CASE NO.

1:

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES BANAL

G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

SPOUSES VICENTE and LEONIDAS BANAL, Respondents.

Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of

the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge.

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal are the registered owners of

19.34 hectares of agricultural land situated in Camarines Norte
covered by TCT No. T-6296.

A portion of the land consisting of 6.23 hectares (5.47 of which

is planted with coconut and 0.76 planted with palay) was compulsorily
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to R.A.
No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Adm. Order No.

6, (s. 1992) as amended by A.O. No. 11, (s. 1994), Landbank valued the
property at P173,918.55.

Spouses Banal rejected the above valuation. A summary

administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land; it
affirmed the Landbanks valuation.

Dissatisfied, spouses Banal, filed with RTC (Br. 40) of Daet,

Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition
for determination of just compensation against DAR and Landbank. They
prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare or an aggregate
amount of P623,000.00.

The trial court computed the just compensation for the coconut
land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of
P703,137.00 and awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash.

It based the same on the facts established in another case

pending before it: Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.

Forthwith, Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for review. The Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto
the judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Can a court summarily take judicial notice of records of other

cases pending in or which have been tried by the same court?

HOLDING:

NO. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR

adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. In the

Page 1 of 69
proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of
Court.

In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider

several factors enumerated in R.A. 6657:

1) cost of acquisition of the land

2) current value of like properties
3) nature, actual use and incomet
4) sworn valuation by the owner
5) tax declarations
6) assessment made by government assessors
7) social and economic benefits
8) non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution

These factors have been translated into a basic formula:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1).

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and
the fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the
property.

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take

judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection
and with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining
here. The RTC applied the Rodriguez case to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of
the parties.

While the determination of just compensation involves the

exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be
discharged within the bounds of the law.

Page 2 of 69
CASE NO. 2:

GARCIA vs. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001 PANGANIBAN, J.

GRACE J. GARCIA, Petitioner,

REDERICK A. RECIO, Respondent.

Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and

judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.

FACTS:

In 1987, Rederick Recio married Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen. In 1989, a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree of divorce
was issued by an Australian family court.

In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. In 1994, he married

Grace Garcia, a Filipina. Since 1995, Recio and Garcia separated de
facto. In 1996, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage in the RTC of Cabanatuan City (Br. 28) on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of Recios prior marriage to Samson
only in 1997. Recio averred that in 1993, he had revealed to Garcia
his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.

In 1998, Recio was able to secure a divorce decree from a family

court in Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down.
Thus, he prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action. To which the OSG agreed.

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground

that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Can Philippine courts take judicial notice of a foreign divorce

decree?

HOLDING:

NO. The Supreme Court states that: It is well-settled in our

jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden

of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,

the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed

Page 3 of 69
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of

May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.

The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to

petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is not

necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,

who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. Neither can we grant
petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
on the ground of bigamy. WHEREFORE we REMAND the case to the court a
quo.

Page 4 of 69
CASE NO. 3:

REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION and GERVEL, INC. vs. QUA

G.R. No. 144413, July 30, 2004 CARPIO, J.

REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION (RGC) and GERVEL, INC., Petitioners,

LAWRENCE C. QUA, Respondent.

To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in

the same case in which it is offered.

FACTS:

Petitioners and Respondent were stockholders of Ladtek, Inc.

Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Development
Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) with its stockholders as
sureties.

Among themselves, the stockholders executed Agreements for

Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks. The Agreements
all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladteks loans,
the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any
sum that any might pay to the creditors.

Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of General Milling

Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. It served as security
for the payment of any sum which RGC and Gervel may be held liable
under the Agreements.

Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP.

Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel
and Qua.

RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million, hence, Metrobank

executed a waiver and quitclaim in favor of RGC and Gervel.
Thereafter, a joint motion to dismiss the Collection Case against RGC
and Gervel was filed.

RGC and Gervel demanded payment from Qua of P3,860,646 or 42.22%

of the total as reimbursement, which the latter refused; hence, they
sent notices of foreclosure of Quas pledged shares.

Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application

for a TRO. RTC of Makati (Br. 63) issued a TRO, but denied the Urgent
Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale. RGC and Gervel eventually
foreclosed all the pledged shares of stock at public auction. Thus,
Quas application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction became
moot.

After trial on the Foreclosure Case, the trial court ordered RGC
and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. On motion
for reconsideration, RGC and Gervel, RTC reversed and set aside its
earlier decision.

Quas MR was denied, hence, he appealed to the CA. The CA

reversed the 2nd ruling of the RTC and reinstated its 1 st ruling.
Hence, the present petition.

Page 5 of 69
ISSUE:

Is Qua estopped from claiming that the other solidary debtors,

RGC and Gervel, did not pay the entire loan obligation; as he is bound
by his judicial admission in the Collection Case?

HOLDING:

NO. RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making
conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua cannot
now claim that the payment made to Metrobank was not for
the entire obligation because of his Motion to Dismiss Collection Case
where he stated that RGC and Gervels payment was for the entire
obligation.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in

relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the
estoppel in his favor.

On the party to be estopped, such party:

1) commits conduct amounting to false representation or concealment
of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are inconsistent with those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert;
2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at
least influence the other party; and
3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.

On the party claiming the estoppel, such party:

1) has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth
on the facts in question;
2) has relied, in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the
party to be estopped;
3) has acted or refrained from acting based on such conduct or
statements as to change the position or status of the party
claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice.

In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.

While Quas statements in the Collection Case conflict with his

statements in the Foreclosure Case, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to
show that Qua, in making those statements, intended to falsely
represent or conceal the material facts. Both parties undeniably know
the real facts. Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel
relied on Quas statements in the Collection Case such that they
changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or
prejudice.

RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court on Judicial Admissions to support their stance:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings

filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal
or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other
stages of the judicial proceeding.

Page 6 of 69
 The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua
made conflicting statements in the Collection Case and in the
Foreclosure Case, and not in the same case as required in Section 4 of
Rule 129.

To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in

the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in
another court, the fact of such admission must be proved as in the
case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it
is entitled to greater weight.

Page 7 of 69
CASE NO. 4:

PEOPLE vs. YATAR

G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004 PER CURIAM

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", Appellant.

Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as

to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. The DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

FACTS:

The 17-year old victim, Kathylyn Uba, lives with her grandmother,
Isabel Dawang in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. On June 30, 1998,
Kathylyn was left alone in the house because her grandmother left for
their farm in Nagbitayan (2 km away).

Anita Wania (Kathylyns aunt) and Beverly Deneng stopped by the

house of Isabel and they saw appellant Joel Yatar (the husband of
Kathylyns aunt Luz) at the back of the house, allegedly getting
lumber.

Around noon, on her way home from Nagbitayan, Judilyn Pas-a

(first cousin of Kathylyn) saw appellant (wearing white shirt with
collar and black pants) descend the ladder from the second floor of
the house of Isabel and run towards the back of the house, where he
paced back and forth.

She again saw him in the afternoon when he called her near her
house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue
pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he
had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that
appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." When Judilyns husband
approached them, appellant immediately left.

In the evening, Isabel arrived home and found that the lights in
her house were off. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the
house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was
tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in
the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.

Kathylyn was found sprawled on the floor naked, with her

intestines protruding out of her stomach. Isabel cried for help.
Relatives and neighbors came to offer assistance and the police were
called to the crime scene.

The police discovered the victims clothes beside her naked

cadaver and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any

knowledge of Kathylynss death; however, he was placed under police
custody. Appellant tried running away, but he was recaptured.

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with

Homicide, and was sentenced to Death; hence, this automatic review.

Page 8 of 69
ISSUE:

Is DNA evidence admissible in evidence and sufficient to warrant

the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?

HOLDING:

YES. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as

a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. In human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.

Subsequent DNA Testing showed that the semen found in the vagina
of the victim matches the gene type of the appellant when he submitted
himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March
30, 2000, in the presence of his counsel.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should

consider, the following factors:
1) how the samples were collected,
2) how they were handled,
3) the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and
6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on her testimony, it was determined
that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that
of the extracts subject of examination.

Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics
and molecular biology.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends

that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
right against self-incrimination. This contention is untenable. The
kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.

Moreover, independently of the physical evidence, there were

several circumstances in this case, which were properly appreciated by
the court a quo to warrant the appellants conviction.

The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in

light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. There is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, if: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Page 9 of 69
CASE NO. 5:

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

REYNALDO DE VILLA, Petitioner,

JUNE DE VILLA, Petitioner-relator,
THE DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS, Respondent.

DNA evidence of non-paternity by the accused of a child born to the

victim of the crime of rape does not affect his conviction, but it may
nonetheless affect the award of child support imposed against him

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1994, the 12-year old victim Aileen Mendoza

woke up in her familys rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to
find petitioner Reynaldo de Villa (her uncle by affinity)on top of
her.

She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her
mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. He succeeded in
inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions
with his body, petitioner ejaculated.

This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileens pregnancy, which

was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza. It was then revealed that
she was raped, prompting her parents to bring her to the Pasig Police
Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was
eight months pregnant. On December 19, 1994, Aileen prematurely gave
birth to an 8-month old baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.

Petitioners defenses: (1) Old age (67 years old) and sickness
rendered him incapable of having an erection (2) Aileens family had a
grudge against him, (3) Alibi, he was in San Luis, Batangas.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of
the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. Hence, the
automatic review to the SC.

In petitioners brief, he sought the conduct of a blood type test

and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was
implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001 affirming
petitioners conviction for rape.

Reynaldo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, wherein he

once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. This was denied with
finality; hence, the Decision became final and executory.

Three years after the promulgation of the 2001 decision, June de

Villa, the son of Reynaldo alleged that he was unaware of the
availability of DNA testing during the trial of the case and was only
informed about it during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioners case.

Page 10 of 69
 Undaunted, June, asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo
and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new,
sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the
sample home and gave it to June, who immediately labeled the cup as
Container A.

June then gathered samples from four (4) grandchildren of

Reynaldo, placed them in separate containers with distinguishing
labels, and temporarily stored them in a refrigerator. During
transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory, the containers were kept on
ice.

June requested the National Science Research Institute (NSRI) to

conduct DNA testing on the samples, including that of Reynaldo. The
preliminary report dated March 21, 2003, showed that Reynaldo could
not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested due to
the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyn's.

Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus with a prayer for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

ISSUE:

Does DNA evidence entitle the accused to outright acquittal, or

if already convicted and incarcerated, to avail of the extraordinary
writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy?

HOLDING:

NO. In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ

of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The
ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to
allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered
evidence.

It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity

is not central to the issue of petitioners guilt or innocence. The
rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question,
separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child.
(People vs. Alberio: Pregnancy is not an essential element of the
crime of rape).

The grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our

Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victims claim
that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given credence
by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this
Court on automatic review.

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ is
unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court which, having
duly acquired jurisdiction was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.

The writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a

post-conviction remedy. In the case of Feria vs. CA, we ruled that

Page 11 of 69
review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only if:
1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the restraint of a person;
2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void
as to such excess.

In the case at bar, petitioner invokes the writ to assail a final

judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on
which to anchor his petition. Clearly, mere errors of fact or law,
which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not
correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Even in the light of the sudden withdrawal of appearance of the

petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Alfonso Salvador (leaving for US
for an indefinite period of time), there was no such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a
constitutional right.

On the other hand, a motion for new trial, under the Rules, is
available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited
grounds, that is, it may be filed at any time before a judgment of
conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its
promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a
motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition has long

attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as
January 16, 2002. Moreover, the DNA evidence does not fall within the
statutory or jurisprudential definition of newly-discovered evidence.

Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the

trial, it does not meet the criteria such that the evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Junes claim that he was unaware of
the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no
weight with this Court.

Even with all the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence

presented by petitioner and his counsel, Reynaldo is not entitled to
outright acquittal. His conviction could, in theory, still stand, with
Aileen Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases.

Page 12 of 69
CASE NO. 6:

HERRERA vs. ALBA

G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005 CARPIO, J.

ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner,

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA,
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Respondents.

Where the evidence to aid investigation of the paternity and

filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established
by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

FACTS:

On May 14, 1998, Rosendo Alba (13 y/o) as represented by his

mother, Armi Alba filed before the RTC of Manila, a Petition for
Compulsory Recognition, Support and Damages against Rosendo Herrera,
the putative biological father of Rosendo Alba.

Herrera denied being the biological father of Rosendo Alba as he

also denied physical contact with Armi Alba.

Hence, Alba filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity

testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, she
presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. to the effect
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.99% in establishing
paternity.

Herrera opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has

not gained acceptability and it violates his right against self-
incrimination.

On February 3, 2000, the trial court granted the Motion. Herrera

filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
June 8, 2000. Herrera appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC. Herreras motion for reconsideration was
again denied, hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Is DNA test, a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to

determine filiation?

HOLDING:

YES. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to

adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as in this case. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child.

There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional

paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.

Page 13 of 69
 In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the
four aspects, namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

Under the Family Code, illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children, to wit:

1) record of birth;
2) admission of filiation in a public or private document;
3) open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child; and
4) any other means allowed by the Rules or and special laws.

Under the Rules on Evidence, an act or declaration about

pedigree, and family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
recognized.

Under jurisprudence, what incriminating acts are acceptable as

evidence to establish filiation includes:

1) A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is

admitted by the putative father;
2) Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth; and

There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood

grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive
on paternity.

Neither the Frye-Schwartz nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is

controlling in the Philippines. At best, American jurisprudence merely
has a persuasive effect on our decisions.

Section 49 of Rule 130, on the opinion of a witness on matters

requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training; does not
pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when
it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.

Page 14 of 69
CASE NO. 7:

AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005 CORONA, J.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS, Minor MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE represented by his
mother FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, Respondents.

DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and

authoritative form of evidence gathering.

FACTS:

Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Arnel Agustin, the
alleged biological father, for support and support pendente
lite before the RTC of Quezon City.

Fe and Arnel shared an amorous relationship resulting in Fes

pregnancy in 1999. Arnel suggested an abortion which Fe refused and
gave birth to their son Martin, out of wedlock in 2000. Martins
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.

Arnel also shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses, but

later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his
financial capacity. He even suggested having Martin be committed for
adoption.

At one time in Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. In
2001, Fe was diagnosed for leukemia and since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. Thus, the action for support.

In his Answer, Arnel admitted that he had a relationship with Fe

sometime in 1993, but it ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception in 2000. He ended the same because Fe had one other secret
lover by the name of Jun and she became obsessive.

Arnel also claimed that his signature and CTC in the

acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC
erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was
actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have
been 1964.

Fe moved for a DNA paternity testing. Arnel opposed said motion

by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He
also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, which the CA affirmed.

Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

1) Can support be converted to a petition for recognition?

2) Can DNA paternity testing be ordered in a proceeding for support
without violating the constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination?

HOLDING:
Page 15 of 69
 NO. On the first issue, the assailed resolution and order did not
convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement.

NO. On the second issue, historically, it has mostly been in the

areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of
privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue.

Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his

argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy
holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights
elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in
any way being violated.

If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake

can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in
this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by

fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication
of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.

Page 16 of 69
CASE NO. 8:
PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656. May 9, 2002 PER CURIAM

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

GERRICO VALLEJO, Accused-Appellant.

An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available,

provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime.

FACTS:

In the afternoon of July 10, 1999, 9-year old victim, DAISY

DIOLOLA, was last seen going to her tutor/neighbors house, AIMEE
VALLEJO, the sister of accused-appellant GERRICO VALLEJO.

The victims mother, MA. NIDA DIOLOLA noticed that her daughter
was not yet home at around 5:30 p.m., so she began looking for her
until the early morning of the following day.

About 10:00 a.m. of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead
body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by
the river after the compuerta of a certain Freddie Quinto.

Witnesses accounts placed the accused-appellant near the crime

scene coupled with his odd behavior during said encounters with them.

One Jessiemin Mataverde testified that she saw Daisy went away
with the accused-appellant, and she saw him again at a store and
noticed that both his shorts and shirt were wet.

Another witness, Charito Yepes, testified that she met accused-

appellant near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked
troubled, and that he did not even greet them, which was unusual. She
also testified that accused-appellants shorts and shirt were wet, but
his face and hair were not.

Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for

questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting, were also taken
into custody. The bloodstained shirt and shorts were recovered from
Vallejos house and were turned over to the NBI for laboratory
examination.

Vallejo also confessed to Municipal Mayor Renato Abutan that he

killed the victim by strangling her, but claimed that he was under the
influence of drugs. He even executed a handwritten confession inside
his cell.

Blood samples (type O), buccal swabs and hair samples were taken
from the accused-appellant and these were compared with the vaginal
swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy. The
clothing of the victim and that of accused-appellant were also
analyzed.

After trial, RTC-Branch 88 of Cavite City found accused-appellant

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentenced him to DEATH. Hence, this automatic review.

Page 17 of 69
ISSUES:

1) Is the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution

sufficient to secure the conviction of accused-appellant?
2) Are the confessions of the accused-appellant admissible in
evidence?

HOLDING:

YES. On the first issue, an accused can be convicted even if no

eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence
is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the crime.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:

1) there is more than one circumstance;

2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more

often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the
crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at
the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify
against the perpetrator.

Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand

direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity
of the perpetrator is unreasonable.

Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his

garments were not proven to have been that of the victim as the
victims blood type was not determined.

The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by

Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellants and the
victims clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type A.

He also questions the validity of the method by which his

bloodstained clothes were recovered. There is no showing, however,
that he was coerced or forced into producing the garments; he
voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police and becomes
more convincing when considered together with his confessions.

The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than

that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is
weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are
not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and
probative force may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the
court. This is how it is in this case.

YES. On the second issue, accused-appellant challenges the

validity of the confessions he made. A careful perusal of the records
of this case clearly shows that there was no violation of the accused-
appellants constitutionally guaranteed rights. These confessions were
made spontaneously and voluntarily. No one forced or coerced the
accused-appellant into executing such confessions.
CASE NO. 9:

Page 18 of 69
 TORRALBA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 153699, August 22, 2005 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

CIRSE FRANCISCO CHOY TORRALBA, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Tape recording is admissible in evidence if a proper foundation has

been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording.

FACTS:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called Tug-

Ani ang Lungsod (Tell the People) which was aired over the radio
station DYFX in Cebu City. Four (4) criminal cases for libel were
filed against him by Atty. Manuel Hontanosas, which were later
consolidated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City.

Prosecution witness, Segundo Lim, one of the incorporators of the

Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc.(TMSI) testified that Torralba
requested TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program, which was approved
by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then its president.
However, due to the incessant criticisms hurled by Torralba against
former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Deputy Director Tomas Toledo
and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector, TMSI ceased
the sponsorship, which only lasted for a month.

Soon thereafter, Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the

minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging higher
handling rates than what it was supposed to collect. On December 17,
1993, Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in Torralbas radio program to
explain their side, but the assault on TMSIs management persisted.
This prompted Lim to ask his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim to record
Torralbas radio program as contained in three (3) tape recordings.

Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear

petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the
tape recordings presented to him by Lim.

Despite Torralbas continuing objection to the admission of the

said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person
who actually made the recordings, the trial court admitted the same.
The tape recording dated April 11, 1994 marked as Exhibit D
containing the statement, to wit:

These Hontanosas, Agapito Hontanosas and Castor

Hontanosas are collaborators during the war. In other words,
they are traitors to the land of their birth. x x x The
father of Manoling Hontanosas had treacherous blood.

was used to convict Torralba of one charge of libel for the

unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late CFI Judge Agapito
Hontanosas, father of Atty. Hontanosas. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the trial courts decision with modification as to the
penalty and award of damages. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Is a tape recording which was not authenticated by the person who
actually recorded the same, be admissible in evidence?

Page 19 of 69
HOLDING:

NO. The Supreme Court held that:

In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that

before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative
value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:

1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking

testimony;
2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the
recording;
4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been
made;
5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
6) identification of the speakers; and
7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made
without any kind of inducement.

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the

criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings.

In the case at bar, the proper foundation for the admissibility

of the tape recording was not adhered to because Shirly Lim, the
person who actually recorded Torralbas radio show on April 11, 1994
was not presented by the prosecution as a witness.

According to Justice Ricardo Francisco, Evidence of a message or

a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when
the identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of
a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech, or by the
witness recognition of the voice of the speaker.

The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness
saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on
April 11, 1994. Lims bare assertion of being near the radio while his
daughter was recording the radio broadcast is entirely different from
actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice of
the speaker. What further undermines his credibility is the fact that
he had an ax to grind against Torralba as he was previously accused by
the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty
as charged by the court.

Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the

testimony of Atty. Hontanosas in the light of his declaration that he
did not listen to Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He
simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence

against Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of
the CA due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of libel.

Page 20 of 69
CASE NO. 10:

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994 PADILLA, J.

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ROMEO ZAMORA (RTC-Branch 94 of Quezon City)
and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, Respondents.

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to

challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, however, where it
is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez was married to petitioner

Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez.

On May 2, 1990, Rafael filed a complaint for annulment of

marriage with damages on the grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of Teresita with Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City.

Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were three (3) cassette

tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and
unidentified persons.

Teresita made her Objection thereto. But the trial court admitted
all of Rafael's offered evidence. Teresitas motion for
reconsideration was also denied, hence, she filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA denied the petition, for two basic reasons: (1) Tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se; and (2) A petition
for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed
error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.

From this adverse judgment, Teresita filed the present petition

for review before this Court.

ISSUE:

Is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals?

HOLDING:

YES. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not

available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently

erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

Page 21 of 69
 In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order
admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent including
tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with
unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained
when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire
tap his home telephone.

Clearly, respondents, RTC and CA failed to consider the

provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility
of the subject tapes is mandatory under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wire Tapping Law. WHEREFORE, the subject cassette tapes are
declared inadmissible in evidence.

Page 22 of 69
CASE NO. 11:

RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 KAPUNAN, J.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA, Respondents.

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is

applied according to its express terms; and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice.

FACTS:

Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in

the amount of P610,000.00 against private respondent Ester S. Garcia
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

This case originated from a confrontation in Garcias office on

February 22, 1988, wherein the latter allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated Ramirez in a hostile and furious mood, and in a manner
offensive to ones dignity and personality.

In support of her claim, Ramirez adduced in evidence a tape

recording of the private conversation.

As a result of Ramirez' recording of the event and alleging that

the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia
filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash (MTQ) the Information on the

ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, which was
granted.

Hence, Garcia filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme

Court (SC), which referred the same to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA ruled that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the MTQ, which is correctible by certiorari. Ramirez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (MR), which was denied; hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE:

Does Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 apply to the taping of a private

conversation by one of the parties to the conversation?

HOLDING:

YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 provides that: It shall be

unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it

illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any

Page 23 of 69
private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication.

Moreover, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a

violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200.

Finally, the phrase "private communication" is broad enough to

include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the
usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most,
if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do
not wish to expose. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.

Page 24 of 69
CASE NO. 12:

NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999 MENDOZA, J.

FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The Anti-Wiretapping Law does not prohibit the recording of a

communication which was not done privately.

FACTS:

On the night of February 4, 1990, prosecution witness Stanley

Jalbuena and the victim, Enrique Ike Lingan who were reporters of
the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan,
went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing
nude dancers.

Jalbuena took a picture of the scantily clad dancer as she

removed her brassieres. The floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a
security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and threatened to kill
him.

When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he
ran out of the joint followed by his companions. They went to the
police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty,
including petitioner Felipe Navarro, were having drinks in front of
the police station, and even asked them to join in, which they
declined.

Meanwhile, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle; they were

met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around
fifteen minutes.

Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena, pushed him to

the wall, and hurled angry remarks at him. At this point, Lingan
intervened saying that they were only there to mediate. Navarro turned
to Sgt. Aonuevo and instructed him to make an entry against Jalbuena
and Lingan, which angered Lingan and challenged Navarro to a fist
fight.

As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with
the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the
floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena, telling him that he was a

living witness that it was Ike Lingan who challenged him first, then
poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his
name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature as his
right hand was trembling so he simply wrote his name in print.

Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro

to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital where he died from his injuries.

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on

tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City found petitioner Felipe Navarro

Page 25 of 69
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE:

Is the tape admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits

wire tapping?

HOLDING:

YES. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the

conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.
This is further corroborated by the tape recording.

The Anti-Wiretapping Law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting,

or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. In the

instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape
presented by the prosecution.

The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there

was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the
placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena;
and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner
Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the
body of Lingan, issued a medical certificate, and her testimony
clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck
him on the forehead with his fist.

Page 26 of 69
CASE NO. 13:

PEOPLE vs. CALICA

G.R. No. 139178, April 14, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

FLORENCIO CALICA, Appellant.

The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the evidence of the accused.

FACTS:

Spouses Igmedio and Dominga Pispis resided at Barangay Malabuan,

Makilala, Cotabato with their two daughters, one of whom was Dolores.
The Pispis family lived in a hut that stood on a rubber plantation.

At around 1:00 a.m. of December 23, 1986, Dominga was awakened by

a call at the door. She peeped through the unfinished portion of the
wall of their house and saw their neighbor, Rolando Gonzales, his
hands tied at the back, and an armed man positioned in front of their
door.

Two more men, similarly armed, stood beside the house, firearms
pointed towards it, while still two others were sitting on a carabao
sled nearby. The armed men wore bonnets over their heads.

The armed men took her husband away. Dominga recognized one of
the men as the appellant, Florencio Calica, who also happened to be
her husbands second cousin and a member of the Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF) of Bato, because his bonnet was loosened and it was a
moonlit night.

In the meantime, Lorena Valdez was with her family at their house
in Barangay Villaflores, Makilala, Cotabato her husband Luis Valdez,
Jr., her brother Joseph Montilla, and her young children. Suddenly,
armed men wearing masks came and took her husband and her brother
away.

The next day, the lifeless and hogtied bodies of Igmedio Pispis,
Rolando Gonzales, Luis Valdez, Jr., Joseph Montilla, and Carlito
Rolluda were found near a quarry in Malabuan.

In his defense, apellant Calica presented his neighbor Elpidio

Asidre and his brother-in-law Rudy Llanado as witnesses. They both
testified that apellant Calica was with them from 8:00 a.m. of
December 22, 1986 until 3:00 p.m. the following day, helping in the
preparations for the death anniversary of Asidres mother, and in the
drinking spree which followed suit. Asidre resided at Barangay Bato,
Makilala, Cotabato, which was about ten (10) kilometers away, or a
three-to-four hour hike to Barangay Malabuan, as the road was very
difficult and one has to pass two (2) mountains to get there.
Furthermore, he has no motive to kill the victim especially that the
latter is his second degree cousin.

Agustin Alonzo and Elias Palog, both members of the CHDF

testified that they personally knew apellant. That in the morning of
December 22, 1986, Commander Pedro Lopez arranged a meeting to pick up
some people who are suspected members of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
including Pispis who was a member of the Hukbalahap. They also
testified that Calica was not among the group who was with Lopez. This

Page 27 of 69
was also the gist of the testimony of Alfredo Aca from whom the armed
men asked for directions to the house of Pispis.

The trial court convicted Calica for the crime of murder. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Was the prosecution able to prove that the appellant was one of
those who abducted Igmedio Pispis from his house on December 23, 1986,
and killed him shortly thereafter?

HOLDING:

NO. In criminal prosecution, accusation is not synonymous with

guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The probative weight of an in-court identification is largely

dependent upon an out-of-court identification. To resolve the
admissibility and probative weight of an out-of-court identification
of suspects, the totality of the following factors must be
considered, viz.:
1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime;
2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification;
5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

The totality of circumstances test has been designed precisely to

assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional
requirement of due process in regard to out-of-court identification
and to prevent the contamination of the integrity of an in-court
identification.
A suspect may be positively identified by his face, physical
attributes, voice, mannerisms and body movements. In several cases,
the Court has ruled that the suspect may be identified by the
illumination by starlight and by the light of the moon.

Proof of the crime charged and the identity of the

suspect/suspects may consist of direct evidence and/or circumstantial
evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that Igmedio was

abducted by five armed men wearing bonnets over their heads at about
1:00 a.m. in front of his house on December 23, 1986. Even the
appellant presented evidence that the perpetrators were Pedro Lopez,
the Commander of the CHDF, and his men who suspected that Igmedio was
a member of the NPA.

However, we find the identification of the appellant as one of

the abductors and killers of the victim dubious and unconvincing.
Consequently, we acquit the appellant of the crime charged.

It is inconceivable how Dominga could have seen the appellants

face when only his eyes and mouth were visible through the bonnet he
wore over his head. Even if the bonnet of the appellant was "loose,"

Page 28 of 69
his face could not have been exposed, unless he was not wearing it, or
it was rolled up and merely covered his head.

Moreover, if Dominga could not identify her husband in broad

daylight from the pictures shown to her because of her blurred vision,
we find it hard to believe that she was able to recognize the
appellant at night with his bonnet on, even if there was moonlight.

Equally unreliable is the testimony of Dolores that she saw the

face of the appellant because his bonnet was loosened as she watched
from inside their hut, looking out from the unfinished portion of the
wall. In contradiction, Dominga testified that her two children were
asleep and they were not awakened by the commotion.

Page 29 of 69
CASE NO. 14:

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARCOS

G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004 CARPIO, J.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS, Respondents.

The absence of the original copy of the documentary evidence casts

suspicion on the existence of said document considering the banks
fiduciary duty to keep efficiently a record of its transactions with
its depositors.

FACTS:

On two occasions in 1982, private respondent Leonilo Marcos made

two (2) time deposits with petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation
(PBC) in the amount of P664,897.67 and P764,897.67, respectively,
earning interests at 17% per annum. PBC issued an official receipt for
the first time deposit and a letter-certification by Branch Manager
Florencio Pagsaligan for the second one.

In 1983, Marcos wanted to withdraw his time deposits and the

accumulated interests to buy materials for his construction business
L.A. Marcos Construction Company. However, the bank through
Pagsaligan persuaded him to keep his time deposits intact and instead
to open several domestic letters of credit (LOC).

Marcos was then required to give a marginal deposit of 30% of the

total amount of the LOC and his time deposits would secure the
remaining 70% by way of a Deed of Assignment in favor of the bank.
Since Marcos trusted PBC and Pagsaligan, he signed blank printed forms
of the application for the domestic LOC, trust receipt agreements
(TRAs), and promissory notes (PNs).

Marcos executed three (3) TRAs totaling P851,250; therefore, his

obligation to PBC was only P595,875 representing 70% of the LOC. He
argued that if only PBC applied his time deposits and the accumulated
interests to his remaining obligation, he would have paid completely
his debt.

Thereafter, PBC filed a complaint for violation of P.D. No. 115

or the Trust Receipts Law against him. PBC further alleged that Marcos
obtained another loan from them in the amount of P500,000 with
interest at 25% per annum covered by PN No. 20-979-83 dated October
24, 1983, which Marcos denied having contracted. Hence, in 1989,
Marcos filed with the trial court a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against PBC.

During the trial, three hearing dates were postponed on account

of PBCs failure to produce its witness, Pagsaligan. On these
scheduled hearings, PBC also failed to present other evidence such as
when ordered by the trial court to produce the original copies of the
loan application and PN No. 20-979-83, PBC instead presented only the
machine copies of the duplicate of these documents.

The trial court also noted some discrepancies such as:

1) Marcos signature on the two documents are merely initials unlike

in the other documents submitted by PBC;

Page 30 of 69
 2) It is highly unnatural for PBC to only have duplicate copies of
the two documents in its custody;
3) The address of Marcos in the documents is different from the
place of residence as stated by Marcos in the other documents
annexed by PBC in its Answer;
4) Pagsaligan made it appear that a check for the loan proceeds
of P470,588 less bank charges was issued to Marcos but the checks
payee was one ATTY. LEONILO MARCOS and, as the trial court noted,
Marcos is not a lawyer; and
5) Pagsaligan was not sure what branch of the bank issued the check
for the loan proceeds.

Moreover, PBC did not have a ledger of the accounts of Marcos or

of his various transactions with the bank and it did not issue a
certificate of time deposit to Marcos. Due to these considerations,
the trial court found in favor of Marcos.

The Court of Appeals sustained the factual findings of the trial

court in ruling that PN No. 20-979-83 is void. There is no evidence of
a bank ledger or computation of interest of the loan. Hence, the
present petition.

ISSUE:

Can mere photocopies be given evidentiary value, when there is no

explanation as to why the original documents cannot be had?

HOLDING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled in this wise:

The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree

of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. As the
banks depositor, Marcos had the right to expect that the bank was
accurately recording his transactions with it. Upon the maturity of
his time deposits, Marcos also had the right to withdraw the amount
due him after the bank had correctly debited his outstanding
obligations from his time deposits.

PBC failed to produce the best evidence which is the original

copies of the loan application and promissory note. The Best Evidence
Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is
merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as
the original evidence can be had. Absent a clear showing that the
original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, the photocopy must be disregarded, being unworthy of any
probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.

What PBC presented were merely the machine copies of the

duplicate of the loan application and promissory note. No explanation
was ever offered by the bank for its inability to produce the original
copies of the documentary evidence. The bank also did not comply with
the orders of the trial court to submit the originals.

The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best

evidence is the prevention of fraud. The absence of the original of
the documentary evidence casts suspicion on the existence of PN No.
20-979-83 considering the banks fiduciary duty to keep efficiently a
record of its transactions with its depositors. Moreover, the
circumstances enumerated by the trial court bolster the conclusion
that PN No. 20-979-83 is bogus.

Page 31 of 69
CASE NO. 15:

SPOUSES DIOSO vs. SPOUSES CARDEO

G.R. No. 150155, September 1, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.

SPOUSES RAMON and FELICISIMA DIOSO, Petitioners,

SPOUSES TOMAS and LEONORA CARDEO, Respondents.

Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence.

FACTS:

The subject property, Lot 248-A with a total area of 222 square
meters, is located along F. Gomez St., Sta. Rosa, Laguna. It was
originally owned by Magno Eraa, the father of petitioner Felicisima
Dioso, respondent Leonora Cardeo, Natividad, Julieta, and Encarnacion
Javel.

It was later on partitioned into two, whereby the outer portion

became the property of respondent spouses Tomas and Leonora Cardeo
where they built their house in 1972. Whie, the interior portion
became the property of Encarnacion (deceased) who sold it to Felicidad
Legaspi who, in turn, sold the same to petitioner spouses Ramon and
Felicisima Dioso.

Petitioners wanted to build their new house on their interior

portion and demanded from respondents, a right of way under the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay ng Paghahati executed between Leonora and
Encarnacion on May 29, 1977.

Respondents refused, hence, petitioners filed with the RTC of San

Pedro, Laguna, a complaint for specific performance and/or easement of
right of way with damages.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the genuineness

and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was
falsified.

According to them, Leonora and Encarnacion could not have claimed

co-ownership over Lot 248-A as early as 1977, because it was only on
August 27, 1992 that the other siblings waived or renounced their
shares over the said property.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, noting that

the petitioners presented only a photocopy or machine copy of the
purported document and they were not willing to pay the indemnity for
the easement to which the respondents are entitled to.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial courts decision.

The petitioners witness, Veneranda Legaspi, merely testified that she
did not know why only a photocopy of the said document was given to
her by her mother, Felicidad Legaspi, from whom the petitioners
acquired the interior one-half portion of Lot 248-A.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the CA, a motion for

reconsideration/new trial based on newly discovered evidence thereby
submitting:

Page 32 of 69
 1) Tax Declaration No. 51637 for the year 1992 covering Lot 248-A in
the name of respondent Leonora Cardeo where reference to the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay was annotated at the dorsal portion
thereof;
2) A photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, certified by the
Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna as having been verified
with the original document kept by Encarnacion Javel;
It likewise, certified that the Pinanumpaang Salaysay had
been presented to the Office in connection with the issuance of
respondent Leonora Cardeos Tax Declaration Nos. 51637 and 51638
covering Lot 248-A; and
3) Affidavit of Magtanggol Yldeso, one of the witnesses to
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, attesting to the circumstances
surrounding its execution and identifying the signatures
appearing thereon

However, this motion was denied. The CA reasoned that the

documents proffered by the petitioners, i.e., Tax Declaration No.
51637, Yldesos affidavit and the Municipal Assessors certification,
could not be considered as newly discovered evidence. Had the
petitioners exercised due diligence in securing these documents, they
could have easily been made available at the time of the filing of the
complaint or even before the case was elevated to it. Hence, the
petitioners now seek relief from this Court.

ISSUE:

Were the petitioners able to establish the existence of

the Pinanumpaang Salaysay by secondary evidence, despite the non-
admission of the copy certified by the municipal assessor?

HOLDING:

YES. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides

that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof
further states that [W]hen the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or

unavailability of the original document is thus warranted upon
satisfactory proof of the following:
1) execution or existence of the original;
2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in
court; and
3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the
part of the offeror.

Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent

loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence.

Admittedly, in this case, the original document of

the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was not presented during trial. However, the
petitioners presented a photocopy thereof, as well as testimonial
evidence to prove its due execution and the loss or unavailability of

Page 33 of 69
the original document. Specifically, the existence and due execution
of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was established by Yldeso, one of the
petitioners witnesses, who testified that he was one of the witnesses
to the execution thereof and that his signature appears thereon.

Moreover, the unavailability of the original document was

established by Veneranda, daughter of Felicidad Legaspi, who bought
Encarnacion Eraas portion of Lot 248-A and eventually sold it to the
petitioners. She testified that they exerted efforts to locate the
original Pinanumpaang Salaysay, to no avail.

Further, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 13, 1984,

executed between Encarnacion Eraa Javel and Felicidad Eraa Legaspi,
covering the formers portion of Lot 248-A, Annex B for the petitioners
and admitted in evidence by the trial court, expressly mentioned
the Pinanumpaang Salaysay.

Clearly then, since there was proof of the due execution of

the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, and that, despite earnest efforts on their
part, the petitioners could not produce the original thereof, the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said
document was justified. Furthermore, contrary to the trial courts
findings, the petitioners had sufficiently laid down the basis for the
introduction of secondary evidence.

The rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the

contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by
a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the
recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated. The trial court
and the CA, therefore, erred in denying the admission of a photocopy
of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, when the same may be properly considered
as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof.
Interestingly, except for the perfunctory denial of the due
execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay contained in their answer, the
respondents never categorically denied the existence or the presence
of their signatures thereon when they took the witness stand. In fact,
when the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration/new trial
with the CA, submitting therewith a copy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay,
certified by the Municipal Assessor of Sta. Rosa as a faithful
reproduction of the original document kept by Encarnacion Javel, the
respondents did not refute the same. Even in their comment and
memorandum filed with this Court, the respondents did not
categorically deny the existence and execution of the said
document. To the Courts mind, this is an indication of the genuineness
of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay.

Page 34 of 69
CASE NO. 16:

REPUBLIC vs. MASONGSONG

G.R. No. 162846, September 22, 2005 CALLEJO, SR., J.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

JOSE AND JUANITO MASONGSONG y LUBIS, Respondents.

The offeror is not obliged to prove the loss or destruction of the

original document beyond all possibility, as it is enough to prove a
reasonable probability of such loss.

FACTS:

The late Serapio Lubis is allegedly the owner of a parcel of land

(6,146.85 sq. m.) denominated as Lot No. 8500 located in Batangas.
Cadastral Decre No. 639024 was purportedly issued in his name on June
21, 1937.

Serapio died on December 12, 1940, he was succeeded by his

daughters, Angela and Gregoria. Gregoria died on April 26, 1977,
leaving behind two (2) daughters, namely, Corazon and Milagros.
Subsequently, on October 29, 1989, Angela died; and she was succeeded
by her six (6) children: Alberto, Nicanor, Jose, Juanito, Arsenia, and
Lourdes.

The heirs of Serapio and their successors-in-interest decided to

adjudicate among themselves said property. They caused the re-survey
of the said property and a survey plan was prepared by geodetic
engineer, Gregorio Pesigan. A deed of extrajudicial settlement of
intestate estate was made on December 31, 1999.

At this juncture they found out that then Bureau of Lands (now
LRA) has no existing or salvaged records of the above-mentioned
Cadastral Decree in the name of Serapio Lubis and they were issued a
Certificate to this effect.

On December 28, 2001, brothers Jose and Juanito Masongsong,

children of the late Angela Lubis filed a petition before the RTC of
Lipa City to nullify Cadastral Decree No. 639024 in the name of their
grandfather and to issue a new Decree in their name.

The trial court gave due course to said petition and set it for
hearing on February 4, 2002. All interested persons may appear and
show cause why the petition should not be granted. A copy of the
petition and the Order dated January 4, 2002 were served upon the
Register of Deeds, the City Prosecutor, and posted in three (3)
conspicuous places, namely, at the Lipa public market, Lipa City Hall
and at Brgy. Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas.

The OSG did not file its opposition. During the hearing, the
petitioners submitted the following evidence in support of their
claim:

1) Technical description of the land as certified by the Director of

the Bureau of Lands (August 13, 1998);
2) Tax declarations covering the property in the name of Serapio
Lubis, from 1968 to 1994;
3) Certification from the LRA dated May 29, 1998, stating that after
due verification of the record book of cadastral lots in its
custody, it was found that Decree No. 639024 was issued on June

Page 35 of 69
 21, 1937 covering Lot No. 8500 of the Cadastral Survey of Lipa
and Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, based on a decision in Cad. Case No.
24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296;
4) Certification by the Register of Deeds of Batangas stating that
there was no existing or salvaged record of the certificate of
title covering Lot No. 8500;
5) Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that per its records, Lot No. 8500 located
in Barangay Calingatan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, is not covered
by any kind of public land application or patent; and
6) Certified true copy of page 88, Cadastral Decree Book, Cadastral
Decree Section, LRC, showing that Decree No. 639024 covering Lot
No. 8500 based on the decision, Cadastral Case No. 79-1 was
issued on June 21, 1937.

On May 29, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision granting the
petition. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA, arguing that the
petitioners failed to adduce evidence of the purported cadastral
decree issued in favour of their predecessor-in-interest and that no
notice was served upon the adjoining lot owners. On March 15, 2004,
the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC and
dismissing the appeal of the OSG. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Is the failure of the petitioners in this case to present in

evidence the assailed cadastral decree or at least a copy of the
decision granting said decree be excused on the mere presumption that
the same has been lost or destroyed during World War II?

HOLDING:

NO. The respondents, as the petitioners in the RTC, were burdened

to prove the following: that the court had rendered the decision in
LRC Case No. 24, LRC Cad. Record No. 1296 covering Lot 8500 in favor
of Serapio Lubis, and that as such, Decree No. 639024 was issued on
June 21, 1937 in favor of Serapio Lubis.

The respondents were burdened to adduce in evidence the original,

or even a certified copy directing the issuance of a decree to prove
its contents. As provided for in Section 3 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, secondary evidence may be adduced in such a case when the
original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror.

Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Rule states that: When the

original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

The offeror is not obliged to prove the loss or destruction of

the original document beyond all possibility, as it is enough to prove
a reasonable probability of such loss. This may be done by a bona
fide and diligent search, fruitlessly made in places where it is
likely to be found.

The respondents failed to adduce evidence that the decision of

the court and the decree were in favor of Serapio Lubis, and failed to

Page 36 of 69
present a certified copy of the LRA decision in LRC Case No. 24. They
even failed to adduce in evidence the original or certified true copy
of the courts decision in favor of Serapio Lubis. They could have
secured a copy of the decision from the court or from the LRA, but
failed to do so. There is even no showing that the court records in
LRC Case No. 24 and the copy of the decision transmitted to the Land
Registration Commission (now the LRA) were missing, lost or destroyed.

Additionally, the Court notes that the respondents failed to

adduce proof that from 1937 until 1968, Serapio Lubis, or after his
death, his heirs, ever declared the property for taxation purposes
under his/their names and paid the realty taxes therefor. There is
even no evidence that Serapio, or his heirs after his death, ever took
possession of the property from 1937. Inexplicably, it was only in
1968, long after Serapios death, that the property was declared for
taxation purposes under his name. Moreover, Jose Masongsong took
possession and cultivated the property only in 1970.

Page 37 of 69
CASE NO. 17:

NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 146267, February 17, 2003 QUISUMBING, J.

NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES

and/or CATHY NG, Petitioners,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)

and VIRGINIA M. PUBLICO, Respondents.

FACTS:

On February 8, 1995, petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia

Publico as a sewer. Under the terms and conditions of her employment,
Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but required to work from 8:00
A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00 daily.

At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be

allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not feeling well due
to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused but nonetheless,
Publico went home. The following day, Publico called up her employer
and notified management that she was still recovering from her
ailment.

On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. However, the security

guard prevented her from entering the NYK premises, allegedly on
managements order. It was only when Publico declared that she would
just complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the guard
let her in.

Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner,

Stephen Ng. She was instead asked to come back the following day. It
was when she found out that she was dismissed due to her refusal to
render overtime service. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Petitioner Corporation and its
manager, petitioner Cathy Ng.

Before the Labor Arbiter (LA), petitioners alleged that Publico

did not report for work on May 7, 1997 because her husband did not
allow her to work at night. As night work is a must in their line of
business, particularly when there are rush orders, petitioners claimed
that given Publicos failure to render overtime work, they were left
with no other recourse but to fire her.

The LA held Publicos dismissal to be illegal and ordered

respondents to reinstate her to her former position with full
backwages from the date her salary was withheld until she is actually
reinstated. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA in
toto.

Petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil

action of certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The
appellate court dismissed the petition outright. because there was
non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified xerox
copy of the assailed NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy
thereof as required by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioners
failed to attach the other pleadings and documents pertinent and
material to their petition, such as the parties position papers,

Page 38 of 69
their evidence and the motion for reconsideration in contravention of
the said rule.

The petitioners motion for reconsideration has been denied,

hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Can a special civil action for certiorari before the CA be

dismissed based on purely technical grounds, i.e., that the attached
copy of the NLRC decision is a mere photocopy of the original
decision?

HOLDING:

NO. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 3-96, a certified true

copy is such other copy furnished to a party at his instance or in his
behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or
representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified. It
must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the issuing
entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true
copy, and not a mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an
annex to the petition or other initiatory pleading.

Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the

disputed document although stamped as certified true copy is not an
authenticated original of such certified true copy, but only
a xerox copy thereof. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright pursuant to
paragraph 5 of the same Administrative Circular, which provides: That
it shall be the duty and responsibility of the party using the
documents to verify and ensure compliance with all the requirements
therefor. Failure to do so shall result in the rejection of such
annexes and the dismissal of the case. Subsequent compliance shall not
warrant any reconsideration unless the court is fully satisfied that
the non-compliance was not in any way attributable to the party,
despite due diligence on his part, and that there are highly
justifiable and compelling reasons for the court to make such other
disposition as it may deem just and equitable.

This Court is not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for

compelling reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural defects in
order to correct a patent injustice made. However, petitioners here
have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule.
Petitioners are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil
action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable
as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it
only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the law and the Rules.

Page 39 of 69
CASE NO. 18:

DE VERA, ET AL. vs. SPOUSES AGUILAR

G.R. No. 83377, February 9, 1993 CAMPOS, JR., J.

BASILIO, LUIS and FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA

represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., Petitioners,

SPOUSES MARIANO and LEONA AGUILAR, Respondents.

Secondary evidence is admissible if there is proof of its former

existence, its due execution, its actual loss or destruction, and the
contents thereof.

FACTS:

Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all

surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano
Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who
died on May 10, 1960.

In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of

land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195
square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621.

This disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and

Felipe to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had
matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Bordador and
in turn Marcosa sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.

On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with

the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the
tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of
another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present,
the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.

On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free

patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.

On September 1, 1980, petitioners claimed that as children of

Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded
partition thereof since the respondents had resold the property to
Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959, which respondents denied.

Hence, petitioners falsification case against the respondents,

which was dismissed. Again in 1981, they filed a suit for reconveyance
of the lot covered by OCT No. P-1356(M).

The trial court ruled in petitioners favor. It admitted, over

the objection of the respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a
xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by
the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa
Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of
P1,500.00.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial courts decision,

hence, this petition.

Page 40 of 69
ISSUE:

Had the petitioners satisfactorily proven the loss of the

original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed
copy of the same?

HOLDING:

NO. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents

were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence
of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as
follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents, although this order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The
sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial
court under all the circumstances of the particular case.

A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely

ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale
dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original
copies of the alleged deed of sale.

In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel

of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the
alleged deed of absolute sale.

In establishing the execution of a document the same may be

established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was
present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.

We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have

sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale
through the testimony of the notary public.

After the due execution of the document has been established, it

must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the
fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its
loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for

before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates
are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-
production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until
it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained
by the opponent or by a third person or the like).

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who
notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has
about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This

Page 41 of 69
petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely
accounted for three out of four or five original copies.

Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed
of sale in question, a purported xerox copy and certified true copy of
which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not been lost or destroyed.
It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for
registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the office
to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason
or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his
representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or
destruction of the original of the document in question has not,
therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is
inadmissible.

Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the

effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of sale in question
because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street,
Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 establish the loss or
destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or
destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the
duplicate original copies on file with him.

Nor did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the

Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he failed to see the
deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration
No. 15412 and of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the
effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because
the notary public might not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it
was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the
record before 1960 were destroyed by termites, prove loss or
destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies
of the document in question.

Page 42 of 69
CASE NO. 19:

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. & TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC., and ELIAS Q. TAN, Petitioners,

COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORP., Respondents.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally

not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the

co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the
respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes
in the amounts of P100,000 each.

As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted

to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the respondent
Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. Hence, respondent Bank
was constrained to file a complaint seeking payment of the specified
sum of money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.

In its answer, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring

indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that the loans were
obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity and for his own
use and benefit; thus, it interposed a cross-claim against petitioner
Tan.

For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the

loans from the respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The parties,
however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds of
petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries
Corporation, a real estate firm. The loans were covered by promissory
notes which were automatically renewable (rolled-over) every year at
an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner
Tan was able to pay the same.

According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee

required him to affix two signatures on every promissory note,
assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance
with their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan
documents to the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner
not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner
Foundation was included as party thereto.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, and ordered defendants Tan and Lapulapu Foundation to pay
jointly and solidarily the principal obligation inclusive of
interests, charges, and penalties as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses plus costs of suit.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment

of the court a quo by deleting the award of attorneys fees. The
appellate court applied the parol evidence rule in rejecting
petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement
between him and the respondent Bank. It likewise applied the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate entity in holding the petitioners
jointly and solidarily liable. Hence, this petition.

Page 43 of 69
ISSUE:

Are the petitioners Tan and Lapulapu Foundation jointly and

solidarily liable for the obligation to respondent Bank?

HOLDING:

YES. This Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner

Tans allegation that he was made to sign blank loan documents and
that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by
the respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation.
It is hard to believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature
could have been so careless as to sign blank loan documents.

In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly

showed upon their faces that they are the obligation of the petitioner
Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and
personal capacity. Moreover, the application for credit accommodation,
the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of petitioner
Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying
the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the
name of the petitioner Foundation. These documentary evidence
unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were
solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.

As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this

Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported
unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment
of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the
petitioners and the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained
maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11,
1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid
on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein
that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over
annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in
the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten
agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and
conditions in the promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is

generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation
of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud
or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in
this case.

Page 44 of 69
CASE NO. 20:

MADRIGAL & MALLARI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142944, April 15, 2005 GARCIA, J.

EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI, Petitioners,

COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSE MALLARI, Respondents.

Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be

resorted to if the same does not express the true intent of the
parties.

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina are the
owners of a 340-square meter residential lot with a 2-storey
residential house erected thereon, situated at Olongapo City.

They have ten (10) children, five (5) of whom are staying with
them in the same house, while the other five (5) are either residing
abroad or elsewhere in the Philippines. One of said children is
petitioner Virgilio Mallari who is residing with his own family in San
Ildefonso, Bulacan.

In need of money for his wifes planned travel to the United

States, Jose thought of mortgaging the above property with a bank.
However, his son Virgilio convinced him to instead assign to him a
portion of the same property, with the following assurances:

1) that his father could continue in occupancy of the property;

2) that he will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store
thereat to continue with the same;
3) that he will occupy one of the rooms in the house in case he goes
to Olongapo City on vacation;
4) that he will renovate the other room and reserve it for his
mother when she comes back from the States;
5) that he will not dispose of the property without his fathers
consent; and
6) that his father could redeem the said property any time he
acquires money.

On October 22, 1987, Jose and Fermina executed a document

denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby the spouses appeared to
have conveyed to their son Virgilio, a one-storey residential house
standing on a 135-square meter lot for a consideration of P50,000.00
although the property easily commands much more at that time.

However, Virgilio sold the same property for the same amount
to Edenbert Madrigal, a longtime neighbor of the Mallaris in the area
through a document entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan dated June
25, 1988.

On September 7, 1988, Madrigal demanded for Jose to vacate the

subject property. It was then that Jose came to know for the first
time of the sale of his property by his son Virgilio in favor of
Madrigal. Hence, Jose filed a complaint for annulment, redemption and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining
order against his son and Madrigal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Olongapo City.

Page 45 of 69
 The RTC rendered judgment for plaintiff Jose Mallari by ordering
defendant Edenbert Madrigal to allow the former to redeem the subject
property based on the same amount it was sold to him by his co-
defendant Virgilio Mallari, and for the two (2) defendants jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff Jose Mallari moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and the cost of suit. This was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied;
hence, petitioners present recourse.

ISSUE:

Can the questioned deed of sale be properly construed as an

equitable mortgage?

HOLDING:

YES. Evidence clearly shows that there was indeed no intent to

sell the subject property. Rather, what transpired between the
parties, who were father and son, was only a mortgage
involving P50,000.00 over a portion of a lot with a house in Olongapo
City. Circumstances surrounding the transaction between respondent
Jose Mallari and petitioner Virgilio Mallari pointed only to one
thing, that respondent was in need of money to finance the US trip of
his wife and he planned to mortgage the subject property with a bank
but he was prevailed by his son, herein petitioner, not to proceed
with his plan and he gave a tempting offer to his father which the
latter cannot refuse. Moreover, the consideration appearing in the
Deed of Sale is grossly inadequate considering the location of the
property, the area and the fact that it was a two-storey building or
house.

We cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation

of the circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilios
parents, more so in the light of his fathers disavowal of what the
document, on its face, purports to state.

In Lustan vs. CA, this Court ruled that [E]ven when a document
appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove
that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an
issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of
the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and
admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given
merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of
the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or
understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the
time of the execution of the contract.

In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote: [I]t is

a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.
However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to
wit:

1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures;
2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

Page 46 of 69
 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and
11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, we have made a close hard look

into this case and found none of the foregoing exceptions as obtaining
herein to warrant our departure from the established norm. Nor are we
inclined to disturb the findings of the courts a quo that petitioner
Edenbert Madrigal is not buyer in good faith.

Page 47 of 69
CASE NO 21:

INCIONG, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96405, June 26, 1996 ROMERO, J.

BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

The rule on parol evidence does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document.

FACTS:

On February 3, 1983, petitioner Baldomero Inciong, Jr., Rene

Naybe, and Gregorio Pantanosas signed a promissory note in the amount
of P50,000.00, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to
private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro
City branch.

The promissory note became due on May 5, 1983 and despite

demands, the obigors have not paid their obligation. Consequently, on
January 24, 1986, private respondent filed a complaint for collection
against the three of them.

The complaint was initially dismissed for failure of the

plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, it was reconsidered and the
sheriff was able to served summons upon petitioner. Pantanosas was
dropped as a defendant, while Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia.

In his answer, petitioner alleged that his friend, Rudy Campos, a

partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private respondent convinced
him to sign as co-maker in the loan of Naybe to the extent of
P5,000.00, in order to purchase a chainsaw as contribution in the
venture. That he signed five (5) copies of blank promissory note and
he indicated on one (1) copy that he bounds himself only for the
amount of P5,000.00.

In the assailed decision of the lower court, it noted that the

typewritten figure "P50,000-" clearly appears directly below the
admitted signature of the petitioner in the promissory note. Hence,
the latter's uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot
prevail over the presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction.
It also noted that petitioner was a holder of a Bachelor of Laws
degree and a labor consultant who was supposed to take due care of his
concerns, and that, on the witness stand, Pio Tio denied having
participated in the alleged business venture. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision and it likewise denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review for failure of
petitioner to comply with the Rules. Both his first and second motion
for reconsideration was denied. Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for
leave to file a motion for clarification. Hence, the present petition
was given due course.

ISSUE:

Is the affidavit of Pontanosas executed after the rendition of

judgment of the lower court, which supports petitioners allegation of
fraud and misrepresentation tenable?

Page 48 of 69
HOLDING:

NO. The petitioner's contentions in the instant petition are

clearly factual. Petitioner is to be reminded of the basic rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Having lost the chance to fully
ventilate his factual claims below, petitioner may no longer be
accorded the same opportunity in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court below. Had he presented Judge
Pantanosas' affidavit before the lower court, it would have
strengthened his claim that the promissory note did not reflect the
correct amount of the loan.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the

promissory note is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed
by law, but a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature
of attesting witnesses, parol evidence may overcome the contents of
the promissory note.

What is required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is

in fact founded on long experience that written evidence is so much
more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory
only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms
of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and
vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different
contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them. Thus, for
the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in
any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule,
bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject
to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the

right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a
loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol contemporaneous
agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract,
it may be shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not
even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must,
therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own uncorroborated
and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.

Page 49 of 69
CASE NO. 22:

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 121506, October 30, 1996

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS, RTC-BRANCH 9 OF CEBU CITY,

MELBA LIMBACO, LINDA and RAMON LOGARTA, Respondents.

Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the

written contract, such evidence is admissible, regardless of whether
or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral
agreement.

FACTS:

In 1949, officers of the National Airport Corporation (NAC)

offered to purchase the various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport for
purposes of its expansion; otherwise, they will be expropriated by the
government.

Among such landowners is Inez Ouano, the grandmother of private

respondent Melba Limbaco. Inez signed a Deed of Sale conveying her
property, because of the promise that the land will be returned to her
when it is no longer in use.

Said deed, however, does not contain any provision regarding Inez
right to repurchase the properties. Nor does she have any rider such
as the one given to Eufemio Vercide.

Nonetheless, during her lifetime, Inez used to remind Melba, who

was living with her, about the assurance by the NAC officials that the
properties will be returned and that the latter can recover the land
herself should Inez die before the proper time arises.

Then President Aquino ordered that the airport be transferred to

Mactan such that the other landowners were able to recover their
properties. The appellees tried to repurchase the properties, but it
was denied by Capt. Antonio Oppus, the manager of appellant Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) because the deed of sale
covering Inez properties does not contain any condition relating to
the right to repurchase, thus, they had become the absolute properties
of the NAC.

Private respondents thereafter filed a case for reconveyance with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, which ruled in their
favor. On appeal to the CA, the same was affirmed in toto. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Is the verbal agreement allowing Inez Ouano and her successors-

in-interest to repurchase the lots in question absent any rider in the
deed of sale admissible in evidence?

HOLDING:

YES. The CAs finding that there was an agreement allowing the
right of repurchase was established after admitting the parol evidence
presented by private respondents. We reject petitioners argument that

Page 50 of 69
in the absence of any rider providing for such right of repurchase, no
evidence, whatsoever can be received to establish that such a right
indeed exists. Both the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the right
of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano can be sufficiently
established by parol evidence.

We see no reason, however, why Inez should be considered as not

similarly situated as the owners of these other lots. All these lots
surround the Lahug Airport and were acquired by the government for the
proposed expansion of the airport. The appellee has not presented any
evidence to show that Inez lots were acquired for a different purpose
or under different conditions. Why then should the sale of such lots
be singled out as not subject to the right to repurchase when a good
number of the lots around them were already repurchased by their
original owners?

In the case at bench, the fact which private respondents seek to

establish by parol evidence consist of the agreement or representation
made by NAC that induced Inez Ouano to execute the deed of sale; that
the vendors and their heirs are given the right of repurchase should
the government no longer need the property. Where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written
contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration
of the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was
executed on the faith of the parol contract or representation, such
evidence is admissible. It is recognized that proof is admissible of
any collateral parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms
of the written contract though it may relate to the same subject
matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a
writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of
existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol
agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received,
regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at
law or in equity.

More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when

private respondents introduced evidence to show the right of
repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been repeatedly
laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against
the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if
not so made, it will be understood to have been waived.

Page 51 of 69
CASE NO. 23:

LECHUGAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. L-39972 & L-40300, August 6, 1986 GUTIERREZ, JR., J

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA, SALVADOR, ISIDRO, CARMELITA, DAVID, AMPARO,
ERLINDA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, Respondents.

The parol evidence rule is not applicable where the controversy is

between one of the parties to the document and third persons.

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoria Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry

with damages against the private respondents, pertaining to lots A and
B on the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the
petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. This complaint was dismissed.
Pending appeal before then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo,
petitioner instituted another action for recovery and possession;
thus, these two (2) cases were tried jointly.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, dismissing the two

cases and declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and Jose Lozada
as owners and lawful possessors of the land in question together with
all the improvements thereon. The Court of Appeals sustained the
dismissal of the cases. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting
and giving credence to the testimony of the vendor, Leoncia Lasangue
regarding the sale of the disputed lot where such testimony is
contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in
favor of the petitioner.

Petitioner testified that she bought the land now subject of this
litigation from Leoncia as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exhibit "A") and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7912. She took
possession of the same in 1951 through her tenants Jesus Leoncio,
Roberta Losarita and Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce
of the riceland with her.

Simeon Guinta corroborated petitioners testimony by stating that

he worked on the subject lot since 1954 when its former tenant,
Roberto Lazarita (now deceased) left the land. On June 14, 1958, while
Simeon was plowing Lot A preparatory to rice planting, private
respondents entered the land and forced him to stop his work. They
were carrying unsheathed bolos, which made him afraid so he left and
reported the matter to petitioner. Again, on June 24, 1958, private
respondents entered Lot B, and cut the 620 bamboo poles growing
thereof. By June 1959, private respondents grabbed the whole parcel of
containing six (6) hectares to the damage and prejudice of petitioner.

Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the land

which petitioner bought from Leoncia in 1950 as evidenced by Exhibit
A, is different from the land now subject of this action.

On April 6, 1931, their predecessor-in-interest, Hugo Loza

purchased a 53,327-square meter parcel of land from Victorina Limor as
evidenced by a Venta Definitiva (Exhibit 3). On March 17, 1941, Hugo
again bought from Emeterio Lasangue a 4-hectare parcel of land

Page 52 of 69
adjoining the land he had earlier bought from Victoria, and which sale
was duly evidenced by a public instrument (Exhibit 2).

These two (2) parcels of land were consolidated and designated,

during the cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No.
5456; while the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina
Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515
in the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza.

Private respondents claimed that the lot bought by plaintiff from

Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by Exhibit A, is situated south of the
land now subject of this action and designated as Lot No. 5522, in the
name of Victoria Lechugas. This fact was testified to by Leoncia
Lasangue herself.

ISSUE:

Is the testimony of the vendor Leoncia Lasangue that what she

sold to petitioner Victoria Lechugas is Lot No. 5522 containing six
(6) hectares and not Lot 5456 which is subject of this litigation,
admissible?

HOLDING:

YES. As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court,

the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be
invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a
party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or
the relation established thereby.

The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is

misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between
one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale
was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The
dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the
private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of
Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell
and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able
to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first
cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of
paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale
of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that

Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of
land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the
respondents. The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for
the reformation of Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The undisputed fact is
that the respondents have timely questioned the validity of the
instrument and have proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect
the true intention of the vendor.

Page 53 of 69
CASE NO. 24:

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 135481, October 23, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.

LIGAYA S. SANTOS, Petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE GERIATRICS FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondents.

The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a
copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.

FACTS:

In 1969, private respondent Philippine Geriatrics Foundation,

Inc. (PGFI) occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on
Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the
invitation of the president of the Philippine Federation of Medical
Practitioners.

In 1971, PGFI built a gymnasium adjacent to said building, which

was later on converted into a canteen and leased to one Victor
Jimenez. Jimenez later on vacated the space after he failed to pay
rentals therefor.

In 1989, petitioner Ligaya Santos occupied the canteen by virtue

of a letter-contract executed between her and Vicente Pulido,
president of PGFI.

Meanwhile, the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its

office at the Geriatrics Center. It agreed and planned to transfer to
the canteen.

On December 27, 1993, PGFI asked petitioner to vacate said space

in a letter advising the latter of the termination of the lease
contract, however, petitioner refused.

In the meantime, the city government of Manila forcibly ejected

PGFI from the Geriatrics Center on January 7, 1995. On October 11,
1995, PGFI through counsel, sent another demand letter to petitioner
asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen space
within ten days of receipt of the letter. Still, petitioner refused.

Thereafter, PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with

a prayer for the payment of rentals in arrears for the period
September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 totaling P36,750.00.

The parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether
or not petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the ground of
non-payment of rentals.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on

the ground that PGFI failed to establish the existence of a lease
contract. PGFI claimed that the contract had been lost when it was
forcibly ejected from the Geriatrics Center.

To prove the existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits

of its trustees and officers and presented to the trial court an
unsigned photocopy of the same. However, the trial court refused to
admit the photocopy as secondary evidence. Consequently, the MeTC

Page 54 of 69
ruled that there is no evidence that would warrant ejectment of
petitioner from the subject premises.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision.

PGFI filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), and a subsequent motion
to treat said MR as a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. Since, PGFI found its copy of the lease contract
signed by petitioner and Pulido, as well as by its other
trustees. PGFI presented said contract to the RTC, which rejected it
as forgotten evidence.

PGFI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which

reversed the ruling of the RTC, treating the unsigned copy of the
lease contract that was presented before the trial court qualified as
secondary evidence. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Is the unsigned copy of the alleged letter-contract of lease

executed between petitioner Santos and PGFI, admissible as secondary
evidence?

HOLDING:

YES. Admittedly, the original copy of the contract was not

presented during trial, so PGFI as plaintiff therein resorted to
presentation of secondary evidence. It presented the disputed unsigned
copy of the contract as well as affidavits of persons who saw the
contract and signed thereon representing PGFI.

Before the contents of an original document may be proved by

secondary evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of the
following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3)
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of
the offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction
of secondary evidence.

In the present case, the existence and due execution of the lease
contract had been established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI
who were signatories thereto. The loss of said contract was likewise
established by the affidavit of Vicente Pulido, who attested to the
fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy of the contract at
the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center. These copies were lost in
the chaos that ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from its
office. Without a place to immediately move to, its files and records
were left for sometime on the street where they were susceptible to
theft. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents
of the contract.

The contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a

copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or
(3) by the recollection of witnesses, in the order stated.

There is testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of

the lost lease contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI
contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject
premises for a specified amount payable every month, and the
conformity to these terms by the trustees of PGFI who signed thereon.
Thus, even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the

Page 55 of 69
trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the
contract in the form of testimonial evidence.

Petitioners emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy

of the contract is misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy
may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of
witnesses. At best, the original copy of the contract that was later
found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary
evidence.

When the original copy of the contract was found, PGFI attempted
to present it before the trial court by moving for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. On this point, we note that
petitioner did not offer any objection as to the genuineness of the
original contract or her signature thereon. She objected only insofar
as claiming that PGFI could no longer present the document since it
was not offered in evidence during the trial of this case. We take
this as an indication that, indeed, there is nothing questionable
about the original contract insofar as its genuineness is concerned.

Page 56 of 69
CASE NO. 25:

PEOPLE vs. GOCE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995 REGALADO, J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

NELLY D. AGUSTIN, Accused-appellant.

The absence of receipts or its disallowance as secondary evidence is

not fatal to a case for illegal recruitment, where the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses are positive and affirmative as contrasted
with the bare and self-serving denials of the accused.

FACTS:

This is a case for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate

and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor
Code, filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and accused-appellant
Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on January
12, 1988.

Sometime between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, Agustin met private
complainants, namely, Lorenzo Alvarez, spouses Ramona and Rogelio
Salado, Dionisio Masaya, Ernesto Alvarez, Rolando Dalida, Dave Rivera,
and Nelson Trinidad.

Accused-appellant Agustin represented herself as the manager of

Clover Placement Agency, which was owned by co-accused, spouses Goce.
Private complainants were promised employment in Oman upon payment of
placement fees and other processing fees such as for passports, in
varying amounts exceeding P5,000.00 each.

Nonetheless, private complainants failed to leave for abroad.

This prompted them to verify the real status of Clover Placement
Agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
and they discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit
job applicants. Thus, they demanded refund, from Agustin who was able
to return only a minimal portion of said sums of money, until such
time the three (3) accused absconded.

This case was archived, but the RTC issued a standing warrant of
arrest against the three (3) accused. Sometime in 1993, Agustin was
apprehended by the Paraaque police, while spouses Goce remained at
large. The counsel for Agustin filed a motion to revive the case,
thus, the RTC reinstated the case and trial thereafter ensued.

For her part, Agustin denied any participation in the illegal

recruitment perpetrated by the Goce spouses; and that all she did was
to introduce private complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a
neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's
(Reynaldo Agustin) overseas job application was processed and
facilitated by them. Although, she admitted having given P500.00 each
to Rogelio Salado and Ernesto Alvarez, she explained that it was
entirely for different reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a
loan, while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that time.

The trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty

as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and
sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as
to pay a fine of P100,000.00. Hence, the present appeal.

Page 57 of 69
ISSUE:

Is there proof that accused-appellant offered or promised

overseas employment to the private complainants, which constitutes
illegal recruitment and placement?

HOLDING:

YES. At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused
in this case were not authorized to engage in any recruitment
activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia Curso,
Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the POEA on November
10, 1987. Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her
counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit applicants for overseas employment.

The testimonial evidence hereon shows that Agustin indeed further

committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four
prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they
initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was
from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as
the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to
her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces,
it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to
said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant
was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part.
She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity.

There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of

having the ability to send a worker abroad. It cannot be denied that
Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their
applications. Her act of collecting from each of the complainant
payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees,
medical tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably constitutes an
act of recruitment within the meaning of the law.

Appellant further argues that there is no evidence of receipts of

collections/payments from complainants to appellant. On the contrary,
xerox copies of said receipts/vouchers were presented by the
prosecution:
1) a cash voucher marked as Exhibit D, showing the receipt of
P10,000.00 for placement fee and duly signed by appellant;
2) receipt, identified as Exhibit E, was issued and signed by
appellant on February 5, 1987 to acknowledge receipt of P4,000.00
from Rogelio and Ramona Salado for processing of documents for
Oman; and
3) receipt marked as Exhibit F, dated March 10, 1987, shows that
appellant received from Ernesto Alvarez P2,000.00 for processing
of documents for Oman.

Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were

lost, hence only xerox copies thereof were presented and which, under
the circumstances, were admissible in evidence.

Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the

prosecution as secondary evidence are not allowable in court, still
the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal of appellant.
In People vs. Comia, the Court held that the complainants'
failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused

Page 58 of 69
therein, as well as their consequent failure to present receipts
before the trial court as proof of the said payments, is not fatal to
their case. The complainants duly proved by their respective
testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment
process. Their testimonies in this regard, being clear and positive,
were declared sufficient to establish that factum probandum.

Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting

the version of the prosecution witnesses, their statements being
positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than
the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The
lame defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution proving her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case

essentially involves the credibility of witnesses which is best left
to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence of abuse of
discretion therein. Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court
on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.

Page 59 of 69
CASE NO. 26:

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS vs. DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005 CARPIO, J.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS (DECS), Petitioner,

JULIA, MARIA, PACENCIA, and HEIRS OF SANTOS DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

Proof of loss of the original document may be shown by anyone who had
made a diligent search in the places where the said document may
likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful.

FACTS:

The heirs of Isaias Del Rosario filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner
DECS. This case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square
meters situated in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, registered in 1976
in the name of respondents under TCT No. T-222432. The Kaypombo
Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS occupied a portion of said
property by mere tolerance of the respondents and their predecessor-
in-interest.

DECS countered that KPPS occupation of the 650 square meters of

the property since 1962 was with the express consent and approval of
respondents father, the late Isaias Del Rosario who donated the same
in 1959. In fact, DECS renamed the school as Isaias Del Rosario
Primary School in honor of its benefactor.

The parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS presenting its

evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the
Municipality. DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal
De Jesus and Judge Eli Natividad, all residents of Kaypombo, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Nicolas testified that during a political meeting in
his residence, he actually saw Isaias and Mayor Ramos sign a document
which is a deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of Sta. Maria
and the signing was made in the presence of Judge Natividad who was
then a municipal councilor.

De Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to secure a

copy of the deed of donation from the Municipality of Sta. Maria, but
according to the people at the municipal hall, when they transferred
to the new municipal building, the deed got lost. They went to the
DECS office in Malolos, but could not likewise find a copy of the
deed.

Judge Natividad testified that he prepared the deed of donation

which was signed by Isaias in his residence which was accepted by the
Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan through a resolution signed in the
office of the secretary and the municipal mayor and a copy of said
resolution could not be found due to the transfer of the municipal
hall from the old to the new building.

Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria

Del Rosario-Esteban, daughters of the late Isaias.

Eugenia R. Ignacio testified that their father Isaias died on

April 18, 1966 long after the construction of the school and that she
does not know everything about the donation because her father never
informed them of his dealings and she did not inquire from him about
the occupancy of the lot by the school. Maria del Rosario-Esteban, on

Page 60 of 69
the other hand, testified that her parents never donated any property
because that is their only property. Also, she stated that their
father told them that he just lent the property temporarily to the
municipality and she never found any document conveying the lot in
question to the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

The RTC rendered judgment dismissing respondents complaint for

recovery of possession. It explained that the defense was able to
prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as
well as the loss of the same; and taking into account the consistency,
credibility and personality of the witnesses of the defense.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTCs decision and denied
DECS motion for reconsideration. The CA was not fully satisfied that
DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged
lost deed of donation. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the recantation or recollection of a witness, a sufficient

form of secondary evidence to prove the existence or the contents of a
document, and its subsequent loss?

HOLDING:

NO. The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is

void without the formalities stated in Article 749 of the Civil Code,
that is, both the donation and its acceptance by the donee should be
made in a public document. But if the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof and this step shall be
noted in both instruments.

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an

authentic copy of the deed of donation with all the formalities
required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the
original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the
contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the
contents of the writing other than the writing itself.

A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a

written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed,
but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad
faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before
he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the
court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-
production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court
in its discretion may change this order if necessary.

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some

extent the existence of the deed of donation since he testified that
he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and
that he witnessed the signing of the document. However, Ricardo
Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did
not have personal knowledge of the contents of the document that
Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.

In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus testimony does not help to

establish the deed of donations existence, execution and contents. On
cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that

Page 61 of 69
Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by
Judge Natividad himself.

DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council

Resolution accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the
donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from
the circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias
lifetime without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that these steps were noted in both instruments.

What mainly militates against DECS claim is, as the CA found,

inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search
in the places where the deed of donation may likely be found and that
the search was unsuccessful.

The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person

knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the
fact of its loss, or by anyone who had made, on the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person
in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find
it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to
satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.

In the present case, it is noted that Judge Natividad who claimed

to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other
copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and
furnish to other designated government offices. The Notarial Law is
explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law
requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his
official acts as notary public.

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register

where Judge Natividad as the notary public should have recorded the
deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the
unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have
also explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as
required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was
no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of
Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these
circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a
diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.

Page 62 of 69
CASE NO. 27:

LEE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.

JOHNSON LEE, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., Respondents.

The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates

thereof.

FACTS:

Petitioner Johnson Lee is one of the original incorporators of

NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI). NMI was incorporated on January 27,
1978 and SEC approved its dissolution on March 1, 1988.

During NMIs existence, it transacted with Victorias Milling

Company, Inc. (VMCI) by providing them with empty white bags for the
latters sugar products. The transactions are as follows:

DATE OF PURCHASE QUANTITY AND CHARGE INVOICE BPI CHECK

PRICE
June 11, 1987 77,500 pieces @ No. 0809 No. 068706
P565,750 dated
08/03/1987
June 18, 1987 100,000 pieces No. 0810
@ P730,000
June 25, 1987 28,000 pieces @ No. 0811 No. 068993
P204,400 dated
08/19/1987

Around this time, Petitioner Johnson Lee was the President of

NMI, while co-accused Sonny Moreno was the General Manager.

The trustee of NMI, Reyes, Treyes & Fudolin Law Office filed a
verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa against petitioner
and Moreno when they failed to turn over to the trustee the P1,500,150
they received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI.

The RTC of Negros Occidental admitted in evidence the photocopies

of Charge Invoice Nos. 0809, 0810, and 0811 issued by NMI to VMCI as
well as that of BPI Check Nos. 068706 and 068993.

To prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the

original copies of the charge invoices and checks, as well as the
authenticity and due execution thereof, the prosecution presented Ban
Hua Flores (employee of NMI). She testified that she saw the two
checks in the office of the petitioner, the signatures at the dorsal
portion of the checks were those of the petitioner, and he indorsed
and deposited the same on September 4, 1987 with the Solidbank,
instead of the BPI Plaza Cervantes branch in Manila, the official
depository bank of NMI. She was able to secure microfilm copies of the
checks from Solidbank. Sometime in 1987, she went to the office of the
VMCI and inquired if it still had copies of the two checks and the
clerk thereat informed her that it would be difficult to locate the
checks as they were stored in the bodega.

Testifying for the prosecution in obedience to a subpoena issued

by the court, Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI,
declared that the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all

Page 63 of 69
checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She testified
that the checks, including their other records, were lost during the
flood in 1985. She also testified on the Certification issued by
Carolina Diaz, the Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two
checks. She, however, admitted that she did not see the original
copies of the checks and that she was not a signatory thereto.

The prosecution also offered the counter-affidavits of petitioner

during the preliminary investigation as part of their evidence.

The accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the

checks and charge invoices on the ground that the best evidence was
the original copies thereof.

Despite said objection, the RTC admitted the counter-affidavit of

the petitioner, as well as the photocopies of the checks and charge
invoices, on the ground that the prosecution had adduced preponderant
evidence that the original copies of the said charges and checks were
lost, destroyed or non-available.

The RTC also denied both the motion for reconsideration and
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence by the accused. Hence,
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
(CA), which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner
sought relief from this Court.

ISSUES:

1) Was the petition at bar, the proper remedy of the petitioner?

2) Did the prosecution adduced evidence, testimonial and documentary,
to prove the predication to the admission of the photocopies of the
charge invoices and of the checks?

HOLDING:

A Petition for Certiorari is not a Proper Remedy against an

Interlocutory Order

NO. In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had

jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public respondent against the
petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies
of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the

original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a
factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the
resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be
sustained.

The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the

photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his
evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision
to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly
raised.

Page 64 of 69
 We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not
sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the
issuance of a writ of certiorari. They are inappropriate for
consideration in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court
inasmuch as they do not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court
hearing the said criminal cases but instead are defenses that might
absolve them from criminal liability. Moreover, the petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals was premature for the reason
that there were other plain and adequate remedies at law available to
the petitioner.

Furthermore, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive on the Court unless the petitioner is able to establish
that the findings of facts of the appellate court are not supported by
or are contrary to the evidence; or if the appellate court ignored,
misconstrued or misinterpreted vital facts and circumstances, which,
if considered, could change or even reverse the outcome of the case.
In this, the petitioner failed.

Proof of existence, due execution, loss, and contents of an

original document must first be satisfied before resort to secondary
evidence.

YES. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world

of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable
evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.

The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the

issues such as the nature, appearance or condition of physical objects
or to evidence relating to a matter which does not come from the
foundation of the cause of action or defense; or when a party uses a
document to prove the existence of an independent fact, as to which
the writing is merely collated or incidental.

It has been held that where the missing document is the

foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved. If the document is
one in which other persons are also interested, and which has been
placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the custodian must
be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such search must
be shown, before secondary evidence can be admitted. The certificate
of the custody of the document is incompetent to prove the loss or
destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by some person who has
knowledge of such loss. The testimony of an eyewitness as to the
execution of a private document must be positive.

In this case, there is no dispute that the original copies of the

checks were returned to VMCI after the same were negotiated and
honored by the drawee bank. The originals of the charge invoices were
kept by VMCI. We agree with the petitioner that the Certification
signed by Carolina Diaz was inadmissible in evidence against him
because of the failure of the prosecution to present her as witness
and to testify on said certification. However, the records show that,
in obedience to the subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum issued
by the trial court directing the VMCI to produce the originals of the
checks and the charge invoices, Bayaban, the Manager for Corporate
Affairs of VMCI, testified that all its records, including the charge
invoices and checks, were destroyed seven years ago in a flash flood

Page 65 of 69
which occurred on November 28, 1995, and that such loss/destruction
was known to all the employees of VMCI, including herself.

Moreover, with the admissions of the petitioner in his counter-

affidavit, the prosecution even no longer needed to adduce
evidence aliunde to prove the existence, due execution and the
authenticity of the charge invoices and the checks.

Page 66 of 69
CASE NO. 28:

REPUBLIC vs. SPOUSES MATEO

G.R. No. 148025, August 13, 2004 CARPIO MORALES, J.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

SPOUSES LORENZO and FELICIANA MATEO, Respondents.

The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission

of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of
the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.

FACTS:

On April 30, 1997, spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan a petition
for Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-38769 issued on July 16, 1971 by the
Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Bataan in the name of Jose Tan. It covers
two (2) parcels of land forming part of Lot No. 979 of barrio Cabog-
Cabog, Bagac, Bataan. Spouses Mateo allegedly acquired said property
from Jose Tan for and in consideration of P50,000.00 as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale dated September 3, 1978.

The original copy of TCT No. T-38769 on file at the ROD of Bataan
is missing and could not be located despite efforts to do so, hence,
deemed lost; while Lorenzo Mateo was in possession of the owners
duplicate copy of the title, due to his frequent reassignment as a
former military officer to different places from 1978 up to his
retirement on September 3, 1990, he misplaced said title among his
files, although he has a xerox copy thereof; and despite efforts to
locate the owners duplicate copy of the title, the same proved futile
and is now deemed lost.

Lorenzo Mateo presented the following documentary evidence:

1) Carbon copy of a September 3, 1978 Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Jose Tan in favor of the Mateos;
2) Photocopy of TCT No. T-38769 issued to Jose Tan on March 14,
1972;
3) Letter dated June 30, 1995 by B/Gen. Lorenzo Mateo informing the
ROD of Balanga, Bataan that owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
38769 was missing and deemed lost following futile efforts to
locate it;
4) Certified photocopy of a decision of March 17, 1969 in Cadastral
Case No. 18, awarding several lots forming part of Lot No. 979 to
six (6) persons including Donato Echivarria, from whom Jose Tan
allegedly purchased the lands;
5) Photocopy of a June 5, 1969 Order issued by Judge Tito V. Tizon
in Cadastral Case No. 18 for the Issuance of Decrees; and
6) Letter dated March 11, 1971 by the Acting Clerk of Court of the
CFI of Bataan Antonio C. Quintos to Mr. Vicente A. Querol,
Assistant Chief, Docket Section, Land Registration Commission
that the original records of the petitions for cadastral
reopenings of Jesus Gutierrez et al., Engracia Salaya et al.,
and Cecilia Briones et al., are presently with the Department of
Justice being used in connection with the investigation of the
administrative charge against Honorable Judge Tito V. Tizon;
7) Said petitions were taken by Senior Prosecutor Vidal M. Tombo
on July 16, 1969 as per receipt of this office; Photocopy of a
RECEIPT (Exhibit T) purporting to show that one, whose signature
is illegible but who is alluded to as NBI agent Ramon Befetel,

Page 67 of 69
 received on March 8, 1973 for VIDAL M. TOMBO, Special Assistant,
Department of Justice, from the ROD of Balanga, Bataan the
therein listed 93 documents including TCT No. T-386769 Jose Tan;
1997 Declaration of Real Property in the name of Jose Tan of 41-D
Tangile St., Quezon City (Exhibit U); and 1997 Declaration of
Real Property in the name of Jose Tan. (Exhibit U-1).

Aside from Lorenzo Mateo, Jose Y. de la Cruz, vaultkeeper since

1972 of the Bataan ROD, took the witness stand, the latter declaring
that the original of the TCT was taken by a Fiscal Tombo. Also
testifying was Mona Liza Esguerra, Chief of the Records Division of
the DOJ since 1980, who declared that Atty. Tombo did not surrender
the title to the Records Section.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that none of the
sources for a petition for the reconstitution of a transfer
certificate of title as enumerated in Sec. 3 of Republic No. 26, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 6732 has been presented by the spouses Mateo.
The Mateos Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts decision
having been denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
ruled in their favor applying the last item of Section 3, RA 26, to
wit:

Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is

sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title., referring to the photocopy of the owners
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-38769 (Exhibit I) as
a secondary evidence.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Was there a validly existing title at the time of the loss, which
may be the subject of reconstitution?

HOLDING:

NO. Reconstitution requires that the subject title was validly

existing at the time of the loss. An invalid title cannot be
reconstituted.

The CAs reliance, as another basis of reconstitution, on the

March 17, 1969 certified photocopy of Judge Tizons decision awarding
to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT, the TCT subject of reconstitution
was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, as noted by the
trial court, there is no showing how the parcels of land were
transferred to Jose Tan, the Mateos predecessor-in-interest.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, provides the sources-documents-bases in

the following order:
1) owners duplicate of the title
2) co-owners mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the title
3) certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian
4) authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the OCT was issued
5) document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property
is encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original had been registered;

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 6) and any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed title.

Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the

TCT has been satisfactorily shown, and that it was taken in 1973 by
the DOJ and the NBI in connection with the investigation of the judge
on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT
was also taken by said government agencies, there is no satisfactory
showing that the TCT has been lost.

By Lorenzo Mateos own information, a year before he

testified, he talked to the NBI agent, Ramon Befetel, who received the
93 documents for Vidal Tombo. Why said agent, who admittedly was still
in the NBI main office, was not presented to shed light on the
whereabouts of the TCT, no reason has been proffered.

In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the

original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this
score alone, the Mateos petition for reconstitution fails.

In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost
or is no longer available, not only is the photocopy of the alleged
owners duplicate copy thereof (Exhibit 1) partly illegible.

When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken
and where it was kept to spare it from being also lost were not even
shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the DOJ and NBI of an
investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and lead
this Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos evidence and
propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.

Page 69 of 69