205

CHAPTER V

THE ADVAITA THEORY OP ERROR

Any discussion of error in the context of

Indian philosophy cannot he said as comprehensive unless!

one takes the Advaita account of error into discussion. 1

In fact, 'it is Advaita alone which is found to have '

s i

given maximum importance to the discussion of error for j

the construction of its own philosophical position. |

Maya. the popular expression for error has been so !

elaborately analysed and discussed in the entire Advaita

literature that the whole system is called by many as

mayavada.

Maja, in the usual sense of the term, stands

; for cosmic illusion. It is very often taken for granted

that the Advaita, by the very discussion of error, comes

l

to the conclusion that the -whole cosmic existence is

--------------------------------------------------------- --------- ----------- :-------------------------------------------------------- :-----------------------------------: .

mava or illusory in essence. Even the rivals of the

Advaitins take this mava to be the central thesis.- of

the Advaitic system:.:. .1, As the man, in the actual

process of illusion, sees a second moon which does not

exist, so also men see a visible world of many objects

which do not exist. The different orthodox schools

criticise the Advaita view vehmently for propagating the

theory of error which ultimately reduces the whole worlc

liHi&sAoru Some of them have even charged the Advaita

to be unorthodox on this account and have presented it

as Buddhism in disguise, Particularly the theistic

Vedantins hardly find any difference between Advaitism

and Buddhism. According to them, both the philosophies

1
consider the world as illusory.

However, the question, whether the

Advaita is Buddhism in disguise or not, is not here a

1. mayavadam a saccha strain praechannam Bauddhameva ea~

Padma Purana quoted by Vijnana Bhiksu in his
Sgmkhya Darsanam. In this connection, the Advaita
saying "mithya nratvava ruuah .... sarvaloka -
pratyaksa is sometimes compared with Madhyamika
sa-vingltanubhavaesa-mtrsaJhr- ----- -
 207

very relevant point to discuss* It is only relevant to

point out that according to. dfche generally accepted versioikL

the Advaita theory of error $S.taapsctetdmp^.ufeoi^crs tfy vthei view

that the world is unreal and illusory.

!

The Advaita, as a distinct philosophical

tradition, owes its origin mainly to the writings of

Sarakara (788-820 AD)* Before hin^ one, of course, finds

the writings of G&udapada (Giro* 7th. century AD) who

is also known as the advocate of the Advaita doctrine

of non-duality. In his Mandukva-Karika. there are

several passages which speak of the non-dual Atman as

alone real and the manifold world as unreal. But the

account of error, in particular, has not been so elaboi tely

discussed;;sby Gaudapadai as it is found in Samkara* s works

Samkara, not only mentions the topic of error in his

,1. Just as on a rope being definitely perceived as

such, the false image disappears, and there appears
the single perception that it is rope only? similar!^
on the self being definitely ascertained as such the
plurality of existence disappears." "niscii:avam
yatha rajjvam vikalpo ................ tadvad atmaviniscavah1
Mandukva Karika, II. 18.
 208

different works but devotes a full chapter on error

which is added ab extra to his famous commentary on the

Brahma Sutras. In fact Samkara insists that any enquiry

into the knowledge of Brahman must necessarily be pre

supposed by a clear analysis of the concept of errorj

what he calls as adhyasa.

It is sometimes pointed out that

Samkara does not clearly advocate the classical Advaita

theory of error, ie., Anirvacanivakhvati which is

rather coined by the Post-Samkarites. It is, howeverj

*
true that Samkara in the Adhya sa-bhasya neither mentions

the term anirvacaniya * nor the term khyati* He has

only made a reference to the rival accounts of error and.

has not elaborately discussed those different accounts*

That error is indeterminable is no where clearly stated

in the Adhya sa-bha sya though the possibility of such a

view is not completely ruled out. The term 1anirvacariiva1

is in fact used by Samkara himself in several places.

1 I
ii.
1* Vide: VSS., vol.XXXIV, pp.328-29. and Viveka
eudamani, Stanza 109.
 209

But it is mainly the later Samkarites who h'aye;eia-hor at e]l y

the Anirvacanlya-khyativada and ha-ye ;.tried:::td iast^bl

it over the other rival theories.

The classical theory of Anirvacaniva-

khyati is found in its detailed expression in the writings

of Suresvara (675-773 AD), Padmap&da (9th.century AD),

Prakasatman, Vimuktatman, Sriharsa (all 12th*century AD)

and Citsukhacarya (13th..century AD) to name a few later

Advaitins. Of course here it is also to be marked that

the Anirvacanlya khyativada, while interpreted and

analysed by the later Advaitins, is found to have gone

under many changes and ramifications. In some cases it

is found to be nearer to Anvathakhvati (especially in

the works of the Bhamati school) while in other it is

having an altogether different turn (especially in the

works of the Vlyarana school). Sven though Samkara does

not raise the question about the locus of error there is

found to be a hot discussion about it among the later

Advaitins. While the Bhamati school argues that avidva

has the Brahman as its object and the jiva as its support.
210
 211

ordinary knowledge (loka-vyavaharah) are based on the

superimposition of self and not-self (atmanatmanoh) and

the vice versa,, it is to be admitted that ordinary

Judggmehte of all varieties is intrinsically erroneous

from such logical point of view. Right knowledge (vidya)

consists only in knowing something as it is (vastu-

svarupayadharanam vidyam). To take something as somethini

else (atasmims tad buddhl) is adhyasa. The silver -

characteristics when are superimposed upon the shell, thas

shell is no more known as it is but as something other

than itself (suktika hi ra.iatabadyafehasate). The mm on,

which is one, appears to be double Cekascandrah

sadvitivabat).

It is taken for granted that from such

a study of particular empirical illusions, Samkara

deduces his final philosophical conclusion that all

empirical cognitions are involved with the confusion of

one element with the other and hence are ail unreal. If

all these are accepted then with the unreality of the

empirical cognitions the unreality of the world is

 212

evident. And Samkara1s whole philosophy is presented

in such a manner as to show that the world is like a

magic-show, intrinsically nrauanca or illusory.

Samkara's philosophy, after being under

stood as advocating illusion!sm, is criticised both by

the rival orthodox philosophers as well as the modern

critics. The orthodox philosophers criticise Samkara

as being too much influenced by the Buddhistic philosopher.

Even if Samkara overtly condemns the Buddhistic

philosophy, these philosophers, as it has been pointed

out already, think that the mavavada of Samkara is

never rooted in orthodox tradition (i.c., Vedas and

Upanisads) but is bfr#dr,-frM the Buddhistic reasoning

The modem critic charges Samkara's illusionistic

rendering of the world-phenomena as most absurd from the

scientific point of view. By reducing the reality of th^

empirical world to sheer magical show, Samkara might

have become successful in framing a grand metaphysical

system but surely hehas failed in maintaining the

unreality of the world-phenomena as a matter of fact.

 213

In order to avoid this charge the moderft

1
exponents of Samkara Vedanta emphasize the different

levels of reality (satta) that are admitted by Samkara.

It is pointed out that the world-phenomena is not reduce

to unreality like that of illusion or dream. The

phenomenal reality of the world is never actually reject sd

by Samkara, His declaring the worldphenomena to be mava

is only significant from the ultimate (paramartTriira)

point of view. But the world is accepted to be as real

as possible so long the ultimate reality is not realised,

The phenomenal reality (vyavaharika satta) of the world

is never denied. There is a definite distinction} said

to have been maintained by Samkara, between the pheno

menal level and the illusory level (pratibhasika satta).

The objects of dream, illusion and hallucination, though

are all said to be real as long as the illusory cognition

persist, yet they are all accepted to be unreal from the

phenomenal point of view. While the illusory silver is

real for the moment of illusion only, the actual silver

1. Cf. Radhakrlshnan: Indian Philosophy.VoT.TT.

 214

is real phenomenally. The actual silver is not likewise

rejected. It is marked that Samkara, while criticising

the Vijnana-vadins, has clearly made the point that as .

the dream-experience is sublated, the waking-experience

1
is not likewise sublated.

But one can easily notice that this way

of defending the Absolutistic philosophies like that of

Samkara or flagarjuna, who also makes a parallel distinction

between paramarthaj,, satya and samvrti satvaT is rather

found to be weak. If paramartha alone is respected from

the philosophical point of view then there is nothing

wrong in declaring the wavaharika world to be illusory

in character. It is clearly maintained by Samkara that

the falsity of the knowledge of the world-phenomena is

only realised when the ultimate knowledge of Brahman

is attained. The world-phenomena is ever false, only its

falsity is realised when it Brahma-knowledge is

attained. The analogy of the shell-silver and the

1. VSS. II. II. 29.

 215

double moon clearly suggest that the world is likewise

unreal. From the final philosophic point of view there

is no difference admitted between wavaharika and prati?

bhasika satta. if the Advaita philosophy aims at

establishing reality as only non-dual then it does not

1
mean much to talk about the three levels of reality*

In this connection, it is sometimes said that illusory

phenomenon is not totally unreal like that of barren

woman's son. A distinction is shown to have been

maintained by the Advaitins between the pratlbhasika

satta and the tucca. The former has at least a momentary

existence while the latter is absolutely non-existent.

But here also it can be pointed out that even the

momentary existence of Illusory object is clearly reject)*

after the illusion is sublated. When the erroneous

perception of silver is replaced by the perception of

1, It is interesting to note that the Mlmamsakas too

while criticising the samvrti satta of the Yogacaras
offer a very similar point. "There can be no reality
about illusory reality and hence, it cannot be a
form of reality, if it is real* it cannot be illusory
and if it is illusory, it cannot be real", quoted by
Qa s'gnnta-.on.Qi^t-,-^-B-,27-7f
shell, the 1 shell* is treated as existent not merely at

the time when it is actually perceived but also when the

silver was previously perceived. In other words, the

shell* is only accepted to be real and the silver* is

completely negated. To use Professor Bhattaearya* s

1
expression, that silver is *no fact*. If this point is

admitted, then the phenomenal reality of the world is

definitely having no philosophical significance. And if

Samkara*s philosophy is the philosophy of non-dualism

then the manifold x-rorld cannot but be unreal as the

illusion and dreams are. According to him, the reality

or the essence of a thing is that which persists through

2
all its states. And as such anything which is

changeable and perishable becomes virtually unreal. If

the self is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion is;

_S

that all else is mere illusion or maya

1. K.CiBhattacarya* Studies in Philosophy. Vol.II,pp,18:. 190.

2. VIA* "eka-rupena hi avasthito vorthah sa naramarthah \
VSS.II.1.11. and "vadvlsaya buddhlr na vyabhicarati
tat sat, yadvisaya vyabhicarati tadasat11. Gita ohasva
of Samkara, 2.16.
3. Dr.Dasgupta: Indian Idealism, Cambridge University
--- Rm s a,3:9S3yn 3:6S - * - --- |
 9 1 7i
rw I

So far I have presented Samkara* s aecour

of error as the tradition has presented it to be. If tfcdis

account is accepted then, the defect of illusionism seems

to be unavoidable. Modern critics have therefore pointed

out that Samkaras criticism of the Vijnana-vada is not

1 ^ .
consistent to his own view of world-appearance. Samkara*$

treatment of error (adhyasa) is throughout taken in this

traditional interpretation as something psychological.

The concept of adhyasa is made intelligible through the

instances of empiric illusions like the shell-silver,

the double moon, etc,.. And because the analogies of the

shell-silver, etc., are given, it is taken for granted

that adhyasa is nothing but illusion. And as such the

eternal adhyasa of not-self over self is also a ease of

illusion in the same psychological sense.

But if one carefully goes through the

whole Adhyasa-bhasya7 one can clearly find that Samkara

here never raises a point which is of psychological in

arac.t.e:r>,, The problem of error, that he raises, is not

1. Asutosh Bhattacharya, on. elf, r>.^56-

 218

psychological but purely logical. In the very beginnin-

of this bhasya, Sankara points out. that all our concepts

which are distinct and different are precluded from any

possibility of combination. Any attempt of corah in in g the

distinct and different concepts results in a coupling of

true and false. Any coupling of the concepts like 'you1

and * I * does great violence against all the accepted

principles of logic. The coupling of true with false is

O
Gj

itself unreal. But since no linguistic expressions are

possible without joining ideas which are distinct and

different, language by its very nature necessarily

falsifies the real.

1. Vide; Dr.G.lisra: :!The Logical Foundations of oamk&ra

Vedanta", The -Srimanta Pratap Seth Lecture on Vedanta
delivered at the 44th session of the. Indian Philoso
phical Congress, held at Karnatak University, Dharwar),
1969. It is subsequently published in Bharat!. The
Utkal University Journal. Vol.III, Noi4, July, 1969,
pp.95-111. For advancing a logical rendering of the
concept of adhyasa. I am greatly indebted to this
lecture of Dr.G.Misra.
2. Vaeaspatis rejoinder, in this connection is interes^jtn
He writes,in his BMmat 1, that Samkara uses mithuni
krutya instead of mithunam just to indicate the
unreality of the coupling itself.
 219

Samkara * s definition of adhyasa "Smrti-

rupah paratra purvadrstababhasah" has been usually

translated as "the apparent presentation, in the form

of remembrance to consciousness of something previously

1
observed, in some other thing". Here the term

'remembrance* has been understood in the sense of memory

to exclude cases like recognition. The term *rupah* is

translated here as likeness. That means the adhyasa is

not exactly identified with memory but is similar to

memory. But here it may be pointed out that 'rupah* in

/ t
Samkara Vedanta has been usually understood as not

similarity but as mere form (e.g. nama-rupah as names

and forms). Samkara, by the phrase *smrtl-rupah* does

not compare adhyasa with smrti but suggests that erronediji

cognition, in so far as it is cognition, is bound to take

certain forms (i.e.. class characteristics or .iati) intq>

account. To put the issue more elaborately, while in an

illusion somebody perceives the * shell* as the 'silver*

he neither takes the 'silver* as something which he has

1. VSS., p.4.
 220

perceived before nor again he takes it as something

completely new, in the sense of not having any trace of

it from before. Unless he applies the universal or class!

characteristic of silverhood to the referent of the

present cognition at issue he can never judge the preset

1
referent as silver. In order to cognise it to be silve^

he is bound to apply the form of memoryi It is, in this

sense, memory which is absolutely essential for all

cognitions. No cognition whether erroneous or non-

erroneous can be possible without taking the universal

forms into considerations. And it is the memory which

is the bearer of all such forms.

1. Padraapada, in his Pancauadika makes it clear by

saying that the manifested object only resembles the
object remembered (i.e., the appearance or rupah of
the superimposed object, is only similar to the
appearance of the recollected object), but is not
the thing (actually) recollected. "In the case of
illusion,as the translator, Venkataramiah puts in
the foot note, "it is not the very object of past
experience that manifests itself but one belonging
to that ;iati". Gaekwads Oriental Series* No.CVII,
pp.17-18.
 From this point of view not only to

cognise the present object as silver, but also to

cognise it as shell becomes possible by taking memory

into its fold. In both? the cognitions, memory plays its

role by supplying the forms. And since these forms are

not in the external referent but are applied to it from

within, the referent is never cognised as it is but

always as something already ^on'ceptuali'Sed^^ : oes

The bare referent is never known. All that is empiri

cally known is only the conceptualised referent. It is,

in this.sense, hot only the silver-cognition is

erroneous but also the shell-cognition' is erroneous.

;J; j:: In other words, here Samkara, like many other

Indian Philosophers, is clearly not interested in

discussing the psychological problem of accounting

empirical errors like illusion, hallucination and

dream. His primary concern is only to explicate the

logical structure of the concept of error .asIffnh If

in erroneous cognition, error is due to the presence

of concepts and forms, etcthen the non-erroneous

 22

cognition also being involved with concepts, etc., cannoi

logically be said ns sacrosanct.

That Samkara is not interested in erroneous perc :>tion

but only analyses the concept of error becomes fully evid !Ut

when in Adhyasa-bnasya he declares all types of ordinary

knowledge as cases of superiraposition of one concept

(self) over the other concept (not-self). Since no

linguistic judgement is possible without employing

concepts and universals, judgement, as such, is said

to be inadequate in comprehending the nature of the

read, referent. All empirical judgements are descriptive

and as such these are likely to state more than

what the referent actually is. It is to be marked

here that the modern analytical philosopher also

recognises like Samkara that ''there is no class of

1
descriptive statements which are incorrigible.

Therefore these judgements are not dependable. In all

such judgements the predicate is different from the

subject. And once the difference between the subject

1 A.J.Ayer, opcit., p*G6 <

 223

and the predicate is allowed, the possibility of error

cannot be ruled out.

Hence Sarakara's main interest is to

disparage all the empirical, judgements that are descri

ptive in character and he seems to have approved the

non^empirical pure demonstrative expressions of identity

like This is this* where no difference between the

/

subject andI the predicate is admitted. li. is'fromithis-v

1
point-- of;view, the identification expressions

(akhandarthaka vakvas) are given superior status over

the relational expressions(samsafgabaeahi vakvas) which

relate one thing not to the same thing but to the other,

The mahavakyas like Thfc^ffaafiJl4s That thou art), etc.5

\

are expressions where differences are xd.thdrawn and

thus there is pure identity.

But philosophers search for pure

demonstrative use of expressions in language is not

1. The akhandarthaka is here taken as identification

just to distinguish it from the identity judgement
like 'Reality is Reality* which is rather trivial
-----ortautological, -
 224

found to be very much fruitful. "Purely demonstrative

expressions are in their way secure; but only because

1
the information which they give is vanishingly small".

It is, however, also true that Samkara does not sanction

absolute logical security to these demonstrative expre

ssions. His fundamental aim is not to find out a

catalogue of merely verbal tautologies and demonstrative

expressions but to point out the limitations of the

conceptual element which is logically inseparable from

any linguistic expression. As such even the identification

expression 'A is A' cannot be finally upheld from the

Advaitic logical point of view. Because here also there

is at least a logical difference between the first * A*

(subject) and the second * A* (predicate). Hence the move

/
Samkara takes, is the very denial of the linguistic

expression itself. *A is A is, no doubt, better than

A is B or 'A is C* and in that sense it is nearest to

truth but yet ultimately it also like others fails to

reach the goal. The logical conclusion to which the

9 *

1. A.J.Ayer: op.cit.. p.53

 225

Advaita is led is the very criticism of the use of .

1
language. '

Hence it seems evident that Samkaras prima 7

interest is to investigate the logical condition of, errspjr

as such. Since all empirical judgements are involved with

conceptualisation, relation and descriptions, these are

all falsificatory in character from the logical point o;

/

view. That Samkara is only interested in the conceptual

analysis of error becomes very much clear when in the

Adhyasa bhasya, the opponent raises the objection that

adhyasa is possible only in respect of the perceptible

object, Samkara retorts saying-that there is no such ruljb

as that. The judgements like The sky is, dim* is made

when people superimpose dimness upon the sky x-zhich is n

' \
a perceptible object. Samkaras point Is that attributi on

of general characteristics goes counter to the uniquene ss

; . ' 2 .

of the thing described. Description of the unique

o o

1. R.Das: The Theory of Ignorance in Advaitism, contributed

as one of the papers to Ajnana, Calcutta Oriental
Series, Wo.26, London, Luzac &Co,, 1933. pp,13-18,

2. Dr.G.Misra, op.cit.. p.97. ,

 226 -

referent by means of a rupah is avidya. His proposal is

that language cannot represent the uniquely real and

that true knowledge consists in knowing the unique a a

the unique, the that1- as the that* and not as the

what1. Brahma-Jnana consists in knowing a thing as. it

is. That is why such knowledge is said to be possible

by means of svarfioa laksana alone and not by tatastha

laic sana.

Adhyasa is claimed by Samkara to be

beginingless and natural (naisargika). For there is no

occasion while any linguistic expression can describe

the 'that* as the * that *; . In this sense, Reality is

not grasped by the human estimation or intellect

(naisa tarlcena matirapaneya). The right' knowledge

can-be possible only when the intellect is guided by .

the direction of discriminating . facility of viveka.

It is to'clearly discriminate the thing that is

rxitya from that of anitya. For any coupling of

nitya (eternal) with anitya (non-eternal) is adhyasa.

 227

If al!l these are accepted then one can say that Samkara1 &

programme is not of discovering any factr/ it is rather

a programme of analysing and investigating the mode of

our using language and employing concepts. The illusion-

istic interpretation of world-phenomena is not warrantee,

from his account of error. His philosophy only aims at

pointing the inadequacy of language. It is a critique of

concepts and judgements. He has nothing to say with

regard to the actual state-of-affairs.

While dealing with the perceptual,

knowledge, Samkara argues like a philosophical sritlfeQ*

He doubts the certainty of perceptual knowledge. Though

the Post-Samkarites distinguish between the Snnndh-nra

adhyasa (error with limiting adjunct) and the Mrugadhika

adhyasa (error without any limiting adjunct), Samkara

himself does not maintain such a distinction. According

to him, no perceptual cognition is logically free from

any limiting adjunct (upadhl). It is, however, true as

a matter of fact that the clear crystal "does not become

dim through its conjunction with a limiting adjunct .in

 228

in the form of red colour; for that it is pervaded by

1
the quality of dimness is altogether erroneous notion".

But the point that is raised.here is thatrcan one ever

perceive a thing except under some background conditions ?

One has to always perceive the object of reference unde]*

some amount of light and what quality one perceives in

the thing will be determined by the nature of light.

The crystal appears white when seen under clean sunlight 9 -

"If red colour is not the real quality of the thing

designated as crystal* why should whiteness constitute:;

2
its real nature?" It can be marked that here the

argument is not at all empirical but purely logical.

Even to confuse shell as silver* which is taken as an

example of nirupadhika adhvasa. is not possible without

the presence of unadhi. The qualities of silver are

wrongly superimposed upon the this*. As it has been

shorn earlier, from the logical point of view, both the

judgements This is silver* and This is not silver;

e M O ( 9 M M

1. VSS., Vol.XXXVTII, p,158.

2, Dr.G.Misra, op.cit., p*105.
 229

this is shell* are equally vulnerable. Therefore,

Samkara maintains, "What is merely due to a limiting

adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a substance,

and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented by

1
nescience only1'.

Some Advaitins take pain to analyse

the different psychological causes of empirical illusion

Those are said to be: pramatr-dosa (the blemishes

associated with the perceiver), pramana-dosa (something

wrong with the means of perception) and nrameva-dosa

(the object of cognition being placed very far). But

these differentiations are not at all relevant from

Samkara* s point of view. He is not busy in finding out

the different psychological conditions for erroneous

perception. His business is not to explain the erroneous

phenomena but to logically analyse the concept of error.

The point that he most emphasizes is that, all perceptual

knowledges, since are involved,with the upadhis. cannot

be maintained as logically unchallengeable

9 e 'o #
1* VSS., op.cit., p.156
 230

The logical nature of the argument

concerning error becomes still more clear when one

examines the arguments advanced by Sarakara for dreams

and hallucinations. The dream-experience is accepted

to be unreal only when it is replaced by a more coherent

waking-experience* But as long as the dream continues,

such experience is accepted to be as real as the waking-

experience. So also our waking-experience is accepted

to be real as long as it is not replaced by a more

coherent experience. But that does not rule out the

logical possibility that it wont be replaced by any

further experience. In other words, so far as this

logical possibility of doubt is taken into account, thei u

is no difference between the dream-experience and the

waking-experience. There can be every possibility of

doubt of what one experiences both in dream as well as

in waking state. But that there is experience as such

both in dream and in the waking state cannot be denied.

The mere experience of reality is not at all challenged,

It is true that while I dream or I am awake, I do not

 231

mean that I simply imagine things before me. So the

experience of mine at least suggests that there is a

reality which is the referent of my experiencing. That

can never be denied. That is always certain though the

what of it can always be doubted. Error consists in

applying the what upon the that.

From the nature of these arguments, it

becomes evident that Samkaras doubt of the reality of

the waking experience is not from any factual point of

view. Always it is from the standpoint of logic. Logical

one can never be certain that the waking experience will

not be turned into a dream. The same sceptical argument

is advanced over the phenomena of hallucinations. One

regards the hallucinatory dagger to be unreal because it

is sublated in the subsequent experience of the empty

space. But there is no logical certainty that the empty

space that is subsequently experienced will not again

be corrected by some other experience. So from this

point of view, as in dreams so also in hallucinations

the sublating experience is no better than the sublated

experience. If illusion, dream and hallucination are

regarded to be unreal because of the presence of certain

limiting conditions then the waking experience too being

not completely free from limiting conditions can never

be regarded as real*

* A

Thus it can be noticed that Sankara* s

account of error is well-connected with his observation^

on dreams and other abnormal perceptions. In fact the

sceptical challenge that he advances in the context of

dreams and hallucinations, follows necessarily from his

criterion of adhyasa If adhyasa means illegitimate

transference of opposite concepts* then in all kinds of

empirical judgements including those derived from

perceptions error is necessarily Involved, There seems

to be no escape from this,. It is only from this point

of view alone that the knowledge regarding the pheno-

a

menal world is challenged as maya. Samkara precisely

questions the certainty of empirical judgements. The

doubt that he casts is, as indicated before, not factua]'

but purely logical. The practical distinction between

 233

valid perception and erroneous perception is never

/
disputed by Samkara. Practically the snake in the

rope-snake illusion is -unreal and the rope is real.

Wo doubt has been thrown against the actuality of rope

and the illusoriness of snake. It is only argued that

if the 'snake cognition is replaced by the rope

cognition' then there is no logical ground to suppose

that the 'rope cognition*will not be. replaced by some

further cognition. It is the logical possibility alone

which rejects all particular experience and admits the

bare experience of the pure existence. That something

is presented, as the bare referent of all cognitions

cannot, however, be denied. That is what is termed as

adhistana. But any characterisation over this adhistana

is a case of adhyasa. And all such characterisations

over the adhistana are possible by means of linguistic

descriptions. Hence language is said to be poisoned

fromc its very origin. It necessarily distorts the .

uncharacterised, indescribable real, i.e. Brahman by

characterising and describing it. By attributing

 234

characteristics, language brings in plurality into the .

asahea and nirguna Brahman Language represents the unidUe

as the instance of a class, the non-relational as relational,

1
the non-qualified as qualified
\

So far I have only expounded Sankaras account

/ ,
of error and I have come to the conclusion, that Sarakara 3

hot involved in a psychological problem for accounting

erroneous perception. He is not found to be such a meta

physician who takes the world-phenomenon as illusory like

the fact of erroneous perception. He is not in search of

a causal explanation for erroneous perception. Samkara

criticises the nature of concepts or class-ideas which af

/ ' !

the necessary part of language. That all the.linguistic ;

judgements are dubitable and falsiflable in character is

concluded only by studying and analysing the nature and

function of language in relation to its referent. So it

is the philosophy of language around which Sankara1 s

discussion of error is actually carried on.

His criticism of language can be exposed froi

two points of views. It is argued that no linguistic

1, Dr.G;Misra-op-rC-lt., p.98,
 235

judgement is possible without joining at least two popposite

concepts, viz,, subject and predicate. And since these tr0

concepts are, by nature, different from each other, the

very attempt of combining them by means of a linguistic

judgement is to violate all the accepted principles of

logic. Subject and predicate are logically of two differs

types. The former is the pure referent and the latter, a

mere descriptive. Since they are of totally different tyjj<

they can never be conjoined. But language can never be

\

possible without such conjoining of subject with predieaij<

Hence language is argued to be defective from its very

origin. Thus far, it ean be marked that it is only from the

/ ,

logical point of view Samkara becomes a critic of langua'ifc,

But besides these he also maintains from an epistemologlcjfil

point of view that no linguistic judgement, that is
descriptive in character, can never be known as infallib|
or incorrigible.. Since describing implies misdescribing,
all descriptive judgements are in principle falsifiable.
It is this mark of corrigibllity of all descriptive
judgements that is shorn by Samkara as the very weakness
of language* The criticism of language is thus advanced
from the standpoint of logic and epistemology. A psyco-
 23d

Now the next point, which needs to

be discussed in this connection, is that how is this

account of error presented in the Adhyasa bhasva related

to the classical theory of Anirvacanlyakhvati. it is

usually maintained that according to the Anirvacaniya-

khyati-vada, the object of the erroneous apprehension is

neither real (Sat), nor unreal (Asat). nor both real arid

unreal (SMasat), but is neither real nor unreal (Sadasa

' Vihile applying this version of the theory to

the instances of empirical illusions, viz* * shell-silver'

it is said that the * silver * that is perceived, cannot

be said as absolutely real. For in that case the * silver-?,

cognition* would not have become replaced by the

subsequent cognition of the shell*. Nor can it be said

that the silver* is totally unreal like a barren woman*k

son, While the latter is absolutely inconceivable the

former is not only conceivable but is also perceptible.

The third alternative, that the object of illusion, i.e.

silver* is both real and unreal, is equally inadmissible

as such an alternative according to the Advaitins, is

 237

self-contradictory. Hence the only alternative, left tc

be accepted, is that the object Silver* in the illusion

is neither real, nor unreal5 it is simply indeterminable

(anirvacanfya).

I have indicated certain grounds in the

introduction as to why the Interpretation of the Khyativallas

in general and the Anirvacanlyakhyati in particular shoul

not be made in terms of such ontological assumption regarding

the nature of the object of erroneous apprehension. I hatj$

offered an alternative suggestion according to which the

different khyatl-va&as are presented-as the different

theories regarding the nature of the judgement. While the

Satkhyati-vada is said as advocating for the truth of all

judgements, the Asatkhyativada is said as advocating for jthe

falsifcy of all judgements. The Atmakhyativada is interpreted

as supporting either, the external referentiality of all

judgements or the mere awareness as the referential

lity of all judgements. In the Akhyati-vada,

1. Vide: Samkara's criticism of Jaina philosophy,

VSS., II.II.33.
 233

while the truth of all judgements are admitted, the

error is just presented as no-judgement1. In both the

Viparlta khyati-vada and the Anyathakhyativada, it, is

maintained that the true judgement is to describe the

referent in the appropriate manner and the false judge

ment is to describe the same in an opposite or differen

manner. The term anirvacaniya. can likewise be said

here as qualifying the judgement.

In analysing the nature of judgement,

/

Sankara first distinguishes between sense and nonsense,

iihile judgements in general are having sense, the self-

contradictorieg like barren womans son, etc., are

regarded to be nonsense (tuQ&a!XThe self-contradictor

expressions are inconceivable and as such the question

of truth and falsity in cases of those expressions

is simply irrelevant. Those are not judgements proper.

In the context of judgement alone, the question of

truth and falsity can significantly be raised. The

judgement This is silver' is regarded as false because

it is sublated by the correcting judgement 'This is

 shell. Because the .judgement 'This is shell* is not

likewise sublated ordinarily, this judgement is regarde< j

| as true. But oamkara points out that if the formerjud<

merit is regarded as false due to its contingent charact T*

then the so called true judgement too cannot he said as

i true because here also the contingent character is not

completely excluded. In other words, it cannot be

I
shown that the so called correcting judgement 'This is

shell* won't be sublated. There is no logical guarantee;

that such judgements are not affected by their continge it

character. Hence, the synthetic judgements, which are .

not yet falsified, cannot even be said as true. That

they are in principle falsifiable cannot be denied.

Though they cannot be said as false, they can neither

even be said as true, Because they are neither true

j nor false nothing 'determinate can be said about them.

i
I
j
They are, therefore, indeterminable. It is this eharac
i
ii
of falsiflability that is the main point of emphasis
i
/
in the arguments advanced by Samkara.

If truth or right knowledge consists

in knowing something as it is (vastu-svarurayadharanam

 240

vidyan) then, no Judgement can bo treated as true*

There is always the logical possibility that any

Judgement, while describing the referent2 is very like!

to go beyond the referent. Because describing involves

taisdescribing. Bo iron the logical noint of view s

linguistic expressions are never incorrigible and are:;

therefore falsifiabie in principle. According to

/

lafnkara any synthetic judgement, in order to be

significant, implies its negative. The opposite of any

synthetic judgement is not logically inconceivable.

If a thiw:g is described as red it does not imply the t

the red-characterisation intrinsically belongs to the

thing. If under one condition, red-characterisation

is taken as appropriate then under ofher conditions,

charscferisafions other than red c^n equally be iuhen

as appropriate. This shows that characterisations are

due to the external conditions and never intrinsically

belong to the thing itself. Hence all descriptive

judgements arc in principle fallible and can never bo

absolutely true., Of course, froa this it should not

 241

necessarily follow that the so called true judgements

are false. Because, as pointed out earlier, their

falsificatory mark is not yet fully ascertained.

/
Samkara, however, grants the synthetic judgements

concerning phenomenal order to be genuine, though

falsifiable from the standpoint of logic. These 'do scrip* ive

judgements are factually significant though do not stuns

to' the scrutiny of logical test. If these observations

are granted then it may seem clear why according to

/

garhkura tho ordinarily called true judgements are neith*

1
true (sat) nor fsl.se (asat).

) 1 ' The . suggestion, that these judgements

)

ma'y be relatively true and relatively false, is ruled

, \ j

oiit from the beginning in an absolutistic logical frame

work. Fjbr an absolutist, there can he no compromise in

r. J

j\ masters regarding truth and falsity. Whatever is true,

is,! true and whatever .is false, is false. The logical

; 1 \

l
Jy.ji/Aln Sanskrit language, >a.t stands for both real and
| true. Here in the context of judgement, true, being
si tlmore appropriate, is adopted.

T
 242

criterion does not admit any degree* Hence the nature

of these judgements are such that they cannot be

determined by any of the logical categories.

Hie Anirvacahlya khyati-vada, though is not

explicitly mentioned and discus sod in. any of damkaras

works, yet.isj thus, not found to be inconsistent to

s
the analysis of error presented by Sankara himself,

Following Baiftkara*s view point, it can be maintained

that the Arrirvacanlya khyati-vada is never about the

ontological status of the object of erroneous percept!^.

Fiore the Mvaitins* main interest is concerned only

with the nature of linguistic judgement that is the

ofc .
hearer of all forms "human knowledge, It is the analyst
A

of the? nature of the judgement which engages the

philosopher throughout his philosophising, that is the

status of judgement? Is it true or false, or both true

or false or neither true nor false?

But such a kind of philosophical programme!

 243

which is solely confined to the logical analysis of

linguistic judgements that involve concepts, classes

and categories, has been totally misconceived by the

Fost-Saihkarites,, A programme for the logical analysis

of the judgement is totally misunderstood. And as such

I

irrelevant ontological assumptions regarding the object

of erroneous apprehension are advanced. As such, attempts

are made to account for the locus ci avidya. While the

Bhamatl tradition insists Brahman to be the object and

.iiva as the support of avidya, the ivarana tradition

insists, on the other hand, Brahman to be the support

as well as the object of avidya, Again Surestfara attemp ts

to interpret avidya in a mystical way. To him "Avidya

is based and yet at the same time it is a baseless

illusion opposed to all reason and cannot stand a logical

scrutiny even as darkness cannot stand the sun".

1, "Seyam bhrantir niralaraba sarvanyayavirodhini sahate

na vicaram sa tamo yad vad dlvakaram".
Naiskarmyasiddhi of Suresvara, III, 66,
(Ed. by Prof. M.Hiriyanna, Bombay, 1925)