ANG PING v.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA

G.R. No. 75860, 17 September 1987, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
temporary restraining order of the ejectment case ordered by the metropolitan trial court of
Manila or the preliminary injunction to stop such implementation of the said case by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Contradictory decisions where rendered by the lower courts
concerned regarding the disputed premises involving the Camp of Ang Ping and Pimentel, the
new owner of the disputed property acquired from a sale by T&L Development Corporation,
previous owner of the property and is occupied by Julio and Zenaida Ko of which they were
lessees even before the sale was done. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila ordered the
camp of Julio Ko to vacate the disputed premises in favor of the petitioners and pay the latter
a monthly rent of 5,000 pesos fromMarch 1, 1981 until after they vacate the area less the
other payments that were settled.However, RTC granted partially a motion for
reconsideration by respondents lowering the ruled amount to be paid by them. The
petitioners then, filed a motion to reconsider the decision of the RTC; however, their petition
were denied so it resorted them to go back to MTC of manila and filed a motion for execution
of the judgement rendered by the said court regarding the case.
Thus, respondents opposed the motion because of the grounds that the RTC decided to nullify
the previous sale of the property, of which is said to be contrary to Article 19 of the Civil
Code,ordered the petitioners to sell the 190 square meters of land they had purchased from
respondents upon paying them 190,000 Pesos by Julio Ko. However, the said grounds by the
respondents were denied by MTC manila and still ordered the execution of the ejectment
case.Moreover, a petition was filed, of which is still pending by the camp of Ang Ping in the
Court of Appeals regarding the nullification of the sale

ISSUE:
Whether or not an execution of a judgment ordering to vacate a disputed property will be
superseded by a decision rendered by a superior court ordering the nullification of sale and
granting the legal redemption in favor of the respondents

RULING:
No, such decision of a superior court will not in any case supersede the decision of an inferior
court for the reason that both decisions are tackling an entirely different matter.Unlawful
detainer is a case concerning material possession while an action for reconveyance of a
property is an issue of ownership.However, the court reiterated that a lower court has no
capacities to interpret or reverse a decision of a higher court. Wherefore, the Supreme Court
deemed that they have the final say in the matters of any justifiable controversy. On the other
hand, the court said that the issue here is to settle the execution of the decision in the
ejectment case and that on the matters of the nullification of sale and reconveyance of
property should be decided by the proper courts and both parties have equal chances of
winning. Moreover, they found that such decision of the RTC was improperly issued and that
they side the petitioners. The court have ruled to immediately execute the decision of the
ejectment case, sets aside the orders concerning the injunction of such and deemed that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration regarding this matter.
The issue in this petition is whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment
case which has gone all the way to the Supreme Court may be stayed by a trial court on the
ground of a supervening event, namely a decision by a regional trial court ordering the
nullification of sale and title and granting legal redemption in favor of the private
respondents.

On November 13, 1985, in G. R. No. 70581, (Ang Ping, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al.), we issued a resolution which reads in part:

On October 25, 1983, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment in an
ejectment case filed by the petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel against private
respondents Julio Ko and Zenaida Ko. The trial court ordered the respondents to vacate the
disputed premises, pay P5,000.00 a month in rentals from March 1, 1981 until they vacate
minus whatever payments may have been made in the meantime, and pay P3,000.00
attorney's fees and costs.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the decision was affirmed in toto on March
26, 1984.

On July 5, 1984, RTC Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco partially granted a motion for reconsideration
by reducing to P500.00 monthly rentals, the rate of monthly rentals agreed upon from June,
1979 or earlier when the respondents and their parents were leasing the premises from Uy
Chaco Sons and Co., Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Manila sustained the MTC findings that
B.P. No. 25 is not applicable because (1) the monthly rental is more than then P300.00 rental
covered by the law and (2) the respondents use the (sic) commercial reasons and not for a
residence. The Urban Land Reform Law, P.D. 1517 was likewise not deemed applicable, a
finding impliedly accepted by the respondents when they abandoned this ground.

(p. 9, Rollo)

We resolved affirmatively the issue of whether or not the October 25, 1983 decision of Judge
J. Cesar Sangco in the ejectment case was valid. Instead of remanding the case for a re-
promulgation of the same judgment, this Court affirmed the decisions of the courts below as
modified, i.e. reducing the P5,000.00 per month rentals to their pre-litigation level of P500.00
per month.

After a motion for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment was made, the
petitioners returned to the metropolitan trial court where they filed a motion for execution
of the judgment. The private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that a complaint
for annulment of sale which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila had, in the
meantime, been decided in their favor.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 13911 declared null and void the sale by
the earlier owner, T & C Corporation, to the petitioners on grounds of equity under Article 19
of the Civil Code and ordered the petitioners to sell 190 square meters of the land they had
purchased to the respondents upon Julio Ko's paying them P190,000.00. The petitioners filed
a motion to set aside and/or reconsider the decision.

According to a manifestation filed September 1, 1987, the motion for reconsideration was
denied, whereupon the matter was raised to the Court of Appeals where the case is now
pending.

Going back to the ejectment case, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila denied the
respondents' opposition and granted the motion for execution.

On April 28, 1986, respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer
for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the
writ of execution in the ejectment case. It is the preliminary injunction issued by Branch 40 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 86-35622 which is now before us.

The bases for the decision in the ejectment case are summarized by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila as follows:

Defendants contend that they cannot be ejected because: (1) they are subsisting lessees at
the time of the purchase of the property in question by the plaintiffs from T & L Development
Corporation, under Sec. 5 of B.P. No. 15; (2) plaintiffs' need of the leased premises is not for
use as a residential unit as required by said law, but as an office and bodega; and (3) since
they were not given an opportunity to exercise their right of first refusal before the leased
premises were sold to the plaintiffs, the sale thereof to the latter is null and void and in fact
filed a complaint for annulment thereof on that ground.

As to the first two grounds the basic issue is whether or not B.P. No. 25 is applicable to this
case. The coverage of said law is defined in Sec. 7 thereof according to which said law applies
only to "All residential units the total monthly rental of which does not exceed three hundred
pesos (P300.00) as of the effectivity of this Act ..." The undisputed fact is that at the time of
the purchase of the premises in question defendants were paying a monthly rental of
P500.00. Moreover, it is even doubtful whether the leased premises may be considered as a
residential unit under Sec. 2(b) of B.P. No. 25, considering that defendants are undeniably
using the same for commercial purposes because it is there where they do business under the
name of Johnson Blacksmith & Machine Shop.

As to the third ground, while it is not necessary to resolve it, it is just as obvious that P.D. 1517
is likewise not applicable, as correctly pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff and as indicated
by the plaintiff and as indicated by defendants' abandonment of this ground.

Since neither B.P. No. 25 nor P.D. 1517 are applicable, the settled rule that a month to month
contract of lease is a contract for a fixed period, expires at the end of every month and may
be terminated on any month, applies. Plaintiff did so when it served notice of termination
thereof dated February 20, 1981, effective 30 days thereafter.
Premises considered the court finds and so declares that plaintiffs have satisfactorily
established their causes of action. (Annex J, Rollo, p. 75-76) (Rollo, pp. 5-6).

On the other hand, the decision in Civil Case No. 139111, nullifying the sale in favor of
petitioners Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel is based on a finding that justice and equity would
be served by allowing Julio and Zenaida Ko to buy the properties already sold to the
petitioners.

Among the findings in Civil Case No. 139111 are:

(1) Julio Ko has been operating his Johnson Blacksmith and Machine Shop in the disputed
premises since 1965.

(2) The respondents have religiously paid the monthly rentals of P500.00 for the
premises.

(3) The respondents were never informed that T & L Development Corporation intended
to sell the premises. They claimed a right to priority in the purchase of the lot and the
corresponding part of the building and on April 24, 1981 deposited with Equitable Banking
Corporation the amount of P192,161.78 in trust for Ang Ping for the redemption or
repurchase of the lot and apartment door sold to Ang Ping and Carmen Pimentel.

The court stated that there is nothing legally wrong in an owner of a leased property selling
it without notifying the tenant. However, it found a failure of the owner and the buyers to
observe honesty and good faith because other tenants were informed of the proposed sale
but not Julio and Zenaida Ko.

The petitioners raise two grounds for the allowance of their petition, namely:

The respondent court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order of April 28, 1986 and the Order of May
16, 1986, denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the MTC
of Manila (Rollo, p. 13)

The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, thereby depriving the petitioners
of the fruits of their legal victory through the implementation of the final and executory
decision. (pp. 13 and 18, Rono)

The petitioners contend that the decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
the nullification of sale and title and reconveyance case does not as yet confer on the
respondents any enforceable right whereas this Court has already entered judgment in the
ejectment case.

The petitioners also point out that we were fully aware of the pending nullification and
reconveyance case because the same was brought to our attention in G.R. No. 70581. Yet, we
denied a motion for reconsideration of our decision in the petition for review of the ejectment
case.

We agree with the petitioners.

The principle enunciated in Ramirez v. Bleza (106 SCRA 187) applies. We ruled in Ramirez:

Moreover, the pendency of Civil Case No. R436, an "accion publiciana", where ownership is
concededly the principal issue, (Rollo, p. 59.) before the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro, does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
R184, where the action was for forcible entry and the only issue involved was the material
possession or possession de facto of the land under litigation. Such action which involves the
title over the premises is entirely independent from forcible entry. (at p. 194)

Justice Ramon C. Aquino was more emphatic in his concurrence:

I concur. Respondent judge of first instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in preventing
the execution of the final and executory judgment of the municipal court in the ejectment
case on the flimsy pretext that another possessory action was pending in his court involving
the same land.

The judgment of the municipal court is res judicata as to the issue of possession de facto but
it not conclusive as to the title or ownership (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pealosa v.
Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).

Possession and ownership of a parcel of land may be held by different persons. The winning
party is entitled to the execution of the municipal court's final judgment as to possession. The
enforcement of that judgment would not cause "chaos and confusion". (id. at p. 195).

In De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 520), we had a similar ruling:

We find no merit in petitioners' aforesaid submission. An unlawful detainer action has an

entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in
unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto;
whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency
of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or
municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will
it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved
is material possession or possession de facto. (Ramirez v. Bleza, L-45640, July 30, 1981, 106
SCRA 187).

This is so because:
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with
respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title
to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. (Section 7,
Rule 70, Rules of Court).

The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings
designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. (Republic v. Guarin, supra). It does not admit of a delay
in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation.
(Mabalot v. Madela, Jr., 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and
reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot
override substantial justice. (Dakudao v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877). So much so that
judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent
further damages arising from loss of possession. (Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167). (At pp.
527-528).

As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that "the only function
of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one
of issuing the order of execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret
or to reverse the judgment of the higher court."

This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states with
finality how the particular case before it has been resolved. We ruled in Tugade v. Court of
Appeals (85 SCRA 226):

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in
any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey.
It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (L-31589, July
31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a
constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure
stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with
finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the
judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit." (ibid., 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel
in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in
Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be
reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration,
has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There
is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings."
(Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila [Branch VI], L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.) (at pp. 230-231).
We refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the decision in the nullification of
sale and reconveyance of property case. The merits will have to be threshed out by the proper
court on a full consideration of the evidence and the law upon which it is based. Our decision
here is limited to the execution of the decision in the ejectment case.

From the foregoing, it is plain that the law is on the side of the petitioners. The injunction was
improperly issued.

Do the equities of the case warrant a disregard of established precedents? It is true that the
private respondents would suffer painful consequences if they are ejected now only to be
reinstated if they eventually win the nullification of sale case. However, the petitioners are
also suffering an injustice. The ejectment case in their favor was decided as early as 1983. The
regional trial court affirmed the decision. The Intermediate Appellate Court ruled that the
promulgation of the trial court's decision was defective and ordered it repromulgated but this
Court set aside the appellate decision and reinstated the metropolitan trial court and regional
trial court decisions.

There being no final decision in the annulment of sale case, the petitioners have equal
chances with the private respondents of also winning that case. The private respondents
cannot claim to have overriding considerations of equity on their side, sufficient to stop the
execution of a final judgment in the ejectment proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders dated April 28, 1986 and May 16,
1986 of the respondent court are SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court is ORDERED to
immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. No motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration of this decision will be granted.

SO ORDERED.