participation should give an undis-
torted picture of the preferences and needs of the entire citizenry. In other
words, the normative standard could be stated more precisely as equal pro-
tection of interests.
Second, the interests that should thus be protected actually come in two
guises. According to Verba et al. (1995: 171), equal consideration should not
only be given to the expressed preferences of the public, but also to the needs
implicit in their social characteristics. We cannot dismiss demographic char-
acteristics from the list of characteristics that are potentially politically rel-
evant. . . . Apart from the explicit demands made by activist publics, there is
implicit information in their social characteristics. Admittedly the posited
link between implicit needs and social characteristics could be questioned.
It certainly adds complexity to the task of empirical measurement. Neverthe-
less, to add needs to the list of characteristics to which the political system
should respond is an important contribution. It makes the evaluative stan-
dard sensitive to what Lukes (1974) termed the third face of power: the fact
that a group of individuals might posses a common interest for some govern-
ment policy or social outcome even if that is not reflected in their manifest
preferences.
Third, however, what is lacking in Verba et al.s empirical account is the
actual impact assessment. In their own words, to demonstrate that policy
makers are responsive to what they hear from citizens is beyond the scope of
their volume (Verba et al. 1995: 30). In the earlier study by Verba and Nie, by
contrast, this second aspect of responsiveness was a central part of the story. By
deliberately designing their study so as to permit cross-sectional comparisons
between 64 target communities, the proposition could be tested that partici-
pation should make political leaders responsive to the citizens of their com-
munity. Their findings by and large confirmed the hypothesis. Higher levels of
participation did improve responsiveness, although only above a certain
threshold (Verba & Nie 1972: Chapters 1719).
It is a troubling fact that so little empirical work has been done to assess the
effects on responsiveness since. One explanation for this might be the prob-
lems involved already at the conceptual level.As pointed out by Verba and Nie
(1972: 301302) themselves, policy makers can be responsive to citizens in
many ways: They may be responsive in terms of knowing what the citizens
want, in terms of agreeing with those priorities, in terms of making an effort to
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deal with those priorities, or in successfully dealing with those priorities. For
reasons of data accessibility, Verba and Nie relied on the first three meanings
of responsiveness mentioned. In the only other study of the impact of partici-
pation known to me, responsiveness in the second sense was measured (Parry
et al. 1992: Chapter 17). From the perspective of normative democratic theory,
however, I would argue that the fourth meaning is what really matters. True,
the first three meanings may be regarded as important in some cases perhaps
even necessary conditions required for bringing about responsiveness in the
latter respect. All things considered, however, a democratic system could
hardly be considered responsive if it never successfully deals with the priorities
of its citizens.
In sum, the responsive model of democracy puts two questions on our
proposed research agenda. The first concerns the representativeness to the
general public of those who engage in influencing attempts. The second
relates to the impact of those influencing attempts on the actions taken by the
government or other institutions in society. In terms of research design,
answers to these questions would require data on preferences, needs and
activity at the level of individual citizens, supplemented with elite level data
from elected representatives and other key decision makers. Since respon-
siveness is an aggregate-level phenomenon, it must then be measured either
across time within the same democratic system, or simultaneously across
several systems. This would allow the necessary evaluation of the entire
linkage chain running from citizens needs and preferences, over preferences
expressed through participation, to preferences perceived, acted upon and
dealt with by the elites.

Direct decision making and self-development

Apart from their focus on direct decision making, the distinguishing feature of
participatory democrats is their argument that this kind of participation fosters
desirable personal and social qualities in democratic citizens (Dahl 1989: 92;
Warren 1992: 9, 11). According to Kaufman (1960), credited with being the one
who first coined the term participatory democracy, citizen participation is
crucial because it contributes to the development of human powers of
thought, feeling and action. Similarly, Pateman (1970: 42) argues that: One
might characterize the participatory model as one where maximum input
(participation) is required and where output includes not just policies (deci-
sions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of each
individual, so that there is feedback from output to input. Thus, self-
realization or self-development is the primary consequentialist criterion prof-
fered by participatory democrats (Macpherson 1977: 2; Gould 1988: 4042,
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4651, 287). The exact definitions of the concept of self-development vary, but
they all share an idea of a not fully realized potential in the human self that
could be transformed or even perfected through political participation
(Warren 1992).
Thus, there is again a straightforward causal proposition involved that is
derived from democratic theory. Does participation in direct decision making
foster self-development? Following Pateman (1970: Chapter 3), most
research in this regard has focused on the effects of participation on the
sense of political efficacy. However, some of the tests that have been per-
formed look at the effects of political participation defined as influencing
attempts (Finkel 1985, 1987; Stenner-Day & Fischle 1992). This misses the
point of the participatory argument. What is needed, of course, is an empirical
assessment of the alleged effects of direct decision making. In this respect,
there is some evidence that curbs the hopes of participatory democrats, but,
most importantly, this evidence is scarce (Sniderman 1975; Pedersen 1982). To
remedy this situation, experimental and case study research would most
likely be preferable in the future (Mansbridge 1997: 424; cf. Pedersen 1982:
558569). The reason is that we are dealing with propositions on the potential
nature of certain relationships. Participatory democrats argue that if oppor-
tunities for participation in direct decision making were widespread at the
workplace, in the neighborhood, in the local community or elsewhere then
self-development would ensue. It could be argued, however, that no demo-
cratic country in the world provides such widespread opportunities to the
population at large or at least that the cross-country variation is not large
enough to allow meaningful impact assessment. Controlled experiments or
well-designed case studies of participatory initiatives at the local or organi-
zational level, by contrast, could enable researchers to explore whether par-
ticipation in direct decision making really pays the psychological dividends
that participatory theorists claim.

Political discussion and subjective legitimacy

Deliberative democrats have presented several outcome-oriented arguments

on the effects to be expected from political discussions. The first is that giving
citizens widespread opportunities for discussion would increase the quality of
democratic judgements (Warren 1996: 46). This argument has been exten-
sively deployed in Fishkins (1991: 1; 1995: 4) defence of so-called deliberative
polls, which gives special credence to the idea that discussion leads to more
informed public opinion. A second line of reasoning tries to reconcile delib-
erative theories of democracy with models concerned with pure preference
aggregation, the argument being that what political discussion can accomplish
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is to make contestants in an argument agree about the dimensions over which

they disagree (Knight & Johnson 1994: 282283). As a result, the instability
and arbitrariness that bedevils any democratic mechanism for preference
aggregation, at least according to the social choice theory of democracy, may
be overcome (Miller 1992; Dryzek & List 2003). Third, and finally, deliberation
has been accredited with the capacity to bestow legitimacy on democratic
procedures and outcomes (Manin 1987; Cohen 1989; Habermas 1996).
I shall argue that these three views need not be incompatible, but that
assessing the third effect (i.e., on legitimacy) poses the most ultimate challenge
to deliberative democrats. One of the problems that have confronted theories
of democracy that assume fixed citizen preferences is what should make
people support a political system where they, in case of conflict, persistently
turn out to be on the loosing side. This is an especially salient issue within
deeply polarized societies, or within those characterized by a plurality of
cultural minorities (Barry 1979). The point put forward by deliberative demo-
crats, however, is that the relationship between outcomes and preferences is
the wrong place to look for such support. Instead, parties to the loosing side of
a persistent conflict may still comply if the arguments for both sides have been
heard and weighted; in other words, if the outcome is preceded by political
discussion. In the words of Gutmann and Thompson (1996: 4142): [E]ven
with regard to political decisions with which they disagree, citizens are likely to
take a different attitude to those that are adopted after careful consideration
of the relevant conflicting moral claims. Yet why should discussion yield this
desirable effect on the legitimacy of the outcome? One answer might be:
because it makes discussants more informed and more likely to agree about
the dimensions over which they disagree that is, the first two effects of
discussion posited above may, when seen from a wider perspective, be viewed
as possible mechanisms responsible for enhancing legitimacy.
As opposed to elitist or responsive theorists of democracy, then, the
source of legitimacy according to deliberative democrats is not the prede-
termined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is,
deliberation itself (Manin 1987: 351352). An important question, however,
is what legitimacy means in this case. Even if we agree upon a generic
definition such as moral acceptability, one must ask: moral acceptability for
whom? For an outside observer trying to assess the legitimacy of a certain
state of affairs, or for the participants operating within the system itself
(Weatherford 1992: 150151)? While the former type of legitimacy may be
termed normative or objective legitimacy, the latter should rather be
called subjective since it is based on a judgement of moral acceptability
made by each individual. Although Habermas (1996: 27) would probably
hold that democratic deliberation should ultimately promote both these
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forms of legitimacy, a more modest claim and more amenable to empirical

testing is that political discussion preceding a decision leads to a greater
acceptance of the outcome for the actors involved. In other words, that it
promotes subjective legitimacy.
In terms of research design, the ordinary opinion poll again suffers from
limitations when it comes to assessing this causal proposition. The main
problem is to gather reliable information on the real-life conditions under
which people engage in political discussions. In a controlled experimental
setting, by contrast, discussions held by the subjects of the experiment could be
observed, video-taped and subjected to careful examination. In addition, opin-
ions could be measured both before and after to enable an assessment of
changes in opinion structure and perceptions of legitimacy. Although the
so-called deliberative poll (Fishkin 1991, 1995) is an interesting innovation in
this regard, truly experimental designs hold more promise in successfully
isolating the effects of political discussion (see, e.g., Sulkin & Simon 2001). A
major drawback of the experimental set up, however, is the impossibility of
recreating all the crosscutting conditions that shape deliberation in an
ongoing political community (Chambers 2003: 318). Thus, the most promising
venue for future empirical studies on the effects of deliberation appears to be
combinations of either survey and experimental designs (Mutz 2002) or
surveys and community case studies (Conover et al. 2002).

Causes of political participation

Let us now turn to the other side of participation: the question of its causes.
Most empirical approaches to political participation have sought to explain
why some people engage in politics whereas others do not. The underlying
standard from which these explanatory models are assessed is their overall
predictive performance (see, e.g., Leighley 1995; Whiteley 1995). Seen from the
viewpoint of positive science, this is a perfectly justified way of proceeding;
however, if we are to take normative democratic theory as our point of depar-
ture, the perspective changes. In this section I shall argue that instead of
seeking to attain maximum overall explanatory power in our assessment of
what causes participation, we should try to ascertain whether certain specific
causes are supported by empirical evidence. More precisely, the evaluative
standard I shall propose involves determining whether political participation is
primarily driven by incentives or resources.
This view follows from a procedural interpretation of our three models of
democracy, rather than the best result version adhered to in the last section.
We are now no longer interested in the outcome of participation. What the
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procedural view entails is instead the idea that the terms of participation in
democratic procedures should themselves be fair (Beitz 1989: 22; emphasis
added). To identify the conditions under which the terms of participation can
be regarded as fair, we must make a critical distinction between opportunity
and realization; or, in Sens (1992) words, between the actual achievement
and the freedom to achieve. Achievement is concerned with what we
manage to accomplish, and freedom with the real opportunity that we have to
accomplish what we value. The two need not be congruent (Sen 1992: 31). In
other words, one could picture a situation where the rates of participation
were unequally distributed, and yet there were equal opportunities to par-
ticipate. This would be the case, for example, if those who did not participate
remained passive out of a free choice and not as a consequence of structural
constraints. Given the same incentives, they could have chosen to act just as
easily as the participants did; thus, if some citizens do not participate because
they freely choose not to be active . . . then participatory inequalities do not
compromise democracy (Verba et al. 1995: 2627).
By analogy with theories of justice, we could think of the causes that enable
citizens to participate as a distributive mechanism an allocation scheme
according to which some are entitled to the social goods called participation,
while others are not. What fairness in the terms of participation then requires
is a constraint on the design of this distributive mechanism (Beitz 1989: 17).
Following Dworkin (1981: 311), we could say that ideally the mechanism
generating political participation should be endowment-insensitive but
ambition-sensitive that is, whether people end up as participants or not
should depend on their ambitions (in the broad sense of goals and projects
about life), but should not depend on their natural and social endowments (the
circumstances in which they pursue their ambitions) (Kymlicka 1990: 75).
Although I prefer the terms resources instead of endowments and incen-
tives instead of ambition, this means we have two rival explanations for
political participation to assess. Are resources or incentives the prime mover?
What follows from this, then, is another normative standard from which to
evaluate the empirical world of political participation. This time the standard
is common to all three models of democracy.What differs between them is only
what kind of participation is being explained: influencing attempts, direct
decision making or political discussion. I will now discuss the two generic types
of causes resources and incentives in turn.

Resources: Physical, human and social capital

Broadly speaking, resources come in three forms: physical, human and social
capital (Coleman 1990: 304). Physical capital covers all material assets
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available to an individual. If we extend the concept to include financial

capital, factors like income, wealth and private property immediately come
to mind. With the rapid development of information technology, access to
equipment such as telephones, radios, televisions, fax machines, personal
computers, cell phones and Internet connections most certainly should be
added to the list of material factors conducive to participation. As indicated
by the proverb time is money, access to spare time could be counted as a
material asset as well.
Originally developed within economics, the concept of human capital is
normally used to signify human skills and capacities that enable action (Becker
1964). In the study of political participation, prominent examples include such
well-known determinants as education, knowledge and skills. Political knowl-
edge, we are told, is to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is
the currency of citizenship (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996: 8). Verba et al. (1995:
Chapter 11), in turn, elaborate on the concept of civic skills, by which they
imply linguistic facility, communication and organizational proficiency.
The notion of social capital, which has gained wide currency among politi-
cal scientists mainly through the works of Putnam (1993, 2000), may require
more than just a cursory note with regard to its conceptual meaning. The most
influential definition is no doubt the one given by Coleman (1990: 302): Social
capital is . . . not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two
characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure,
and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.
Social capital defined as social networks, then, is a social resource, not an
economic asset or a cognitive disposition. Unlike other forms of capital, social
capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among
persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of
production (Coleman 1990: 302). Although they might be empirically linked,
social resources and socioeconomic status must thus be treated as theoretically
separate entities (Campbell et al. 1986).
Leaving aside some of the disputed issues involved in this definition (see
Lin 2001: 812), I shall here concentrate on how it can be used to develop an
idea of social capital as a resource engendering participation. The basic idea is
simple: access to social networks increases the likelihood that a person is being
recruited to political participation (Knoke 1990: 1042; Verba et al. 1995:
Chapter 5; Teorell 2003).This could imply solicitations to join some influencing
attempt, some arena for direct decision making or some political discussion
group. As argued by Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992) among others, social
networks serve to structure the flow of information surrounding an individual.
Since large but loosely coupled networks link people to a wider context, access
to such networks increases the probability of being exposed to appeals for
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political action. Although the logic is primarily developed with reference to

informal networks, it might easily be taken to apply in the case of formal
groups as well. Involvement in multiple organizations increases the likelihood
of being reached by many diverse others (Granovetter 1973: 13621365, 1375).
Hence, it increases the likelihood of being recruited to participation.

Incentives: General and selective

Apart from having ample access to physical, human and social capital, people
must have a desire to take part. They must be both willing and able. More
formally, we can think of resources as the first of two successive filtering
operations. Among the full set of actions available to an individual, resources
work as a constraint that delimits a smaller set of feasible actions. Within this
smaller set, the second filter determines which action will actually be carried
out. This latter role is the one played by incentives (Elster 1989: 1314).
The literature on incentives for political action usually takes as its starting
point the provocative claim by Olson (1965) that rational actors should not
engage in activities oriented towards a common good. Since one could reap the
benefits of these general incentives even if others provide them, each individual
has a rational motive to abstain. The fact that people do engage in collective
endeavours must instead be explained with reference to selective incentives
that is, benefits that only accrue from the act of actually contributing to the
outcome oneself (Olson 1965: 51).
Whereas Olson was almost exclusively concerned with material benefits, a
range of other more psychic and less tangible selective rewards to political
participation have been suggested over the years (see, e.g., Rosenstone &
Hansen 1993: 1620; Verba et al. 1995: Chapter 4; Whiteley 1995; Finkel &
Muller 1998). One such set of factors may be termed process incentives:
people may participate out of sheer excitement, regardless of what outcomes
are at stake. A related selective reward is often called expressive incentives:
people may participate simply in order to express their support or reaffirm
their identity (Calvert 2002). Yet another set of selective incentives are
related to social norms (Elster 1989: Chapter 12; Coleman 1990: Chapters
1011). Both an internalized sense of duty to the wider community and norms
supported by the threat of social sanctions may engender citizen participation
(Knack 1992). While these selective incentives have primarily been developed
for explanatory models of participation defined as influencing attempts, they
easily translate to the other types of political participation as well. If people
were only to engage in direct decision making or join political discussion for
the pursuit of collective goals, then again any single individual seen in isola-
tion would be better off remaining inactive. Selective incentives such as
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 political participation and democracy 801

process incentives, expressive awards or norms could however still explain

why some do engage in these activities.

The interplay of resources, incentives and action

In sum, the two generic propositions as to what makes people engage in

politics are: because they have the resources and because they have the incen-
tives to do so. The most crucial test from a normative standpoint is whether
resources have a causal impact at all. To the extent they do, the mechanism
generating participation is not endowment-insensitive and, hence, the terms
of participation cannot be considered fair. Let me point out two caveats in this
evaluative approach, however. The first one concerns the nature of the rela-
tionship between incentives and resources. We can hardly assume they are
independent of each other (see, e.g., Elster 1989: 1620). To begin with, a
willingness to achieve could be used to invest in resources that are productive
for that purpose. An individuals holding of resources cannot be assumed
constant over the life cycle. It is not only affected by natural and social
endowments, but by ambition as well. To the extent that resources deliber-
ately accumulated in this fashion generate participation, the distributive
mechanism should still be considered fair. What needs to be assessed in this
situation, then, is only the causal impact of resources controlling for incentives.
The other scenario, that resources sometimes shape incentives, presents a
more severe difficulty. Yet there are numerous accounts of ways in which such
a causal mechanism might operate, the fable of the fox and the sour grapes
perhaps being the most famous one (Elster 1983). Incapacity for action
weakens the will for action, as does the opposite: more action opportunities
instigate more action. In other words, resources may affect participation indi-
rectly with incentives merely being the mediating mechanism. When this is
the case, the terms for participation are unfair since endowments still exercise
a causal (albeit indirect) impact. Thus, not only must the association between
resources and incentives be known, so must the direction of causality operat-
ing between them.
The second caveat presents a similar problem. We have hitherto assumed
that participation can be treated as fully endogenous in relation to its posited
causes. This need not be the case. The act of participation may in itself lead to
an investment in resources, be it physical, human or social capital. Similarly,
early experience of participation may affect the future willingness to partici-
pate again. To estimate the association between either incentives or resources,
on the one hand, and participation, on the other, without taking the possibility
of a reciprocal relationship into account, would again flaw our assessment of
the fairness of participation. Both these caveats provide strong support for
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experimental or panel designs in future research on political participation

(Finkel & Muller 1998). Only through random allocation of treatments or by
tracking the same individuals through time will it be possible to disentangle
the causal directions involved in the interplay of incentives, resources and
participation.

Conclusion: Toward an integrated agenda for political participation

studies

Some three decades ago Robert Salisbury (1975: 337) noted that: There are so
many good questions arising under the heading of political participation that
it would be foolish even to attempt a summary listing. Nevertheless, I shall
make such an attempt. In Figure 1, I summarize the theoretical framework
underlying this article, bringing together the empirical research questions
derived from all three normative models of democracy. In the central box, the
three conceptions of participation are located, bringing descriptive questions
pertaining to the distribution of political participation to the fore. Arrows then
signify the causal relationships that need to be assessed in order to evaluate the
state of political participation in a given collective entity abiding to democratic
principles. These arrows are either running to or from political participation
(capturing either its causes or its effects).
Common to all three models, when given a procedural interpretation, is
their definition of fairness in the terms of participation. Irrespective of whether
participation as influencing attempts, direct decision making or political dis-
cussion is being considered, incentives should be the causal force, not

Causes of participation Conceptions of participation Consequences of participation

Influencing attempts Equal protection of interests

Resources

Direct decision making Self-development

Incentives
Political discussion Subjective legitimacy

Figure 1. Causes, conceptions and consequences of political participation.

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 political participation and democracy 803

resources. Even if this was found to be the case in terms of direct effects on
participation, however, the possibility that resources have an indirect effect
must be taken into consideration, with incentives merely acting as an inter-
vening variable. For this reason, the possibility of a reciprocal relationship
between resources and incentives has been indicated. In a similar vein, the
causal effect running from resources and incentives to participation must be
disentangled from the effect running in the opposite direction.
In terms of the responsive model of democracy, the desired effect of politi-
cal participation is equal protection of interests. Individual needs and prefer-
ences should be translated into collectively binding decisions by means of
responsiveness to the preferences and needs expressed through participation.
These preferences and needs, moreover, should give equal weight to the inter-
est of each citizen. In contrast to all other effects indicated in the model, this is
an aggregate level proposition. Both the participatory and the deliberative
models primarily imply individuallevel effects of participation. In the case of
participatory democracy, what is required is a transformation of the personal
qualities of the human being, or self-development. Deliberative democrats, in
turn, are ultimately concerned with subjective legitimacy. They argue that only
when arguments from each contending side has been sifted through political
discussion will the outcomes of democratic decision making be morally accept-
able to the individual.
Participation studies in the past have clearly covered certain areas high-
lighted in Figure 1 better than others. In conceptual terms, political participa-
tion defined as influencing attempts have dominated the field. With respect to
consequences, the impact on equal protection of interest has attracted greater
attention than the individual-level effects on self-development and subjective
legitimacy, although, as was noted above, much work remains when it comes to
gauging the actual impact of influencing attempts on the behaviour of state
agents. By and large, the responsive model of democracy is better assessed
than both its participatory and deliberative counterparts. Both resources and
incentives loom largely in the empirical literature on the causes of participa-
tion (again concentrated on influencing attempts), but their theoretical status
has never been assessed in terms of fairness as suggested here (see, however,
Teorell, Sum & Tobiasen, forthcoming, for an attempt in this direction). This is
another important blind spot that should be addressed in the future agenda for
participation research.
Thus far I have only discussed how the research agenda proposes assess-
ments of the three models of democracy independent of one another. I have
also been ignoring ways to incorporate more than one evaluative dimension in
a single study. By relaxing both these constraints, we can take a first step
toward an agenda for political participation studies that integrates both
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normative models and evaluative criteria. First, whereas Figure 1 outlines the
main effects of each participation form posited in the literature, there are a
number of interesting side effects to explore that involve core concepts from
the other normative models. Some of these have been mentioned in passing
above. Thus, for example, most studies of self-development have been looking
at the effects of influencing attempts rather than direct decision making. More-
over, political discussions may have other effects than increased subjective
legitimacy, such as more informed citizens, which is a form of self-
development. Political discussions may also lead to more structured prefer-
ence orderings, which may facilitate the aggregation of interests into
collectively binding decisions. In other words, participation in political discus-
sion may promote the equal protection of interests.
Other causal propositions, never referred to above, now also present them-
selves. Through Patemans (1970: 2427) close reading of Rousseau, for
example, two new potential effects of direct decision making may be devel-
oped. One is based on the idea that the interests of individual citizens can
never be protected indirectly by elected representatives. They can only be
secured through participation in direct decision making. Thus by, for example,
comparing the representativeness of elected bodies with local boards of citizen
self-management, one could assess a causal arrow running from participation
in direct decision making to the equal protection of interests.A second hypoth-
esis is that participation in direct decision making has a legitimizing effect. This
proposition is based on the idea that citizens are only willing to accept the
outcome of decision-making processes of which they have been a part.
Whereas these steps to integrate the separate components of Figure 1 have
been taken vertically, there are also horizontal linkages to explore. Most
importantly, explorations of the causes of participation could be incorporated
into the assessment of its effects. A promising first attempt in that direction
was undertaken by Verba et al. (1995: 465) in their study of how the process
by which people come to participate affects the substance of what is commu-
nicated through their participation. A similar strategy might be employed
with respect to the development of subjective legitimacy. The deliberative
model of democracy is generally considered to suffer from a scale problem in
that most ordinary citizens will never be able to take part in the political
discussions preceding large-scale decisions (Dryzek 2001; Parkinson 2003).
Yet perhaps it is not the actual participation in political discussions that
matters for subjective legitimacy, but the causes leading to that participation?
According to this view, the outcome of political decisions are accepted as
legitimate when opportunities for participation have been provided to those
who have incentives to take part, and not in relation to their access to
resources. It could be left open for investigation, moreover, whether it is the
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 political participation and democracy 805

causal mechanisms regulating peoples participation in political discussions,

direct decision making or influencing attempts that have the strongest impact
on subjective legitimacy.
Needless to say, to answer all the questions implied by this research agenda
presents a tremendous challenge to political scientists. The ideal research
design would include comparative cross-sections, panel studies and community
case studies of citizens and elites, as well as controlled experiments. This is not
the place to dwell on the methodological challenges lying ahead. Suffice it to
say that the proposed agenda probably requires a collective endeavour that
goes far beyond the scope of any single research project.
If this research agenda was actually pursued to its end, could the results
affect our evaluation of the three normative models of democracy? Most
probably, but in different ways. Empirical research can of course never deter-
mine the desirability of responsiveness, self-development or subjective legiti-
macy. That is an issue to be dealt with by political philosophers (Held 1987: 7,
196197). What positive political science can contribute to normative philoso-
phy are, however, systematic tests of the means-to-ends relationships some-
times implied by normative argument. The participatory theory of democracy
in particular is a case in point. According to Pateman (1970: 42), the justifica-
tion for a democratic system in the participatory theory of democracy rests
primarily on the human results that accrue from the participatory process. If
we are to take this quotation seriously, and if no empirical support for such
human results can be found, the justification for participatory democracy
would, by implication, be undermined. Deliberative democrats would also
suffer if it could be established that discussion, even under ideal conditions, is
not conducive to subjective legitimacy. As argued above, however, deliberation
has been justified in other instrumental terms than its alleged effect on sub-
jective legitimacy. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the efforts to
reconcile deliberation with the responsive model of democracy, the argument
being that discussion could be a way to avoid voting cycles and other impos-
sibility theorems inherent in the responsive model.
What about the responsive model? Would it be affected if it could be
shown that influencing attempts do not promote responsiveness? This is the
consequentialist proposition where most evidence has been mustered thus
far. Somewhat ironically, however, the normative justification for this model
seems to be the one least affected by empirical results. Advocates of respon-
sive democracy would probably see no reason to abandon their ideal due to
discouraging empirical results as regards the effects of participation. I believe
the explanation for this is an important difference between this model and
the other two. As alluded to already in the labeling of their models, both
participatory and deliberative democrats take a certain preferred form of
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806 jan teorell

participation (i.e., direct decision making and political discussion) as their

normative point of departure. Their main concern is then how this particular
activity can be defended. The same is not true for responsive democrats. Their
core concept is responsiveness itself, while participation in influencing
attempts is merely one possible means to reach this ultimate end. Should
participation turn out to be inconsequential or even detrimental for demo-
cratic responsiveness, responsive democrats could turn their attention to
other means, such as competitive elections, instead.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Per Adman, Axel Hadenius, Jrgen Hermansson, Mats

Lundstrm and Curt Rftegrd for helpful comments on earlier versions of
this article. Work on this article was made possible by the research project
Demokratins Mekanismer, funded by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary
Foundation.

Notes

1. In effect, Verba and Nies conception is narrower than the more general definition of
political participation as action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some
political outcomes (Brady 1999: 737) since political outcomes may be determined by
other than government personnel (see, e.g., Norris 2002: 193194). However, Verba and
Nie (1972: 2) were aware of this limitation in that they saw governmental decisions only
as a close approximation of the more general process of political decision making (see
Teorell, Torcal & Montero, forthcoming).
2. Barber (1984), for example, is most commonly treated as a participatory democrat,
although he also pays attention to preference formation and the importance of citizen
dialogue.

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Address for correspondence: Jan Teorell, Department of Political Science, Lund University,
Box 52, S-22100 Lund, Sweden. Sweden. E-mail: jan.teorell@svet.lu.se

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