People vs.

Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)

FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to
respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on
Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the
thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The
evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—she considers
him her husband as he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew
of the pregnancy and that it was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable,
due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable

to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into
the thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she

was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all
happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused
of.

US vs. Tanedo [15 Phil. 196 (1910)]

Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on
his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the accused went on his
way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The
accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue hissearch for the
elusive wild chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out
in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one,
Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass,
& later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & achicken was killed by a gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused
and the deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed
during the trial. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into
the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of
reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty

Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the chicken and the
man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to:

§ Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by
law…

§ Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident
without liability or intention of causing it.

§ Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be

innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown
he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed that the
accused was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the deceased.
The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the body.

The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not
required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of
intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a
consideration of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit."
Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

People vs PO3 Fallorina

G.R. No. 137347

March 4, 2004

Facts:

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the third
child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon
City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed. Together with his
playmate Whilcon “Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned
carinderia beside the road.

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and his
three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from
the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG),
knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one of his friends was previously been scolded by
the appellant before.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the
former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof
flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon
as Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45
caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate
near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.

The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought
him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single
gunshot wound in the head.

Issues:
(a) Whether the appellant is exempted from criminal liability?

(b) Whether the appellant can offset an aggravating circumstance by taking advantage of his public
position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender?

Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be committed
either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with
due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts
and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the accused. The court also failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused since it was only
after three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And lastly, the
court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the accused.

On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant-accused of murder,
qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in
favor of the appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y
Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized by Article 248
of the RPC, as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the
accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual
damages of P49,174.00 (paid for funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced the appellant to
suffer the Death Penalty.
People vs praxedes AYAYA GR- L-29396 (umbrella)

Jose Fajardo(chief of police) went to the house of Benito de la Cruz(deceased)(because of a complaint

ofsome drunk guy vomiting) only to find the latter wounded on the left upper eyelid which
was bleeding.He was brought to the hospital where he died 4 days later. The cause of death was
cerebral hemorrhagedue to the wound inflicted. Ayaya then was tried and charged for the death of his
husband.

AYAYA’S DEFENSE:

On appeal, Ayaya defense states She, Benito, and her son Emilio drank tuba and went to the cinema. No
quarrels occurred on that night or even before the incident. But on their way home, Benito gave a blow
without warning to ayaya which she dodged. Benito then went home before them. When Ayaya and
Emilio arrived at their house, Benito was preventing the door from being opened. The door slightly gave
an opening and Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the wall and door, however, the door was
crushing Emilio’s head and when Benito poked his head on the door,

Ayaya jabbed him with his umbrella. When they gained access to the door, they found Benito already
lying in bed with a wound on his head. The testimony was supported by her son. Ayaya’s action in
thrusting her umbrella was did so to free her son from imminent danger of being crushed in the head,
the absence of any reasonable motive to her husband made the court believe that it was a
mere accident without any fault or intention of causing it. She incurred nocriminal liability because it
was a licit act to free her son from the grave danger of crushing his head. Ayaya is acquitted.

AMPLOYO V PEOPLE
Facts: Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the
breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo
contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened at
7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very much
underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly
whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Art 336 RPC and
not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved.
Issues: WON lewd design was established; WON Amployo violated RA 7610.

Held: *Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be
met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.
The first element is a lewd design. The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or
obscene; [12] it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is
entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can
be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as
lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very
nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. Lewd design was established. Amployo
cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has conveniently left out details which indubitably
prove the presence of lewd design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what
happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the
very same petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past. *The first element of
RA 7610 obtains. Petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s breasts (sometimes under her
shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct. The second element is likewise present. As we observed in
People v. Larin, [24] Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through
coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to
the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at
the time of the incident in question.
Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Isaias Castillo y Completo
G.R. No. 172695 29 June 2007

FACTS:

In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His father-
in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave the house. As
he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was
heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body
of Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was
the cut jugular vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a
nail.”
ISSUE:
Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental
RULING:

The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or intention
of causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the
act, the consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury. Also,
the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a
husband with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s evidence, the claim that the act
was accidental cannot be appreciated in favour of the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Susan Latosa

G.R. NO. 186128 June 23, 2010
Facts:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Susan Latosa, herein appellant, together with
his husband Major Felixberto Sr. and two children Sassy mae and Michael, were in their house in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig. While Major Felixberto Sr .was asleep, Sassy mae saw her mother take
Felixberto Sr.’s gun and leave. She asked her mother where she was going and if she could come
along, appellant refused. Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassy
mae to buy ice cream. After
Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to join his sister, but he refused. Appellant thereafter
turned up the volume of the television and radio to full. Shorty after that, appellant gave her son
money to buy food. After buying his food, Michael went back to their house and thereupon saw his
friend Mac-Mac who told him that he saw appellant running away from their house. Moments later, a
certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house. Michael replied in
the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in
the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told
him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office. Then, Sassy
mae arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand.
Appellant claimed that the killing was an accident, that when Felixberto, Sr woke up, he asked her to
get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him it
suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down.

•
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of parricide. The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the followingcircumstantial evidence
established by the prosecution: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two (2) children
to do errands for her which were not usually asked of them; (2) at the time of the shooting, only
theappellant and Felixberto, Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seenrunning away from the hou
se immediately after the shooting; (4) whenMichael went inside their house, he found his father with
a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand; (5) the medico-legal report showed that the cause of
death was intracranial hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the head with the point of entry at
the left temporal region; (6) the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant fired two
(2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassy
mae testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant “bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major
iyong baril saka mo pinutok ”; (9) appellant’s children testified that they were informed by Felixberto,
Sr. regarding the threat of appellant’s
paramour,Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa presented amemorandum
showing that appellant was terminated from her teaching jobby reason of immorality.
•
The CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted having killed her
husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the exempting
circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility. She must rely on the strength
of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be

weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.
Issue:
WON appellant has strongly established the exempting circumstance of accident to relieve him
from criminal liability.
Held:
No
Ratio:
SC held that it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear andconvincing evidence, the followi
ng essential requisites for the exemptingcircumstance of accident. To prove the circumstance she
must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution,
for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.SC find
no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial evidence her
motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense
on which her conviction rests. The following circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill her husband and sustained her
conviction for the crime.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The amount of exemplary damages is increased toP30,000.00

People of the Philippines v. Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista

and Edgar Pimentel
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014
Carpio, Acting C.J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar Pimentel are detention prisoners who
are charged for the murder of two jail guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the CA found
petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.

Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his
hearing scheduled for that day. JO2 Niturada answered the telephone in the administration building
and upon returning, he saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated,
and Chan shot the latter with a short firearm.

Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite.
Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad,
armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the armalite from JO1
Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.

Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw
jeep belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’s knowledge and consent. They picked up
Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. The group then transferred to a Mazda pick-up
truck. Eventually they abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field where they were arrested.

Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of carnapping, they allege that they were
under the influence of uncontrollable fear from Leal, who forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to
facilitate his flight from jail. With regards to the crime of murder, accused-appellants allege that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that there can be no treachery in
the case since the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and carnapping?

HELD:
YES, the guilt of the petitioners are proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant argue that there can
be no treachery since “the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from
danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound.” This argument is untenable.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista
to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun
and shot JO1 Bacolor. Hence, there is treachery.

Anent the crime of carnapping, the prosecution likewise proved all the elements of the offense in this
case. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
(2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person
other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded
the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he
did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.

The defense of uncontrollable fear is likewise untenable. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must
show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without
will but against his will as well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave
no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.

In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed
when Fieldad voluntarily followed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles.
The circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of the carnapping would
not justify in any way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their
fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail,
consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its
owner.

Hence, with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and of carnapping.

People of the Philippines vs Roderick Licayan et.al.

FACTS:
Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara were convicted of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and were
sentenced to death by the RTC of Marikina City. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
on August 15, 2001. It became final and executor on November 9, 2001, and a Writ of Execution
was issued on November 18, 2003 ordering the accused to be executed on January 30, 2004 at
3:00 PM. Weeks before Licayan and Lara were scheduled to be executed, two of their co-accused in
the original Information were arrested †“ Pedro Mabansag and Rogelio Delos Reyes. The PAO
filed with the Supreme Court on January 15, 2004 an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave
of Court. The Court issued a Resolution ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of
Licayan and Lara for a period of 30 calendar days. On February 17, 2004, the Supreme Court
granted the Urgent Motion to Re-open the Case with Leave of Court and remanded the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence. During their arraignment, Mabansag and Delos Reyes
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in the Infromations under which their co-accused were
previously indicted. On November 15, 2005, Mabansay dies while detained at the Marikina City Jail.
On February 17, 2009, the RTC rendered its decision finding Licayan, Lara, and Delos Reyes guilty
of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision on July 4, 2012.
Accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his defense of exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear as to why he did not report the crime to the police because he was being threatened by his
other co-accused. Moreover, other accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their
conviction on the basis of newly discovered evidence presented during their retrial.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable dear should be considered in favor
of Delos Reyes
(2) Whether or not Licayan and Lara should be acquitted based on purportedly newly discovered
evidence

RULING:
(1) Accused-appellant Delos Reyes did not refute the testimony of private complainant Co that he
(Delos Reyes) was one of the abductors. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro
Mabansag, Tata Placio and Jojo (two of the co-accused who were not apprehended) poked a gun at
him and threatened him that they would kill him if he reports the matter to the police. He admitted
that he saw 2ersons inside the house near the kitchen. After he left the safe house, Delos Reyes
admitted that he no longer felt being threatened but still he did not report what he witnessed to the
police authorities. The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, adding that the testimony of Delos
Reyes was self-serving and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting
circumstances relied upon. The Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must
therefore prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court
did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but
not reflected on the record. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally
discovers kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a
mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the
regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or
that Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.

(2) The pro hac vice resolution of the Supreme Court on January 15, 2004 allows the Court an
unusual task to revisit its own final and executor decision. It should be stressed that a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused or
motu proprio with the consent of the accused at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final. Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be considered newly
discovered in that the affiants are the movants†™co-accused who were already identified as such
during the trial. To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the
effects of Rule 121, Section 6 (b) of the Rules of Court. In general, the new evidence adduced in the
second trial consists in (1) allegations that the identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and
Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits of the recently apprehended Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that Licayas and Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3)
testimonies purporting to establish Lara was a t work in Antipolo during the kidnapping incident. The
second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present new evidence that were
not available during the first trial. However, the focus of their defense was to show that the
identification made by the victims was unreliable. The Court held that discrepancies in testimonies
concerning minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair
their credibility. Instead of weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their
credibility, because they discount the probability of their being rehearsed. The new evidence alluded
to by the Supreme Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was supposed to be the
testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and Delos Reyes, who both denied that Licayan
and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of Mabansag and Delos Reyes would have been
given more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the crime. Moreover, the
Court has repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The new
evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only fialed to prove that iehter of them was in another
place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to
discredit the positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay. WHEREFORE, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4, 2012, which affirmed in toto the
disposition of the Regional Trial Court ofMarikina in Criminal Case No. 98-2605-MK and 98-2606-MK
dated February 17, 2009, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.