Legal Foundations

i
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
ii Legal Foundations
iii
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
Keir Bamford
Kevin Browne
Judith Embley
Lesley King
Anthony Morgan
Lisa Rawcliffe
iv Legal Foundations
Published by
College of Law Publishing,
Braboeuf Manor, Portsmouth Road, St Catherines, Guildford GU3 1HA
© The University of Law 2017
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any way or
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: 978 1 911269 82 3
Typeset by Style Photosetting Ltd, Mayfield, East Sussex

Tables and index by Moira Greenhalgh, Carnforth, Lancashire
Printed in Great Britain by The Irongate Group, Derby
v
Preface
This book is divided into five Parts, the first four each dealing with one of the topics which pervade the
syllabus of the Legal Practice Course. These topics are: Revenue Law, Professional Conduct, EU Law and
Human Rights. Part V deals with the core subject, Probate and Administration. The material contained in
this book is intended to be an introduction to the pervasive and core topics, and is designed for those with
little or no previous knowledge of the subjects. It has been written primarily to support and complement
the Legal Practice Course undertaken by trainee solicitors. The approach taken to the subjects is
essentially practical and is enhanced by worked examples showing the application of the topics in a
practical context.
For the sake of brevity, the masculine pronoun is used to include the feminine. To refer to ‘he or she’ on every
occasion when such a reference was necessary would have added many extra pages to an already lengthy book.
The law is generally stated as at May 2017.
KEIR BAMFORD
KEVIN BROWNE
JUDITH EMBLEY
LESLEY KING
ANTHONY MORGAN
LISA RAWCLIFFE
The University of Law
vi Legal Foundations
Contents vii
Contents
PREFACE v
TABLE OF CASES xv
TABLE OF PRIMARY LEGISLATION xxiii
TABLE OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION xxix
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxiii
Part I REVENUE LAW 1

Chapter 1 VALUE ADDED TAX 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Charge to VAT 4
1.3 Tax payable to HM Revenue & Customs 5
1.4 Penalties 6
Chapter 2 INCOME TAX 9

2.1 Introduction 9
2.2 Total income 12
2.3 Allowable reliefs 14
2.4 Personal allowances 15
2.5 Personal Savings and Dividend Allowances 17
2.6 Rates of tax 18
2.7 Calculating the tax due 26
2.8 A full income tax calculation 26
2.9 Collection of income tax and dates for payment 27
Chapter 3 CAPITAL GAINS TAX 31

3.1 Introduction 31
3.2 Disposals 33
3.3 Calculation of gains 34
3.4 Reliefs 36
3.5 The annual exemption 37
3.6 CGT calculation where there is more than one disposal in a tax year 38
3.7 Unabsorbed losses 39
3.8 Part disposals 41
3.9 Husband and wife 42
Chapter 4 INHERITANCE TAX 43

4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 The main charging provisions 44
4.3 Transfers on death 45
4.4 Lifetime transfers: potentially exempt transfers 54
4.5 Other lifetime transfers: lifetime chargeable transfers 57
4.6 Effect of death on lifetime transfers 59
4.7 Liability and burden of payment 64
4.8 Time for payment 68
Chapter 5 TAX-EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS 73

5.1 Introduction 73
5.2 Investments eligible for income tax relief 73
5.3 Investments producing tax-free income or capital gains 74
viii Legal Foundations
5.4 Investment to escape a CGT liability 75
Appendix to Part I 77
TAX RATES SUMMARY 77
Summary of rates and allowances for 2017/18 for individuals 77
Part I Summaries – Revenue Law 79
Part II PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 85

Chapter 6 THE LEGAL PROFESSION 87
6.1 Professional conduct 87
6.2 The Legal Services Board 88
6.3 The Solicitors Regulation Authority 88
6.4 The Law Society 88
6.5 Different aspects of practice 89
6.6 Employed solicitors 91
6.7 Law centres 92
6.8 Legal advice centres 92
6.9 Duty solicitor schemes 92
Chapter 7 REGULATING THE PROFESSION 93

7.1 Introduction 93
7.2 How the profession regulates itself 93
7.3 The pervasive nature of conduct 95
7.4 Complaints against solicitors, authorised bodies and those who work for them 95
7.5 The Legal Ombudsman 96
7.6 Breach of professional conduct 97
7.7 The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 99
7.8 Other powers of the Solicitors Regulation Authority 100
7.9 Powers of the court 101
7.10 Negligence 101
7.11 The SRA Compensation Fund 101
Chapter 8 THE PRINCIPLES 103

8.1 Introduction 103
8.2 The Principles 103
8.3 Principle 1: Justice and the rule of law 104
8.4 Principle 2: Integrity 104
8.5 Principle 3: Independence 104
8.6 Principle 4: Best interests of clients 104
8.7 Principle 5: Standard of service 104
8.8 Principle 6: Public trust 105
8.9 Principle 7: Compliance with legal and regulatory obligations 105
8.10 Principle 8: Effective business management 105
8.11 Principle 9: Equality of opportunity and respect for diversity 105
8.12 Principle 10: Protection of client money and assets 106
8.13 Examples 106
Chapter 9 OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS 107

9.2 General principles 107
9.3 Advertising 108
9.4 Referrals of business 110
9.5 Fee sharing 111
9.6 Introductions to third parties 112
9.7 Examples 112
Contents ix
Chapter 10 THE RETAINER 115

10.2 Acceptance of instructions 115
10.3 Refusal of instructions to act 116
10.4 Duties to the client during the retainer 118
10.5 The client’s authority 120
10.6 Termination of the retainer 120
10.7 Liens 121
10.8 Examples 121
Chapter 11 CLIENT CARE AND COSTS 123

11.2 Client care – Chapter 1 124
11.3 Information about costs 125
11.4 Client care letter 127
11.5 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 127
11.6 Fees and costs 127
11.7 Options available for solicitor’s fees 128
11.8 Money on account 130
11.9 Solicitor’s bill 130
11.10 Client’s right to challenge the bill 131
11.11 Non-contentious business agreements 133
11.12 Contentious business agreements 133
11.13 Overcharging 133
11.14 Commission 133
11.15 Example 134
Chapter 12 CONFIDENTIALITY 137

12.1 Duty of confidentiality 137
12.2 Duty of disclosure 139
12.3 Placing confidential information at risk 140
12.4 Confidentiality and privilege 143
12.5 Examples 144
Chapter 13 CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 147

13.2 Chapter 3: Conflict of interests 147
13.3 Client conflict 148
13.4 Conflict of interests between two existing clients 151
13.5 Own interest conflict 151
13.6 Systems and controls for identifying conflicts 152
13.7 Professional embarrassment 152
13.8 Limited retainer 153
13.9 Conveyancing 153
13.10 Examples 153
Chapter 14 UNDERTAKINGS 155

14.2 Why undertakings are necessary 156
14.3 Breach of an undertaking 156
14.4 Oral and written undertakings 156
14.5 Terms of the undertaking 156
14.6 Client’s authority 157
14.7 Change of circumstances 158
14.8 Enforcement 158
14.9 Liability of others 158
14.10 Standard forms of undertaking 159
14.11 Examples 159
x Legal Foundations
Chapter 15 MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 161
15.2 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 161
15.3 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 166
15.4 Confidentiality 171
15.5 Examples 172
Chapter 16 DUTIES OWED TO THE COURT AND THIRD PARTIES 175

16.2 Refusing instructions to act 177
16.3 Instructing counsel 177
16.4 Immunity for advocacy work 178
16.5 Duty to third parties 178
16.6 Relations with other solicitors 180
16.7 Examples 180
Chapter 17 FINANCIAL SERVICES 183

17.2 Source material 184
17.3 Financial services regulatory structure 184
17.4 The general framework 185
17.5 The need for authority 186
17.6 Regulated activity 186
17.7 Exemption for professional firms – s 327 exemption 190
17.8 The SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001 192
17.9 Consumer credit activity 193
17.10 Insurance mediation 193
17.11 Financial promotions 194
17.12 Examples 196
Chapter 18 REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICE 199

18.1 The SRA Suitability Test 2011 199
18.2 Practising certificates 201
18.3 Additional practising requirements 203
18.4 Accountants’ reports 203
18.5 Indemnity insurance 203
18.6 Responsibility of managers of recognised and licensed bodies 204
18.7 Supervision 204
18.8 Separate businesses 205
18.9 Duty to the Solicitors Regulation Authority 206
18.10 Examples 206
Appendix to Part II 209

SRA CODE OF CONDUCT 209
Chapter 1 – Client care 209
Chapter 3 – Conflicts of interests 211
Chapter 4 – Confidentiality and disclosure 214
PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 217

Part 7 – Money Laundering 217
Part II Summaries – Professional Conduct 231
Part III EU LAW 243

Chapter 19 SOURCES OF EU LAW 245
19.2 Background 245
19.3 The Treaties 246
Contents xi
19.4 Regulations 249

19.5 Directives 249
19.6 The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 249
19.7 Other EU measures 250
19.8 Conclusion 250
19.9 Overview of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 250
19.10 Conversion table – notable Article numbers 251
Chapter 20 THE INSTITUTIONS 253

20.2 The Council 253
20.3 The European Council 254
20.4 The European Commission 254
20.5 The Parliament 255
20.6 The Court of Justice 256
20.7 The General Court 257
20.8 The Court of Auditors 257
20.9 The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 258
20.10 The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 258
20.11 The Committee of the Regions 258
Chapter 21 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 259

21.2 EU law and the EU citizen 259
21.3 The concept of direct effect 260
21.4 The supremacy of EU law 262
21.5 The concept of indirect effect 262
21.6 Action against a State for failure to implement a Directive 263
21.7 Article 267 TFEU reference procedure 264
Chapter 22 SEEKING A REMEDY IN NATIONAL COURTS 267

22.2 EU law as a defence 267
22.3 Effective remedies 268
22.4 Injunctions/interim injunctions 268
22.5 Damages for breach of EU rights 269
22.6 Repayment of discriminatory tax/VAT 269
22.7 Statutory remedies 270
22.8 Time-limits 270
22.9 Limits on compensation 270
Chapter 23 FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 273

23.2 What does the Treaty provide? 273
23.3 When does the Treaty allow Member States to deny entry? 275
23.4 Can the worker bring his family with him? 275
Chapter 24 FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND PROVISION OF SERVICES 277

24.2 The right of establishment: Article 49 TFEU 278
24.3 The right to provide services: Article 56 TFEU 278
24.4 Secondary legislation 279
24.5 Constraints under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 279
24.6 Can the self-employed person bring his family with him to the host State? 281
24.7 Derogations from Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 281
24.8 Rights of potential recipients of services under EU law 281
24.9 Summary and conclusion 281
xii Legal Foundations
Chapter 25 FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 283

25.3 Are there circumstances in which Article 34 TFEU will not apply? 285
25.4 Summary of the position regarding trading measures 287
25.5 How to use Article 34 TFEU 288
Chapter 26 COMPETITION LAW 291

26.2 Anti-competitive agreements: Article 101 TFEU 291
26.3 Abuse of a dominant position: Article 102 TFEU 297
26.4 Chapter Summary 299
Part IV HUMAN RIGHTS 303

Chapter 27 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 305
27.1 Introduction to human rights 305
27.2 Introduction to the Convention 305
27.3 The relationship between the ECHR and English law 306
27.4 The relationship between the ECHR and the EU 306
27.5 The substantive law of the ECHR 306
27.6 Petitioning the Court in Strasbourg 326
Chapter 28 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 329

28.2 Convention rights 330
28.3 The mechanisms of the Act 330
28.4 Procedure for using the Act 338
28.5 The Commission for Equality and Human Rights 341
Appendix to Part IV 343

HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 343
IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CONVENTION RIGHTS: A CHECKLIST 355
EVERYDAY SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE HRA 1998 MIGHT APPLY 357
RESPONDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGMENTS 359
EXAMPLES OF HOW BUSINESS CAN IMPACT CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS 361
Part V PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 365

Chapter 29 SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY ON DEATH: THE BACKGROUND LAW 367
29.2 What property can pass under a will and the intestacy rules? 367
29.3 What property passes independently of the will and intestacy rules? 368
29.4 The requirements for a valid will 369
29.5 How a will takes effect 375
29.6 The effect of the intestacy rules 379
29.7 The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 384
Chapter 30 PROBATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 389

30.2 Who are the PRs? 390
30.3 First steps after receiving instructions 390
30.4 Deciding whether a grant of representation is necessary 393
30.5 Applying for grant 394
30.6 Completing the IHT account 396
30.7 The requirement for an IHT account 399
30.8 Oaths: general background 404
30.9 Oath for executors 405
30.10 Oath for administrators with will annexed 407
Contents xiii
30.11 Oath for administrators 411

30.12 Effect of grant 416
30.13 Limited grants 416
30.14 The chain of representation and grant de bonis non administratis 416
30.15 Caveats and citations 418
30.16 An alternative to citation 419
Chapter 31 ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE 421

31.2 The administration period 421
31.3 Duties of the PRs 422
31.4 Protection against liability 422
31.5 Administrative powers of PRs 422
31.6 Collecting the deceased’s assets 432
31.7 Paying the deceased’s funeral and testamentary expenses and debts 433
31.8 Paying the legacies 435
31.9 Completing the administration and distributing the residuary estate 437
Part V Summary – Probate and Administration 445

INDEX 447
xiv Legal Foundations
Table of Cases xv
Table of Cases
A
A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25 319
Abd Ali Hameed Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 310
Abdulaziz v United Kingdom; Cabales v United Kingdom; Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471 323
Ablitt v Mills & Reeve (1995) The Times, 25 October 139
AH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 787 309
Airey v Ireland (Case A/32) (1979) 2 EHRR 305 314
Ali v Birmingham CC [2010] UKSC 8 313
Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK (Application Nos 26766/05 and 22228/06) (2011) The Times, 22 December 315
Allué (Pilar) and Coonan (Mary Carmel) v Università degli Studi di Venezia [1991] 1 CMLR 283 274
Alpine Investments BV v Minister Van Financien [1995] All ER (EC) 543 282
Al-Saadoon v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811 337
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 262
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Spa San Giorgio [1983] ECR 359 269
Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] QB 1124 339
AP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 3 WLR 51 309
Aragonesa de Publicidad v Departmamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluna
[1991] OJ C220/8 286
Arkwright v IRC [2004] WLTR 181 398
Arrondelle v United Kingdom (1982) 26 DR 5 318
Arthur JS Hall & Co (A Firm) v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, [2000] 3 All ER 673 119, 178
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billisley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 335
Astrid Proll v Entry Clearance Officer [1988] 2 CMLR 387 275
Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5 310
Ayling v Summers [2010] 1 All ER 410 372
B
Balcik v Turkey, no 25/02 322
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 308
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 369
Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1991] 1 QB 344 250
Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 275
Belgian Linguistic Case (No 2) (1979–80) 1 EHRR 252 322
Belgische Radio en Televisie v SV SABAM [1974] ECR 313 260
Benjamin, re [1902] 1 Ch 723 392
Biggs v Somerset County Council [1996] ICR 364 270
Biggs, re [1966] 1 All ER 358 419
Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [1970] ECR 661 292
Bonifacti v Italy [1992] IRLR 84 263
Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1985] 3 WLR 1027 269
Bowman v Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226 168
Brady v United Kingdom (1979) 3 EHRR 297 313
Bright v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWCA Civ 1628 316
Buckley v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101 318
Bukta and Others v Hungary (Application No 25691/04) 321
Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 316
Bullivant v A-G for Victoria [1901] AC 196 143
C
Campbell v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 137 308
Campus Oil Ltd v The Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727 286
Cannon v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1992] IRLR 474 270
Centrafarm BV and De Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 1147 287
Centros Ltd v Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] 2 CMLR 551 278
Chemidus Wavin v Société pour la Transformation et l’Exploitation des Resines Industrielles SA [1978] 3 CMLR 514 293
Christians Against Racism and Fascism v United Kingdom (1980) 21 DR 138 321
CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA [1996] 2 CMLR 781 289
xvi Legal Foundations
CILFIT Srl v Ministro della Sanitro [1982] ECR 3415 264

Cinethèque v Fédération Nationale des Cinemas Français [1986] 1 CMLR B65 285
City of London v Tammy Samede (representative of those persons taking part in a protest camp at St Paul’s
Churchyard, London EC4) [2012] EWHC 34 321
Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1997] ECR 2043 270
Commission of European Communities v Belgium; Re Public Employees (No 1) [1980] ECR 3881 275
Commission of European Communities v Denmark; sub nom Re Disposable Beer Cans [1989] 1 CMLR 619 285, 288
Commission of European Communities v France [1991] ECR I-659 279
Commission of European Communities v Germany [1988] ECR 5427 280
Commission of European Communities v Ireland; Re ‘Buy Irish’ Campaign [1982] ECR 4005 284
Commission of European Communities v Italy [1961] ECR 317 283
Commission of European Communities v United Kingdom; sub nom Re Imports of Poultry Meat [1982] ECR 2793 286
Conde Nast Publications Ltd v UK (2008) Application No 00029746/05, LTL 29 February 313
Conegate v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1986] ECR 1007 286
Connors v UK (2004) Application No 66746/01 325
Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH (Etablissements) v EEC Commission [1996] CMLR 418 292, 299
Cowan v Le Trésor Public (The Treasury) [1989] ECR 195 281, 282
Cream Holdings Ltd and Others v Banerjee and Others [2004] UKHL 44 320
Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and Mithouard [1995] 1 CMLR 101 284
D
Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 284
DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7 321
Defrenne (Gabrielle) v SABENA [1976] ECR 455 250, 260
Delcourt v Belgium (1979–80) 1 EHRR 355 313
Delimitis v Henninger Braü [1991] ECR 1-935 295
Diatta v Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567 275
Dillenkofer and Others v Germany [1996] 3 CMLR 469 263
Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28 340
Dombo Beheer BV v Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213 313
Doughty v Rolls Royce plc [1992] IRLR 126 261
Douglas v Hello! [2003] 3 All ER 996 316
DPP v Darby; DPP v Henn [1979] ECR 3795 286
Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd (formerly Reliance Systems) [1988] AC 618 263
Dunn v Parole Board [2009] 1 WLR 728 339
Dyestuffs [1972] ECR 619 292
E
East Riding of Yorkshire County Council v Gibson [2000] 3 CMLR 329 261
Edilizia Industriale v Ministero delle Finanze [1999] 2 CMLR 995 270
Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney-General [1991] IRLR 387 270
Engel v Netherlands (1979–80) 1 EHRR 647 310, 313
Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Employment [1994] 1 All ER 910 264, 270
Eva Molnar v Hungary (Application No 10346/05) 321
F
Fischer [1994] IRLR 662 270
Foglia v Novello [1980] ECR 745 265
Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3133 261, 264, 335
G
Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130, [1983] 3 WLR 143 260, 268, 269, 293
Gaskin Case, The [1990] 1 FLR 167 318
GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du Commerce Luxembourgeoise Asbl [1991] 2 CMLR 801 287
Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] All ER (EC) 139 278, 281
Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 371
Glantz v Finland [2014] STC 2263 313
Glass v United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 61827/00 316
Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524 318
Grant v Ministry of Justice [2011] EWHC 3379 316
Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593 281
Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 261
Guardian News & Media Ltd v HM Treasury In the Matter of [2010] UKSC 1 316
Table of Cases xvii
Guardian Newspapers v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 153 320
H
H (a child: breach of Convention rights: damages), Re [2014] EWFC 38 341
Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523 316
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478 324
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 308, 318
Hassan v UK (2014) 38 BHRC 358 310
Hilti v Commission of the European Communities [1992] 4 CMLR 16 298
Holy Monasteries v Greece (1994) 20 EHRR 1 324
Hugin Kassareregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers v EC Commission [1979] ECR 1869 298
Humphreys v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2010] EWCA Civ 56 323
Hünermund v Landespothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787 287
I
Ianelli and Volpi sPA v Meroni [1977] ECR 557 260
In the matter of an application by JR38 For Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2015] UKSC 42 317
International Fruit Co NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (No 3) [1971] ECR 1107 284
J
James v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 12 310
Javico v Yves St Laurent (1998) Financial Times, 13 May 293
Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer (No 2) [1995] IRLR 187 270
Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651 261
K
K v United Kingdom (1986) 50 DR 199 317
K, Re [2002] 2 WLR 1141 309
Kay v UK [2010] ECHR 1322 318
Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81 335
Kicks v Leigh [2014] EWHC 3926 (Ch) 370
Kirklees MBC v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 717 269
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) 1 EHRR 711 323
Klyakhin v Russia [2004] ECHR 46082/99 316
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB; Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v
TV-Shop I Sverige AB (De Agostini) [1997] All ER (EC) 687 288
Kroon v Netherlands (1994) 19 EHRR 263 315
L
L (a child), Re (2013) LTL 4 February, CA 313
Lancashire County Council v Taylor [2005] EWCA Civ 284 333
Larkos v Cyprus (1990) 30 EHRR 597 322
Le Compte v Belgium [1982] ECC 240 312
Leclerc v TFI Publicité [1995] ECR I-179 288
Levez v TH Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd [1999] All ER (EC) 1, [1999] IRLR 764 270
Levin v Secretary of State for Justice [1982] 1 ECR 1035 274
Lindsay v Customs & Excise Commissioners [2002] EWCA Civ 267, [2002] STC 588 308
Lingens v Austria (1981) 26 DR 171 314
Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 319
Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546 262
Local Authority v A, B, C, D and E [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam) 309
London Boroughs, Re [1990] 3 CMLR 495 261
López Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277 316
Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377 281
Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 601 340
M
Mahmood v BBC [2014] EWHC 4207 (QB) 320
Malcolm v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ 1538 316
Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14 307, 318
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 318
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 262
xviii Legal Foundations
Marper v UK [2007] ECHR 110 316

Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 723 261
Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority (No 2) [1993] 3 CMLR 293 268, 270
Mayeka v Belgium [2007] 1 FLR 1726 310
McDonald (by her litigation friend) v McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049 318
McLeod v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 493 318
Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4238 274
Minister of Finance v Richardt [1992] 1 CMLR 61 286
Monory v Romania [2005] ECHR 71099/01 316
MS v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR 313 316
Murray v United Kingdom (Right to Silence) (1996) 22 EHRR 29 314
N
Neilson v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175 309
Nold (J) KG v EC Commission [1974] ECR 491 249
Northamptonshire CC v AS, KS and DS (by his children’s guardian) [2015] EWFC 7 341
Nurettin Aldemir v Turkey, nos 32124/02, 32126/02, 32129/02, 32132/02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and
32138/02 (joined) [2007] ECHR 1121 321
O
O’Connor v Bar Standards Board [2016] EWCA Civ 775 339
O’Dowd v UK [2010] ECHR 1324 311
Oliari and Others v Italy (Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015) 317
Open Door Dublin Well Women v Ireland (1992) 15 EHRR 244 319
Opinion No 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, 28 March 1996 306
OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277 320
Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 313
P
P (by his litigation friend The Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West & Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19 309
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 59 331
PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26 320
PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1132 319
Prantl (Karl), Re [1984] ECR 1299 284
Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629 261
Q
Q (a child), Re [2011] EWCA Civ 1610 317
R
R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 331, 332
R v Cornick [2014] EWHC 3623 (QB) 319
R v Cox and Railton (1884) LR 14 QBD 153 143
R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 314
R v Drummond [2002] EWCA Crim 527, [2002] 2 Cr App R 25 314
R v Dryzner [2014] EWCA Crim 2438 319
R v Durham, ex p Huddleston [2000] 1 WLR 1484 262
R v Foronda [2014] NICA 17 315
R v Heritage Secretary, ex p Continental TV (Red Hot TV) [1993] 2 CMLR 333 269
R v HM Attorney General, ex p Rusbridger [2003] UKHL 38, [2003] 3 All ER 784 332
R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc [1994] 1 CMLR 621 269
R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc [1996] All ER (EC) 411 263
R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 330
R v Immigration Appeals Tribunal, ex p Antonissen [1991] 2 CMLR 373 274
R v JP [2014] EWCA Crim 2064 313
R v Keogh [2007] EWCA Civ 528 314
R v Khan [1997] AC 558 330
R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 329, 338
R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] All ER (EC) 493 286
R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 335
R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p Seymour-Smith [1999] 3 WLR 460 264
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1990] 3 WLR 818 262, 268, 289
Table of Cases xix
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 3) [1991] 3 All ER 769 268, 278
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 4) [1996] 2 WLR 506 263, 268, 269, 289
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 5) [1999] 4 All ER 906, HL 263, 269
R v Thompson (Brian Ernest) [1978] ECR 2247 286
R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63 322, 332
R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673 340, 341
R (K)(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 115 313
R (on the application of A) (A Child By Her Mother and Litigation Friend) v Secretary of State for Health
[2015] EWCA Civ 771 317
R (on the application of Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 337
R (on the application of Bentham) v Governor of Usk & Prescoed Prison [2014] EWHC 2469 (Admin) 316
R (on the application of C) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2016] EWCA Civ 47 316
R (on the application of Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] UKSC 9 316
R (on the application of Chapti) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 3370 323
R (on the application of Degainis) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 137 341
R (on the application of Dritan Krasniqi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1549 310
R (on the application of F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17 332
R (on the application of G) v X School Governors [2011] UKSC 30 313
R (on the application of G) v Y City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1. 313
R (on the application of Gillan and Another) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Another
[2006] UKHL 12 324
R (on the application of Hanley) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 66 310
R (on the application of Heather and Others) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366 336
R (on the application of Hester) v Secretary of State for Justice (2011) LTL, 20 December 341
R (on the application of Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 9 311
R (on the application of Idira) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1187 311
R (on the application of Infinis Plc) v Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2011] EWHC 1873 (Admin) 340
R (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 56 317
R (on the application of K) v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 1149 312
R (on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55 324
R (on the application of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 319
R (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 308
R (on the application of M) v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2014] EWCA Civ 1651 318
R (on the application of MA) v National Probation Service [2011] EWHC 1332 316
R (on the application of MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 334
R (on the application of Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1546 325
R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] EWCA Civ 297,
[2002] 2 All ER 756 336
R (on the application of Prudential Plc) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1 316
R (on the application of RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 614 323
R (on the application of Roberts) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 69 316
R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 323
R (on the application of Sacker) v HM Coroner for the County of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 11 331
R (on the application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 156 323
R (on the application of Sinclair Collis Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWCA Civ 437 324
R (on the application of Smith) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1 311
R (on the application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29 337
R (on the application of T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2014] UKSC 35 316
R (on the application of the Countryside Alliance and Others) v AG [2007] UKHL 52 317
R (on the application of V) v Independent Appeal Panel for Tom Hood School [2010] EWCA Civ 142 313
R (on the application of Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587 335
R (on the application of Whiston) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 39 311
R (on the application of Williams (by his litigation friend)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2017] EWCA Civ 98 323
R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35 332
Rabone v Pennine NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 1 339
Rayner v United Kingdom (1986) 47 DR 5 316
Reading v Reading [2015] EWHC 946 (Ch) 379
Redfearn v UK [2012] ECHR 1878 322
Regent Leisuretime v Skerrett [2005] EWHC 2255 178
Rewe Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649 284
Rewe-Zentralfinanz e GmbH v Landwirtschaftskammer [1975] ECR 843 284
Reyners v The Belgian State [1974] ECR 631 260, 280
xx Legal Foundations
RK (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v BCC [2011] EWCA Civ 1305 309
RocknRoll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) 316
Ross v Caunters [1980] 1 Ch 297 179
Rush Portuguesa v Office National d’Immigration [1990] ECR I-1417 279
S
S, Re [2002] 2 AC 313 331
Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313 314
Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 429
Scammell v Farmer [2008] EWHC 1100 (Ch) 370
Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No 30141/04, 24 June 2010) 317
Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden (1979–80) 1 EHRR 632 322
Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2011] EWCA Civ 1608 310
Secretary of State for Justice v Staffordshire County Council [2016] EWCA Civ 1317 309
Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11 321
Sidabras v Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR 6 316
Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1998] 3 WLR 1218 287
Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347 318
Simpson v United Kingdom (1989) 64 DR 188 313
Sims v Dacorum BC [2014] UKSC 63 324
Smith and Grady v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 620 340
Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 548 316
Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (Ireland) v Grogan (Stephen) [1991] 3 CMLR 849 280
Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1994] 3 All ER 129, HL 179
Stanford v United Kingdom (1994) The Times, 8 March 313
Steel and Morris v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 68416/01 314, 319
Stellato v Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 1435 312
STM v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235 292
Stögmüller v Austria (1969) 1 EHRR 155 311
Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden (1976) 1 EHRR 617 322
SXH v CPS [2014] EWCA Civ 90 316
T
Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission of the European Communities [1991] FSR 654 299
Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48 143
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom; Lord Aldington v Watts (1995) 20 EHRR 442 319
Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc [1989] ECR 765 284
Tormala v Finland (2004) Application No 41528/98 324
U
Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 262 158
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1996] All ER (EC) 97 273
United Brands Co (New Jersey, USA) and United Brands Continentaal B (Rotterdam, The Netherlands) v
EC Commission [1978] ECR 207 298
Unwesen in den Wirtschaft eV v Yves Rocher GmbH (1994) Financial Times, 9 June 287
V
Vallianatos and Others v Greece (Application Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013) 317
Van Binsbergen (JHM) v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 260, 280
Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803 279
Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337 260
Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 1 246, 260
Van Raalte v Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 503 322
Variola sPA v Amministrazione Italiana della Finanze [1973] ECR 981 249
Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Others [2001] 2 WLR 1038 338
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics (Case C-315/92)
[1994] ECR I-317 288
Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities (No 2) [1972] ECR 977 292
Volk v Verwaecke [1969] ECR 295 293
W
W v Ministry of Justice [2015] EWCA Civ 742 312
W (Children), Re [2010] UKSC 12 314
Table of Cases xxi
Wadman v Carpenter Farrer Partnership [1993] 3 CMLR 93 250

Walker v Badmin [2014] All ER (D) 258 (Nov) 370
Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) [1994] IRLR 482 263
Webster v Ministry of Justice [2014] EWHC 3995 (QB) 340
Weller v Associated Newspapers Limited [2015] EWCA Civ 1176 316
White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 891 179
Williams v London Borough of Hackney [2017] EWCA Civ 26 339
Wilson v Secretary for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40 332
Wood Pulp Cartel, Re [1988] ECR 5193 292
Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414 316
Wood v United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 23414/02 316
X
X v Netherlands 5 YB 224 311
Y
YL (by her litigation friend) v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 335, 336
Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 38 322
Z
ZH (a protected party by his litigation friend, GH) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
[2013] EWCA Civ 69 310, 341
xxii Legal Foundations
Table of Primary Legislation xxiii
Table of Primary Legislation
Page numbers in bold refer to full text of material Family Law Reform Act 1987
s 2ZA 383, 384
Administration of Estates Act 1925 379, 387, 434, 443 s 18(2) 383, 384, 412
s 7 417 Finance Act 1986 46
s 25 422, 444 Finance Act 2012 49
s 27 446 Finance Act 2013 11, 44
s 33 380 Finance Acts 3, 9
s 34(3) 434 Finance Bill 2016 53
s 35 434 Financial Services Act 2012 184, 185, 186
s 36(4) 443 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 183, 184, 185, 186,
s 36(6) 443 187, 188, 195, 197, 198
s 41 380, 423 s 3B 185
s 44 436 s 19 186, 188, 190, 194, 196, 240
s 46 380, 383, 414, 445 s 21 186, 194, 241
s 55(1)(x) 380 s 22 186, 193
Sch 1 s 22(6) 186
Part II 434 s 326 190
Administration of Estates Act 1971 s 327 134, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 198
s 9 422 s 327(3) 134
Administration of Estates (Small Payments) Act 1965 393, s 328 190, 192
399, 432 s 329 190
Administration of Justice Act 1982 373 Sch 2 186
s 17 371 Forfeiture Act 1982 378
Adoption and Children Act 2002 384
Apportionment Act 1870 Gender Recognition Act 2004 379
s 2 430
Housing Act 1996
Bribery Act 2010 87 s 185 333
s 7 87 s 185(4) 334
s 193(5) 313
Children Act 1989 424, 429 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 379, 383,
s 3 424 384
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 347 Human Rights Act 1998 305, 306, 308, 314, 326, 329–54,
Companies Act 1985 90, 314 343–54, 359
Coroners Act 1988 s 1(1)–(6) 343
s 11(5) 331 s 2 330
County Courts Act 1984 s 2(1)-(2) 343
s 69 131 s 2(3) 343–4
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 s 3 331, 333, 336, 338, 339
s 1 346 s 3(1) 330, 344
s 58 129 s 3(2) 344
s 58AA(3)(a) 129 s 4 332
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 349 s 4(1) 332, 344
s 4(2) 332, 334, 344
Data Protection Act 1998 108, 109, 113, 121 s 4(3)–(5) 344
s 4(6) 333, 344
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 264 s 5(1) 344
Equal Pay Act 1970 270 s 5(2) 344–5
Equality Act 2006 s 5(3)–(5) 345
s 30(3) 341 s 6 335, 337, 338, 339
Equality Act 2010 105, 117, 270, 276 s 6(1) 335, 338, 339, 345
Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of s 6(2) 336, 345
Succession) Act 2011 377, 378 s 6(3) 338, 345
s 2 378 s 6(3)(b) 335, 336
s 3 381, 382, 383 s 6(4)–(6) 345
European Communities Act 1972 259, 262 s 7(1) 338, 345
s 7(2)–(4) 345
xxiv Legal Foundations
Human Rights Act 1998 – continued Inheritance Tax Act 1984 – continued
s 7(5) 339, 346 s 21 56
s 7(5)(a) 339 s 22 56
s 7(6)–(13) 346 s 23 402
s 8 339, 341 s 23(1) 49
s 8(1) 339, 346 s 24 402
s 8(2) 346 s 24A 402
s 8(3) 340, 346 s 27 402
s 8(4)–(5) 347 s 28 402
s 8(6) 339, 347 s 160 47, 397
s 9 333, 340 s 162 48
s 9(1)–(5) 347 s 171 47, 48
s 10 333, 359 ss 178–189 437
s 10(1) 347–8 ss 190–198 438
s 10(2)–(7) 348 s 199 68
s 11 348 s 200 65
s 12 320 s 200(1)(c) 66
s 12(1)–(3) 348 s 211 434
s 12(4) 348–9 s 227 69
s 12(5) 349 s 230(1) 399
s 13(1)–(2) 349 s 267 402
s 19 331 s 505 48
s 21(1) 349–50 Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 379, 384, 425
s 21(2)–(5) 350 s 4 384
s 22(1)–(3) 350 Interception of Communications Act 1985 318
s 22(4) 351 Intestates’ Estates Act 1952
s 22(5)–(7) 351 s 5 382
Sch 1 330, 351–4
Sch 2 333 Law of Property Act 1925
Hunting Act 2004 317 s 21 424
s 184 377
Income Tax Act 2007 9 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940
Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 9, 12, 13, 14, s 3 347
29 Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 373, 378, 380
Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 9, 12, 13, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act
29 2012 111, 129
Part 2 12, 13, 26, 28 Legal Services Act 2007 88, 89, 91, 93, 96, 98
Part 3 12, 13, 28 Limitation Act 1980
Part 4 12, 13, 26 s 33(3) 339
Part 5 12
Part 6 13 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 373
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 Married Women’s Property Act 1882 399
367, 384, 384–6, 387, 422, 446 s 11 368, 394, 432
s 1(1) 384 Mental Capacity Act 2005 120, 370
s 1(2) 385 s 1(2) 370
s 1(2)(a)–(b) 385 Code of Practice 120
s 1(3) 385 Merchant Shipping Act 1988 262, 268, 278
s 3 385 Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 349
s 3(1) 385 Modern Slavery Act 2015 326
s 3(5) 386
s 3(6) 386 Northern Ireland Act 1998 349, 350
s 4 384 Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 43, 47 s 1 350
s 1 44 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
s 2 44 s 38(1)(a) 349, 350
s 3(1) 54
s 3A(1A) 54 Obscene Publications Act 1959 308
s 5 54 Official Secrets Act 1989 139
s 5(1) 45 s 2(3) 314
s 11 54 s 3(4) 314
s 18 48, 401
s 18(2) 48 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 103, 118, 138, 166, 170, 238
ss 19–20 56 Part 7 (ss 327–340) 217–30
Table of Primary Legislation xxv
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 – continued Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982
s 327 166, 217, 241 s 13 118, 234
s 328 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 217–18, 239
s 328(1) 166 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 31
s 329 169, 172, 218–19, 239 Terrorism Act 2000 166
s 330 169, 170, 171, 173, 219–21, 239 s 44 324
s 331 221–2 Treason Felony Act 1848
s 332 222–3 s 3 332
s 333A 171, 172, 223, 239 Trustee Act 1925 422, 444
s 333A(1) 171 s 19 424
s 333A(3) 171 s 27 391, 392, 422
s 333B 171, 172, 223–4, 239 s 31 425, 426, 427, 429, 444
s 333C 171, 172, 224, 239 s 31(1) 425–6, 426, 427
s 333D 171, 172, 224–5, 239 s 31(1)(i) 425–6
s 333D(2)–(4) 171 s 31(1)(ii) 426
s 333E 225 s 31(2)–(3) 426, 427
s 334 225 s 31(4) 427
s 335 226 s 32 427, 428, 429, 444
s 336 226–7 s 32(1) 427
s 337 227–8 s 32(1)(a) 427
s 338 228 s 32(1A) 428
s 338(2A) 167 s 32(1)(b) 427, 428
s 338(3) 168 s 32(1)(c) 427, 428
s 339 228–9 s 61 422
s 339A 229 Trustee Act 2000 422, 423, 425, 444
s 339ZA 229 s 3 424
s 340 166, 229–30 s 8 425
s 342 171 s 28 431
Sch 9 169 s 28(2) 431
s 28(4) 431
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 29 431
318 s 29(2) 431
s 30 431
Senior Courts Act 1981 s 31 431
s 35A 131 s 34 424
s 114 410, 411, 416 Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013 430
s 114(2) 411 s 1 430
s 116 419 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 429
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 250, 263, 270, 271 s 11 429, 430
Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 12 430
s 82 332 s 19 429
Shops Act 1950 269
Solicitors Act 1974 102, 130 Value Added Tax Act 1994 3
s 1 201, 207, 241 s 2(1) 4
s 3 200 s 3(1) 4
s 13B 202 s 4(1)–(2) 4
s 15(1) 202 s 5(2) 4
s 34 203 s6 5
s 36 101 s 19(2)–(3) 5
s 36A 101 s 59 7
s 44B 101 s 69 6
s 46 99 s 72 6
s 47 100 s 94 5
s 57 133 Sch 4 4
ss 59–63 133 Sch 7A 5
s 65(2) 130, 131 Sch 8 5
s 68 121 Sch 9 4
s 69 131 Video Recordings Act 2010 319
s 69(2A) 130
s 69(2C) 130 Wills Act 1837 369, 395
s 70 131 s 9 371, 372, 386, 395, 445
s 73 121 s 11 372
s 87 128, 201 s 15 372, 378
xxvi Legal Foundations
Wills Act 1837 – continued Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – continued
s 18 373 Art 101 250, 251, 260, 267, 268, 269, 291, 292, 293, 294,
s 18(3) 373 295, 297, 299, 300
s 18(5) 373 Art 101(1) 293
s 18A 373, 378, 406, 407 Art 101(2) 293, 294, 299
s 20 372, 373 Art 101(3) 250, 293, 294, 295, 299
s 24 375, 376 Art 102 250, 251, 260, 268, 269, 291, 293, 296, 297, 298,
s 33 377, 378 299
s 33A 377, 378 Art 107 260
Art 110 251, 267, 269
Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 331 Art 111 260
s 41 331 Art 157 250, 251, 260, 261, 264, 270, 306
s 41(3)(c) 331 Art 258 256
Art 259 256
EU Art 267 256, 262, 264, 265, 281
Art 288 246, 249, 250, 260, 261
Accession Treaty 1973 247 Treaty of Lisbon 245, 248, 253, 254, 256, 257
Accession Treaty 1981 247 Treaty of Nice 245, 248, 256, 257
Accession Treaty 1986 247 Treaty of Paris 1951 247
Accession Treaty 1995 247 Treaty of Rome 1957 245, 246, 247, 248, 253, 254, 255, 256,
Accession Treaty 2004 247 257, 259, 283
Accession Treaty 2007 247 continued as EC Treaty and Treaty on the Functioning of the
Accession Treaty 2013 247 European Union
EC Treaty 247, 248 International

continued as Treaty on the Functioning of the European European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
Union and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 248, 305–27, 329, 330,
European Economic Area Treaty 1992 247 333, 349
Art 1 337
Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union Art 2 306, 331, 343, 355, 357
Merger Treaty 1965 246, 258 Art 2(1)–(2) 351
Art 3 306, 310, 343, 351, 355, 357
Single European Act 1986 247, 253, 255, 257, 273, 283 Art 4 306, 343, 355
Art 4(1)–(3) 351
Treaty of Amsterdam 245, 248, 256 Art 5 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 324, 336, 343
Treaty on European Union 245, 247, 248, 253, 255, 256 Art 5(1) 308–9, 310, 351–2, 355
Art 4(3) 263 Art 5(2)–(3) 309, 310, 352
Art 15 254 Art 5(4) 309, 310, 311, 341, 352
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 245, 250, Art 5(5) 309, 310, 311, 341, 347, 352
255, 259, 273, 277 Art 6 306, 312, 313, 314, 324, 331, 341, 343, 355
Art 3(1)(b) 291 Art 6(1) 312, 313, 314, 352
Art 18 251, 257, 260, 268, 278, 281 Art 6(2)–(3) 312, 314, 352
Art 20 273 Art 6(3)(c) 314
Art 21 273 Art 7 306, 343, 355
Art 30 250, 260 Art 7(1)–(2) 353
Art 34 250, 260, 267, 269, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, Art 8 306, 307, 314, 315, 317, 318, 320, 323, 324, 325,
289 332, 334, 340, 341, 343, 355, 357
Art 35 250, 283, 285, 287 Art 8(1) 315, 317, 353
Art 36 250, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288 Art 8(2) 315, 318, 353, 355
Art 45 250, 260, 267, 273, 274, 279, 282 Art 9 306, 307, 343, 355, 357
Art 45(2) 273, 274 Art 9(1)–(2) 353
Art 45(3) 275, 281 Art 10 281, 307, 318, 319, 320, 324, 325, 336, 343, 356,
Art 45(4) 275 357
Art 49 250, 260, 263, 267, 268, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, Art 10(1)–(2) 318, 353
282 Art 11 307, 320, 321, 324, 343, 356, 357
Art 51 281 Art 11(1) 320, 353
Art 52 281, 282 Art 11(2) 320, 321, 353–4
Art 53 280 Art 12 307, 343, 354, 356
Art 54 278 Art 14 307, 322, 323, 334, 343, 354, 356, 357
Art 56 250, 260, 267, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 Arts 16–18 343, 354
Art 57 279, 281 Art 26 343
Art 62 281 Art 27(2) 343
Arts 63–66 250, 260 Art 31 343
Table of Primary Legislation xxvii
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 – continued and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 – continued
Art 32 350 Art 2 307, 343, 354, 356, 357
Art 34 346 Art 3 343
Art 41 340, 347 Protocol 6 306
Art 46 343, 350 Protocol 11 327, 350
Art 54 350 Art 5(3)–(4) 350
Protocol 1 306, 349 Art 5(6) 350
Art 1 307, 323, 324, 343, 354, 356 Protocol 13 350
Art 1 343
xxviii Legal Foundations
Table of Secondary Legislation xxix
Table of Secondary Legislation
Page numbers in bold refer to full text of material Money Laundering Regulations 2007 – continued
reg 6(2)–(3) 164
Administration of Insolvent Estates of Deceased Persons reg 6(6) 165
Order 1986 (SI 1986/1999) 435 reg 7 162
reg 8 165
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) reg 9 162
Part 44 reg 13 163
r 44 101 reg 14 165
r 44.5 132 reg 14(2) 165
Part 45 reg 14(4)–(5) 165
r 45 101 reg 19 166
Part 48 reg 20 162
r 48.8(1A) 126 reg 20(2)(d)(i) 162
Part 54 338, 339 reg 21 166
Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013 (SI 2013/689) 129
Consumer Contracts (Information Cancellation and Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 (SI 1987/2024) 390,
Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134) 420
127, 129 r 2 416
r 19 446
Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 r 20 390, 407–8, 409, 413, 417, 418, 419, 446
(SI 2013/609) 129 r 22 390, 411, 412, 413, 414, 417, 418, 419
r 22(1)–(3) 412
Equal Opportunities (Employment Legislation) (Territorial r 27(4)–(5) 410
Limits) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3163) 279 r 27(6) 407
r 44 418
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial r 46 419
Promotion) Order 2005 (SI 2005/1529) 184, 195
Art 8 195 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive)
Art 15 195 Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/2426) 108
Arts 28–28A 195 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Money Laundering; Exceptions
Arts 53–54 195 to Overseas Conduct defence) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1070)
Art 55 195 168
Art 55A 195 Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999) 127,
Art 62 195 204
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Pre-regulated
Activities) Order 2013 (SI 2013/556) 184, 185 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Professions) (Non- 1975 (SI 1975/1023) 200
Exempt Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1227) 184, 192
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations
Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/544) 184, 185, 186, 187, 1993 (SI 1993/2798) 271
188, 193, 197, 198 Solicitors’ (Non-Contentious Business) Remuneration
Pt 2 193 Order 2009 (SI 2009/1931) 128, 132
Pt 3A 193 Supply of Services (Exclusion of Implied Terms) Order 1982
Art 22 188 (SI 1982/1771)
Art 29 188 Art 2 119
Inheritance Tax (Delivery of Accounts) (Excepted Estates) Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011 (SI 2011/631)
Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/2543) 399–403 333
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
Land Registration Rules 2003 (SI 2003/1417) 443 Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794) 262
Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2157) 109, VAT (General) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/2518) 3, 6
116, 138, 161–6, 169, 172, 238
reg 3 161 Rules and Codes
reg 5 163 Code of Conduct 2011 see SRA Code of Conduct 2011
reg 6 163 Code of Non-broadcast Advertising and Direct and
reg 6(1) 163, 165 Promotional Marketing (CAP Code) 108
xxx Legal Foundations
Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007 94, 120, 121, 125, 127, SRA Code of Conduct 2011 – continued
140, 141, 142, 157, 176, 177, 178, 205 IB 5.2 177
SRA Accounts Rules 2011 95, 100, 105, 202, 203, 204, 241 IBs 5.3–5.4 176
SRA Authorisation Rules for Legal Services Bodies and IB 5.5 176, 181
Licensable Bodies 2011 90, 91, 111 IB 5.6 177
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 85, 94, 97, 103, 106, 117, 119, IB 5.7 175
120, 123, 138, 157, 209–15, 231, 232, 233 IB 5.8 176
Chp 1 102, 109, 115, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 134, IB 5.9 175
135, 177, 371 IB 5.10 176
Chp 2 105 IB 5.11 175
Chp 3 147, 148, 153 IBs 5.12–5.13 176
Chp 4 109, 137, 138, 141, 170 IBs 6.1–6.2 112, 113
Chp 5 175, 176, 177 IBs 6.3–6.4 112
Chp 6 110, 112, 113, 114, 234 IB 6.5 112, 113
Chp 7 105, 205 IB 8.5 109, 113
Chp 8 108, 113, 125, 233 IB 8.6 110
Chp 9 110, 111, 114, 233, 234 IBs 8.7–8.9 109
Chp 11 155, 158, 178, 179, 180 IBs 9.1–9.3 110
Chp 12 205 IB 9.4 111
Indicative Behaviours 94, 103, 150 IB 9.5 111
IBs 1.1–1.18 210 IB 9.6 111
IBs 1.1–1.3 124 IB 9.7 111
IB 1.4 110, 111 IB 9.8 111
IB 1.5 124 IB 9.9 111
IBs 1.6–1.7 117 IB 9.11 111
IB 1.8 204 IB 9.12 110
IB 1.9 117 IB 11.1 179
IB 1.10 121 IB 11.4 180, 240
IB 1.11 102 IB 11.5 156, 158, 238
IB 1.12 101 IB 11.6 158, 238
IB 1.13 124, 126 IB 11.7 178
IB 1.14 125, 128 IBs 11.8–11.10 179
IB 1.15 125 Outcomes 94, 103, 122, 124, 127, 135, 150, 153, 156, 177,
IBs 1.16–1.18 126 181, 207
IB 1.19–1.28 211 O 1.1 117, 119, 124, 209
IB 1.19 127 O 1.2 116, 124, 209, 235
IB 1.20 112, 134, 191 O 1.3 116, 118, 120, 209, 234
IB 1.21 125 O 1.4 117, 209
IB 1.22 95 O 1.5 124, 209, 235
IBs 1.23–1.24 96 O 1.6 118, 129, 209, 235
IB 1.25 116, 121, 234 O 1.7 125, 209
IB 1.26 120, 234 O 1.8 204, 209
IB 1.27 118, 129 O 1.9 95, 209
IB 1.28 117, 121 O 1.10 96, 209
IB 2.1 105 O 1.11 95, 209, 231
IB 2.5 116, 234 O 1.12 124, 209, 235
IB 3.1 152, 213 O 1.13 125, 128, 209, 235
IBs 3.2–3.3 148, 213 O 1.14 132, 209
IB 3.4–3.5 149, 153, 213 O 1.15 112, 113, 133, 152, 191, 209
IB 3.5 149, 150, 153, 213 O 1.16 101, 209
IB 3.6 150, 213 O 2.1 105, 116, 178
IBs 3.7 213 O 2.2 105
IBs 3.8–3.10 151, 213 O 2.3 105, 117
IBs 3.11–3.12 149, 213 O 3.1 152, 211, 237
IBs 3.13–3.14 213 O 3.2 152, 212, 237
IB 4.1 214 O 3.3 149, 152, 212, 237
IB 4.2 137, 214 O 3.4 151, 212, 237
IB 4.3 214 O 3.5 148, 153, 212, 236
IB 4.4 139, 214–15 O 3.6 148, 149, 212, 237
IB 4.5 140, 142, 215 O 3.7 148, 149, 150, 153, 212, 237
IB 4.6 138, 144, 215 O 4.1 109, 137, 144, 171, 181, 214, 236
IB 4.7 138, 215 O 4.2 139, 144, 214, 236
IB 5.1 176 O 4.3 140, 144, 214, 236
Table of Secondary Legislation xxxi
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 – continued SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011 – continued
O 4.4 140, 141, 142, 154, 214 r 8 90
O 4.5 137, 214 r 12 204
Os 5.1–5.2 175, 181, 239 r 13 90
Os 5.3–5.5 176, 239 r 13.2 205
O 5.6 175, 239 r 14 91
O 5.7 176 SRA Practising Regulations 2011 202
O 5.8 176, 239 reg 3 202
Os 6.1–6.2 112, 113 reg 7 202
Os 6.3–6.4 112 reg 8 202
O 7.3 205 SRA Property Selling Rules 95
Os 7.5–7.6 205 SRA Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Crime)
O 7.8 205 Regulations 2013 203
O 7.13 203
O 8.1 108 EU
O 8.2 109 Directive 67/227 3
O 8.3 109, 113, 233 Directive 76/207 (Equal Treatment) 261, 263
Os 8.4–8.5 109 Directive 77/187 262
Os 9.1–9.2 110, 111, 233 Directive 77/249 (Lawyers’ Services) 280
O 9.3 110 Directive 77/338 (6th VAT) 3, 267
Os 9.4–9.8 111 Directive 80/987 263
O 9.11 110 Directive 83/189 289
O 10.3 202 Directive 85/337 (Environmental Protection) 249, 262
O 10.4 206, 242 Directive 85/374 (Product Liability) 249
O 10.6 206, 242 Directive 89/48 280
Os 10.7–10.8 206 Directive 89/104 (Trade marks) 287
O 10.9 101, 206 Directive 92/51 280
O 10.11 206 Directive 96/71 (Posted Workers) 279
O 11.1 178, 240 Directive 98/5 (Establishment of Lawyers) 280
O 11.2 97, 155, 157, 237 Directive 2002/92 (Insurance Mediation) 193
Os 12.1–12.4 205 Directive 2004/38 274, 275, 281
Os SB1–SB3 199 Art 24 274
Principles 94, 98, 103, 107, 109, 115, 117, 119, 127, 142, Directive 2005/60 (Money Laundering (Third)) 161
156, 176, 177, 181, 232, 233 Directive 2006/54 (Equal Treatment) 249, 270
P 1 104, 105, 177 Directive 2006/123 (Services) 279
P 2 104, 110, 119, 179, 180, 240, 371 Directive 2013/11 (Alternative Dispute Resolution) 96
P 3 104, 106, 110 Directives (Company Law) 249
P 4 104, 106, 110, 117, 177, 183, 192, 371 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 294, 299
P 5 104, 106, 110, 124 Regulation 19/65 255
P 6 105, 179 Regulation 1612/68 (Free Movement of Workers) 249
Ps 7–9 105 Art 7 274
P 10 106 Regulation 1408/71 (Social security) 274
SRA Compensation Fund Rules 2011 101, 102 Regulation 4064/89 (Mergers) 249
SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011 95, 98 Regulation 330/2010 295, 299, 300
SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001 art 1(b) 297
95, 184, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 241 art 1(c) 296
rr 3–5 192 art 2(1)–(4) 295
r 6 193 art 3 296
r 8 193 art 4 295
SRA Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001 95, 184, 191, art 4(a) 295
192, 194, 197, 198, 241 art 4(b) 296, 300
SRA Higher Rights of Audience Regulations 2011 203 art 4(c)–(d) 296
SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 95, 203, 204, 207, 242 art 5 296, 297
SRA Overseas Rules 2013 95, 104 art 5(b) 297
SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011 89, 204, 205, 242 Regulation 1215/2012 267
r 4 92 Regulation 316/2014 295
xxxii Legal Foundations
Table of Abbreviations xxxiii
Table of Abbreviations
ABS alternative business structure

AEA 1925 Administration of Estates Act 1925
AEA 1971 Administration of Estates Act 1971
AIM Alternative Investment Market
APR annual percentage rate
ATP authorised third person
CGT capital gains tax
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
COB Rules 2001 SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001
COFA compliance officer for finance and administration
COLP compliance officer for legal practice
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPR Civil Procedure Rules 1998
CTM Community trade mark
DPB designated professional body
EAT Employment Appeal Tribunal
ECA 1972 European Communities Act 1972
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EEA European Economic Area
EEIG European Economic Interest Grouping
EFTA European Free Trade Agreement
EIS Enterprise Investment Scheme
ESC Economic and Social Committee
EurAtom European Atomic Energy Community
FCA Financial Conduct Authority
FPO 2005 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSMA 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
HMRC HM Revenue & Customs
HRA 1998 Human Rights Act 1998
ICTA 1988 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988
IHT inheritance tax
IHTA 1984 Inheritance Tax Act 1984
IP intellectual property
I(PFD)A 1975 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975
IPDI immediate post-death interest
ISA Individual Savings Account
ITA 2007 Income Tax Act 2007
ITEPA 2003 Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003
ITTOIA 2005 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005
LASPO 2012 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
LCS Legal Complaints Service
LCT lifetime chargeable transfer
LeO Legal Ombudsman for England and Wales
xxxiv Legal Foundations
LPA 1925 Law of Property Act 1925

MCA 2005 Mental Capacity Act 2005
MEP member of the European Parliament
MEQR measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction
NCA National Crime Agency
NCPR 1987 Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987
NSNDI non-savings, non-dividend income
OEICs open-ended investment companies
PAYE Pay As You Earn
PEP Politically Exposed Person
PET potentially exempt transfer
PR personal representative
QLTT Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test
RAO 2001 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001
RPI Retail Prices Index
Scope Rules 2001 SRA Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001
SRA Solicitors Regulation Authority
TA 1925 Trustee Act 1925
TA 2000 Trustee Act 2000
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TLATA 1996 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
VATA 1994 Value Added Tax Act 1994
VCT Venture Capital Trust
1
PART I
REVENUE LAW
2 Legal Foundations
Value Added Tax 3
CHAPTER 1
Value Added Tax
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Charge to VAT 4
1.3 Tax payable to HM Revenue & Customs 5
1.4 Penalties 6
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will be able to understand:

• the circumstances that give rise to a VAT charge
• the current rates at which VAT is charged and supplies that are exempt from VAT
• the penalties for failing to comply with the VAT legislation.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Sources of VAT law
The main charging statute relating to value added tax (VAT) is the Value Added Tax Act 1994
(VATA 1994), as amended by later Finance Acts and certain statutory instruments. Detailed
provisions implementing the Act are to be found in the VAT (General) Regulations 1995 (SI
1995/2518) and other statutory instruments. In addition, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC)
issues VAT Notices which, although lacking legal force, express its views on the law. Value
added tax was introduced in 1973 in order to harmonise UK law with European Community
law, therefore EC Directives 67/227 and 77/338 are also relevant. The standard practioner’s
work is De Voil, Indirect Tax Service (Butterworths, looseleaf ).
1.1.2 Charge to tax

In the current tax year, the standard rate of VAT is 20%.
Generally, VAT is charged whenever a business supplies goods or services. The business
charges the customer VAT at 20% on the value of the goods or services. This is known as
‘output tax’. The business deducts from the output tax which it collects any VAT it has paid
(‘input tax’) on goods or services received and pays the difference to HMRC.
Value of VAT charged VAT paid to

goods (£) to buyer (£) HMRC (£)
(a) A manufacturer buys raw material 1,200 40

costing £200 plus VAT from a producer
Producer pays to HMRC 40
(b) The manufacturer sells finished article 1,000 200

to a retailer for £1,000 plus VAT
Manufacturer pays to HMRC 160 (200 – 40)

4 Legal Foundations
Value of VAT charged VAT paid to

goods (£) to buyer (£) HMRC (£)
(c) The retailer sells the finished article to a 2,000 400

consumer for £2,000 plus VAT
Retailer pays to HMRC 200 (400 – 200)

Total paid to HMRC 400
Note: (i) VAT does not cost the business anything as any VAT paid is recouped from VAT
charged.
(ii) Each business accounts for VAT on the ‘value added’ to the goods whilst in the
possession of the business. The value added by the manufacturer is £800 (£1,000
– £200). Twenty per cent of £800 is £160, the sum paid to HMRC.
(iii) The ultimate burden falls on the consumer, who pays £2,000 plus £400 VAT for
the product. The £400 VAT has been paid to HMRC in three stages.
1.2 CHARGE TO VAT

1.2.1 Definition
Value added tax is ‘charged on any supply of goods or services made in the United Kingdom
where it is a taxable supply made by a taxable person in the course or furtherance of any
business carried on by him’ (VATA 1994, s 4(1)). Tax will be charged on the ‘value of the
supply’ (VATA 1994, s 2(1)). The elements of this charge are defined widely, in order both to
prevent avoidance and to comply with the Directives, and are dealt with in outline below.
1.2.2 Supply of goods or services

1.2.2.1 Supply of goods
Any transfer of the whole property in goods is a supply of goods (VATA 1994, Sch 4). As well as
more obvious transactions like the sale of consumer goods, this includes a supply of power or
heat, the grant of an interest in land, and even a gift of goods.
1.2.2.2 Supply of services

Anything that is not a supply of goods but which is done for a consideration is a supply of
services (VATA 1994, s 5(2)). This includes the provision of a solicitor’s services for a fee, but
not a gratuitous supply of services.
1.2.3 Taxable supply

Any supply of goods or services (other than an exempt supply) is taxable (VATA 1994, s 4(2)).
Exempt supplies are listed in VATA 1994, Sch 9 and include supplies of residential land,
insurance, postal services, education and health services.
1.2.4 Taxable person

A taxable person is a person who makes or intends to make taxable supplies and who is or is
required to be registered under the Act (VATA 1994, s 3(1)). A person is required to register if
he makes taxable supplies in a defined period which have exceeded a limit, which is set each
year, or will exceed that limit. Currently, a person must register if the value of his taxable
supplies in the preceding 12 months exceeded £85,000.
Any person who makes taxable supplies is entitled to be registered if he so requests (see
1.3.4). A person who makes only exempt supplies cannot register.
Value Added Tax 5
Once registered, a taxable person (individual, partnership or company) receives a VAT number
which is issued for all businesses operated by that person.
1.2.5 Course of business

‘Business’ includes any trade, profession or vocation (VATA 1994, s 94). A supply in the course
of business includes the disposal of a business or any of its assets.
1.2.6 Value of supply

Value added tax is charged on the value of the supply of goods or services. This is what the goods
or services would cost were VAT not charged and is often shown as part of the price. For example,
a television may be advertised as costing ‘£400 plus VAT’; £400 is the value of the supply.
If the supply is shown as being for a VAT inclusive amount (eg, a television costs ‘£240’), the
value of supply is ‘such amount as, with the addition of the tax chargeable, is equal to the
consideration’ (VATA 1994, s 19(2)). In the case of the television, the value of supply would be
£200 and the VAT £40. A price is deemed to include VAT unless the contrary is stated.
If the supply is not for a consideration in money, the value of supply is taken to be its market
value (VATA 1994, s 19(3)).
1.2.7 Rate of tax

The standard rate of VAT is 20%. However, there is a large category of supplies which are taxed
at 0%. ‘Zero-rated’ supplies are listed in VATA 1994, Sch 8 and include food, other than food
supplied in the course of catering, water, books and newspapers, transport and construction
of dwellings. A reduced rate of 5% is applied to certain supplies, including domestic fuel,
installation of energy-saving materials and child car seats (VATA 1994, Sch 7A).
1.2.8 Time of supply

A taxable person must account for VAT one month after the end of each quarter (see 1.3.1).
The time of supply (tax point) determines the accounting period within which a supply of
goods or services falls.
In the case of goods, the basic tax point is the time goods are removed, or the time they are
made available to the person to whom they are supplied. In the case of services, the basic tax
point is the time the services are performed (VATA 1994, s 6).
The basic tax point can be varied in a number of cases. For example, it can be brought
forward, if the supplier issues a tax invoice (see 1.3.5) or receives a payment, to the time when
the invoice is issued or payment received. It can be delayed, if the supplier issues a tax invoice
within 14 days after the basic tax point, to the time when the invoice is issued. Thus the time
for accounting for VAT may be brought forward or delayed.
1.3 TAX PAYABLE TO HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS

1.3.1 Introduction
A person who is registered for VAT must send a return to HMRC showing the VAT payable by
him, together with a cheque for this amount, generally within one month after the end of each
quarter.
The amount payable is the VAT he has charged on all supplies of goods and services in the
course of his business (‘output tax’), less any VAT he has paid in the course of his business
(‘input tax’). If input tax exceeds output tax, the person will receive a rebate.
1.3.2 Zero-rated and exempt supplies

Zero-rated and exempt supplies are similar to each other, in that the customer does not pay
any VAT. However, a person who makes zero-rated supplies will be able to reclaim the VAT he
6 Legal Foundations
has paid from HMRC. A person who makes only exempt supplies cannot register (see 1.2.4)
and so cannot reclaim VAT.
EXAMPLE
A baker and a doctor in private practice are converting premises into a shop and a surgery
respectively. They will both pay VAT on the cost of their conversions. The baker, who
makes zero-rated supplies of food, will be able to reclaim the VAT; the doctor, who makes
exempt supplies of health services, will not be able to do so.
1.3.3 Taxable and exempt supplies

Where a person makes both exempt and taxable supplies, for example a doctor in private
practice who also acts as an expert witness in personal injury claims, only part of his input tax
will be deductible from the output tax charged on the fees for acting as an expert witness (see
the VAT (General) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/2518).
1.3.4 Voluntary registration

A person who makes taxable supplies of £85,000 or less per annum is not required to register
and charge VAT. This can be an advantage as such a supplier may be able to undercut larger
rivals who are obliged to charge VAT.
However, only those people who are registered can reclaim any input tax they have paid. For
example, a builder with a small business who bought a van could not reclaim VAT payable on
the purchase of the van if he were not registered.
When deciding whether to register voluntarily, people in business must weigh up the
advantage of being able to reclaim VAT against the disadvantage that customers might be put
off by higher prices.
1.3.5 Tax invoices

A person making a taxable supply to a taxable person must provide him with a tax invoice. A
tax invoice is an ordinary invoice or bill which contains specified information about the
transaction, such as the VAT number, the tax point, the value of supply and the rate of tax
charged.
The tax invoice is important because a person who is claiming to deduct input tax must have
tax invoices in respect of all the tax claimed.
1.4 PENALTIES
1.4.1 Introduction
A person who fails to comply with the VAT legislation is liable to a range of criminal and civil
penalties in addition to being required to pay any unpaid tax with interest. There are very few
defences to these provisions, although, apart from the default surcharge (see 1.4.4), the civil
penalties may be mitigated. A number of these penalties are dealt with in outline below.
1.4.2 Fraudulent evasion of tax

A person knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of tax is liable, on conviction on
indictment, to an unlimited fine and imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years
(VATA 1994, s 72).
1.4.3 Breaches of regulations

Regulations impose many obligations on taxable persons. Breach of a regulation will lead to a
civil penalty. There is a penalty of £500 for failure to keep certain records. Other breaches
attract a penalty calculated at a daily rate over the period of the breach (VATA 1994, s 69).
Value Added Tax 7
1.4.4 The default surcharge

A person who fails to send a return (see 1.3.1) is regarded as being in default. If he is
persistently in default he becomes liable to a surcharge rising to 15% of the tax for any period
in which he was in default (VATA 1994, s 59).
8 Legal Foundations
Income Tax 9
CHAPTER 2
Income Tax
2.1 Introduction 9
2.2 Total income 12
2.3 Allowable reliefs 14
2.4 Personal allowances 15
2.5 Personal Savings and Dividend Allowances 17
2.6 Rates of tax 18
2.7 Calculating the tax due 26
2.8 A full income tax calculation 26
2.9 Collection of income tax and dates for payment 27
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will be able to:

• identify chargeable income
• identify allowable reliefs
• identify the appropriate personal allowance for a taxpayer
• understand the difference between income (except savings and dividend income)
and savings and dividend income
• identify the tax rates applicable to taxable income
• complete a full income tax calculation.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.1.1 The importance of income tax
Income tax is the tax which produces the greatest revenue for the UK Government. For
example, in the most recent year for which figures are available (2016/17), total tax revenues
collected by HMRC reached over £566.7 billion, of which nearly £176 billion was generated by
income tax (source: ONS: HMRC Tax & NIC Receipts, March 2017). Income tax is, therefore, a
vital source of revenue from which public services such as health, education, welfare,
transport and defence can be funded. Income tax is collected by HMRC (see 2.9).
2.1.2 Sources of income tax law

2.1.2.1 Statute
The charging statute for income tax is the Income Tax Act 2007 (ITA 2007) as amended by
later Finance Acts. Also of importance are the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act
2005 (ITTOIA 2005) and the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA 2003).
Income tax is an annual tax renewed each year by Act of Parliament.
2.1.2.2 Case law

The meaning and extent of the statutory provisions are decided by the judiciary.
10 Legal Foundations
An appeal by a taxpayer against an assessment to tax is heard by the First-tier Tribunal.

Appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal are made to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and
Chancery Chamber). There is a right of appeal from the Upper Tribunal on a point of law to
the Court of Appeal and, with leave, to the Supreme Court.
2.1.2.3 Official Statements

There would be an impossible workload if all questions as to the meaning and extent of tax
legislation were taken to court. Official Statements made by HMRC are therefore an
important source of information. The two most important types of statement are Extra-
Statutory Concessions and Statements of Practice.
Extra-Statutory Concessions
These are published by HMRC in a booklet. If a taxpayer satisfies the terms of an Extra-
Statutory Concession, HMRC waives its right to collect tax which would otherwise be due.
Statements of Practice
These are announced by press release and published in the professional journals. They
indicate what view HMRC will take of particular tax provisions.
Note that these Official Statements do not bind the courts.
2.1.3 What is income?

There is no statutory definition of ‘income’ and the courts have failed to impose a judicial
definition. A distinction must be made between income and capital profits: the former is
subject to income tax; the latter are subject to capital gains tax. Generally, money received will
be income if there is an element of recurrence, for example, a salary or partnership profit
share received every month, or interest paid on a bank or building society account every
quarter.
2.1.4 Who pays income tax?

The following are liable to pay income tax:
(a) individuals;
(b) partnerships (partners are individually responsible for the tax due on their share of
partnership profits);
(c) personal representatives (who pay the deceased’s outstanding income tax and income
tax chargeable during the administration of the estate); and
(d) trustees (who pay income tax on the income produced by the trust fund).
Companies pay corporation tax (see Business Law and Practice).
Charities are generally exempt from paying tax. There are tax-efficient ways of giving money
to charities, for example, Gift Aid.
2.1.5 The tax year

Income tax is paid with reference to the ‘tax year’ or ‘year of assessment’, which runs from 6
April until 5 April the following year. It is referred to by the calendar years which it straddles:
for example, the tax year beginning on 6 April 2017 is referred to as the tax year 2017/18. So,
in the simple tax calculation below at 2.1.8, Amy’s salary received between 6 April 2017 and 5
April 2018 will be charged to tax in the tax year 2017/18.
Income Tax 11
Calendar Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Jan 2019

Year
6 April 2017 5 April 2018
Tax Year or
Year of Assessment
2017/18
2.1.6 Anti-avoidance legislation

Income tax is one of the taxes subject to the ‘general anti-abuse rule’ (GAAR) introduced by
the Finance Act 2013. The GAAR is an addition to the existing anti-avoidance legislation in
this area and is designed to allow HMRC to counteract ‘abusive’ tax avoidance schemes
intended to exploit loopholes in the legislation covering the rules for calculating tax.
2.1.7 How much income tax is payable?

Income tax is a ‘progressive’ tax, ie a tax where the rate of tax increases as the income of the
taxpayer increases, with the result that taxpayers with higher incomes pay a higher average
rate of tax than those on lower incomes.
Tax is payable on taxable income, which is calculated by deducting any available reliefs and
allowances taxed at the appropriate rate or rates. The allowances and rates are different for the
various types of income. Therefore, before a final calculation is made, the different types of
income must be separated from one another into three categories. The categories are:
(a) non-savings, non-dividend income (‘NSNDI’), comprising all sources of income except
income derived from savings and dividends;
(b) savings income, which is interest from various sources, for example building society
accounts, most National Savings accounts, unit or investment trusts and corporate or
government bonds and gilts; and
(c) dividend income.
The steps to work through to calculate the amount of tax payable are as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the total income
Step 2: Deduct any allowable reliefs
The resulting sum is net income
Step 3: Deduct any personal allowances
The resulting sum is taxable income
Step 4: Separate NSNDI, savings income and dividend income, and calculate the tax on
each type of income at the applicable rate(s) (starting rate, basic rate, higher rate
and additional rate)
Step 5: Add together the amounts of tax from Step 4 (to give the overall income tax liability)
Note: As explained below, income tax is charged on an individual’s taxable income for 2017/18
at a variety of rates ranging from 0% to 45% (depending on the amount and type of income).
2.1.8 Simple income tax calculation

The five steps may be used to carry out a simple tax calculation. For example, Amy has the
following income for 2017/18: £62,000 share of partnership profits, and £9,240 from writing
learned articles. She is liable to make interest payments of £2,000 per annum on a qualifying
loan. Amy is a single person. Amy’s income tax may be calculated as follows:
£)
STEP 1 Calculate the total income
Partnership profits 62,000)
Learned articles 9,240)
TOTAL INCOME 71,240)
STEP 2 Deduct any allowable reliefs (interest) (2,000)
NET INCOME 69,240)
STEP 3 Deduct any personal allowance (11,500)
TAXABLE INCOME 57,740)
STEP 4 Calculate the tax at the applicable rate(s)
£33,500 at 20% 6,700)
£24,240 at 40% 9,696)
£57,740
STEP 5 Add together the amounts of tax from Step 4
OVERALL INCOME TAX LIABILITY 16,396)
The calculation above indicates the principles used to establish an individual’s liability to
income tax. The remainder of this chapter will consider each step of the calculation in more
detail.
2.2 TOTAL INCOME

Total income is the aggregate of the taxpayer’s income from all sources which is charged to
income tax.
2.2.1 What income is charged to income tax?

2.2.1.1 The chargeable sources of income
Income is charged to income tax if it comes from a source specified by the ITTOIA 2005 and
the ITEPA 2003. The most important sources are listed below.
Location Source
ITTOIA 2005
Part 2 Trading income
(Profits of a trade, profession or vocation. Part 2 therefore charges the self-
employed and applies to sole traders, trading partnerships, sole practitioners
and professional partnerships)
Part 3 Property income
(Rents and other receipts from land in the UK)
Part 4 Savings and investment income
(Interest, annuities and dividends)
Part 5 Certain miscellaneous income
(Annual income not otherwise charged)
ITEPA 2003 Employment and pensions income
(Income arising out of employment and including social security payments
such as sick pay and maternity payments)
Income Tax 13
2.2.1.2 How do the chargeable sources of income work?

If income is shown to be derived from one of the sources, it will be charged to income tax. For
example, if an individual receives rent from land, he will pay income tax under Part 3 of the
ITTOIA 2005. Income not having a chargeable source cannot be charged to income tax at all.
2.2.1.3 Why is it divided into chargeable sources?

Each Part of the ITTOIA 2005 and the ITEPA 2003 has its own rules for calculating the amount
of income. For example, under Part 3 of the ITTOIA 2005 (which taxes income from land) the
charge is on rents and other receipts, but the landlord may deduct expenses such as repairs on
the property, ie expenses of an income nature. This means that income tax is charged on the
profit element rather than the gross income. Note that, from April 2017, HMRC has been
phasing in measures to restrict the tax relief that landlords of residential properties get for
finance costs, such as mortgages, to the basic rate of income tax.
Further details of how the ITTOIA 2005 and the ITEPA 2003 operate can be found in Business
Law and Practice.
2.2.2 Exempt income

Certain items are free of income tax. They include:
(a) certain State benefits;
(b) interest on Savings Certificates;
(c) scholarships;
(d) interest on damages for personal injuries or death;
(e) income from investments in an individual savings account (ISA) (see 5.3);
(f ) gross income up to £7,500 a year from letting a furnished room in the taxpayer’s home;
(g) annual payments under certain insurance policies, for example, where insurance
benefits are provided in times of sickness; and
(h) premium bond winnings.
Most of the above items are set out in the ITTOIA 2005, Part 6 (Exempt Income). In addition, a
number of items are exempted from tax because of Extra-Statutory Concessions (see 2.1.2.3).
2.2.3 Calculating the total income

It should now be possible to calculate the total income.
The total income is the aggregate of chargeable income computed according to the rules of
the various chargeable sources. To work out the total income of a taxpayer it is necessary to
find out what sources of income he has, calculate the income arising under each source and
then add all the ‘gross’ income together. For example:
Employment Dividends Interest Property income Trading income
income ITTOIA 2005 ITTOIA 2005 ITTOIA 2005 ITTOIA 2005
ITEPA 2003 Part 4 Part 4 Part 3 Part 2
TOTAL INCOME
Most types of income are received by the taxpayer without any tax having been deducted prior
to receipt. These types of income are said to be received ‘gross’. Trading, property, interest
and dividend income are received gross.
2.2.3.1 Tax deducted at source

For most taxpayers, their main source of income will be employment income, from which tax
will have been deducted at source. The payee receives the net amount, not the gross amount.
This is to ensure a steady flow of tax to HMRC and then on to central government to fund
public services throughout the year.
Any sum received after deduction of tax at source must be grossed up to find the original sum
from which the tax was deducted. This gross figure must be entered into the payee’s
calculation of total income. This is because the tax calculation is a way of checking that,
overall, the taxpayer pays the right amount of tax.
At the end of the tax calculation, the tax that has already been paid will be credited to the
taxpayer so that he will owe HMRC only the outstanding amount.
Salaries and other employment income are assessable under ITEPA 2003 using the Pay As You
Earn system (PAYE). Under the PAYE system, the employer deducts from the employee’s
salary and then pays to HMRC income tax at the appropriate rate at the time the salary is paid.
The PAYE system also takes account of personal allowances.
Gross amount £100
HMRC
£ tax
employer £ balance employee
Employment income cannot be grossed up using a simple formula because deduction at

source may not be just at one single rate. Under the PAYE scheme, income tax at various rates
and National Insurance contributions will be deducted from salaries by the employer using
tables and information supplied by HMRC and taking into account the employee’s personal
reliefs. A certificate of tax paid (P60), showing the gross figure, is given by the employer to the
employee on a yearly basis and he can put this figure into his tax return. A taxpayer must
complete a tax return if he has other sources of income.
2.2.3.2 Savings and dividend income

The Summer Budget of 2015 introduced new rules for savings and dividend income.
Historically, interest was paid net after deduction of income tax at 20%, and dividends after
deduction of a notional 10% tax credit. From April 2016, both interest and dividends are paid
gross, and both savings and dividend income will have the benefit of annual tax-free
allowances (see 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). Both savings and dividend income still form part of Total
Income, and must be aggregated with other income at this stage
2.3 ALLOWABLE RELIEFS

Total Income
Less
Allowable Reliefs
=
Net Income
Income Tax 15
2.3.1 Net income

Net income is total income less certain specified commitments known as allowable reliefs,
for example interest on qualifying loans. Allowable reliefs remove sums of money from the
income tax calculation.
2.3.2 Interest payments on qualifying loans

Most interest payments receive no tax relief at all, for example ordinary bank overdrafts, credit
card interest and hire purchase interest payments. The borrower pays the interest out of taxed
income.
However, in certain cases, tax relief may be available for interest paid on money borrowed. A
taxpayer obtains income tax relief for certain interest payments by deducting them from his
total income as an allowable relief. To obtain tax relief, interest must be payable on a
‘qualifying loan’.
Qualifying loans include the following.
2.3.2.1 A loan to buy a share in a partnership or to contribute capital or make a loan to a

partnership
EXAMPLE
Dawn, a partner, has total income of £25,000. She borrows £10,000 to make a loan to the
partnership to be used wholly and exclusively for partnership business. The interest rate
on the loan is 7% per annum. Dawn’s net income is:
£
Total income 25,000
Deduct any allowable reliefs
(interest on qualifying loan) 700
Net income 24,300
There is a cap of £50,000 or 25% of ‘adjusted total income’ on the amount of relief that can be
claimed under this provision. ‘Adjusted total income’ is taxable income less allowable
pension contributions. See Business Law and Practice for further details.
2.3.2.2 A loan to invest in a close trading company

See Business Law and Practice.
2.3.2.3 A loan to personal representatives to pay inheritance tax

See 30.6.3.5.
2.4 PERSONAL ALLOWANCES

Personal allowances are deducted from net income to obtain the taxpayer’s taxable income.
This means that a certain amount of income is free each year.
The availability of allowances depends not on the type of income involved but on the
taxpayer’s personal circumstances, for example disability or the amount of income received
each tax year.
The taxpayer must claim his allowances each year in his tax return. The principal allowances
available and deducted at this stage are as follows.
2.4.1 Personal Allowance

Net Income
Less
Personal Allowance
=
Taxable Income
The Personal Allowance available for 2017/18 is £11,500. This is, however, subject to an
income limit of £100,000 (see below). It may be set against income of any kind. It is applied in
this order: first against NSNDI; then, if there is a surplus, against savings income; and finally
any remaining surplus is applied against dividend income. For most employees, their Personal
Allowance will be used up by their employment income, unless such income is below
£11,000.
If the Personal Allowance exceeds the net income of the taxpayer, the surplus is unused and
cannot be carried forward for use in future years (subject to the Marriage Allowance – see
2.4.2).
This allowance may be claimed by taxpayers resident in the UK, male, female, adult or child,
married or single. Husband and wife are treated as separate single people. Each spouse is
independently liable for tax on his or her own income, and each has his or her own Personal
Allowance (but see 2.4.2).
The Personal Allowance is reduced where the taxpayer’s income exceeds the income limit of
£100,000. This reduction applies irrespective of age. The Personal Allowance is reduced by £1
for every £2 of income above the £100,000 limit. The effect of the reduction is that for a
taxpayer with income of £123,000 or more, no Personal Allowance will be available. In order
to calculate the adjusted Personal Allowance for a taxpayer with a net income in excess of
£100,000 but under £123,000, a formula may be used:
£11,500 – (net income – £100,000) = adjusted Personal Allowance
2
The adjusted Personal Allowance should be rounded up to nearest £1.
EXAMPLE 1
Jo has a net income of £50,000. Jo is entitled to deduct the full Personal Allowance of
£11,500 from her net income of £50,000 to obtain a taxable income figure of £38,500.
EXAMPLE 2
Miriam has a net income of £110,000. Miriam is not entitled to deduct the full Personal
Allowance as her net income exceeds the £100,000 income limit. Using the above formula,
Miriam’s adjusted Personal Allowance can be calculated.
£11,500 – (£110,000 – £100,000)
2
£11,500 – £10,000
2
£11,500 – £5,000 = £6,500
Miriam is entitled to deduct £6,500 from her net income of £110,000 to obtain a taxable
income figure of £103,500.
Income Tax 17
2.4.2 Marriage Allowance

From April 2015, a transferable ‘marriage allowance’ has been available to married couples
and civil partners. Where one spouse or partner does not have enough income to use their
Personal Allowance fully for that tax year, they may transfer £1,150 of their Personal
Allowance to their spouse or civil partner. The recipient must not be a higher or additional
rate taxpayer.
2.4.3 Blind Person’s Allowance

A taxpayer who is a registered blind person receives an allowance of £2,230. If a husband and
wife are both registered blind, they can each claim the Blind Person’s Allowance.
2.5 PERSONAL SAVINGS AND DIVIDEND ALLOWANCES

The Personal Allowance must be distinguished from the new Personal Savings and Dividend
Allowances, which were introduced by the Summer Budget in 2015 and took effect from April
2016.
2.5.1 Personal Savings Allowance (PSA)

The PSA can be set against savings income, so that up to the first £1,000 of savings income
will be tax free.
The amount of the PSA to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on whether the taxpayer is a
basic or higher rate taxpayer. This is calculated by reference to the taxpayer’s taxable income,
as calculated at Step 3. (Allowances will be made for allowable pension contributions and gift
aid.) Additional rate taxpayers do not receive a PSA. (Contrast the Personal Allowance, where
both basic and higher rate taxpayers receive the same (£11,500 for 2017/18) and additional
rate taxpayers receive a reduced allowance (see 2.4.1).)
The table below sets out the amounts of the allowance.
Tax rate Income band Allowance

(Taxable Income)
Basic rate taxpayer £0 – £33,500 £1,000 tax free
Higher rate taxpayer £33,501 – £150,000 £500 tax free
Additional rate taxpayer £150,001 and above No allowance
Table 2.1 PSA
Until interest rates start to rise from their current level of 0.25% (as at April 2017), it is
unlikely that interest from bank or building society account will exceed the allowance, so,
realistically, only the additional rate taxpayers will now pay tax on their savings. The
Government estimates that a basic rate taxpayer would have to have £50,000 of savings
attracting an interest rate of 2% before they exceeded the allowance. However, loans yielding
a higher rate could be caught, for example peer to peer loans.
EXAMPLE 1
Asaad has a salary of £22,000, and receives interest of £750 a year. (He has no relevant
allowable reliefs.) For the purposes of calculating how much PSA Asaad is entitled to,
Asaad is a basic rate taxpayer, as his total taxable income is below the basic rate threshold.
He therefore has a PSA of £1,000, which will be set against his savings income, and so he
will not pay any tax on his savings income.
EXAMPLE 2
Janine has a salary of £61,000 and receives interest of £550 a year from her bank and
building society savings accounts. For the purposes of calculating how much PSA Janine is
entitled to, Janine is a higher rate taxpayer, as here taxable income is above the basic rate
threshold (and below the additional rate threshold). She therefore has a PSA of £500,
which will be set against her net savings income, leaving £50 taxable savings income to be
taxed at 40%.
EXAMPLE 3
Eleanor has a salary of £200,000 and receives interest of £500 a year. (She has no relevant
allowable reliefs.) For the purposes of calculating how much PSA Eleanor is entitled to,
Eleanor is an additional rate taxpayer as her taxable income is over £150,000. She
therefore has no PSA, which means that the whole £500 is taxable savings income and will
be taxed at 45%.
2.5.2 Dividend Allowance

The Dividend Allowance can be set against dividend income, so that the first £5,000 of a
taxpayer’s dividend income will be free from tax. All taxpayers (whether basic, higher or
additional rate taxpayers) are entitled to the £5,000 allowance. (Contrast the Personal
Allowance, which is adjusted for higher rate taxpayers.) Taxpayers who receive less than
£5,000 a year will pay no tax on their dividends, even if they are higher or additional rate
taxpayers.
2.5.3 Nil rate bands

Although described as allowances, it seems that HMRC does not regard these as exemptions
for the purposes of calculating total taxable income, but rather as a nil rate for each of these
two types of income:
… higher rate income is income on which tax is charged at the higher or dividend upper rate, or would
be but for the operation of this new savings nil rate or the dividend nil rate (which will also be available
from 6 April 2016). Additional rate income is income on which tax is charged at the additional or
dividend additional rate, or would be but for the savings or dividend nil rates. (Source: HMRC:
Personal Savings Allowance: Update, 1 April 2016)
The result is that these allowances are not set off at this stage with the Personal Allowance to
reduce taxable income. Only the Personal Allowance is relevant for calculating Taxable
Income. The new allowances are relevant for arriving at and calculating the amount of the
Personal Savings Allowance (if relevant) that the taxpayer is entitled to and the rates of tax that
will be applicable to savings and dividend income (see 2.6.4).
2.6 RATES OF TAX

2.6.1 Types of income
The taxable income is taxed at the appropriate rate or rates. We have seen that income tax is a
progressive tax. The rates of tax increase as the taxpayer’s income increases. In addition, the
rates are different for the various types of income. Therefore, before the rates can be applied,
the different types of income must be separated from one another (see 2.1.7).
To find out how much taxable income is comprised of NSNDI and how much of savings and
dividend income, the savings and dividend income are deducted from the Taxable Income
figure arrived at in Step 3.
Income Tax 19
Taxable Income
Less
Savings and Dividend Income
=
Taxable NSNDI
This is amount of NSNDI which will
be subject to tax at the relevant
rate(s)
(This calculation ensures that the taxpayer gets the maximum allowed benefit from any
deductions of any allowable reliefs and the personal allowance, as NSNDI is taxed at a higher
rate than savings and dividend income.)
2.6.2 Order of taxation

Income is taxed in ‘slices’. The first slice is the NSNDI. The next slice is the savings income,
and the top slice is the dividend income (see Table 2.2). The rates are different for each slice.
These rates are fixed annually.
Historically, there was a main rate for all income except dividend income, which was taxed at
the dividend rate. The March 2015 Budget has now separated out the main rate into three
distinct groups: the main rate for NSNDI, a savings rate for interest and other savings income,
and a default rate that will apply mainly to trustees and non-residents.
Table 2.2 shows the order in which income is taxed, and the different rates for the tax year
2016/17.
Any savings and dividend income is taxed after NSNDI. Savings and dividend income are
therefore treated as the top slices of taxable income (see Table 2.2 below).
Top slice Dividends: Dividend ordinary rate: 7.5%

taxed at the Dividend upper rate: 32.5%
dividend rates Dividend additional rate: 38.1%
Next slice Interest: Starting rate for savings: 0%
taxed at the savings Savings basic rate: 20%
rates Savings higher rate: 40%
Savings additional rate: 45%
Taxed first NSNDI: Basic rate: 20%
taxed at the main Higher rate: 40%
rates Additional rate: 45%
Table 2.2 Order and rates of taxation
2.6.3 NSNDI
NSNDI is taxed first. Once the NSNDI has been calculated, it is taxed first at the basic rate,
higher rate and additional rate. These rates are fixed annually, and the rates for the tax year
2017/18 are set out in Table 2.2.
EXAMPLE 1
Timothy has a taxable income of £180,000, of which £20,000 is savings and dividend
income. Timothy’s NSNDI amounts to:
Taxable income £180,000

Less savings and dividend income £20,000
NSNDI £160,000
Timothy’s NSNDI will be liable to tax:
(a) at the basic rate of 20% on the first £33,500;
(b) at the higher rate of 40% to the extent that it is above the basic rate limit of £33,500
but falls below the higher rate limit of £150,000. Therefore, £116,500 (£150,000 –
£33,500) will be taxed at 40%; and
(c) at the additional rate of 45% on the income in excess of the £150,000 limit
(£10,000).
The tax liability in respect of his NSNDI will be:
£33,500 @ 20% £6,700
£116,500 @ 40% £46,600
£10,000 @ 45% £4,500
£160,000 £57,800
The savings and dividend income is calculated separately (not shown here).
2.6.4 Savings and dividend income

Any savings and dividend income is taxed next, savings income first and then dividend
income.
2.6.4.1 Rates of tax for savings and dividend income

Savings and dividend income are taxed at different rates, so it is necessary to separate out
these two types of income. As we have seen, the rates for both types of income are calculated
without making an exemption for the relevant allowances, so appropriate adjustments must
be made for the fact that the ‘first slice’ of each type of income is taxed at 0%, before working
out how much remains to be taxed at the appropriate rate.
2.6.4.2 Taxing savings income

First, the PSA must be deducted from the savings income figure to give the amount of savings
income which will be taxed at the savings rates set out below.
Savings Income
Less
PSA (taxed @ 0%)
=
Remaining Taxable Savings Income
This is the amount of savings income
which will be subject to tax at the
relevant rate(s)
The remaining savings income after deduction of the PSA is taxed at the savings starting,
basic, higher and additional rates. For the tax year 2017/18 the rates are as follows:
Starting rate for savings of 0% £0–£5,000
Savings basic rate of 20% £5,001–£33,500
Savings higher rate of 40% £33,501–£150,000
Savings additional rate of 45% over £150,000
Income Tax 21
As the PSA is treated as the ‘first slice’ of savings income, in order to work out whether an
individual will pay start to tax on the remaining savings income at the savings basic, higher or
additional rate, the amount of the PSA is added to his taxable NSNDI. Any remaining savings
income after deduction of the PSA which falls below the starting rate limit is taxed at 0%. If it
falls between the savings starting and basic rate limits, it is taxed at the basic rate of 20%; if it
falls between the savings basic and higher rate limits, it is taxed at the higher rate of 40%; and
any excess over the higher rate limit is taxed at the 45% additional rate. (For a summary of the
calculation see the table below.)
Tax PSA @ 0%
Add PSA to taxable NSNDI
(This establishes the relevant rate(s) of tax)
Remaining taxable savings income at the appropriate rate(s)
If the taxable If the taxable If the taxable If the taxable
NSNDI plus PSA is NSNDI plus PSA is NSNDI plus PSA NSNDI plus PSA
less than £5,000, less than £33,500, exceeds £33,500, exceeds £150,000,
the remaining the remaining the remaining the remaining
taxable savings taxable savings taxable savings taxable savings
income will be taxed income below income below income will be taxed
at the starting rate £33,500 will be £150,000 will be at the savings
for savings. taxed at the savings taxed at the savings additional rate.
basic rate (and at the higher rate (and at
higher and the savings
additional rates as additional rate
appropriate above above £150,000).
£33,500).
EXAMPLE 1
Eric has a taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £3,880, of which £2,380 is
NSNDI and £1,500 is interest. Eric is a basic rate taxpayer, and so will be entitled to an
allowance of £1,000, which is taxed at 0%. After deduction of the PSA, all of his remaining
savings income falls within the £5,000 starting rate. He will be liable to tax:
(a) at the basic rate of 20% on the first £2,380 of NSNDI (£476); and
(b) at the savings starting rate of 0% on the remaining ‘top slice’ of £500 of savings
income (£0).
EXAMPLE 2
Morven has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £6,000, of which £4,500 is
NSNDI and £1,500 is interest. Morven is a basic rate taxpayer, and so will be entitled to a
PSA of £1,000, which is taxed at 0%. All of her remaining savings income, after deduction
of the PSA, falls within the basic rate. (Taxable NSNDI plus PSA = £5,500.) She will be liable
to tax:
(b) at the savings basic rate of 20% on the remaining ‘top slice’ of £500 of savings
income (£100).
EXAMPLE 3
Deka has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £43,500, of which £41,500 is
NSNDI and £2,000 is interest. Deka is a higher rate taxpayer. She will be entitled to a PSA
of £500, which is taxed at 0%. All of her remaining savings income, after deduction of the
PSA, falls within the savings higher rate band. (Taxable NSNDI plus PSA = £42,000.) She
will be liable to tax:
(a) on the NSNDI:
(i) at the basic rate of 20% on the first £33,500 (£6,700); and
(ii) at the higher rate of 40% on the remaining £8,500 (£3,400); and
(b) at the savings higher rate of 40% on the remaining ‘top slice’ of £1,500 of savings
income (£600).
EXAMPLE 4
Josh has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £160,000, of which £140,000 is
NSNDI and £20,000 is interest. Josh is an additional rate taxpayer. He is not entitled to a
PSA. He will be liable to tax:
(a) on the NSNDI:
(b) on the interest:
(i) at the savings higher rate of 40% to the extent that it falls below the higher
rate limit of £150,000, so £10,000 (£150,000 – £140,000) will be taxed at 40%
(£4,000); and
(ii) at the savings additional rate of 45% on the remaining £10,000 (£4,500).
2.6.4.3 Taxing dividend income

Dividend income is treated as the top slice of taxable income, above both NSNDI and savings
income.
First, the Dividend Allowance must be deducted from the dividend income figure to give the
amount of dividend income which will be taxed at the dividend rates set out below.
Dividend Income
Less
Dividend Allowance (taxed @ 0%)
=
Remaining Taxable Dividend Income
This is the amount of dividend income
which will be subject to tax at the
relevant rate(s)
The remaining dividend income after deduction of the Dividend Allowance is taxed at the
dividend ordinary rate, upper and additional rates. For the tax year 2017/18 the rates are as
follows:
Dividend ordinary rate of 7.5% £0–£33,500
Dividend upper rate of 32.5% £33,501–£150,000
Dividend additional rate of 38.1% over £150,000
Income Tax 23
As the Dividend Allowance is treated as the ‘first slice’ of dividend income, in order to work
out whether an individual will pay tax on dividends at the dividend ordinary, upper or
additional rate, the amount of the Dividend Allowance is added to his total taxable NSNDI
and total savings income. So, to the extent that dividend income falls within the basic rate
limit, it is taxed at 7.5%. To the extent that dividend income falls between the basic rate limit
and the higher rate limit, it is taxed at 32.5%; and any excess over the higher rate limit is taxed
at 38.1%. (For a summary of the calculation see the table below.)
Tax Dividend Allowance @ 0%
Add Dividend Allowance to taxable NSNDI plus total savings income (including PSA)
(This establishes the relevant rate(s) of tax)
Remaining taxable dividend income at the appropriate rate(s)
If the taxable NSNDI plus If the taxable NSNDI plus If the taxable NSNDI plus
total savings income plus total savings income plus total savings income plus
the Dividend Allowance is the Dividend Allowance the Dividend Allowance
less than £33,500, the exceeds £33,500, the exceeds £150,000, the
remaining taxable dividend remaining taxable dividend remaining taxable dividend
income below £33,500 will income below £150,000 will income will be taxed at the
be taxed at the dividend be taxed at the dividend dividend additional rate.
ordinary rate (and at the upper rate (and at the
dividend upper and dividend additional rate
additional rates as above £150,000).
appropriate above £33,500).
EXAMPLE 1
Arthur has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £10,000, of which £4,500 is
NSNDI and £5,500 is dividend income. (He has no savings income.) Arthur is a basic rate
taxpayer. He is entitled to a Dividend Allowance of £5,000, which is taxed at 0%. All of his
remaining dividend income, after deduction of the Dividend Allowance, falls within the
basic rate (Taxable NSNDI plus Dividend Allowance = £9,500.) He will be liable to tax:
(b) at the dividend ordinary rate of 7.5% on the ‘top slice’ of the remaining £500 of
dividend income (£37.50).
EXAMPLE 2
Sanjay has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £51,500, of which £41,500 is
NSNDI and £10,000 is dividend income. (He has no savings income.) Sanjay is a higher
rate taxpayer. He is entitled to a Dividend Allowance of £5,000, which is taxed at 0%. All of
his remaining dividend income, after deduction of the Dividend Allowance, falls within the
higher rate. (Taxable NSNDI plus Dividend Allowance = £46,500.) He will be liable to tax:
(a) on the NSNDI:
(i) at the basic rate of 20% on the first £33,500, (£6,700); and
(b) on the remaining ‘top slice’ of dividend income (£5,000), at the dividend upper rate
of 32.5% (£1,625).
EXAMPLE 3
Carrie has taxable income (after allowances and reliefs) of £160,000, of which £140,000 is
NSNDI and £20,000 is dividend income. Carrie is an additional rate taxpayer. She is
entitled to a Dividend Allowance of £5,000, which is taxed at 0%. Part of her remaining
dividend income falls within the upper rate and part falls within the additional rate.
(Taxable NSNDI plus Dividend Allowance = £145,000, leaving £5,000 of the higher rate
available.) She will be liable to tax:
(a) on the NSNDI:
(b) on the remaining dividend income (£15,000):
(i) at the dividend upper rate of 32.5% to the extent that it falls below the
dividend higher rate limit of £150,000, so £5,000 (£150,000 – £145,000) will
be taxed at 32.5% (£1,625); and
(ii) at the dividend additional rate of 38.1% on the remaining £10,000 (£3,810).
2.6.4.4 Taxing both savings and dividend income

The examples above illustrate the position where the taxpayer has either savings or dividend
income in addition to taxable NSNDI. The example below shows a simple calculation where
the taxpayer has both savings and dividend income, as well as taxable NSNDI (and see 2.8).
EXAMPLE 1
Ben has taxable NSNDI of £17,500, savings income of £1,250 and dividend income of
£10,000. Ben is a basic rate taxpayer and is entitled to a PSA of £1,000 and a Dividend
Allowance of £5,000.
(a) Ben will be liable to tax on the NSNDI at the basic rate: £17,500 at 20% (£3,500).
His NSNDI will use up only £17,500 of the basic rate band, leaving £16,000.
The savings income is taxed next. To decide what rate applies to his savings income, the
£1,000 PSA is added to his taxable NSNDI and treated as the first slice of his savings
income and taxed at 0%. The remaining taxable savings income all falls within the £33,500
threshold, and is taxed at the savings basic rate.
(b) Ben will be liable to tax on the remaining savings income at the savings basic rate:
£250 at 20% (£50).
This has used up a further £1,250 of the basic rate band, leaving £14,750.
The dividend income is taxed last. The £5,000 Dividend Allowance is added as the first
slice of Ben’s dividend income, and taxed at 0%. His remaining taxable dividend income
all falls below the £33,500 threshold.
(c) Ben will be liable to tax on the remaining dividend income at the dividend ordinary
rate: £5,000 at 7.5% (£375).
Income Tax 25
£33,500
Basic rate
Unused basic rate band £4,750 threshold
Remaining taxable dividend income £5,000 x 7.5% = £375
Dividend Allowance £5,000 x 0% = £0
Remaining taxable savings income £250 x 20% = £50
PSA £1,000 x 0% = £0
NSNDI £17,500 x 20% = £3,500
Note that the treatment of these allowances as nil rate bands has the potential to take a
taxpayer into a higher tax band, increasing the amount of tax payable.
EXAMPLE 2
Assume now that Ben has taxable NSNDI of £27,500, savings income of £1,250 and
dividend income of £10,000. Ben is a higher rate taxpayer and is entitled to a PSA of £500
and a Dividend Allowance of £5,000.
(a) Ben will be liable to tax on the NSNDI at the basic rate: £27,500 at 20% (£5,500).
His NSNDI will use up £27,500 of the basic rate band, leaving £6,000.
The savings income is taxed next. To decide what rate applies to his savings income, the
£500 PSA is added to his taxable NSNDI and treated as the first slice of his savings income
and taxed at 0%. The remaining taxable savings income all falls within the £33,500
threshold, and is taxed at the savings basic rate.
(b) Ben will be liable to tax on the remaining savings income at the savings basic rate:
£750 at 20% (£150, as opposed to £50 in Example 1, where Ben was entitled to a
PSA of £1,000).
This has used up a further £1,250 of the basic rate band, leaving £4,750.
The dividend income is taxed last. The £5,000 Dividend Allowance is added as the first
slice of Ben’s dividend income, and taxed at 0%. The Dividend Allowance has used up all
of the remaining basic rate band.
(c) Ben will be liable to tax on the remaining dividend income at the dividend upper
rate: £5,000 at 32.5% (£1,625 as opposed to £375).
(Hypothetically, were HMRC to allow deduction of these as true allowances in order to calculate
taxable savings and dividend income, all of Ben’s remaining taxable savings and dividend income
would ( just) fall within the basic rate band, thus reducing his tax bill.)
Remaining taxable dividend income £5,000 x 32.5% = £1,625 £33,500

Basic rate
Dividend Allowance £5,000 x 0% = £0
threshold
Remaining taxable savings income £750 x 20% = £150
PSA £500 x 0% = £0
NSNDI £27,500 x 20% = £5,500
2.7 CALCULATING THE TAX DUE

The five steps described above will enable a taxpayer to calculate his overall tax liability for a
tax year. However, deductions can be made for any tax deducted at source.
Salaries and other employment income

Tax is deducted at source using the PAYE system (see 2.2.3.1). The amount of tax paid (shown
in a taxpayer’s P60) is deducted from the taxpayer’s overall tax liability. If the tax paid exceeds
that liability, a refund will be due.
2.8 A FULL INCOME TAX CALCULATION

Frederick carries on a business in partnership and his total income from the partnership’s
trade for 2017/18 is £35,165. However, to buy his share of this partnership he took out a loan
from the Blankshire Bank, and the interest on that loan is £1,165 per annum.
Frederick also has an account at the Guildfleet Building Society on which he receives interest
of £4,500 in 2017/18. He also owns shares in a company and receives dividends of £10,000 net
in 2017/18.
To calculate Frederick’s tax bill for 2017/18:
£)
Step 1: Calculate total income
Trade profits (ITTOIA 2005, Part 2) 35,165)
Interest (ITTOIA 2005, Part 4) 4,500)
Dividends (ITTOIA 2005, Part 4) 10,000)
Total Income 49,665)
Step 2: Deduct allowable reliefs
Loan interest to Blankshire Bank (1,165)
Net Income 48,500)
Step 3: Deduct personal allowances
Personal Allowance (11,500)
Taxable Income 37,000)
Step 4: Separate NSNDI and savings and dividend income and calculate tax at the applicable rate(s)
(a) NSNDI
Taxable income 37,000)
Less savings income (4,500)
Less dividend income (10,000)
= NSNDI 22,500)
This element of Frederick’s taxable income falls £11,000 short of the £33,500 basic rate
threshold and so is taxed at the basic rate of 20%:
£22,500 @ 20% = £4,500
(b) Savings income
The total of his NSNDI and savings income (£27,000) falls £6,500 short of the £33,500 basic
rate threshold.
As Frederick is a higher rate taxpayer (his taxable income exceeds £33,500), he is entitled to a
PSA of £500, which is taxed first at 0%.
The remaining savings income after deduction of the PSA (£4,000) all falls within the basic
rate band, and so is taxed at 20%.
£500 @ 0% = £0
£4,000 @ 20% = £800
£800
Income Tax 27
(c) Dividend income

The total of his NSNDI, savings and dividend income (£37,000) exceeds the £33,500 basic rate
threshold by £3,500.
Frederick is entitled to a Dividend Allowance of £5,000, regardless of whether he is a basic or
higher rate taxpayer. This is taxed first at 0%.
To the extent that the remaining dividend income after deduction of the Dividend Allowance
(£5,000) falls within the remaining basic rate band (£1,500), it is taxed at the dividend
ordinary rate of 7.5%; the excess over the basic rate threshold (£3,500) is taxed at the dividend
upper rate of 32.5%.
£5,000 @ 0% = £0
£1,500 @ 7.5% = £112.50
£3,500 @ 32.5% = £1,137.50
£1,250.00
Step 5: Add together the amounts of tax from Step 4
OVERALL INCOME TAX LIABILITY (£4,500 + £800 + £1,250) £6,550
There are no relevant deductions, as none of Frederick’s income was deducted at source.
Income tax to pay £6,550
2.9 COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AND DATES FOR PAYMENT

2.9.1 HM Revenue & Customs
Before considering the collection of income tax (see 2.9.2), it is worth noting that HMRC is
also responsible for:
(a) administering corporation tax, capital gains tax, petroleum revenue tax, inheritance
tax, stamp duties, VAT, customs duties and excise duties;
(b) collecting National Insurance contributions;
(c) advising on tax policy;
(d) advising on valuation policy and providing valuation services;
(e) enforcing the National Minimum Wage; and
(f ) recovering student loan repayments.
2.9.2 Collection of income tax: deduction at source

There are two methods of collection of tax: deduction at source and the self-assessment
regime.
As explained above (see 2.2.3), for certain types of income, tax is deducted at source. The
payer of the income acts as a tax collector by deducting from the payment the appropriate
amount of income tax and handing it to HMRC. The taxpayer therefore receives the payment
net of income tax.
2.9.3 Collection of income tax: self-assessment

The self-assessment regime covers all income tax due. There is a set of payment dates for all
sources of income and a single tax bill for the year. However, where income tax has been
deducted at source, the taxpayer will declare this income on his tax return and his overall tax
liability will be reduced by the amount of income tax already paid.
Examples of when income will be declared on a tax return and the appropriate amount of
income tax collected under the self-assessment regime are:
(a) Trading profit (ITTOIA 2005, Part 2). Any income profits of a trade which a taxpayer has
made will be assessed under ITTOIA 2005, Part 2 and collected under the self-
assessment regime.
(b) Rent (ITTOIA 2005, Part 3). A landlord (taxpayer) receiving gross rent from the tenant
will be assessed to tax under ITTOIA 2005, Part 3 and any income tax payable will be
collected under the self-assessment regime.
The self-assessment method assumes that the taxpayer has actually received the sum on
which he is to pay tax and can send part of it to HMRC to satisfy his income tax liability. There
is a risk that the taxpayer will spend the income received before HMRC can claim its share.
2.9.3.1 The tax return

Under the self-assessment regime, the taxpayer completes an annual tax return, which
includes computation pages to enable the taxpayer to calculate his own income tax. Tax
returns are issued soon after 5 April. There are different returns for different types of income.
HMRC now encourages taxpayers to use an online tax return.
Even if a taxpayer does not normally receive a tax return, there is a statutory obligation to notify
HMRC that he has income that is liable to tax. This must be done within six months of the end
of the relevant tax year. There is a penalty for default.
2.9.3.2 Dates for payment

The online tax return and any payment must be filed by 31 January following the tax year to
which the return relates. If the taxpayer would rather send a paper return, this must be
submitted no later than 31 October.
The taxpayer is automatically required to make two payments on account towards the income
tax due for any year, and then a third and final balancing payment to meet any tax still
outstanding. The first payment on account is due on 31 January in the tax year in question.
The second payment on account is due on 31 July after the end of the tax year. Any balancing
payment is due on the next 31 January.
Each payment on account should be approximately one half of the income tax liability for the
year. They are calculated by reference to the previous year’s income tax liability, and are
reduced to give credit for tax deducted at source. No payments on account are required if this
‘relevant amount’ is below a certain limit. This limit is set at a level that ensures most
employees and pensioners (and others who receive the bulk of their income after deduction of
income tax at source or who have relatively small outstanding tax liabilities) do not have to
make payments on account.
EXAMPLE
Josie’s income tax liability for 2016/17 came to £15,000, of which £7,000 was deducted at
source. Her return for 2017/18 will be issued in April 2018 and a paper return must be
submitted to HMRC by 31 October 2018, or an online return by 31 January 2019 at the
latest. For 2017/18 she will make interim payments on account of ½ × (£15,000 – £7,000)
= £4,000 on 31 January 2018 and 31 July 2018. Her final adjustment for 2017/18 is due on
31 January 2019.
Taxpayers have the right to claim a reduction or cancellation of payments on account where
they have grounds for believing that payments based on the tax liability for the previous year
will lead to an overpayment of tax in the current year.
Income Tax 29
2.9.3.3 Penalties for default

Interest is charged on any amount of tax unpaid at the due date for payment whether that tax
is due as a payment on account or as a balancing payment. There are also fixed penalties for
late or non-payment.
Throughout the self-assessment regime the onus is on the taxpayer, and there is a statutory
requirement to maintain adequate records to support the return, backed up by a penalty for
default. HMRC has extensive powers, for example random audits and specific enquiries, to
check the accuracy of any return. Appeals against assessments and determinations are made
to the First-tier Tribunal.
SUMMARY
There is no statutory definition of income but income payments and receipts have an
element of recurrence.
Income tax is payable by individuals, partners, PRs and trustees.
Income tax is payable on income only if it derives from a source specified in either ITTOIA
2005 or ITEPA 2003. Income, which does not derive from one of these sources, is not
taxable and some income is specifically exempted from tax.
Income tax is paid on income received during a tax year. The tax year runs from 6 April to 5
April.
There are five steps to be used to calculate a taxpayer’s income tax liability.
Step 1: Calculate total income
This is achieved by adding together all the taxpayer’s gross income arising under each
source. Some income (eg interest received and dividends) is received net and will have to
be grossed up before being added to the gross income from other sources.
Step 2: Deduct any allowable reliefs to give net income
Interest on a qualifying loan is an example of a payment which may be deducted at this
stage.
Step 3: Deduct any personal allowance to give taxable income
Generally, the only allowance which may be deducted at this stage is the personal
allowance of £11,500. This allowance is subject to an income limit of £100,000.
Step 4: Calculate the tax at the applicable rate(s)
Before applying the tax rates, separate the income (except savings and dividend income)
from the savings and dividend income. This is achieved as follows:
Taxable income
LESS Savings and dividend income
Non-savings, non-dividend income
First, tax the income (except savings and dividend income) as follows:
Basic rate £0–£33,500 @ 20%
Higher rate £33,501–£150,000 @ 40%
Additional rate over £150,000 @ 45%
Next, having made adjustment for the Personal Savings and Dividend Allowances, tax the
savings and dividend income, starting with any interest received.
To the extent that the starting rate for savings, basic rate and higher rate bands remain
available after taxing the income (except savings and dividend income), interest received
is taxed as follows:
Starting rate for savings £0–£5,000 @ 0%
Savings basic rate £5,001–£33,500 @ 20%
Savings higher rate £33,501–£150,000 @ 40%
Savings additional rate over £150,000 @ 45%
Finally, tax any dividend income element of the savings and dividend income.
To the extent that the dividend ordinary rate and upper rate bands remain available after
taxing the non-savings, non-dividend income, dividends are taxed as follows:
Dividend ordinary rate £0–£33,500 @ 7.5%
Dividend upper rate £33,501–£150,000 @ 32.5%
Dividend additional rate over £150,000 @ 38.1%
Step 5: Add together the amounts of tax from Step 4 to give the taxpayer’s overall tax liability
Having calculated the taxpayer’s overall liability, reduce that liability by any income tax
deducted at source (and therefore paid direct to HMRC). The resulting figure is the
income tax which the taxpayer is obliged to pay to HMRC.
The taxpayer will submit a tax return to HMRC by 31 January following the tax year to
which the return relates. The taxpayer will make payments on account on 31 January in the
tax year in question and on 31 July after the end of tax year in respect of his income tax
liability. Any balancing payment must be made by 31 January after the end of the tax year.
Capital Gains Tax 31
CHAPTER 3
Capital Gains Tax
3.1 Introduction 31
3.2 Disposals 33
3.3 Calculation of gains 34
3.4 Reliefs 36
3.5 The annual exemption 37
3.6 CGT calculation where there is more than one disposal in a tax year 38
3.7 Unabsorbed losses 39
3.8 Part disposals 41
3.9 Husband and wife 42
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• the circumstances that give rise to a capital gains tax charge
• the method for calculating a taxpayer’s chargeable gain(s) for the tax year
• the means by which the taxpayer can claim tax relief on his capital losses.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 Sources of capital gains tax law
The principal charging statute is the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992.
3.1.2 The charge to tax

Capital gains tax (CGT) is charged on the chargeable gains made by a chargeable person on
the disposal of chargeable assets in a tax year (6 April to following 5 April).
3.1.3 Chargeable assets

All forms of property are treated as assets for CGT purposes, including such things as debts,
options, incorporeal property and property created by the person disposing of it. Sterling is
excluded from the definition so disposals of cash do not attract CGT liability. The legislation
does provide for a limited category of non-chargeable assets, the main example being private
motor vehicles. The legislation also provides that certain assets which are not non-chargeable
shall be wholly or partly exempt from CGT – see 3.4.
Who pays CGT?

Chargeable persons are:
(a) individuals;
(b) partners (each partner is charged separately for his share of the partnership gains when
there is a disposal of a chargeable partnership asset);
(c) personal representatives (who pay CGT when there is a disposal of the deceased’s
chargeable assets);
(d) trustees (who pay CGT when there is a disposal of a chargeable asset from the trust
fund).
Companies pay corporation tax (see Business Law and Practice). Charities are generally exempt
from paying tax.
3.1.4 How much CGT will an individual pay?

The steps required to calculate the amount of CGT payable are as follows:
3.1.4.1 Step 1: Disposal of a chargeable asset

It is first necessary to identify the disposal of a chargeable asset, for example the sale of land.
3.1.4.2 Step 2: Calculation of the gain

This, in basic terms, will be the consideration received when the asset is sold less cost.
3.1.4.3 Step 3: Consider reliefs

Various reliefs may be available (see 3.4). Early examples assume that none of these apply for
the sake of simplicity.
3.1.4.4 Step 4: Aggregate gains/losses; deduct annual exemption

An individual does not pay tax on all the gains he makes. There is an exemption for the first
£11,300 of total net gains made by an individual in the current tax year (2017/18).
3.1.4.5 Step 5: Apply the appropriate rates of tax

When calculating the appropriate rate(s) of tax, gains are treated as if they were the top slice
of the taxpayer’s income for the tax year. There are four possible rates:
(a) Subject to paras (c) and (d) below, if an individual’s gains and taxable income added
together do not exceed the threshold for basic rate income tax (£33,500), the rate of tax
on the gains is 10%.
(b) Subject to paras (c) and (d) below, if an individual’s gains and taxable income added
together exceed the basic rate income tax threshold, any part of the gains below the
basic rate threshold is taxed at 10%, but the rate of tax on the gains that exceed the
threshold is 20%.
(c) Any gains made on the disposal of residential property (which is not exempted by the
principal private residence exemption (see 3.4.2)) are subject to an 8% surcharge on the
normal rate, which means that such gains falling below the basic rate threshold will be
taxed at 18% and above the threshold at 28%.
(d) Any gains that qualify for entrepreneurs’ relief (see 3.4.8) are taxed at a flat rate of 10%.
Where an individual has gains that qualify for entrepreneurs’ relief and other gains that do
not, the entrepreneurs’ relief gains (taxed at a flat rate of 10%) will be added to his income
first with the result that his other gains will be treated (for the purpose of calculating the
appropriate rate) as the very top slice of his income and so be more likely to be taxed at 20%
(or 28% on residential property).
It makes no difference to the overall tax liability if residential property gains are taxed next or
taxed after non-residential property gains; ie whether residential property gains are taxed at
the basic rate or the higher rate, the additional 8% surcharge will always apply.
Note: All examples in this chapter assume that entrepreneurs’ relief is not available. Please
refer to Chapter 28 of Business Law and Practice for a detailed explanation of how
entrepreneurs’ relief is applied in practice.
Gains realised by trustees and personal representatives are taxed at a flat rate of 20% (or 28%
on residential property).
EXAMPLE
In August, Sarah sells shares for £91,300. The shares cost her £70,000. It is her only
disposal during the tax year. Sarah has a taxable income for the tax year of £50,000, which
means that all of her gain is taxed at 20%.
Step 1: Identify the disposal
Sale of shares
Step 2: Calculate the gain
Proceeds of disposal £91,300)
Less: Cost (£70,000)
£21,300)
Step 3: Consider exemptions and reliefs Nil)
Step 4: Gain £21,300)
Deduct annual exemption (£11,300)
Chargeable gain £10,000)
Step 5: What is the rate of tax?
CGT at 20% on £10,000 is £2,000.
3.1.5 Assessment and payment of CGT

Capital gains tax is assessed on the aggregate net gain of the current tax year and so it is
necessary to consider all the disposals made during the tax year. Tax for individuals is payable
on or before 31 January following the end of the tax year (or 30 days from the making of an
assessment if later).
The above example shows the principles used to establish an individual’s liability for CGT. The
remainder of this chapter will consider each step of the calculation in more detail.
3.2 DISPOSALS
3.2.1 The sale or gift of a chargeable asset
There must be a disposal of a chargeable asset. Disposal is widely defined and includes a sale
or a gift. If a gift is made then HMRC taxes the gain the taxpayer is deemed to have made on
the disposal. This is done by using the market value of the asset at the time of the gift instead
of consideration received.
EXAMPLE
In September, Barbara makes a gift of a Ming vase worth £271,000. She had bought the
vase for £180,000. It is her only disposal during the tax year. Barbara’s taxable income for
the tax year is £60,000.
Gift of vase
Market value of vase £271,000)
Less: Cost (£180,000)
£91,000)
Step 3: Consider exemptions and reliefs Nil
Step 4: Gain £91,000)

CGT at 20% on £79,700 is £15,940.
3.2.2 The disposal of part of an asset

A sale of part of an asset or a gift of part of an asset is a disposal, for example the sale of part of
a field. This is considered in detail in 3.8.
3.2.3 The death of the taxpayer

On death there is no disposal by the deceased, so there is no charge to CGT. The personal
representatives acquire the deceased’s assets at the market value at the date of death (the
probate value). This has the effect of wiping out gains which accrued during the deceased’s
lifetime so that these gains are not charged to tax.
EXAMPLE
Christopher dies owning shares worth £150,000. He had bought the shares for £60,000.
Since death is not a disposal, there is no charge to CGT when Christopher dies. His
personal representatives will acquire the shares at the market value at his death, ie at
£150,000. The gain of £90,000 is wiped out and is not charged to tax. The £90,000 is the
difference between the cost of the shares and the market value of the shares at the date of
Christopher’s death.
3.3 CALCULATION OF GAINS

The basic aim is to tax the gain in value that the asset has realised from the date of acquisition
to the date of disposal. Consequently, the gain is generally the consideration for the disposal
(or market value if the taxpayer gives away the asset) less any of the following expenditure
incurred by the taxpayer:
Initial expenditure
(a) The cost price of the asset (or its market value at the date of acquisition if the asset was
given to the taxpayer; or the probate value if the taxpayer acquired the asset by will or
intestacy) plus incidental costs of acquisition. Examples of incidental costs of
acquisition are legal fees, valuation fees, stamp duty.
(b) Expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred in providing the asset. An example is the
cost of building a weekend cottage.
Subsequent expenditure
(a) Expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred to enhance the value of the asset, which is
reflected in the value of the asset at the time of disposal. An example is the cost of
building an extension to a house. The cost of routine maintenance, repairs and
insurance, on the other hand, is not deductible.
(b) Expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred in establishing, preserving or defending
title to the asset. An example is the cost of legal fees incurred to resolve a boundary
dispute.
Incidental costs of disposal
Examples are legal fees and estate agent’s fees.
Note that expenditure which is deductible for income tax purposes cannot be deducted when
calculating a capital gain.
EXAMPLE
Paul sells his holiday cottage (chargeable residential property) for £184,800. He bought
the cottage for £50,000 and spent £700 on a survey and £1,300 on legal fees when he
purchased it. He spent £7,600 improving the cottage. Legal fees when he sells the cottage
are £800 and the estate agent’s commission is £3,400. For the current tax year Paul has a
taxable income of £23,500.
Sale of holiday cottage
Less:
Legal fees £800
Estate agent’s commission £3,400
(£4,200)
Net proceeds of disposal £180,600)
Less:
Initial expenditure
Cost £50,000
Survey fee £700
Legal fees £1,300
£52,000
Subsequent expenditure
Cost of improvements £7,600
(£59,600)
GAIN £121,000)
Step 3: Consider exemptions and reliefs Nil)
Step 4: Gain £121,000)
CGT at 18% on the first £10,000
(ie amount of gain below the basic rate threshold) = £1,800
CGT at 28% on remaining £99,700
(ie amount of gain above the basic rate threshold) = £27,916
Total CGT £29,716
3.3.1 The indexation allowance

For gains realised before 6 April 2008, an indexation allowance was used when calculating the
gain on an asset which had been owned for any period between 31 March 1982 and 5 April
1998. The purpose of the indexation allowance is to remove inflationary gains from the CGT
calculation so that a smaller gain is charged to tax. Inflation is measured by reference to the
Retail Prices Index (the RPI). The indexation allowance is calculated by applying to the initial
and subsequent expenditure the percentage increase in the RPI from the date the expenditure
was incurred to the date of disposal (or April 1998 if earlier). Tables published by HMRC
express this information as an indexation factor for ease of calculation.
The allowance still has some relevance to gains, the charge to which has been deferred before
6 April 2008 by the use of various roll-over or hold-over reliefs – see 3.4. This is because, on a
subsequent disposal after 6 April 2008, the rolled-over or held-over gain will be reduced by the
appropriate amount of indexation allowance, provided the relevant assets were owned for
some time between 31 March 1982 and 5 April 1998.
The same point applies to inter-spouse disposals made before 6 April 2008 – see 3.9.
3.3.2 Assets owned on 31 March 1982

Where a taxpayer disposes of an asset which he owned on 31 March 1982, special rules are
applied. The aim of these rules is to exclude from the tax calculation the part of the gain that
accrued before 31 March 1982, so that no CGT is paid on that part of the gain.
As a result, the gain on such assets is calculated by using the market value of the assets on 31
March 1982, rather than actual expenditure.
3.3.3 Losses
The formula ‘consideration received (or market value) less cost’ can produce a capital loss.
EXAMPLE
Christine bought shares for £10,000 three years ago. She sells them for £10,300 but her
incidental costs of acquisition were £250 and her incidental costs of disposal were £200.
Sale of shares
Step 2: Calculate the gain/loss
Less:
Broker’s commission (£200)
Net proceeds of disposal £10,100)
Less:
Initial expenditure
Cost £10,000
Broker’s commission £200
Stamp duty £50
(£10,250)
LOSS £150)
The treatment of losses will be considered at 3.6 and 3.7.
3.4 RELIEFS
After calculating the gain, the next step is to consider whether any reliefs apply. Generally,
reliefs may be available due to the nature of the asset being disposed of. The majority of reliefs
are aimed at smaller businesses, to encourage investment in this sector of the economy.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of CGT reliefs.
3.4.1 Tangible moveable property
Wasting assets (ie assets with a predictable life of less than 50 years) are generally exempt. Most
consumer goods will fall into this category, for example televisions and washing machines.
Not all items of tangible moveable property are wasting assets. Some will go up in value, for
example antiques. However, they will be exempt from CGT if the disposal consideration is
£6,000 or less.
3.4.2 Private dwelling house

A gain on the disposal by an individual of a dwelling house, including grounds of up to half a
hectare, will be completely exempt, provided it has been occupied as his only or main
residence through his period of ownership (ignoring the last three years of ownership).
For most people, their home is their most valuable asset. The effect of this relief is that the
house can be sold (or given away) without CGT liability being incurred.
3.4.3 Damages for personal injury

The recovery of damages or compensation may amount to the disposal of a chargeable asset;
however, the receipt of damages for personal injury is exempt.
3.4.4 Hold-over relief

Hold-over relief enables an individual to make a gift of certain types of business assets without
paying CGT. However, if the donee disposes of the asset, the donee will be charged to tax not
only on his own gain but on the donor’s gain as well. Because hold-over relief defers the charge
to tax until a disposal by the donee, there must be an election by donor and donee to claim hold-
over relief.
3.4.5 Relief for replacement of business assets (‘roll-over’ relief )

This relief encourages expansion and investment in qualifying business assets by enabling the
sale of those assets to take place without an immediate charge to CGT, provided the proceeds
of sale are invested in other qualifying business assets. The charge to CGT is postponed until
the disposal of the new asset.
3.4.6 Roll-over relief on incorporation of a business

This relief again defers a CGT charge. It is applied (subject to conditions) when an individual
sells his interest in an unincorporated business (sole trader, partnership) to a company. The
gain is rolled over into the shares received as consideration for the interest being sold to the
company. The CGT charge is postponed until the disposal of the shares.
3.4.7 Relief for re-investment in certain unquoted shares

To encourage investment in small company shares, it is possible for an individual to defer
payment of CGT on any chargeable gain provided the proceeds of sale are re-invested in certain
shares in an unquoted trading company. This is dealt with in 5.4.
3.4.8 Entrepreneurs’ relief

From 6 April 2008, relief (in the form of a reduced rate of tax) is available on gains made by
individuals on the disposal (ie on a sale or a gift) of certain assets, including:
(a) all or part of a trading business the individual carries on as a sole trader or in partnership;
(b) shares in a trading company, subject to certain conditions, including that the
individual’s holding is at least 5% of the ordinary voting shares of the company (ie, it is
his ‘personal’ trading company);
(c) assets owned and used by the individual’s personal trading company or trading
partnership.
The detailed workings of this relief are set out in Business Law and Practice.
3.5 THE ANNUAL EXEMPTION

The annual exemption is applied to make exempt the first slice of the taxpayer’s net capital
gains for the tax year. Unlike the reliefs referred to in 3.4, it is not applied to any particular
disposal but is rather a general deduction from the total net gain. However, where someone
makes gains on several disposals in a tax year and those gains are liable to CGT at different
rates, the taxpayer is permitted to apply the exemption first to the gains that would otherwise
attract the higher rates (see 3.6).
As explained in 3.1.4.4, the amount of the exemption for tax year 2017/18 is £11,300. If a
taxpayer’s net gain is smaller than the annual exemption the unused part of the exemption
cannot be carried forward to the following tax year.
Personal representatives and trustees of settlements are also entitled to an annual exemption;
see Part V: Probate and Administration.
3.6 CGT CALCULATION WHERE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE DISPOSAL IN A

TAX YEAR
As explained in 3.1.4.5, different rates of tax apply to disposals, not only depending on the
taxpayer’s income tax position but also due to the type of assets disposed of. In this respect,
chargeable assets fall into three categories – residential property, other assets not qualifying
for entrepreneurs’ relief and assets qualifying for entrepreneurs’ relief. Because of the
different rates that apply, gains made on assets within each category must be aggregated in
separate compartments.
Where the taxpayer realises gains in two or three of the categories, any losses and the annual
exemption can be deducted from gains in the best way possible for the taxpayer (ie to the
gains that would otherwise attract the higher rates), so from residential property gains first,
then non-entrepreneurs’ relief gains and, finally, entrepreneurs’ relief gains.
As previously stated, the following examples deal only with disposals that do not qualify for
entrepreneurs’ relief.
EXAMPLE 1
Gordon made the following disposals during 2017/18. Gordon has a taxable income in the
tax year of £40,000.
On 17 July 2017, he sold his 3% shareholding in Pibroch Ltd for £11,600. He bought it for
£4,000 on 16 April 1997.
On 12 August 2017, he sold his holiday cottage, ‘Landseer Lodge’, for £190,000. He
acquired it on his mother’s death on 11 January 1990, when its market value was £30,000.
On 8 January 2018, he sold his units in TVT Unit Trust for £5,000. He had purchased them
on 16 May 2001 for £9,000.
Note: For the sake of simplicity, the example ignores incidental costs of acquisition and
disposal on all of the transactions and it is assumed that no reliefs are available on any of
the disposals.
Pibroch Ltd Landseer Lodge TVT

Step 1: Identify the disposal Sale of shares Sale of holiday Sale of unit trust
cottage units
Step 2: Calculate the gain.
Proceeds of disposal £11,600) £190,000) £5,000)
Less:
Acquisition expenditure (£4,000) (£30,000) (£9,000)
Gain/(Loss) £7,600) £160,000) (£4,000)
Step 3: Consider exemptions
and reliefs None None None
Step 4: Aggregate net gains/ Non- Residential
losses entrepreneurs’ property gain
relief gain
7,600) 160,000)
Deduct current year loss (4,000)
156,000)
Deduct annual exemption (11,300)
Chargeable gains 7,600) 144,700)
Step 5: What are the rates of tax?
CGT at 20% on £7,600 gain on Pibroch shares is £1,520)
CGT at 28% on £144,700 gain on Landseer Lodge is £40,516)
Total CGT £42,036)
3.7 UNABSORBED LOSSES

It is, of course, possible that a taxpayer’s CGT losses in a tax year may exceed his overall CGT
gains. If so, setting the losses against the gains will wipe them out completely and the
taxpayer will have no CGT to pay. In such a situation, the setting-off of current year losses to
wipe out the gains entirely means that the taxpayer loses the use of his annual exemption. The
exemption cannot be carried forward to use against gains of future tax years.
If, after setting losses against gains, there are still unabsorbed losses, these may be carried
forward to future years and then used to the extent necessary to reduce gains to the limit of
the annual exemptions available in those future years. Unabsorbed losses can be carried
forward indefinitely. The approach should be:
(a) work out the gain or loss on each disposal made during the tax year;
(b) deduct any losses of the current year from gains;
(c) deduct any losses brought forward from previous years to reduce any remaining gains to
the limit of the annual exemption;
(d) deduct the annual exemption from any remaining gains.
Note: As previously stated, the losses and annual exemption should be applied in the most
advantageous way for the taxpayer.
EXAMPLE 2 (CONTINUED FROM 3.6)

Year of loss
In 2016/17, the year before the 3.6 scenario, Gordon made gains of £30,000, and losses of
£70,000. He had no unused losses from previous years.
Gains for the year £30,000
Less: losses for the year £70,000
Net loss for the year £40,000
The £30,000 gain is wiped out, and the unused loss of £40,000 is carried forward to the
next year.
As there is no net gain for 2016/17, the annual exemption cannot be used in this year and it
cannot be carried forward to later years.
Year following year of loss
In 2017/18, Gordon’s loss of £40,000 carried forward from 2016/17 would be set against
the gain on Landseer Lodge (as this is residential property which would otherwise be
taxed at the higher rate of 28%) after the deduction of the current year loss of £4,000. The
annual exemption would also be applied against the remaining gain on Landseer Lodge
for the same reason.
Step 4: Aggregate net Non- Residential
gains/losses entrepreneurs’ property gain
relief gain
7,600 160,000)
Less current year loss (4,000)
Less previous year loss (40,000)
116,000)
Chargeable gains 7,600 104,700)
Step 5: What are the rates of tax?
CGT at 20% on £7,600 gain on Pibroch shares is £1,520
CGT at 28% on £104,700 gain on Landseer Lodge is £29,316
Total CGT £30,836
FURTHER EXAMPLE
If Gordon’s unabsorbed loss in 2016/17 had been greater, eg £180,000, it would be carried
forward and used in 2017/18 as follows:
As the available losses are greater than the aggregate gains for 2017/18, these will be wiped
out altogether and so there is no need to consider the order in which the taxpayer might
like to apply the losses. In this situation the losses would simply be deducted from the total
gains of £167,600. First, the deduction of the current year loss of £4,000 would mean that
the aggregate net gains for the current tax year are £163,600. The brought-forward loss of
£180,000 would then be set against this figure until the gains are reduced to the limit of the
annual exemption of £11,300. The balance of the loss (£27,700) remains unused and can
be carried forward to set against gains of future years.
Loss carried) 2017/18)

forward) gains)
£) £)
2016/17 loss 180,000)
2017/18 aggregate net gains/losses 7,600)
160,000)
(4,000)
Use part loss (152,300) (152,300)
11,300)
2017/18 taxable gains nil)
Balance of loss to be carried forward 27,700)
3.8 PART DISPOSALS

Where the disposal is of only part of the asset the initial and subsequent expenditure are
apportioned when calculating the gain.
EXAMPLE
Anna bought a large plot of commercial property for £100,000 in 2000. She sells part of it
for £90,000 in October 2017. The remaining property is worth £360,000. This is her only
disposal in the tax year.
Anna’s taxable income for the year is £28,500.
Identify the disposal: sale of part of commercial property.
Calculation of the gain on the land sold:
The consideration received is £90,000.
What is the cost of the part sold?
The total value of the two pieces of land is £450,000, ie £90,000 plus £360,000.
The part sold is worth 1-5- of the total value, ie £90,000 is 1-5- of £450,000.
Therefore, take 1-5- of the cost as the relevant figure for the calculation, ie 1-5- of £100,000, that
is £20,000.
£)
Proceeds of disposal 90,000)
Less:
Apportioned cost (20,000)
Gain 70,000)
Chargeable gain 58,700)
What is the rate of tax?
CGT at 10% on the first £5,000
(ie amount of gain below the basic rate threshold) = £500)
CGT at 20% on remaining £53,700
(ie amount of gain above the basic rate threshold) = £10,740)
Total CGT £11,240)
3.9 HUSBAND AND WIFE

3.9.1 Disposals between spouses
Where spouses or civil partners are living together, a disposal by one to the other is treated as
being made for such a consideration as to provide neither a gain nor a loss. This means that a
spouse (or civil partner) can dispose of property to the other without paying CGT on the
disposal. The donor’s gain is not wiped out but merely deferred. If the donee disposes of the
asset, the donee will be charged to tax not only on the donee’s gain but on the donor’s gain as
well.
EXAMPLE
David gives a portrait to his wife Jane. David will not pay CGT on this disposal.
The portrait was worth £100,000 at the time of the gift. It cost David £80,000 three years
ago.
Usually, when a gift is made the acquisition cost of the donee is the market value at the
time of the gift (£100,000) but because the portrait was a gift from her husband, Jane will
acquire it with a value of £80,000, ie the amount David paid for the painting.
If Jane disposes of the asset, she will have a lower acquisition cost to set against her gain
and she will be charged to tax on both her own gain and her husband’s gain.
Assume Jane sells the painting for £150,000, five years later.
The calculation will be:
Consideration received £150,000
Less: Cost £80,000
£70,000
If Jane had not acquired the painting from her husband, so that the ordinary rules applied,
the calculation would have been:
Consideration received £150,000
Less: Cost £100,000
£50,000
A comparison of the above calculations shows that a larger gain is produced on Jane’s
disposal where she acquired the portrait from her husband; but, of course, David avoided
any CGT charge at the time of the gift to Jane.
3.9.2 Tax planning point: making full use of annual exemptions and lower rate of tax
The fact that that both spouses are entitled to a separate annual exemption in each tax year
can lead to tax-planning opportunities. By way of example, assume that the wife wishes to
dispose of a number of assets in the tax year and that these disposals would realise gains that
use up all of her annual exemption and leave some of the gains chargeable. On the other hand,
the husband would not be making any disposals and so would not use his annual exemption at
all. In this situation, it may be beneficial for the wife to transfer some of the assets to the
husband (remember that this is a disposal that would not create a gain or a loss – see 3.9.1), so
that they both make gains and both can use their own annual exemption to make exempt
gains up to £22,600, rather than £11,300.
Also, if the asset-holding spouse would be taxed on gains at the higher rate of 20% (or 28%)
but the other would be taxed at the basic rate of 10% (or 18%), it would again be sensible to
make an inter-spouse transfer so that the disposal is made by the spouse who is subject to the
basic rate.
Inheritance Tax 43
CHAPTER 4
Inheritance Tax
4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 The main charging provisions 44
4.3 Transfers on death 45
4.4 Lifetime transfers: potentially exempt transfers 54
4.5 Other lifetime transfers: lifetime chargeable transfers 57
4.6 Effect of death on lifetime transfers 59
4.7 Liability and burden of payment 64
4.8 Time for payment 68
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• understand the overall structure of inheritance tax
• explain how a person’s death estate is taxed
• explain how certain lifetime transfers are taxed
• appreciate the rules on liability, burden and timing of payments of inheritance tax.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains the basic principles of inheritance tax (IHT). Some form of death duty
has existed in the UK since the 19th century and has varied in name and approach over that
period, beginning with estate duty then capital transfer tax and now IHT. Inheritance tax is
governed principally by the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984). Despite its name, the tax
does not apply only to death estates but can also catch transfers made during life.
There are three main occasions when IHT may be charged:
(a) on death;
(b) on lifetime gifts made to individuals within seven years prior to death;
(c) on lifetime gifts to a company or into a trust.
4.1.1 Death
Inheritance tax is intended primarily to take effect on death. When an individual dies, IHT is
charged on the value of his estate (broadly, his assets less his liabilities) subject to various
exemptions and reliefs.
4.1.2 Lifetime gifts made to individuals within seven years prior to death
If IHT were limited to a charge on death, one way to avoid tax would be to reduce the size of
one’s estate by making lifetime gifts; IHT is therefore also charged on certain lifetime gifts or
‘transfers’ if the donor dies within seven years after making them. Such gifts to individuals are
called ‘potentially exempt transfers’, because at the time when the transfer is made no IHT is
chargeable; the transfer is ‘potentially exempt’. If the transferor survives for seven years, the
transfer becomes exempt. If he dies within that period, the transfer becomes chargeable.
4.1.3 Lifetime gifts to a company or into a trust

Inheritance tax might also be avoided by the use of a trust or corporate entity. At present a
lifetime gift to a company or into a trust is immediately chargeable to IHT at the time when it
is made, unless the trust is for a disabled person.
4.1.4 Anti-avoidance legislation

As with income tax and capital gains tax, IHT is one of the taxes subject to the ‘general anti-
abuse rule’ (GAAR) introduced by the Finance Act 2013, which is designed to allow HMRC to
counteract ‘abusive’ tax avoidance schemes intended to exploit loopholes in the legislation
covering the rules for calculating IHT.
4.2 THE MAIN CHARGING PROVISIONS

Inheritance tax is charged on ‘the value transferred by a chargeable transfer’. The term
‘chargeable transfer’ is defined as ‘a transfer of value which is made by an individual but is not
an exempt transfer’ (IHTA 1984, ss 1, 2).
This charge may apply in any of the three situations outlined above, because the term
‘chargeable transfer’ may refer to:
(a) the transfer on death; or
(b) a lifetime transfer which is potentially exempt when it is made but becomes chargeable
because the transferor dies within seven years; or
(c) a lifetime transfer which is immediately chargeable at the time when it is made.
In each case, the method by which tax is calculated is broadly similar, and may be approached
by applying a sequence of logical steps.
4.2.1 Step 1: Identify the transfer of value

A lifetime transfer of value is any disposition which reduces the value of the transferor’s
estate. On death, tax is charged as if the deceased had made a transfer of value of his estate.
4.2.2 Step 2: Find the value transferred

For a lifetime transfer, this is the amount of the reduction in the transferor’s estate.
On death, it is the value of the estate.
4.2.3 Step 3: Apply any relevant exemptions and reliefs

Various exemptions and reliefs exist for public policy reasons which can reduce or eliminate
the IHT charge on any given transfer.
Some exemptions apply both to lifetime transfers and to the transfer on death (eg transfers to
spouse or civil partner). Others are more restricted, and many apply only to lifetime transfers
(eg annual exemption).
The main reliefs are business and agricultural property relief, which may apply both to
lifetime transfers of such property and to the transfer on death.
4.2.4 Step 4: Calculate tax at the appropriate rate

Rates of tax
A range of tax rates apply to IHT, the lowest being zero per cent. There are two bands for
which this is relevant:
(a) the nil rate band (currently £325,000) – available for all transfers of value;
(b) the residence nil rate band (currently £100,000) – available only on a transfer on death
where there is a ‘qualifying residential interest’.
Inheritance Tax 45
The rate of tax that applies in excess of the nil rate band and the residence nil rate band (where
applicable) varies according to the type of transfer (details are given in context below).
Cumulation
The nil rate band will not necessarily be available in full (or at all) for any given transfer. In
order to calculate the available nil rate band on any transfer, whether during lifetime or on
death, one must first look back over the seven years immediately preceding the transfer. Any
chargeable transfers made by the transferor during that period must be taken into account in
order to determine how much of the nil rate band remains available. This process is known as
‘cumulation’ and is used solely to calculate whether the nil rate band is available for any
chargeable transfer.
As the residence nil rate band is not available for lifetime transfers, it will be available in full
on death, subject to any adjustments in relation to estates over £2 million (see 4.3.6).
Cumulation is not relevant.
This chapter will consider the detailed application of the steps outlined above to each of the
three types of transfer in turn. Note that, for ease of reference in the examples provided, any
mention of the nil rate band assumes that the band has always been £325,000. In fact, it has
increased over the years to its current level. In real calculations one may have to identify the
previous bands.
4.3 TRANSFERS ON DEATH

The steps outlined at 4.2 above apply as follows.
4.3.1 Step 1: Identify the transfer of value

When a person dies, he is treated for IHT purposes as having made a transfer of value
immediately before his death, ie there is a deemed transfer of value. The value transferred is
the value of the deceased’s ‘estate’ immediately before his death.
4.3.1.1 Definition of ‘estate’

A person’s estate is defined by IHTA 1984, s 5(1) to mean all the property to which he was
beneficially entitled immediately before his death, with the exception of ‘excluded property’.
Property included within this definition falls into three categories, as set out below.
(a) Property which passes under the deceased’s will or on intestacy.
The deceased was ‘beneficially entitled’ to all such property immediately before he died.
(b) Property to which the deceased was ‘beneficially entitled’ immediately before his death but which does
not pass under his will or on intestacy.
This applies to the deceased’s interest in any joint property passing on his death by
survivorship to the surviving joint tenant(s). In most cases, the deceased will be taken to
have owned an equal share in the property with the other joint tenant(s).
(c) Property included because of special statutory provisions.
By statute, the deceased is treated as having been ‘beneficially entitled’ to certain types
of property which would otherwise fall outside the definition. These rules apply to
(i) certain trust property; and
(ii) property given away by the deceased in his lifetime but which is ‘subject to a
reservation’ at the time of death.
Each of these categories is explained further below.
4.3.1.2 Trust property included in the estate for IHT purposes
In certain circumstances, a person who is entitled to the income from a trust is treated for IHT
purposes as ‘beneficially entitled’ to the capital which produces that income. This means that
where a beneficiary who is entitled to all the income from such a trust dies, the trust fund is
taxed as if it were part of the beneficiary’s estate.
The type of beneficial interest covered by these provisions is known as a ‘qualifying interest in
possession’. To be an interest in possession, it must be an interest under which the beneficiary
is entitled to claim the income from the trust property (or enjoy trust property in some
equivalent way, such as living in it) with no power on the part of the trustees to decide whether
or not he should receive it. An interest in possession arising before 22 March 2006 will be a
qualifying interest in possession. The rules changed on that date and where an interest in
possession arises on or after 22 March 2006, it will only be a qualifying interest in possession
in limited circumstances. The main example is where the interest is an ‘immediate post-death
interest’ (IPDI). An IPDI is, broadly, an interest in possession arising on the death of the
settlor under his will or intestacy.
EXAMPLE 1
Gina died in January 2011. In her will, she left all her estate to her executors/trustees, Tom
and Tessa, on trust to pay the income to Gina’s son, Simon, for life with remainder to Rose
absolutely. Both Simon and Rose are over 18 years old.
Tom and Tessa must invest the property to produce income. Simon is entitled to the
income during his life. Tom and Tessa must pay it to him. Thus Simon, the life tenant, has
an interest in possession.
When Simon dies, his rights under the trust cease. Under the terms of the trust instrument
(Gina’s will), Rose is now entitled to the trust fund, and Tom and Tessa must transfer all the
trust property to her.
For IHT purposes, Simon had a qualifying interest in possession by virtue of it being an
IPDI. Although he was entitled only to the income from the trust property and had no
control over the disposition of the fund on his death, he is treated for tax purposes as
‘beneficially entitled’ to the whole trust fund. The fund is taxed on his death as part of his
estate. The tax on the trust property will be paid from the trust fund.
EXAMPLE 2
The facts are as in Example 1, except that Gina did not die in January 2011. Instead, she
created the trust on that date by transferring the funds to Tessa and Tom and signing a
declaration that they were to hold on trust for Simon for life with remainder to Rose. While
the beneficiaries’ rights under the trust will be exactly the same as in Example 1, the trust
will not be an IPDI. Instead it will be taxed under the ‘relevant property’ regime. Details of
this regime are outside the scope of this chapter.
4.3.1.3 Property subject to a reservation

The Finance Act 1986 contains provisions designed to prevent people from avoiding tax by
giving property away more than seven years before death but continuing to enjoy the benefit
of the property. The rule applies where the deceased gave away property during his lifetime
but did not transfer ‘possession and enjoyment’ of the property to the donee, or was not
entirely excluded from enjoying the property. If property is subject to a reservation at the time
of the donor’s death, the donor is treated as being ‘beneficially entitled’ to the property.
Inheritance Tax 47
EXAMPLE
In 2009, Diana gave her jewellery, worth £100,000, to her daughter Emma, but retained
possession of it. Diana dies in 2017, when the jewellery (still in her possession) is worth
£120,000. Although the jewellery belongs to Emma, tax is charged on Diana’s death as if
she were still beneficially entitled to it. The jewellery, valued at £120,000, is taxed as part
of Diana’s estate. The tax on the jewellery will be borne by Emma.
4.3.1.4 Property outside the estate for IHT purposes

From the above, it can be seen that the definition of ‘estate’ turns on whether the deceased
was (or was deemed to be) beneficially interested in property immediately before his death.
Property in which the deceased did not have such an interest falls outside the definition. Two
common examples of property outside the definition are a life assurance policy once it is
written in trust for a named beneficiary (because the proceeds are no longer payable to the
deceased’s estate) and a discretionary lump sum payment made from a pension fund to the
deceased’s family (because the pension trustees are not obliged to pay it to the deceased’s
estate).
4.3.1.5 Excluded property

Certain property which would otherwise be included in the estate for IHT purposes is defined
in IHTA 1984 as ‘excluded property’. Excluded property is not part of the estate for IHT
purposes. One example of excluded property is a ‘reversionary interest’. For IHT purposes this
means a future interest under a settlement, for example an interest in remainder under a
trust, created before 22 March 2006.
EXAMPLE
In 2005, Faith created a settlement placing £500,000 on trust for Guy for life, remainder to
Hazel absolutely. Whilst both Guy and Hazel are alive, Guy has a qualifying interest in
possession and Hazel has a reversionary interest (that is excluded property).

4.3.2.1 Basic valuation principle
Assets in the estate are valued for IHT purposes at ‘the price which the property might
reasonably be expected to fetch if sold in the open market’ immediately before the death
(IHTA 1984, s 160).
This means that the value immediately before death of every asset forming part of the estate
for IHT purposes must be assessed and reported to HMRC. Some assets, such as bank and
building society accounts and quoted shares, are easy to value. Others, such as land, may be
more difficult, especially where it was jointly owned (in some cases it may be possible to
reduce the value of the share of the deceased to reflect the difficulty in selling a share in a
jointly-owned property). Negotiations may be required (in the case of land, with the district
valuer) in order to reach an agreed valuation.
The value of an asset agreed for IHT purposes is known as the ‘probate value’.
4.3.2.2 Modification of the basic valuation principle: s 171

The IHTA 1984, s 171 provides that, where the death causes the value of an asset in the estate
to increase or decrease, that change in value should be taken into account.
EXAMPLE
Brian has insured his life for £50,000. The benefit of the policy belongs to him (ie the
policy is not written in trust). Immediately before Brian’s death, the value of the policy to
him is its ‘surrender value’ (ie the value if he surrendered his rights back to the insurance
company in return for a payment). This will be considerably less than its maturity value of
£50,000. Under s 171, the effect of Brian’s death on the value of the policy is taken into
account: its value for IHT purposes is £50,000.
4.3.2.3 Valuing quoted shares

The value of quoted shares is taken from the Stock Exchange Daily Official List for the date of
death (or the nearest trading day). The list quotes two prices. To value the shares for IHT, take
one-quarter of the difference between the lower and higher price and add it to the lower price.
EXAMPLE
John died owning 200 shares in ABC plc. On the date of John’s death the quoted price per
share is 102p/106p. The value of each share for IHT is 103p, and so the value of John’s
holding is £206.
4.3.2.4 Debts and expenses

Liabilities owed by the deceased at the time of death are deductible for IHT purposes provided
that they were incurred for money or money’s worth (IHTA 1984, s 505). Thus debts such as
gas and telephone bills may be deducted. In addition, the deceased may not have paid enough
income tax on the income he received before he died; this amount may also be deducted.
Reasonable funeral expenses are also deductible (IHTA 1984, s 162).

The main exemptions applicable on death depend on the identity of the beneficiary. Reliefs
depend on the nature of the property in the estate. Thus it is important to see who is entitled
to the property on death and whether the property qualifies for a relief.
4.3.3.1 Spouse or civil partner exemption

Section 18 of the IHTA 1984 provides as follows:
A transfer of value is an exempt transfer to the extent that the value transferred is attributable to
property which becomes comprised in the estate of the transferor’s spouse or civil partner.
Any property included in the estate for IHT purposes is exempt if it passes to the deceased’s
spouse or civil partner under the deceased’s will or intestacy or, in the case of joint property,
by survivorship. (But note that under s 18(2), if the transferor is domiciled in the UK but the
transferee is not, the level of the exemption is limited to £325,000. Alternatively, the
transferee can elect to be treated as UK-domiciled for IHT purposes and so receive the full
exemption.)
The rule applicable to qualifying interest in possession trusts is that IHT is charged as if the
person with the right to income owned the capital (see 4.3.1.2). This rule applies for the
purpose of spouse exemption, both on creation of the trust (whether by will or on intestacy)
and on the death of a life tenant.
Inheritance Tax 49
EXAMPLE
In his will, Dan leaves his estate worth £300,000 to trustees on trust for his wife, Jane, for
life with remainder to their children. Although Jane only has the right to the income from
Dan’s estate for her lifetime, the trust is treated for IHT purposes as if Jane owned the
capital. On Dan’s death, his whole estate will, therefore, be spouse exempt.
Note that this exemption does not apply to co-habitees.
4.3.3.2 Charity exemption

The IHTA 1984, s 23(1) provides as follows:
Transfers of value are exempt to the extent that the values transferred by them are attributable to
property which is given to charities.
Any property forming part of the deceased’s estate for IHT purposes which passes on death to
charity is exempt. The exemption most commonly applies to property which passes to charity
under the deceased’s will. However, if the deceased had a life interest in trust property which
passes under the terms of the trust to charity, the charity exemption applies.
A similar exemption applies to gifts to certain national bodies and bodies providing a public
benefit, such as museums and art galleries, and to political parties.
When large charity gifts are made by the deceased, not only is the transfer itself exempt, but it
may affect the tax rate on the rest of the death estate (see 4.3.4).
4.3.3.3 Business and agricultural property relief

Business property relief applies to reduce the value transferred by a transfer of ‘relevant
business property’ by a certain percentage, provided that the transferor owned the property
for the two years immediately before the transfer.
The reduction is 100% for:
(a) a business, or an interest in a business (such as a share in a partnership); and
(b) unquoted shares.
The reduction is 50% for:
(a) quoted shares which gave the transferor control of the company; and
(b) certain land, buildings and machinery owned by the transferor but used in his company
or partnership.
Agricultural property relief applies in a similar manner to reduce the agricultural value of
agricultural property.
Further details of these reliefs are given in Business Law and Practice.
4.3.4 Step 4: Calculate tax at the appropriate rate

4.3.4.1 Nil rate band
Generally, the position is that, if the deceased has made no chargeable transfers in the seven
years before death, the rate of tax on the first £325,000 of his estate (the ‘nil rate band’) is 0%.
If his estate exceeds the nil rate band, IHT is normally charged on the excess at 40%. In a small
number of cases, provisions introduced in the Finance Act 2012 may apply. These provisions
are aimed at increasing charitable giving and will apply a 36% tax rate in place of the normal
40% rate when at least 10% of a defined ‘component’ of a person’s net estate (after deduction
of other exemptions, reliefs and the available nil rate band) passes to charity. The provisions
will rarely apply as most people will not want to give anything close to 10% of their net estate
to charity, whereas those that do want a charity as their main beneficiary (often because they
have no close family) tend to leave the vast majority of their estate to that charity with any
other gifts falling within the nil rate band. For further details, see Private Client: Wills, Trusts
and Estate Planning.
If the deceased died on or after 9 October 2007 having survived a spouse or civil partner, the nil
rate band in force at the date of death of the survivor is increased by whatever percentage of the
nil rate band of the first to die was unused by them (subject to a maximum increase of 100%).
EXAMPLE
Emily, a widow, dies on 21 August 2016. Her husband Guy died 10 years earlier leaving all
his estate to Emily. There was no tax to pay on Guy’s death as his whole estate was spouse
exempt, and his nil rate band was not used. Emily’s estate benefits from a 100% uplift in
her nil rate band, so that the rate of tax on the first £650,000 of her estate is 0%.
Cumulation
If the deceased did make any chargeable transfers in the seven years before death the
cumulation principle outlined at 4.2.4 will apply. The effect is that the lifetime –transfers use
up the deceased’s nil rate band first, reducing the amount available for the estate. Most
lifetime gifts are potentially exempt from IHT and become chargeable only if the transferor
dies within seven years. Less commonly, the deceased may also have made gifts in the seven
years before death which were immediately chargeable to IHT at the time they were made, eg a
gift into a trust. The cumulation principle applies to both types of transfer.
The ‘values transferred’ by such transfers must be aggregated. This means that any lifetime
exemptions or reliefs which operate to reduce the value transferred are taken into account.
EXAMPLE 1
In 2014, David made a gift to his daughter. The value transferred (after exemptions and
reliefs) was £175,000.
In August 2017, David dies, leaving his estate, valued at £200,000, to his son. The estate
did not include a qualifying residential interest.
(It may help you, when calculating cumulative totals, to draw a timeline showing the
relevant transfers. An example is given below.)
7 years
August 2010 2014 August 2017
Gift PET David’s death

£175,000
(now chargeable)
The 2014 transfer was potentially exempt from IHT but has now become chargeable.
David’s cumulative total is £175,000.
The nil rate band applicable to David’s estate on death is £325,000
less cumulative total £175,000
= remaining nil rate band £150,000
Tax on David’s estate:
£150,000 @ 0% = nil
£50,000 @ 40% = £20,000
For further details of the effect of the cumulation principle, see 4.6.
Inheritance Tax 51
4.3.4.2 Example of the application of IHT to an estate on death

Facts
Veronica dies intestate on 3 August 2016 survived by her partner William (to whom she was
not married) and their children Brian (19) and Carla (22). She holds the following property:
£
House (in joint names with William): value of share 90,000
Bank account (in joint names with William): value of share 5,000
Life assurance policies:
(1) payable to estate: maturity value 195,000
(2) written in trust for William: maturity value 30,000
Unquoted shares: 15% holding in a trading company (held for 10 years) 15,000
Building society account 19,000
Car and chattels 15,000
There are various debts, including funeral expenses, which total £4,000.
Two years before her death, Veronica made a gift of £211,000 in cash to William.
She made no other substantial lifetime gifts.
Step 1: identify the estate

Property to which Veronica was beneficially entitled immediately before death:
Passing on intestacy (to children): life assurance policy (1)
unquoted shares
building society account
car and chattels
Passing by survivorship (to William): interest in house
interest in bank account
(Life assurance policy (2) is not included in the estate for IHT purposes because Veronica was
not beneficially entitled to it immediately before her death.)
Step 2: value the estate

£ £
Passing on intestacy:
life assurance policy (1) (full maturity value) 195,000
unquoted shares (market value) 15,000
building society account 19,000
car and chattels 15,000
244,000
Joint property:
interest in the house 90,000
interest in the bank account 5,000
95,000
339,000
Less debts (including funeral expenses) 4,000
Value of estate (before reliefs) 335,000
Step 3: apply exemptions and reliefs

No exemptions apply to Veronica’s estate as she had no spouse
and left no property to charity.
The unquoted shares qualify for business property relief at 100%:
100% of £15,000 15,000
Value of estate for IHT 320,000
Step 4: calculate tax at the appropriate rate

Cumulate the value transferred by chargeable transfers made in the seven years before death.
The gift to William was a potentially exempt transfer which has now become chargeable.
£
Value of gift 211,000
Less two annual exemptions (see 4.4.3) 6,000
Value transferred 205,000
Only £120,000 of Veronica’s nil rate band remains available on her death.
Calculate tax on the estate of £320,000:
on £120,000 @ 0% nil
on £200,000 @ 40% £80,000
4.3.4.3 Residence nil rate band

The nil rate band will remain at £325,000 until April 2021. However, for deaths occurring after
6 April 2017, the new residence nil rate band (RNRB) will be available in addition to the nil
rate band. This will be £100,000 for the tax year 2017/18, rising gradually to £175,000 by April
2021. The allowances are as follows:
2017/18 £100,000
2018/19 £125,000
2019/20 £150,000
2020/21 £175,000
From 2021, both the nil rate band and the RNRB will increase in line with the consumer price
index.
For the RNRB to apply, the deceased must die owning a ‘qualifying residential interest’ which
is ‘closely inherited’:
(a) A qualifying residential interest is an interest in a dwelling house which has at any time
been the deceased’s residence and which forms part of the deceased’s estate.
(b) For a property to be ‘closely inherited’, it must pass to:
(i) a child, grandchild or other lineal descendant of the deceased outright or on
certain types of trust. Lineal descendants are defined as children, step-children,
adopted children, foster children, or children where the deceased had been
appointed as a guardian;
(ii) the current spouse or civil partner of the deceased’s lineal descendants; or
(iii) the widow, widower or surviving civil partner of a lineal descendant who
predeceased the deceased, unless such persons have remarried or formed a new
civil partnership before the deceased’s death.
The RNRB will apply only up to the value of the deceased’s residence. You cannot claim for
more than the property is worth. When calculating the tax, the RNRB is taxed first at 0%,
Inheritance Tax 53
reducing the amount of the total chargeable estate, then, subject to cumulation, the nil rate
band is taxed next at 0% and finally the remaining death estate at 40%.
Where the estate is valued at £2 million or more, the RNRB is reduced by £1 for every £2 over
the £2 million threshold. To calculate the adjusted RNRB for an estate over £2 million, for the
tax year 2017/18, the following formula may be used:
£100,000 – (value of estate – £2 million) = adjusted RNRB
2
If the deceased has not used all of his RNRB, like the nil rate band, any unused RNRB may be
claimed by a surviving spouse, even if the first spouse died before 6 April 2017.
EXAMPLE
Angela dies on 4 September 2017, leaving her entire estate to her two children in equal
shares. The value of her estate, after payment of debts and funeral expenses, is £1,750,000
and includes a house worth £1,250,000. Her husband, Richard, died four years earlier,
leaving all his estate (worth less than £2 million) to Angela.
On Richard’s death, the whole estate was spouse exempt, and the RNRB was not available
to Richard’s executors. As Richard has not used any of his RNRB, the amount transferred to
Angela is an additional 100% of the RNRB, but at the current rate.
Therefore, when Angela dies, her executors can claim her own personal RNRB of £100,000
and Richard’s unused RNRB of £100,000 (£200,000). This is the amount of RNRB current
at the time of the death of the second spouse. If, for example, Angela had died in
September 2018, her executors would be able to claim £250,000 (2 x £125,000). This is in
addition to the £650,000 nil rate band (2 x £325,000) from which Angela’s estate will also
benefit (see 4.3.4).
The Finance Bill 2016 introduced a downsizing allowance to prevent (particularly older)
people from hanging on to unsuitable properties in order to claim the full benefit of the
allowance. If, after 8 July 2015, the deceased has downsized prior to death to a less valuable
property, or sold his property in order, for example, to move to a care home, the personal
representatives can still claim the RNRB to which the deceased would have been entitled,
provided the property would have qualified for the RNRB had it been retained, and the
replacement property or other assets of an equivalent value (where the property had been
sold) is left to lineal descendants.
4.3.4.4 Example of the application of IHT to an estate on death which includes a closely inherited
qualifying residential interest
Facts
If we take the facts from the example above, Angela, who died on 4 September 2017, left her
entire estate to her two children in equal shares. Her husband, Richard, died four years
earlier, leaving all his estate (worth less than £2 million) to Angela.
Angela’s estate includes the following assets:
£
House 1,250,000
Bank and Building Society Accounts 25,000
Quoted shares 455,000
Chattels, including a car 25,000
There are various debts, including funeral expenses, amounting to £5,000. Angela has not
made any lifetime gifts.
Step 1: Identify the transfer of value

Property to which Angela was entitled immediately before death
Step 2: Identify the value transferred
House 1,250,000)
Bank and Building Society Accounts 25,000)
Quoted shares 455,000)
Chattels, including a car 25,000)
1,755,000)
Less debts (including funeral expenses) (5,000)
Value of estate (before reliefs) 1,750,000)
Step 3: Apply exemptions and reliefs
No exemptions or reliefs apply on the facts
Step 4: Calculate the tax at the appropriate rates
Cumulation is not relevant as Angela did not make any lifetime gifts.
Calculate tax on estate of £1,750,000, remembering that Angela benefits from both the nil
rate band (NRB) and the RNRB transferred from Richard:
(1) Tax Total RNRB @ 0%: £200,000 @ 0% nil
(2) Tax Total NRB @ 0%: £650,000 @ 0% nil
£850,000 (leaving £900,000)
(3) Tax remaining £900,000 @ 40% £360,000
Note that both the RNRB and the NRB operate to reduce the amount of the total chargeable
estate.
4.4 LIFETIME TRANSFERS: POTENTIALLY EXEMPT TRANSFERS

The definition of a potentially exempt transfer (PET) includes any gift made by an individual
to another individual or into a disabled trust (IHTA 1984, s 3A(1A)), to the extent in either
case that the gift would otherwise be chargeable.
This means that all lifetime gifts to an individual are ‘potentially exempt’ to the extent that no
immediate exemption applies.
4.4.1 Step 1: Identify the ‘transfer of value’

The term ‘transfer of value’ is defined to mean any lifetime disposition made by a person (‘the
transferor’) which reduces the value of his estate (IHTA 1984, s 3(1)). In principle, therefore,
any lifetime gift falls within the definition.
Certain dispositions are excluded from the definition, such as a transfer for the maintenance,
education or training of the transferor’s child under 18, or over that age if still undergoing
full-time education or training, or for the maintenance of a dependent relative (IHTA 1984,
s 11). Such dispositions have no significance for IHT.

The second step is to find the value transferred by the transfer of value. In the case of a
lifetime transfer, this is the amount by which the value of the transferor’s estate is ‘less than it
would be but for’ the transfer (IHTA 1984, s 3(1)). In other words, the value transferred is the
loss in value to the estate of the transferor brought about by the transfer. The transferor’s
‘estate’ is the aggregate of all the property to which he is beneficially entitled (IHTA 1984, s 5).
In practice, the loss to the estate will usually be the market value of the property transferred,
although this does not follow in every case.
Inheritance Tax 55
EXAMPLE
Vanessa owns a pair of matching bronze statuettes. The market value of the pair together
is £80,000, but individually each one is worth £25,000. If Vanessa were to give away one
statuette to her son, the loss to her estate would be calculated as follows:
£
Value of pair 80,000
Less value of remaining statuette 25,000
Loss to estate 55,000
Related property
The related property rules are designed to prevent tax avoidance in relation to a group or set of
assets. The rules apply most often to property transferred between husband and wife.
EXAMPLE (CONTINUED)
Suppose Vanessa gives one of the statuettes to her husband Boris (an exempt transfer to
spouse). Without the related property rules Vanessa and Boris would each then own one
statuette worth £25,000.
However, the two statuettes owned by Vanessa and Boris are related property. Under the
related property valuation rule, the value of each statuette is the appropriate portion of
the value of the pair, ie half of £80,000 which is £40,000. If Vanessa was then to give away
her statuette, the value transferred would be £40,000.

As seen at 4.4, a gift is potentially exempt only to the extent that it would otherwise be
chargeable. At the time when a lifetime gift is made it may be clear that an exemption applies.
Some lifetime exemptions, however, may apply to only part of a lifetime transfer, so that the
excess is potentially exempt.
The main exemptions and reliefs applicable on death apply also to lifetime transfers. In
addition, there are some further exemptions which apply only to lifetime transfers.
4.4.3.1 Spouse or civil partner and charity exemptions

These exemptions, outlined at 4.3.3, apply to lifetime transfers as well as to the transfer on
death. So any lifetime gift to the transferor’s spouse or civil partner or to charity is exempt,
even if the transferor dies within seven years.
4.4.3.2 Business and agricultural property relief

The reliefs set out at 4.3.3 apply to reduce the value transferred by transfers of business or
agricultural property made during lifetime as well as on death. However, if the transferor dies
within seven years after the transfer, the relief will generally be available only if the transferee
still owns the property or qualifying replacement when the transferor dies (see 4.6.2).
4.4.3.3 Order of application of exemptions and reliefs

Spouse or civil partner and charity exemptions are applied before reliefs, since their effect is to
make the transfer wholly exempt. If, for example, a transferor gives relevant business property
to his wife, business property relief is academic – the transfer is exempt.
The ‘lifetime only’ exemptions, however, may apply to only part of a transfer. Since the reliefs
apply to reduce the value transferred, they should be applied before such exemptions are
considered.
4.4.3.4 Lifetime only exemptions

The annual exemption (IHTA 1984, s 19)
The annual exemption applies to the first £3,000 transferred by lifetime transfers in each tax
year. Any unused annual exemption may be carried forward for one year only, so that a
maximum exemption of £6,000 may be available. The current year’s exemption must be used
before the previous year’s exemption can be carried forward.
EXAMPLE
On 1 May 2015, Annie gives £3,000 to her son Ben. The transfer falls within Annie’s annual
exemption for 2015/16 and is exempt. Annie does not make any further gifts until 1 May
2017.
On 1 May 2017, Annie gives £7,000 to her daughter Claire. Annie may apply her annual
exemption for 2017/18 and may carry forward her unused annual exemption for 2016/17.
Thus £6,000 of the transfer is exempt at the time of the gift. (The remaining £1,000 will be
‘potentially exempt’, as explained below.)
If a transferor makes more than one transfer of value in any one tax year, then the exemption
is used to reduce the first transfer. Any unused exemption is set against the second and any
further transfers until it is used up.
EXAMPLE
Sarah gives £10,000 to Jessica on 30 April 2017 and £10,000 to Kirsty on 1 May 2017. She
has made no previous transfers. The annual exemptions for 2017/18 and 2016/17 will be
set against the transfer to Jessica and reduce it to £4,000. (The remaining part of Jessica’s
gift and the whole of Kirsty’s gift will be ‘potentially exempt’, as explained below.)
Small gifts (IHTA 1984, s 20)

Lifetime gifts in any one tax year of £250 or less to any one person are exempt. This exemption
cannot be set against a gift which exceeds £250.
Normal expenditure out of income (IHTA 1984, s 21)

A lifetime transfer is exempt if it can be shown that:
(a) it was made as part of the transferor’s normal expenditure; and
(b) it was made out of the transferor’s income; and
(c) after allowing for all such payments, the transferor was left with sufficient income to
maintain his usual standard of living.
EXAMPLE
Andrew, who is a highly-paid company director, has a niece at drama college. He sends his
niece £100 each month (paid from his income) to assist her with her living expenses.
These transfers are exempt as normal expenditure out of Andrew’s income (provided
Andrew’s remaining income is sufficient to support his normal standard of living).
Gifts in consideration of marriage (IHTA 1984, s 22)

Lifetime gifts on marriage are exempt up to:
(a) £5,000 by a parent of a party to the marriage;
(b) £2,500 by a remoter ancestor of a party to the marriage (eg, a grandparent); and
(c) £1,000 in any other case.
Inheritance Tax 57
4.4.3.5 Potentially exempt status

As long as the lifetime transfer is not immediately chargeable (see 4.5), any value remaining
after exemptions and reliefs have been applied at step 3 is potentially exempt. The transfer
will become chargeable only if the transferor dies within seven years. The transferor does not
need to take any action at the time when such a lifetime transfer is made, and if he survives for
seven years it will automatically become exempt. However, if the transferor dies within the
seven-year period, the transfer becomes chargeable and must be assessed as such. (For further
explanation of the effect of death within seven years, see 4.6.)
EXAMPLE
On 1 March 2017, Jane gives £130,000 to her brother, Brian. She has made no previous
lifetime gifts. The disposition is a transfer of value because the value of Jane’s estate is
reduced. The value transferred is £130,000, the loss to Jane’s estate.
£
Less: annual exemptions for 2016/17 and 2015/16 6,000
Potentially exempt transfer 124,000
No tax is payable at the time of the gift. Jane has made a PET. If Jane survives until 1 March
2023, the PET will become completely exempt. If Jane dies before that date, the PET will
become a chargeable transfer.
4.5 OTHER LIFETIME TRANSFERS: LIFETIME CHARGEABLE TRANSFERS

Any lifetime transfer which does not fall within the definition of a PET (see 4.4) is
immediately chargeable as a ‘lifetime chargeable transfer’ (LCT). The main example is a
lifetime transfer made on or after 22 March 2006 into any trust (other than a disabled trust) or
to a discretionary trust or company (whether made before, on or after 22 March 2006). The
charge to IHT on lifetime creation of trusts is part of a wider regime under which further
charges to tax arise during the existence of the trust and on its ending. The details of these
further charges are beyond the scope of this book. The examples below refer to transfers into
trusts: in each case it is assumed that the trusts are not disabled trusts.
4.5.1 Calculating tax on a lifetime chargeable transfer

Where an individual makes an LCT, the IHT calculation begins with application of the first
three steps as described at 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. Once relevant exemptions and reliefs have
been applied (except the small gifts exemption which is not available to LCTs), the balance is
chargeable to IHT and tax must be calculated by applying step 4.
The rates of tax applicable to LCTs are:
(a) 0% on the first £325,000 (the nil rate band); and
(b) 20% on the balance of the chargeable transfer (this rate being half the rate for transfers
which are chargeable on death).
4.5.1.1 The effect of cumulation

Chargeable transfers made in the seven years before the current chargeable transfer reduce
the nil rate band available to that current transfer. In other words, the value transferred by
chargeable transfers made in the seven years before the current chargeable transfer must be
‘cumulated’ with that transfer (whilst the transferor is alive, any PETs made by him are ignored
for cumulation purposes because they may never become chargeable).
EXAMPLE 1
In this example, it is assumed that Venetia has used up her annual exemptions in each
relevant tax year.
On 1 May 2017, Venetia transfers £50,000 to the trustees of a trust.
She has previously made the following lifetime chargeable transfers (after applying
relevant annual exemptions):
1 May 2009 £100,000
1 May 2012 £280,000
She has made no other lifetime transfers (and makes no more in the current tax year).
To calculate the IHT due on the chargeable transfer of £50,000, the values transferred by
any chargeable transfers made in the seven years prior to 1 May 2016 must be ‘cumulated’.
(Remember that it may help you when calculating cumulative totals to draw a time line,
showing the relevant transfers. An example is given below.)
7 years
May 2009 May 2010 May 2012 May 2017
Chargeable Chargeable Gift to trust

transfer transfer (£500,000)
(£100,000) (£280,000)
Venetia’s cumulative total consists of the £280,000 transferred on 1 May 2012 (less than
seven years before the present transfer).
The transfer of £100,000 was made more than seven years ago and can be ignored.
£
Nil rate band 325,000
less cumulative total 280,000
= remaining nil rate band 45,000
Tax on current chargeable transfer of £50,000:
£45,000 at 0% = nil
£5,000 at 20% = £1,000
Note that only chargeable transfers are relevant for cumulation. If the May 2012 transfer
had been an outright gift of cash, it would have been a PET and not chargeable (as Venetia
is still alive). It would not have been relevant for cumulation purposes, and the whole nil
rate band would be available in relation to the 2017 gift to the trust.
Remember that each transfer has its own cumulation period. If a new transfer is made, it is
necessary to re-calculate the cumulative total.
EXAMPLE 2
On 1 May 2018, Venetia makes a further transfer of £100,000 to the trustees of the trust.
Assuming that the rates of IHT remain the same as for 2017/18, her position for IHT would
be as follows:
Nil rate band exhausted by transfers of 1 May 2012 and 1 May 2017.
£100,000 at 20% = £20,000
Inheritance Tax 59
EXAMPLE 3
Venetia makes the following further transfer to the trustees of the trust:
1 July 2019 £200,000
Assuming the rates of IHT remain the same as for 2017/18, Venetia’s position for IHT
would be as follows:
The transfer on 1 May 2012 was made more than seven years ago and can be ignored.
Venetia’s cumulative total consists of the £50,000 transferred on 1 May 2017 and the
£100,000 transferred on 1 May 2018.
£ £
Nil rate band 325,000
less cumulative total
1 May 2017 50,000
1 May 2018 100,000 150,000
= remaining nil rate band 175,000
£175,000 at 0% = nil
£25,000 at 20% = £5,000
Note that the effect of death on lifetime chargeable transfers is considered at 4.6.3.
4.6 EFFECT OF DEATH ON LIFETIME TRANSFERS

4.6.1 Introduction
The death of a transferor may result in a charge (or additional charge) to IHT on any transfers
of value which he has made in the seven years immediately preceding his death, whether those
transfers were PETs or LCTs when they were made. First, PETs made in that period become
chargeable and the transferee will be liable for any IHT payable. Secondly, the IHT liability on
LCTs made in that period is recalculated and the trustees will be liable for any extra tax
payable. In either case, as the liability arises on death, the rate of tax, once the nil rate band
and, if relevant, the RNRB are exceeded, is 40%.
Once the transfers that must be (re)assessed have been identified by checking the seven-year
period before the transferor’s death, each of those transfers must be analysed chronologically,
starting with the transfer furthest back in time and working through the transfers (ending
with the calculation of death on the death estate). If a transfer was originally a PET, the rules
are those set out at 4.6.2; if it was a LCT, the rules at 4.6.3 are used.
4.6.2 Effect of death on PETs

Potentially exempt transfers are defined and explained in 4.4. There is no liability on a PET at
the time of the transfer, and it will become wholly exempt if the transferor survives for seven
years after the transfer. Many gifts will thus escape a charge to IHT.
A PET will become chargeable only if the transferor dies within seven years of making the
transfer.
4.6.2.1 Steps 1–3

As seen at 4.4, the first three steps are applied to determine the size of the PET. Business
property relief and/or agricultural property relief may apply to reduce the value transferred,
provided that the transferee still owns the business or agricultural property (see Business Law
and Practice).
4.6.2.2 Step 4: Calculate tax at the appropriate rate

The final step is to identify the rate or rates of tax applicable to the transfer in question. In
order to do this, one must first establish the transferor’s cumulative total of transfers at the
time of the PET, as this will reduce the available nil rate band. The cumulative total will be
made up of:
(a) any LCTs made in the seven years before the PET being assessed (even if the LCT was made
more than seven years before the transferor’s death – therefore a taxpayer who makes an
LCT may have to survive for 14 years before it ceases to have any impact); and
(b) any other PETs made during the seven years before the PET being assessed which have
become chargeable as a result of the transferor’s death.
The rates of tax applicable to chargeable transfers made within seven years of death of the
transferor are:
(a) 0% on the available nil rate band; and
(b) 40% on the balance (the lower 36% charity rate is not applicable).
EXAMPLE 1
On 5 May 2015, Adam gives quoted shares worth £356,000 to his daughter, Emma.
On 21 September 2017, Adam dies, leaving his estate (consisting of quoted shares and
bank deposits worth £200,000) to his son, Matthew. He made no other significant lifetime
gifts.
The transfer on 5 May 2015 was a PET which has now become chargeable as the transferor
has died within seven years.
(1) Tax on the PET £
Less annual exemptions 2015/16; 2014/15 6,000
350,000
Adam had made no chargeable transfers in the seven years preceding 5 May 2015, so his
nil rate band was intact.
Tax on £325,000 @ 0% Nil
Tax on £25,000 @ 40% £10,000 (payable by Emma).
(2) Tax on the estate
The cumulation principle means that Adam’s nil rate band has been used up by the
chargeable transfer made within the preceding seven years.
Tax on £200,000 @ 40% £80,000 (payable by Adam’s PRs from the estate
passing to Matthew)
EXAMPLE 2
Gina gave the following gifts of cash to her children:
1 September 2011 £200,000 to Claire
25 June 2015 £200,000 to James
Gina died on 30 August 2017 leaving her estate (consisting of her house and bank
accounts worth a total of £400,000) to the two children equally. She had made no other
significant gifts.
Inheritance Tax 61
Both gifts were PETs which have now become chargeable as Gina has died within seven
years.
(1) Tax on the 2011 PET £
Annual exemptions 2011/12; 2010/11 6,000
194,000
Gina had made no chargeable transfers in the seven years before 1 September 2011 so her
nil rate band was intact.
Tax on £194,000 @ 0% Nil
(2) Tax on the 2015 PET £
Annual exemptions 2015/16; 2014/15 6,000
194,000
Gina’s cumulative total of chargeable transfers made in the seven years up to 25 June 2015
was £194,000 (the 2011 transfer to Claire). Only £131,000 of Gina’s nil rate band remains.
Tax on £194,000
£131,000 @ 0% Nil
£63,000 @ 40% £25,200 (payable by James)
(3) Tax on Gina’s estate: The house is a qualifying residential interest which has been
closely inherited, so Gina is entitled to the RNRB of £100,000. Gina’s nil rate band has
been used up by the two chargeable transfers in the last seven years.
Tax on £100,000 @ 0%
Tax on £300,000 @ 40% £120,000 (payable by Gina’s PRs from the
property passing to the children)
4.6.2.3 Tapering relief

Where a PET has become chargeable, tapering relief is available if the transferor survives for
more than three years after the transfer. The relief works by reducing any tax payable on the PET.
Tax is reduced to the following percentages:
(a) transfers within three to four years before death: 80% of death charge
(b) transfers within four to five years before death: 60% of death charge
(c) transfers within five to six years before death: 40% of death charge
(d) transfers within six to seven years before death: 20% of death charge
EXAMPLE
1 January 2011 Leonora makes a gift of £96,000 to Isadora
Leonora’s cumulative total before the gift is made is £325,000
1 July 2017 Leonora dies
Effect of death: £
Transfer of value 96,000
Less: Annual exemptions 2010/11; 2009/10 6,000
PET (which is now chargeable) 90,000
Rate of tax: Cumulative total £325,000 so all £90,000 is in the 40% band
£90,000 @ 40% 36,000
Tapering relief applies. Leonora died within six to seven years of the PET
so 20% of this figure is payable
Tax payable by Isadora 20% of £36,000 7,200
4.6.3 Effect of death on LCTs

If a transferor dies within seven years of making an LCT, the IHT payable must be recalculated
and more IHT may be payable by the trustees. The tax bill may be increased not only because
the full death rate of IHT will now apply, but also because PETs made before the LCT may have
become chargeable. They will increase the cumulative total and so reduce the nil rate band
applicable to the LCT.
4.6.3.1 Steps 1–3

As described at 4.5.1, the first three steps apply to find the value transferred by the LCT that is
chargeable to tax. It will be necessary to check whether any reliefs claimed at step 3 when the
LCT was made (such as BPR or APR) are still available.
4.6.3.2 Step 4: calculate tax at the appropriate rate(s)

Inheritance tax is recalculated in accordance with the rates of tax in force at the transferor’s
death if these are less than the rates in force at the time of the transfer; if not, the death rates
at the time of the transfer are applied (the lower 36% charity rate is not applicable).
The cumulative total relevant to the LCT will determine how much (if any) of the nil rate band
is available. The cumulative total is made up of:
(a) any other LCTs made in the seven years before the LCT being assessed (even if such earlier
LCTs were made more than seven years before the transferor’s death); and
(b) any PETs made during the seven years before the LCT being assessed which have become
chargeable as a result of the transferor’s death.
Remember that each transfer that becomes chargeable or rechargeable has its own
cumulation period, which means that a taxpayer who makes an LCT may have to survive for 14
years before it ceases to have an impact.
EXAMPLE 1
Jasmin dies in November 2017. During her lifetime, she made the following gifts. In
December 2010, she gave her son £100,000 in cash and, in January 2004, she transferred
£300,000 to a discretionary trust for the benefit of her grandchildren. (Assume that Jasmin
used her annual exemption each year.)
7 years
Jan 2004 Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Nov 2017
Dec 2003 Gift to trust PET (now Jasmin’s death

(LCT) chargeable)
(£100,000)
7 years
The December 2010 PET is just within 7 years of Jasmin’s death, and has now become
chargeable. As a result, it now has its own cumulation period, so you must look back 7
years from December 2010, when the PET was made, to see if any chargeable transfers were
made during that period. The January 2004 LCT is just within the 7 years from December
2010 and must be cumulated. As a result, there is only £25,000 nil rate band left for the
December 2010 PET.
Inheritance Tax 63
Notes:
(a) As Jasmin survived for more than 7 years from the January 2004 LCT, it is not
rechargeable. It is only relevant for cumulation purposes.
(b) Had the January 2004 transfer been a PET, as Jasmin survived for more than 7 years,
it would never have become chargeable, and so would not be taken into account
when calculating the cumulative total.
(c) The cumulative total for the death estate, looking back 7 years from November
2017, is £100,000, ie the amount taken by the PET which has become chargeable.
The January 2004 LCT has no effect on the death estate as it is outside the 7 years
before Jasmin’s death.
4.6.3.3 Tapering relief and credit for IHT already paid

Once the IHT on the LCT has been recalculated, and if more than three years have elapsed
between the transfer and the subsequent death, tapering relief applies to reduce the
recalculated tax (using the rules set out at 4.6.2.3). Credit is then given for any IHT paid on the
LCT at the time it was made but if the recalculated bill is lower than the original amount paid
(which may occur if tapering relief is available) no tax is refunded.
EXAMPLE 1
On 1 May 2014, George transferred £381,000 into a trust on condition that the trustees
must pay the IHT. He had made no other lifetime gifts.
(a) On 1 May 2014, George made an LCT.
£
375,000
Calculate tax.
£325,000 @ 0% 0
£50,000 @ 20% 10,000
Tax payable by trustees 10,000
(b) George dies on 1 September 2017, within seven years of the LCT.
Recalculate tax at death rates.
£
£325,000 @ 0% 0
£50,000 @ 40% 20,000
20,000
George died between three and four years after the transfer, so apply tapering relief
£
80% of £20,000 16,000
Less: tax already paid (see part (a)) 10,000
Further tax payable by trustees 6,000
EXAMPLE 2
Drusilla dies on 1 August 2017. During her lifetime she made only the following transfers
of value:
1 July 2011 Gift of £150,000 to Rukhsana
1 July 2014 Gift of £332,000 on discretionary trusts
The consequences are as follows:
(a) On 1 July 2011, Drusilla made a PET:

£
Potentially exempt transfer 144,000
(b) On 1 July 2014, Drusilla made an LCT:
Charge to tax on 1 July 2014:
£
326,000
Rate of tax Cumulative total zero
£325,000 @ 0% 0
£1,000 @ 20% 200
Tax payable by trustees 200
(c) Recalculation of tax on PET following death: Drusilla has died within seven years after 1
July 2011, so the PET of £144,000 to Rukhsana has become chargeable. There is no IHT on
the transfer as it falls within Drusilla’s nil rate band, but her cumulative total is now
£144,000.
(d) The tax on the LCT of 1 July 2014 must be recalculated.
Rate of tax: Cumulative total £144,000 so £181,000 of nil rate band left
£
£181,000 @ 0% 0
£145,000 @ 40% 58,000
£326,000 58,000
Tapering relief applies. Drusilla died between three and four years after the LCT so the
recalculated tax is reduced to 80%.
£
80% of £58,000 46,400
Less: IHT already paid 200
Tax payable by trustees 46,200
(e) Effect on Drusilla’s death estate. In the seven years before her death, Drusilla made two
chargeable transfers. Her cumulative total at the time of her death is:
£
1 July 2011 PET (now chargeable) 144,000
1 July 2014 LCT 326,000
470,000
This means that, when calculating tax on Drusilla’s estate on death, her nil rate band has
been used up. Assuming that her estate did not include a qualifying residential interest,
tax on her estate will be charged at a flat rate of 40%.
4.7 LIABILITY AND BURDEN OF PAYMENT

4.7.1 Meaning of ‘liability’ and ‘burden’
The rules that follow concern the question of who is liable to account to HMRC for the
payment of IHT and who bears the burden of the tax. HMRC is concerned with obtaining
payment of the tax (ie liability). Payment will usually be obtained from people who are not
beneficially entitled to the property but who hold property in a representative capacity (ie PRs
Inheritance Tax 65
and trustees). Those who ultimately receive the property are concurrently liable with such
representatives, but in most cases tax will have been paid before the beneficiaries receive the
property. The concept of ‘burden’ concerns who ultimately bears the burden of the tax.
4.7.2 The estate rate

The term ‘estate rate’ means the average rate of tax applicable to each item of property in the
estate for IHT. When tax on the estate has been calculated, it may be necessary for various
reasons to work out how much of the tax is attributable to a particular item of property in the
estate. For example:
(a) since tax on certain types of property, such as land, may be paid in instalments, the
personal representatives (PRs) must calculate how much of the tax relates to that
property;
(b) the PRs may not be liable to pay all the tax on the estate. If the estate for IHT purposes
includes trust property, the trustees are liable to pay the tax attributable to that
property;
(c) the will may give a legacy ‘subject to tax’ so that the recipient has the burden of tax
relating to that legacy.
The principle is that tax is divided between the various assets in the estate proportionately,
according to their value. This may be applied by calculating the average rate of tax on the
estate as a percentage, ie the ‘estate rate’. For example, if the deceased’s nil rate band was
completely used up by lifetime transfers, the ‘estate rate’ would normally be 40%. However, it
is not always necessary to calculate the estate rate as a percentage; instead, the amount of tax
on a particular item of property in the estate may be calculated by applying to the value of that
property the proportion which the total tax bill bears to the total chargeable estate.
EXAMPLE
Graham, who has made no lifetime transfers, leaves a house, valued at £210,000, to his
brother, Henry, subject to payment of IHT, and the rest of his estate, valued at £190,000
net, to his nephew, Ian.
Tax on Graham’s estate: £325,000 @ 0% nil
£75,000 @ 40% £30,000
The ‘estate rate’ is: £30,000 (total tax bill)
£400,000 (total chargeable estate) × 100 = 7.5%
Henry pays tax on the house: £210,000 × £30,000 = £15,750
£400,000
Ian pays tax on the residue: £190,000 × £30,000 = £14,250
£400,000
The same result would be achieved if the estate rate of 7.5% was applied to the value of
the house and residue respectively.
4.7.3 Liability for IHT on death

4.7.3.1 The PRs: tax on the non-settled estate
The PRs are liable to pay the IHT attributable to any property which ‘was not immediately
before the death comprised in a settlement’ (IHTA 1984, s 200). This includes:
(a) the property which vests in the PRs (ie the property which passes under the deceased’s
will or intestacy); and
(b) property (other than trust property) which does not pass to the PRs but is included in
the estate for IHT because the deceased was beneficially entitled to it immediately
before death (eg, joint property which passes by survivorship).
Thus the PRs are liable to pay the IHT on joint property even though that property does not
vest in them. Their liability is, however, limited to the value of the assets they received, or
would have received but for their own neglect or default.
Concurrently liable with the PRs is ‘any person in whom property is vested … at any time after
the death or who at any such time is beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in the
property’ (IHTA 1984, s 200(1)(c)). This means that tax on property passing by will or
intestacy may in principle be claimed by HMRC from a beneficiary who has received that
property. Similarly, HMRC may claim tax on joint property from the surviving joint tenant.
Such tax is normally paid by the PRs and it is relatively unusual for HMRC to claim tax from
the recipient of the property.
4.7.3.2 The trustees: tax on settled property
If the estate for IHT purposes includes any property which was ‘comprised in a settlement’
immediately before the death, the trustees of the settlement are liable for IHT attributable to
that property. This principle is relevant where the deceased had a qualifying interest in
possession under a trust (see 4.3.1.2). Again, any person in whom the trust property
subsequently vests or for whose benefit the trust property is subsequently applied is
concurrently liable with the trustees.
EXAMPLE
In 1996, Ruth’s father died leaving shares now worth £300,000 on trust for Ruth for life
with remainder to Arthur. Ruth dies leaving property worth £200,000 which passes under
her will to her niece, Tessa. The trust fund is taxed as part of Ruth’s estate as she had a
qualifying interest in possession for IHT purposes. She had made no lifetime transfers.
Tax on Ruth’s death:
on £325,000 @ 0% nil
on £175,000 @ 40% £70,000
The trustees are liable to pay the tax on the trust fund (calculated according to the estate
rate):
£300,000 × £70,000 = £42,000
£500,000
Arthur, the remainderman, is concurrently liable if any of the trust property is transferred
to him before the tax has been paid.
Ruth’s PRs are liable to pay the tax on Ruth’s free estate (the remaining £28,000).
4.7.3.3 Additional liability of PRs

Property which the deceased gave away during his lifetime is treated as part of his estate on
death if the donor reserved a benefit in the property which he continued to enjoy immediately
before death (see 4.3.1). The donee of the gift is primarily liable to pay tax attributable to the
property. However, if the tax remains unpaid 12 months after the end of the month of death,
the PRs become liable for the tax.
4.7.4 Liability for IHT on PETs

Where a person dies within seven years of making a PET, the transfer becomes chargeable and
IHT may be payable. The transferee is primarily liable but, again, the PRs become liable if the
tax remains unpaid 12 months after the end of the month of death.
The liability of the PRs is limited to the extent of the assets they actually received, or would
have received but for their neglect or default. However, PRs cannot escape liability on the
Inheritance Tax 67
grounds that they have distributed the estate and so they should ideally delay distribution
until IHT on any such lifetime gifts has been paid.
4.7.5 Liability for IHT on LCTs

4.7.5.1 Trustees pay
The transferor is primarily liable for IHT, although HMRC may also claim the tax from the
trustees. In practice, the trustees often pay IHT out of the property they have been given.
EXAMPLE
Ahmed transfers £146,000 cash into a trust. His cumulative total is £285,000 and he is
entitled to two annual exemptions. Ahmed stipulates that the trustees must pay any IHT.
£
Less: Two annual exemptions 6,000
140,000
Rate of tax: Cumulative total £285,000, so £40,000 of the nil
rate band is left
£40,000 @ 0% 0
£100,000 @ 20% 20,000
Tax payable by trustees: 20,000
4.7.5.2 Transferor pays: grossing up

If the transferor pays, the amount of tax will be more than it would be if the trustees paid.
This is because IHT is charged on the value transferred, ie the loss to the transferor’s estate
brought about by the gift (see 4.4.2). If the transferor pays, the loss is increased by the amount
of tax he pays.
EXAMPLE
Henrietta transfers £80,000 in cash to trustees of a trust. Earlier in the tax year, she gave
them £331,000 in cash. She has made no previous chargeable transfers.
The annual exemptions for this tax year and last have already been used by the gift of
£331,000 and her cumulative total stands at £325,000. All the current transfer will be
taxed at 20%.
If trustees pay IHT:
The loss to her estate is £80,000. Tax payable is 20% of £80,000, which is £16,000.
If Henrietta pays IHT:
The total loss to her estate (ie the value transferred) is £80,000 plus the IHT payable on
that transfer.
Therefore, in order to ascertain the value transferred, it is necessary to calculate what sum
would, after deduction of tax at the appropriate rate (ie 20%), leave £80,000 (ie the
transfer must be grossed up).
Gross up £80,000 at 20%
100
£80,000 × --------- = £100,000
80
The gross value transferred is £100,000.
Calculate tax on £100,000:
£100,000 @ 20% = £20,000
The tax payable by Henrietta is more than the tax payable by the trustees.
However, if she pays, the trustees are left with the full amount of the property transferred,
£80,000, as opposed to £64,000 if they pay.
4.7.5.3 Additional liability following the transferor’s death

If additional IHT becomes due on a LCT following the transferor’s death, the rules for those
liable for the additional tax are set out in IHTA 1984, s199 (as summarised at 4.7.4 above).
4.7.6 Burden of IHT

Unlike liability, the question of where the burden of tax should fall is one for the transferor to
decide. For example, the burden of tax could fall on the transferees of any gifts (including
PETs and LCTs) or the transferor could choose to relieve them of that burden by paying any
IHT himself on lifetime gifts and directing that any IHT arising following his death be paid
from the residue of his estate. Further details of the default rules that apply when
administering the deceased’s estate are contained in 31.8.
4.8 TIME FOR PAYMENT

4.8.1 Death estates
4.8.1.1 The basic rule
The basic rule is that IHT is due for payment six months after the end of the month of death
(although PRs will normally pay earlier in order to speed up the administration of the estate as
any IHT due must be paid before the grant of representation can be obtained; see 30.6).
If the tax due is not paid on time, interest runs on the outstanding amount.
4.8.1.2 The instalment option

Some property, such as land and certain types of business property, attracts the instalment
option. Any tax attributable to instalment option property may be paid in 10 equal yearly
instalments, the first falling due six months after the end of the month of death. The tax on
the estate is apportioned using the estate rate to find how much tax is attributable to the
instalment option property.
The instalment option applies to:
(a) land of any description;
(b) a business or an interest in a business;
(c) shares (quoted or unquoted) which immediately before death gave control of the
company to the deceased;
(d) unquoted shares which do not give control if either:
(i) the holding is sufficiently large (a holding of at least 10% of the nominal value of
the company’s shares and worth more than £20,000); or
(ii) HMRC is satisfied that the tax cannot be paid in one sum without undue hardship;
or
(iii) the IHT attributable to the shares and any other instalment option property in the
estate amounts to at least 20% of the IHT payable on the estate.
4.8.1.3 Interest
Where the instalment option is exercised in relation to tax on shares or any other business
property or agricultural land, instalments carry interest only from the date when each
instalment is payable. Thus, no interest is due on the outstanding tax provided that each
instalment is paid on the due date.
Inheritance Tax 69
In the case of other land, however, interest is payable with each instalment (apart from the
first) on the amount of IHT which was outstanding for the previous year.
4.8.1.4 Sale
If the instalment option property is sold, all outstanding tax and interest becomes payable.
4.8.2 PETs
Any IHT on a PET that has become chargeable is due six months after the end of the month of
death. The instalment option outlined above may be available depending on the
circumstances (IHTA 1984, s 227).
4.8.3 LCTs
4.8.3.1 At the time of the transfer
Any IHT on LCTs made after 5 April and before 1 October in any year is due on the 30 April in
the following year. Inheritance tax on LCTs which are not made between those dates is due six
months after the end of the month in which the LCT is made.
4.8.3.2 Following subsequent death within seven years

Any additional IHT on the reassessment of a LCT following the transferor’s death is due six
months after the end of the month of death.
Again, the instalment option may be available (IHTA 1964, s 227).
4.8.4 Example of the rules on liability, burden and timing

EXAMPLE
Xander, who was divorced, dies on 4 May 2017, leaving an estate on which the total IHT
due is £150,000. His taxable estate (of £800,000) comprises instalment property (a house)
worth £240,000 and non-instalment property worth £560,000 (of which £200,000 is
Xander’s share of a joint bank account held with this brother, Zak). Xander left a valid will,
leaving the residue of his estate to his nephew, but which makes no mention of the burden
of IHT.
Liability
The executors of Xander’s estate are liable for the entire IHT due of £150,000.
Burden
As the will makes no contrary provision, the default rule is that the IHT on the share of the
joint bank account is borne by Zak as the surviving joint tenant:
£200,000 × £150,000 = £37,500
£800,000
IHT on the property passing via the will is paid from the residuary estate as a testamentary
expense:
£600,000 × £150,000 = £112,500
£800,000
Timing
The house qualifies as instalment option property:
£240,000 × £150,000 = £45,000
£800,000
This tax can be paid in 10 equal annual instalments, with the first instalment of £4,500
payable on 30 November 2017 (six months after the end of the month of death).
The remaining IHT of £105,000 is all due no later than 30 November 2017, but if the
executors submit the IHT account before that date, they will have to pay the tax at that
time. They will have a right of recovery from Zak for the £37,500 in respect of the joint
bank account for which they have liability to HMRC but for which he bears the burden.
SUMMARY
The main occasions of charge to IHT are:
(a) on death on the value of an individual’s estate;
(b) on lifetime gifts made by one individual to another made within seven years prior to
death;
(c) on lifetime gifts to a company or into a trust.
Lifetime gifts to an individual are only chargeable to IHT if the donor dies within the seven
years after making the gift. At the time such a gift is made it is a ‘potentially exempt
transfer’ (PET). It becomes exempt if the donor survives for seven years or chargeable if he
dies during that period.
Lifetime gifts into a trust or to a company are immediately chargeable to IHT at the time
they are made. They are known as ‘lifetime chargeable transfers’ (LCTs).
There are four steps to be used to calculate liability to IHT.
Step 1: Identify the transfer of value
On death this means the value of the estate, ie all the property to which the deceased was
beneficially entitled.
For lifetime transfers this means any transaction which reduces the value of the
transferor’s estate. This includes any gift or a sale at an undervalue.
Step 2: Find the value transferred
On death this means the value of the property in the estate, valued at open market value.
For lifetime transfers this means the amount by which the transferor’s estate has been
reduced as a result of the transfer.
Step 3: Apply exemptions and reliefs
Transfers to spouse or charity are exempt whether in lifetime or on death.
Some exemptions apply only to lifetime transfers. These include annual exemption (£3,000
pa), small gifts, marriage gifts and gifts made as normal expenditure out of income.
Business property relief applies to reduce the value transferred by a transfer of certain
types of business property by 100% or 50%. This may apply to transfers made in lifetime
or on death.
Step 4: Calculate tax at the appropriate rate
If the estate includes a qualifying residential interest which is closely inherited, tax is
charged at 0% on the first £100,000 (the residence nil rate band).
Tax is then charged at 0% on the first £325,000 of other transfers (the nil rate band).
Inheritance Tax 71
In order to calculate IHT on any transfer, chargeable transfers made during the preceding
seven years must be taken into account. Such transfers will reduce the nil rate band
available for the current transfer.
The balance of the transfer in excess of the nil rate band is taxed at 40% (or, rarely, 36%) if
the transfer is on death or 20% for LCTs.
Potentially exempt transfers (PETs) made within seven years of the transferor’s death
become chargeable as a result of his death. The rate of tax is 40%, but the amount of tax is
tapered if the transferor survived for more than three years after the transfer.
If a transferor dies within seven years of making a LCT, tax must be recalculated at death
rates, applying taper if the death was more than three years after the transfer.
Tax-efficient Investments 73
CHAPTER 5
Tax-efficient Investments
5.1 Introduction 73
5.2 Investments eligible for income tax relief 73
5.3 Investments producing tax-free income or capital gains 74
5.4 Investment to escape a CGT liability 75
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will have a basic understanding of the different forms of tax
relief available on a range of investments.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
An individual with high levels of income or capital gains can reduce his exposure to tax by
making tax-efficient investments. Depending on which investment vehicle is chosen, it may
be possible to:
(a) obtain income tax relief on the investment (and so pay less income tax in the current
year);
(b) ensure that future income or capital gains escape tax;
(c) avoid paying CGT on a capital gain by re-investing it.
The rest of this chapter introduces the main features of some investments which meet these
objectives. However, no investor should allow a tax advantage to cloud his judgement as to the
merits or risk of any particular investment. The list is not comprehensive, but gives examples
of the opportunities available. Fuller treatment of these complex matters can be found in
Simon’s Direct Taxes (LexisNexis Butterworths).
5.2 INVESTMENTS ELIGIBLE FOR INCOME TAX RELIEF

5.2.1 Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)
This relief is designed to encourage investment in smaller (and riskier) companies. An
individual is allowed to subscribe up to £1 million each tax year in the ordinary shares of
qualifying unquoted companies. Broadly, this means trading companies that are not listed on
The Stock Exchange, so there is no ready market for their shares. Certain asset-based
activities, for example share dealing, property development, farming, shipbuilding and coal
and steel production are excluded. During the two years before and three years after the
subscription, the individual must not be ‘connected with’ the company. Thus, the combined
shareholdings of the investor and his ‘associates’ (which includes spouse and close family)
must not exceed 30%; neither he nor his associates are normally permitted to be paid
employees or directors, although there are exceptions to this rule.
The relief is given by deducting a sum equal to 30% of the amount invested from the
shareholder’s income tax liability for the tax year of the investment (the maximum deduction
is, therefore, £300,000), provided he continues to satisfy the personal qualifying conditions
throughout the next three years. A further attraction is that gains on disposal will be exempt
from CGT; conversely, if the enterprise fails, the investor’s loss on his shares may be set
against his income or capital gains.
5.2.2 Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS)

This relief is similar to the EIS, in that the qualifying conditions are broadly similar, but it is
aimed at small start-up companies with less than 25 full-time employees and assets of up to
£200,000. The maximum qualifying investment is £100,000 and the rate of income tax relief
is 50%. Subject to certain restrictions and provided the SEIS shares are held for more than
three years, a gain on the sale of SEIS shares is also free from capital gains tax.
5.2.3 Venture Capital Trust (VCT)

A VCT is a quoted company run by professional fund managers as a vehicle to hold shares in a
range of unquoted trading companies which match the EIS criteria. Smaller enterprises are
thus given access to funds and the investor buying shares in the VCT can invest indirectly in
smaller businesses, at the same time reducing the risk attendant on investment in a single
unquoted company.
Such VCTs carry tax advantages similar to EISs, but to qualify the shares must be held for five
years and the maximum investment each tax year is £200,000. A sum equal to 30% of the
amount invested can be deducted from the investor’s income tax liability (so the maximum
tax deduction in any one tax year is £60,000). Gains on disposal are also CGT exempt. The
added feature is that dividend income from a VCT is exempt from income tax.
5.3 INVESTMENTS PRODUCING TAX-FREE INCOME OR CAPITAL GAINS

5.3.1 Individual Savings Account (ISA)
Two types of ISA have existed since they were introduced in 1999: the Cash ISA and the Stocks
and Shares ISA. A third type of ISA, effective from tax year 2016/17, is the Innovative Finance
ISA (IF ISA). As the IF ISA relates to a particular method of investing, outside the usual
requirements of the ordinary investor, this section describes the Cash ISA and Stocks and
Shares ISA only.
In each tax year, an individual aged 18 or above (or 16 for a Cash ISA) and resident in the UK
can put money into either or both types of ISA. If both types are used, they can be held with
different providers.
A Cash ISA resembles an ordinary savings account and deposits are generally held in bank or
building society accounts.
A Stocks and Shares ISA is a wrapper that can be put around a wide range of investment
products, including unit trusts and investment trusts.
The ISA investment allowance for the current tax year is £20,000. This can be held in any mix
of cash or stocks and shares and the funds can be freely moved between these categories, so
giving the taxpayer the option of investing the whole ISA allowance in cash, stocks and shares
or any combination of the two.
The tax benefits of ISAs are as follows.
(a) No income tax liability on income produced by the ISA.
(b) No CGT liability on gains arising from ISA investments.
(c) Tax relief is not forfeited when money is taken out of the scheme.
Up until the current tax year, although money could be withdrawn from either type of ISA at
any time without losing the tax benefits, contributions would remain the same for the
purposes of calculating the available allowance for that tax year. So, if an individual who had
invested £7,000 in an ISA in a tax year, subsequently withdrew £2,000 of that investment, the
Tax-efficient Investments 75
maximum additional ISA investment for that year would be based on the maximum allowance
less £7,000 (not £5,000). As from April 2016, however, provided investors have what is called
a ‘flexible ISA’, they will be allowed to dip into their current year investments, then replenish
the balance in the same tax year without the transaction affecting any unused portion of their
annual allowance. Taking the above example into the current tax year, that would mean that
the £2,000 withdrawn could be reinvested as part of the original £7,000 investment, leaving a
further possible £13,000 ISA allowance available in the tax year.
5.3.2 Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS)
Capital gains are CGT exempt (see 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).
5.3.3 Venture Capital Trust (VCT)

Both income and capital gains are exempt (see 5.2.3).
5.4 INVESTMENT TO ESCAPE A CGT LIABILITY

5.4.1 Deferral relief on re-investment in EIS shares
Unlimited deferral of capital gains arising on the disposal of any asset is available where an
individual subscribes wholly for cash for shares in a company which qualifies under the EIS.
(As the shares must be acquired for cash, this relief will not usually be available to a partner or
sole trader who transfers his business to a company, as the shares acquired following such a
transfer are usually in return for the non-cash assets of the business.)
(a) This deferral relief is available where the shares acquired meet the requirements of the
EIS (see 5.2.1).
(b) The relief is complex but, in general terms, the individual’s chargeable gain on the
disposal of the asset (up to the subscription cost of the shares) is deferred until he
disposes of the shares. The deferred gain is taxed at the rate applicable to the taxpayer in
the tax year of the disposal of the EIS shares.
(c) The relief is available where the EIS shares are acquired within one year before or three
years after the disposal.
(d) As regards the ‘true gain’ on the disposal of the EIS shares themselves, a slightly
different relief applies. Such gains will be exempt from CGT if held for three years, but
only if the investor is not ‘connected’ with the company (see 5.2.1).
EXAMPLE
Shares in X Co Ltd (not EIS) have been held by Andrew for two years. He sells them and
realises a gain of £60,000. This gain is deferred when he subscribes for shares in Y Co Ltd
(an EIS company) for £100,000. Andrew holds the shares in Y Co Ltd for four years and
then sells them for £120,000. His deferred gain of £60,000 is now chargeable to CGT. The
‘true’ gain of £20,000 on the disposal of the shares in Y Co Ltd will be exempt if all the
qualifying conditions are met.
A similar relief on reinvestment in VCT shares was withdrawn in the 2004 Budget.
77
APPENDIX TO PART I
Tax Rates Summary

SUMMARY OF RATES AND ALLOWANCES FOR 2017/18 FOR INDIVIDUALS
Value Added Tax
Rates: Standard rate: 20%
Lower 5%
Zero 0%
Registration threshold: £85,000
Income Tax
Rates for non-savings, non-dividend income
Rates: Basic rate £0–£33,500 20%
Higher rate over £33,500–£150,000 40%
Additional rate over £150,000 45%
Rates for savings and dividend income Interest Dividends
Rates: Starting rate £0–£5,000 0% 7.5%
Note: the starting rate for savings income of 0% does not apply where the
taxpayer’s non-savings income exceeds the starting rate limit of £5,000.
Basic rate over £5,000–£33,500 20% 7.5%
Higher rate over £33,500–£150,000 40% 32.5%
Additional rate over £150,000 45% 38.1%
Income tax allowances:
Personal Allowance £11,500
Income limit for full Personal Allowance £100,000
Personal Savings Allowance:
Basic rate: £1,000 (taxed @ 0%)
Higher rate: £500 (taxed @ 0%)
Additional rate: £0
Dividend Allowance: £5,000 (taxed @ 0%)
Capital Gains Tax

Rates on gains:
Gains below the basic rate income tax threshold 10%
Gains above the basic rate income tax threshold 20%
Gains qualifying for entrepreneurs’ relief 10%
Note: An 8% surcharge applies to gains made on the disposal of residential property.
Annual exempt amount:
Individuals £11,300
Inheritance Tax
Rates:
£0 to £325,000 nil %
over £325,000 40%
Note 1: For estates, where 10% or more of a person’s net estate is left to charity, transfers
exceeding the nil rate band of £325,000 are taxed at 36%.
Note 2: A surviving spouse or civil partner may claim the unused proportion (or percentage)
of the nil rate band of an earlier deceased spouse or civil partner. The unused proportion is
based on the amount of the nil rate band available at the time of the death of the second
spouse or civil partner.
Note 3: From April 2017 an additional nil rate band applies when a main residence is passed
on death to a direct descendant. This will be:
£100,000 in 2017/18
£125,000 in 2018/19
£150,000 in 2019/20
£175,000 in 2020/21
It will then increase in line with the Consumer Prices Index from 2021 to 2022 onwards. Any
unused nil rate band will be able to be transferred to a surviving spouse or civil partner. For
estates valued at more than £2 million, the additional threshold (and any transferred
additional threshold) will be gradually tapered away.
Transfer on death
Full rates apply.
Lifetime transfers
(a) Potentially exempt transfers
Gifts to individuals, and gifts into trusts for the disabled.
(i) On or within seven years of death
On death, the full rates apply with a tapered reduction in the tax payable on
transfers as follows:
Years between Percentage of full charge
gift and death
0–3 100
3–4 80
4–5 60
5–6 40
6–7 20
Note: the scale in force at date of death applies
(ii) More than seven years before death – gift is exempt therefore NIL tax payable
(b) Chargeable transfers

Gifts into and out of most types of trusts and gifts involving companies.
At the time of gift, half the full rates apply. If the gift also falls within seven years of death,
(a)(i) above applies but the lifetime tax (paid at the time of the transfer) will be credited
against tax due on death.
PART I SUMMARIES
Revenue Law
Chapter 2: Income Tax
Topic Summary References

Occasions of Individuals, partners, personal representatives and trustees
charge could all incur IT liability on the receipt of taxable income.
Income or Income receipts must be distinguished from capital 2.1.3
capital? receipts. Only income can be subject to IT; capital gains may
be subject to capital gains tax.
Chargeable To be chargeable, the income must come from a specified 2.2.1 and
income source and not be exempt. 2.2.2
In practice, most income receipts are chargeable. In each 2.2.3
tax year, all chargeable income from the different sources
are added together to find the taxpayer’s total income.
Deduction at Employers are obliged to deduct the recipient’s basic rate IT 2.2.3.1 to
source liability, before payment, and send this direct to HMRC 2.2.3.2
under the PAYE system. In such cases, it is necessary to
gross-up the payment received by the taxpayer, in order to
find his true income from that source. The grossed-up (as
opposed to the net) income will be added to his total
income.
Reliefs The taxpayer may deduct allowable reliefs (eg interest on 2.3
loans to invest in his business) from his total income. The
resulting figure is his net income.
Allowances The taxpayer may deduct relevant personal allowances 2.4
(eg the personal allowance and/or the blind person’s
allowance) from his net income. The resulting figure is his
taxable income.
Taxpayers are also entitled to a Personal Savings Allowance 2.2.3.2 and
of up to £1,000 on interest and a Dividend Allowance of 2.5
£5,000. These allowances operate as nil rate bands for the
relevant type of income, and are taxed at 0%.
Savings and Interest and dividends are savings and dividend income. All 2.1.7 and
dividend other income is non-savings, non-dividend income 2.6.1
income and (NSNDI).
non-savings,
non-dividend
income
(NSNDI)

Rates of tax Generally, taxable income falls into three bands – the basic 2.6.2
rate band, the higher rate band and the additional rate
band. Within these three bands, however, different rates
apply, depending on whether the income is classed as
NSNDI or savings and dividend income. NSNDI is taxed first,
followed by interest and then dividends.
Tax credits Once the taxpayer’s total IT liability is worked out, credit is 2.7
given for any tax deducted at source (eg by his employer).
The remaining balance is then sent to HMRC, to meet the
taxpayer’s outstanding liability.
IT – liability and In general terms, the recipient of taxable income must pay 2.9
time for the balance of his tax liability to HMRC by 31 January
payment following the tax year in which the income was earned.
Special rules apply to the self-employed.
Chapter 3: Capital Gains Tax

Occasions of Individuals, partners, personal representatives and trustees
charge could all incur CGT liability when they dispose of chargeable
assets.
Disposals For CGT to arise there must be a disposal of a chargeable
asset. Disposals include gifts, as well as sales, but do not
include property passing on death.
Chargeable Most forms of property are chargeable. The main exemption 3.1.3
assets is sterling. In general terms, depreciating assets are also
non-chargeable. This prevents the taxpayer from setting
losses on these types of assets against his other chargeable
gains.
Calculation of In basic terms, this is the sale price less allowable 3.3
the gain expenditure. The main element of allowable expenditure
will usually be the acquisition cost of the asset but other
expenditure is also deductible.
To work out the notional gain made on a gift, the asset is 3.2.1
deemed to be disposed of at its market value on the date of
the gift.
Reliefs Various reliefs are available, depending on the 3.4.1
circumstances. Most of the reliefs available are aimed at
encouraging business investment. Otherwise, a major relief
for the ordinary taxpayer is the principal private residence
exemption.
Disposals These are treated as being for such consideration as to 3.9.1
between provide neither a gain nor a loss. On a subsequent disposal
spouses (and by the donee spouse, the gain will be assessed by using the
civil partners) donor spouse’s acquisition cost.

Losses Losses can be set against gains of the same tax year to reduce 3.7
the net chargeable gain. Unabsorbed losses can be taken
forward to set against gains of future tax years, but in such a
way that the taxpayer does not lose the use of his annual
exemption in future years.
Rates of tax (a) On normal gains, after deducting an annual 3.1.4.5
exemption from an individual’s net aggregate gains,
the balance is added onto his taxable income. After
doing this, if any part of the gains is below the basic
rate income tax threshold it is taxed at 10% (or 18%
on residential property), while any part of the gains
above the threshold is taxed at 20% (or 28% on
residential property).
(b) Gains qualifying for entrepreneurs’ relief are
calculated separately from other gains and are taxed
at a flat rate of 10%.
(c) Gains realised by trustees and PRs are taxed at a flat
rate of 20% (or 28% on residential property).
Liability and Any taxpayer still having net aggregate gains after applying 3.1.6
time for his annual exemption, is liable to pay CGT on them by 31
payment January following the tax year in which the gains were made.
Chapter 4: Inheritance Tax

Occasions of A charge to IHT can arise on transfers into most types of trust 4.3 and 4.4
charge or to companies, on other lifetime transfers made within
seven years of the transferor’s death and on property
passing on death.
Transfer of IHT is charged on the value transferred by a chargeable 4.3 and 4.4
value transfer. A chargeable transfer is a transfer of value made by
an individual but which is not an exempt transfer. A transfer
of value is any disposition which reduces the value of the
transferor’s estate.
Value This is the amount of the reduction in the transferor’s 4.3.2.1 and
transferred estate. On death, it is the value of the estate. 4.4.1
Exemptions Any property passing to a spouse (or civil partner) and to a 4.3.3
applying to all charity is exempt. Business property relief (and agricultural
types of property relief) may be available on relevant business (and
lifetime agricultural) property, to reduce the value transferred by
transfer either 50% or 100%.
In addition, lifetime transfers may be exempted by a 4.4.3.4
number of other exemptions, including the small gifts
exemption, gifts in consideration of marriage and the
annual exemption.

Transfers into To the extent that exemptions are not available, these are 4.5
most types of immediately chargeable to IHT and are referred to as
trust lifetime chargeable transfers (LCTs).
Rate of tax on All amounts above the available nil rate are charged at a flat
LCTs at time of rate of 20%.
transfer
Other lifetime The main example of these is a transfer to an individual. To 4.4
transfers the extent that other exemptions are not available, the
transfer is a potentially exempt transfer (PET). As PETs, they
are exempt from any IHT charge at the time of the transfer
and will become unconditionally exempt if the transferor
survives for seven years after the transfer.
IHT – effect of To the extent that they do not fall within the nil rate band, 4.6.3
death of LCTs made within seven years of the transferor’s death must
transferor be re-assessed at the death rate of 40%.
within seven
Any PETs made within seven years of transferor’s death 4.6.2,
years of any
become chargeable transfers (failed PETs) and, to the extent 4.6.2.1 and
type of lifetime
that they do not fall within the nil rate band, are then 4.6.2.2
transfer
chargeable at the death rate of 40%.
IHT – To assess the rate of tax on any individual transfer, it is 4.2.4,
cumulation necessary to take into account the value of any other 4.3.4, 4.5.1
chargeable transfers made within the seven years before the and 4.6.2
transfer being assessed. The nil rate band is applied to
transfers in chronological order, so chargeable transfers
within the previous seven years will have taken up some or
all of the nil rate band, leaving only the balance for the
transfer being assessed.
IHT – tapering If any lifetime transfer (LCT or failed PET) was made 4.6.2.3
relief between three and seven years before the death of the
transferor, any IHT charge to which it is subject is
progressively reduced by between 80% and 20% of the full
liability.
IHT – transfers The deceased is deemed to have made a transfer of value 4.3
on death immediately before death. The value transferred is the value
of his ‘estate’ immediately before death. The estate includes
all property to which the deceased was beneficially entitled.
Property held by the deceased on trust for others does not
form part of the estate.
Although property held by the deceased as a beneficial joint 4.3.1
tenant passes automatically by survivorship to the
remaining joint tenant(s), the value of the deceased’s share
in the property will form part of his estate for IHT purposes.
Also included in the estate is property, which the deceased
transferred in his lifetime but which he continued to have
the use of until his death (gifts with a reservation of benefit).

Liabilities of the deceased at the time of death and 4.3.2.4
reasonable funeral expenses are deductible from the value
of the estate.
IHT – Any property passing to a spouse (or civil partner) and to a 4.3.3
exemptions charity is exempt. Business property relief (and agricultural
applicable to property relief) is available on relevant business (and
death transfers agricultural) property, to reduce the value transferred by
either 50% or 100%.
IHT – rate of tax Amounts falling within the residence nil rate band or nil rate
on death band (subject to cumulation) are charged at 0%. The excess
transfers is taxed at 40% (except where a large enough amount
passes to charity to trigger the lower 36% rate).
IHT – liability Primary liability for IHT falls on the donee of a failed PET, the
and time for transferor of a LCT and the personal representatives of the
payment deceased’s estate.
In the case of lifetime transfers, if the transfer was made
between 1 October and 5 April, the date for payment is six
months from the end of the month in which the transfer was
made. Otherwise, the payment date is on 30 April following
the date of the transfer. On death, the general rule is that
IHT is payable six months after the end of the month in
which the death occurred. However, in the case of certain
assets, such as land and shares, the tax may be paid in 10
yearly instalments.
85
PART II
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Author’s notes
• This Part has been compiled from the SRA Code of Conduct 2011 and related material
available at the time of writing.
• This book is not intended as a definitive guide to the subject.
• This book is not intended to constitute legal advice. The publisher and author are not
responsible or liable for the results of any person acting (or omitting to act) on the basis
of information contained within this publication.
• The examples given in this Part are intended to illustrate a point only, and not as model
examination answers.
The Legal Profession 87
CHAPTER 6
The Legal Profession
6.1 Professional conduct 87

6.2 The Legal Services Board 88
6.3 The Solicitors Regulation Authority 88
6.4 The Law Society 88
6.5 Different aspects of practice 89
6.6 Employed solicitors 91
6.7 Law centres 92
6.8 Legal advice centres 92
6.9 Duty solicitor schemes 92
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• what is meant by ‘professional conduct’
• the role of The Law Society and Solicitors Regulation Authority
• different aspects of practice.
6.1 PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

‘Professional conduct’ is the term that is often used to describe the rules and regulations with
which a solicitor must comply. Solicitors, like every other person, must comply with the laws
of the country. However, additional requirements are placed upon solicitors due to the nature
of their job.
A solicitor is said to be a member of a profession. Other examples of members of professions
include doctors and accountants. The public must be able to place a great deal of trust in such
professionals due to the work that they carry out. For example, on a simplistic level, both
solicitors and accountants often handle large amounts of clients’ money. A client must be able
to trust that this money will be safe in the hands of those professionals.
In addition to holding client monies, solicitors must be able to be trusted to act in the best
interests of clients. Clients often seek advice from solicitors concerning transactions worth
millions of pounds. With that amount of money at stake, the client must be certain that the
solicitor will provide honest advice and take every step to protect that client’s interests.
Equally, clients often seek a solicitor’s advice on sensitive matters. The client must be
reassured that whatever the matter, the solicitor can be trusted to keep the information
confidential and not, for example, sell it to third parties like the press.
Law firms, like any other commercial organisation, must comply with general regulatory
requirements such as the Bribery Act 2010, which came into force on 1 July 2011. The Act
creates a new offence under s 7, which can be committed by commercial organisations that
fail to prevent persons associated with them (including employees) committing bribery on
their behalf. It is, however, a full defence for an organisation to prove that, despite bribery
having occurred, it nevertheless had in place adequate procedures to prevent bribery by
persons associated with it. Guidance about such procedures has been published by the
Ministry of Justice, and firms will need to ensure that they comply with this.
In addition to the general law, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) publishes a number
of rules and requirements with which the solicitor (and those who work with solicitors) must
comply at all times. These rules and requirements apply to the entire profession, including
trainee solicitors and student members. The aim of these rules is to ensure the protection of
the public and to uphold the integrity of the profession itself.
Breach of these rules and requirements can have severe consequences. For example, where a
solicitor breaches certain requirements relating to the service provided to clients, he may be
ordered to pay the client compensation of up to £50,000. The ultimate sanction for breach of
the requirements of professional conduct is to be ‘struck off ’. This effectively ends the
solicitor’s career and prevents him from acting as a solicitor.
6.2 THE LEGAL SERVICES BOARD

The Legal Services Board was created by the Legal Services Act 2007. It supervises the
‘approved regulators’ of the legal profession. These regulators include the SRA (for solicitors),
the Bar Council (for barristers), the Institute of Legal Executives (for legal executives), the
Council of Licensed Conveyancers (for licensed conveyancers), the Chartered Institute for
Patent Attorneys (for patent attorneys), the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys (for trade mark
attorneys), the Association of Law Costs Draftsmen (for law costs draftsmen), and the Master
of the Faculties (for notaries public).
6.3 THE SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

The SRA was established by The Law Society in January 2007 to take over the regulation of
solicitors from The Law Society itself. The SRA also controls matters such as training and
admission to the profession.
The SRA’s own literature states that it is independent and regulates in the public interest. The
SRA is governed by a board of 15 members. This board comprises seven solicitors and eight
lay members. The current Chair is Enid Rowlands, who is the board’s first lay member Chair.
Details of the members of the SRA’s board can be found at www.sra.org.uk.
The headquarters of the SRA are at The Cube, Birmingham, and there is an office in central
London. Its budget is funded from the practising certificate fee (see 18.2).
The regulation of the profession is considered in detail in Chapter 7.
6.4 THE LAW SOCIETY

6.4.1 Introduction
The Law Society is the representative body for solicitors in England and Wales. It was founded
in 1825 to raise the reputation of the profession. Today it fulfils a number of roles.
The Law Society represents solicitors within England and Wales. For example, The Law
Society lobbies the Government in respect of changes in the law, and campaigns for better
working conditions for solicitors, particularly on behalf of solicitors undertaking publicly
funded work. The Law Society also seeks to improve the reputation of the profession as a
whole, and to promote the benefits of using a solicitor to the general public.
6.4.2 Membership
After admission, membership of The Law Society is voluntary. However, all members of the
profession are bound by the requirements of professional conduct whether they are members
of The Law Society or not.
6.4.3 Governance
The Law Society is governed by the Council of The Law Society. The Council delegates many
of its powers and decision-making responsibilities to various Boards, such as the
Management Board and the Regulatory Affairs Board.
6.4.4 Local law societies

There are approximately 120 local law societies throughout England and Wales. These often
provide representation, training and facilities (such as law libraries) to local firms within their
area. They also help to provide a link between The Law Society and local solicitors. Local law
societies do not have any disciplinary powers.
6.5 DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF PRACTICE

The legal profession is made up of a number of different types of organisations. Within these
organisations there are a number of roles that a solicitor may fill.
The SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011 set out the ways in which legal services may be
provided to the public, and these are detailed below.
6.5.1 As a recognised sole practice or the employee of a recognised sole practice

A sole practitioner is a solicitor who chooses to practise on his own. He almost certainly will
employ administration staff, such as secretaries, etc and may also employ other solicitors or
paralegals. However, he will own, and therefore be responsible for, the firm in its entirety.
Whilst sole practitioners used to be fairly common, there is a general trend for solicitors to
practise in larger organisations. There are a number of reasons for this. One prominent
reason is cost. In recent times, a solicitor’s practice has become more reliant on information
technology. Solicitors’ firms use such equipment for researching legal issues, for running
sophisticated accounts programs, and for the day-to-day management of clients’ files. Both
the hardware and software required to perform these operations are expensive. Accordingly, it
is easier to share this cost out amongst a number of partners, rather than for one person (ie
the sole practitioner) to cover the entire cost.
Another reason is practicality. When a partner, or other fee earner, in a law firm goes on
holiday, his clients’ matters may temporarily be taken over by another solicitor within the
firm. The sole practitioner may not have this option. Accordingly, the sole practitioner may
have to arrange for a locum solicitor to supervise his absence from the office.
There is also a growing trend for solicitors to specialise in one particular area of law, for
example family law or insolvency. Unless the sole practitioner is running a niche practice, this
option is not open to him.
From 1 November 2015, sole practitioners will be authorised under the same authorisation
rules as other types of firm. Accordingly, their organisation will be authorised by the SRA as a
‘sole practice’ rather than recognising the individual as a sole practitioner.
6.5.2 As a manager, employee, member or interest holder of an authorised body

6.5.2.1 Introduction
The term ‘authorised body’ means a body that has been authorised by the SRA to practise as a
recognised body or a licensed body (SRA Handbook Glossary). This is perhaps the biggest
change brought about by the reforms introduced by the Legal Services Act 2007.
A recognised body may take the form of a partnership, a limited liability partnership (LLP) or
a company. These forms will be discussed below. Licensed bodies include ABSs (see 6.5.2.4).
Authorisation for authorised bodies is granted by the SRA and enables them to undertake
certain aspects of ‘reserved work’, such as conducting court proceedings, the preparation/
lodging of documents relating to the transfer or charging of land, the preparation of probate
documents and also immigration work, or as specified in the authorisation by the SRA in the
case of licensed bodies (SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011, Rule 8).
The requirements relating to applications for authorisation and the conditions of such
authorisation are set out in the SRA Authorisation Rules for Legal Services Bodies and
Licensable Bodies 2011, which came into effect on 6 October 2011. These include a
requirement that a manager or an employee of an authorised body or a related authorised
body (as defined in the SRA Handbook Glossary) is designated as its compliance officer for
legal practice (COLP), and one is designated as its compliance officer for finance and
administration (COFA). These officers took up their roles on 1 January 2013.
6.5.2.2 Form of a recognised body

A recognised body may take the following forms:
Partnerships
Most solicitors’ firms operate as partnerships. The firm is owned and run by the partners,
who then employ other solicitors and administration staff to work for them. As the partners
own the firm, they are entitled to share the profits generated by the firm between them.
Some large firms have two types of partners – ‘equity’ partners and ‘salaried’ partners. A
salaried partner is the first step on the partnership ladder. A salaried partner may not be
entitled to share in the profits of the firm, but he will receive a salary from the firm in excess of
that paid to other non-partner fee earners. After a number of years, a salaried partner may be
promoted to an equity partner, whereupon he will be entitled to share in the profits of the firm.
Limited liability partnerships

An LLP is an incorporated partnership. Instead of partners, LLPs have members. The
members will share in the profits of the LLP.
Companies
A solicitors’ practice may be incorporated as a company registered under the Companies Act
1985. The company will have directors and shareholders like any other company.
6.5.2.3 Requirements for a recognised body

Each recognised body must comply with a number of requirements under Rule 13 of the SRA
Practice Framework Rules 2011. The detail of these requirements is beyond the scope of this
book, but a brief summary of some of the key issues follows.
Eligibility criteria
To be eligible to be a recognised body, the partnership, company or LLP must have at least one
manager who is a solicitor, registered European lawyer (REL) or (in the case of a partnership or
an LLP) a body corporate as further defined in the Rules. In addition, all of the managers and
interest holders (eg, a person who holds shares in the body) have to be lawyers and legally
qualified bodies. The term ‘lawyer’ includes solicitors, barristers, legal executives, licensed
conveyancers and notaries public.
Services requirement
The business of a recognised body is limited to:
(a) professional services of the sort provided by individuals practising as solicitors and/or
lawyers of other jurisdictions; and
(b) professional services of the sort provided by notaries public, but only if a notary public
is a manager or an employee of a recognised body.
6.5.2.4 Licensed bodies

The provision of legal services in England and Wales has changed radically with the
introduction of alternative business structures (ABSs), a concept introduced by the Legal
Services Act 2007. These structures allow non-lawyers to offer legal services alongside non-
legal services. They also, for the first time, allow non-lawyers to own and invest in firms that
provide legal services.
The first ABSs were licensed in early 2012 and so became ‘licensed bodies’ for the purposes of
the SRA Authorisation and Practising Requirements. The SRA is a licensing authority for this
purpose and licensed its first three ABSs in March 2012, including Co-operative Legal
Services. A register of ABSs can be found on the SRA website.
Eligibility criteria
Under Rule 14 of the SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011, for a body to be eligible to be a
licensed body there must be at least one manager who is a solicitor, an REL, a lawyer of England
and Wales who is authorised by an approved regulator other than the SRA, eg the Council of
Licensed Conveyancers (see 6.2) or a European lawyer who is registered with the Bar Standards
Board. It also has to be a ‘licensable body’. A body (‘B’) will be a ‘licensable body’ if a non-
authorised person (ie, someone not authorised by the SRA or another approved regulator):
(a) is a manager of B; or
(b) is an interest holder of B (eg, a person who holds shares in it or is entitled to exercise any
voting rights).
Alternatively (or in addition to the above), a body (‘B’) will be a licensable body if:
(a) another body (‘A’) is a manager of B, or is an interest holder of B; and
(b) non-authorised persons are entitled to exercise, or control the exercise of, at least 10%
of the voting rights in A.
Authorisation
Applications for authorisation to operate as a licensed body are governed by the SRA
Authorisation Rules 2011. Under these rules, an application may be refused if, for example,
the SRA is not satisfied that the applicant body’s managers and interest holders are suitable as
a group to operate or control a business providing regulated legal services, and/or that its
management or governance arrangements are adequate to safeguard the regulatory objectives
of the Legal Services Act 2007.
6.5.3 As a manager, employee, member or owner of an authorised non-SRA firm

Lastly, a solicitor may practise for a non-SRA firm. A non-SRA firm means a firm authorised
by one of the other ‘legal’ regulators (see 6.2 above).
However, a solicitor practising for such a firm can only provide services to the public of a sort
that the firm is authorised to carry out by the relevant regulator. For example, a partner in a
firm regulated by the Council for Licensed Conveyancers could not carry out litigation
services for clients, as the Council for Licensed Conveyancers is not authorised to regulate
this type of work.
6.6 EMPLOYED SOLICITORS

An ‘employed solicitor’ is a solicitor who is employed by a non-solicitor employer. He may
also be referred to as ‘in-house counsel’. A number of large companies have in-house legal
departments to advise on issues that arise from their business activities. Law firms often
second their solicitors to work for their larger clients on a temporary basis. It is not
uncommon for these solicitors to leave their law firm and go on to work for these clients on a
full-time basis as employed solicitors.
Employed solicitors are subject to the same rules and regulations as solicitors in private
practice. They will also be subject to the additional requirements of Rule 4 of the SRA Practice
Framework Rules 2011 (‘In-house practice’).
6.7 LAW CENTRES

Law centres are run by solicitors, other legal advisers and community workers, to provide free
legal advice and case work to disadvantaged individuals within local communities. There are
45 of these centres in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Law Centres Federation acts
as a co-ordinating body for law centres nationally.
A solicitor who works for a law centre must still comply with all of the requirements of
professional conduct. He will also be subject to the additional requirements of Rule 4 of the
SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011.
6.8 LEGAL ADVICE CENTRES

A legal advice centre is a place where the public may attend for legal advice but where no case
work is undertaken. In many parts of the country legal advice centres are operated by the
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux and solicitors will attend to give free legal advice either as honorary
legal advisers, or on a rota scheme. The University of Law itself runs legal advice centres,
staffed by its students under the supervision of a qualified solicitor.
6.9 DUTY SOLICITOR SCHEMES

The police station duty solicitor scheme aims to provide advice and assistance to people at
police stations who otherwise would not be legally represented.
The court duty solicitor scheme aims to provide emergency legal representation at
magistrates’ courts on a rota basis to those who are not otherwise represented.
In both cases, the scheme is staffed by contracted solicitors on a rota basis, with fees being
paid by the Legal Aid Agency.
SUMMARY
(1) A solicitor is said to be part of a profession. Accordingly, a higher standard of
behaviour is expected of him than of a member of the public.
(2) The Solicitors Regulation Authority regulates the legal profession. It publishes rules
and regulations with which a solicitor must comply in addition to the general law.
(3) These rules and requirements must be obeyed by all solicitors, whether they are
members of The Law Society or not.
(4) The Law Society represents the legal profession.
(5) The legal profession is made up of a number of different types of practices.
Regulating the Profession 93
CHAPTER 7
Regulating the Profession
7.1 Introduction 93
7.2 How the profession regulates itself 93
7.3 The pervasive nature of conduct 95
7.4 Complaints against solicitors, authorised bodies and those who work for them 95
7.5 The Legal Ombudsman 96
7.6 Breach of professional conduct 97
7.7 The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 99
7.8 Other powers of the Solicitors Regulation Authority 100
7.9 Powers of the court 101
7.10 Negligence 101
7.11 The SRA Compensation Fund 101
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• how the profession is regulated
• how complaints against solicitors and those who work with/for them are dealt with
• the sanctions for breaches of professional conduct
• the role of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter looked at the legal profession and the fact that a higher standard of
behaviour is expected from the profession than from an ordinary citizen. This is because
solicitors are often trusted with large amounts of client money and/or a client’s confidential
information.
This chapter will consider who is responsible for specifying the rules and requirements which
ensure that this higher standard of behaviour is met, and also how these rules are enforced.
7.2 HOW THE PROFESSION REGULATES ITSELF

7.2.1 The Solicitors Regulation Authority
As was noted in Chapter 6, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) was created by The Law
Society in January 2007 to deal with the regulation of solicitors in England and Wales.
Following the introduction of reforms brought about by the Legal Services Act 2007, the SRA
now regulates solicitors, the firms in which they operate and all those working within those
firms. However, a separate organisation, the Legal Ombudsman, is often the first point of
contact for the public when complaining about solicitors (see 7.5).
The SRA was created in anticipation of the Legal Services Act 2007. As we have already seen,
the Legal Services Board supervises the SRA’s regulation of the profession.
The SRA can publish and enforce rules governing how solicitors behave and conduct their
business. As mentioned in Chapter 6, since early 2012, alternative business structures (ABSs)
have enabled lawyers and non-lawyers to share the management and control of businesses
providing legal services. In anticipation of this, the SRA decided to undertake a complete
review of the regulation framework, and it subsequently formulated and put out proposals for
consultation. The result is the SRA Handbook, which underpins the regulation of both
traditional law firms and ABSs.
The SRA Code of Conduct 2011 contained in the Handbook replaces the Solicitors’ Code of
Conduct 2007 and came into force for all firms on 6 October 2011.
7.2.2 The SRA Handbook and approach to regulation

The Handbook sets out the standards and requirements which apply to everyone regulated by
the SRA, so it covers not just traditional law firms and in-house practice but also the new
ABSs. The current approach to regulation taken by the SRA is that it should focus more on the
quality of what a solicitor is delivering to the client, rather than prescribing how the solicitor
reaches that stage, and this is known as ‘outcomes-focused regulation’. The responsibility for
meeting the requirements in the Handbook and operating effective systems lies with the firms,
and the SRA believes that this form of regulation will enable firms to devise and implement
systems and processes that are right for their clients and the size and type of practice. This is
likely to involve a greater degree of judgement on the part of firms than perhaps was the case
under the more prescriptive 2007 Code.
The structure and content of the Handbook is as follows.
7.2.2.1 Principles
There are 10 Principles that are mandatory and apply to all those regulated by the SRA and to
all aspects of practice. They underpin all of the Handbook requirements.
7.2.2.2 Code of Conduct

The Code is divided into five sections:
• You and your client
• You and your business
• You and your regulator
• You and others
• Application, waivers and interpretation
Each section is divided into chapters dealing with particular regulatory issues, for example:
client care, conflicts of interests, and publicity.
Rather than containing prescriptive rules supported by guidance, as was the case with the
Code of Conduct 2007, the current Code comprises Outcomes and Indicative Behaviours.
Each chapter sets out the ‘Outcomes’ required by the SRA. These Outcomes are mandatory
and, when achieved, will help ensure compliance with the Principles. The SRA recognises,
however, that these Outcomes may be achieved in a variety of ways depending on the
particular circumstances, and they are supplemented by non-mandatory ‘Indicative
Behaviours’. These provide examples of the kind of behaviour which may establish whether
the Outcomes have been achieved and the Principles therefore complied with. The Indicative
Behaviours are not designed to be exhaustive and the SRA is clear that the Outcomes can be
achieved in other ways. The SRA may ask a firm to demonstrate how it has met an Outcome if
the relevant Indicative Behaviours have not been followed. In such cases, it would be prudent
for the decision on how the Outcome has been/will be met to be recorded.
The provisions of the current Code are considered in detail in the following chapters. As there
is no longer any guidance in the Code, reference will be made to the guidance contained in the
2007 Code as an aid to interpretation and application where relevant. However, it remains to
be seen to what extent the SRA will place any weight on such guidance in the current
regulatory regime.
7.2.2.3 The SRA Accounts Rules

This section contains rules for the protection of client money.
7.2.2.4 Authorisation and Practising Requirements

This section sets out various rules and regulations, including those relating to the training
and admission of individuals intending to become solicitors, exercising higher rights of
audience, firms setting up in practice and a Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Crime).
7.2.2.5 Client Protection

This section contains the key elements for the financial protection of clients such as the SRA
Indemnity Insurance Rules.
7.2.2.6 Disciplinary and Costs Recovery

This includes the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules.
7.2.2.7 Specialist Services

This section contains provisions which are applicable only when certain services are being
provided to clients, for example the SRA Property Selling Rules. It also includes the SRA
Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001 and the SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business)
Rules 2001 (see Chapter 17).
7.2.2.8 Overseas Practice

The SRA Overseas Rules 2013 were introduced on 1 October 2013. They apply to regulated
individuals established outside England and Wales, and to regulated entities which have
operations under their control outside England and Wales. The rules are a starting point for
the conduct of SRA regulated individuals and authorised bodies ‘practising overseas’ (as
defined in the Handbook Glossary), and contain the Overseas Principles that are a modified
version of the SRA Principles (see Chapter 8) to take into account the different legal,
regulatory and cultural context of practice in other jurisdictions. Failure to meet the
obligations set out in the Rules may result in regulatory action being taken by the SRA,
including limiting, or removing, the right to practise as an authorised body or individual
regulated by the SRA.
7.3 THE PERVASIVE NATURE OF CONDUCT

Conduct is said to be a pervasive subject – it cannot be viewed in isolation. It pervades all
aspects of a solicitor’s life and work, regardless of the area of work in which the solicitor
chooses to practise. The topics covered in this book are of general application.
7.4 COMPLAINTS AGAINST SOLICITORS, AUTHORISED BODIES AND THOSE

WHO WORK FOR THEM
A solicitor must ensure that clients are informed in writing at the outset of their matter of
their right to complain and how complaints may be made (Outcome 1.9 of the Code of
Conduct).
Clients’ complaints must be dealt with promptly, fairly, openly and effectively by the solicitor
(Outcome 1.11). Although having a written complaints procedure is not mandatory and the
content of a procedure not prescribed, Indicative Behaviour 1.22 provides that it may tend to
show that the Outcomes have been achieved and the Principles complied with where a
solicitor has a written complaints procedure which:
(a) is brought to clients’ attention at the outset of the matter;

(b) is easy for the clients to use and understand, allowing for complaints to be made by any
reasonable means;
(c) is responsive to the needs of individual clients, especially those who are vulnerable;
(d) enables complaints to be dealt with promptly and fairly, with decisions based on a
sufficient investigation of the circumstances;
(e) provides for appropriate remedies; and
(f ) does not involve any charges to clients for handling their complaints.
The Legal Ombudsman (see 7.5) has also produced a ‘Guide to good complaint handling’
which sets out how it expects lawyers to deal with complaints.
A copy of the firm’s complaints procedure being provided to a client on request and, in the
event that a client makes a complaint, the solicitor providing him with all necessary
information concerning the handling of the complaint are both further Indicative Behaviours
(1.23 and 1.24 respectively).
The firm must also inform the client of his right to challenge or complain about the firm’s bill,
and the circumstances in which he may be liable to pay interest on an unpaid bill (see 11.9.2).
Clients must be informed in writing, both at the time of engagement and at the conclusion of
the firm’s complaints procedure, of their right to complain to the Legal Ombudsman and the
time frame for doing so, and be given full details of how to contact the Legal Ombudsman
(Outcome 1.10 and see 7.5). As a result of the implementation of the EU Alternative Dispute
Resolution Directive (2013/11/EU) in the UK in July 2015, clients must also be informed of the
name and address of an ADR approved body which would be competent to deal with the
complaint (ie, other than the Legal Ombudsman) should both parties wish to use the scheme,
and whether the firm intends to use that approved body. The Chartered Trading Standards
Institute (CTSI) has approved a number of ADR entities that will be able to provide ADR
services. The obligation is to provide information about an ADR approved body, and so firms
are not required to submit complaints to the body unless they wish to. Additional information
must be provided by solicitors who come within the definition of an ‘online trader’ under a
separate EU regulation on online dispute resolution.
7.5 THE LEGAL OMBUDSMAN

The Legal Ombudsman for England and Wales (‘LeO’) became operational on 6 October
2010. It was set up by the Office for Legal Complaints under the Legal Services Act 2007 and
is based in Birmingham. It deals with complaints made not only against solicitors, but also
against barristers, legal executives, licensed conveyancers, notaries and patent attorneys,
claims management companies (amongst others), and it replaced the Legal Complaints
Service (LCS) so far as complaints against solicitors are concerned. It therefore brings all legal
service complaint handling under one roof for the first time.
The Scheme Rules provide that only certain types of client can complain to the LeO, including
individuals, ‘micro-enterprises’ (broadly speaking, an enterprise with fewer than 10 staff and
a turnover or balance sheet value not exceeding £2 million), clubs and associations with an
annual income net of tax of less than £1 million, and personal representatives or beneficiaries
of a person’s estate. The complaint must relate to an act/omission by the lawyer and must
relate to the services which the lawyer provided. The LeO also accepts complaints in relation
to services which the lawyer offered, or refused to provide, to the claimant.
Ordinarily, the complainant cannot use the LeO unless the lawyer’s complaints procedure has
been used, and a maximum of eights weeks is given for the complaint to be resolved in this
way.
The complaint should be brought no later than:
• six years from the act/omission; or

• three years from when the complainant should reasonably have known there was cause
for complaint.
When the LeO accepts a complaint for investigation, it aims to resolve it by whatever means it
considers appropriate, including informal resolution. If the LeO considers that an
investigation is necessary, both parties will be given an opportunity to make representations.
A hearing will be held only where the LeO considers that the complaint cannot be determined
fairly without one. A recommendation report (an ‘assessment’) will then be made, with a time
limit for response. If neither party indicates a disagreement within that time limit, the LeO
may treat the complaint as having been resolved by the recommendation report. If, however,
any party disagrees within that time limit, the LeO will issue a final decision (a
‘determination’). The details of the procedure are set out in the Scheme Rules.
The LeO’s determination may direct the lawyer to:
(a) apologise;
(b) pay compensation (together with interest) for any loss suffered and/or inconvenience/
distress caused;
(c) ensure (and pay for) the putting right of any error or omission;
(d) take (and pay for) any specified action in the interests of the complainant;
(e) pay the costs of the complainant in pursuing the complaint;
(f ) limit the lawyer’s fees (including that all or part of any amount paid is refunded, with or
without interest, or that all or part of the fees are remitted).
The determination may contain one or more of the above directions. There is a limit of
£50,000 on the total value that may be awarded in respect of compensation and the costs in
respect of (c) and (d) above. The limit does not apply to (a), (e) or (f ) above, or to interest on
compensation for loss suffered.
If the complainant accepts the determination, it is binding on the parties and final, and
neither party may start or continue any legal proceedings in respect of the subject matter of
the complaint. It may be enforced through the High Court or county court by the
complainant, and the report may also be published. If the complainant rejects the
determination, both parties remain free to pursue other legal remedies (such as suing for
negligence).
Although the LeO has the power to adjudicate on acts/omissions as a result of which the
complainant has suffered loss, in the event that the LeO considers that the resolution of a
particular legal question is necessary in order to resolve a dispute, it may refer that question to
the court.
Lastly, where the LeO receives a complaint which discloses any alleged professional
misconduct, it will inform the relevant approved regulator. In the case of a solicitor, this will
be the SRA.
The LeO has published an online list of lawyers or law firms involved in complaints which
have led to a formal decision by the LeO since April 2012. The list is updated quarterly.
More information about the LeO may be found at <www.legalombudsman.org.uk>.
7.6 BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

7.6.1 Professional misconduct
‘Professional misconduct’ primarily concerns breaches of the SRA’s Code of Conduct. For
example, if a solicitor gave an undertaking (see Chapter 14) to post his client’s witness
statement to another solicitor on 1 May and then failed to do so, he would not achieve Outcome
11.2 of the Code and so would be said to breach the requirements of professional conduct.
7.6.2 The Solicitors Regulation Authority

Although all complaints from the general public are received through the Legal Ombudsman,
complaints primarily concerning a breach of professional conduct will be dealt with by the
SRA.
The role of the SRA is to protect the public. Accordingly, having received a report of a breach
of the Code, the SRA must assess the risk to the general public posed by the solicitor. The SRA
will write to the solicitor setting out the allegations or potential breaches of the SRA
Principles (see Chapter 8) and seek a written explanation. If the SRA decides that further
action is necessary, it may conduct a formal on-site investigation. This investigation will result
in a factual report being made, detailing whether any breaches were found. If serious breaches
were found, a more detailed ‘desk-based’ investigation may take place, requiring a written
explanation from the solicitor before a final decision is made. The SRA may then decide that
no further investigation is necessary or, if it considers that it is reasonable for those involved
to remedy the decision, it may issue a letter of guidance. If the SRA decides that the Principles
have been breached, there are a number of possible outcomes depending on the gravity of the
breach and the status of the individual/body in question.
7.6.3 Outcomes – professional misconduct

The powers of the SRA following a finding of professional misconduct depend upon the
subject of the complaint. Some of these powers are detailed below.
7.6.3.1 Firms and regulated individuals

The SRA may do the following:
(a) Make a finding with or without a warning about future conduct
The SRA may make a finding about the conduct and/or warn about future conduct and
recover the costs of the investigation.
(b) Impose a fine or rebuke
The Legal Services Act 2007 gave the SRA new powers to rebuke and/or direct a firm
and/or a regulated person to pay a penalty of up to £2,000 for law firms or up to £250
million for ABSs, and up to £50 million for individuals within ABSs. The details are
contained in the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011. As from 1 January 2008, the
SRA has made its regulatory decisions public. This allows the general public to search
under the name of the solicitor they propose to use, to establish whether he has been
subject to any regulatory sanction.
(c) Control how the firm/regulated person practises
The SRA could impose conditions on, or suspend, a practising certificate or the
registration of a firm. It could also impose conditions on, revoke, suspend or modify the
terms and conditions of authorisation of a firm.
(d) Refer the matter to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal
In some cases, the SRA does not make a final decision but refers alleged misconduct to
the Tribunal, where it is responsible for prosecuting the matter. The Tribunal is
independent from the SRA (see 7.7 below).
(e) Intervene into the practice
The SRA can close the practice. The practice monies vest in the SRA, and the SRA takes
possession of the practice documents, including client papers. An agent appointed by
the SRA carries out the intervention and the practice is liable for the costs of this.
(f ) Enter into agreements with the firm/regulated person
These are regulatory decisions made by the SRA, the terms of which are accepted by the
firm/regulated person. These agreements will detail the allegations made and the
sanctions agreed, and are published on the SRA’s website.
(g) Revoke/suspend authorisation of the firm or withdraw approval of/disqualify an individual

The SRA can revoke or suspend the authorisation of the firm or withdraw approval of or
disqualify an individual from acting in certain capacities within the firm (eg, as a COLP
or a COFA – see 6.5.2.1), withdraw approval of a person being an owner of a licensed
body, or impose conditions on the holding of an interest.
Note that the SRA’s powers extend to non-solicitors if they are employed by a recognised/
licensed body/solicitor. The SRA may also decide to refer the conduct of employees or
managers of a licensed body to an individual’s appropriate regulator. There is a right of appeal
against some of these outcomes.
7.6.4 Distinction between complaints about professional services and negligence

A solicitor owes a duty of care to his client in the law of tort. Where the solicitor breaches this
duty and the client suffers loss as a result, the solicitor may be sued by the client for
negligence (see further 7.10 below).
The client does not have to suffer any loss for the Legal Ombudsman to make a determination
against the solicitor arising from a complaint about the services provided by him. The mere
fact that the solicitor has provided services which are not of the quality reasonably to be
expected of a solicitor is enough. For example, a solicitor may miss a deadline in respect of
issuing proceedings, which would then deprive his client of the opportunity to pursue the
matter in court. The service provided would clearly be below what it is reasonable to expect
from a solicitor. However, it would also constitute negligence, as the solicitor has breached
his duty of care to his client and as a result the client has suffered a foreseeable loss (ie, he will
not be able to pursue his matter in court and recover damages).
The Legal Ombudsman and the SRA have no power to adjudicate upon issues of negligence in
a legal sense, ie they are not courts and so do not have the power to adjudicate on legal issues.
However, where there is an overlap between negligence and complaints about professional
services, the Legal Ombudsman may adjudicate on those services where its powers of redress
would be adequate to compensate the client.
7.7 THE SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

7.7.1 Introduction
The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal hears and determines applications relating to allegations
of unbefitting conduct and/or breaches of the requirements of professional conduct by
solicitors, RELs, recognised bodies, managers of recognised bodies and employees of
recognised bodies/sole practitioners. Since 23 December 2011, the Disciplinary Tribunal has
also dealt with appeals made in relation to ABSs and licensing rules. Most applications to the
Disciplinary Tribunal are made on behalf of the SRA. However, except where the Solicitors Act
1974 expressly provides otherwise, any person may make an application directly to the
Tribunal without first making a complaint to the SRA.
The Disciplinary Tribunal was established by s 46 of the Solicitors Act 1974 and is
independent of The Law Society and the SRA. The members of the Disciplinary Tribunal are
appointed by the Master of the Rolls. There is no statutory maximum on the number of
members, and at the time of writing it comprised about 60 members, of whom two-thirds are
solicitor members and one-third lay members. The solicitor members must have been
admitted for at least 10 years, and the lay members must be neither solicitors nor barristers.
The Disciplinary Tribunal sits in divisions of three members, each made up of two solicitors
and one lay person. The decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal may be delivered by a single
member.
7.7.2 Tribunal procedure

The Disciplinary Tribunal has power, exercisable by statutory instrument, to make rules
governing its procedure and practice. These rules are made with the concurrence of the
Master of the Rolls. The SRA maintains a panel of solicitors in private practice who prosecute
applications before the Disciplinary Tribunal on its behalf. In most cases, either the SRA’s
own advocates or the panel solicitor will present the case before the Disciplinary Tribunal. In
complex cases, counsel may be instructed to present the case.
7.7.3 Application to the Tribunal

An application to the Disciplinary Tribunal must be made in the prescribed form, supported
by evidence (this will be prepared by the panel solicitor, or the SRA’s advocate where the
applicant is the SRA). The Disciplinary Tribunal will consider the application and, if satisfied
that there is a case to answer, will fix a hearing date. Either party may be represented at the
hearing by a solicitor or counsel. Evidence is given on oath and witnesses may be called.
The decisions of the Disciplinary Tribunal are called ‘Judgments’ and ‘Orders’. The Order
itself, together with brief reasons for the decision, is made available at the end of the hearing.
The Order takes effect once it is filed with The Law Society. A detailed written Judgment
containing reasons, findings and repeating the Order is made available to the parties, The
Law Society and The Law Society’s Gazette after the hearing (usually within seven weeks of the
hearing).
Where (unusually) an application is made directly to the Disciplinary Tribunal, the Tribunal
may refer the matter to the SRA for investigation before proceeding with the application.
Where in such a case the SRA investigates the complaint and finds it to be substantiated, it
may take over the application on the applicant’s behalf (or deal with the matter by using the
powers of the SRA discussed at 7.6 above).
7.7.4 Powers of the Tribunal

The Solicitors Act 1974, s 47 gives the Disciplinary Tribunal power to make such order as in its
discretion it thinks fit, including the following:
(a) striking a solicitor off the roll;
(b) suspending a solicitor from practice or imposing restrictions upon the way in which a
solicitor can practise;
(c) imposing an unlimited fine payable to HM Treasury;
(d) reprimanding the solicitor;
(e) requiring the payment by any party of costs or a contribution towards costs.
7.7.5 Restoration to the roll

Once struck off the roll of solicitors, the Tribunal may also restore a solicitor to the roll.
7.7.6 Appeals
Appeal from a substantive decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal is made to the Administrative
Court.
7.8 OTHER POWERS OF THE SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

7.8.1 The investigation of accounts
In order to monitor a solicitor’s compliance with the SRA Accounts Rules, the SRA may
require a solicitor to produce his financial accounts, and any other relevant documents, to the
SRA.
7.8.2 Intervention
Where the public is at risk, the SRA may take control of a solicitor’s files and client monies.
This is generally referred to as an ‘intervention’. The SRA appoints another firm of solicitors
to act as its agents to close down the practice. Intervention may also occur where a sole
practitioner is unable to continue his practice through ill health, an accident or death.
7.8.3 Delivery of files

In order to investigate complaints of misconduct, the SRA has the power, under s 44B of the
Solicitors Act 1974, to serve a notice on a solicitor requiring the delivery of a file or
documents in the possession of the solicitor to the SRA. Outcome 10.9 of the Code also
requires solicitors to produce documents and information to the SRA pursuant to a written
notice.
7.9 POWERS OF THE COURT

A solicitor is an officer of the court. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction to discipline the
solicitor in respect of costs within any matter before the court. The court may order the
solicitor to pay costs to his own client, or to a third party (see CPR, rr 44 and 45).
7.10 NEGLIGENCE
7.10.1 Introduction
In addition to or instead of the actions that the SRA or Legal Ombudsman may take, a solicitor
may be sued by his client in the tort of negligence. A solicitor owes his clients a duty of care.
Where a solicitor breaches this duty, and the client suffers loss as a result of that breach, the
solicitor may be sued in negligence. A solicitor may also be sued for breach of contract in
these circumstances. Firms must carry compulsory indemnity insurance against such actions
(see 18.4).
7.10.2 Steps to be taken on discovery of a claim

Outcome 1.16 of the Code provides that if a solicitor discovers any act or omission which
could give rise to a claim by a current client against him, he must inform the client.
In circumstances where the client notifies the solicitor of his intention to make a claim, or
where the solicitor discovers an act or omission which might give rise to a claim, it may tend
to show that the relevant Outcomes have been achieved if the solicitor considers whether a
conflict of interests has arisen or whether the client should be advised to obtain independent
advice (Indicative Behaviour 1.12). It will be very rare that a conflict of interest does not arise
in such situation.
However, The Law Society’s guidance states that solicitors should respond to complaints even
if they believe the allegations concern negligence and a referral to the firm’s insurance
provider will be necessary.
Where the solicitor does cease to act for the client, and is asked to hand over the papers to
another solicitor who is giving independent advice on the merits of a claim, the solicitor
should keep copies of the original documents for his own reference.
7.11 THE SRA COMPENSATION FUND

The SRA Compensation Fund is maintained by the SRA under ss 36 and 36A of the Solicitors
Act 1974. The Fund is governed by the SRA Compensation Fund Rules 2011, which are
accessible on the SRA’s website and contained in the Handbook.
The Fund exists to make grants to persons who have suffered loss as the result of an act or
omission of a defaulting practitioner (as defined in the Handbook Glossary, including a
solicitor or the employee, manager or owner of a defaulting practitioner).
Applications to this Fund may be made where an individual/organisation has suffered loss due
to a defaulting practitioner’s dishonesty, or where the individual/organisation is suffering
hardship due to a defaulting practitioner’s failure to account for monies he has received.
Eligibility criteria setting out those applicants that may be able to apply for a grant are set out
in the SRA Compensation Fund Rules 2011.
Individuals/organisations are not automatically entitled to a grant from the Fund (they have to
apply and their claims will be assessed). The Fund does not pay out sums of more than £2
million per claim.
Where payment is made from the Fund, the SRA will seek to be subrogated to the rights of the
applicant and can therefore take proceedings against the defaulting solicitor to recover the
amount paid out of the Fund.
The client may be asked to exhaust any legal remedy before applying to the Fund.
It may tend to show that the outcomes of Chapter 1 of the Code have been achieved where
clients are informed if they are not entitled to the protections of the SRA Compensation Fund
(Indicative Behaviour 1.11).
From October 2012 the SRA Compensation Fund is also to provide cover for claims made
against uninsured firms (see 18.5.1).
SUMMARY
(1) The SRA is empowered by the Solicitors Act 1974 to publish rules and requirements
for the regulation of conduct of solicitors, recognised/licensed bodies, members of
recognised/licensed bodies, and employees of recognised/licensed bodies/sole
practitioners.
(2) These rules and requirements are enforced by the SRA and the Legal Ombudsman.
(3) The SRA deals with breaches of the requirements of professional conduct, whereas
the Legal Ombudsman primarily deals with complaints about services provided by
legal practitioners, including solicitors.
(4) The Legal Ombudsman deals with complaints relating to an act/omission by a legal
practitioner and which relates to services provided by him. The client does not need
to suffer any loss as a result of the service provided in order to raise the issue.
(5) The SRA may impose disciplinary sanctions for a breach of the requirements of
professional conduct, or in serious cases may refer the matter to the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal.
(6) The Legal Ombudsman has numerous sanctions at its disposal. These include
directing the solicitor to limit his fees, or directing the solicitor to compensate the
client up to £50,000. The SRA/Legal Ombudsman has no power to pay
compensation to the client itself.
(7) The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal may fine a solicitor, suspend the solicitor or, as
an ultimate sanction, strike the solicitor off the roll.
(8) A solicitor will be negligent if he breaches a duty of care to his client and foreseeable
loss results as a consequence of that breach. Where the solicitor has been negligent,
he may be sued by the client for damages.
(9) The SRA Compensation Fund is maintained by the SRA. Payment may be made from
the Fund when a client has suffered loss as a result of a defaulting practitioner’s act
or omission or to cover claims against uninsured firms.
The Principles 103
CHAPTER 8
The Principles

8.2 The Principles 103
8.3 Principle 1: Justice and the rule of law 104
8.4 Principle 2: Integrity 104
8.5 Principle 3: Independence 104
8.6 Principle 4: Best interests of clients 104
8.7 Principle 5: Standard of service 104
8.8 Principle 6: Public trust 105
8.9 Principle 7: Compliance with legal and regulatory obligations 105
8.10 Principle 8: Effective business management 105
8.11 Principle 9: Equality of opportunity and respect for diversity 105
8.12 Principle 10: Protection of client money and assets 106
8.13 Examples 106
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will be able to understand the essentials of professional
conduct.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The profession is regulated by the Government (eg, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) and by
the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) itself. As was noted in Chapter 7, the SRA Handbook
contains all of the SRA’s regulatory requirements, including a Code of Conduct.
The starting point for the consideration of the regulatory framework is the 10 Principles. The
Principles are all-pervasive and underpin all of the Handbook requirements. The chapters of the
Code of Conduct show how the Principles will apply in certain contexts through mandatory
provisions (‘Outcomes’) and non-mandatory provisions (‘Indicative Behaviours’).
8.2 THE PRINCIPLES

The notes to the Principles in the Code state that:
The Principles embody the key ethical requirements on firms and individuals who are involved in the
provision of legal services. You should always have regard to the Principles and use them as your starting
point when faced with an ethical dilemma.
Where two or more Principles come into conflict, the one which takes precedence is the one which
best serves the public interest in the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in the
proper administration of justice.
The Principles are mandatory and apply to all individuals and firms regulated by the SRA,
whether traditional firms of solicitors, ABSs or in-house. Breach of the Principles may
constitute professional misconduct. In the introduction to the Handbook, the SRA indicates
that its approach to enforcement is proportionate, outcomes-focused and risk-based, and so
how it deals with failure to comply with the Principles will depend on all the particular
circumstances of each case: ‘Our primary aim is to achieve the right outcomes for clients.’
Where an individual or a firm is practising overseas, the Overseas Principles will apply instead
(see 7.2.2.8).
8.3 PRINCIPLE 1: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Principle 1 provides that a solicitor must uphold the rule of law and the proper administration
of justice. The SRA’s notes to the Principles in the Handbook state that a solicitor has
obligations not only to clients but also to the court and to third parties with whom the
solicitor may deal. A solicitor’s obligations to the court and third parties are discussed in
Chapter 16.
8.4 PRINCIPLE 2: INTEGRITY

This Principle provides that a solicitor must act with integrity in all professional dealings with
clients, the court, other lawyers and the public. A solicitor is in a position of trust, and so
must behave in an appropriate manner to reflect that position.
8.5 PRINCIPLE 3: INDEPENDENCE

A solicitor must not allow his independence to be compromised. ‘Independence’ in this
context means a solicitor’s own and his firm’s independence, and not merely his ability to give
independent advice to a client. The notes state that a solicitor should avoid situations which
might put his independence at risk, eg giving control of his practice to a third party which is
beyond the regulatory reach of the SRA or other approved regulator.
8.6 PRINCIPLE 4: BEST INTERESTS OF CLIENTS

This Principle provides that a solicitor must act in the best interests of each client. The notes
further provide that ‘[y]ou should always act in good faith and do your best for each of your
clients’. In particular, the solicitor should observe his duty of confidentiality (see Chapter 12)
and obligations with regard to conflicts of interest (see Chapter 13).
This Principle derives from the common law, as a solicitor is said to be in a fiduciary position
in relation to his client. This fiduciary relationship is considered further in Chapter 10.
8.7 PRINCIPLE 5: STANDARD OF SERVICE

A solicitor must provide a proper standard of service to his clients. This duty extends to
providing a proper standard of client care (see Chapter 11 generally) and also a proper
standard of work, ie the solicitor must ensure that he exercises the appropriate competence,
skill and diligence, and taking into account the individual needs and circumstances of each
client. Meeting the competencies set out in the Competence Statement forms an integral part
of this requirement (see 18.2.8).
This Principle is linked to the concept that a solicitor must act in the best interests of a client
(see 8.6 above).
For example, imagine that a client is seeking to instruct a solicitor in respect of a complex
dispute regarding a contract of insurance. If the solicitor in question knows very little about
insurance law then he will be unable to act in the best interests of the client. The best interests
of the client in this case would be for the solicitor to refer the client to an expert (ideally this
would be a colleague, or alternatively someone in another firm) in the relevant field of law.
Equally, a solicitor must consider whether he has the capacity (in terms of work volume) to
take on a particular matter. If a solicitor was to take on work when he did not have the capacity
to deal with it effectively, he would not be acting in the client’s best interests and would be
unlikely to be able to provide a proper service to that client.
The Principles 105
8.8 PRINCIPLE 6: PUBLIC TRUST

Both The Law Society and the SRA are keen to improve the reputation of the profession in the
eyes of the general public. Accordingly, this Principle provides that a solicitor must behave in a
way that maintains the trust the public places in the profession and in the provision of legal
services. The notes state:
Any behaviour either within or outside your professional practice which undermines this trust
damages not only you, but also the ability of the legal profession as a whole to serve society.
For example, if a solicitor were to use money from his client account to fund the purchase of a
new car then he would not only breach the SRA Accounts Rules, but he would almost certainly
harm the public’s trust in the profession and breach Principle 6.
A solicitor may harm the public’s trust in the profession by behaviour outside of his solicitors’
practice. For example, conviction of a criminal offence would lead the solicitor to breach
Principle 6. Where a solicitor is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, it is likely that he
will be struck off the roll of solicitors.
8.9 PRINCIPLE 7: COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL AND REGULATORY

OBLIGATIONS
This Principle obliges a solicitor to comply with his legal and regulatory obligations, and to
deal with his regulators and ombudsmen in an open, timely and cooperative manner. This will
include dealings with the SRA and the Legal Ombudsman (see Chapter 7), and in relation to
the reporting and notification requirements set out in the Code.
8.10 PRINCIPLE 8: EFFECTIVE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

A solicitor must run his business or carry out his role in the business effectively and in
accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk management principles.
This includes meeting the Outcomes set out in Chapter 7 of the Code (‘Management of your
business’).
8.11 PRINCIPLE 9: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND RESPECT

FOR DIVERSITY
A solicitor must run his business or carry out his role in the business in a way that encourages
equality of opportunity and respect for diversity.
In addition to complying with all anti-discrimination legislation, including the Equality Act
2010, a solicitor is under a much wider duty not to discriminate in his professional dealings
with clients and others in relation to any group listed in Chapter 2 of the Code (‘Equality and
diversity’). Accordingly, a solicitor must not unlawfully discriminate against any person on
grounds of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy
and maternity, race, religion or belief, and sex or sexual orientation. He should also not
victimise or harass anyone in the course of his professional dealings (Outcome 2.1). A finding
of unlawful discrimination outside practice could also amount to a breach of Principles 1 and 6.
The Outcomes in Chapter 2 of the Code require firms to provide services to clients in a way
that respects diversity, and to make reasonable adjustments to ensure that disabled clients,
employees or managers are not placed at a substantial disadvantage compared to those who
are not disabled, without passing on the costs of such adjustments to these individuals
(Outcomes 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). Having in place a written equality and diversity policy
which includes the features set out in Indicative Behaviour 2.1, may tend to show that a firm
has achieved the Outcomes of Chapter 2 of the Code and therefore has complied with the
Principles.
8.12 PRINCIPLE 10: PROTECTION OF CLIENT MONEY AND ASSETS

This Principle provides that a solicitor must protect client money and assets belonging to his
clients that have been entrusted to him or his firm. The term ‘assets’ in this context is defined
as including money, documents, wills, deeds, investments and other property (Handbook
Glossary). This closely links to Principle 4 and the duty to act in the best interests of clients.
8.13 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are asked to act for Mr Monks, who wishes to sue X Co Ltd for a substantial
amount of money. The case, if successful, would also generate a substantial
amount of bad publicity for X Co Ltd, which would result in fewer sales for that
company. You hold a significant number of shares in X Co Ltd. Should you act
for Mr Monks?
Answer You need to act in the best interests of your client (Principle 4), and you must
also ensure that your independence is not compromised (Principle 3). If the
case is successful, this may well lead to a substantial reduction in the share
price of X Co Ltd, and you would stand to lose out financially in respect of your
shares.
In these circumstances, could you act in the best interests of your client (when
these interests conflict with your own) and provide unbiased and objective
advice?
For these reasons you must decline to act.
EXAMPLE 2
Question You are a sole practitioner who specialises in patent disputes. You are
considered an expert in your field. However, you are already overworked and
are struggling to keep up with your existing caseload.
You are approached by a large American company, which wishes to bring an
action for a breach of one of its patents. You consider that this work would be
very lucrative for your firm. Should you take on this work?
Answer You must provide a proper standard of service to your clients (Principle 5). Your
expertise is not in question. However, it would appear that you do not have the
capacity to take on the work. Therefore you should decline to act, even if you
would lose out on this lucrative work.
SUMMARY
(1) The SRA sets out standards and requirements concerning professional conduct.
(2) The starting point for consideration of the Code of Conduct and the other regulatory
requirements is the 10 Principles.
(3) The Principles set out the fundamental requirements which all individuals and firms
regulated by the SRA must satisfy in practice.
(4) Breach of the Principles may constitute professional misconduct.
Obtaining Instructions 107
CHAPTER 9
Obtaining Instructions

9.2 General principles 107
9.3 Advertising 108
9.4 Referrals of business 110
9.5 Fee sharing 111
9.6 Introductions to third parties 112
9.7 Examples 112
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will have learned about:
• the general principles of obtaining instructions
• advertising
• referrals of business
• fee sharing
• introductions to third parties.
9.1 INTRODUCTION
A solicitors’ firm is a business, and has much in common with any high street store. Obviously
a firm of solicitors sells services rather than goods, but just like a high street store it needs a
regular supply of customers to survive. Without clients, a solicitors firm cannot generate
income to pay staff salaries, the rent on premises, or for the upkeep of the office equipment.
Accordingly, just like a high street store, a firm of solicitors must take steps to try to maintain
and increase its market share. The two most common ways of trying to achieve this are
through advertising and referrals.
9.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

As noted above, a solicitors’ firm must take steps to try to maintain and increase its market
share in order to prosper as a business. However, no matter how urgent these financial
pressures may be, a solicitor must at all times comply with the requirements of professional
conduct, and in particular with the Principles (see Chapter 8). A solicitor’s primary duty is to
his client. Accordingly, a solicitor must not do anything that would compromise his
independence. Therefore a solicitor must not do anything, or enter into any arrangement, that
would restrict him from acting in the best interests of his client.
For example, a firm of solicitors may be offered a large financial incentive to refer all clients
requiring advice on financial services to a particular firm of brokers. However, the firm must
not accept this offer if it would prevent the solicitors acting in the best interests of their
clients.
9.3 ADVERTISING
9.3.1 Introduction
In the past, it was common for solicitors to rely on their personal reputation to obtain work.
For example, a solicitor would earn a reputation for a certain type of work (eg, family law) by
word of mouth in a town or city. This method of obtaining work is still valuable today. One of
the best ways of attracting clients is by personal recommendation of a friend or colleague who
has experienced similar problems. There are also publications, such as the Legal 500, which
list the names of the ‘top’ solicitors in a particular legal field and geographical location.
However, in recent times firms have invested a lot of money with a view to attracting new
clients through different means. For example, firms will advertise their services in local
newspapers, on their websites or through promotional literature. The use of radio and
television advertisements has become more frequent in recent years (particularly in the area of
personal injury). The use of social media is also increasingly being embraced by the
profession in order to engage with current and potential clients and to market its services.
The aim of these advertisements is to increase the general public’s awareness of the firm in
question, and of the services that the firm offers (ie, how the firm could help the potential
client). Therefore, when a potential client needs the services of a solicitor, he will know which
firm to contact.
Another purpose of advertising is to improve the reputation of the profession in the eyes of
the general public. For example, during September 2004, The Law Society launched an
advertising campaign entitled ‘My hero, my solicitor’, to remind the general public of the
benefits of using solicitors, rather than unqualified individuals, when they have problems in
their lives. The current campaign is entitled ‘Use a Professional. Use a Solicitor.’
Solicitors are generally free to publicise their practice, provided that they comply with:
(a) the general laws on advertising and data protection in force at the time. These include:
(i) the UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising and Direct and Promotional Marketing
(CAP Code),
(ii) the Data Protection Act 1998, and
(iii) the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (SI
2003/2426);
(b) Chapter 8 of the Code of Conduct.
9.3.2 Chapter 8 of the Code – Publicity

9.3.2.1 General
Chapter 8 of the Code of Conduct is concerned with the manner in which a solicitor publicises
his firm or practice, or any other business.
The SRA considers that there is an imbalance of knowledge between the general public on the
one hand and the solicitor providing the service on the other. Accordingly, publicity in
relation to the firm, practice or any other business must be accurate and not misleading, and
not likely to diminish the trust the public places in the solicitor and in the provision of legal
services (Outcome 8.1). The term ‘publicity’ is very widely defined and includes all
promotional material and activity, including the name and description of the firm, stationery,
advertisements, brochures, websites, directory entries, media appearances, promotional
press releases, and direct approaches to potential clients and other persons, whether
conducted in person, in writing or electronic form (Handbook Glossary). It does not, however,
include press releases prepared on behalf of a client.
Publicity relating to solicitors’ charges is also covered by these requirements. Any such
publicity must be clearly expressed and identify whether VAT and disbursements are included
(Outcome 8.2). Examples which may tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved these
Outcomes and therefore not complied with the Principles in relation to such publicity are:
(a) advertising an estimated fee which is pitched at an unrealistically low level (Indicative
Behaviour 8.7);
(b) describing overheads of the firm (such as normal postage, telephone calls and client
due diligence under Money Laundering Regulations 2007 – see Chapter 15) as
disbursements in advertisements (Indicative Behaviour 8.8);
(c) advertising an estimated or a fixed fee without making it clear that additional charges
may be payable, if that is the case (Indicative Behaviour 8.9).
9.3.2.2 Unsolicited visits or phone calls

A solicitor may wish to ‘cold call’ individuals in order to promote his business. As mentioned
above in 9.3.1, a solicitor must comply with the general law applicable to such marketing. This
means that the solicitor must have all consents required by the relevant data protection
legislation for the type of marketing he intends to carry out.
The Data Protection Act 1998 also permits all individuals to request that their details are not
used for direct marketing purposes, and therefore if a solicitor receives such a request, it
should be taken seriously and complied with.
In addition, Outcome 8.3 prohibits a solicitor from making unsolicited approaches in person
or by telephone to members of the public to publicise his firm, in-house practice or other
business. Accordingly, approaching people in the street, at ports of entry, in hospital or at
scenes of accidents are examples of behaviour which may tend to show that the solicitor has
not achieved the Outcomes, as will approaching people to conduct a survey which involves
collecting contact details of potential clients or otherwise promotes his firm or in-house
practice (Indicative Behaviour 8.5). However, the term ‘members of the public’ for this
purpose does not include a current or former client, another firm or its manager, an existing
or potential professional or business connection, or a commercial organisation or public body
(Handbook Glossary). Even in circumstances when such visits or calls are permitted in this way,
solicitors should be mindful of complying with the provisions of the relevant legislation.
9.3.2.3 Letterheads, websites and e-mails

As mentioned in 9.3.2.1, a letterhead, a website and e-mails are considered forms of publicity.
The SRA specifies that clients and the public must have appropriate information about the
solicitor, his firm and how he is regulated (Outcome 8.4). Accordingly, letterheads, websites
and e-mails must show the words ‘authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation
Authority’, and either display the firm’s registered name and number if it is an LLP or a
company, or, if the firm is a partnership or sole practitioner, the name under which it is
licensed/authorised by the SRA and the number allocated to it by the SRA (Outcome 8.5).
9.3.2.4 Social media

Whilst there are no specific provisions in the Code that apply to the use of social media by
solicitors and firms, regard must still be had to the Principles and the relevant Outcomes,
including those in Chapter 8, when using social media as a marketing tool. For example, if a
relationship with a client is established and continued via social media, the solicitor must still
comply with Chapter 1 of the Code on client care (see Chapter 10) and Chapter 4 of the Code
with regard to confidentiality and disclosure (see Chapter 12). A Law Society practice note on
social media gives as an example a solicitor commenting on Twitter that he is in a certain
location at a certain time which may result in him unintentionally disclosing that he is
working with a client, so breaching the duty to keep the affairs of clients confidential
(Outcome 4.1).
Where a solicitor is using social media for personal use, he must still be mindful that he could
be associated with views expressed, comments and activities that are available to view by a
wider audience online, and so should consider compliance with, for example, Principle 6, ie
behaving in a way that maintains the trust the public places in the profession (see Chapter 8).
9.3.3 Responsibility for advertising

A solicitor may instruct a third party, such as an advertising agency, to deal with certain
aspects of his advertising campaign. However, allowing any other person to conduct publicity
for his firm in a way that would breach the Principles may tend to show that a solicitor has not
achieved the Outcomes (Indicative Behaviour 8.6).
9.4 REFERRALS OF BUSINESS

9.4.1 Introduction
In addition to targeting the general public, a solicitor may also enter into an agreement with a
third party to refer clients to the solicitor. For example, a solicitor could enter into an
arrangement with a local estate agent, so that the agent will ‘introduce’ to the solicitor’s firm
any potential house buyers looking for a solicitor to complete their conveyancing. Any such
arrangement must comply with the Principles, the most relevant being Principles 2, 3, 4 and 5
(see Chapter 8), and the Outcomes in Chapter 9 of the Code.
9.4.2 Chapter 9 of the Code – Referrals

As the relationship between a solicitor and his client should be built on trust, it follows that
any referral arrangement should not jeopardise that trust. Accordingly, a solicitor should
ensure that his independence and professional judgement are not prejudiced by virtue of any
arrangement with another person (Outcome 9.1). Accordingly, allowing an introducer to
influence the advice a solicitor gives to his client may tend to show that the Outcomes have not
been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 9.11). The term ‘arrangement’ is defined to mean any
express or tacit agreement between a solicitor and another person, whether contractually
binding or not, and the term ‘referral’ includes any situation in which another person,
business or organisation introduces, refers or recommends a client to the solicitor’s business,
or otherwise puts the solicitor and a client in touch with each other (Handbook Glossary).
A solicitor must also ensure that the clients’ interests are protected regardless of the interests
of an introducer (defined in the Handbook Glossary as any person, business or organisation
who or that introduces or refers potential clients to the firm, or recommends your firm to
clients, or otherwise puts the solicitor and clients in touch with each other) or the solicitor’s
own interest in receiving referrals (Outcome 9.2).
In entering into any arrangement, clients must still be in a position to make informed
decisions about how to pursue their matter (Outcome 9.3). Clearly, accepting referrals where
a solicitor has reason to believe that a client has been pressurised or misled into instructing
him may tend to show that the Outcomes have not been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 9.12).
Indicative Behaviour 1.4 (‘Client Care’) also provides that it may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved by the solicitor explaining any referral arrangements which are
relevant to the client’s instructions.
Entering into arrangements only with reputable third parties and monitoring the outcome of
those arrangements to ensure that clients are treated fairly may tend to show that the solicitor
has achieved the necessary Outcomes (Indicative Behaviour 9.1), as will advising a client if the
arrangement with an introducer is not in his best interests (Indicative Behaviour 9.2) and
terminating any arrangement that causes a solicitor to breach the Principles on any
requirements of the Code (Indicative Behaviour 9.3). Being satisfied that any client referred by
an introducer has not been acquired as a result of marketing or other activities which, if done
by a person regulated by the SRA, would be contrary to the Principles or any requirements of
the Code (see 9.3) is also an Indicative Behaviour (9.4). Entering into any type of business
relationship which places a solicitor in breach of any of the SRA Authorisation Rules or any
other regulatory requirements in the Handbook may tend to show that the outcomes have not
been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 9.10).
9.4.3 Referral fees

During March 2004, the Master of the Rolls lifted the ban on solicitors paying referral fees to
third parties introducing clients to solicitors. These arrangements have been used mainly in
areas such as personal injury and conveyancing. For example, in April 2005 it was reported
that Shoosmiths had agreed to pay a referral fee to the Automobile Association (AA) in respect
of the parties’ deal that Shoosmiths would act as the exclusive provider of legal services to the
AA’s customers.
After some uncertainty as to their future, the SRA announced in December 2007 that referral
fees would continue to be permitted. However, with effect from 1 April 2013, the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) prohibits the payment or
receipt of referral fees in claims for damages following personal injury or death. As a result, an
Outcome has been added to the Code to provide that those governed by the Code must ensure
that any payment (as defined) made for services, such as marketing, does not amount to a
‘prohibited referral fee’ (as defined in the Handbook Glossary with reference to the relevant
sections of LASPO 2012) (Outcome 9.8). Firms are also obliged to retain records and
management information to enable them to demonstrate that any payments made are not
prohibited referral fees (Indicative Behaviour 9.9). The Outcomes are further supported by
Indicative Behaviours 9.7 and 9.8.
The SRA has warned solicitors that they should only deal with claims management companies
that are appropriately regulated. It is envisaged, however, that the ban on referral fees for
personal injury work will result in a steep reduction in the claims management company
industry and so result in a loss of client leads which firms previously derived from this source.
A solicitor must ensure that clients are informed of any financial or other interest which an
introducer has in referring the client to him (Outcome 9.4), and that any financial
arrangements are in writing (Outcome 9.7). Accordingly, it may tend to show that the relevant
Outcomes have been achieved where a solicitor draws the client’s attention to any payments
he makes or other consideration provided in connection with any referral (Indicative
Behaviour 9.5); and if he ensures that where any information needs to be given to clients, this
is clear and in writing or in a form appropriate to the client’s needs (Indicative Behaviour 9.6).
9.4.4 Limitations
A solicitor must not make any payments to an introducer in respect of clients who are the
subject of criminal proceedings or who have the benefit of public funding (Outcome 9.6).
9.5 FEE SHARING

Fee sharing would occur if a solicitor made a payment to a third party in respect of a
percentage of fees earned on a particular matter, or a percentage of the solicitor’s gross or net
fees for a particular period.
The provisions of Chapter 9 of the Code relating to referrals of business apply equally to fee-
sharing arrangements. Accordingly, a solicitor must ensure that independence and his
professional judgement are not prejudiced by virtue of any such arrangement (Outcome 9.1),
and that the client’s interests are protected regardless of the interests of the fee sharer or his
own interests in receiving referrals under such an arrangement (Outcome 9.2). The client
must be informed of any fee-sharing arrangement that is relevant to his matter (Outcome 9.5;
see also Indicative Behaviour 1.4). The other provisions are as set out in Chapter 9 (see 9.4).
9.6 INTRODUCTIONS TO THIRD PARTIES

9.6.1 Introduction
In circumstances where a solicitor wishes to refer a client to third parties, such as another
lawyer or a financial services provider, the duties of the solicitor are set out in Chapter 6 of the
Code. In making such a referral, the solicitor must ensure that his recommendation is in the
best interests of the client and does not compromise the solicitor’s independence (Outcome
6.1). A client must also be fully informed of any financial or other interest which the solicitor
has in referring the client to another person or business (Outcome 6.2) and must be in a
position to make informed decisions about how to pursue his matter (Outcome 6.3).
With effect from 1 April 2013, the payment or receipt of referral fees in claims for damages
following personal injury or death is prohibited (see 9.4.3). A ‘prohibited referral fee’ (as
defined in the Handbook Glossary) must not be paid to those governed by the Code (Outcome
6.4). This is supported by Indicative Behaviours 6.3 and 6.4.
9.6.2 Financial services

A solicitor who carries out a regulated activity without being authorised by the Financial
Conduct Authority or exempt will commit a criminal offence. A regulated activity would
include giving advice on a specified investment such as stocks and shares. There are a number
of exemptions and exclusions of which a solicitor may take advantage when carrying out a
regulated activity (see Chapter 17).
However, it may tend to show that the Outcomes of the Code have not been achieved where a
solicitor enters into any arrangement, eg with a financial services provider, which restricts his
freedom to recommend any particular business (Indicative Behaviour 6.5). An example of this
would be where a solicitor enters into an agreement with Monks and Co Financial Advisers to
refer all clients seeking financial advice to that firm, as this would restrict the solicitor’s
ability to refer clients to another suitable firm within the area. The only exception to this is
where the advice concerns regulated mortgage contracts, general insurance contracts or pure
protection contracts (as defined in the Handbook Glossary). However, even where this
exception applies, it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved where any
arrangement entered into by the solicitor provides that referrals will be made only where this
is in the best interests of the particular client and where the contract is suitable for his needs
(Indicative Behaviour 6.1). Where any referrals are made to a third party that can offer
products from only one source (ie a tied agent), it may tend to show that the Outcomes have
been achieved where the referral is to be made only after the client has been informed of this
limitation (Indicative Behaviour 6.2).
Lastly, a solicitor must properly account to clients for any financial benefit (eg commission)
he receives as a result of his instructions (Outcome 1.15 and see also Indicative Behaviour
1.20). This would include a referral to a financial services provider (see 11.13).
The topic of financial services and solicitors is considered further in Chapter 17.
9.7 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question Your firm is conducting a marketing drive. Your marketing department has
identified a number of former clients who have not used your firm for a
number of years. The marketing department suggests that the firm telephones
these former clients to try to convince them to use the firm again.
Your marketing department also suggests approaching people in the street to
conduct a survey about legal services which would involve collecting their
contact details as potential clients.
Can your firm do this?

Answer Your firm must comply with the general law concerning advertising/publicity
and also with Chapter 8 of the Code. A firm must not make unsolicited
telephone calls to members of the public (Outcome 8.3). However, the
definition of ‘members of the public’ does not include the former clients of the
firm. Therefore the firm can cold-call former clients as long as it complies with
the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the general law. The firm
should have given its clients (and former clients) an opportunity to refuse to
receive direct marketing, such as cold-calls. If this process has been carried out,
the firm must not call those former clients who have withheld their consent.
Conducting the survey in the street would be an example of behaviour which
may tend to show that the solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes in Chapter
8, and therefore has not complied with the Principles (Indicative Behaviour
8.5).
EXAMPLE 2
Question You are contacted by a local firm of insurance agents who offer a wide range of
financial products, but only those developed and provided by one particular
insurance company. The firm proposes entering into an arrangement whereby
you refer all clients seeking financial advice to it. In return it will pay you a
modest commission for each client referred.
Can you accept this proposition?
Answer In accordance with the Outcomes in Chapter 6 of the Code, any
recommendation that a client uses a particular business must be in the best
interests of the client and must not compromise your independence (Outcome
6.1). The proposed arrangement here would restrict your freedom to
recommend any particular business to clients for the purposes of seeking
advice on financial products, and so may tend to show that the Outcomes have
not been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 6.5). However, an exception would be
if the arrangement was only in connection with advice concerning regulated
mortgage contracts, general insurance contracts or pure protection contracts
(Indicative Behaviour 6.5). In taking advantage of such an arrangement, it may
tend to show that you have achieved the Outcomes by informing the client
beforehand that the firm in question is a tied agent (ie offers products from
only one source) (Indicative Behaviour 6.2), and, in relation to regulated
mortgage contracts, general insurance contracts or pure protection contracts,
if the referral is in the best interests of the particular client and the product is
suitable for his needs (Indicative Behaviour 6.1). You must inform the client of
the financial interest you have in referring him to the firm, ie the commission
(Outcome 6.2), and account to the client for this (Outcome 1.15).
SUMMARY
(1) Solicitors should always be independent when giving advice to a client and ensure
that their clients’ interests are protected.
(2) Solicitors are free to publicise their practice, provided that they comply with the
general law on advertising in force at the time and with the Outcomes in Chapter 8
of the Code.
(3) A solicitor’s promotional material must not be misleading or inaccurate.
(4) Solicitors may enter into a financial arrangement with an introducer and enter into
fee-sharing arrangements, provided that they comply with the Outcomes in Chapter
9 of the Code.
(5) A solicitor may introduce clients to third parties, such as a financial services
provider, provided he complies with the Outcomes in Chapter 6 of the Code.
The Retainer 115
CHAPTER 10
The Retainer
10.2 Acceptance of instructions 115
10.3 Refusal of instructions to act 116
10.4 Duties to the client during the retainer 118
10.5 The client’s authority 120
10.6 Termination of the retainer 120
10.7 Liens 121
10.8 Examples 121
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• accepting and declining instructions
• the duties owed to the client
• ending the relationship.
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The contract between a solicitor and his client is often referred to as a ‘retainer’. As with any
other contract, the relationship between the solicitor and the client is governed by the general
law. However, in addition to considering the general law, a solicitor must also comply with
obligations placed upon him by the requirements of professional conduct.
10.2 ACCEPTANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS

10.2.1 Terms of the retainer
As noted above, many of the terms of the retainer will be implied into the contract either by
the law, or by the requirements of professional conduct. Some of these terms are considered
below. However, the solicitor must ensure that the more basic terms of the retainer are
understood by the client. One such critical issue is to ensure that the client understands
exactly what work the solicitor has agreed to undertake. Although not required by the Code, it
would be good practice for a solicitor to send a letter to his client at the start of the
transaction, confirming to the client exactly what he understands his instructions to be (and
also what action, if any, the client must take), along with certain other information to show
compliance with the Outcomes in Chapter 1 of the Code (‘Client Care’) and the Principles (see
Chapter 11). This will help to avoid any misunderstandings at a later date, such as where a
client makes a complaint against the solicitor for his failure to complete a certain task which
the solicitor was unaware he had been instructed to complete.
It is important that a client’s expectations are managed at an early stage of the solicitor–client
relationship. If the client knows what the solicitor will and will not be doing for him, there will
be less scope for problems to arise at a later date.
10.2.2 Identity of the client

Equally, the solicitor must ensure that he clarifies the identity of his client. For example, a
solicitor may be instructed by a director of a company concerning the debts of that company.
The solicitor will be obliged to clarify whether he is being instructed by the director in her
personal capacity, or by the director on behalf of the company (ie, the company will be the
client, not the director personally). As noted below, a solicitor owes many duties to his client,
and he can ensure that these duties are met only if he knows the identity of his client.
A solicitor is also under a separate duty to obtain ‘satisfactory evidence’ of the identity of his
clients (ie, are they who they say they are?). This obligation is imposed by the Money
Laundering Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2157) and is considered further at 15.2.3.
10.2.3 Third party instructions

A solicitor may receive instructions from a third party on behalf of a client. For example, a
client’s daughter may seek to instruct a solicitor on behalf of her elderly mother, as the mother
may have mobility problems in attending the solicitor’s office.
Alternatively, a solicitor may receive instructions from one client purporting to instruct the
solicitor on behalf of a number of clients. For example, a solicitor may be instructed by Mr
Smith to purchase a property on behalf of Mr Smith and Mr Brown.
Where a solicitor receives such third party instructions, it may tend to show that the relevant
Outcomes have not been achieved if he acts without satisfying himself that the person
providing the instructions has the authority to do so on behalf of all of the clients (the mother
in the first example; Mr Smith and Mr Brown in the second example) (Indicative Behaviour
1.25).
When considering whether to accept instructions from or on behalf of a number of clients,
the solicitor must take into account any actual or potential conflicts of interests (see Chapter
13).
10.3 REFUSAL OF INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT

10.3.1 Introduction
Solicitors firms spend thousands of pounds in attempting to attract new clients to their
business. They will also try to ensure that they retain their existing clients. However, there will
be some clients for whom a solicitor will decline to act. For example, a solicitor may decline to
act for a client who is known for not paying his legal fees.
Generally, like any other business, a solicitor is free to decide whether to accept or decline
instructions to act for a particular client. However, this discretion is limited by the
requirements of professional conduct set out in the Code, and also by the general law (see
Outcome 1.3). A solicitor may not decline to act in certain circumstances.
10.3.2 Restrictions placed on the refusal of instructions

A solicitor must not unlawfully discriminate against anyone in his professional dealings
(Outcome 2.1). Therefore, if a solicitor discriminates unlawfully when accepting or refusing
instructions to act for a client, it may tend to show that he has not achieved this Outcome
10.3.3 Situations where a solicitor may or has to decline to act

10.3.3.1 Duress or undue influence and vulnerable clients
A solicitor must provide services to his clients in a manner which protects their interests in
their matter, subject to the proper administration of justice (Outcome 1.2). It follows,
therefore, that it may tend to show that the relevant Outcomes have not been achieved if a
The Retainer 117
solicitor acts for a client when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the instructions
are affected by duress or undue influence, without satisfying himself that they represent the
client’s wishes (Indicative Behaviour 1.28).
The elderly, or those with language or learning difficulties, or mental health issues, are
particularly susceptible to undue pressure from others. It may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved in taking instructions and during the course of the retainer
where the solicitor has proper regard to the client’s mental capacity or other vulnerability,
such as incapacity or duress (Indicative Behaviour 1.6). Where a solicitor suspects that a
client’s instructions are tainted by duress or undue influence, it would be prudent for him
therefore to take steps to ensure that the client’s instructions are genuine, eg by arranging to
interview the client alone, away from any third party such as a relative.
A solicitor should also bear in mind his duties under the Equality Act 2010, in particular the
need to make reasonable adjustments in relation to clients with disabilities (Outcome 2.3 and
see 8.11). In its guidance ‘Outcomes-focused regulation at a glance’, the SRA provides the
following as examples of evidence of good client care:
(a) In a case where a solicitor is concerned about the client’s mental capacity, the file should
clearly document the steps taken to establish that the client had the necessary capacity
to instruct him on the matter.
(b) In a case where a solicitor was concerned about the client’s ability to speak and/or
understand English, the file should indicate whether an independent interpreter was
used.
10.3.3.2 Where a solicitor cannot act in the client’s best interests

A solicitor must treat his clients fairly (Outcome 1.1), and it may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved and that the solicitor has therefore complied with the
Principles where the solicitor considers whether he should decline to act because he cannot
act in the client’s best interests (Indicative Behaviour 1.7). There is an overlap here with
Principle 4 and other Outcomes and Indicative Behaviours in the Code, eg a solicitor should
not act where there is an own-interest conflict or a client conflict (see Chapter 13), or where
the solicitor holds ‘material’ confidential information for an existing or former client which
would be relevant to a new instruction (see Chapter 12).
A solicitor must have the resources, skills and procedures to carry out his client’s instructions
(Outcome 1.4). Accordingly, the solicitor must consider the level and quality of service he will
be able to provide to the client. Every solicitors’ firm will have a maximum capacity of work
with which the firm can deal effectively at any one time. If the solicitor or firm does not have
the time or resources to deal with the client’s matter then it would not be in that client’s best
interests to accept the instruction.
Equally, if a solicitor is approached by a prospective client about an area of law about which
the solicitor knows very little, it would be in the client’s best interests to be referred to another
solicitor or firm which possesses the requisite knowledge.
10.3.3.3 Gifts of significant value

The Code also provides that it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved and
the Principles complied with if a solicitor refuses to act where his client proposes to make a
gift of significant value to him or to a member of his family, or to a member of his firm or that
person’s family, unless the client takes independent legal advice (Indicative Behaviour 1.9).
The Code provides no further guidance on what would amount to ‘significant value’ in this
context. However, the Law Society has issued a practice note, which indicates that an amount
may be significant in itself, or as a proportion of the client’s estate. It advises that a solicitor
should carefully consider any gift worth more than £500 to determine whether it may be
considered significant in the particular circumstances, and that it can be assumed that it
would be significant if:
(a) it is worth more than 1% of the client’s current estimated net estate;
(b) it might become valuable at some point, especially after the death of the client;
(c) it provides a benefit to an individual which is more valuable than his relationship to the
deceased reasonably justifies.
The note advises solicitors, before preparing a will in such circumstances, to consult the
firm’s compliance officer for legal practice (COLP) or a senior practice member, who will then
consider the potential conflict of interests (see Chapter 13) and the best interests of the client,
and to place a written summary of the decision with the file. The SRA Guidance on the
Drafting and Preparation of Wills provides an example of a situation where it may be still
appropriate to draft the will even if the client has not received independent legal advice. This
is where the solicitor is drafting wills for his own parents and the survivor of them wishes to
leave the residuary estate to the solicitor and his siblings in equal shares.
10.3.3.4 Compliance with the law and the Code

In deciding whether to act (or terminate his instructions) a solicitor must comply with the law
and the Code (Outcome 1.3). For example, a solicitor instructed on the sale of a property
might be instructed to draw up a false surveyor’s report and send it to the purchaser in order
to hide some defects to the structure of the property. If the solicitor agreed, he would be
participating in a fraud against the purchaser. Clearly, instructions must be refused here.
Where a solicitor becomes aware that his client is involved in criminal conduct, the solicitor
must consider very carefully the obligations placed on him by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(see Chapter 15).
Examples of instructions which would not comply with the Code are where:
(a) there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of interest between the solicitor and his client, or
between two or more clients (see Chapter 13);
(b) the solicitor holds material confidential information for an existing or former client
which would be relevant to a new instruction (see Chapter 12);
(c) the client instructs the solicitor to mislead or deceive the court (see 16.1.1).
Also, entering into unlawful fee arrangements when accepting instructions from a client may
tend to show that the Outcomes have not been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 1.27; see also
Outcome 1.6). This would include an unlawful contingency fee (see Chapter 11).
10.4 DUTIES TO THE CLIENT DURING THE RETAINER

10.4.1 Introduction
A solicitor will owe the client a number of duties throughout the retainer. These duties are
prescribed by the common law and the requirements of professional conduct. Some of these
duties (such as the duty of confidentiality) will continue even after the retainer has been
terminated. The following are examples of some of the duties that solicitors owe to their
clients.
10.4.2 Duty of reasonable care and skill

In addition to the solicitor’s duty of care in common law, s 13 of the Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982 provides that a supplier of services will carry out those services with
reasonable care and skill. This term is implied into the retainer between a solicitor and his
client, and therefore the solicitor may be sued for a breach of contract if the term is breached.
However, this implied term does not apply to advocacy services provided before a court,
The Retainer 119
tribunal, inquiry or arbitrator (Supply of Services (Exclusion of Implied Terms) Order 1982 (SI
1982/1771), art 2).
Nevertheless, the solicitor may be sued for negligence in both contentious and non-
contentious proceedings. The House of Lords removed an advocate’s protection from
negligence claims in Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615. Accordingly, a solicitor who
acts as an advocate may be sued in the tort of negligence if he breaches his duty of care to his
client within court proceedings.
In certain circumstances, a solicitor may owe a duty of care to third parties, such as
beneficiaries to an estate (see 16.5.6).
10.4.3 Duty to act in the best interests of the client

As has been noted throughout this Part, a solicitor must act in the best interests of his client.
This duty is taken from the Principles in the Code of Conduct, and also from common law.
The solicitor–client relationship is said to be a ‘fiduciary relationship’. Under the common
law, a fiduciary relationship is one where one party must act in the best interests of the other
party. This means that the solicitor must put the interests of his client before his own.
Another example of a fiduciary relationship is the doctor–patient relationship. Directors of a
company also owe a fiduciary duty to the company itself.
Where such a relationship exists, one party may not make a secret profit at the expense of the
other party. For example, a solicitor may be paid commission, say £50, when referring a client
to a third party such as an accountant (see Chapter 9). As the solicitor owes a fiduciary duty to
his client, this £50 must be accounted for to the client. This duty to account is also mirrored
by the Code (see 11.14).
Equally, there is a presumption of undue influence where a fiduciary duty exists. This means
that in any dealings between a solicitor and his client, there will be a rebuttable presumption
that the solicitor has exercised undue influence in persuading the client to enter into that
dealing. In order to rebut this presumption, the solicitor would need to show that such
influence had not been exercised, for example by making a full disclosure of all relevant facts,
ensuring that the client took independent legal advice and understood the transaction, and
ensuring that all dealings were fair and at arm’s length.
10.4.4 Taking advantage of the client

As a result of the fiduciary relationship between the solicitor and client, the solicitor must not
take advantage of the client. This is reflected in Principle 2 of the Code, which provides that a
solicitor must act with integrity, and in certain of the Outcomes, eg that a solicitor must treat
his clients fairly (Outcome 1.1).
10.4.5 Confidentiality
A solicitor and his firm have a duty to keep the affairs of their client confidential. This duty
continues even after the retainer has been terminated. This topic is considered in detail in
Chapter 12.
10.4.6 Disclosure
A solicitor owes the client a duty to disclose all relevant information to the client, regardless
of the source of this information. This topic is considered in detail in Chapter 12.
10.4.7 Client care and costs

A solicitor is obliged to provide information on costs and other issues at the start of and
throughout the matter, to enable the client to make informed decisions. A solicitor must also
keep the client informed throughout the transaction and deal with the client’s matter in a
timely manner (see Chapter 11).
10.5 THE CLIENT’S AUTHORITY

A solicitor may derive authority from the retainer to bind the client in certain circumstances.
This authority can be limited expressly by the client in the terms of the retainer. However, the
solicitor should never seek to rely on this implied authority to bind the client. Express
instructions should always be taken from the client prior to the solicitor taking any step in the
proceedings or matter.
10.6 TERMINATION OF THE RETAINER

10.6.1 Introduction
As with any contractual relationship, the retainer may be terminated by either party, or by the
general law.
10.6.2 Termination by the client

A client may terminate the retainer at any time for any reason. However, the client is likely to
be liable to pay the solicitor’s fees for work done up until the point of termination. A solicitor
may require his costs to be paid prior to forwarding the file to the client (see 10.7).
10.6.3 Termination by the solicitor

In contrast to the right of a client to terminate the retainer at will, the Code of Conduct
restricts the right of a solicitor to terminate the retainer. Outcome 1.3 provides that when
deciding whether to terminate his instructions, a solicitor must comply with the general law
and the Code. Ceasing to act for a client without good reason and without providing
reasonable notice may tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved this Outcome (Indicative
Behaviour 1.26).
10.6.3.1 Good reason

In the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007 examples were given by the SRA of what constitutes ‘a
good reason’ to terminate, and these continue to be helpful. They include where:
(a) the solicitor has to terminate the retainer because the instructions would involve the
solicitor in a breach of the law or the requirements of professional conduct;
(b) the solicitor cannot obtain proper instructions from the client;
(c) there has been a breakdown in confidence within the relationship between the solicitor
and client (eg, the client is not willing to accept the advice of the solicitor).
10.6.3.2 Reasonable notice

The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007 provided that what amounts to
‘reasonable notice’ will depend on the circumstances. For example, the guidance stated that it
would rarely be acceptable to stop acting for the client immediately before a court hearing,
where it would be impossible for the client to find someone else to represent him at the
hearing.
10.6.4 Termination by law

The retainer will be terminated automatically by law in certain circumstances. These include
where the solicitor is declared bankrupt or either party loses mental capacity after the retainer
has commenced.
Where the solicitor does not practise as a sole practitioner, his being declared bankrupt or
losing mental capacity will have little practical effect, as one of his partners will take over the
client’s matter.
Where the client loses mental capacity, the solicitor should have regard to the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 and its accompanying Code.
The Retainer 121
10.6.5 Responsibilities on termination

As a matter of good practice, a solicitor should confirm to the client in writing that the
retainer has been terminated, and take steps to deal with any property of the client which may
be held by the solicitor. For example, the solicitor may be holding client monies which,
subject to the position on costs, should be returned to the client as soon as possible, together
with any interest. The solicitor will also have to deal with the client’s paperwork. It may tend
to show that the Outcomes have been achieved as to client care if, when a solicitor has to cease
acting for a client, he explains to the client his possible options for pursuing his matter
Where the client’s matter is ongoing and the client has instructed another firm of solicitors, it
may be advisable to retain a copy of the file. The solicitor should also consider the client’s
rights and the solicitor’s obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Act requires
that any personal data in those files are retained only for the purpose for which they were
collected, although this will not prevent the solicitor from retaining a copy of the file in order
to defend himself from any future claims of negligence.
10.7 LIENS
A lien is a legal right that allows a creditor to retain a debtor’s property until payment.
Accordingly, a solicitor may hold on to property already in his possession, such as client’s
papers, until his proper fees are paid. The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct
2007 suggested that where possible an undertaking to pay the costs should be accepted
instead of the solicitor retaining the client’s papers under a lien.
The court has the power under s 68 of the Solicitors Act 1974 to order the solicitor to deliver
up any papers to the client. The SRA also has a similar power where it has intervened in a
solicitor’s practice (see 7.8.2).
Alternatively, a solicitor may apply to court under s 73 of the Solicitors Act 1974 for a charging
order over any personal property of the client recovered or preserved by the solicitor within
litigation proceedings. The charging order may cover the solicitor’s taxed costs for those
proceedings.
10.8 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are instructed by Mr Evans on behalf of his elderly mother. He instructs you
to transfer his mother’s house into his name. He gives you a letter purportedly
from his mother confirming these instructions. He explains that her age means
that she is unable to visit your office to speak with you in person.
Should you accept these instructions?
Answer There are two issues here. First, as you have received these instructions from a
third party, it may tend to show that you have not achieved the relevant
Outcomes if you act for Mrs Evans, unless you are satisfied that Mr Evans has
the authority to give those instructions (Indicative Behaviour 1.25).
Secondly, the circumstances (Mrs Evans’ age, the facts that she is gifting away a
valuable asset and her absence from your office) should give reasonable
grounds to suspect duress or undue influence. It may tend to show that you
have not achieved the Outcomes if you act for Mrs Evans without satisfying
yourself that the instructions represent her wishes (Indicative Behaviour 1.28).
To do so, you would need to interview Mrs Evans away from her son and assess
whether you believe she genuinely wishes to transfer her house to her son.
Where there is no actual evidence of undue influence but the client wants to act
against his or her best interests, it would be advisable to explain the
consequences of the instructions and ask the client whether he or she wishes to
proceed, and for this advice and consent to be documented.
EXAMPLE 2
Question You have acted for Ms Caldicott for a number of years, and consider her to be a
good client. You are currently dealing with the sale of one of her businesses.
She contacts you to express her disappointment that your firm has recently
been acting in defence of a large corporation accused of polluting a local river.
On this basis she demands that you transfer her files to Jones & Co Solicitors.
You do not consider that you have done anything wrong, and wish to dispute
Ms Caldicott’s right to transfer solicitors. Can you do this?
Answer No. A client can terminate at any time and for any reason. Whilst you have a
right to claim a lien over Ms Caldicott’s files until any outstanding bills are paid,
previous SRA guidance suggests that you should accept an undertaking from
Jones & Co to pay your costs rather than exercising this right.
SUMMARY
Acceptance of instructions
(1) The solicitor must ensure that the client understands the extent of the retainer
between the solicitor and client.
(2) Where the solicitor receives instructions from a third party, it may tend to show that
the client care Outcomes have not been achieved if he acts for the client, unless he is
satisfied that the third party has the authority to issue instructions on behalf of all
the clients.
Refusal of instructions
(1) A solicitor’s ability to accept or decline instructions is limited by the general law and
the requirements of professional conduct.
(2) It may tend to show that the client care Outcomes have not been achieved where a
solicitor discriminates unlawfully when refusing instructions to act for a client.
Duty to the client during the retainer
(1) The solicitor has a duty to act with reasonable skill and care when providing services
(such as legal advice).
(2) The solicitor has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the client.
Accordingly, a solicitor must not take advantage of his client.
(3) A solicitor owes various duties to the client throughout the retainer, including a duty
of confidentiality and a duty of disclosure.
(4) A solicitor should not seek to rely on any implied authority to bind his client.
Termination of the retainer
(1) The retainer may be terminated by either party, or by law.
(2) The solicitor’s right to terminate the retainer is restricted by the law and the
requirements of professional conduct.
(3) As a matter of good practice, a solicitor should deal promptly with the papers and
property of the client within his possession. In certain circumstances a solicitor may
exercise a lien over this property until his fees are paid.
Client Care and Costs 123
CHAPTER 11
Client Care and Costs

11.2 Client care – Chapter 1 124
11.3 Information about costs 125
11.4 Client care letter 127
11.5 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 127
11.6 Fees and costs 127
11.7 Options available for solicitor’s fees 128
11.8 Money on account 130
11.9 Solicitor’s bill 130
11.10 Client’s right to challenge the bill 131
11.11 Non-contentious business agreements 133
11.12 Contentious business agreements 133
11.13 Overcharging 133
11.14 Commission 133
11.15 Example 134
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• the obligation to give the client information
• the controls which exist over the charges solicitors may make to their clients
• how a client may challenge the charges made by a solicitor
• the need to account to clients for commissions received.
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The marketplace for legal services is a very competitive area. From high street firms to large
city firms, the competition to work for the best clients in a particular matter is often fierce.
Firms often spend large amounts of money on marketing budgets to attract clients. It is
therefore in the firms’ best interests to try to keep their clients from instructing other firms by
providing a high level of service.
Where a client becomes dissatisfied with his solicitors, it is often due to a lack of information
concerning issues such as costs or how the matter is progressing. Accordingly, Chapter 1 of the
Code of Conduct sets out the minimum standards of service that a client can expect to receive.
The Code is not prescriptive on exactly how a firm should comply with the Outcomes in
Chapter 1, as different types of law firms will have in place differing client care systems. Also,
the Notes to Chapter 1 make clear that the information a solicitor gives to clients will vary
according to the needs and circumstances of the individual client and the type of work the
solicitor is doing for him. For example, a client providing instructions on a conveyancing
matter is unlikely to need the same information as a sophisticated commercial client who
instructs the firm on a regular basis.
The aim of Chapter 1 links in with Principle 5 of the Code: the solicitor must provide a proper
standard of service to his clients. This includes a proper standard of client care.
11.2 CLIENT CARE – CHAPTER 1

11.2.1 Clients able to make informed decisions
A solicitor must ensure that clients are in a position to make informed decisions about the
services they need, how their matter will be handled and the options available to them
(Outcome 1.12).
As part of this process, it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved where a
solicitor discusses whether the potential outcomes of the client’s matter are likely to justify
the expense or risk involved, including any risk of having to pay someone else’s legal fees
(Indicative Behaviour 1.13). For example, a complaint from clients is often that they were
unaware that it would cost so much to achieve so little.
11.2.2 Level of service

In general terms, a solicitor must treat his clients fairly (Outcome 1.1). The services offered by
a solicitor to his clients must be provided in a manner which protects their interests in their
matter, subject to the proper administration of justice (Outcome 1.2). The service provided
must also be competent, delivered in a timely manner, and take accounts of a client’s needs
and circumstances (Outcome 1.5).
It may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved where a solicitor agrees an
appropriate level of service with his client, for example the type and frequency of
communications (Indicative Behaviour 1.1). Some clients may want to be updated in writing
on a regular basis. On the other hand, a client may want to hear nothing from a solicitor until
a certain stage of a transaction has been reached.
11.2.3 Responsibilities
Both the solicitor and client will have their own responsibilities during a matter. For example,
one of the responsibilities of the solicitor could be to keep the client informed of progress and
seek the client’s instructions where required. The solicitor will also expect the client to keep
him updated as the matter progresses. It may tend to show that the Outcomes have been
achieved where these responsibilities are explained to the client (Indicative Behaviour 1.2);
and although not a requirement of the Code, it would be prudent to have a written record of
this information from the outset.
11.2.4 Status and supervision

By ensuring that a client is told, in writing, the name and status of the person(s) dealing with
the matter, and the name of the person responsible for its overall supervision, a solicitor may
tend to show that he has achieved the Outcomes relating to client care (Indicative Behaviour
1.3). Again, it would seem prudent to do this at the start of the matter.
11.2.5 Restrictions on acting

Where a client has been referred to the solicitor by a third party and/or because of the way the
client’s matter is funded, there may be conditions placed on how the solicitor may act for
the client. For example, a client may be referred to a solicitor by the client’s insurer. Under
the terms of acting, the solicitor may not be able to issue proceedings without the
authority of the insurer (who will be funding any such action). Accordingly, it may tend to
show that the Outcomes have been achieved by the solicitor explaining any limitations or
conditions on what he can do for the client (Indicative Behaviour 1.5).
However, a solicitor must ensure that his independence and professional judgement are not
prejudiced by virtue of any arrangement with a third party, and he should advise a client in
circumstances where such an arrangement is not a client’s best interests (see 9.4.2).
11.2.6 Information on regulation

Clients must be informed whether and how the services being provided are regulated and how
this affects the protections available to the client (Outcome 1.7). For solicitors, the regulator
will be the SRA and, in some circumstances, the Financial Conduct Authority (see Chapter
17). Further requirements are set out in Chapter 8 of the Code (see 9.3.2.3).
11.3 INFORMATION ABOUT COSTS

11.3.1 Introduction
One of the most important issues for a client is the overall cost of legal services. When an
individual goes into a shop to buy something, it is easy for that person to work out how much
the thing will cost and therefore whether he wants to spend that amount of money on buying
the product.
The provision of legal services often does not work in the same way. Nevertheless, the client
must be given the best possible information as to the overall costs of the matter if he is to be
able to make an informed decision about whether he wants to go ahead with it.
11.3.2 Best possible information

A solicitor is obliged to provide the client with the best possible information about the likely
overall cost of a matter, both at the time of engagement and when appropriate as his matter
progresses (Outcome 1.13).
As for how a solicitor can show that he has provided the best possible information about
costs, the Indicative Behaviours in Chapter 1 of the Code provide some guidance. The solicitor
clearly explaining his fees and if and when they are likely to change may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 1.14). For example, the client may be
charged a fixed fee, or by reference to an hourly charge-out rate. Another Indicative Behaviour
is warning the client about any other payments for which he may be responsible (Indicative
Behaviour 1.15). For example, when dealing with a residential conveyancing matter, the
solicitor will be obliged to obtain details concerning the property from local authority and
Land Registry searches. It may also tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved if a
solicitor ensures that disbursements included in his bill reflect the actual amount spent or to
be spent on behalf of the client (Indicative Behaviour 1.21).
It will often be impossible to provide an accurate estimate of the overall cost of a matter at the
start. However, just providing the client with details of the solicitor’s charge-out rate will
rarely be sufficient. For example, if the only information the solicitor provides to a client is
that his charge-out rate will be £200 per hour, the client will not know whether he will have to
pay £200 for the matter to be finished (if the solicitor puts in one hour’s work) or £20,000 (if
the solicitor puts in 100 hours’ work).
If a precise figure is not possible, the SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007
suggested that the solicitor should explain why the precise figure cannot be given and agree
either:
(a) a ceiling figure, above which the solicitor’s costs cannot go, without the client’s
permission; or
(b) a review date when the parties will revisit the costs position.
The solicitor must not forget expressly to include VAT in any hourly rate or quote. For example,
a solicitor may quote his hourly rate as £200 plus VAT. If the solicitor fails to quote with VAT,
the price the client pays will be deemed to include VAT. Accordingly, if a solicitor were to say
that his charge-out rate was £200 per hour, that would be all the client was liable to pay. The
solicitor would have to pay the VAT element to the authorities from this £200, and would
therefore lose out.
11.3.3 Funding arrangements

It may tend to show that the Outcomes in Chapter 1 have been achieved if a solicitor discusses
how the client will pay for the legal services, including whether public funding may be
available, whether the client has insurance that might cover the fees and whether fees may be
paid by someone else, such as a trade union (Indicative Behaviour 1.16).
11.3.3.1 Publicly-funded work

Where a solicitor is acting for a publicly-funded client, it may tend to show that the relevant
Outcomes have been achieved if the solicitor explains how the client’s publicly-funded status
affects the costs (Indicative Behaviour 1.18). This might include the following:
(a) the effect of the statutory charge (ie, that the client may have to repay money to the
Legal Aid Agency should the client recover or preserve any assets in proceedings);
(b) that the client may have to pay a fixed or periodic contribution to the Legal Aid Agency,
and the consequences of not doing so;
(c) the circumstances in which the client may have to pay his own legal costs or the costs of
the other party; and
(d) that even if the client is successful, the other party may not be ordered to pay (or be able
to pay) his costs in full.
11.3.4 Costs issues in litigation

By discussing whether the potential outcomes of the client’s matter are likely to justify the
expense or risk involved, it may tend to show that a solicitor has achieved the Outcomes in
Chapter 1 of the Code (Indicative Behaviour 1.13). This would include discussing any risk of
having to pay someone else’s legal fees. For example, in litigation the client may be ordered to
pay the costs of the winning party. The solicitor should consider whether these costs might be
covered by insurance.
Regardless of any costs order the court may make in favour of the client concerning litigation,
it would be good practice for the client to be advised that he may still be liable to pay his own
solicitor’s costs. For example, the amount that the losing party in litigation is ordered to pay
to the winning party will be assessed by the court, and it is unlikely to cover the entirety of the
winning client’s legal costs. Where the solicitor wishes to charge the client for any such
excess, the solicitor must have entered into a written agreement with the client to that effect
(see CPR, r 48.8(1A)).
The client will also remain liable to pay his solicitor’s costs where the losing party is unable to
meet the costs order. Again, it would be good practice for this to be made clear to the client
prior to starting any litigious proceedings.
11.3.5 Conditional fee arrangements

The Outcomes in Chapter 1 also apply to conditional fee arrangements (see 11.7.3). Where a
solicitor is acting under a conditional fee arrangement, it may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved if the solicitor gives the client all relevant information relating
to that arrangement (Indicative Behaviour 1.17). For example, this might include explaining
the circumstances in which the client will be liable to pay the solicitor’s costs.
11.3.6 Form of costs information

It may tend to show that the relevant Outcomes in Chapter 1 have been achieved where the
solicitor provides the costs information in a clear and accessible form which is appropriate to
the needs and circumstances of the client (Indicative Behaviour 1.19). Although not a
requirement, it would be prudent for this to be done in writing.
11.4 CLIENT CARE LETTER

Under the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007, a solicitor was obliged to provide the necessary
client care information to a client in writing, and this was routinely done in the form of a letter
sent out to the client after the first interview, known as the ‘client care letter’. Although only
information about the complaints procedure is now required to be in writing by the Outcomes
in Chapter 1 (see 7.4), it is likely that solicitors will continue to provide the client care
information and the terms of the firm’s retainer in the form of a letter to the client for the
avoidance of doubt, and to help show compliance with the Outcomes and the Principles.
Additional, but in many respects overlapping, obligations on the provision of information to
clients are contained in the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999) (for
example, stating the firm’s VAT number). As with the information specified in the Code, this
will usually be provided in the client care letter.
11.5 CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 2013

Solicitors need to ensure that they comply with the Consumer Contracts (Information,
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134). These apply to a wide
range of contracts made between solicitors and their clients and would include a contract to
carry out legal work for a client. The Regulations distinguish between ‘on-premises’ and ‘off-
premises’ contracts. Whilst most contracts will be concluded between a solicitor and his
client at the solicitor’s place of business (‘on-premises’), there may be situations which will
result in the contract falling within the definition of an ‘off-premises’ contract, for example
where a solicitor visits a client at home and the client offers to engage him to carry out legal
work. Even if the offer is accepted by the solicitor telephoning the client from his office the
next day, this would be considered an ‘off-premises’ contract.
The Regulations specify that certain pieces of information must be provided to clients before
they enter into the contract. Much of the information that solicitors are required to provide
under the Regulations is likely to be included in their client care letter; however, the
information required varies depending on what type of contract it is. For example, where a
client has agreed to an ‘off-premises’ contract, he must additionally be informed that he has
the right to cancel it without giving any reason or incurring any liability during the
cancellation period (which in most cases is 14 days beginning on the date after the contract is
entered into). Failure to do so is an offence under the Regulations. For this reason, solicitors
need to ensure that if they are likely to enter into contracts in different types of circumstances,
their standard letters contain any additional information required under the Regulations.
Legal aid contracts do not fall within the Regulations.
11.6 FEES AND COSTS

11.6.1 Introduction
The retainer between the solicitor and client is a contract, and so the fees and charges the
solicitor will levy for acting for the client will be agreed between the parties at the start of the
retainer. However, restrictions are placed upon the fees a solicitor may charge, and also upon
how the solicitor will be remunerated by the SRA and the general law. The rest of this chapter
offers a summary of the main provisions; it is not intended to be a comprehensive guide.
These restrictions vary depending upon what type of work the solicitor has agreed to carry out
for the client. A distinction is made between ‘contentious’ business and ‘non-contentious’
business. This distinction is particularly relevant when considering whether, and how, a client
can challenge the bill of a solicitor.
11.6.2 Contentious business

Contentious business is defined as ‘business done, whether as a solicitor or an advocate, in or
for the purposes of proceedings begun before a court or an arbitrator, not being business
which falls within the definition of non-contentious business or common form probate
business’ (Solicitors Act 1974, s 87). Accordingly, contentious business is work done in
relation to proceedings. However, contentious business starts only once proceedings have
been issued.
For example, a client may seek the advice of a solicitor with a view to suing his previous firm
for negligence. The solicitor advises that the client should start proceedings, but suggests that
a letter is sent to the previous firm beforehand, giving that firm seven days to offer
appropriate compensation. The client is clearly contemplating litigious proceedings, but if
the firm makes an acceptable offer before proceedings are issued, the solicitor’s work will be
classified as non-contentious.
11.6.3 Non-contentious business

Non-contentious business is defined as ‘any business done as a solicitor which is not
contentious business’ (Solicitors Act 1974, s 87). This includes obvious examples such as
conveyancing or commercial drafting work. The definition also includes all proceedings
before tribunals, except the Lands Tribunal and the Employment Appeals Tribunal.
Non-contentious business is governed by the Solicitors’ (Non-Contentious Business)
Remuneration Order 2009 (SI 2009/1931).
11.7 OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR SOLICITOR’S FEES

A solicitor may agree to charge a client for work done on a number of different bases. Some of
these options are considered below. Whichever method of charging the client and solicitor
agree, the overall amount of the charge will be regulated by statute and so the client may be
able to challenge the bill at a later date (see 11.10). It may tend to show that the Outcomes in
Chapter 1 of the Code have been achieved if the solicitor clearly explains his fees (however
charged) and if and when they are likely to change (Indicative Behaviour 1.14).
11.7.1 Hourly rate

Perhaps the most common method of charging clients is by use of an hourly rate, ie the client
is charged for the time spent on the file. The client is informed at the start of the matter which
fee earner will be working on the client’s files, and the fee earner’s respective charge-out rates.
However, in order to achieve the Outcome that the client receive the best possible information
about the overall cost of the matter (Outcome 1.13), it is unlikely that merely giving an hourly
rate will be acceptable (see 11.3.2).
11.7.2 Fixed fee

Alternatively a solicitor may agree to complete the work for a fixed fee, or a fixed fee plus VAT
and disbursements. Fixed fees are often used for conveyancing transactions. If the solicitor
agrees to act in return for a fixed fee, this fee cannot be altered at a later date (unless the client
agrees) if the work turns out to be more expensive than the solicitor first expected.
11.7.3 Variable fees

A solicitor is permitted, in certain circumstances, to charge a fee which varies according to the
outcome of the matter. One such example of a variable fee is a contingency fee. However, a
solicitor must only enter fee agreements that are legal, and which he considers are suitable for
the client’s needs and take account of the client’s best interests (Outcome 1.6; see also
Indicative Behaviour 1.27).
Agreements which are permitted by law are conditional fee agreements (CFAs) and damages-
based agreements (DBAs). An example of a conditional fee agreement is the ‘no win, no fee’
basis of charging that is popular in areas of work such as personal injury. Under such an
agreement, the solicitor may agree to charge nothing if the client loses, but will charge his
fees plus an agreed ‘uplift’ (or ‘success fee’, for example an extra 20%) in the event of success.
In respect of litigation or advocacy services, a solicitor may enter into (and enforce) a CFA if it
complies with s 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (see also the Conditional Fee
Agreements Order 2013 (SI 2013/689)). For example, the agreement must be in writing,
signed by both the solicitor and the client, and, where a success fee is to be paid, specify the
percentage of the success fee. The success fee cannot exceed a percentage specified by the
Lord Chancellor (currently 100% uplift in the normal hourly charge rate, with the exception of
personal injury cases where the cap is 25% of general damages recovered). The solicitor must
carry out a proper risk assessment to calculate the amount of the success fee. A solicitor
cannot enter into a CFA for any criminal work or family proceedings.
The CFA must also comply with any additional requirements specified by the SRA (see also
11.3.5) and the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 (see 11.5). To aid compliance, The Law Society has published a model CFA
for use by the profession.
If a client instructs a solicitor on a CFA (for example, on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis), this does not
mean that the client will not have to pay any legal costs if he loses the case. Although he may
not be liable to pay his solicitor’s fees, he will usually have to pay disbursements such as court
fees, barristers’ fees and VAT. The client may also have to pay his opponent’s costs. A solicitor
should explore whether the client can obtain insurance to cover these costs in the event of
losing the case (known as after-the-event insurance). He should also ask whether the client
has before-the-event insurance which will cover the costs.
Following recommendations made by Lord Justice Jackson, significant changes have been
introduced in respect of the costs of civil litigation, including CFAs. These changes have been
effective since 1 April 2013, when the relevant provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 came into force. For example, with a few exceptions, the
success fee and after-the-event insurance premiums will now be paid by the client, not the
other side, if the client is successful.
A DBA (defined by s 58AA(3)(a) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and covered by the
Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609)) provides that, if the client
recovers damages, the solicitor’s fee is an agreed percentage of those damages. The DBA must
not provide for a payment above an amount which, including VAT, is equal to 50% of the sums
ultimately recovered by the client. Also, personal injury cases are subject to a cap of 25% of
the general damages recovered. The points made above in respect of combining a CFA with
after-the-event insurance cover (or before-the-event insurance cover) apply equally to a DBA.
A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee arrangement in respect of non-contentious work,
but to be enforceable this must be in the form of a non-contentious business agreement (see
11.11).
11.7.4 Other methods

A solicitor may agree to be remunerated by some other means. One such example would be a
solicitor agreeing to accept shares in a new company in return for his work, rather than costs.
However, in such circumstances the client should be advised to seek independent advice
about such a costs agreement.
11.8 MONEY ON ACCOUNT

It is common for a solicitor to require a client to pay a sum of money to the solicitor at the start
of the transaction on account of the costs and disbursements that will be incurred.
In contentious business, a solicitor may require a client to pay a reasonable sum to the
solicitor on account of costs. If the client does not pay this money within a reasonable time,
the solicitor may terminate the retainer (Solicitors Act 1974, s 65(2)).
There is no such statutory right in non-contentious business. Accordingly, where the solicitor
requires money on account before starting a matter, the solicitor should make this a
requirement of the retainer.
11.9 SOLICITOR’S BILL

11.9.1 Introduction
For a solicitor to be able to obtain payment from the client, certain formalities need to be
complied with in respect of the solicitor’s bill. These matters include (but are not limited to)
the following:
(a) The bill must contain enough information for the client to be satisfied that the bill is
reasonable, and also provide details of the period to which the bill relates.
(b) The bill must be signed by the solicitor or on his behalf by an employee authorised to do
so. Alternatively, the solicitor/authorised employee may sign a covering letter which
refers to the bill (Solicitors Act 1974, s 69(2A)).
(c) The bill must be delivered by hand to the client, by post to his home, business address
or last known address, or by e-mail if the client has agreed to this method and
provided an appropriate e-mail address (Solicitors Act 1974, s 69(2C)).
11.9.2 Interim bills

A solicitor may wish to bill his client for work done on the client’s file before the matter has
completed. This will particularly be the case where the client’s matter is likely to go on for
some months, such as protracted litigation. A solicitor may wish to issue interim bills
throughout the matter.
There are two different types of interim bills. The first type are known as interim ‘statute bills’
because they comply with the provisions of the Solicitors Act 1974. Although they are interim
bills, they are also self-contained final bills in respect of the work covered by them.
Consequently, the solicitor may sue the client for non-payment of such bills and the client may
apply to have them assessed by the court (see 11.10.1). However, interim statute bills are rare
and may arise during the retainer in only two ways:
(a) there is authority for issuing such bills in a ‘natural break’ in lengthy proceedings, but
there is little authority as to what will actually amount to a natural break, and so this
should perhaps be avoided as a basis for statute bills except in the clearest of cases;
(b) by agreement with the client, and The Law Society recommends that this right should
be expressly reserved within the retainer. The Law Society’s guidance provides that the
solicitor must specify the time-limit within which the client must pay the interim bill,
and must also expressly reserve the right to terminate the retainer in the event of non-
payment.
The second, and more common, type of interim bill is the ‘bill on account’. Such bills are
effectively requests for payments on account of the final bill which will be delivered at the end
of the matter/retainer. An advantage of this type of interim bill is that it does not need to
represent the final figure for costs in respect of the work covered by it, so that when preparing
his statute bill at the end of the matter the solicitor can assess a fair overall costs figure for all
of the work done since the start of the retainer. However, unlike with an interim statute bill, a
solicitor is unable to sue the client for non-payment of such a bill, and the client cannot apply
to have the bill assessed. If the client does not pay the bill on account within a reasonable time
then in contentious business the solicitor may terminate the receiver under s 65(2) of the
Solicitors Act 1974 (see 11.8). In the event that the client regards the amount of the bill as
excessive, he can request that the solicitor issues a statute bill which he may then apply to have
assessed by the court.
11.9.3 Interest on bills

In a non-contentious matter a solicitor may charge interest on the whole or the outstanding
part of an unpaid bill with effect from one month after delivery of the bill, provided that notice
of the client’s right to challenge the bill has been given to him. The rate of interest chargeable
must not exceed that which is payable on judgment debts. At the time of writing the rate is
currently 8%.
In contentious business, The Law Society’s guidance provides that a solicitor may charge
interest on an unpaid bill where the solicitor expressly reserves this right in the retainer, or the
client later agrees for a ‘contractual consideration’ to pay interest. Alternatively, where a
solicitor sues the client for non-payment of fees, the court has the power to award the solicitor
interest on the debt under s 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 or s 69 of the County Courts
Act 1984.
The rate of interest will be the rate payable for judgment debts unless the solicitor and client
expressly agree a different rate.
11.9.4 Enforcement
Subject to certain exceptions, a solicitor may not commence any claim to recover any costs due
to the solicitor (such as suing the client) until one month has passed since the solicitor
delivered his bill (Solicitors Act 1974, s 69). The bill must also be in the proper form (see
11.9.1).
However, the High Court has the power under s 69 to allow the solicitor to commence such a
claim against the client within this one-month period where the court is satisfied that the
client is about to leave the country, be declared bankrupt (or enter into a composition with his
creditors), or do anything else which would prevent or delay the solicitor obtaining his fees.
11.10 CLIENT’S RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE BILL

The client may challenge the amount of a solicitor’s bill, provided that he complies with
certain requirements. These requirements depend upon how the client wishes to go about
challenging the bill.
11.10.1 Assessment by the court

A client may apply to have his bill assessed by the court in both contentious and non-
contentious proceedings. This is sometimes referred to as a bill being ‘taxed’.
The client must apply to have the bill assessed within one month from the date of delivery.
Where no application is made within this month, the client may still apply within 12 months
of delivery, but will require the leave of the court for the bill to be assessed (Solicitors Act
1974, s 70).
The costs will be assessed by a judge or district judge sitting as a ‘costs officer’. The costs
officer has the power to assess the fees and disbursements of the solicitor.
The costs will (with certain exceptions) be assessed on an ‘indemnity basis’. The court will
allow only costs that have been reasonably incurred by the solicitor and which are reasonable
in amount. Any doubt as to what is to be considered reasonable is resolved in the favour of the
solicitor. However, the client may be ordered to pay the costs of the solicitor arising from the
assessment process.
11.10.1.1 Non-contentious proceedings

Where a court is asked to assess a solicitor’s bill in non-contentious proceedings, in deciding
what is reasonable, the court must have regard to the following circumstances (Solicitors’
(Non-Contentious Business) Remuneration Order 2009):
(a) the complexity of the matter, or the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised;
(b) the skill, labour, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved;
(c) the time spent on the business;
(d) the number and importance of the documents prepared or considered, without regard
to length;
(e) the place where and the circumstances in which the business or any part thereof is
transacted;
(f ) the amount or value of any money or property involved;
(g) whether any land involved is registered;
(h) the importance of the matter to the client; and
(i) the approval (express or implied) of the entitled person, or the express approval of the
testator, to:
(i) the solicitor undertaking all or any part of the work giving rise to the costs, or
(ii) the amount of the costs.
11.10.1.2 Contentious proceedings

The factors the court must take into account when considering whether costs are reasonable
are set out in CPR, r 44.5. These include (but are not limited to):
(a) the conduct of the parties;
(b) the amount or value of any money or property involved;
(c) the importance of the matter to the parties;
(d) the particular complexity of the matter, or the difficulty or novelty of the questions
raised;
(e) the skill, effort, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved;
(f ) the time spent on the case; and
(g) the place where and the circumstances in which work, or any part of it, was done.
Subject to certain exceptions, a client cannot apply for an assessment of costs where the
solicitor and client have entered into a contentious business agreement (see 11.12).
11.10.2 Using the firm’s complaints procedure

Solicitors must ensure that clients are informed of their right to challenge or complain about
their bills (Outcome 1.14).
If the client is not satisfied with the firm’s response, he may complain to the Legal
Ombudsman. The Legal Ombudsman may then limit the solicitor’s fees by, for example,
directing the solicitor to refund all or part of any amount paid, or to remit all or part of his fees
(see Chapter 7 generally).
Further, the firm must also inform the client of the circumstances in which he may be liable to
pay interest on an unpaid bill (Outcome 1.14)
11.11 NON-CONTENTIOUS BUSINESS AGREEMENTS

A solicitor and client may enter into a non-contentious business agreement in respect of the
solicitor’s remuneration for any non-contentious work. Under this agreement the solicitor
may be remunerated by a gross sum, commission, a percentage, a salary, or otherwise.
To be enforceable, the agreement must comply with s 57 of the Solicitors Act 1974. For
example, the agreement must:
(a) be in writing;
(b) be signed by the client;
(c) contain all the terms of the agreement (including whether disbursements and VAT are
included in the agreed remuneration).
Where the relevant provisions have been complied with, the client will be unable to apply to
have his bill assessed by the court. However, the court may set the agreement aside if the
amount charged by the solicitor is unfair or unreasonable.
11.12 CONTENTIOUS BUSINESS AGREEMENTS

A solicitor may enter into a contentious business agreement in respect of his remuneration for
contentious work completed on behalf of the client (see Solicitors Act 1974, ss 59–63).
The agreement may provide for the solicitor to be remunerated by reference to a gross sum, an
hourly rate, a salary or otherwise. However, the solicitor may not be remunerated by a
contingency fee.
In order to be enforceable, the agreement must comply with certain requirements, including:
(a) the agreement must state it is a contentious business agreement;
(b) the agreement must be in writing;
(c) the agreement must be signed by the client; and
(d) the agreement must contain all the terms.
Where the contentious business agreement is enforceable, the client will be unable to apply to
court for an assessment of costs (except where the agreement provides that the solicitor is to
be remunerated by reference to an hourly rate.) However, the court may set aside the
agreement if it is unfair or unreasonable.
11.13 OVERCHARGING
A solicitor must act in the best interests of the client and must treat his clients fairly. Therefore
a solicitor must not overcharge for work done. Where a costs officer (when assessing a
solicitor’s bill in a non-contentious matter) reduces the amount of the costs by more than
50%, he must inform the SRA. Overcharging the client will be considered a breach of
professional conduct.
11.14 COMMISSION
The solicitor–client relationship is a fiduciary relationship (see 10.4.3), and so a solicitor
must not make a secret profit whilst acting for the client. Outcome 1.15 of the Code obliges a
solicitor to account to a client properly for any financial benefit he receives as a result of the
client’s instructions. The term ‘financial benefit’ includes any commission, discount or rebate
(Handbook Glossary).
For example, a client may require specialist tax advice, and so may be referred by the solicitor
to a tax consultant. The tax consultant may pay the solicitor commission in return for this
referral.
Indicative Behaviour 1.20, which is relevant to a solicitor showing that he has achieved
Outcome 1.15, states that where a solicitor receives a financial benefit as a result of acting for
a client, it may tend to show that he has achieved the Outcomes if he either:
(a) pays it to the client; or
(b) offsets it against his fees; or
(c) keeps it only where he can justify keeping it, and he has told the client the amount of the
benefit (or an approximation of the amount) and the client has agreed that he can keep
it.
Where the solicitor is carrying out an exempt regulated activity in respect of financial services
(see Chapter 17), the solicitor must consider s 327 of the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000. Accordingly, to comply with s 327(3), the solicitor must likewise account to the client
for all commission received.
11.15 EXAMPLE
Question You have just submitted your final bill to Mr Waugh in respect of a partnership
dispute. You managed to resolve the matter without having to issue
proceedings. The next day you receive a call from Mr Waugh who claims your
bill (£7,000 plus VAT) is too high.
Assuming that your bill complies with the relevant formalities, what options are
available to Mr Waugh to challenge your bill?
Answer Mr Waugh has two options:
(a) Assessment by the court
Mr Waugh has one month from receiving the bill to apply to have his bill
assessed by the court (failing that, within 12 months from receiving the bill, but
only with the court’s leave). Both you and Mr Waugh will be bound by the
results.
(b) Using the firm’s complaints procedure
Mr Waugh could make a formal complaint about the bill in accordance with the
firm’s complaint’s procedure. If he is not satisfied with the firm’s response he
may complain to the Legal Ombudsman. In the event that the Legal
Ombudsman makes a final determination about the bill (which can include a
direction that you remit all or part of your fees) which is accepted by Mr Waugh,
it will be binding on both of you.
SUMMARY
Client care
(1) A solicitor must achieve the Outcomes on client care prescribed by the SRA in
Chapter 1 of the Code.
(2) The solicitor must ensure that clients are in a position to make informed decisions
about the services they need, how their matter will be handled and the options
available to them.
(3) The solicitor must inform clients in writing of their right to complain to the Legal
Ombudsman, both at the time of engagement and at the conclusion of the firm’s
complaint procedure.
(4) Clients must be treated fairly.
Information about costs

(1) A solicitor must give his client the best possible information as to the likely overall
costs of a matter, both at the outset and when appropriate as the client’s matter
progresses.
(2) It may tend to show that the relevant Outcomes have been achieved if a solicitor
clearly explains his fees and if and when they are likely to change.
(3) Providing information about costs in a clear and accessible form which is
appropriate to the client’s needs and circumstances may tend to show that the
Outcomes in Chapter 1 have been achieved.
Fees and costs
(1) A solicitor and client may agree the level of costs the solicitor may charge. However,
this agreement is regulated by statute and the common law.
(2) A distinction is made between costs in contentious matters and costs in non-
contentious matters.
(3) A solicitor’s bill must contain prescribed information in order for the bill to be
enforceable.
(4) A client may challenge the costs of a solicitor both in contentious and non-
contentious proceedings.
(5) Generally, a solicitor may not sue to recover his costs from the client until one month
has elapsed since the bill was delivered.
Confidentiality 137
CHAPTER 12
Confidentiality
12.1 Duty of confidentiality 137

12.2 Duty of disclosure 139
12.3 Placing confidential information at risk 140
12.4 Confidentiality and privilege 143
12.5 Examples 144
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• the nature and extent of the duty of confidentiality
• the duty to disclose relevant information to the client
• legal professional privilege.
12.1 DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY

You [must] keep the affairs of clients confidential unless disclosure is required or permitted by law or
the client consents. (Outcome 4.1 of the Code)
12.1.1 Introduction
Confidentiality is a fundamental principle of the solicitor–client relationship. For example, it
is important that a solicitor receives all the relevant information from a client in order to give
the best possible advice. A client would be dissuaded from informing his solicitor of all the
relevant facts if he thought that this information would be released to the public. However,
the obligation of confidentiality extends beyond obviously confidential information given to a
solicitor by his client and includes all information about a client or matter, regardless of the
source of that information. Solicitors must have in place effective systems and controls to
enable risks to client confidentiality to be identified and to mitigate these risks (Outcome
4.5).
This duty will continue after the retainer has been terminated. Accordingly, a solicitor will
owe a duty of confidentiality to former, as well as existing, clients. The duty also continues
after the death of the client, whereupon the right to enforce or waive the duty of
confidentiality is passed to the client’s (or former client’s) personal representatives. All
members of a firm, including support staff, owe a duty of confidentiality to clients of the firm.
It may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved where the solicitor complies with
the law in respect of his fiduciary duties in relation to both confidentiality and disclosure
(Indicative Behaviour 4.2). Any breach of the duty of confidentiality will be a breach of
professional conduct. The solicitor may be disciplined by the SRA, or by the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal (see Chapter 7). In addition, the client (or former client) may sue the
solicitor for any breach of this duty.
The Outcomes and Indicative Behaviours concerning confidentiality are contained in Chapter
4 of the Code.
12.1.2 Specific examples

The Indicative Behaviours in Chapter 4 of the Code include specific examples which may tend
to show that a solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes relating to the duty of confidentiality:
(a) disclosing the content of a will on the death of a client (including a former client),
unless consent has been provided by the PRs for the content to be released (Indicative
Behaviour 4.6);
(b) disclosing details of bills sent to clients (including former clients) to third parties, such
as debt-factoring companies in relation to the collection of book debts, unless the client
has consented (Indicative Behaviour 4.7).
A solicitor will have to take various practical steps to safeguard the identity of his clients. For
example, he will have a file, or files, for particular clients and the client’s name (and often
address and type of matter, such as divorce) may be written on the file. If a solicitor routinely
interviews clients at his desk, steps should be taken to ensure that the covers of these files are
not left where they could be read by any other clients.
A number of solicitors’ firms use the names of their clients in their marketing and publicity to
illustrate the quality of clients that instruct their firm. Where solicitors wish to use the names
of their clients in marketing materials, they must obtain the consent of these clients
beforehand.
The Notes to Chapter 4 indicate that the protection of confidential information may be at
particular risk where two or more firms merge and where an individual leaves one firm and
joins another.
12.1.3 Where confidential information may be disclosed

Although no specific examples are contained in the Code as to when confidential information
may be disclosed in the absence of the client’s consent, there are circumstances in which
disclosure is permitted by law. By way of example:
(a) pursuant to a statutory requirement, eg to HMRC in certain circumstances;
(b) pursuant to a statutory duty, such as in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money
Laundering Regulations 2007 (see Chapter 15), and under the terrorism legislation;
(c) under a court order, or where a police warrant permits the seizure of confidential
documentation.
If a solicitor is uncertain as to whether to disclose the confidential information, he should
consider taking legal advice or contact the Professional Ethics Guidance Team. The solicitor
must also bear in mind legal professional privilege (see 12.4).
The SRA has also published ethics guidance which sets out examples of circumstances which,
although still technically amount to a breach of the duty of confidentiality, may be taken into
account as mitigation in the context of disciplinary action. It should be noted that none of
them allows for disclosure after the event. The main examples set out in the guidance are as
follows:
(a) Where a client has indicated their intention to commit suicide or serious self-harm. The SRA advises
that, in the first instance, the solicitor should consider seeking consent from the client
to disclose that information to a third party (for example, a ward nurse where the client
is in hospital) but, where this is not possible or appropriate, the solicitor may decide to
disclose the information to the relevant person or authority without consent in order to
protect the client or another person.
(b) Preventing harm to children or vulnerable adults. This covers situations where the child or
adult indicates that they are suffering sexual or other abuse, or where the client
discloses abuse either by themselves or by another adult against a child or vulnerable
Confidentiality 139
adult. Whilst there is no requirement in law to disclose this information, the solicitor
may consider that the threat to the person’s life or health is sufficiently serious to justify
a breach of the duty of confidentiality.
(c) Preventing the commission of a criminal offence. At common law there is no confidence in
information of an iniquitous nature and so, if a solicitor is being used by a client to
perpetrate a fraud or any other crime, the duty of confidentiality does not arise. In other
circumstances, a breach may be mitigated where disclosure is made to the extent that
the solicitor believes it necessary to prevent the client or a third party from committing a
criminal act that the solicitor believes, on reasonable grounds, is likely to result in
serious bodily harm.
12.1.4 Use of confidential material received by mistake

Due to the volume of information which passes between solicitors on a daily basis,
occasionally mistakes may be made and information destined for a third party may be
inadvertently disclosed to a solicitor. For example, a solicitor acting for one party in a matter
may mis-address correspondence destined for his client to the solicitor acting for the other
party. In this case, immediately on becoming aware of the error, the receiving solicitor must
return the papers to the originating solicitor without reading them or otherwise making use
of the information contained therein (Ablitt v Mills & Reeve (1995) The Times, 25 October).
12.2 DUTY OF DISCLOSURE

Any individual within a firm who is advising a client must make that client aware of all
information material to that retainer of which the individual has personal knowledge
(Outcome 4.2).
12.2.1 Limitations
In spite of the absolute terms of Outcome 4.2, Indicative Behaviour 4.4 sets out specific
exceptions to the requirement to disclose all information material to the client’s matter of
which the solicitor is personally aware, and by observing these a solicitor may tend to show
that he has achieved the relevant Outcomes:
(a) the client gives specific informed consent to non-disclosure or a different standard of
disclosure arises. (It should be noted, however, that a solicitor should consider issues
such as professional embarrassment (see 12.3.5) prior to agreeing a different (ie lower)
standard of disclosure);
(b) there is evidence that serious physical or mental injury will be caused to a person or
persons if the information is disclosed to the client;
(c) legal restrictions effectively prohibit the solicitor from passing the information to the
client, such as the provisions in the money laundering and anti-terrorism legislation;
(d) it is obvious that privileged documents have been mistakenly disclosed to the solicitor;
(e) the solicitor comes into possession of information relating to State security or
intelligence matters to which the Official Secrets Act 1989 applies.
12.2.2 Duty of confidentiality overrides duty of disclosure

The duty of disclosure will often conflict with the duty of confidentiality. Consider the
following situation:
EXAMPLE
Mr Smith instructs a solicitor to purchase a derelict plot of land from X Limited in order for
him to build a new house. Another one of the solicitor’s clients, Mrs Brown, sold the land
to X Limited two years ago at a knock-down price as the land is contaminated. This
information would be relevant to Mr Smith and so the solicitor would owe a duty to
disclose the information to him. However, to do so would be to breach the solicitor’s duty
of confidentiality to Mrs Brown, even though the solicitor has completed the work for Mrs
Brown and she no longer owns the land.
In situations such as this, your duty of confidentiality always takes precedence over your duty
of disclosure (Outcome 4.3). The solicitor could tell Mr Smith only if Mrs Brown waived her
confidentiality in respect of the information.
12.3 PLACING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AT RISK

12.3.1 Introduction
In order to protect against any accidental disclosure, the Code provides that a solicitor (or
firm) must not act in certain circumstances.
A solicitor must act in the best interests of the client and so must not place himself in a
situation where any relevant information could be disclosed to another client, as any such
disclosure would be against the best interests of the client to whom the solicitor owes a duty of
confidentiality.
Accordingly, it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved by a firm not acting
for A where B is a client (including a former client) for whom it holds confidential information
which is material to A, unless the confidential information can be protected (Indicative
Behaviour 4.5). For examples of safeguards, see 12.3.4.1.
In addition, a firm must not act for A in a matter where A has an interest which is adverse to B
and B is a client (including a former client) for whom the firm holds confidential information
which is material to A in that matter, unless the confidential information can be protected by
the use of safeguards and certain other requirements are met (Outcome 4.4).
12.3.2 Is the information material?

For the purposes of Outcome 4.4 and Indicative Behaviour 4.5, the confidential information
must be ‘material’. The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007 defined this as
information which is:
(a) relevant to your client’s matter; and
(b) of more than inconsequential interest to the client (ie, will the decision affect the
client’s decision-making?).
The question of whether the information is ‘material’ relates to the client to whom the duty of
disclosure concerning the information is owed. In the example at 12.2.2, the solicitor would
need to consider whether the information that Mrs Brown provided to the firm is relevant to
Mr Smith’s land purchase (eg, Mr Smith will need to be advised to try to reduce the price). If
so, this information would be ‘material’ to Mr Smith.
12.3.3 Do the clients have an ‘adverse’ interest?

For the purposes of Outcome 4.4, the interests of the clients must be ‘adverse’. Adversity
relates to the relationship between two respective clients. The previous SRA guidance in the
Code of Conduct 2007 provided that this relationship will be said to be adverse where the
client to whom the firm owes the duty of confidentiality is, or is likely to become, an opposing
party in a matter to the client who is owed the duty of disclosure.
Confidentiality 141
This would include a situation where the clients litigate against each other, are involved in
mediation, or even if the clients are on opposing sides of a negotiation.
12.3.4 When it is possible to act under Outcome 4.4

Where the same individual within a firm holds confidential information for one party which
is relevant to another client, that particular solicitor will be unable to act for both clients
unless a client agrees to a lesser duty of disclosure. This will be regardless of whether the two
clients have an interest adverse to each other. This is because that individual owes a personal
duty of disclosure to his clients.
However, Outcome 4.4 provides that where a firm holds confidential information for one
client (B), which is material to another client (A), and A has an interest adverse to B, the firm
may still act for the client to whom the duty of disclosure is owed (ie A) if the confidential
information can be protected by use of safeguards and the following requirements are met:
(a) the firm reasonably believes that A is aware of, and understands, the relevant issues and
gives informed consent; and
(b) either B gives informed consent and the firm agrees with B the safeguards to protect B’s
information, or, where this is not possible, the firm puts in place effective safeguards,
including information barriers which comply with common law; and
(c) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to act for A with such safeguards in place.
12.3.4.1 Information barriers

Safeguards include information barriers, which are practical steps taken to ensure that
confidential information cannot pass from one client to another client. These steps were
previously referred to within the profession as ‘Chinese walls’. On a practical level they aim to
prevent confidential information, given by a client to one part of a firm, from being made
available to another part of the same firm.
The SRA, in its previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007, set out a number of measures
which will normally be appropriate to protect confidential information by this method, and
these will presumably remain pertinent to achieving the Outcomes in the current Code. These
measures include the acknowledgement in writing by a client who might be interested in the
confidential information that the information held by the firm will not be given to him. Also,
that all members of the firm who hold the relevant confidential information are identified,
have no involvement with the other client and must not discuss the information with anyone
else in the firm.
Practical arrangements may also be appropriate. For example, in the case of current clients,
that the groups acting for each of the clients affected are physically separated from each other
(eg, in separate buildings or on separate floors), that confidential information on computer
systems is protected by use of separate computer networks or password protection, and that
the firm has systems in place for the opening of post, faxes and e-mails that ensure that the
information is not disclosed to the other group.
It will be noted from the situation covered in (b) in 12.3.4 above, that where it is not possible
to agree effective safeguards with the client to whom the duty of confidentiality is owed, it is
still possible to act if the firm puts in place effective safeguards, including information
barriers, which comply with the standards that are required by law at the time they are put in
place. These standards will be established by case law.
Given the nature of the safeguards, information barriers will not be appropriate in every
situation. Indeed the Notes to Chapter 4 of the Code make it clear that the following
circumstances may make it difficult to implement effective safeguards and information
barriers:
(a) the firm is small;
(b) the physical structure or layout of the firm means that it will be difficult to preserve
confidentiality; or
(c) the clients are not sophisticated users of legal services.
12.3.4.2 Informed consent

In broad terms, the client(s) must consent after having understood and considered the risks
and rewards involved in the situation. The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct
2007 indicated that one of the difficulties with seeking such consent is that it is often not
possible to disclose sufficient information about the identity and business of the other client
without breaching that other client’s confidentiality. It would be for the firm to decide in each
case whether it would be able to provide sufficient information for the client to be able to give
‘informed consent’.
The SRA considered that ‘informed consent’ would generally be of use only to ‘sophisticated
clients’, such as large companies with in-house legal advisers or other expertise, who would be
able to assess the risks of giving their consent based on the information provided, and there is
no reason to doubt that this will continue to be the case under the Code.
The exception allowing solicitors to act where they are holding confidential information will
rarely be of use to, for example, matrimonial clients or personal injury clients.
12.3.4.3 Is it reasonable to act?

Lastly, the firm of solicitors must consider whether it would be reasonable to act for the new
client (or to continue to act for two existing clients) in all the circumstances. The following
example is based upon one given by the SRA’s previous guidance notes in the Code of Conduct
2007:
Shepherd Co Limited approaches your firm to act for it in the purchase of Derkin Co Limited. Derkin
Co Limited is a former client of your firm and when acting for Derkin Co your firm obtained
confidential information that the company has millions of pounds missing from its accounts. Even if
the rules permitted your firm to act for Shepherd Co, your firm must consider whether it would be
reasonable to act given the knowledge that the firm holds. You could not disclose the information to
Shepherd Co due to your duty of confidentiality to Derkin Co.
12.3.5 Professional embarrassment

Even where Outcome 4.4 and Indicative Behaviour 4.5 would allow a firm to act for two
clients, where the firm held confidential information for one client that was material to the
other client’s matter, a solicitor might still be obliged to refuse to act on the grounds of
professional embarrassment.
A firm should decline to act where the information which it cannot disclose to the client
would cause severe embarrassment to the firm if the fact that it had agreed to act in those
circumstances ever came out.
The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007 provided an example in which a
firm agrees to act for a company to draft a contract of employment for a prospective employee,
where the firm knows (but is unable to disclose to the client due to confidentiality) that the
prospective employee is under investigation for fraud. The embarrassment here would stem
from the fact that the firm would know that the client seeking to employ the prospective
employee was wasting legal fees on an outcome that (if it knew all the facts) it would not wish
to pursue.
The firm should also consider the Principles, such as whether it will be able to act in the best
interests of the client in question, and public trust in the legal profession. Acting in the above
situation would clearly not be in the best interests of the client, and arguably would also
damage the reputation of the profession.
Confidentiality 143
12.3.5.1 Example
Adapting the example at 12.2.2, Mr Smith instructs a firm of solicitors to purchase a plot of
derelict land. Mrs Brown, also a client of the firm, had previously sold the land and had
informed another solicitor at the firm that the land was contaminated. The information is
material to Mr Smith’s matter – information concerning the state of the land is relevant to
whether Mr Smith will want to buy it. However, the two clients’ interests are not adverse to
one another. There is no suggestion that Mr Smith and Mrs Brown are likely to be on opposing
sides of a particular matter. Therefore, subject to any conflicts of interest, and providing the
confidential information could be protected, the Code would not prevent the firm acting for
both parties. However, the firm could not inform Mr Smith of the contamination – the firm’s
duty of confidentiality to Mrs Brown would remain. Nevertheless, the firm should decline
instructions on the basis of professional embarrassment.
12.4 CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE

The obligation of confidentiality which a solicitor owes to his client is distinct from the issue
of legal professional privilege. While confidentiality prevents a solicitor from disclosing any
information relating to a client without that client’s consent, legal professional privilege
allows a solicitor to withhold specific information which he would otherwise be required to
disclose, for example in court proceedings.
Legal professional privilege applies to information which is passed between a solicitor and a
client, whether written or oral, directly or indirectly. The rationale behind this right to
withhold information, even from the court, is similar to the rationale for the obligation of
confidentiality – it exists to enable a client to speak to his solicitor without worrying that the
information passed over might be disclosed at a later date.
However, there are limitations in place to prevent legal professional privilege being used as a
cloak to hide information which a client does not wish a court to see. One type of legal
professional privilege is legal advice privilege. It applies only to information passed between
the client and a solicitor acting in the capacity of a solicitor. In other words, the communication
must relate to the request for, or the provision of, advice to the client by the solicitor. If
documents are sent to or from an independent third party, even if they are created for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, they will not be covered by this privilege, and therefore
simply ‘copying in’ a solicitor will not mean the information can be withheld. If the
communication is made for the purpose of committing a fraud or a crime, it will not attract
privilege (R v Cox and Railton (1884) LR 14 QBD 153).
Clients and solicitors may also claim litigation privilege in respect of documents created for
the sole or dominant purpose of litigation or other adversarial proceedings which have already
commenced or are contemplated. This privilege also extends to communications between a
solicitor and third parties. A related issue which also arises in the case of litigation is that
anything said by a solicitor whilst speaking in court as an advocate is privileged. Therefore the
solicitor cannot be sued for defamation in such circumstances.
A House of Lords case, Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48, examines closely the
limits of legal professional privilege. It was concerned with advice given in complex matters
involving large corporate clients, but left unanswered important questions concerning which
representatives of a large corporate client can be regarded as the client for the purpose of
claiming privilege. A Court of Appeal case suggests that solicitors will have to take care to
identify and restrict those within the client corporation from whom they take instructions and
to whom they give advice.
Like the obligation of confidentiality, privilege continues beyond the death of a client
(Bullivant v A-G for Victoria [1901] AC 196).
The court has power to decide whether or not a particular item is privileged.
12.5 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You acted for Mrs Evans for a number of years and drew up her will. Sadly Mrs
Evans dies, and the following week you are contacted by her daughter, who is
one of the beneficiaries in the will. She asks whether you can tell her who will
receive her mother’s house. Can you give her this information?
Answer You must keep the affairs of all clients confidential (Outcome 4.1). Does this
duty apply to former clients? Yes. In this case the duty of confidentiality will
pass to Mrs Evans’ PRs. Indicative Behaviour 4.6 indicates that if you disclosed
the contents of the will to the daughter without the consent of the PRs, this may
tend to show that you have not achieved the Outcome.
EXAMPLE 2
Question You are an assistant solicitor acting for both X Co Ltd and Y Co Ltd in a patents
dispute. They are both being sued by Z Co Ltd for breach of a patent. X Co Ltd
manufactures widgets and Y Co Ltd distributes these products. Due to Y Co
Ltd’s lack of funds, X Co Ltd is paying your fees in respect of both clients.
You get a call from the managing director of X Co Ltd who tells you that he has
concerns about the financial situation of Y Co Ltd. He states that it has fallen
behind in paying X Co Ltd’s invoices and he is likely to issue a winding-up
petition within the next few days.
Can you tell Y Co Ltd this information? Can you continue to act for both
parties?
Answer You owe a duty of confidentiality to X Co Ltd under Outcome 4.1, but you also
owe a personal duty to Y Co Ltd to disclose any ‘material’ information under
Outcome 4.2. Is this information ‘material’ to Y Co Ltd, ie relevant to its matter
and more than of inconsequential interest to it?
This information is clearly relevant to Y Co Ltd, particularly as X Co Ltd is
currently funding the litigation. Therefore, can you inform Y Co Ltd of your
conversation? No. Your duty of confidentiality takes precedence over your duty
of disclosure (Outcome 4.3).
Can you continue to act for both parties? Unless X Co Ltd is willing to waive
confidentiality to allow you to inform Y Co Ltd of your conversation, or Y gives
specific informed consent to non-disclosure or a lower standard of disclosure
arises, then no. You would have to cease acting for one (Y Co Ltd) or both
clients.
SUMMARY
(1) A solicitor (and his staff ) must keep the affairs of his clients confidential.
(2) The duty of confidentiality continues until the client permits disclosure or waives the
confidentiality.
(3) The duty of confidentiality may be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
(4) The solicitor also has a personal duty to disclose to the client all information that is
relevant to the client’s matter.
(5) The duty of confidentiality takes precedence over the duty of disclosure.
Confidentiality 145
(6) A firm must not risk breaching confidentiality by acting for a client, A, whose
interests are adverse to another client, B, where the firm holds information for B that
would be material to A’s matter, unless appropriate safeguards can be put in place
and certain other requirements are met.
(7) In addition to the duty of confidentiality, a solicitor must also consider legal
professional privilege. Where legal professional privilege applies, a solicitor can
refuse to disclose communications between himself and a client.
Conflict of Interests 147
CHAPTER 13
Conflict of Interests

13.2 Chapter 3: Conflict of interests 147
13.3 Client conflict 148
13.4 Conflict of interests between two existing clients 151
13.5 Own interest conflict 151
13.6 Systems and controls for identifying conflicts 152
13.7 Professional embarrassment 152
13.8 Limited retainer 153
13.9 Conveyancing 153
13.10 Examples 153
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• the principles governing conflict of interests
• identifying and dealing with such conflicts.
13.1 INTRODUCTION
A solicitor must act in the best interests of his clients. There will be situations where the
interests of two clients (or prospective clients) conflict. Where this happens it will be
practically impossible for the solicitor to act in the best interests of the two clients
simultaneously.
For example, a solicitor is asked to act for Mr Lacey and Mr Roberts, who are suing each other
over a boundary dispute (an obvious situation where the interests of the two clients conflict).
Both clients will ultimately want to win their case, and so the solicitor will have a duty to act in
the best interests of each client and take steps to try to ensure that they are successful in their
litigation. However, the solicitor would be placed in an impossible situation, as anything done
to help Mr Lacey win his case will be detrimental to Mr Roberts’ case (and therefore not in
Mr Roberts’ best interests).
For this reason, the SRA prohibits solicitors from acting where there is a conflict of interests
between two or more clients, except in specified limited circumstances.
13.2 CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

There are two situations where a conflict of interests may arise:
(a) a conflict between two or more clients (a ‘client conflict’); or
(b) a conflict between the client’s interests and the solicitor’s interests (an ‘own interest
conflict’).
A solicitor can never act where there is a conflict between himself and a current client, but
there are limited circumstances in which a solicitor can act where there is a conflict between
two or more current clients. The introduction to Chapter 3 of the Code of Conduct states that
in deciding whether to act in these circumstances, the overriding consideration will be the
best interests of each of the clients concerned, and in particular whether the benefits to the
clients of the solicitor acting for all or both of the clients outweigh the risks.
13.3 CLIENT CONFLICT

13.3.1 Introduction
For the purposes of Chapter 3 of the Code, a client conflict means any situation where:
(a) the solicitor or firm owes separate duties to act in the best interests of two or more
clients;
(b) in relation to the same or related matters; and
(c) those duties conflict, or there is a significant risk that those duties may conflict (Handbook
Glossary).
Outcome 3.5 provides that a solicitor must not act if there is a client conflict, or a significant
risk of a client conflict, unless the circumstances set out in Outcomes 3.6 or 3.7 apply (see
13.3.5).
13.3.2 Former clients – confidential information.

A conflict of interests may arise only between two current clients of the firm. Where a client’s
retainer has been terminated the firm no longer owes a duty to act in that client’s best
interests, and so a conflict of interest cannot arise concerning the affairs of a former client.
However, even in the absence of a conflict of interests, a firm may be prevented from acting
for a client where it holds confidential information for the former client which would be
material to the work done for the new client. See Chapter 12 for further details.
13.3.3 Same or related matters

It is easy to see how a conflict of interests might arise when advising two clients about the
same matter. The first example in this chapter (at 13.1) concerned two clients involved in the
same matter – a court case. Indeed, declining to act for clients whose interests are in direct
conflict, for example claimant and defendant in litigation, may tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved (Indicative Behaviour 3.2). It may also tend to show that the
Outcomes have been achieved by a solicitor declining to act for clients where he may need to
negotiate on matters of substance on their behalf, for example negotiating on price between a
buyer and a seller of property (Indicative Behaviour 3.3).
A conflict of interests can also arise concerning different but related matters. A matter will be
related if it concerns the same asset or liability. For example, you could not act to sell a new
house for one client whilst also acting for another client who is alleging that a part of the
house has been built on his land. However, there would need to be some reasonable degree of
relationship (such as in the above example) for a conflict to arise.
Where the only conflict between the parties is their wider business interests then this will not
create any conflict of interest issues. For example, imagine that Isla Cola and Samet Cola are
the two main cola distributors in England and Wales. A firm of solicitors could represent Isla
Cola on a purchase of a new IT system for their factory, whilst also representing Samet Cola in
the purchase of a fleet of cars for their management. Although the interests of Isla Cola and
Samet Cola will conflict (as they will both want to sell more cola than the other firm), a
solicitors’ firm may act for both at the same time without breaching Outcome 3.5 as the
purchases of the IT system and the cars are not related matters.
13.3.4 Significant risk of a conflict of interests

An actual conflict of interests is not required. A significant risk that your duties to act in the
best interests of each client may conflict will be enough to satisfy Outcome 3.5.
For example, if Mr and Mrs Rowntree sought to instruct the same solicitor to act for them in
their divorce from one another, the solicitor could not act for both of them. This would remain
the case even if they explained that their divorce was an amicable one, and they had agreed the
division of their assets and what should happen to the children. Even if there was no actual
conflict between their interests (an unlikely event), the solicitor could not act, as there would
be a significant risk that the duty to act in their best interests might conflict. For instance, Mrs
Rowntree might want more of the matrimonial assets once the solicitor has advised her about
her legal rights, and Mr Rowntree might not agree to this.
There is also a significant risk of a conflict arising where there is inequality of bargaining
power between the clients. Accordingly, it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been
achieved where a solicitor declines to act where there is unequal bargaining power between
the clients (Indicative Behaviour 3.4); the example given is acting for a seller and buyer where
a builder is selling to a non-commercial client. See also Outcome 3.3 at 13.6.
13.3.5 Exceptions
Where a conflict of interests exists, or where there is a significant risk that a conflict may exist,
a firm of solicitors may still act for both parties in defined circumstances and with the consent
of both parties.
The following exceptions were originally introduced by The Law Society and contained in the
previous Code of Conduct following a period of lobbying by parts of the profession to
liberalise the previous conflict of interest rules, which prohibited a firm acting where there
was a conflict, or where the firm held confidential information for one client which was
relevant to another client. The exceptions are now contained in Outcomes 3.6 and 3.7 of the
Code.
The substantially common interest exception (Outcome 3.6)

Where there is a client conflict and the clients have a substantially common interest in
relation to a matter or a particular aspect of it, a solicitor may act only if:
(a) the solicitor has explained the relevant issues and risks to the clients, and he has a
reasonable belief that they understand those issues and risks;
(b) all the clients have given informed consent in writing to the solicitor acting;
(c) the solicitor is satisfied that it is reasonable for him to act for all the clients and that it is
in their best interests; and
(d) the solicitor is satisfied that the benefits to the clients of him doing so outweigh the
risks.
The Handbook Glossary defines ‘a substantially common interest’ as a situation in which there
is a clear common purpose in relation to any matter or a particular aspect of it between the
clients, and a strong consensus as to how it is to be achieved, and the client conflict is
peripheral to this common purpose.
There are some Indicative Behaviours which apply specifically to this exception. It may tend to
show that the Outcomes have been achieved if a solicitor declines to act under Outcome 3.6
where the clients cannot be represented even-handedly or will be prejudiced by lack of
separate representation (Indicative Behaviour 3.5). Likewise, it may tend to show that the
Outcomes have not been achieved if a solicitor acts for two or more clients in a conflict of
interests under this exception where the clients’ interests in the end result are not the same,
for example one partner buying out the interest of another partner in their joint business or a
seller transferring a property to a buyer (Indicative Behaviour 3.11), or where it is
unreasonable to act because there is unequal bargaining power (Indicative Behaviour 3.12).
An example of when this exception might be used is where a solicitor is instructed by a group
of people who want to set up a company. Having regard to the Indicative Behaviours, the
solicitor should be careful to consider whether all of the clients can be represented even-
handedly, or whether all or some will be prejudiced by lack of separate representation, and he
must be alert to any unequal bargaining power amongst them.
The competing for the same objective (or ‘commercial’) exception (Outcome 3.7)
Where there is a client conflict and the clients are competing for the same objective, a solicitor
may act only if:
(a) the solicitor has explained the relevant issues and risks to the clients, and he has a
reasonable belief that they understand those issues and risks;
(b) the clients have confirmed in writing that they want the solicitor to act, in the
knowledge that the solicitor acts, or may act, for one or more other clients who are
competing for the same objective;
(c) there is no other client conflict in relation to that matter;
(d) unless the clients specifically agree, no individual acts for, or is responsible for the
supervision of work done for, more than one of the clients in that matter; and
(e) the solicitor is satisfied that it is reasonable for him to act for all the clients and that the
benefits to the clients of his doing so outweigh the risks.
The Handbook Glossary sets out the meaning of some of the terminology used in this exception
to aid in its interpretation. Clients will be ‘competing for the same objective’ in a situation in
which two or more clients are competing for an ‘objective’ which, if attained by one client, will
make that ‘objective’ unattainable to the other client or clients. The term ‘objective’ is further
defined as
an asset, contract or business opportunity which one or more clients are seeking to acquire or recover
through liquidation (or some other form of insolvency process) or by means of an auction or tender
process or a bid or offer which is not public.
Again, there are some Indicative Behaviours which apply specifically to this exception. It may
tend that show that the Outcomes have been achieved where a solicitor acts for clients under
Outcome 3.7 only where the clients are sophisticated users of legal services (Indicative
Behaviour 3.6) and declines to act where the clients cannot be represented even-handedly or
will be prejudiced by lack of separate representation (Indicative Behaviour 3.5). It may tend to
show that the Outcomes have not been achieved if a solicitor acts for two buyers where there is
a conflict of interest under this exception, for example where two buyers are competing for a
residential property (Indicative Behaviour 3.5).
This exception is likely, therefore, to continue to be used for corporate clients only. For
example, it would enable one firm to act for two companies bidding to take over a third
company, despite the fact that the obligations to act in the best interests of the clients would
conflict (both want to be successful in their bid to acquire the company, and any step taken by
the firm to try to make this happen for one client would be detrimental to the interests of the
other client).
13.3.5.2 Informed consent

One condition common to both exceptions is the concept of informed consent. A client
providing consent will not be enough.
As noted in the previous chapter (see 12.3.4.2), obtaining informed consent may apply mainly
to sophisticated clients such as large companies, perhaps with in-house legal departments,
which will have the expertise to appreciate the issues and risks involved, and make a decision
based on those risks.
13.3.5.3 Is it reasonable to act?

When considering whether to use one of the above exceptions it also must be reasonable for
the firm to act for all the clients.
The solicitor should consider – both at the outset and throughout the duration of the retainer
– whether one client is at risk of prejudice if he is not represented separately (ie by another
firm) from the other client(s). This will particularly be the case where one client is vulnerable,
or where the parties do not have equal bargaining power.
13.3.5.4 Confidential information

Where a solicitor or firm does decide to act by taking advantage of one of the above
exceptions, the firm may well put itself in a position where it holds material confidential
information for one client which it has a duty to disclose to another client. Where this is the
case, the firm will need to consider whether it should be acting where the confidential
information would be placed at risk. See Chapter 12 for more details.
13.4 CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN TWO EXISTING CLIENTS

A solicitor may have agreed to act for two clients where, at the beginning of the transaction,
there was no actual conflict or any significant risk of a conflict. However, a conflict may arise
during the retainer.
Where such a conflict does arise between two existing clients, a solicitor must have regard not
only to the conflict of interest, but also to the issues surrounding confidential information.
The solicitor may continue to act for one of the clients but must ensure that his duty of
confidentiality is not put at risk (see Chapter 12 for more details).
13.5 OWN INTEREST CONFLICT

Outcome 3.4 provides that a solicitor must not act where there is an ‘own interest’ conflict, or
a significant risk of an ‘own interest’ conflict. This refers to any situation in which a solicitor’s
duty to act in the best interests of any client in relation to a matter conflicts, or there is a
significant risk that it may conflict, with his own interests in relation to that or a related
matter (Handbook Glossary).
For example, a solicitor could not act for a client suing a company where the solicitor was a
major shareholder in that company. The solicitor would be obliged to act in the best interests
of the client and take steps to try to ensure that the client was successful in suing the
company. In taking those steps the solicitor would be acting to the detriment of the company.
If the client was successful, the company would have to pay the client damages and so its share
price might drop. This would be detrimental to the company’s shareholders – including the
solicitor.
Further examples of situations in which a solicitor’s interest might conflict with that of his
client are provided in the Indicative Behaviours. Accordingly, it may tend to show that the
Outcomes have not been achieved where a solicitor:
(a) in a personal capacity, sells to, buys from, lends to or borrows from a client, unless the
client has obtained independent legal advice (Indicative Behaviour 3.8);
(b) advises a client to invest in a business in which the solicitor has an interest, which
affects his ability to provide impartial advice (Indicative Behaviour 3.9);
(c) holding a power of attorney for a client, uses that power to gain a benefit for himself
which in his professional capacity he would not have been prepared to allow to a third
party (Indicative Behaviour 3.10).
See also Outcome 3.2 at 13.6.
A solicitor must act in the best interests of his client. Thus a solicitor must not make a secret
profit whilst acting for the client. Outcome 1.15 obliges a solicitor to account properly to
clients for any financial benefit he receives as a result of his instructions (see 11.14).
13.6 SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS FOR IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS

Given that the proper handling of conflicts of interests is important for public protection,
there is an emphasis in the Code on firms having in place appropriate and effective systems
and controls to identify and assess potential conflicts of interests (Outcome 3.1). The detail
regarding what such systems and controls need to assess differs, however, depending on
whether they relate to an ‘own interest’ conflict or a client conflict.
Outcome 3.2 provides that systems and controls for indentifying ‘own interest’ conflicts must
be appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm, and to the nature of the work
undertaken. They must enable the firm to assess all the relevant circumstances, including
whether the solicitor’s ability as an individual, or that of anyone within the firm, to act in the
best interests of the client(s) is impaired by:
(a) any financial interest;
(b) a personal relationship;
(c) the appointment of the solicitor, or a member of his family, to public office;
(d) commercial relationships; or
(e) his employment.
According to Outcome 3.3, the systems and controls for identifying client conflicts must also
be appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm, and to the nature of the work
undertaken. They must enable the firm to assess all relevant circumstances, including
whether:
(a) the clients’ interests are different;
(b) the ability to give independent advice to the clients may be fettered;
(c) there is a need to negotiate between the clients;
(d) there is an imbalance in bargaining power between the clients; or
(e) any client is vulnerable.
Indicative Behaviour 3.1 provides that it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been
achieved where a firm trains employees and managers to identify and assess potential
conflicts of interests.
13.7 PROFESSIONAL EMBARRASSMENT

Even where there is no conflict of interests, nor any significant risk of a conflict, a solicitor
may still decline to act for a client due to professional embarrassment. (See also 12.3.5
above.)
A solicitor should consider whether accepting instructions to act for a client would breach one
of the Principles. One example might be acting against a former client. There would be no
conflict of interest, as a conflict cannot arise between a current client and a former client.
However, the solicitor must consider whether he would feel restricted in doing his best for the
current client on the basis that he was acting against a former client (with whom the solicitor
may have built up a good relationship). If so, the solicitor would not be acting in the best
interests of the current client in accepting the instructions.
A solicitor may also take into account his own commercial considerations when deciding
whether to accept instructions from a new client. For example, if your firm’s major client is
Isla Cola and you are asked to act for its major rival on a completely unrelated matter, you
might decline to do so if you thought that Isla Cola would instruct another firm as a result.
13.8 LIMITED RETAINER

Where a conflict arises between two clients, either at the beginning of or during a
transaction, an alternative to relying on one of the exceptions set out above (at 13.3.5) may
be to accept a limited retainer. The solicitor could be retained to act only in relation to those
areas where no conflict exists, with each client seeking independent advice on the
conflicting areas. It is necessary to make clear the terms of your retainer, and that there are
defined areas where you cannot advise.
However, it is unlikely that the Outcomes of Chapter 3 will be achieved if a solicitor acts under
a limited retainer where there is an unequal bargaining position between the two parties
13.9 CONVEYANCING
The area of conveyancing is subject to additional requirements regarding acting for more than
one party within a transaction. These are considered in more detail in Property Law & Practice.
13.10 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are approached by Mr Smith and Mr Jones. They are the sole partners of
Smith, Jones & Co, a firm of solicitors. Mr Jones explains that he wishes to leave
the partnership and that Mr Smith has agreed to buy his interest in the
partnership. They suggest to you that they both have the same aim and do not
wish to go to the expense of instructing different solicitors to act from them.
Can you or your firm act for both of them in agreeing the sale of Mr Jones’
interest in the partnership?
Answer Is there a conflict of interests here? Yes. You would owe separate duties to act in
the best interests of both clients in relation to the same matter. Do these
interests conflict? Yes. Mr Jones will wish to receive as high a price as possible
for his share in the partnership, whereas Mr Smith will want to pay as little as
possible. Other issues of conflict will also arise in relation to liability for debts,
etc.
Can the ‘substantially common interest’ exception be used here? Although it
may appear initially that the two clients have a common interest – one wishes
to sell and the other wishes to buy – their interest conflicts for the reasons
stated above.
You must send at least one client to another firm of solicitors.
EXAMPLE 2
Question X Co Ltd is put up for sale as a result of continuing financial difficulties. A
number of parties enter negotiations to buy the company as a going concern.
Can your firm act for two of these parties (Party A and Party B)?
Answer Is there a conflict of interests here? Yes – clearly the interests of Party A and
Party B conflict on the same matter as they both wish to buy X Co Ltd.
Therefore Outcome 3.5 would prevent your firm from acting for both parties.
However, does an exception apply? It is possible that the ‘commercial’
exception under Outcome 3.7 could allow the firm to act for both parties on
the basis that the clients are competing for the same objective (ie, to buy X Co
Ltd as a going concern) which, if attained by one client, will make that
objective unattainable to the other, and as long as the following conditions are
met:
(a) the firm has explained the relevant issues and risks to the clients, and it
has a reasonable belief that they understand those issues and risks;
(b) the clients have confirmed in writing that they want the firm to act, in the
knowledge that the firm acts for another client who is competing for the
same objective;
(c) there is no other client conflict in relation to the matter;
(d) unless the clients specifically agree, no individual acts for, or is
responsible for the supervision of work done for, more than one of the
clients in the matter; and
(e) the firm is satisfied that it is reasonable for it to act for both of the clients
and that the benefits to the clients of the firm doing so outweigh the
risks.
The firm would also have to deal with protecting the confidential information
of both clients. Outcome 4.4 would apply as the information obtained from
either client would be ‘material’ to the other client, and both clients have an
interest adverse to one another by virtue of competing for the same objective.
The firm would have to comply with the conditions imposed by Outcome 4.4,
which include obtaining the informed consent of both clients and protecting
the confidential information of both clients by the use of safeguards, including
information barriers.
SUMMARY
(1) A solicitor must not act where there is a conflict, or significant risk of a conflict,
between the interests of two or more clients, or between the interests of the client
and the solicitor.
(2) Where there is a conflict between two or more clients, a solicitor may act if he can
satisfy the requirements of the substantially common interest exception or the
commercial exception.
(3) Regardless of the requirements concerning conflicts of interests, the solicitor must
also consider his duty of confidentiality.
(4) A solicitor may decline to act if he is professionally embarrassed, or for commercial
considerations.
Undertakings 155
CHAPTER 14
Undertakings

14.2 Why undertakings are necessary 156
14.3 Breach of an undertaking 156
14.4 Oral and written undertakings 156
14.5 Terms of the undertaking 156
14.6 Client’s authority 157
14.7 Change of circumstances 158
14.8 Enforcement 158
14.9 Liability of others 158
14.10 Standard forms of undertaking 159
14.11 Examples 159
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• what an undertaking is
• the operation and effect of giving an undertaking
• ‘policing’ and risk management of undertakings.
14.1 INTRODUCTION
In its Code of Conduct, the SRA defines an undertaking as ‘a statement given orally or in
writing, whether or not it includes the word “undertake” or “undertaking”, made by or on
behalf of you or your firm in the course of practice, or by you outside the course of practice but
as a solicitor or REL to someone who reasonably relies upon it, that you or your firm will do
something or cause something to be done, or refrain from doing something’ (Handbook
Glossary).
In other words, an undertaking could be said to be an enforceable promise. Any statement
made by a solicitor to do or not do something, whether given to a client or to another third
party (such as another solicitor), may be an undertaking. Indeed, even if such a promise is
made on a solicitor’s behalf by a member of his staff, it may constitute an undertaking.
A solicitor must perform all undertakings given by him within an agreed timescale or within a
reasonable amount of time (Outcome 11.2)
As the definition makes clear, it is not necessary to use the word ‘undertake’ for the
undertaking to be binding. Even a promise to give an undertaking will usually be interpreted
as an undertaking, and therefore will be binding on the solicitor concerned.
Once the undertaking has been relied upon by the recipient, it can be withdrawn only by
agreement.
Given the consequences for breaching an undertaking (see 14.3 below), the SRA makes it
clear in the introduction to Chapter 11 of the Code that a solicitor is not obliged to give or
accept an undertaking. Indeed, a solicitor should think carefully when considering whether to
give an undertaking.
14.2 WHY UNDERTAKINGS ARE NECESSARY

Undertakings are often given by solicitors in order to smooth the path of a transaction. They are
a convenient method by which some otherwise problematic areas of practice can be avoided.
EXAMPLE
Imagine a solicitor is acting for Mr Taylor concerning the sale of his business. Mr Taylor has
agreed that he will pay the legal costs of the purchaser if the purchaser buys the business.
However, the purchaser of the business wants Mr Taylor to pay this money (an agreed
£10,000) up front before the deal takes place, in order to fund the necessary due diligence
process (eg, to examine the contracts and leases of the business to establish whether the
business is worth the asking price).
The solicitor could give an undertaking to the purchaser’s solicitors to pay £10,000
towards the purchaser’s costs from the proceeds of sale of the business (assuming that the
proceeds of sale would cover the £10,000). If accepted, the purchaser’s solicitors might
well be happy to complete the due diligence work without any money on account from
their client. In the absence of such an undertaking the client would have to fund paying
the £10,000 before receiving the proceeds of sale from the business.
14.3 BREACH OF AN UNDERTAKING

Where a solicitor gives an undertaking, the terms of that undertaking will be personally
binding on the individual solicitor concerned.
For example, a solicitor is acting for a client who is in arrears with his mortgage payments.
The client is taken to court by his mortgage company to repossess his house. To prevent the
house being repossessed the client offers to pay the arrears (£10,000) within seven days. The
mortgage company agrees to withdraw the repossession proceedings, but only on the basis
that the solicitor gives an undertaking to pay the mortgage company £10,000 within seven
days. If the solicitor agreed to give the undertaking in those terms and the client didn’t come
up with the money, the solicitor would be personally liable to pay the £10,000.
If a solicitor fails to comply with such an undertaking, the solicitor may be sued personally by
the recipient. The solicitor will also breach the requirements of professional conduct and will
be disciplined by the SRA or the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (see 14.8). The solicitor’s
firm may also be disciplined for a lack of supervision. It may tend to show that the firm has
achieved the Outcomes, and therefore complied with the Principles, if it maintains an
effective system that records when undertakings have been given and when they have been
discharged (Indicative Behaviour 11.5).
14.4 ORAL AND WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS

An undertaking will be binding regardless of whether it is given orally or in writing (Handbook
Glossary). However, it is advisable to give undertakings in writing, so that there can be no
dispute as to the terms of the undertaking. If, however, it is necessary in the circumstances to
give an oral undertaking, the solicitor should ensure that an attendance note recording the
undertaking is placed on the client’s file and that it is confirmed in writing as soon as
possible.
14.5 TERMS OF THE UNDERTAKING

14.5.1 Introduction
An undertaking is not a contract. For example, there is no obligation for consideration
(whether in monetary or other forms) to be present for an undertaking to be enforceable
against a solicitor. However, given the binding effect of undertakings, and the consequences
Undertakings 157
for breach, a solicitor should take just as much care in drafting undertakings as he would do
when drafting a contract for a client.
14.5.2 Wording of an undertaking

The SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007 provided that any ambiguity in the
wording of the undertaking would be interpreted in favour of its recipient. As this is still likely
to be the case, great care should be taken by the solicitor when drafting undertakings.
14.5.3 Acts outside the solicitor’s control

From time to time, a solicitor may be called upon to undertake to perform an action which is
outside of his control, such as to forward documents which are not in his possession. The
simple fact that the solicitor is unable to perform the undertaking without the cooperation of
his client or another third party does not discharge the solicitor’s obligation to perform, and
the undertaking remains enforceable.
In order to avoid this situation, a solicitor may seek to give an undertaking that, in respect of
our example above, he will use his ‘reasonable endeavours’ to obtain and provide the
documents requested. This will impose a lesser obligation upon the solicitor, just as such a
‘reasonable endeavours’ obligation in contract imposes a lesser obligation on the contracting
party. However, it may not give the party who might seek to rely on it the same comfort as an
absolute undertaking, and he may therefore choose not to accept it, which may cause delay to
the transaction.
14.5.4 Undertakings ‘on behalf’ of a client

Whilst an undertaking is almost always made for the benefit of the solicitor’s client (in order
to smooth the transaction as explained above), it is made in the solicitor’s name. However, an
undertaking may be drafted as being made ‘on behalf of ’ the solicitor’s client. This will not
prevent the undertaking from being enforceable as against the solicitor, who will remain
personally liable.
It is possible for a solicitor to give an undertaking ‘on behalf ’ of a client and exclude personal
liability, but in order to do so the SRA’s previous guidance in the Code of Conduct 2007
provided that the solicitor must clearly and expressly disclaim personal liability, or make it
clear that he is simply informing the other side of his client’s intentions. This is likely to
remain the case under the current Code of Conduct.
Therefore an undertaking that seeks to exclude personal liability on behalf of the solicitor is
legally possible. However, it is unlikely to be accepted by the proposed recipient, as his ability
to enforce it (and therefore rely on it) will be greatly reduced.
14.5.5 Timescale
Outcome 11.2 expressly provides that undertakings must be performed ‘within an agreed
timescale’, and therefore it is important that a timescale is expressed when the undertaking is
given. Where no timescale has been agreed, however, the Outcome provides that the
undertaking must be performed within a ‘reasonable amount of time’.
14.5.6 Costs
Where an undertaking is given in respect of the payment of costs of another party, the term
‘costs’ will be implied to mean proper costs unless a specific amount is agreed. Therefore, a
solicitor is able to request an assessment of the costs by the court if costs are not agreed.
14.6 CLIENT’S AUTHORITY

As has been made very clear in this chapter, an undertaking is a personal obligation on the
solicitor who gave it, and therefore the solicitor will be held liable for it, even if performance
would put the solicitor in breach of his duty to his client. A solicitor should therefore ensure
that he has clear and express authority from his client before giving any undertakings. When
such authority has been received, it may be withdrawn by the client at any time until the
solicitor has acted upon it, even if it is expressed to be irrevocable.
14.7 CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

An undertaking will remain binding upon the solicitor if the circumstances change so that it
is impossible to fulfil it, either wholly or partially. However, the recipient may agree to its
variation or discharge.
It may tend to show that the outcomes in Chapter 11 of the Code have been achieved, and
therefore the Principles complied with, if, where an undertaking is given which is dependent
upon the happening of a future event and it becomes apparent the future event will not occur,
the solicitor notifies the recipient of this (Indicative Behaviour 11.6).
14.8 ENFORCEMENT
14.8.1 The courts
The court is able to enforce an undertaking against a solicitor as an officer of the court.
Accordingly, where an undertaking has been breached, an aggrieved party may seek
compensation for any loss (for example, see Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 262).
Firms are obliged to carry indemnity insurance to cover such claims. However, the value of
such claims may well fall within the excess of those policies, leading to personal liability for
the solicitor concerned.
As outlined below, a breach of an undertaking is likely to be a breach of professional conduct.
However, given the court’s jurisdiction over solicitors concerning undertakings, the SRA’s
previous guidance provided that the SRA would not investigate a breach of an undertaking
given to the court itself, unless the court reported the matter to the SRA, and this is likely to
remain the case.
14.8.2 The SRA and the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal

If a solicitor fails to comply with the terms of an undertaking he has given, this will be a
breach of professional conduct. The Legal Ombudsman, the SRA and the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal have no power to enforce the performance of an undertaking. Neither
can these organisations direct that a solicitor pay compensation to an aggrieved third party.
However, they may investigate the solicitor’s conduct and impose disciplinary sanctions (up
to and including, in the case of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, striking the solicitor off
the roll of solicitors).
However, the SRA’s previous guidance provided that where an undertaking has been obtained
by fraud or deceit, it is unlikely that any action will be taken against the solicitor who has
breached the undertaking.
14.9 LIABILITY OF OTHERS

The definition of ‘undertaking’ includes those made on behalf of the solicitor or his firm (see
14.1). This includes undertakings given by non-admitted staff, and also undertakings give by
anyone held out by the firm as representing the firm. For example, if an undertaking given by
an assistant solicitor is not honoured, there will be a breach of professional conduct by the
solicitor and also the partners of the firm. Accordingly, many firms have strict procedures in
respect of recording undertakings given, and who within the firm is authorised to give
undertakings (see also Indicative Behaviour 11.5).
Undertakings 159
14.10 STANDARD FORMS OF UNDERTAKING

Any written undertaking given by a solicitor should be tailored carefully to the circumstances.
However, standard forms of wording exist for common undertakings, for example in
conveyancing transactions.
14.11 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
A solicitor is instructed by a landlord regarding the renewal of a lease of a domestic
property. The solicitor is told that the landlord is very keen to retain the existing tenant,
rather than going to the expense of advertising the property and having it stand empty for
possibly weeks whilst a new tenant is found.
The solicitor is told that the tenant will attend the solicitor’s office tomorrow (the day the
lease is due to expire), to ‘tie up a few loose ends’ and sign a new tenancy agreement.
The following day the tenant duly arrives at the solicitor’s office. However, it soon
becomes clear that there are problems to be resolved before the tenant will agree to the
new tenancy. The tenant explains that the house is in a shabby state, and the only way that
the tenant would be willing to agree to a new tenancy is if the landlord agrees to
redecorate the entire house and fit new carpets.
The solicitor tries to negotiate with the tenant that the landlord will look at the matter after
the new lease is signed. However, the tenant states that unless the issues are dealt with
today, he will terminate the existing lease and rent some other property. The solicitor is
unable to contact the landlord and so reluctantly gives an undertaking on behalf of the
landlord that the property will be redecorated and the carpets replaced within one month.
The tenant happily renews the lease.
The solicitor informs his client of the undertaking the next day. The landlord is outraged,
and refuses to carry out the work.
The undertaking was given on behalf of a client, but as the solicitor did not expressly
disclaim personal liability, the solicitor will be bound to comply with the undertaking. The
tenant can enforce the undertaking by suing the solicitor. If the client maintains his stance
and refuses to comply, the solicitor will personally have to pay for the redecoration and
carpets. In addition to being sued by the tenant, the solicitor could also be reported to the
Legal Ombudsman in the form of a complaint about the services provided by him.
The solicitor should not have given the undertaking without obtaining his client’s
authority and consent.
EXAMPLE 2
A solicitor is acting for a client concerning a large debt. The client owes Berkin Finance
£100,000 and is being pressed to pay the debt. The client agrees to sell his holiday cottage
by auction in order to pay the debt. The cottage is valued at £120,000 and the client is
hopeful that he will receive at least this price at the auction.
Berkin Finance writes to the client stating that unless the debt is paid in full within seven
days, it will commence court proceedings. As the auction is to be held in 10 days’ time, the
solicitor (acting on the instructions of the client) undertakes to Berkin Finance to pay
£100,000 from the proceeds of sale of the cottage.
The cottage is sold at auction for £90,000. Berkin Finance demands the full £100,000 from
the solicitor. Unfortunately for the solicitor, the SRA’s previous guidance provided that
where an undertaking is given to make a payment from the proceeds of sale of an asset,
the solicitor must pay the full amount (ie, £100,000), regardless of whether the proceeds
of sale are sufficient, and this is still likely to be the case under the current Code of
Conduct.
The solicitor should have drafted the undertaking to state clearly that his liability would be
limited to the money he received from the sale, or to make it clear that he was disclaiming
all personal liability.
SUMMARY
(1) An undertaking is any statement made by or on behalf of a solicitor or his firm (in
the course of practice or outside of it but as a solicitor) to do or refrain from doing
something, given to someone who reasonably places reliance upon it.
(2) A solicitor will be personally bound to honour an undertaking, regardless of whether
the undertaking was given orally or in writing.
(3) Any ambiguity in the wording of an undertaking is likely to be construed against the
party that gave it.
(4) A solicitor should obtain his client’s express authority before giving an undertaking.
(5) An undertaking may be enforced by the court.
(6) The SRA/Legal Ombudsman/Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal do not have the power
to enforce an undertaking. However, any breach of an undertaking may be
considered a breach of professional conduct, or result in a complaint about services
provided by a solicitor which may lead to sanctions against the solicitor concerned.
Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 161
CHAPTER 15
Money Laundering and the

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
15.2 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 161
15.3 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 166
15.4 Confidentiality 171
15.5 Examples 172
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• solicitors’ obligations under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007
• solicitors’ obligations concerning money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002.
15.1 INTRODUCTION
‘Money laundering’ is the process by which criminals seek to alter or ‘launder’ their proceeds
of crime so that it appears that these funds come from a legitimate source.
Suppose a thief has stolen £1 million. The thief then instructs a number of intermediaries
each to invest a relatively small proportion of the money. The investments can later be sold,
and the thief then appears to be in possession of the proceeds of a legitimate transaction.
In this particular example the ‘audit trail’ by which investigators follow the proceeds of crime
is not too difficult, but it does not take a great deal of imagination to see how a series of deals
using different intermediaries and types of investment could throw the investigators off track.
Solicitors are targets for criminals in their efforts to launder their proceeds of crime. The
purpose of regulation in this area is to disrupt serious crime (including terrorism) by
inhibiting criminals’ ability to reinvest or benefit from the proceeds of crime.
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce some of the issues relating to the Government’s
anti-money laundering legislation. Further guidance can be sought from The Law Society,
which produces detailed advice on this subject.
15.2 THE MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS 2007

15.2.1 Introduction
The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2157) came into force on 15 December
2007 and implemented the Third European Money Laundering Directive (2005/60/EC). The
Regulations place obligations on ‘relevant persons’. This is defined in reg 3, and includes
‘independent legal professionals’. This is further defined in reg 3 as including (but not limited
to):
a firm or sole practitioner who by way of business provides legal or notarial services to other persons,
when participating in financial or real property transactions . . .
Therefore the vast majority of solicitors firms will be subject to the Regulations. Failure to
comply with the Money Laundering Regulations is a criminal offence.
In contrast to the previous regulations, the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 have sought
to move away from a ‘tick box’ approach to a risk-based approach. Therefore obligations are
placed on solicitors to know their clients and understand the transactions they have been
instructed upon. On this basis, solicitors are expected to assess the risk that each transaction
or client poses, and implement anti-money laundering measures as appropriate.
Firms which are subject to the Regulations must comply with, for example, the matters
discussed in 15.2.2 to 15.2.5 below. What follows is simply an overview of the often complex
requirements imposed upon solicitors. More guidance can be obtained from
www.moneylaundering.lawsociety.org.uk.
15.2.2 Nominated officers and reporting procedures

A firm must have internal procedures in place for the identification and reporting of money
laundering (reg 20). Most notably, reg 20(2)(d)(i) requires firms to appoint a person within
the firm to act as a ‘nominated officer’, referred to in practice as a ‘Money Laundering
Reporting Officer’ (MLRO).
The nominated officer (who will be a senior member of the firm) will receive reports from
within the firm concerning any instances of suspected money laundering, and will then
decide whether an external report (known as a suspicious activity report, or SAR) to the
National Crime Agency (NCA) should be made.
15.2.3 Client due diligence (client identification)

Subject to limited exceptions, firms carrying out relevant business are obliged to obtain
verification of the identity of each of their clients (reg 7). The need to verify the client’s
identity includes the following circumstances:
(a) if the client and solicitor agree to form a business relationship; or
(b) occasional transactions, ie a single transaction or linked transactions, which amounts
to 15,000 euros or more; or
(c) where the solicitor suspects money laundering or terrorist financing; or
(d) where the solicitor doubts the accuracy or adequacy of documents or information
supplied to verify the client’s identity.
The verification must take place before a business relationship is established and before an
occasional transaction can be carried out (reg 9). However, a solicitor may verify the identity
of the client during the establishment of a business relationship if:
(a) there is little risk of any money laundering or terrorist financing occurring;
(b) it is necessary not to interrupt the normal course of business; and
(c) the identity is verified as soon as possible.
However, the solicitor cannot:
(a) carry out a transaction with or for the client through a bank account; or
(b) allow funds or property to be transferred or final deals signed until verification is
complete.
How the solicitor must verify the identity of the client varies according to the type of client
involved and the risk of money laundering.
15.2.3.2 Simplified due diligence

Simplified due diligence will apply where the identity of the client means that the risk of
money laundering or terrorist financing is low. The clients which qualify for simplified due
diligence are specified in reg 13. These include companies listed on a regulated EEA market
subject to specified disclosure obligations (such as a public limited company listed in the
United Kingdom on the Stock Exchange), or a public authority within the United Kingdom.
The exact verification required depends on the identity of the client. For example, for a plc
listed in the UK, the solicitor must obtain confirmation of the company’s listing on the Stock
Exchange.
15.2.3.3 Standard due diligence

Standard due diligence will apply to most clients. The solicitor is obliged to verify the identity
of the client using ‘documentation, data or information obtained from a reliable and
independent source’ (reg 5).
For natural persons, evidence of identity may be based on documents such as passports and
photocard driving licences. The Law Society considers it good practice to have either:
(a) one government document which verifies either the person’s name and address, or his
name and date of birth; or
(b) a government document which verifies the client’s full name, plus another supporting
document which verifies his name and either his address or his date of birth.
For partnerships, it will be necessary to obtain information on the constituent individuals
who make up the partnership. However, where partnerships are well-known, reputable
organisations with long histories in their industries and with substantial public information
about them, The Law Society’s guidance advises that it should be sufficient to obtain their
name, registered or trading address and nature of business.
For companies, it will be necessary to identify and verify the existence of the company. For
private companies and those not listed on a regulated market (which is the London Stock
Exchange for UK companies) the standard identifiers are the company’s full name, business/
registered address and nature of business, and the names of two directors or equivalent.
Sources for verifying a company’s identification may include the certificate of incorporation,
details from Companies House obtained by way of a company search and filed audited
accounts. The Law Society’s guidance advises that it may also be appropriate to consider
whether the person providing the instructions on behalf of the company has the authority to
do so. In addition, where simplified due diligence does not apply (see 15.2.3.2) it will be
necessary to consider the identity of beneficial owners.
Beneficial owners
A solicitor must identify any ‘beneficial owner’ where the beneficial owner is not the client
(reg 5). A beneficial owner is defined in reg 6, and the definition varies depending on the
nature of the client.
In the case of companies, reg 6(1) defines a beneficial owner as any individual who:
(a) ultimately owns or controls (whether through direct or indirect control) more than 25%
of the shares or voting rights in the body; or
(b) otherwise exercises control over the management of the company (eg members of the
company board).
This regulation does not apply to a company listed on a regulated market. It does apply to UK
limited liability partnerships.
EXAMPLE
A Co Ltd instructs a firm of solicitors. The solicitors will have to obtain documentary
confirmation of the name, registered address and the directors of the company. This can
be obtained by carrying out a company search at Companies House. However, the
solicitors also need to identify any ‘beneficial owner’ of the company.
If Mr Smith owns 50% of the shares, Mr Jones owns 30% of the shares and Mr McConnell
owns the remaining 20%, Smith and Jones will be the beneficial owners.
However, what happens if A Co Ltd is owned by B Co Ltd? The Law Society’s guidance
states that a risk-based decision should be taken as to whether to make further enquiries.
However, it is common for law firms to seek to identify the beneficial owners of any parent
company up to and including the ultimate parent entity.
Therefore, if A Co Ltd is owned by B Co Ltd, the solicitor is likely to make enquiries to
identify the beneficial owners of B Co Ltd and so on.
In the case of a partnership (other than a limited liability partnership), reg 6(2) defines a
beneficial owner as any individual who:
(a) ultimately is entitled to or controls (whether the entitlement or control is direct or
indirect) more than a 25% share of the capital or profits of the partnership, or more
than 25% of the voting rights in the partnership; or
(b) otherwise exercises control over the management of the partnership (ie the ability to
manage the use of funds or transactions outside of the normal management structure
and control mechanisms).
In the case of a trust, reg 6(3) sets out three types of beneficial owners of a trust:
(a) Any individual entitled to a specified interest in at least 25% of the trust capital. A person has a
specified interest if, for example, he has an interest in possession in the capital of the
fund (ie, a right to enjoy the use or possession of the fund) or an interest in remainder in
the capital of the fund (ie, a right to the capital which is postponed to one or more prior
interests in possession in the income of the fund).
(b) The class of persons in whose main interest the trust is set up or operates. This covers any trust that
includes those who do not fit within (a) above. It is necessary to identify the class of
persons in whose main interest the trust operates. All discretionary trusts will fall
within this category. The approach to identification for these purposes is to understand
the nature of the class, eg ‘the grandchildren of X’, rather than having to identify each
member of it.
(c) Individuals who control a trust. The term ‘control’ in this context means certain powers
which are exercisable alone, jointly with another person or with the consent of another
person. Examples include the powers (under the trust instrument or by law) to add or
remove a person as a beneficiary, or to appoint or remove trustees.
EXAMPLE
Mr James’s will provides that after payment of legacies and testamentary expenses, his
residuary estate passes to his children in equal shares. Mr James has died and is survived
by four children, the youngest of whom is 16 years of age.
On the death of Mr James, each of his children has a vested (ie a specified) interest in one
quarter of the residuary estate, notwithstanding that the youngest child will not receive
his share until he is 18 years old (he cannot yet give a valid receipt to the executors).
After the estate of Mr James has been administered, all four children should be identified
as beneficial owners of the trust as they are each entitled to a specified interest in at least
25% of the trust capital.
Whilst generally the beneficiaries of a trust will be individuals, they may at times be a
company. If this is the case, it is necessary to apply reg 6(1) (above) to determine the
beneficial owners of the company in question.
In the case of other arrangement or entities, for example unincorporated associations and
foundations, beneficial ownership is dealt with by reg 6(6), but the detail is outside the scope
of this book.
15.2.3.4 Enhanced due diligence

Enhanced due diligence applies where:
(a) the solicitor has not met the client face to face;
(b) there are higher risk factors in relation to money laundering or terrorist financing; or
(c) the client is a Politically Exposed Person (PEP) (reg 14).
In these situations, a solicitor will have to apply enhanced due diligence measures. For
example, where the client is not present on a face-to-face basis, reg 14(2) suggests that the
client’s identity is established by additional documents, or by ensuring that the first payment
from the client to the solicitor is carried out through a bank account opened in the client’s
name.
A PEP is anyone who has held, within the last year, a ‘prominent public function’ for a State
(other than within the UK), an EU institution or an international body (reg 14(5)). Prominent
public functions include the following:
(a) Heads of State, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers;
(b) members of parliament;
(c) members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial
bodies whose decisions are not generally subject to further appeal, except in exceptional
circumstances;
(d) members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks;
(e) ambassadors, chargés d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces;
(f ) members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of State-owned
enterprises.
A PEP also includes the family members of the primary PEPs listed above (spouse, partner,
children and their spouses or partners, and parents) and known close associates of the
primary PEP, eg with whom there are close business relationships. Middle-ranking and junior
officials, however, are not PEPs.
Where a solicitor is dealing with a PEP, additional obligations are placed on the solicitor, such
as having approval from senior management to act for the client, and taking additional
measures to identify the source of wealth and source of funds involved in the proposed
transaction or business relationship (reg 14(4)).
15.2.3.5 Ongoing monitoring

A solicitor is obliged to undertake ongoing monitoring of business relationships, to ensure
that the transactions are consistent with the solicitor’s knowledge of the client (reg 8).
15.2.4 Training
Firms are obliged to provide training to their employees in respect of money laundering (reg
21). Employees should be made aware of the law relating to money laundering and terrorism
financing (for example, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the Terrorism Act 2000, and the
Money Laundering Regulations 2007). The Regulations also specify that employees should be
given regular training on how to recognise (and then deal with) transactions that potentially
involve money laundering.
The Regulations do not specify how the training should take place. However, guidance
provided by The Law Society suggests that appropriate methods of delivery may include face-
to-face learning or e-learning. The Law Society’s guidance also recommends the use of a staff
manual on money laundering issues.
Where no such training is given, this may provide the employee with a defence to some of the
offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (see 15.3.3.7).
15.2.5 Record keeping

A firm must keep various records in respect of money laundering. These include evidence
supporting client due diligence (reg 19). This can be either a copy of the evidence provided to
verify the client’s identity (eg a copy of the client’s passport, etc) or references to it. These
records must be kept for at least five years from when the business relationship ends or the
end of the occasional transaction.
The firm must also keep records of a business relationship or occasional transactions for a
similar period. The Law Society also recommends that a detailed record is kept of suspicions
and disclosures in respect of money laundering.
15.3 THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002

15.3.1 Introduction
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 makes it an offence to become involved in money laundering.
For example, under s 327, it is an offence to conceal, disguise, convert or transfer criminal
property, or remove criminal property from England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland.
This chapter will focus on the three offences which most concern solicitors in their day-to-day
practice.
15.3.2 Arrangements
A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement which he
knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal
property by or on behalf of another person. (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 328(1))
15.3.2.2 Definitions
Section 328 is drafted very widely. For example, if a solicitor transferred a house to a relative of
a client, where the solicitor knew or suspected that the house was purchased with the
proceeds of crime, then the solicitor would ‘[become] concerned in an arrangement’ and so
would breach s 328(1).
There is no requirement that the funds pass through the hands of the person concerned with
the arrangement, ie the solicitor.
‘Criminal property’ is defined by s 340 of the Act as a person’s direct or indirect benefit from
criminal conduct (if the offender knows or suspects that the property constitutes or
represents such a benefit).
‘Criminal conduct’ is defined very widely, and includes any offence committed within the
United Kingdom. This would include offences ranging from armed robbery to fraudulent
receipt of welfare benefits. The definition also includes an international element. For example,
if the offence occurred outside of the United Kingdom, it would still constitute criminal
conduct if it would be classed as an offence if it had occurred within the United Kingdom. For
example, a criminal robs a bank in France. This would still constitute ‘criminal conduct’ under
the Act as robbery is an offence within the United Kingdom. It is irrelevant whether robbery is
an offence in France. (However, there are exceptions to this international element – see
15.3.2.6.)
15.3.2.3 Authorised disclosure

Disclosure prior to the act taking place
A solicitor does not commit an offence under s 328 if he makes an authorised disclosure to the
firm’s nominated officer as soon as is practically possible prior to the transaction taking
place, and the authorisation of the nominated officer or the NCA is obtained to complete the
transaction.
However, once the nominated officer has made a suspicious activity report to the NCA, the
nominated officer is unable to give consent for the transaction to proceed until one of the
following conditions is met:
(a) the nominated officer, having made a disclosure to the NCA, receives the consent of the
NCA;
(b) the nominated officer, having made a disclosure to the NCA, hears nothing for seven
working days (starting with the first working day after the disclosure is made);
(c) where consent is refused by the NCA, the nominated officer may not give consent for
the transaction to proceed unless consent is subsequently granted within 31 days
starting on the day refusal is given, or a period of 31 days has expired from the date of
refusal. This 31-day period gives the authorities time to take action to seize assets or
take other action with respect to the money laundering.
Disclosure during the prohibited act

A solicitor may seek to make an authorised disclosure whilst the prohibited act is ongoing.
However, if the solicitor is to avoid breaching s 328 by making the disclosure, he must satisfy
the provisions of s 338(2A):
(a) the disclosure is made whilst the prohibited act is ongoing; and
(b) when the alleged offender began to do the act, he did not know or suspect that the
property constituted or represented a person’s benefit from criminal conduct; and
(c) the disclosure is made as soon as is practicable after the alleged offender first knows or
suspects that the property constitutes or represents a person’s benefit from criminal
conduct, and the disclosure is made on the alleged offender’s own initiative.
Take the example of a solicitor conducting a conveyancing transaction on behalf of a client.
Until the client exchanges contracts to sell the property, the solicitor has no knowledge or
suspicion that the house was bought with the proceeds of crime. Accordingly, there is no
breach of s 328, as the solicitor does not possess the requisite knowledge or suspicion. After
contracts have been exchanged, the solicitor correctly begins to suspect that the house was
bought with the proceeds of crime. Accordingly, he is now concerned in an arrangement
which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property and therefore
is in breach of s 328.
In order to seek the protection of making an authorised disclosure, the solicitor must disclose
his suspicions to his nominated officer on his own initiative, and must do so as soon as is
practicable after his first suspicions arise.
Disclosure after the prohibited act

A solicitor may also seek to make an authorised disclosure after the prohibited act is been
completed. However, the solicitor must have a good reason for his failure to disclose prior to
his completing the act (s 338(3)). The disclosure must be made as soon as is practicable, and
again the solicitor must make the disclosure on his own initiative.
15.3.2.4 Reasonable excuse for non-disclosure

A solicitor may have a defence to breaching s 328 where he intended to make an authorised
disclosure but has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. The Law Society’s guidance states
that a ‘reasonable excuse’ has not been defined by the courts. However, the guidance advises
solicitors to document their reasons for non-disclosure.
15.3.2.5 Litigation proceedings

In Bowman v Fels [2005] EWCA Civ 226, the Court of Appeal considered whether taking steps in
litigation could be construed as ‘arranging’ under s 328. The Court concluded that taking
steps in litigation (including pre-action steps) and the resolution of issues in a litigious
context were excluded from the scope of s 328. Therefore a solicitor would not be obliged to
make an authorised disclosure.
EXAMPLE
A solicitor is acting for Mr Smith in divorce proceedings. Financial relief proceedings are
issued by Mrs Smith, as she wishes to have the matrimonial home transferred into her sole
name. The solicitor becomes aware that the house was purchased by Mr Smith with the
proceeds of crime. The solicitor will not breach s 328 by merely conducting the litigation
on behalf of Mr Smith.
It was originally thought that transferring the house from Mr Smith to Mrs Smith after the
court proceedings would have fallen into the definition of an arrangement. However, the
current Law Society guidance provides that dividing assets in accordance with a court
judgment would not fall within this definition, therefore no consent would be required.
However, the guidance goes on to state that careful consideration should be made of whether
the client would be committing an offence by receiving stolen property.
The solicitor would not be able to take advantage of this exclusion if the litigation was a sham
created for the purposes of money laundering.
15.3.2.6 ‘Overseas’ defence

Despite the wide definition of ‘criminal conduct’ (see 15.3.2.2 above), a solicitor will not
commit an offence under s 328 where the criminal conduct occurred outside of the United
Kingdom and was not unlawful in the country where it happened. However, this defence is
not available (subject to certain exceptions) where the offence would carry a sentence of
imprisonment for 12 months or more were it to be carried out within the United Kingdom
(see the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Money Laundering: Exceptions to Overseas Conduct
Defence) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1070)).
15.3.2.7 Penalties
An individual convicted under s 328 may receive a maximum sentence of 14 years’
imprisonment.
15.3.3 Acquisition, use or possession

A person commits an offence under s 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if he acquires,
uses or has possession of criminal property.
15.3.3.2 Adequate consideration defence

An issue may arise in connection with s 329 where, for example, a solicitor receives money for
his costs for work carried out for a client charged with a criminal offence and there is a
possibility that the money in question is criminal property.
The adequate consideration defence applies if there was adequate consideration for acquiring,
using and possessing the criminal property, unless the individual knew or suspected that
those goods or services might help to carry out criminal conduct. The Crown Prosecution
Service guidance for prosecutors says that this defence applies where professional advisers,
such as solicitors, receive money for or on account of costs, including disbursements.
However, the fees charged must be reasonable and the defence is not available if the value of
the work is significantly less than the money received.
It must be borne in mind that returning the balance of money in an account to a client may be
an offence under s 328 if the solicitor knows or suspects that the money is criminal property.
In that case, an authorised disclosure must be made to avoid such an offence being committed
(see 15.3.2.3).
15.3.4 Failure to disclose

A person commits an offence under s 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if:
(a) he knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds to know or suspect, that a person is
engaged in money laundering; and
(b) the information comes to him in the course of a business in the regulated sector; and
(c) the information may assist in identifying the money launderer or the location of any
laundered property; and
(d) he does not make an authorised disclosure as soon as is practicable.
15.3.4.2 Objective test

A solicitor will commit this offence even where he genuinely did not know or suspect that a
person was engaged in money laundering. The court will consider, based on the information
available to the solicitor at the time, whether he should have known (or at least suspected) that
money laundering was occurring. Accordingly, turning a blind eye to a transaction will not
provide the solicitor with a defence.
15.3.4.3 Regulated sector

Firms will be within the ‘regulated sector’ if they undertake relevant business (see the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Sch 9). Most solicitors firms will fall within the regulated sector
for at least some of the work with which they deal. The definition of ‘regulated sector’ is
closely aligned to the definition given in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (see
15.2.1).
15.3.4.4 The information

The information obtained by the solicitor must be of some use to the authorities. Accordingly,
the solicitor must be able to identify, or believe the information may assist in identifying:
(a) the money launderer; or
(b) the location of the laundered property.

If the solicitor is genuinely unable to provide this information, the solicitor will not breach
s 330.
The solicitor cannot blindly assume that the information will be of no use to the authorities.
When considering whether the solicitor has breached s 330, the court will consider whether it
would have been reasonable to expect the solicitor to believe that the information would assist
in identifying the offender, or locating the laundered property.
15.3.4.5 Authorised disclosure

A solicitor will be provided with a defence to s 330 if he makes an authorised disclosure to the
firm’s nominated officer as soon as practically possible. The disclosure on its own will be
enough to grant an effective defence under s 330. However, the nominated officer will still
consider whether the information should be forwarded to the NCA.
15.3.4.6 Reasonable excuse for non-disclosure

Once again, a solicitor will not commit this offence where he intended to make a disclosure
and has a reasonable excuse for not doing so (see 15.3.2.4).
15.3.4.7 Training
A further defence under s 330 concerns the training provided to an individual. Firms
undertaking ‘relevant business’ are obliged to provide anti-money laundering training to their
employees. If an employee does not know or suspect that a client is engaged in money
laundering due to a lack of training then the employee may not commit the offence (see 15.2.2).
15.3.4.8 Confidentiality and privilege

The position concerning a solicitor’s duty of confidentiality in Chapter 4 of the Solicitors’
Code of Conduct is considered below at 15.4.
A solicitor is also under a duty at common law to keep confidential certain information given
to him from a client. This is referred to as legal professional privilege (LPP). Communications
will be protected from disclosure if they fall within ‘advice privilege’ or ‘litigation privilege’
(see 12.4). However, LPP cannot be relied upon where the communication takes place with
the purpose of carrying out an offence.
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 mirrors the common law position, in that a solicitor is not
obliged under s 330 to disclose any information that comes to him as a professional legal
adviser in privileged circumstances, eg in connection with giving or seeking legal advice, or in
relation to legal proceedings, whether contemplated or actual. However, this exemption does
not apply where the information is communicated with the intention of furthering a criminal
purpose (eg, money laundering).
15.3.4.9 ‘Overseas’ defence

A solicitor will not breach s 330 for failing to disclose where he believes that the money
laundering is taking place outside of the United Kingdom, and money laundering is not
unlawful in that country. The Secretary of State has the power to limit this defence, but at the
time of writing has not taken any steps to do so.
15.3.4.10 Penalties
A person convicted of an offence under s 330 may receive a maximum sentence of five years’
imprisonment.
15.3.5 Tipping off

15.3.5.1 The offences
There are two aspects of tipping off that must be avoided under s 333A.
Disclosing a suspicious activity report (s 333A(1))

It is an offence to disclose to any person that a suspicious activity report (on money
laundering) has been made if that disclosure is likely to prejudice any investigation that
follows such a report. For example, this offence would apply where a solicitor informs his
client that an authorised disclosure has been made, with the intention of the client taking
steps to frustrate any action taken by the law enforcement authorities. This would apply where
a disclosure of suspicion is made to a MLRO, the NCA, the Police, or to HMRC.
EXAMPLE
Mr Wilkinson instructs his solicitor to sell his house. The solicitor suspects that the house
was purchased with the proceeds of tax evasion and so makes an authorised disclosure
under s 328. The transaction cannot be completed until the solicitor obtains the consent
of his MLRO or the NCA (see 15.3.2.3). Mr Wilkinson demands to know why his house sale
has not been completed. The solicitor’s trainee receives Mr Wilkinson’s call and, having
checked the file, informs Mr Wilkinson that an authorised disclosure has been made to the
NCA. In these circumstances the trainee may breach s 333A unless he can rely on one of
the defences (see 15.3.4.2).
Disclosing an investigation (s 333A(3))

This is a more general offence, and applies regardless of whether or not a suspicious activity
report has been made. The offence is committed where a disclosure is made to any person
that an investigation into money laundering is being carried out, or is being contemplated,
and that disclosure is likely to prejudice the money laundering investigation.
The idea behind both offences is to ensure that information is not leaked to the money
launderer or another third party before the authorities have had the opportunity to investigate
the matter and consider whether any enforcement action is necessary.
15.3.5.2 Defences
There are a number of defences to tipping off. These include that the person who made the
disclosure did not know or suspect that the disclosure would prejudice an investigation into
money laundering (s 333D (3) and (4)). Another defence is that the disclosure is made to the
client for the purposes of dissuading the client from engaging in the alleged money
laundering (s 333D(2)), although this exception should be treated with caution.
15.3.5.3 Penalties
Both the offences set out in 15.3.5.1 above carry a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine,
and/or a maximum prison sentence of two years.
15.3.5.4 ‘Regulated sector’

These sections (ss 333A to 333D) only apply to the regulated sector. However, similar
provisions apply to work completed outside of the regulated sector by virtue of s 342.
15.4 CONFIDENTIALITY
A solicitor is under a duty under Outcome 4.1 of the Code of Conduct to keep confidential the
affairs of clients (including former clients). However, when making a disclosure under s 328
or s 330, the legislation expressly provides that such a disclosure will not breach this duty.
Nevertheless, the SRA’s previous guidance advised that a solicitor should be mindful of the
importance of the duty of confidentiality, and seek advice when uncertain as to whether to
report confidential information.
15.5 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are acting on a corporate transaction. Your client is buying X Co Ltd.
During the course of your due diligence you discover that a number of X Co
Ltd’s lucrative contracts were obtained by paying bribes.
What obligations are you now under? Can you complete the transaction?
Answer You need to consider whether anything of a criminal nature has occurred.
Obtaining property using bribes is a criminal offence. These contracts will have
generated cash which will be owned by X Co Ltd. Therefore when your client
buys the company, it will be acquiring the proceeds of crime, which is an
offence under s 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Simply by completing
the transaction you will be concerned in an arrangement which facilitates the
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property, which is an offence
under s 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Therefore you need to report
the matter to your Money Laundering Reporting Officer as soon as possible. He
will then need to seek the consent of the NCA for the transaction to proceed.
EXAMPLE 2
Question This is a continuation of the above question. The above information comes to
you on the morning of the day for completion of the deal. You are unable to
obtain the consent of the NCA in time to complete the deal. Therefore you
must postpone completion of the deal to allow you to obtain this consent. Can
you explain your reasons for the delay to the solicitors representing X Co Ltd?
Answer No. This would constitute ‘tipping off’ – an offence under ss 333A–333D of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This will place you in a very difficult position.
Therefore it is vital that you disclose any suspicion to the Money Laundering
Reporting Officer as soon as possible to attempt to avoid this situation.
SUMMARY
(1) Money laundering is the process whereby the proceeds of crime are changed so that
they appear to come from a legitimate source.
(2) The Government has introduced legislation to disrupt this process.
(3) Solicitors who undertake relevant business must comply with the Money Laundering
Regulations 2007.
(4) Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, firms must appoint a nominated
officer, who will receive internal reports concerning money laundering and must
consider whether to report the matter to the NCA.
(5) A person commits an offence under s 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 where
he becomes concerned in an arrangement involving money laundering.
(6) Section 328 does not apply to steps taken in litigation.
(7) A person commits an offence under s 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if he
acquires, uses or has possession of criminal property.
(8) A solicitor within the regulated sector is obliged to disclose any suspected money
laundering activity to his nominated officer under s 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002.
(9) It is an offence to disclose to any person that a disclosure has been made where this
may prejudice an investigation.
Duties Owed to the Court and Third Parties 175
CHAPTER 16
Duties Owed to the Court

and Third Parties

16.2 Refusing instructions to act 177
16.3 Instructing counsel 177
16.4 Immunity for advocacy work 178
16.5 Duty to third parties 178
16.6 Relations with other solicitors 180
16.7 Examples 180
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will be able to understand the duties owed by solicitors to:
• the court
• third parties generally
• other solicitors
• barristers.
16.1 INTRODUCTION
16.1.1 Duty to the court
The introduction to Chapter 5 of the Code explains that the chapter is about duties to clients
and to the court if a solicitor is exercising a right to conduct litigation or acting as an advocate.
The Outcomes apply to both litigation and advocacy, but there are some Indicative Behaviours
which may be relevant only when a solicitor is acting as an advocate.
A solicitor must comply with his duties to the court (Outcome 5.6). A solicitor must also not
attempt to deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court, or be complicit in another
person deceiving or misleading the court (Outcomes 5.1 and 5.2 respectively). The Handbook
Glossary defines ‘court’ as any court, tribunal or enquiry of England and Wales, or a British
court martial, or any court of another jurisdiction.
The Code provides examples of such behaviour in the form of the Indicative Behaviours in
Chapter 5. Accordingly, it may tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes,
and therefore not complied with the Principles, if he:
(a) constructs facts supporting the client’s case, or drafts any documents relating to any
proceedings containing any contention which the solicitor does not consider to be
properly arguable or any allegation of fraud, unless the solicitor has been instructed to
do so and he has material which he reasonably believes shows, on the face of it, a case of
fraud (Indicative Behaviour 5.7);
(b) calls a witness whose evidence he knows is untrue (Indicative Behaviour 5.9);
(c) tampers with evidence or seeks to persuade a witness to change his evidence (Indicative
Behaviour 5.11).
Where a solicitor becomes aware that he has inadvertently misled the court, it may tend to
show that he has achieved the necessary Outcomes and complied with the Principles if he
immediately informs the court, with the client’s consent, or ceases to act if the client does not
consent to this (Indicative Behaviour 5.4).
Similarly, it may tend to show that a solicitor has achieved the Outcomes if he refuses to
continue acting for a client if he becomes aware that the client has committed perjury or
misled (or attempted to mislead) the court, unless the client agrees to disclose the truth to the
court (Indicative Behaviour 5.5). However, the SRA’s previous guidance in the 2007 Code of
Conduct stated that a solicitor is not obliged to stop acting where the client gives inconsistent
evidence – there must be an intention on behalf of the client to submit false evidence, and this
is likely to remain the case under the current Code.
A solicitor must comply with court orders which place obligations on him (Outcome 5.3), and
it may tend to show that the Outcomes have been achieved if a solicitor advises his clients to
comply with court orders made against them and advises them of the consequences of failing
to comply (Indicative Behaviour 5.1).
Furthermore, a solicitor must not place himself in contempt of court (Outcome 5.4) and must
ensure that evidence relating to sensitive issues is not misused (Outcome 5.7). Child witness
evidence is dealt with by Indicative Behaviour 5.3. There is also an obligation on a solicitor to
inform a client, where relevant, of the circumstances in which his duties to the court outweigh
his obligations to the client (Outcome 5.5). There may be occasions when the obligation as a
litigator or an advocate to act in the best interests of a client may conflict with his duty to the
court. The Notes to Chapter 5 advise that in such situations a solicitor may need to consider
whether the public interest is best served by the proper administration of justice and should
take precedence over the client’s interests.
Lastly, solicitors appearing before the court should exercise considerable caution when
communicating with judges outside of the courtroom. It is advised by the SRA that advocates
should communicate with judges in this fashion only when invited to do so and in the
presence of the legal representative of the other client.
16.1.2 Witnesses
It may tend to show that the Outcomes in Chapter 5 of the Code have not been achieved if a
solicitor, when acting as an advocate, names in open court a third party whose character
would thereby be called into question, unless it is necessary for the proper conduct of the case
(Indicative Behaviour 5.12). Likewise calling into question the character of a witness he has
cross-examined unless that witness has been given the opportunity to answer the allegations
during cross-examination (Indicative Behaviour 5.13), or suggesting that any person is guilty
of a crime, fraud or misconduct, unless those allegations are material to the solicitor’s own
client’s case and appear to him to be supported by reasonable grounds (Indicative Behaviour
5.8).
Should a solicitor wish, or require, in the best interests of his client, to take statements from a
witness or potential witness, he may do so at any point in the proceedings. This remains the
case whether or not that individual has already been interviewed by another party, or has been
called as a witness by another party. However, the SRA’s previous guidance suggested that the
witness be interviewed in the presence of his legal representative. Attempting to influence a
witness when taking a statement from him, with regard to the contents of that statement, may
tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes in Chapter 5 (Indicative
Behaviour 5.10).
A solicitor may not make (or offer to make) payments to a witness dependent upon their
evidence or upon the outcome of the case (Outcome 5.8).
16.1.3 Duty to disclose law and facts

A solicitor who appears before the court for the defence in a criminal case, or for either party
in a civil case, has no duty to inform the court of any evidence or witnesses which would
prejudice the solicitor’s own client.
In the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007, there was a duty on the part of a solicitor, when
exercising a right to conduct litigation or act as an advocate, to draw to the court’s attention
relevant cases and statutory provisions and any material procedural irregularity. The
accompanying Guidance Note indicated that if an advocate omitted, or made an incorrect
reference to, a case or provision, it was the duty of the other advocate to draw attention to it
even if it assisted the opponent’s case (ie, whether or not it was in the best interests of his own
client to do so).
The duties described above not do appear in the current Code as an Outcome. Instead,
Indicative Behaviour 5.2 provides that it may tend to show that the solicitor has achieved the
Outcomes of Chapter 5 if he draws the court’s attention to relevant cases and statutory
provisions, and to any material irregularity. Whilst no express mention is made of a situation
in which to do this would not necessarily be in the interests of the solicitor’s own client, the
notes to the Principles in the Code state that where two or more Principles come into conflict,
the Principle which takes precedent is the one which best serves the public interest, especially
in the proper administration of justice (Principle 1). As a result, it is likely that the position
reflects that in the Code of Conduct 2007 in that Principle 1 will take precedence over
Principle 4 (acting in the best interests of the client) in such a situation.
16.2 REFUSING INSTRUCTIONS TO ACT

There are no longer any specific references in the Code to situations in which a solicitor must
not refuse to act as an advocate. The introduction to Chapter 1 on ‘Client care’ states that a
solicitor is generally free to decide whether or not to accept instructions in any matter,
provided that he does not discriminate unlawfully (see also 10.3.2).
If it is clear to a solicitor appearing as an advocate, or acting in litigation, that he or anyone
else in his firm will be called as a witness in the matter, it may tend to show that the Outcomes
have been achieved if the solicitor declines to appear/act unless he is satisfied that this will not
prejudice his independence as an advocate or a litigator, or the interests of his clients or the
interests of justice (Indicative Behaviour 5.6).
16.3 INSTRUCTING COUNSEL

A solicitor is obliged to act in the best interests of his client. Accordingly, where the client
requires advocacy services, the solicitor must consider, based on the complexity of the case
and the solicitor’s own experience, whether it would be in the best interests of that client to
instruct another solicitor within the firm or counsel to act as the advocate in the proceedings.
16.3.1 Duty to counsel

If it is in the client’s best interests to instruct counsel, it remains the solicitor’s duty to ensure
that adequate instructions are provided to the chosen barrister. As an extension of the
solicitor’s duty to his client, he should ensure that these instructions, including any relevant
supporting statements, information or documents, are provided in good time to allow
adequate preparation of the case.
In order to provide such information, it may be necessary, if practicable, to arrange a
conference with counsel, either with or without the client, to enable the barrister to discuss
directly the nature of the case, obtain instructions or further information, and provide advice
in a direct manner. It is a matter for the solicitor to ascertain whether such a conference would
be appropriate and in the client’s best interests, and if so, to arrange it.
16.3.2 Duty to the client when instructing an advocate

Notwithstanding the appointment of counsel and the duties the chosen barrister may owe to a
solicitor’s client, all the solicitor’s duties to his client remain in full force and effect.
Instructing counsel does not relieve the solicitor of those duties, particularly the overriding
duty to act in the best interests of the client.
The solicitor must therefore exercise care in choosing the appropriate barrister for the case,
taking into consideration the experience and seniority of counsel available. The solicitor
should also ensure he is are happy with the quality of the advice given, to ensure that there are
no obvious errors or inconsistencies. If such errors are apparent, clarification should be
requested or a second opinion obtained (see, for example, Regent Leisuretime v Skerrett [2005]
EWHC 2255).
16.3.3 Counsel’s fees

A solicitor is responsible for appointing counsel and (subject to limited exceptions) is
therefore responsible personally for the payment of counsel’s fees. This applies regardless of
whether the solicitor’s client has provided the requisite monies. Many solicitors therefore
request that their clients provide money on account to cover prospective barristers’ fees.
16.3.4 Discrimination – choice of advocate

As noted at 16.3.2 above, a solicitor should select an advocate of sufficient seniority and
experience to represent his client adequately in court. A solicitor may consult with his client
when choosing a barrister. However, a solicitor must not unlawfully discriminate against
anyone in his professional dealings (Outcome 2.1), and consequently must not discriminate
when instructing a barrister on the grounds of, for example, age, race, sex or disability. If the
client’s request appears to be based on discriminatory grounds (eg, a male client defending
himself in an Employment Tribunal against an allegation of sex discrimination may request to
be represented by a female advocate), the SRA’s previous guidance provided that the solicitor
must discuss the issue with his client and ask the client to change his instructions. Where the
client refuses, the solicitor must cease to act.
16.4 IMMUNITY FOR ADVOCACY WORK

In previous years, immunity was granted to advocates against claims of negligence or breach
of contract in respect of advocacy work undertaken. However, this was abolished by the House
of Lords in Arthur JS Hall & Co (A Firm) v Simons [2000] 3 All ER 673.
16.5 DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES

16.5.1 Not taking an unfair advantage
Outcome 11.1 provides that a solicitor must not use his position as a solicitor to take an unfair
advantage of anyone. This applies to the solicitor acting in his personal capacity as well as
within his practice, and relates to the protection of the integrity of the profession.
Particular care should be taken when dealing with unrepresented third parties. Usually a
solicitor must act in the best interests of his client, but this duty is tempered by a solicitor
being required not to take unfair advantage of another person. Accordingly, it may tend to
show that the Outcomes in Chapter 11 have not been achieved if a solicitor takes unfair
advantage of an opposing party’s lack of legal knowledge where that party has not instructed a
lawyer (Indicative Behaviour 11.7). The SRA’s previous guidance in the 2007 Code of Conduct
suggested that the solicitor should advise such an individual to seek independent legal advice.
In the event that a solicitor provides some form of help to an unrepresented third party, care
should be taken that a retainer does not arise between the solicitor and the third party.
16.5.2 Public office and personal interests

Solicitors may sometimes be appointed to a public office, such as being a member of a
planning committee or a district judge. The public office may provide the solicitor with
confidential information or inside knowledge of, for example, policy, which may affect the
solicitor’s advice to the client or his approach to the matter.
The ‘inside information’ might also be available to the solicitor if another individual at the
solicitor’s practice (whether partner member or employee) held such an office, or indeed if it
was held by a member of the solicitor’s family.
If a solicitor takes unfair advantage of a public office held by him, a member of his family or
his firm, it may tend to show that he has not achieved the Outcomes in the Code and therefore
not complied with the Principles (Indicative Behaviour 11.10). The same would be the case if a
solicitor were to use his professional status or qualification to take unfair advantage of
another person to advance his personal interests (Indicative Behaviour 11.9).
16.5.3 Giving references

Under the general law of negligence, a solicitor will owe a duty of care to the subject of any
reference given by that solicitor (see Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1994] 3 All ER 129, HL).
Accordingly, great care must be taken when giving any such reference to avoid incurring
liability. Many firms have in place policies with regard to the giving of references, covering
who may give them and the nature of the content.
Furthermore, giving a false reference would almost certainly breach the Code of Conduct, eg
for damaging the public trust in solicitors and the provision of legal services (Principle 6).
16.5.4 Offensive letters

A solicitor is under a duty to act with integrity (Principle 2). Accordingly, a solicitor must not
write to any third party in a manner that could be considered to be offensive.
16.5.5 Third parties and costs

It may tend to show that a solicitor has achieved the Outcomes in Chapter 11 of the Code if,
when another person is paying the client’s costs, the solicitor provides the third party with
sufficient time and information to enable the costs to be agreed (Indicative Behaviour 11.1).
In respect of claiming costs, however, it may tend to show that the Outcomes have not been
achieved if the solicitor demands anything that is not legally recoverable. For example, when
instructed to collect a simple debt, if a solicitor demands from the debtor the cost of the letter
of claim, since such a cost is not legally recoverable at that stage (Indicative Behaviour 11.8).
16.5.6 Beneficiaries
Where a solicitor is instructed to administer a probate estate, the solicitor’s client will be the
PRs of the deceased’s estate. However, in certain circumstances a solicitor will also owe a duty
of care to the beneficiaries of that estate.
For example, in Ross v Caunters [1980] 1 Ch 297 a solicitor failed to warn a testator that the will
should not be witnessed by a beneficiary. Accordingly, the beneficiary who witnessed the will
was unable to claim her share of the estate. The solicitor was held liable in negligence to the
beneficiary. See also White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 891, where a solicitor was instructed to draw
up a will. The client died approximately a month later, before the will had been drafted. The
solicitor was successfully sued in negligence by the beneficiaries who missed out on their
share of the estate as a result of the solicitor’s failure to draft the will.
16.5.7 Contacting a represented third party

Where a client instructs a solicitor, it is often because the client lacks legal knowledge and
skills, and therefore seeks the assistance of a legal expert. Accordingly, it may tend to show
that the Outcomes have been achieved and the Principles complied with if a solicitor ensures
that he does not communicate with another party when he is aware that the other party has
retained a lawyer in a matter except:
(a) to request the name and address of the other party’s lawyer; or
(b) where the other party’s lawyer consents to him communicating with the client; or
(c) where there are exceptional circumstances (Indicative Behaviour 11.4).
16.5.8 Dealing with unrepresented parties

The SRA’s previous guidance provided that where a solicitor is dealing with an unrepresented
third party, care should be taken that an implied retainer does not arise from the solicitor’s
dealings with that third party (see 16.5.1).
Particular care should be taken when a solicitor discovers he is dealing with an unqualified
person (see 18.2.1) who is carrying out work reserved for solicitors, such as preparing papers
for a grant of probate. The solicitor is advised to inform the SRA and seek immediate advice
from the Professional Ethics Guideance Team.
16.5.9 Agents’ costs

As with counsel’s fees, a solicitor is personally responsible for meeting the fees of agents or
others he appoints on behalf of his client. This extends only to costs properly incurred. Again,
this applies whether or not the solicitor has been put in funds, and therefore the solicitor may
ask for monies on account prior to incurring such expenditure. Alternatively, the solicitor and
agent may agree that the agent’s fee will become payable on receipt by the solicitor of the
client’s payment.
16.6 RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOLICITORS

A solicitor must act with integrity (Principle 2). Therefore a solicitor must treat other
solicitors with due respect in all their communications, whether written or oral.
16.6.1 Agency
As noted at 16.5.9 above, solicitors are personally liable to pay the fees of any agent they
instruct on behalf of their clients. This applies even when that agent is another solicitor.
Solicitors frequently appoint other solicitors to attend court on their behalf, for example
where it is not cost-efficient for the solicitor to travel some distance to attend court. The
instructing solicitor therefore remains liable for meeting such costs, regardless of whether his
client has put him in funds, unless he agrees otherwise with the solicitor-agent.
16.6.2 Other solicitors’ clients

One of the Indicative Behaviours in Chapter 11 deals with communicating with another party
who the solicitor knows has retained a lawyer in the matter (see 16.5.7).
16.7 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are representing your client in an employment tribunal. Your client is suing
for unfair dismissal. He was sacked for allegedly stealing a laptop. During
cross-examination he denies that he ever had the laptop in his possession.
Later that day he confides in you that he took the laptop and sold it to a friend
to fund a holiday. What should you do here?
Answer You must not attempt to deceive or mislead the court, or be complicit in
another person deceiving or misleading the court, which includes the tribunal
(Outcomes 5.1 and 5.2). Following your conversation, you are aware that your
client has committed perjury within court proceedings. It may tend to show
that you have achieved the Outcomes of the Code and therefore complied with
the Principles if you refuse to continue to act for the client unless the client
agrees to disclose the truth to the tribunal (Indicative Behaviour 5.5). You
cannot inform the tribunal of the truth (or your reasons for withdrawal) without
the consent of the client as to do so would be a breach of confidentiality
(Outcome 4.1).
EXAMPLE 2
Question A solicitor instructs counsel on behalf of a client to provide advice on a
particular piece of law. Counsel’s fee is £1,000 plus VAT. Before the solicitor can
bill the client, the client is declared bankrupt. Who is responsible for the
counsel’s fee?
Answer The solicitor. This is why many solicitors request that their clients provide them
with money on account before instructing counsel.
SUMMARY
The solicitor and the court
(1) A solicitor must not mislead or deceive the court. A solicitor must also comply with
any order of the court which places obligations on him.
(2) A solicitor must not offer to make payments to witnesses dependent upon their
evidence or the outcome of the case.
(3) Calling a witness whose evidence the solicitor knows to be untrue, or attempting to
influence a witness when taking a statement from him as to the contents of that
statement, may tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes of the
Code and therefore not complied with the Principles.
(4) Drawing the court’s attention to relevant cases and statutory provisions (even if they
help the other side) may tend to show that a solicitor has achieved the necessary
Outcomes and complied with the Principles.
(5) A solicitor still owes his client a duty to act in the client’s best interests even when
the solicitor has instructed counsel to act for that client.
Duty to third parties
(1) A solicitor must not take an unfair advantage of any person, either for the solicitor’s
own benefit or for another person’s benefit.
(2) It may tend to show that a solicitor has not achieved the Outcomes of the Code, and
therefore not complied with the Principles, if he takes unfair advantage of a public
office held by him.
(3) In certain circumstances a solicitor owes a duty of care to third parties, such as
beneficiaries.
(4) A solicitor must act with integrity when dealing with other solicitors.
Financial Services 183
CHAPTER 17
Financial Services

17.2 Source material 184
17.3 Financial services regulatory structure 184
17.4 The general framework 185
17.5 The need for authority 186
17.6 Regulated activity 186
17.7 Exemption for professional firms – s 327 exemption 190
17.8 The SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001 192
17.9 Consumer credit activity 193
17.10 Insurance mediation 193
17.11 Financial promotions 194
17.12 Examples 196
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• the structure of financial services regulation
• how solicitors are regulated in carrying out financial services work.
17.1 INTRODUCTION
From time to time, solicitors engage in financial services work. To do this, they must be
sufficiently competent in that area of practice, and in some cases will need to comply with
certain regulations imposed by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and/or The Law
Society and Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA).
Such work could arise:
(a) in conveyancing, if a client needs help in finding a mortgage and a supporting package,
which could include a life insurance policy;
(b) in probate, when the executors sell off the deceased’s assets;
(c) in litigation, if helping a successful client to invest damages just won;
(d) in company work, in making arrangements for a client to buy or sell shares in a
company, and also in arranging corporate finance;
(e) in family work, if arrangements have to be made on a divorce in respect of endowment
life policies and/or a family business;
(f ) in tax planning or portfolio management, for a private client including trustees.
Under Principle 4 of the Code of Conduct, a solicitor would be in breach of his duty to act in
the client’s best interests if he did not have sufficient expertise in the area concerned.
Therefore, a trainee solicitor should not give investment advice to a client unless the trainee is
an expert in that field.
However, many activities in connection with investments are subject to regulation under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and, for example, to give advice on
these, or even to make arrangements for clients to acquire or dispose of them, may require the
solicitor to be authorised to carry out that activity. To do this without authority could involve
the commission of a criminal offence. Thus you will, when handling a matter in which
investments are involved, even if only peripherally, need to be doubly careful before advising
and assisting such clients. You will need to ask yourself two questions:
(a) Have I got the necessary skill and knowledge?
(b) What am I ‘permitted’ to do under the financial services regulations?
17.2 SOURCE MATERIAL

The FSMA 2000 gained Royal Assent on 14 June 2000. It contains 433 sections and 22
Schedules. The regulatory regime for financial services came into force at midnight on 30
November 2001. The Financial Services Act 2012, which received Royal Assent of 19
December 2012, extensively amends the FSMA 2000. The provisions of that Act will come into
force, or in some cases have already come into force, on such dates as the Treasury specifies in
commencement orders. The substance of the provisions of the FSMA 2000 discussed below,
however, has remained unchanged.
The FSMA 2000 provides only a general framework, and the detail is in secondary legislation
(eg, Orders in Council made by the Treasury). In order to understand the whole of the
regulation, it is necessary to study the FSMA 2000 and the various Orders made by the
Treasury, for example:
(a) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544
(RAO 2001);
(b) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Professions) (Non-Exempt Activities) Order
2001, SI 2001/1227;
(c) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, SI 2005/
1529 (FPO 2005);
(d) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-regulated Activities) Order 2013, SI
2013/556.
The regulation of financial services is a complex and detailed area. This chapter will serve
only as an introduction to the regulatory framework. Further guidance may be sought from
The Law Society.
Materials on financial services work include:
(a) the SRA Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001 (Scope Rules 2001);
(b) the SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001 (COB Rules 2001).
These may be found on the SRA’s website at <www.sra.org.uk> and form part of the SRA
Handbook.
17.3 FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY STRUCTURE

The FSMA 2000 in effect established the Financial Services Authority (FSA) whose authority
was vast and included the regulation of financial services. Following the financial crisis of
2007/08 and criticisms of the regulatory system at the time, the Government announced
major reforms in the regulatory structure, including the abolition of the FSA in its current
form. Three new regulatory bodies were established under the Financial Services Act 2012:
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the
Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The FCA and PRA have taken over the majority of the FSA’s
functions, whilst the FPC (a committee of the Bank of England) is responsible for monitoring
the stability of the whole UK financial system and so will not of itself directly supervise firms.
The new regulatory structure came into effect on 1 April 2013.
17.3.1 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)

The FCA inherited most of the FSA’s market regulatory functions, including responsibility for
the conduct of business regulation of all firms (such as solicitors’ firms), including dual-
regulated firms (see 17.3.2), and for the prudential regulation of firms (ie their safety and
soundness) not regulated by the PRA (known as FCA-authorised or FCA-only firms).
The FCA is set the following objectives in the FSMA 2000 (as amended):
(a) securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (the consumer protection
objective);
(b) protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system (the integrity
objective);
(c) promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in the market, including
for regulated financial services (the competition objective).
It also shares a set of ‘regulatory principles’ with the PRA and these are set out in s 3B of the
FSMA 2000.
The FCA has been given powers not previously granted to the FSA, including being able to
require firms to withdraw or amend misleading financial promotions (see 17.11) with
immediate effect and to block the launch of, or stop, a service or product. On 1 April 2014 the
FCA took over responsibility for the regulation of consumer credit and second charge
mortgages secured over property, both formerly regulated by the Office of Fair Trading (see
17.9).
From 1 April 2013, the FCA took over the FSA’s role relating to the regulation and supervision
of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), an internationally recognised interest rate
benchmark used to set a range of financial transactions. This was against a background of
widespread concerns about the operation of LIBOR among regulators and users of LIBOR,
including attempts to manipulate it. LIBOR is now a ‘specified benchmark’ for the purposes
of two new regulated activities in the RAO 2001 (see 17.6), namely providing information in
relation to, and administering, a specified benchmark. The manipulation of a specified
benchmark is also now a criminal offence under the Financial Services Act 2012.
17.3.2 The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)

The PRA is a subsidiary of the Bank of England and is responsible for the authorisation,
prudential regulation and general supervision of those firms which manage significant
financial risks, namely banks, building societies, insurers, credit unions, certain investment
firms and Lloyd’s of London. These firms are known as PRA-authorised firms or dual-
regulated firms, as they will also be regulated by the FCA for conduct purposes (see 17.3.1).
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-regulated Activities) Order 2013 sets out
which regulated activities in the RAO 2001 (see 17.6) are PRA-regulated activities, and any
firm with permission to carry out such activities will be designated a PRA-authorised firm.
The activities include accepting deposits and effecting a contract of insurance and dealing
with investments as principal.
17.4 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Businesses carrying on certain activities, known as ‘regulated activities’, will need to be
authorised by the appropriate regulator, which in the case of a solicitors’ firm will be the FCA.
The FSMA 2000 contains a special provision for professional firms which do not carry out
‘mainstream’ investment business but may carry out a regulated activity in the course of
carrying out their professional work, such as corporate work. If certain conditions are
satisfied, such a firm will be exempt from having to obtain authority from the FCA, provided it
is regulated and supervised by a professional body designated by the Treasury (a designated
professional body or ‘DPB’). The SRA is a DPB for these purposes.
17.5 THE NEED FOR AUTHORITY

There are two main restrictions of most relevance to solicitors:
(a) carrying out a regulated activity;
(b) making a financial promotion.
Section 19 of the FSMA 2000 provides that: ‘No person may carry on a regulated activity in the
UK unless authorised or exempt’ (the ‘General Prohibition’). Authorised persons are persons
with permission granted by the appropriate regulator (the FCA) under the FSMA 2000. A
further offence is that of making an unauthorised financial promotion under s 21. Breach of
either of these provisions could result in the commission of a criminal offence. Breach of s 19
could also render unenforceable any resulting agreement which has as a party to it the person
who contravened s 19, or made with an authorised person carrying on a regulated activity.
17.6 REGULATED ACTIVITY

17.6.1 The four tests
The definition of a ‘regulated activity’ is set out in s 22 of the FSMA 2000 and has been
substantially amended by the Financial Services Act 2012.
In order to determine if an activity is regulated there are four tests:
(a) Are you in business?
(b) Is there a specified activity (see 17.6.3 below)?
(c) Is there a specified investment (see 17.6.2 below), or does the specified activity relate to
information about a person’s financial standing or the setting of a specified
benchmark?
(d) Is there an exclusion?
The particular activities and investments are specified by the Treasury in the RAO 2001 (as
amended) under the FSMA 2000, s 22. Information about a person’s financial standing
includes providing, or advising upon, credit reference and credit information services (FSMA
2000, Sch 2). The term ‘benchmark’ is defined in s 22(6) of the FSMA 2000. Originally the
only ‘specified’ benchmark set out in the RAO 2001 was LIBOR (see 17.3.1), but as from 1
April 2015 a further seven benchmarks were added.
17.6.2 Specified investments

These include:
(a) company stocks and shares (but not shares in the share capital of open-ended
investment companies or building societies incorporated in the UK);
(b) debentures, loan stock and bonds;
(c) government securities, such as gilts;
(d) unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs), which are similar to unit
trusts, but use the structure of a company rather than a trust;
(e) insurance contracts (including life policies and pension policies) (see 17.10);
(f ) mortgages;
(g) home reversion/home purchase plans (the former enables a homeowner to sell the
whole or a proportion of his property to a finance provider in order to raise funds, and
he then becomes a tenant of the property, whilst the latter serves the same purpose as a
mortgage but is structured in a way that is compliant with Islamic law);
(h) deposits. (These would include cash ISAs and sums of money held in bank or building
society accounts. However, the only specified activity relating to these investments is
‘accepting deposits’, which is mainly carried out by banks and building societies. The
main specified investment activities set out in 17.6.3 do not apply to deposits. Sums
received by solicitors acting in the course of their business are exempt under the RAO
2001.)
Investments that will not be relevant include:
(a) interests in land;
(b) certain National Savings products.
17.6.3 Specified investment activities

In relation to specified investments, these include (but are not limited to):
(a) dealing as agent;
(b) arranging;
(c) managing;
(d) safeguarding;
(e) advising;
(f ) lending money on/administering a regulated mortgage contract.
There are also specified activities that are very particular in their scope, such as establishing,
operating or winding up a collective investment scheme or personal pension scheme.
17.6.3.1 Dealing as agent

This involves buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting the investments where you deal
on behalf of a client (ie, rather than on your own account) and commit that client to
transactions. For example, selling shares on behalf of a client pursuant to a financial order
made on divorce.
17.6.3.2 Arranging
Solicitors will have many clients whose transactions involve investments (eg, endowment
policies in conveyancing, unit trusts and shares in probate, etc). The solicitor will very often
be involved as the contact between the client and the life company, or the client and the
stockbroker. It is in this context that the solicitor may be ‘arranging’. Arrangements are
excluded where the solicitor merely introduces clients to a person authorised by the FCA (an
authorised third person – ATP) and the introduction is made with a view to the provision of
independent advice to the client. However, this exclusion does not apply where the
transaction relates to an insurance contract. If you do something more than just introduce the
client in respect of the investment (eg, you help the client to complete an application form),
you will be ‘arranging’.
17.6.3.3 Managing
Managing requires active participation beyond the mere holding of investments and applies
only to ‘discretionary management’ (ie, involving the exercise of discretion). This investment
activity will be most common in firms that undertake probate and trust work, where the
solicitor is acting as trustee or personal representative.
17.6.3.4 Safeguarding
This involves safeguarding and administering investments belonging to a client. This is also
particularly relevant for firms which undertake probate and trust work.
17.6.3.5 Advising
This involves giving advice to a person in his capacity as an investor on the merits of his
buying, selling, subscribing for, or underwriting an investment. Advice must be about a
specific investment; generic advice is outside the scope of the FSMA 2000. Thus you can, if
you have the knowledge, advise a client to invest in shares rather than gilts, but if you advise
the client to buy shares in a particular company, say Tesco, this will be a regulated activity.
If you do not have the requisite knowledge to provide generic advice, or if the client requires
advice on a specified investment, you could refer him to a person authorised by the FCA (an
ATP) with a view to the ATP providing that advice. Thus if a client wants advice on what shares
to buy, you could refer him to an authorised stockbroker. It will be the stockbroker who
‘advises’ the client under the FSMA 2000. The referral to the ATP would not amount to a
specified activity.
17.6.3.6 Example
EXAMPLE
You have recently managed to secure a large settlement in respect of your client’s recent
litigation matter. The client tells you that he wishes to invest this money in buying shares in
a local company, and asks you which company he should invest in.
Referring to the four-stage test described at 17.6.1, the client is seeking your advice in
your capacity as a solicitor, so you are ‘in business’. Shares are a specified investment, and
you have been asked to advise on the purchase of these shares – advising is a specified
investment activity. Therefore if you are to give this advice you need to take advantage of
an exclusion or exemption (see below). If you provide this advice without relying on an
exclusion or exemption, you will breach the ‘general prohibition’ under s 19 of the FSMA
2000, which is a criminal offence.
17.6.4 Exclusions
There are various exclusions set out in the RAO 2001. If an exclusion applies to a particular
activity you are carrying out, you do not need to be authorised for that particular transaction.
Those exclusions likely to be relevant to solicitors include:
(a) introducing (see 17.6.3.2);
(b) using an ATP;
(c) acting for an execution-only client;
(d) acting as trustee or personal representative;
(e) the ‘professional/necessary’ exclusion;
(f ) the ‘takeover’ exclusion.
17.6.4.1 Authorised third persons – the ATP exclusion

If you do something more than merely ‘introduce’ the client to an ATP (see 17.6.3.5), you
could be ‘arranging’ or even ‘ dealing as the client’s agent’. However, these will be excluded
under RAO 2001, arts 22 and 29 if the transaction is entered into with or through an ATP on
the advice given to the client by the ATP.
You cannot rely on this exclusion if you receive from any person other than the client any
pecuniary reward (eg, commission) or other advantage, for which you do not account to your
client, arising out of his entering into the transaction.
This exclusion will not apply if the transaction relates to an insurance contract.
17.6.4.2 The execution-only client exclusion

There is an exclusion similar to the ATP exclusion where the client, in his capacity as an
investor, is not seeking and has not sought advice from the solicitor as to the merits of the
client’s entering into the transaction (or, if the client has sought such advice, the solicitor has
declined to give it but has recommended that the client seek such advice from an authorised
person). There is the same restriction in respect of commissions and contracts of insurance.
17.6.4.3 Trustees or personal representatives

The exclusion applies to arranging, managing, safeguarding and advising fellow trustees and/
or beneficiaries. It also applies to lending money on, or administering a regulated mortgage
contract.
This exclusion has limitations. It is available to a solicitor acting as a trustee or PR, and not to
a solicitor acting for a trustee or PR. However, the exclusion does apply if a member of the firm
is a trustee or PR but the activity is actually carried out by other members of the firm. Note
that the exclusion does not apply if the solicitor is remunerated for what he does ‘in addition
to any remuneration he receives as trustee or personal representative, and for these purposes
a person is not to be regarded as receiving additional remuneration merely because his
remuneration is calculated by reference to time spent’. For managing and safeguarding, the
exclusion is also not available if the solicitor holds himself out as providing a service
comprising managing or safeguarding.
The Law Society’s guidance provides that this exclusion will not apply to contracts of
insurance.
17.6.4.4 Activities carried on in the course of a profession or non-investment business – the

‘professional/necessary’ exclusion
This applies to advising, arranging, safeguarding and dealing as agent. There is an exclusion if
the activity is performed in the course of carrying on any profession or business and may
reasonably be regarded as a necessary part of other services provided in the course of that
profession or business. However, the exclusion does not apply if the activity is remunerated
separately from the other services. Examples of where this exclusion may apply include: in
matrimonial work, arranging the sale or transfer of a joint endowment insurance; or in
probate work, arranging for the sale of all the assets to pay IHT.
17.6.4.5 Activities carried on in connection with the sale of a body corporate – the takeover
exclusion
This exclusion applies to arranging, advising and dealing as agent. It will apply to a
transaction to acquire or dispose of shares in a body corporate (other than an OEIC), or for a
transaction entered into for the purposes of such an acquisition or disposal, if:
(a) the shares consist of or include 50% or more of the voting shares in the body corporate;
and
(b) the acquisition or disposal is between parties each of whom is a body corporate, a
partnership, a single individual or a group of connected individuals.
It is possible to add the number of shares being acquired by a person to those already held by
him in order to determine whether the 50% limit has been achieved.
Even if the above criteria are not met, eg the number of shares acquired is less than 50%, but
the object of the transaction may nevertheless reasonably be regarded as being the acquisition
of day-to-day control of the affairs of the body corporate, the exclusion still applies.
This is an extremely valuable exclusion for the corporate department where a client is seeking
to take over, or sell its interest in, a company, whether public or private.
This exclusion does not apply to advising on, arranging, or dealing as an agent in respect of
buying or selling contracts of insurance.
17.6.4.6 Summary table

The table below summarises the specified investment activities to which the exclusions apply.
Specified activity Applicable exclusions

Dealing as agent • ATP
• Execution-only
• Professional/necessary
• Takeover
Arranging • Introducing
• ATP
• Execution-only
• Professional/necessary
• Acting as trustee/PR
• Takeover
Advising • Professional/necessary
• Takeover
Managing • Acting as trustee/PR
Safeguarding • Professional/necessary
17.6.4.7 Example
EXAMPLE
You are approached by Mrs Patel, who owns 100% of the share capital in X Co Ltd. Mrs
Patel wishes to sell 75% of these shares to her son.
Referring to the four tests described at 17.6.1, the client is seeking your advice and
assistance in your capacity as a solicitor, so you are ‘in business’. Shares are a specified
investment, and in dealing with the matter you will be carrying out specified investment
activities (eg advising and arranging). Therefore you need to rely on an exclusion or
exemption to avoid breaching s 19 of the FSMA 2000 and committing a criminal offence.
Here you are transferring more than 50% of X Co Ltd, and so can rely on the takeover
exclusion described above. Therefore you may complete this work without breaching the
general prohibition.
17.7 EXEMPTION FOR PROFESSIONAL FIRMS – s 327 EXEMPTION

17.7.1 Introduction
Under s 326 of the FSMA 2000, the Treasury can designate a professional body (a DPB), and
has so designated The Law Society (this role will now be undertaken by the SRA).
Under s 327, the general prohibition in s 19 of the FSMA 2000 will not apply to a regulated
activity carried on by a firm of solicitors if the following conditions are met:
(a) the firm must not receive from a person other than its client any pecuniary or other
advantage arising out of the activity for which it does not account to its client;
(b) the manner of providing ‘any service in the course of carrying on the activities must be
incidental to the provision’ by the firm of professional services, ie services regulated by
the SRA.
(c) the firm must carry out only regulated activities permitted by the DPB, ie the SRA.
(d) the activities must not be prohibited by an order made by the Treasury, or any direction
made by the FCA under s 328 or s 329;
(e) the firm must not carry on any other regulated activities.
Each of these criteria is discussed further below.
17.7.2 The firm must not receive from a person other than its client any pecuniary or
other advantage
If the firm wishes to take advantage of the s 327 exemption then it must account for any such
pecuniary advantage to its client. This is mirrored by Outcome 1.15 of the Code. Indicative
Behaviour 1.20 provides guidance as to the ways in which this may be achieved (see 11.14).
17.7.3 Incidental
There are two ‘incidental’ tests: a specific test and a general test.
The ‘specific’ test relates to the particular client concerned. Under the Scope Rules 2001, the
relevant regulated activity must arise out of, or be complementary to, the provision of a
particular professional service to a particular client. The firm could not, therefore, carry out a
regulated activity in isolation for a client; the relevant regulated activity must ‘arise out of ’ or
be ‘complementary to’ some other service being provided by it. This other service must not be
a regulated activity but must be a ‘professional’, ie legal, service (eg, in corporate work, giving
legal advice, drafting documents or dealing with a regulatory matter; or in probate work,
winding up the estate or giving tax advice). It follows that the professional service being
provided to the client should be the primary service, and the regulated activity should be
‘incidental’ or ‘subordinate’ to the provision of the professional service. Note also that both
the professional service and the regulated activity must be supplied to the same person. Thus,
in a probate matter, where the probate client is the executor, advice to a beneficiary under the
will would not satisfy this test.
To satisfy the ‘general’ test of being incidental, the activities carried out by the firm which
would otherwise be regulated cannot be a major part of the firm’s activities. For example, a
firm will be ineligible if its income from investment business is half or more of its total
income. Further factors are:
(a) the scale of regulated activity in proportion to other professional services provided;
(b) whether and to what extent the exempt regulated activities are held out as separate
services; and
(c) the impression given of how the firm provides those activities, for example through
advertising its services.
17.7.4 The firm must carry out only regulated activities permitted by the DPB
The role of setting out rules concerning the s 327 exemption, once occupied by The Law
Society, now falls to the SRA. Accordingly, the SRA has published the SRA Financial Services
(Scope) Rules 2001 (see below) and the SRA Conduct of Business (COB) Rules 2001 for this
purpose (see 17.8). Firms must comply with the requirements prescribed by these rules at all
times when seeking to use this exemption.
For example, under the SRA Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001:
(a) a solicitor may not recommend, or arrange, for a client to buy or subscribe for a
packaged retail investment product (ie, financial products which the Government
perceives as ones in respect of which ordinary investors require the most protection,
such as certain life policies, unit trusts, and shares in open-ended investment
companies). However, a solicitor may advise the client to dispose of a packaged retail
investment product, or give negative advice (ie, advise the client not to purchase a
packaged retail investment product). There are also restrictions, for example, on
advising an individual to acquire certain specified investments (eg, to buy quoted
shares), recommend that a client enter into regulated mortgage contracts, or
recommend/make arrangements for the client to buy/dispose of rights or interests in a

personal pension scheme;
(b) discretionary management is allowed only in prescribed circumstances, for example
where the firm, partner or employee is a trustee/PR and an ATP is used when buying an
investment. This means that if a solicitor is the trustee of a trust and wishes to acquire
some shares, the solicitor will need to be advised by an ATP;
(c) if a firm wishes to undertake insurance mediation (see 17.10), it must appoint a
compliance officer and be registered on the FCA Register;
(d) firms that carry on a credit-related activity (as defined in the Handbook Glossary) or a
connected activity (see 17.9) are required to comply with the relevant provisions and
guidance set out in the FCA’s Consumer Credit Sourcebook (CONC).
For more detail on the above, please consult the Scope Rules 2001, which may be found on the
SRA’s website at <www.sra.org.uk> and in the SRA Handbook.
17.7.5 The activities must not be prohibited by Treasury order or the FCA
The Treasury has set out, in the FSMA 2000 (Professions) (Non-Exempt Activities) Order
2001, a list of activities that cannot be provided by professional firms under the s 327
exemption. The activities that are most relevant to solicitors are incorporated into the SRA
Financial Services (Scope) Rules 2001.
The FCA also has power, under s 328, to issue directions (in writing) limiting the application
of the exemption in respect of different classes of persons or different descriptions of
regulated activities.
17.7.6 The firm must not carry on any other regulated activities
The s 327 exemption cannot be used by firms which are authorised by the FCA. For example, a
firm could be authorised by the FCA concerning defined regulated activities. Such a firm
could not use s 327 for any other ‘non-mainstream’ regulated activities.
17.8 THE SRA FINANCIAL SERVICES (CONDUCT OF BUSINESS) RULES 2001

17.8.1 When do the Rules apply?
The SRA Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules 2001 (COB Rules 2001) apply only
when the firm is carrying out an exempt regulated activity; they do not apply if the firm is not
carrying out a regulated activity at all.
17.8.2 Status disclosure (COB Rules 2001, r 3)

A firm must provide clients with certain information concerning the status of the firm. For
example, the firm must confirm to the client that it is not authorised by the FCA, and explain
that complaints and redress mechanisms are provided through the SRA and the Legal
Ombudsman. Any information that is provided under r 3 must be given in a manner that is
clear, fair and not misleading.
17.8.3 Best execution (COB Rules 2001, r 4)

A solicitor must act in the best interests of his clients (Principle 4 of the Code of Conduct).
Therefore, the firm must carry out transactions for clients as soon as possible and on the best
terms available.
17.8.4 Transactions (COB Rules 2001, r 5)

The firm must keep records of:
(a) instructions from clients to carry out transactions; and
(b) instructions to third parties to carry them out.
17.8.5 Commissions (COB Rules 2001, r 6)

Under the COB Rules 2001, r 6, the firm must keep records of commissions received in
respect of regulated activities and how those commissions were dealt with.
17.8.6 Execution-only clients (COB Rules 2001, r 8)

Where a firm acts for an execution-only client (see 17.6.4.2) and the investment concerned is
a packaged retail investment product, it must send a letter to the client confirming that he or
she is not relying on the advice of the solicitor, and the firm must keep a copy of this letter.
This rule would apply, for example, when the packaged retail investment product is a contract
of insurance. Here the ‘execution only’ exclusion would not apply, and therefore the solicitor
would have to rely on the exemption for professional firms (see 17.7) (and thus comply with
the COB Rules).
17.9 CONSUMER CREDIT ACTIVITY

With effect from 1 April 2014, consumer credit activity (for example, credit brokerage, debt
collecting under a consumer credit or hire agreement, debt advice and debt management or
administration) became a regulated activity for the purposes of s 22 of the FSMA 2000,
following the transfer of responsibility for the regulation of such activities from the Office of
Fair Trading to the FCA. The activities (known as credit-related activities) are set out in Pt 2
and Pt 3A of the RAO 2001. Accordingly, solicitors carrying out such activities will need to be
authorised by the FCA to carry out this business, or ensure that the activities fall within the s
327 exemption (see 17.7). Representing a client in a litigation matter which has arisen from a
consumer credit or hire agreement is not a credit-related activity for these purposes.
A solicitor could be carrying out a credit-related activity by virtue of the way in which he
accepts the payment of his fees, including allowing a client time to pay. However, such an
arrangement will be regarded as an exempt agreement under the RAO 2001 if all of the
following conditions apply:
(a) the number of repayments does not exceed 12;
(b) the payment term does not exceed 12 months; and
(c) the credit is provided without interest or other charges.
In most other cases, such arrangements are likely to be covered by the s 327 exemption.
17.10 INSURANCE MEDIATION

The Government decided to extend regulation to all general insurance selling and
administration in order to comply with the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC)
approved by the European Parliament on 30 September 2003.
A firm will be carrying out ‘insurance mediation’ where it carries out (or agrees to carry out)
the following activities in relation to contracts of insurance:
(a) advising;
(b) arranging;
(c) acting as agent;
(d) assisting in the administration and performance of such contracts, in particular in the
event of a claim.
‘Contracts of insurance’ are defined widely, and include life policies (eg endowment policies),
buildings insurance, after-the-event legal insurance, and pension policies.
Thus, whatever the type of insurance policy involved, if a solicitor assists a client to obtain
one, even if all he does is to introduce the client to an insurance broker, the solicitor will be
carrying out a specified activity. Similarly, if a solicitor is involved in an insurance claim
against an insurance company, this will also be caught. All of these activities involve
‘insurance mediation’.
Given that the main exclusions will almost certainly not apply to insurance mediation, the
firm will have to rely on the s 327 exemption (see 17.7), seek authorisation from the FCA, or
rely on the limited exceptions available for insurance mediation activities (which are beyond
the scope of this book).
EXAMPLE
You are acting for Mr George on purchasing a commercial property. Your client needs to
obtain defective title insurance. You offer to arrange this for your client.
Using the four tests described at 17.6.1, you are providing this service to your client and so
are ‘in business’. Contracts of insurance are a specified investment and arranging is a
specified investment activity. Therefore you need to rely on an exclusion or exemption to
avoid breaching s 19 of the FSMA 2000 and committing a criminal offence.
However, none of the exclusions applies to contracts of insurance. Therefore, in order to
arrange the insurance, you must use the s 327 exemption. Here, arranging the insurance is
incidental to your dealing with the property transaction. If your firm can comply with the
other conditions outlined above (eg the COB and Scope Rules) then you will be able to
arrange the defective title insurance without breaching the general prohibition.
17.11 FINANCIAL PROMOTIONS

17.11.1 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 21
As a result of the FSMA 2000, s 21, a solicitor who is not authorised by the FCA will be unable
to make a financial promotion (ie, ‘communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in
investment activity’) unless its contents are approved by an authorised person. The structure
of the definitions is similar to that for regulated activities, with the Treasury having power by
order to specify which investments and activities are ‘controlled’. Broadly, the definitions are
much the same, although not quite identical.
The result is that you can use almost the same tests as for regulated activities, namely:
(b) Are you making an invitation or inducement?
(c) In connection with an investment?
(d) In connection with an investment activity?
Notice, however, that the ‘exclusion’ test is not applicable. Thus, although you may be carrying
out an activity which is not regulated, it may be ‘controlled’ and subject to the restrictions on
financial promotions. The result is that almost anything you may say or write in connection
with many transactions could be construed as a financial promotion. Thus if a solicitor
advises PRs to sell the deceased’s assets, this could be an invitation to deal in investments if,
for example, the estate included shares or gilts.
All communications are caught, both real-time and non-real-time. A real-time communica-
tion is any communication made in the course of a personal visit, telephone conversation or
other interactive dialogue. A non-real-time communication is any other communication, eg,
letters e-mails, or brochures. Therefore communications to the other side (eg, letters) and
communications to advisers (eg, a fax to a broker) are included just as much as communica-
tions to clients.
A real-time communication is ‘solicited’ where it is made in the course of a personal visit,
telephone call or other interactive dialogue, if that call, visit or dialogue:
(a) was initiated by the recipient (eg, the client) of the communication; or
(b) takes place in response to an express request from the recipient of the communication
(see FPO 2005, art 8).
17.11.2 Exemptions
There are then some exemptions set out in the FPO 2005. Many of these are in terms similar to
the exclusions for regulated activities. These include:
(a) trustees, PRs (FPO 2005, arts 53/54);
(b) takeover of body corporate (FPO 2005, art 62).
17.11.3 Exemption for exempt professional firms

There are two exemptions designed specifically for firms claiming the special exemption
under the FSMA 2000 for exempt regulated activities (see 17.7). These deal with real-time and
non-real-time promotions.
17.11.3.1 Real-time promotions (FPO 2005, art 55)

A solicitor who carries on exempt regulated activities may make a real-time promotion, for
example during a meeting or a telephone conversation:
(a) if made to a client who has, prior to the communication being made, engaged the
solicitor to provide professional services; and
(b) where the controlled activity to which the communication relates is exempt because of
the exemption for professional firms, or is excluded from being a regulated activity by
the ‘necessary’ exclusion; and
(c) where the controlled activity to which the communication relates would be undertaken
for the purposes of, and be incidental to, the provision of professional services to or at
the request of the client.
The effect is that if the activity is excluded from being a regulated activity by an exclusion
other than the ‘necessary’ exclusion, art 55 does not apply.
17.11.3.2 Non-real time promotions (FPO 2005, art 55A)

This applies to letters, e-mails, brochures, websites, etc, where the solicitor carries on exempt
regulated activities, provided the promotion contains certain specific statements.
17.11.4 One-off promotions (FPO 2005, arts 28/28A)

One-off, non-real-time communications and solicited real-time communications are exempt
under the FPO 2005, art 28 if certain conditions are satisfied. Basically the communication
must be one that is personal to the client.
One-off, unsolicited real-time communications are exempt under art 28A, provided the
solicitor believes on reasonable grounds:
(a) that the client understands the risks associated with engaging in the investment activity
to which the financial promotion relates; and
(b) that, at the time of the communication, the client would expect to be contacted by the
solicitor in relation to that investment activity.
17.11.5 Introducers (FPO 2005, art 15)

You may make any real-time communication in order to introduce a client to an ATP,
provided:
(a) you are not connected to (eg, a close relative of ) the ATP;
(b) you do not receive other than from the client any pecuniary reward or other advantage
arising out of making the introduction; and
(c) the client is not seeking and has not sought advice from you as to the merits of his
engaging in investment activity (or, if the client has sought such advice, you have
declined to give it, but have recommended that the client seeks such advice from an
authorised person).
17.12 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are approached Mr McParlane and Mr Ferguson. Between them and Mr
Smith they own 100% of the share capital in Y Co Ltd, the company they
founded. Mr McParlane owns 40% of the share capital, Mr Ferguson owns 40%
and Mr Smith owns the remaining 20%. The shares carry equal voting rights.
They inform you that Mr McParlane wishes to retire from the business, and Mr
Ferguson wishes to buy out his interest in the company. They want you to act
for both of them in negotiating and arranging this transfer.
You decline to act for both of them due to the conflict of interest between them
(see Chapter 13), but agree to act for Mr McParlane in the sale of his shares to
Mr Ferguson. Your firm is not authorised by the FCA. Can you act for Mr
McParlane without breaching s 19 of FSMA 2000?
Answer You are advising Mr McParlane as a solicitor, so you are ‘in business’. Shares are
a specified investment, and in dealing with the sale you would be taking part in
a specified investment activity (arranging or advising). Therefore you need to
take advantage of an exclusion or exemption.
Can you use the takeover exclusion? This applies to a transaction to acquire or
dispose of shares in a body corporate. Although the transfer of shares does not
include 50% or more of the voting shares in the company, the transfer will give
Mr Ferguson more than 50% of the voting shares; therefore the exclusion will
apply. You can act for Mr McParlane without breaching the general prohibition
and committing a criminal offence.
EXAMPLE 2
Question Review the example given at 17.10. Would it have made any difference if the
client was dealing with the property purchase himself, and just came to you to
arrange the defective title insurance?
Answer Yes.
You are still in business, and carrying out a specified investment activity
(arranging) in relation to a specified investment (a contract of insurance).
None of the exclusions apply to contracts of insurance.
However, here the s 327 exemption is not available as the work you have been
instructed to do is not incidental to your provision of legal work.
SUMMARY
Regulated activity
In order to determine if an activity is regulated there are four tests:
(1) Are you in business?
(2) Is there a specified investment?
(3) Is there a specified investment activity (or an activity related to information about a
person’s financial standing or the setting of a specified benchmark)?
(4) Is there an exclusion?
Specified investments
(1) These include:
(a) shares (but not shares in the share capital of an open-ended investment
company or building society incorporated in the UK);
(b) debentures;
(c) gilts;
(d) unit trusts and OEICs;
(e) contract of insurance;
(f ) mortgages;
(g) home reversion/home purchase plans;
(h) deposits.
(2) Investments that will not be relevant include:
(a) interests in land;
(b) National Savings products.
Specified investment activities
These include:
(1) dealing as agent;
(2) arranging;
(3) managing;
(4) safeguarding;
(5) advising.
Exclusions
These include:
(1) introducing;
(2) ATP;
(3) execution-only;
(4) trustee/PR;
(5) professional/necessary;
(6) takeover.
Exempt regulated activities
(1) A firm not authorised by the FCA should pay attention to:
(a) FSMA 2000;
(b) RAO 2001;
(c) any rules made by the FCA;
(d) SRA Scope Rules 2001.
(2) Conditions set out in the FSMA 2000, the RAO 2001 and the Scope Rules 2001
overlap.
(3) The main conditions for claiming the s 327 exemption are:
(a) the activity must arise out of, or be complementary to, the provision of a
particular professional service to a particular client;
(b) the manner of provision by the firm of any service in the course of carrying out
the activities is incidental to the provision by the firm of professional services;
(c) the firm must account to the client for any reward or other advantage which
the firm receives from a third party;
(d) the Scope Rules do not prohibit the firm using the exemption.
(4) Packaged retail investment products. Generally, you are not allowed to recommend
or arrange for a client to buy or subscribe for a packaged retail investment product,
for example:
(a) certain life policies;
(b) unit trusts;
(c) OEICs.
(5) There are also restrictions on advising an individual to acquire certain specified
investments (eg, shares in publicly quoted companies).
Conduct of Business Rules
(1) The SRA COB Rules 2001 apply only when the firm is carrying out an exempt
regulated activity; they do not apply if the firm is not carrying out a regulated activity
at all.
(2) The SRA COB Rules 2001 cover:
(a) best execution;
(b) records of transactions;
(c) records of commissions;
(d) letters to execution-only clients.
Financial promotions
(1) There are four questions:
(b) Do you make an invitation or inducement?
(c) Is there a specified investment?
(d) Is there a specified investment activity?
(2) There are two special exemptions for professional firms:
(a) real-time promotions;
(b) non-real-time promotions.
(3) Other exemptions include:
(a) one-off promotions;
(b) introducers;
(c) trustees, PRs;
(d) takeover of body corporate.
Requirements of Practice 199
CHAPTER 18
Requirements of Practice
18.1 The SRA Suitability Test 2011 199

18.2 Practising certificates 201
18.3 Additional practising requirements 203
18.4 Accountants’ reports 203
18.5 Indemnity insurance 203
18.6 Responsibility of managers of recognised and licensed bodies 204
18.7 Supervision 204
18.8 Separate businesses 205
18.9 Duty to the Solicitors Regulation Authority 206
18.10 Examples 206
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• the need to satisfy the SRA Suitability Test 2011
• the need to hold a practising certificate and comply with other practising requirements
• the need to submit accountants’ reports
• the requirement for indemnity insurance
• the need for effective supervision.
18.1 THE SRA SUITABILITY TEST 2011

18.1.1 Applicability
This test came into force on 6 October 2011 and applies to:
(a) students and trainee solicitors;
(b) qualified lawyers from other jurisdictions seeking qualification via a formal transfer;
(c) those seeking admission as solicitors;
(d) compliance officers, owners and/or managers at the point of and throughout their
period of authorisation; and
(e) former solicitors seeking restoration to the roll of solicitors.
The aim is for the test to apply the same standards to all those working within the profession,
whether to not they are solicitors.
18.1.2 Outcomes of the test

The Outcomes which apply to the test are that:
(a) solicitors are of the required standard of character and suitability (Outcome SB1);
(b) authorised role holders are fit and proper to hold those roles (Outcome SB2); and
(c) clients, and the wider public, will have confidence that Outcome SB1 has been
demonstrated (Outcome SB3).
Those subject to the test must also comply with the Principles set out in the Code of Conduct
(see Chapter 8).
18.1.3 Requirements
Those applying for eligibility to commence or continue a period of recognised training,
admission or restoration to the roll must comply with the basic requirements set out in Part 1
of the test, as discussed below.
18.1.3.1 Criminal offences

If an applicant has been convicted of a criminal offence, the action taken by the SRA will
depend upon the type of offence involved. These are dealt with in the following categories:
(a) Convictions for criminal offences which will result in the application being refused unless there are
exceptional circumstances. These include offences resulting in a custodial or suspended
sentence, involving dishonesty, perjury, fraud and/or bribery, or which demonstrated
behaviour showing signs of discrimination towards others.
(b) Those in respect of which the SRA will more likely than not refuse the application. These include
convictions for criminal offences not falling within the category described in (a) above,
but which have an impact upon the applicant’s ‘character and suitability’ (defined as
satisfying the requirement of s 3 of the Solicitors Act 1974 in order that an individual
shall be admitted as a solicitor). These also include an offence involving dishonesty for
which a caution has been accepted.
(c) Those in respect of which the SRA may refuse the application. This includes where an applicant
has received a local warning from the police or accepted a caution from the police for an
offence not involving dishonesty.
18.1.3.2 Disclosure
Failing to disclose any material information relating to the application will amount to prima
facie evidence of dishonest behaviour. Criminal convictions or cautions which are ‘protected’
by virtue of the amended Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 (SI
1975/1023) are not, however, required to be disclosed.
18.1.3.3 Behaviour not compatible with that expected of a prospective solicitor

Being responsible for certain behaviour will result in the application being refused unless
there are exceptional circumstances. This includes behaviour which is dishonest or violent, or
where there is evidence of discrimination towards others.
18.1.3.4 Assessment offences

Unless there are exceptional circumstances, an application will be refused if the applicant has
committed and/or been adjudged by an education establishment to have committed a
deliberate assessment offence which amounts to plagiarism or cheating to gain an advantage
for himself or for others.
18.1.3.5 Financial behaviour

Unless there are exceptional circumstances, an application will be refused if there is evidence:
(a) that the applicant cannot manage his finances properly and carefully;
(b) that the applicant has deliberately sought to avoid responsibility for his debts; and/or
(c) of dishonesty in relation to the management of the applicant’s finances.
If an applicant has been declared bankrupt, entered into any individual voluntary arrangements
or has had a county court judgment issued against him, it will raise a presumption that there
has been evidence that he cannot manage his finances properly and carefully.
18.1.3.6 Regulatory history

Examples of when an application will be refused on this basis (unless there are exceptional
circumstances) are where an applicant has been made the subject of a serious disciplinary
finding, sanction or action by a regulatory body, has failed to disclose information to a
regulatory body when required to do so or has significantly breached the requirements of a
regulatory body. A rebuke, reprimand or warning about an applicant’s conduct by a regulatory
body may result in the application being refused, unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Those seeking to become authorised role holders must comply with both the basic
requirements in Part 1 and the additional requirements set out in Part 2 (which are beyond the
scope of this book).
18.2 PRACTISING CERTIFICATES

18.2.1 Requirement to hold a certificate
Section 1 of the Solicitors Act 1974 states:
No person shall be qualified to act as a solicitor unless—
(a) he has been admitted as a solicitor, and
(b) his name is on the roll, and
(c) he has in force a certificate issued by the Society . . . authorising him to practise as a solicitor (in
this Act referred to as a ‘practising certificate’).
Any person who does not comply with this section will fall within the definition of an
‘unqualified person’ (Solicitors Act 1974, s 87) and so cannot practise as a solicitor.
Any person who practises as a solicitor without having a practising certificate will commit a
criminal offence.
18.2.2 Persons who need a certificate

The following persons are amongst those who must hold a current practising certificate:
(a) a solicitor who administers an oath;
(b) all solicitors in private practice;
(c) any person held out, or employed, explicitly or implicitly as a practising solicitor;
(d) any person undertaking work reserved for solicitors in England and Wales (subject to
limited exceptions);
(e) any person, who is admitted as a solicitor and has his name on the roll (see 18.2.3), who
is employed by a solicitor (or recognised body) in connection with the provision of any
legal service (for example as a paralegal);
(f ) any person involved in legal practise whose work depends upon him being a solicitor.
18.2.3 The roll

The SRA keeps a list of all solicitors, called ‘the roll’, containing details such as their date of
birth, date of admission, and principal place of business in the case of a practising solicitor.
Entries on the roll are available for inspection by the public. A solicitor does not have to hold a
practising certificate to remain on the roll of solicitors.
18.2.4 Issue of certificates

Those who are required to hold a practising certificate must apply to the SRA each year to have
their certificates renewed. All practising certificates become due for renewal on 31 October
each year. A fee is payable on renewal of the certificate. A new fee policy was put in place in
2010 which splits the fee between the individual solicitor (flat fee) and the firm (a fee based on
its turnover), although in reality the firm may be willing to pay the fee in its entirety.
Solicitors and firms also have to make a fixed yearly contribution to the SRA’s Compensation
Fund (see 7.11).
A solicitor is obliged to inform the SRA promptly of any material changes to relevant
information about himself, including serious financial difficulty, action taken against him by
another regulator, and serious failure to comply with or achieve the Principles, rules and
Outcomes in the SRA Handbook (Outcome 10.3).
18.2.5 The SRA Practising Regulations 2011

As the issuer of practising certificates, the SRA, pursuant to the SRA Practising Regulations
2011, has a certain level of discretion regarding their issue. Where reg 3 applies, the SRA may
grant or decline to grant the certificate, or may impose conditions on the certificate.
Regulation 3 applies in specific circumstances, including:
(a) where the solicitor has been reprimanded by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, struck
off or suspended by the court, or where the applicant has been refused approval to be a
manager, owner or compliance officer of an authorised body or whose authority has
been suspended or revoked by the SRA/another approved regulator;
(b) where the SRA has requested an explanation from the solicitor in respect of his conduct,
and the SRA has notified the solicitor that it does not regard the solicitor’s response (or
lack of response) as satisfactory;
(c) where the solicitor has failed to obtain or deliver an accountant’s report (see 18.4);
(d) where the solicitor has been suspended from practice and that suspension has come to
an end;
(e) where the solicitor’s practising certificate is currently subject to a condition;
(f ) where the solicitor is an undischarged bankrupt.
In any of these circumstances, the SRA has the discretion to impose conditions on the issue
of, or refuse to issue, a practising certificate. However, the SRA may impose a condition on a
certificate only where one of the requirements of reg 7 is met. For example, where the SRA
considers that the solicitor is likely to put at risk the interests of clients, third parties or the
public by taking certain steps in relation to legal practice, and that imposing conditions
would, in the public interest, restrict, limit or halt the taking of such steps. This may, for
example, include additional requirements for filing accountants’ reports more frequently
than normal if the solicitor in question was found to have been in breach of the SRA Accounts
Rules.
18.2.6 Refusal of certificate

Whilst the SRA is granted a discretion with regard to the issue of practising certificates in
certain circumstances, measures are in place to ensure that it cannot unreasonably withhold,
or impose conditions on, a practising certificate. For example, reg 8 provides that where the
SRA refuses to issue or replace a practising certificate, the applicant may appeal to the SRA
and thereafter to the High Court.
18.2.7 Suspension of certificate

Where a bankruptcy order is made against a solicitor, his practising certificate is
automatically suspended (Solicitors Act 1974, s 15(1)). The SRA may also suspend a current
practising certificate if the solicitor is convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or deception,
or an indictable offence (Solicitors Act 1974, s 13B).
18.2.8 Post-admission training requirements

The SRA has introduced a new approach to ensure that solicitors remain competent post
admission. In place of solicitors undertaking a set number of hours of training each year, the
regime involves:
(a) reflection on the quality of their practice by reference to a Competence Statement

(consisting of a statement of solicitor competence, the threshold standard and a
statement of legal knowledge) and addressing learning and development needs; and
(b) making an annual declaration that they have considered their training needs and taken
measures to maintain their competence.
This has been mandatory for all solicitors from 1 November 2016.
18.3 ADDITIONAL PRACTISING REQUIREMENTS

18.3.1 Higher rights of audience
Solicitors are granted rights of audience in all courts upon qualification, but cannot exercise
those rights in the higher courts, namely the Crown Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court, until they have complied with additional requirements set out in the SRA
Higher Rights of Audience Regulations 2011.
18.3.2 Criminal advocacy

With effect from 30 September 2013, solicitors who carry out criminal advocacy (as defined in
the Handbook Glossary) can do so only where accredited by the SRA under the SRA Quality
Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Crime) Regulations 2013 (known as the QASA
Regulations).
18.4 ACCOUNTANTS’ REPORTS

Under s 34 of the Solicitors Act 1974 and the SRA Accounts Rules, unless exempt, solicitors
who have held or received client money must obtain an accountant’s report within six months
of their accounting period.
The purpose of the report is to certify compliance with the SRA Accounts Rules. Any breach of
the Rules should be identified by the accountant, and, if the accountant finds it necessary to
qualify the report, such a report must be delivered to the SRA within six months of the end of
the accounting period.
To be independent, the accountant should not be employed by the solicitor’s firm or any
connected business, and the report must include the name of the individual accountant who
has prepared the report.
A recognised or licensed body may obtain one report for the firm.
As outlined in 18.2.5, the SRA may require a solicitor to deliver an accountant’s report in all
circumstances, or more frequent delivery of reports, as a condition on his practising
certificate following disciplinary proceedings.
18.5 INDEMNITY INSURANCE

18.5.1 Requirement for insurance
Under Outcome 7.13 of the Code of Conduct, firms are required to assess and purchase the
level of professional indemnity insurance that is appropriate for its current and past practice,
taking into account potential levels of claim by its clients and others and any alternative
arrangements the firm or its clients may make. The insurance must meet certain minimum
requirements set out in the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013.
The requirement does not apply to assistant solicitors, trainees, or other individuals employed
by a solicitors practice, who will be covered by any insurance taken out by the firm or their
principal.
This insurance protects the solicitor against civil claims made against him in the course of his
practice; it also protects an injured client by ensuring that solicitors in practice have sufficient
monies in place to meet claims made against them.
In previous years, The Law Society ran its own insurance scheme and firms were obliged to
obtain their insurance through this scheme. However, firms must now take out insurance with
one or more participating insurers in accordance with the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules
2013, and ensure that they have qualifying insurance in place at all times. The participating
insurer has to comply with certain minimum terms and conditions (for example, see 18.5.2).
Claims against uninsured firms are dealt with by way of grants from the SRA Compensation
Fund (see 7.11).
18.5.2 Amount of cover

The sum insured for any one claim (exclusive of defence costs) must be at least £3,000,000 for
relevant recognised and licensed bodies, and at least £2,000,000 in all other cases. The term
‘relevant recognised bodies’ excludes sole practitioners and non-LLP partnerships. However,
this may not be the minimum level of cover they need in order to provide adequate insurance
protection for their practice. Firms may therefore take out ‘top-up’ cover to increase the
amount covered under their insurance.
The Code of Conduct provides that solicitors must ensure that clients have the benefit of
compulsory professional indemnity insurance, and that they do not exclude or attempt to
exclude liability below the minimum required level (Outcome 1.8). If a solicitor seeks to limit
his liability to a client to a level above the minimum required by the SRA Indemnity Insurance
Rules 2013, ensuring that this limitation is in writing and is brought to the client’s attention
may tend to show that he has achieved the relevant Outcomes of the Code (Indicative
Behaviour 1.8). In addition, under the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999),
it is necessary to make available to clients information about the firm’s compulsory layer of
professional indemnity insurance, including details of the insurer and the territorial coverage
of its insurance.
18.6 RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGERS OF RECOGNISED AND LICENSED

BODIES
Managers of recognised and licensed bodies must ensure that their practice complies with the
requirements of professional conduct. In certain cases, they will be held to be liable for any
breach. For example, where one partner breaches the SRA Accounts Rules, every other partner
of the firm will be jointly responsible for this breach and liable to be disciplined. This will be
the case even if the other partners had no knowledge of what the ‘rogue’ partner was doing.
For breaches other than breaches of the SRA Accounts Rules, the SRA has a discretion as to
whether to pursue disciplinary action against the other principals (eg partners, members of
an LLP, etc).
18.7 SUPERVISION
18.7.1 Qualified to supervise
Under the SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011 (which came into effect from 6 October 2011),
at least one of the lawyer managers of an authorised body (eg, a partner or member of an LLP)
must be ‘qualified to supervise’.
‘Qualified to supervise’ is defined in Rule 12 as being someone who has:
(a) completed the training specified from time to time by the SRA for this purpose
(currently at least 12 hours of training on management skills); and
(b) been entitled to practise as a lawyer for at least 36 months within the last 10 years; and
(c) must be able to demonstrate this if asked by the SRA.

These requirements replicate those set out in the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 2007.
18.7.2 Responsibilities of supervision and management

Chapter 7 of the Code of Conduct sets out requirements concerning the management and
supervision of the firm. The SRA recognises that the overarching responsibility for the
management of the business in the broadest sense rests with the managers. Accordingly, the
managers must, for example:
(a) identify, monitor and manage risks to achieve compliance with all the Principles, rules
and Outcomes, and other requirements of the SRA Handbook, and take steps to address
issues identified (Outcome 7.3);
(b) comply with legislation applicable to their business, including anti-money laundering
and data protection legislation (Outcome 7.5);
(c) train individuals working in the firm to maintain a level of competence appropriate to
their work and level of responsibility (Outcome 7.6);
(d) have a system for supervising clients’ matters, to include the regular checking of the
quality of work by suitably competent and experienced people (Outcome 7.8).
The Code does not go on to specify the precise arrangements that should be put in place to
meet these Outcomes. The introduction to the Chapter makes it clear that the managers of the
firm should determine what arrangements are appropriate. Factors to be taken into account
include the size and complexity of the firm, the number, experience and qualifications of the
employees, the number of offices and the nature of work undertaken.
18.8 SEPARATE BUSINESSES

A solicitor’s ability to set up and run a business which provides legal services of a type
normally supplied by solicitors is limited by the Outcomes in Chapter 12 of the Code.
The object of Chapter 12 is very clear. It is important that clients or members of the public are
protected when they obtain mainstream legal services from a firm regulated by the SRA. It is
vital that the public is not confused or misled by a solicitor incorporating non-regulated
services into his solicitors’ practice.
A separate business essentially means a business which is not authorised by the SRA or
another approved regulator.
Solicitors should ensure, and have safeguards in place to ensure, that clients are clear about
the extent to which the services that they and the separate business offer are regulated
(Outcome 12.1) and that the separate business or any of its services is not represented,
directly or indirectly, as being regulated by the SRA (Outcome 12.2).
The separate business cannot carry on ‘reserved legal activities’ (which include the exercise of
a right of audience, the conduct of litigation and probate activities) or immigration work
unless that work is regulated by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner
(Outcome 12.3). These are ‘mainstream’ legal services which the SRA considers members of
the public would expect a lawyer to offer. Historically, examples of the kind of services that a
separate business offered are alternative dispute resolution, financial services and an estate
agency. However, the SRA Practice Framework Rules 2011 have been amended to permit
recognised bodies and sole practices to offer a wider range of services than before, including
the kind of services mentioned above (see Rule 13.2), and so a separate business would no
longer be required in order to offer these.
A solicitor should only refer, recommend or introduce a client to the separate business or
divide a client’s matter between his regulated business and the separate business where the
client has given informed consent (Outcome 12.4).
18.9 DUTY TO THE SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

18.9.1 Duty to cooperate
A solicitor must cooperate fully with the SRA and the Legal Ombudsman at all times, including
in relation to any investigation about a claim for redress against him (Outcome 10.6).
A solicitor must also comply promptly with any written notice from the SRA (Outcome 10.8).
Such a notice may be served where the SRA is investigating whether the solicitor or firm is
complying with the requirements of professional conduct. All documents held and all
information and explanations requested are to be produced for inspection by the SRA
(Outcome 10.9).
Lastly, a solicitor must not attempt to prevent anyone from providing information to the SRA
or the Legal Ombudsman (Outcome 10.7).
18.9.2 Investigating claims for redress

Solicitors and recognised/licensed bodies must, if required to do so by the SRA on a particular
matter, act promptly to investigate whether a person may have a claim for redress resulting
from an act or omission of the firm. The firm must provide the SRA with a report into the
matter, notify the individual of the details of the potential claim, and provide details of the
firm’s complaints procedure and of the Legal Ombudsman (Outcome 10.11).
18.9.3 Reporting serious misconduct

A solicitor is obliged, pursuant to Outcome 10.4, to report to the SRA promptly serious
misconduct by any person or firm authorised by the SRA, or any employee, manager or owner
of such a firm (taking into account, where necessary, the duty of confidentiality to the client).
18.10 EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1
Question You are a manager in a recognised body. You learn that one of your clients has
complained to the Legal Ombudsman that one of the assistant solicitors under
your supervision has been acting on a matter where his interests conflict with
those of the client? Who may be disciplined by the SRA in these circumstances?
Answer The SRA may discipline the solicitor concerned. However, instead of or in
addition to this action, the SRA will look at whether this solicitor was
adequately supervised. Therefore the SRA could pursue you as the manager
responsible and/or the recognised body in this regard.
EXAMPLE 2
Question You are a manager in a recognised body. Whilst completing a file review of an
assistant solicitor, you discover that he has persuaded an elderly client to
transfer his house (worth £300,000) to him for £50,000. It appears that the
assistant solicitor convinced the client that the house was worth only £40,000.
What are you obliged to do?
Answer You are obliged to report any serious misconduct by a solicitor to the SRA
(Outcome 10.4). Whether misconduct can be considered ‘serious’ will depend
on the circumstances, but conduct involving deception, dishonesty or a serious
criminal offence will amount to serious misconduct. Given the circumstances,
the solicitor’s conduct is clearly serious misconduct. You must report the
matter to the SRA.
SUMMARY
SRA Suitability Test
(1) Those intending to become solicitors, those seeking to become authorised role
holders within authorised bodies and former solicitors seeking restoration to the roll
of solicitors must satisfy the SRA Suitability Test 2011.
(2) Certain behaviour, including the committing of certain criminal or assessment
offences, will result in the application to become a solicitor/authorised role holder
being refused by the SRA unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Practising certificates and related matters
(1) The Solicitors Act 1974, s 1 states:
No person shall be qualified to act as a solicitor unless—
(a) he has been admitted as a solicitor, and
(b) his name is on the roll, and
(c) he has in force a certificate issued by the Society … authorising him to practise as a solicitor
(in this Act referred to as a ‘practising certificate’).
(2) Practising certificates are issued annually by the SRA.
(3) The SRA may grant or refuse an application for a certificate. The SRA may also grant
a certificate subject to specified conditions.
(4) Solicitors wishing to exercise higher rights of audience and carrying out criminal
advocacy must comply with additional SRA requirements.
(5) Solicitors’ firms are obliged to obtain an annual accountant’s report.
Indemnity Insurance
(1) The SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 require solicitors to take out compulsory
insurance cover against the risks of professional negligence or other civil liability
claims.
(2) Firms can insure with any approved commercial insurer.
(3) Relevant recognised and licensed bodies must obtain cover to a minimum £3 million
per individual claim (a minimum of £2 million in all other cases). Voluntary top-up
cover may be required.
Supervision
(1) At least one lawyer manager of an authorised body must be ‘qualified to supervise’.
(2) Regardless of whether they are ‘qualified to supervise’, managers should determine
what arrangements are appropriate for the management and supervision of their
firms, to meet the Outcomes of the Code.
Appendix to Part II 209
APPENDIX TO PART II
SRA Code of Conduct

CHAPTER 1 – CLIENT CARE
Outcomes
You must achieve these outcomes:
O(1.1) you treat your clients fairly;
O(1.2) you provide services to your clients in a manner which protects their interests in their matter,
subject to the proper administration of justice;
O(1.3) when deciding whether to act, or terminate your instructions, you comply with the law and the
Code;
O(1.4) you have the resources, skills and procedures to carry out your clients’ instructions;
O(1.5) the service you provide to clients is competent, delivered in a timely manner and takes account of
your clients’ needs and circumstances;
O(1.6) you only enter into fee agreements with your clients that are legal, and which you consider are
suitable for the client’s needs and take account of the client’s best interests;
O(1.7) you inform clients whether and how the services you provide are regulated and how this affects
the protections available to the client;
O(1.8) clients have the benefit of your compulsory professional indemnity insurance and you do not exclude or
attempt to exclude liability below the minimum level of cover required by the SRA Indemnity
Insurance Rules;
O(1.9) clients are informed in writing at the outset of their matter of their right to complain and how
complaints can be made;
O(1.10) clients are informed in writing, both at the time of engagement and at the conclusion of your
complaints procedure, of their right to complain to the Legal Ombudsman, the time frame for doing
so and full details of how to contact the Legal Ombudsman;
O(1.11) clients’ complaints are dealt with promptly, fairly, openly and effectively;
O(1.12) clients are in a position to make informed decisions about the services they need, how their
matter will be handled and the options available to them;
O(1.13) clients receive the best possible information, both at the time of engagement and when
appropriate as their matter progresses, about the likely overall cost of their matter;
O(1.14) clients are informed of their right to challenge or complain about your bill and the circumstances
in which they may be liable to pay interest on an unpaid bill;
O(1.15) you properly account to clients for any financial benefit you receive as a result of your instructions;
O(1.16) you inform clients if you discover any act or omission which could give rise to a claim by them
against you.
Indicative behaviours
Acting in the following way(s) may tend to show that you have achieved these outcomes and
therefore complied with the Principles:
Dealing with the client's matter

IB(1.1) agreeing an appropriate level of service with your client, for example the type and frequency of
communications;
IB(1.2) explaining your responsibilities and those of the client;
IB(1.3) ensuring that the client is told, in writing, the name and status of the person(s) dealing with the
matter and the name and status of the person responsible for its overall supervision;
IB(1.4) explaining any arrangements, such as fee sharing or referral arrangements, which are relevant to the
client’s instructions;
IB(1.5) explaining any limitations or conditions on what you can do for the client, for example, because
of the way the client’s matter is funded;
IB(1.6) in taking instructions and during the course of the retainer, having proper regard to your
client’s mental capacity or other vulnerability, such as incapacity or duress;
IB(1.7) considering whether you should decline to act or cease to act because you cannot act in the client’s
best interests;
IB(1.8) if you seek to limit your liability to your client to a level above the minimum required by the
SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules, ensuring that this limitation is in writing and is brought to the
client’s attention;
IB(1.9) refusing to act where your client proposes to make a gift of significant value to you or a
member of your family, or a member of your firm or their family, unless the client takes
independent legal advice;
IB(1.10) if you have to cease acting for a client, explaining to the client their possible options for pursuing
their matter;
IB(1.11) you inform clients if they are not entitled to the protections of the SRA Compensation Fund;
IB(1.12) considering whether a conflict of interests has arisen or whether the client should be advised to obtain
independent advice where the client notifies you of their intention to make a claim or if you
discover an act or omission which might give rise to a claim;
Fee arrangements with your client

IB(1.13) discussing whether the potential outcomes of the client’s matter are likely to justify the expense or
risk involved, including any risk of having to pay someone else’s legal fees;
IB(1.14) clearly explaining your fees and if and when they are likely to change;
IB(1.15) warning about any other payments for which the client may be responsible;
IB(1.16) discussing how the client will pay, including whether public funding may be available, whether the
client has insurance that might cover the fees, and whether the fees may be paid by someone else
such as a trade union;
IB(1.17) where you are acting for a client under a fee arrangement governed by statute, such as a conditional
fee agreement, giving the client all relevant information relating to that arrangement;
IB(1.18) where you are acting for a publicly funded client, explaining how their publicly funded status
affects the costs;
SRA Code of Conduct 211
IB(1.19) providing the information in a clear and accessible form which is appropriate to the needs and
circumstances of the client;
IB(1.20) where you receive a financial benefit as a result of acting for a client, either:
(a) paying it to the client;
(b) offsetting it against your fees; or
(c) keeping it only where you can justify keeping it, you have told the client the amount of the
benefit (or an approximation if you do not know the exact amount) and the client has agreed
that you can keep it;
IB(1.21) ensuring that disbursements included in your bill reflect the actual amount spent or to be spent on
behalf of the client;
Complaints handling
IB(1.22) having a written complaints procedure which:
(a) is brought to clients’ attention at the outset of the matter;
(b) is easy for clients to use and understand, allowing for complaints to be made by any reasonable
means;
(c) is responsive to the needs of individual clients, especially those who are vulnerable;
(d) enables complaints to be dealt with promptly and fairly, with decisions based on a sufficient
investigation of the circumstances;
(e) provides for appropriate remedies; and
(f ) does not involve any charges to clients for handling their complaints;
IB(1.23) providing the client with a copy of the firm’s complaints procedure on request;
IB(1.24) in the event that a client makes a complaint, providing them with all necessary information
concerning the handling of the complaint.
Acting in the following way(s) may tend to show that you have not achieved these outcomes and
therefore not complied with the Principles:
Accepting and refusing instructions

IB(1.25) acting for a client when instructions are given by someone else, or by only one client when you
act jointly for others unless you are satisfied that the person providing the instructions has the
authority to do so on behalf of all of the clients;
IB(1.26) ceasing to act for a client without good reason and without providing reasonable notice;
IB(1.27) entering into unlawful fee arrangements such as an unlawful contingency fee;
IB(1.28) acting for a client when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the instructions are affected
by duress or undue influence without satisfying yourself that they represent the client’s wishes.
CHAPTER 3 – CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS

Outcomes
Systems
O(3.1) you have effective systems and controls in place to enable you to identify and assess potential
conflicts of interests;
O(3.2) your systems and controls for identifying own interest conflicts are appropriate to the size and
complexity of the firm and the nature of the work undertaken, and enable you to assess all the
relevant circumstances, including whether your ability as an individual, or that of anyone within
your firm, to act in the best interests of the client(s), is impaired by:
(a) any financial interest;
(b) a personal relationship;
(c) the appointment of you, or a member of your firm or family, to public office;
(d) commercial relationships; or
(e) your employment;
O(3.3) your systems and controls for identifying client conflicts are appropriate to the size and complexity
of the firm and the nature of the work undertaken, and enable you to assess all relevant
circumstances, including whether:
(a) the clients’ interests are different;
(b) your ability to give independent advice to the clients may be fettered;
(c) there is a need to negotiate between the clients;
(d) there is an imbalance in bargaining power between the clients; or
(e) any client is vulnerable;
Prohibition on acting in conflict situations

O(3.4) you do not act if there is an own interest conflict or a significant risk of an own interest conflict;
O(3.5) you do not act if there is a client conflict, or a significant risk of a client conflict, unless the
circumstances set out in Outcomes 3.6 or 3.7 apply;
Exceptions where you may act, with appropriate safeguards, where there is a client conflict
O(3.6) where there is a client conflict and the clients have a substantially common interest in relation to a matter
or a particular aspect of it, you only act if:
(a) you have explained the relevant issues and risks to the clients and you have a reasonable
belief that they understand those issues and risks;
(b) all the clients have given informed consent in writing to you acting;
(c) you are satisfied that it is reasonable for you to act for all the clients and that it is in their best
interests; and
(d) you are satisfied that the benefits to the clients of you doing so outweigh the risks;
O(3.7) where there is a client conflict and the clients are competing for the same objective, you only act if:
(a) you have explained the relevant issues and risks to the clients and you have a reasonable
belief that they understand those issues and risks;
(b) the clients have confirmed in writing that they want you to act, in the knowledge that you act,
or may act, for one or more other clients who are competing for the same objective;
(c) there is no other client conflict in relation to that matter;
(d) unless the clients specifically agree, no individual acts for, or is responsible for the
supervision of work done for, more than one of the clients in that matter; and
(e) you are satisfied that it is reasonable for you to act for all the clients and that the benefits to
the clients of you doing so outweigh the risks.
IB(3.1) training employees and managers to identify and assess potential conflicts of interests;
IB(3.2) declining to act for clients whose interests are in direct conflict, for example claimant and
defendant in litigation;
IB(3.3) declining to act for clients where you may need to negotiate on matters of substance on their
behalf, for example negotiating on price between a buyer and seller of a property;
IB(3.4) declining to act where there is unequal bargaining power between the clients, for example acting
for a seller and buyer where a builder is selling to a non-commercial client;
IB(3.5) declining to act for clients under Outcome 3.6 (substantially common interest) or Outcome 3.7
(competing for the same objective) where the clients cannot be represented even-handedly, or will be
prejudiced by lack of separate representation;
IB(3.6) acting for clients under Outcome 3.7 (competing for the same objective) only where the clients are
sophisticated users of legal services;
IB(3.7) acting for clients who are the lender and borrower on the grant of a mortgage of land only where:
(a) the mortgage is a standard mortgage (i.e. one provided in the normal course of the lender’s
activities, where a significant part of the lender’s activities consists of lending and the
mortgage is on standard terms) of property to be used as the borrower’s private residence;
(b) you are satisfied that it is reasonable and in the clients’ best interests for you to act; and
(c) the certificate of title required by the lender is in the form approved by the Society and the
Council of Mortgage Lenders.
IB(3.8) in a personal capacity, selling to or buying from, lending to or borrowing from a client, unless the
client has obtained independent legal advice;
IB(3.9) advising a client to invest in a business, in which you have an interest which affects your ability to
provide impartial advice;
IB(3.10) where you hold a power of attorney for a client, using that power to gain a benefit for yourself
which in your professional capacity you would not have been prepared to allow to a third
party;
IB(3.11) acting for two or more clients in a conflict of interests under Outcome 3.6 (substantially common interest)
where the clients’ interests in the end result are not the same, for example one partner buying out
the interest of the other partner in their joint business or a seller transferring a property to a
buyer;
IB(3.12) acting for two or more clients in a conflict of interests under Outcome 3.6 (substantially common interest)
where it is unreasonable to act because there is unequal bargaining power;
IB(3.13) acting for two buyers where there is a conflict of interests under Outcome 3.7 (competing for the same
objective), for example where two buyers are competing for a residential property;
IB(3.14) acting for a buyer (including a lessee) and seller (including a lessor) in a transaction relating to
the transfer of land for value, the grant or assignment of a lease or some other interest in land for
value.
CHAPTER 4 – CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE

Outcomes
O(4.1) you keep the affairs of clients confidential unless disclosure is required or permitted by law or the
client consents;
O(4.2) any individual who is advising a client makes that client aware of all information material to that
retainer of which the individual has personal knowledge;
O(4.3) you ensure that where your duty of confidentiality to one client comes into conflict with your duty
of disclosure to another client, your duty of confidentiality takes precedence;
O(4.4) you do not act for A in a matter where A has an interest adverse to B, and B is a client for whom you
hold confidential information which is material to A in that matter, unless the confidential
information can be protected by the use of safeguards, and:
(a) you reasonably believe that A is aware of, and understands, the relevant issues and gives
informed consent;
(b) either:
(i) B gives informed consent and you agree with B the safeguards to protect B’s
information; or
(ii) where this is not possible, you put in place effective safeguards including information
barriers which comply with the common law; and
(c) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to act for A with such safeguards in place;
O(4.5) you have effective systems and controls in place to enable you to identify risks to client
confidentiality and to mitigate those risks.
IB(4.1) your systems and controls for identifying risks to client confidentiality are appropriate to the size
and complexity of the firm or in-house practice and the nature of the work undertaken, and enable
you to assess all the relevant circumstances;
IB(4.2) you comply with the law in respect of your fiduciary duties in relation to confidentiality and
disclosure;
IB(4.3) you only outsource services when you are satisfied that the provider has taken all appropriate
steps to ensure that your clients’ confidential information will be protected;
IB(4.4) where you are an individual who has responsibility for acting for a client or supervising a client’s
matter, you disclose to the client all information material to the client’s matter of which you are
personally aware, except when:
(a) the client gives specific informed consent to non-disclosure or a different standard of
disclosure arises;
(b) there is evidence that serious physical or mental injury will be caused to a person(s) if the
information is disclosed to the client;
(c) legal restrictions effectively prohibit you from passing the information to the client, such as
the provisions in the money-laundering and anti-terrorism legislation;
(d) it is obvious that privileged documents have been mistakenly disclosed to you;
(e) you come into possession of information relating to state security or intelligence matters to
which the Official Secrets Act 1989 applies;
IB(4.5) not acting for A where B is a client for whom you hold confidential information which is material to
A unless the confidential information can be protected.
IB(4.6) disclosing the content of a will on the death of a client unless consent has been provided by the
personal representatives for the content to be released;
IB(4.7) disclosing details of bills sent to clients to third parties, such as debt factoring companies in
relation to the collection of book debts, unless the client has consented.
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 217
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

PART 7
MONEY LAUNDERING
OFFENCES
327. Concealing etc

(1) A person commits an offence if he—
(a) conceals criminal property;
(b) disguises criminal property;
(c) converts criminal property;
(d) transfers criminal property;
(e) removes criminal property from England and Wales or from Scotland or from
Northern Ireland.
(2) But a person does not commit such an offence if—
(a) he makes an authorised disclosure under section 338 and (if the disclosure is
made before he does the act mentioned in subsection (1)) he has the appropriate
consent;
(b) he intended to make such a disclosure but had a reasonable excuse for not doing
so;
(c) the act he does is done in carrying out a function he has relating to the
enforcement of any provision of this Act or of any other enactment relating to
criminal conduct or benefit from criminal conduct.
(2A) Nor does a person commit an offence under subsection (1) if—
(a) he knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct
occurred in a particular country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) the relevant criminal conduct—
(i) was not, at the time it occurred, unlawful under the criminal law then
applying in that country or territory, and
(ii) is not of a description prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State.
(2B) In subsection (2A) ‘the relevant criminal conduct’ is the criminal conduct by reference
to which the property concerned is criminal property.
(2C) A deposit-taking body that does an act mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d) of subsection
(1) does not commit an offence under that subsection if—
(a) it does the act in operating an account maintained with it; and
(b) the value of the criminal property concerned is less than the threshold amount
determined under section 339A for the act.
(3) Concealing or disguising criminal property includes concealing or disguising its nature,
source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any rights with respect to it.
328. Arrangements
(1) A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement
which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention,
use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person.
(2) But a person does not commit such an offence if:

consent;
so;
(c) the act he does is done in carrying out a function he has relating to the
(3) Nor does a person commit an offence under subsection (1) if—
(4) In subsection (3) ‘the relevant criminal conduct’ is the criminal conduct by reference to
which the property concerned is criminal property.
(5) A deposit-taking body that does an act mentioned in subsection (1) does not commit an
offence under that subsection if—
(b) the arrangement facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal
property of a value that is less than the threshold amount determined under
section 339A for the act.
329. Acquisition, use and possession

(1) A person commits an offence if he—
(a) acquires criminal property;
(b) uses criminal property;
(c) has possession of criminal property.
(2) But a person does not commit such an offence if:
consent;
so;
(c) he acquired or used or had possession of the property for adequate consideration;
(d) the act he does is done in carrying out a function he has relating to the
(2A) Nor does a person commit an offence under subsection (1) if—
(2B) In subsection (2A) ‘the relevant criminal conduct’ is the criminal conduct by reference
to which the property concerned is criminal property.
(2C) A deposit-taking body that does an act mentioned in subsection (1) does not commit an
offence under that subsection if—
(b) the value of the criminal property concerned is less than the threshold amount
determined under section 339A for the act.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) a person acquires property for inadequate consideration if the value of the
consideration is significantly less than the value of the property;
(b) a person uses or has possession of property for inadequate consideration if the
value of the consideration is significantly less than the value of the use or
possession;
(c) the provision by a person of goods or services which he knows or suspects may
help another to carry out criminal conduct is not consideration.
330. Failure to disclose: regulated sector

(1) A person commits an offence if the conditions in subsections (2) to (4) are satisfied:
(2) The first condition is that he—
(a) knows or suspects; or
(b) has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,
that another person is engaged in money laundering.
(3) The second condition is that the information or other matter—
(a) on which his knowledge or suspicion is based; or
(b) which gives reasonable grounds for such knowledge or suspicion,
came to him in the course of a business in the regulated sector.
(3A) The third condition is—
(a) that he can identify the other person mentioned in subsection (2) or the
whereabouts of any of the laundered property; or
(b) that he believes, or it is reasonable to expect him to believe, that the information
or other matter mentioned in subsection (3) will or may assist in identifying the
other person or the whereabouts of any of the laundered property.
(4) The fourth condition is that he does not make the required disclosure to—
(a) a nominated officer; or
(b) a person authorised for the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the
National Crime Agency,
as soon as is practicable after the information or other matter mentioned in subsection
(3) comes to him.
(5) The required disclosure is a disclosure of—
(a) the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (2), if he knows it;
(b) the whereabouts of the laundered property, so far as he knows it; and
(c) the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3).
(5A) The laundered property is the property forming the subject-matter of the money
laundering that he knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting, that other person to be engaged in.
(6) But he does not commit an offence under this section if—
(a) he has a reasonable excuse for not making the required disclosure;
(b) he is a professional legal adviser or ... relevant professional adviser, and
(i) if he knows either of the things mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and (b), he
knows the thing because of information or other matter that came to him in
privileged circumstances, or
(ii) the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3) came to him in
privileged circumstances, or
(c) subsection (7) or (7B) applies to him.
(7) This subsection applies to a person if:
(a) he does not know or suspect that another person is engaged in money laundering;
and
(b) he has not been provided by his employer with such training as is specified by the
Secretary of State by order for the purposes of this section.
(7A) Nor does a person commit an offence under this section if—
(a) he knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the money laundering is
occurring in a particular country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(b) the money laundering—
(i) is not unlawful under the criminal law applying in that country or territory,
and
(ii) is not of a description prescribed in an order made by the Secretary of State.
(7B) This subsection applies to a person if—
(a) he is employed by, or is in partnership with, a professional legal adviser or a
relevant professional adviser to provide the adviser with assistance or support,
(b) the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3) comes to the person
in connection with the provision of such assistance or support, and
(c) the information or other matter came to the adviser in privileged circumstances.
(8) In deciding whether a person committed an offence under this section the court must
consider whether he followed any relevant guidance which was at the time concerned:
(a) issued by a supervisory authority or an appropriate body;
(b) approved by the Treasury; and
(c) published in a manner it approved as appropriate in its opinion to bring the
guidance to the attention of persons likely to be affected by it.
(9) Disclosure to a nominated officer is a disclosure which—
(a) is made to a person nominated by the alleged offender’s employer to receive
disclosures under this section; and
(b) is made in the course of the alleged offender’s employment.
(9A) But a disclosure which satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (9) is not to be
taken as a disclosure to a nominated officer if the person making the disclosure—
(a) is a professional legal adviser or ... relevant professional adviser,
(b) makes it for the purpose of obtaining advice about making a disclosure under this
section, and
(c) does not intend it to be a disclosure under this section.
(10) Information or other matter comes to a professional legal adviser or ... relevant
professional adviser in privileged circumstances if it is communicated or given to him:
(a) by (or by a representative of ) a client of his in connection with the giving by the
adviser of legal advice to the client;
(b) by (or by a representative of ) a person seeking legal advice from the adviser; or
(c) by a person in connection with legal proceedings or contemplated legal
proceedings.
(11) But subsection (10) does not apply to information or other matter which is
communicated or given with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(12) Schedule 9 has effect for the purpose of determining what is—
(a) a business in the regulated sector;
(b) a supervisory authority.

(13) An appropriate body is any body which regulates or is representative of any trade,
profession, business or employment carried on by the alleged offender.
(14) A relevant professional adviser is an accountant, auditor or tax adviser who is a member
of a professional body which is established for accountants, auditors or tax advisers (as
the case may be) and which makes provision for—
(a) testing the competence of those seeking admission to membership of such a body
as a condition for such admission; and
(b) imposing and maintaining professional and ethical standards for its members, as
well as imposing sanctions for non-compliance with those standards
331. Failure to disclose: nominated officers in the regulated sector

(1) A person nominated to receive disclosures under section 330 commits an offence if the
conditions in subsections (2) to (4) are satisfied—
(2) The first condition is that he—
(a) knows or suspects; or
(b) has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,
(a) on which his knowledge or suspicion is based; or
(b) which gives reasonable grounds for such knowledge or suspicion,
came to him in consequence of a disclosure made under section 330.
(a) that he knows the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (2), or the
whereabouts of any of the laundered property, in consequence of a disclosure
made under section 330,
(b) that that other person, or the whereabouts of any of the laundered property, can
be identified from the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3),
or
(c) that he believes, or it is reasonable to expect him to believe, that the information
or other matter will or may assist in identifying that other person or the
whereabouts of any of the laundered property.
(4) The fourth condition is that he does not make the required disclosure to a person
authorised for the purposes of this Part by the Director General of SOCA as soon as is
practicable after the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3) comes to
him.
(a) the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (2), if disclosed to him
under section 330,
(b) the whereabouts of the laundered property, so far as disclosed to him under
section 330, and
laundering that he knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting, that other person to be engaged in.
(6) But he does not commit an offence under this section if he has a reasonable excuse for
not making the required disclosure.
(6A) Nor does a person commit an offence under this section if—

and
(7) In deciding whether a person committed an offence under this section the court must
consider whether he followed any relevant guidance which was at the time concerned:
(a) issued by a supervisory authority or any other appropriate body;
(b) approved by the Treasury; and
(c) published in a manner it approved as appropriate in its opinion to bring the
guidance to the attention of the persons likely to be affected by it.
(8) Schedule 9 has effect for the purpose of determining what is a supervisory authority.
(9) An appropriate body is a body which regulates or is representative of a trade, profession,
business or employment.
332. Failure to disclose: other nominated officers

(1) A person nominated to receive disclosures under section 337 or 338 commits an offence
if the conditions in subsections (2) to (4) are satisfied.
(2) The first condition is that he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in
money laundering.
(3) The second condition is that the information or other matter on which his knowledge or
suspicion is based came to him in consequence of a disclosure made under the
applicable section.
(a) that he knows the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (2), or the
whereabouts of any of the laundered property, in consequence of a disclosure
made under the applicable section,
(b) that that other person, or the whereabouts of any of the laundered property, can
be identified from the information or other matter mentioned in subsection (3),
or
(c) that he believes, or it is reasonable to expect him to believe, that the information
or other matter will or may assist in identifying that other person or the
whereabouts of any of the laundered property.
(4) The fourth condition is that he does not make the required disclosure to a person
authorised for the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the National Crime
Agency as soon as is practicable after the information or other mater mentioned in
subsection (3) comes to him.
(a) the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (2), if disclosed to him
under the applicable section;
(b) the whereabouts of the laundered property, so far as disclosed to him under the
applicable section; and
laundering that he knows or suspects that other person to be engaged in.
(5B) The applicable section in section 337 or, as the case may be, section 338.
(6) But he does not commit an offence under this section if he has a reasonable excuse for
not making the required disclosure.
(7) Nor does a person commit an offence under this section if—
and
333A. Tipping off: regulated sector

(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person discloses any matter within subsection (2);
(b) the disclosure is likely to prejudice any investigation that might be conducted
following the disclosure referred to in that subsection; and
(c) the information on which the disclosure is based came to the person in the course
of a business in the regulated sector.
(2) The matters are that the person or another person has made a disclosure under this
Part—
(a) to a constable,
(b) to an officer of Revenue and Customs,
(c) to a nominated officer, or
(d) to a National Crime Agency officer authorised for the purposes of this Part by the
Director General of that Agency,
of information that came to that person in the course of a business in the regulated
sector.
(3) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person discloses that an investigation into allegations that an offence under
this Part has been committed is being contemplated or is being carried out;
(b) the disclosure is likely to prejudice that investigation; and
(c) the information on which the disclosure is based came to the person in the course
of a business in the regulated sector.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months,
or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years,
or to a fine, or to both.
(5) This section is subject to—
(a) section 333B (disclosures within an undertaking or group etc),
(b) section 333C (other permitted disclosures between institutions etc), and
(c) section 333D (other permitted disclosures etc).
333B. Disclosures within an undertaking or group etc

(1) An employee, officer or partner of an undertaking does not commit an offence under
section 333A if the disclosure is to an employee, officer or partner of the same
undertaking.
(2) A person does not commit an offence under section 333A in respect of a disclosure by a
credit institution or a financial institution if—
(a) the disclosure is to a credit institution or a financial institution,
(b) the institution to whom the disclosure is made is situated in an EEA State or in a
country or territory imposing equivalent money laundering requirements, and
(c) both the institution making the disclosure and the institution to whom it is made
belong to the same group.
(3) In subsection (2) ‘group’ has the same meaning as in Directive 2002/87/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16th December 2002 on the supplementary
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a
financial conglomerate.
(4) A professional legal adviser or a relevant professional adviser does not commit an
offence under section 333A if—
(a) the disclosure is to professional legal adviser or a relevant professional adviser,
(b) both the person making the disclosure and the person to whom it is made carry
on business in an EEA State or in a country or territory imposing equivalent
money laundering requirements, and
(c) those persons perform their professional activities within different undertakings
that share common ownership, management or control.
333C. Other permitted disclosures between institutions etc

(1) This section applies to a disclosure—
(a) by a credit institution to another credit institution,
(b) by a financial institution to another financial institution,
(c) by a professional legal adviser to another professional legal adviser, or
(d) by a relevant professional adviser of a particular kind to another relevant
professional adviser of the same kind.
(2) A person does not commit an offence under section 333A in respect of a disclosure to
which this section applies if—
(a) the disclosure relates to—
(i) a client or former client of the institution or adviser making the disclosure
and the institution or adviser to whom it is made,
(ii) a transaction involving them both, or
(iii) the provision of a service involving them both;
(b) the disclosure is for the purpose only of preventing an offence under this Part of
this Act;
(c) the institution or adviser to whom the disclosure is made is situated in an EEA
State or in a country or territory imposing equivalent money laundering
requirements; and
(d) the institution or adviser making the disclosure and the institution or adviser to
whom it is made are subject to equivalent duties of professional confidentiality
and the protection of personal data (within the meaning of section 1 of the Data
Protection Act 1998).
333D. Other permitted disclosures etc

(1) A person does not commit an offence under section 333A if the disclosure is—
(a) to the authority that is the supervisory authority for that person by virtue of the
Money Laundering Regulations 2007; or
(b) for the purpose of—
(i) the detection, investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence (whether in
the United Kingdom or elsewhere),
(ii) an investigation under this Act, or
(iii) the enforcement of any order of a court under this Act.
(2) A professional legal adviser or a relevant professional adviser does not commit an
offence under section 333A if the disclosure—
(a) is to the adviser’s client, and
(b) is made for the purpose of dissuading the client from engaging in conduct
amounting to an offence.
(3) A person does not commit an offence under section 333A(1) if the person does not
know or suspect that the disclosure is likely to have the effect mentioned in section
333A(1)(b).
(4) A person does not commit an offence under section 333A(3) if the person does not
know or suspect that the disclosure is likely to have the effect mentioned in section
333A(3)(b).
333E. Interpretation of sections 333A to 333D

(1) For the purposes of sections 333A to 333D, Schedule 9 has effect for determining—
(a) what is a business in the regulated sector, and
(b) what is a supervisory authority.
(2) In those sections—
‘credit institution’ has the same meaning as in Schedule 9;
‘financial institution’ means an undertaking that carries on a business in the regulated
sector by virtue of any of paragraphs (b) to (i) of paragraph 1(1) of that Schedule.
(3) References in those sections to a disclosure by or to a credit institution or a financial
institution include disclosure by or to an employee, officer or partner of the institution
acting on its behalf.
(4) For the purposes of those sections a country or territory imposes ‘equivalent money
laundering requirements’ if it imposes requirements equivalent to those laid down in
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th October
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering and terrorist financing.
(5) In those sections ‘relevant professional adviser’ means an accountant, auditor or tax
adviser who is a member of a professional body which is established for accountants,
auditors or tax advisers (as the case may be) and which makes provision for—
(a) testing the competence of those seeking admission to membership of such a body
as a condition for such admission; and
(b) imposing and maintaining professional and ethical standards for its members, as
well as imposing sanctions for non-compliance with those standards.
334. Penalties
(1) A person guilty of an offence under section 327, 328 or 329 is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years
or to a fine or to both.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under section 330, 331 or 332 is liable:
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
(3) A person guilty of an offence under section 339(1A) is liable on summary conviction to a
fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
CONSENT
335. Appropriate consent

(1) The appropriate consent is—
(a) the consent of a nominated officer to do a prohibited act if an authorised
disclosure is made to the nominated officer;
(b) the consent of a constable to do a prohibited act if an authorised disclosure is
made to a constable;
(c) the consent of a customs officer to do a prohibited act if an authorised disclosure
is made to a customs officer.
(2) A person must be treated as having the appropriate consent if—
(a) he makes an authorised disclosure to a constable or a customs officer, and
(b) the condition in subsection (3) or the condition in subsection (4) is satisfied.
(3) The condition is that before the end of the notice period he does not receive notice from
a constable or customs officer that consent to the doing of the act is refused.
(4) The condition is that—
(a) before the end of the notice period he receives notice from a constable or customs
officer that consent to the doing of the act is refused; and
(b) the moratorium period has expired.
(5) The notice period is the period of seven working days starting with the first working day
after the person makes the disclosure.
(6) The moratorium period is the period of 31 days starting with the day on which the
person receives notice that consent to the doing of the act is refused.
(7) A working day is a day other than a Saturday, a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a
day which is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the
part of the United Kingdom in which the person is when he makes the disclosure.
(8) References to a prohibited act are to an act mentioned in section 327(1), 328(1) or
329(1) (as the case may be).
(9) A nominated officer is a person nominated to receive disclosures under section 338.
(10) Subsections (1) to (4) apply for the purposes of this Part.
336. Nominated officer: consent

(1) A nominated officer must not give the appropriate consent to the doing of a prohibited
act unless the condition in subsection (2), the condition in subsection (3) or the
condition in subsection (4) is satisfied.
(a) he makes a disclosure that property is criminal property to a person authorised for
the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the National Crime Agency, and
(b) such a person gives consent to the doing of the act.
the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the National Crime Agency, and
(b) before the end of the notice period he does not receive notice from such a person
that consent to the doing of the act is refused.
the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the National Crime Agency,
(b) before the end of the notice period he receives notice from such a person that
consent to the doing of the act is refused, and
(c) the moratorium period has expired.

(5) A person who is a nominated officer commits an offence if—
(a) he gives consent to a prohibited act in circumstances where none of the
conditions in subsections (2), (3) and (4) is satisfied, and
(b) he knows or suspects that the act is a prohibited act.
(6) A person guilty of such an offence is liable—
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both, or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
(7) The notice period is the period of seven working days starting with the first working day
after the nominated officer makes the disclosure.
(8) The moratorium period is the period of 31 days starting with the day on which the
nominated officer is given notice that consent to the doing of the act is refused.
(9) A working day is a day other than a Saturday, a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a
day which is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the
part of the United Kingdom in which the nominated officer is when he gives the
appropriate consent.
(10) References to a prohibited act are to an act mentioned in section 327(1), 328(1) or
(11) A nominated officer is a person nominated to receive disclosures under section 338.
DISCLOSURES
337. Protected disclosures

(1) A disclosure which satisfies the following three conditions is not to be taken to breach
any restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).
(2) The first condition is that the information or other matter disclosed came to the person
making the disclosure (the discloser) in the course of his trade, profession, business or
employment.
(a) causes the discloser to know or suspect, or
(b) gives him reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,
(4) The third condition is that the disclosure is made to a constable, a customs officer or a
nominated officer as soon as is practicable after the information or other matter comes
to the discloser.
(4A) Where a disclosure consists of a disclosure protected under subsection (1) and a
disclosure of either or both of—
(a) the identity of the other person mentioned in subsection (3), and
(b) the whereabouts of property forming the subject-matter of the money laundering
that the discloser knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting, that other person to be engaged in,
the disclosure of the thing mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) (as well as the disclosure
protected under subsection (1)) is not to be taken to breach any restriction on the
disclosure of information (however imposed).
(5) A disclosure to a nominated officer is a disclosure which—
(a) is made to a person nominated by the discloser’s employer to receive disclosures
under section 330 or this section, and
(b) is made in the course of the discloser’s employment.
338. Authorised disclosures

(1) For the purposes of this Part a disclosure is authorised if—
(a) it is a disclosure to a constable, a customs officer or a nominated officer by the
alleged offender that property is criminal property, . . . and
(c) the first, second or third condition set out below is satisfied.
(2) The first condition is that the disclosure is made before the alleged offender does the
prohibited act.
(2A) The second condition is that—
(a) the disclosure is made while the alleged offender is doing the prohibited act,
(b) he began to do the act at a time when, because he did not then know or suspect
that the property constituted or represented a person’s benefit from criminal
conduct, the act was not a prohibited act, and
(c) the disclosure is made on his own initiative and as soon as is practicable after he
first knows or suspects that the property constitutes or represents a person’s
benefit from criminal conduct.
(3) The third condition is that—
(a) the disclosure is made after the alleged offender does the prohibited act,
(b) he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to make the disclosure before he did the
act, and
(c) the disclosure is made on his own initiative and as soon as it is practicable for him
to make it.
(4) An authorised disclosure is not to be taken to breach any restriction on the disclosure of
information (however imposed).
(4A) Where an authorised disclosure is made in good faith, no civil liability arises in respect
of the disclosure on the part of the person by or on whose behalf it is made.
(5) A disclosure to a nominated officer is a disclosure which—
(a) is made to a person nominated by the alleged offender’s employer to receive
authorised disclosures, and
(b) is made in the course of the alleged offender’s employment.
(6) References to the prohibited act are to an act mentioned in section 327(1), 328(1) or
339. Form and manner of disclosures

(1) The Secretary of State may by order prescribe the form and manner in which a
disclosure under section 330, 331, 332 or 338 must be made.
(1A) A person commits an offence if he makes a disclosure under section 330, 331, 332 or
338 otherwise that in the form prescribed under subsection (1) or otherwise than in the
manner so prescribed.
(1B) But a person does not commit an offence under subsection (1A) if he has a reasonable
excuse for making the disclosure otherwise than in the form prescribed under
subsection (1) or (as the case may be) otherwise than in the manner so prescribed.
(2) The power under subsection (1) to prescribe the form in which a disclosure must be
made includes power to provide for the form to include a request to a person making a
disclosure that the person provide information specified or described in the form if he
has not provided it in making the disclosure.
(3) Where under subsection (2) a request is included in a form prescribed under subsection
(1), the form must—
(a) state that there is no obligation to comply with the request, and
(b) explain the protection conferred by subsection (4) on a person who complies with
the request.
(4) A disclosure made in pursuance of a request under subsection (2) is not to be taken to
breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).
(5) ...
(6) ...
(7) Subsection (2) does not apply to a disclosure made to a nominated officer.
339ZA. Disclosures to the NCA

Where a disclosure is made under this Part to a constable or an officer of Revenue and
Customs, the constable or officer of Revenue and Customs must disclose it in full to a person
authorised for the purposes of this Part by the Director General of the National Crime Agency
a soon as practicable after it has been made.
339A. Threshold amounts

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C).
(2) The threshold amount for acts done by a deposit-taking body in operating an account is
£250 unless a higher amount is specified under the following provisions of this section
(in which event it is that higher amount).
(3) An officer of Revenue and Customs, or a constable, may specify the threshold amount
for acts done by a deposit-taking body in operating an account—
(a) when he gives consent, or gives notice refusing consent, to the deposit-taking
body’s doing of an act mentioned in section 327(1), 328(1) or 329(1) in opening,
or operating, the account or a related account; or
(b) on a request from the deposit-taking body.
(4) Where the threshold amount for acts done in operating an account is specified under
subsection (3) or this subsection, an officer of Revenue and Customs, or a constable,
may vary the amount (whether on a request from the deposit-taking body or otherwise)
by specifying a different amount.
(5) Different threshold amounts may be specified under subsections (3) and (4) for
different acts done in operating the same account.
(6) The amount specified under subsection (3) and (4) as the threshold amount for acts
done in operating an account must, when specified, not be less than the amount
specified in subsection (2).
(7) The Secretary of State may by order vary the amount for the time being specified in
subsection (2).
(8) For the purposes of this section, an account is related to another if each is maintained
with the same deposit-taking body and there is a person who, in relation to each
account, is the person or one of the persons entitled to instruct the body as respects the
operation of the account.
INTERPRETATION
340. Interpretation
(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part.
(2) Criminal conduct is conduct which—
(a) constitutes an offence in any part of the United Kingdom, or
(b) would constitute an offence in any part of the United Kingdom if it occurred there.
(3) Property is criminal property if—
(a) it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a

benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and
(b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a
benefit.
(4) It is immaterial—
(a) who carried out the conduct;
(b) who benefited from it;
(c) whether the conduct occurred before or after the passing of this Act.
(5) A person benefits from conduct if he obtains property as a result of or in connection
with the conduct.
(6) If a person obtains a pecuniary advantage as a result of or in connection with conduct,
he is to be taken to obtain as a result of or in connection with the conduct a sum of
money equal to the value of the pecuniary advantage.
(7) References to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained in connection with conduct
include references to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained in both that
connection and some other.
(8) If a person benefits from conduct his benefit is the property obtained as a result of or in
connection with the conduct.
(9) Property is all property wherever situated and includes—
(a) money;
(b) all forms of property, real or personal, heritable or moveable;
(c) things in action and other intangible or incorporeal property.
(10) The following rules apply in relation to property—
(a) property is obtained by a person if he obtains an interest in it;
(b) references to an interest, in relation to land in England and Wales or Northern
Ireland, are to any legal estate or equitable interest or power;
(c) references to an interest, in relation to land in Scotland, are to any estate, interest,
servitude or other heritable right in or over land, including a heritable security;
(d) references to an interest, in relation to property other than land, include
references to a right (including a right to possession).
(11) Money laundering is an act which—
(a) constitutes an offence under section 327, 328 or 329,
(b) constitutes an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence specified
in paragraph (a),
(c) constitutes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an
offence specified in paragraph (a), or
(d) would constitute an offence specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) if done in the
United Kingdom.
(12) For the purposes of a disclosure to a nominated officer—
(a) references to a person’s employer include any body, association or organisation
(including a voluntary organisation) in connection with whose activities the
person exercises a function (whether or not for gain or reward), and
(b) references to employment must be construed accordingly.
(13) References to a constable include references to a person authorised for the purposes of
this Part by the Director General of the National Crime Agency.
(14) ‘Deposit-taking body’ means—
(a) a business which engages in the activity of accepting deposits; or
(b) The National Savings Bank.
PART II SUMMARIES
Professional Conduct
Chapter 6: The Legal Profession
Topic Summary
Professional conduct Professional conduct is the term that is used to describe the
rules, regulations and requirements with which a solicitor
must comply. Solicitors are in a position of trust, and so a
higher standard of behaviour is expected of them than of
members of the public.
Solicitors Regulation The SRA regulates solicitors in England and Wales. It also
Authority (SRA) controls such matters as training and entry into the
profession.
The Law Society The Law Society is the representative body for solicitors in
England and Wales. Membership is voluntary, but all
solicitors (and those who are employed by them) are bound
by the requirements of professional conduct whether or not
they are members of The Law Society.
Different aspects of The legal profession is made up of a number of different types

practice of organisation. Within these organisations, there are a
number of roles that a solicitor may fill. However, most
solicitors in private practice are employed by recognised
bodies.
Chapter 7: Regulating the Profession
Topic Summary
Solicitors Regulation The SRA publishes and enforces rules and requirements
Authority (SRA) concerning how solicitors, authorised bodies and their
employees behave and conduct their business. The subject
matter of this Part is the SRA Code of Conduct 2011.
Complaints against Every firm must have a complaints handling procedure, and
solicitors must ensure that complaints are dealt with promptly, fairly,
openly and effectively (Outcome 1.11). If a complaint cannot
be resolved by the firm, the client must be given details of the
Legal Ombudsman.
Legal Ombudsman The Legal Ombudsman is the sole point of receipt for
complaints concerning services provided by solicitors and
other types of legal practitioner, and refers any allegations of
breaches of the requirements of professional conduct
concerning solicitors to the SRA.
Topic Summary
Powers of the Legal Where the Legal Ombudsman makes a determination

Ombudsman following a complaint, it has the power to order the firm of
solicitors to limit its fees, or to direct that the firm must
compensate the client up to the sum of £50,000 (plus interest)
amongst other sanctions. The Legal Ombudsman cannot pay
compensation to a client itself.
Powers of the SRA – Where a finding of professional misconduct is made, the SRA
professional may discipline the firm or regulated individual by imposing
misconduct disciplinary sanctions, or referring the matter to the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal. The SRA may also revoke or suspend
authorisation of the firm.
Solicitors Disciplinary The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal hears and determines

Tribunal applications relating to allegations of professional
misconduct. It is independent of the SRA and The Law Society.
It has the power to suspend a solicitor, to fine a solicitor an
unlimited amount and, in the most extreme cases, to strike a
solicitor off the roll – which will effectively end his career.
Negligence In addition to or instead of the actions that the SRA may take
against a solicitor, a solicitor may be sued by his client in the
tort of negligence. A solicitor owes his client a duty of care.
Where this duty is breached, and the client suffers a
foreseeable loss as a result of that breach, the solicitor may be
sued for negligence. Firms must carry compulsory indemnity
insurance against such actions.
The SRA Compensation The SRA Compensation Fund is maintained by the SRA.
Fund Payment may be made from the Fund when a client has
suffered loss as a result of a defaulting practitioner’s act or
omission.
Chapter 8: The Principles
Topic Summary
The SRA Code of The profession is regulated by the Government and by

Conduct requirements of conduct set out by the SRA.
The Principles The Principles are contained within the SRA Handbook. They
underpin all of the Handbook requirements, including the
Code of Conduct. They define the fundamental ethical and
professional standards expected of all firms and individuals
when providing legal services.
Integrity The Principles provide that a solicitor must act with integrity,
for example towards clients, the courts, lawyers and the
public. A solicitor is in a position of trust, and so must behave
in an appropriate manner to reflect that position.
Topic Summary
Best interests of clients The Principles include the solicitor’s duty to act in the best
interests of each client. This places an obligation on the
solicitor always to act in good faith, and always to do his best
for his clients.
Public confidence A solicitor must also behave in a way that maintains the trust
the public places in him and in the provision of legal services.
Therefore a solicitor must not do anything that would be likely
to damage this trust. This obligation extends to both the
solicitor’s behaviour within practice, and outside of it in his
daily life.
Breach of the Principles Where a solicitor breaches the Principles, he may well be
guilty of professional misconduct. In serious cases, this could
also lead to him being ‘struck off’ the roll of solicitors, which
would effectively end his career.
Chapter 9: Obtaining Instructions
Topic Summary
General principles A solicitors’ firm must take steps to try to maintain and
increase its market share in order to prosper. However, a
solicitor must at all times comply with the general law and the
Code of Conduct. In particular, no matter what financial
pressure he is under, a solicitor should always be independent
and impartial when giving advice to a client.
Advertising Solicitors are free to publicise their practices, provided that

they comply with the general law on advertising in force at the
time and with the Outcomes in Chapter 8 of the Code of
Conduct.
Chapter 8 Chapter 8 of the Code applies to all forms of publicity. It

provides that all publicity issued by, or on behalf of, law firms
must not be misleading or inaccurate.
Cold calling Outcome 8.3 provides that a solicitor may not cold call the
general public. However, this restriction does not apply to
contacting clients or former clients.
Referrals of business A solicitor may enter into an arrangement with a third party to
refer clients from that third party. However, such
arrangements must comply with the Outcomes in Chapter 9
of the Code.
Protection of the clients’ The clients’ interests must be protected, regardless of the
interests interests of an introducer or the solicitor’s interest in receiving
referrals (Outcome 9.2)
Solicitors’ A solicitor must not place himself in a position whereby his

independence advice to a client is affected due to an attempt not to offend a
(Outcome 9.1) referrer of work.
Topic Summary
Referral fees A solicitor may pay to or receive referral fees from a third party,
but must comply with the Outcomes in Chapter 9. For
example, clients must be informed of any financial or other
interest which an introducer has in referring the client to the
solicitor.
Fee sharing Clients must be informed of any fee-sharing arrangement that

is relevant to their matter.
Introductions to third A solicitor may wish to refer clients to third parties, such as
parties another lawyer or a financial services provider. Such
introductions must comply with the Outcomes in Chapter 6 of
the Code.
Chapter 10: The Retainer
Topic Summary
The retainer The contract between a solicitor and his client is often referred
to as a retainer. The contract is governed by the general law,
and also the requirements of professional conduct.
Acceptance and refusal When deciding whether to act or to terminate instructions,

of instructions the solicitor must comply with the law and the Code
(Outcome 1.3)
Unlawful discrimination A solicitor must not unlawfully discriminate against anyone in

the course of his professional dealings. Therefore,
discriminating unlawfully when accepting or refusing
instructions to act for a client may tend to show that the
relevant Outcomes have not been achieved (Indicative
Behaviour 2.5).
Acceptance of third It may tend to show that the solicitor has not achieved the
party instructions relevant Outcomes if he acts for a client when instructions are
given by someone else, unless he is satisfied that the person
providing the instructions has the authority to do so on behalf
of all the clients (Indicative Behaviour 1.25).
Duty to the client during A solicitor owes the client a number of duties throughout the
the retainer retainer. For example, s 13 of the Supply of Goods and
Services Act 1982 provides that a supplier of services (such as
a solicitor) will carry out those services with reasonable care
and skill.
Termination of the A client may terminate the retainer at any time and for any
retainer reason. Ceasing to act for a client without good reason and
without providing reasonable notice, may tend to show that
the relevant Outcomes have not been achieved (Indicative
Behaviour 1.26).
Topic Summary
Responsibilities on It is good practice for a solicitor to confirm to the client in

termination writing that the retainer has been terminated, and to take
steps to deal with any property of the client that may be held
by the solicitor. In certain circumstances a solicitor may
exercise a lien over the property until his fees are paid.
Chapter 11: Client Care and Costs
Topic Summary
Client care A solicitor must achieve the Outcomes on client care as

prescribed by the SRA, including treating clients fairly.
Client’s ability to make The solicitor must ensure that clients are in a position to make
informed decisions informed decisions about the services they need, how their
matter will be handled and the options available to them
(Outcome 1.12).
Protection of clients’ The solicitor must provide services in a manner that protects
interests clients’ interests in their matter, subject to the proper
administration of justice (Outcome 1.2).
Level of service The service provided to clients must be competent, delivered

in a timely manner and take account of the client’s needs and
circumstances (Outcome 1.5).
Costs information A solicitor is obliged to provide his client with the best
possible information as to the likely overall costs of a matter,
both at the time of engagement and when appropriate as the
matter progresses (Outcome 1.13).
Fee agreements A solicitor must only enter into fee agreements with clients
that are legal, and which he considers are suitable for the
client’s needs and take account of the client’s best interests
(Outcome 1.6).
Solicitor’s fees A solicitor and client may agree the level of costs that the
solicitor may charge. However, this agreement is regulated by
statute and the common law. A distinction is made between
costs in contentious matters and costs in non-contentious
matters.
Solicitor’s bill A solicitor’s bill must contain prescribed information in order

for the bill to be enforceable.
Client’s right to A client may challenge the costs of a solicitor in both

challenge the bill contentious and non-contentious matters. Generally
speaking, in both types of matters the client may apply to have
the costs assessed by the court. The client may also complain
to the firm about the level of charges under the firm’s
complaints procedure, and subsequently to the Legal
Ombudsman.
Suing on a bill Generally, a solicitor may not sue to recover his costs from the
client until one month has elapsed since the bill was delivered.
Topic Summary
Overcharging A solicitor must act in the best interests of the client and must
not take advantage of his client. Therefore a solicitor must not
overcharge for work done. Overcharging may well be
considered by the SRA as a breach of professional conduct.
Chapter 12: Confidentiality
Topic Summary
Duty of confidentiality A solicitor (and his staff) must keep the affairs of his clients
and former clients confidential except where disclosure is
required or permitted by law or the client consents (Outcome
4.1).
Overriding the duty of Information which is the subject of the duty of confidentiality
confidentiality may be disclosed as prescribed by law.
Duty of disclosure The solicitor also has a duty to disclose to the client all
information that is material to the client’s matter of which he
has personal knowledge (Outcome 4.2). The duty of
confidentiality takes precedence over the duty of disclosure
(Outcome 4.3).
Placing confidential Where a solicitors’ firm holds confidential information for one
information at risk client, it must not risk breaching confidentiality by acting for
(or continuing to act for) another client on a matter where the
information might reasonably be expected to be material, and
where the clients have an adverse interest to one another,
unless proper arrangements can be made to protect the
confidential information. These proper arrangements include
issues such as obtaining informed consent and erecting
information barriers.
Professional Even when a solicitor would be permitted to act for two clients
embarrassment on a matter pursuant to the Code, he may still have to refuse
instructions on the basis of professional embarrassment.
Privilege In addition to the duty of confidentiality, a solicitor must also

consider legal professional privilege. Where legal
professional privilege applies, a solicitor can refuse to disclose
communications between himself and a client.
Chapter 13: Conflict of Interests
Topic Summary
General principles A solicitor must not act where there is a conflict, or a

significant risk of a conflict between the interests of two or
more clients (a ‘client conflict’) (Outcome 3.5).
Topic Summary
Same or related matters The conflict of interest must arise in relation to the same
matter, or related matters. A matter will be related if it
concerns the same asset or liability. However, there would
need to be some reasonable degree of relationship for a
conflict to arise.
Former clients Due to the definition of a conflict of interest, a conflict cannot

arise with a former client. However, the solicitor may still be
prevented from acting if he holds confidential information
concerning the former client.
Exceptions Where there is a conflict between two clients, a solicitor may

act if he can satisfy the requirements of the substantially
common interest exception (Outcome 3.6) or the commercial
exception (Outcome 3.7).
Conflict between the A solicitor must not act where there is a conflict or significant
solicitor’s and client’s risk of a conflict between the client’s interests and the
interests solicitor’s interests (an ‘own interest conflict’). There are no
exceptions to this rule (Outcome 3.4).
Systems and controls for A solicitor must have in place controls to enable him to
identifying conflicts identify and assess potential conflicts of interests, and which
are appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm and to
the nature of the work undertaken (Outcomes 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3).
Chapter 14: Undertakings
Topic Summary
Definition An undertaking is a statement, given orally or in writing,

whether or not it includes the word ‘undertake’ or
‘undertaking’, made by or on behalf of a solicitor or his firm, in
the course of practice, or by him outside the course of practice
but as a solicitor or REL, to someone who reasonably places
reliance on it, that the solicitor or his firm will do something or
cause something to be done, or refrain from doing something
(Handbook Glossary). Essentially an undertaking is an
enforceable promise.
Effect and time for An undertaking is personally binding on the giver of the
performance undertaking. All undertakings must be performed within an
agreed timescale, or within a reasonable time (Outcome
11.2).
Ambiguity Any ambiguity in the wording of the undertaking is likely to be

construed against the party that gave the undertaking.
Topic Summary
Undertakings ‘on behalf It is possible for a solicitor to give an undertaking on behalf of

of a client’ a client and exclude personal liability. However, the solicitor
must clearly and expressly disclaim personal liability or make
it clear that he is simply informing the other side of his client’s
intentions.
Change of An undertaking will remain binding upon a solicitor even if the

circumstances circumstances change so that it is impossible to fulfil the
undertaking. It may tend to show that the relevant Outcomes
have been achieved in circumstances where an undertaking is
given which is dependent upon the happening of a future
event and it becomes apparent that the future event will not
occur, if the solicitor notifies the recipient of this (Indicative
Behaviour 11.6).
Effective systems to It may tend to show that the relevant Outcomes have been
record undertakings achieved if the solicitor maintains an effective system for the
recording of undertakings given and discharged (Indicative
Behaviour 11.5).
Breach Breach of an undertaking is prima facie professional

misconduct. The SRA/Legal Ombudsman/Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal do not have the power to enforce an
undertaking. However, any breach may lead to sanctions
against the solicitor concerned.
The courts The court is able to enforce an undertaking against a solicitor

as an officer of the court. Accordingly, where an undertaking
has been breached, the aggrieved party may sue the solicitor
for compensation for any loss.
Chapter 15: Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
Topic Summary
Money laundering ‘Money laundering’ is the process by which criminals seek to

alter or ‘launder’ their proceeds of crime so that it appears
that these funds come from a legitimate source. Solicitors are
often targets for criminals in their efforts to launder the
proceeds of their crimes. The Government has introduced
legislation to disrupt this process.
Money Laundering Solicitors who undertake ‘relevant business’ must comply

Regulations 2007 with the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. ‘Relevant
business’ includes the provision of legal services which
involves participation in a ‘financial or real property
transaction’, and so the vast majority of solicitors’ firms will be
subject to the Regulations.
Nominated officer Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, firms must
appoint a nominated officer, who will receive internal reports
concerning money laundering and must consider whether to
report the matter to the National Crime Agency.
Topic Summary
Arrangements A person commits an offence under s 328 of the Proceeds of

Crime Act 2002 where he becomes concerned with an
arrangement involving money laundering. However, s 328
does not apply to steps taken in litigation. An individual
convicted under s 328 may receive a maximum sentence of 14
years’ imprisonment.
Acquisition, use or A person commits an offence under s 329 of the Proceeds of

possession Crime Act 2002 if he acquires, uses or has possession of
criminal property. The adequate consideration defence may
be available to a solicitor in relation to money received for or
on account of costs from a client.
Failure to disclose A solicitor within the regulated sector is obliged to disclose

any suspected money laundering activity to his nominated
officer (s 330). Failure to do so may result in a maximum
sentence of five years’ imprisonment.
Tipping off It is an offence to disclose to any person that a disclosure has

been made to a nominated officer or the National Crime
Agency where this disclosure may prejudice an investigation
(ss 333A–333D), or that an investigation into money
laundering is being carried out or contemplated. An
individual convicted under ss 333A–333D may receive a
maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Chapter 16: Duties Owed to the Court and Third Parties
Misleading or A solicitor is under a duty never to mislead or Outcomes

deceiving the deceive the court or be complicit in another 5.1 and 5.2
court and person’s misleading or deceiving the court.
contempt A solicitor must also comply with any orders of the Outcomes
court, and must not become in contempt of court. 5.3 and 5.4
Witnesses A solicitor must not make (or offer to make) Outcome

payments to witnesses dependent upon the nature 5.8
of the evidence given, or on the outcome of the case.
Duty to the court Where relevant, clients must be informed of the Outcomes
circumstances in which a solicitor’s duties to the 5.5 and 5.6
court outweigh his obligations to the client. A
solicitor must comply with his duties to the court.
Instructing A solicitor must act in the best interests of his client.

counsel Accordingly, if it is in the client’s best interests to
instruct counsel, the solicitor must ensure that
adequate instructions are provided to the chosen
barrister. Instructing counsel does not relieve the
solicitor of his duties towards his client, particularly
the duty to act in the client’s best interests.
Duty to third A solicitor must not take an unfair advantage of any Outcome
parties person, either for the solicitor’s own benefit or for 11.1
another person’s benefit (such as the client).
Particular care should be taken when dealing with
unrepresented third parties.
Recovering A solicitor must not demand anything from a third

costs party which is not legally recoverable.
Represented Subject to limited exceptions, it may tend to show Indicative

third parties that the Outcomes have been achieved by a solicitor Behaviour
ensuring that he does not communicate directly 11.4
with third parties where the solicitor knows that the
third party has instructed a legal representative.
Beneficiaries In certain circumstances, a solicitor owes a duty of

care to third parties, such as beneficiaries. If this
duty is breached, the solicitor may be sued by the
third party.
Dealings with A solicitor must act with integrity. Therefore a Principle 2

other solicitors solicitor must treat other solicitors with due respect
in all their communications.
Chapter 17: Financial Services
Topic Summary
General Section 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000
prohibition provides that ‘no person may carry on a regulated activity in the UK
unless authorised or exempt’.
Regulated A person carries out a regulated activity when, while in business, he

activity carries out a specified investment activity in relation to a specified
investment or a specified activity related to information about a person’s
financial standing or the setting of a specified benchmark, and cannot
take advantage of an exclusion.
Specified Specified investments include company stocks and shares, debentures,

investment unit trusts, insurance contracts and mortgages.
Specified Specified investment activities include advising, arranging, dealing as

investment agent, managing and safeguarding.
activities
Exclusions Numerous exclusions exist, such as the authorised third party exclusion.
Each exclusion has different conditions and restrictions. If a solicitor can
take advantage of an exclusion, he will not be carrying out a regulated
activity.
Topic Summary
Exempt As an alternative to using an exclusion, a firm may seek to use the s 327
regulated exemption to avoid breaching the general prohibition. Once again, a
activities number of conditions must be satisfied. These include that the activity
the firm carries out must be incidental to the provision of legal services
by the firm. The firm must also comply with the Scope and COB Rules.
Financial A solicitor who is not authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority is

promotions unable to make a financial promotion unless its contents are approved
by an authorised or exempt person (FSMA 2000, s 21). Once again, this
prohibition is subject to exclusions.
Chapter 18: Requirements of Practice
SRA Suitability Those intending to become solicitors, authorised

Test 2011 role holders and former solicitors seeking
restoration to the roll of solicitors must satisfy the
SRA Suitability Test 2011. Certain behaviour will
result in an application being refused by the SRA,
unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Requirement to No person may act as a solicitor unless he has been Solicitors

hold a practising admitted as a solicitor, his name is on the roll of Act 1974, s 1
certificate solicitors, and he holds a current practising
certificate.
Practising Practising certificates are issued annually by the

certificates SRA, which has a certain level of discretion as to
whether to issue a certificate to a particular person.
In certain circumstances the SRA may decline to
issue a certificate or may impose conditions on the
certificate.
Suspension of A practising certificate is automatically suspended

practising where a bankruptcy order is made against the
certificate solicitor concerned. The SRA may also suspend a
practising certificate if the solicitor is convicted of a
crime involving dishonesty or deception.
Additional Solicitors who wish to exercise higher rights of

practising audience and carry out criminal advocacy must
requirements comply with additional SRA requirements.
Accountants’ All solicitors who hold a practising certificate and

reports also hold client monies must obtain an
independent accountant’s report each year. The
purpose of the report is to certify compliance with
the SRA Accounts Rules. One report may be
obtained for a firm as a whole.
Indemnity The Solicitors Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013

insurance require solicitors to take out compulsory insurance
cover against the risks of professional negligence or
other civil liability claims. Firms can insure with any
approved commercial insurer. Relevant recognised
and licensed bodies must obtain cover to a
minimum of £3 million per individual claim (a
minimum of £2 million in all other cases). Voluntary
top-up cover may be required.
Responsibility of Managers must ensure that their firm complies with

managers the requirements of professional conduct. In
certain cases, managers will be held liable for any
breach.
Supervision At least one lawyer manager of every authorised SRA Practice

body must be ‘qualified to supervise’. This means Framework
that he must have been entitled to practise as a Rules 2011
lawyer for at least 36 months within the last 10
years, and must have completed at least 12 hours of
training on management skills.
Regardless of whether they are ‘qualified to
supervise’, managers are obliged to make
arrangements for the effective management of the
firm.
Duty to the SRA A solicitor is under a duty to cooperate with the SRA Outcome
and the Legal and the Legal Ombudsman at all times. 10.6
Ombudsman
Reporting A solicitor is obliged to report to the SRA any Outcome

serious incident of serious misconduct by any person or 10.4
misconduct firm authorised by the SRA, or any employee,
manager or owner of any such firm.
243
PART III
EU LAW
Sources of EU Law 245
CHAPTER 19
Sources of EU Law

19.2 Background 245
19.3 The Treaties 246
19.4 Regulations 249
19.5 Directives 249
19.6 The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 249
19.7 Other EU measures 250
19.8 Conclusion 250
19.9 Overview of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 250
19.10 Conversion table – notable Article numbers 251
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• what types of EU legislation there are
• the various treaties which have developed EU law
• the status of the decisions of the Court of Justice
• the key elements of the latest EU Treaty.
19.1 INTRODUCTION
The UK in 2016 voted to leave the EU. As the mechanics of leaving will take many months, EU
law will remain binding on the UK in the meantime. It is unclear at the time of writing to what
extent the UK and EU will make agreement for the free movement of persons, capital and
trade once the UK leaves, but it is possible that some of the Treaty Articles discussed in the
following chapters will remain enforceable in UK courts.
Even if no such agreement is made, EU law will in any event continue to be important for
many UK lawyers, as their clients will often be multinational and/or operate within Europe.
Even if advising clients which operate solely within the UK, lawyers will often deal with UK
laws which have been influenced by EU principles in their drafting. It is important therefore
that you gain a sound understanding of principles of EU law despite the UK’s decision to leave
the EU.
19.2 BACKGROUND
The Treaty on European Union (the ‘Maastricht Treaty’) took Europe into a new stage of
development, with more ambitious objectives, in order, in the words of the preamble to the
Treaty, ‘to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.
This drive towards a closer union continued with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice
and the Treaty of Lisbon, all of which made amendments to (rather than replaced) the original
EC Treaty (the Treaty of Rome 1957) and the Treaty on European Union. The Treaty on
European Union retains its original name, but the EC Treaty, post-Lisbon, is now called the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It should be noted that Articles of
the EC Treaty which survived Lisbon are numbered differently in the TFEU – see 19.10.
Post-Lisbon, the European Court of Justice was renamed the Court of Justice, and the court
below it (the Court of First Instance) was renamed the General Court. Perhaps confusingly,
the two courts together form an institution called the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU). Most decisions that you will look at as a lawyer will be of the (higher) Court of Justice,
although commentators are likely to continue calling it the European Court of Justice (or ECJ)
for some time.
The sources of EU law are:
(a) the Treaties;
(b) Regulations;
(c) Directives;
(d) the jurisprudence of the CJEU (and its predecessors).
Regulations and Directives are secondary legislation made under Article 288 TFEU. How
these sources of law become part of English law will be discussed in Chapter 21.
Article 288 TFEU also provides for the making of Decisions, Recommendations and
Opinions. Of these, only Decisions are legally binding, and they bind only the person
(Member State, company or individual) to whom they are addressed.
The Court of Justice has been highly influential in developing both substantive areas of EU law
(eg, the free movement of goods) and general principles of EU law, such as proportionality.
19.3 THE TREATIES

19.3.1 The Treaty of Rome 1957
The primary aim of the Treaty of Rome (‘the EEC Treaty’) was to create a European Economic
Community, a common market, for the original six signatories: France, West Germany, Italy,
The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. This common market required not only the
abolition of customs duties and quotas for goods passing between the six, but also a
recognition on the part of the Member States that their populations had a right to share
directly in the benefits of the new system. In particular, the Member States had to recognise
the right of workers to move freely throughout the Community, and the right of individuals
and companies to set up in business or to provide services throughout the Community.
From its very beginning, it was apparent that the Community was more than a mere free trade
zone. One of the stated objectives in the preamble to the Treaty was ‘to lay the foundations of
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. It is also central to an understanding of
the Treaty to remember that it created supra-national institutions, not least the Court of
Justice (see Chapter 20). The result was, in the words of the Court itself in Van Gend en Loos v
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 1, a ‘new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals’ (see Chapter
21).
The most important provisions, as far as the achievement of a common market is concerned,
are those dealing with free movement, in particular of goods, persons and services, and
competition law. These will be considered at Chapters 23–26.
19.3.2 The Merger Treaty 1965

Since the Treaty of Paris 1951, there had existed a European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), created by the original six signatories of the Treaty of Rome. That Treaty had also
established supra-national institutions, including a High Authority, the equivalent of the EC
Commission.
In 1957, at the same time as the European Economic Community was established, the same
signatories created the European Atomic Energy Community (EurAtom). The European
Economic Community and EurAtom shared with the ECSC only the Court and the Assembly
set up under the Treaty of Paris. In 1965, the institutions of the three Communities were
merged. The Merger Treaty is therefore concerned with their integration within a single
organisational structure.
19.3.3 The Accession Treaties

In 1973, the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark joined the Community, followed in 1981
by Greece and in 1986 by Spain and Portugal. Sweden, Finland and Austria joined on 1 January
1995. The European Union welcomed 10 new countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and
Romania joined on 1 January 2007, and Croatia joined on 1 July 2013, bringing the total number
of Member States to 28. Current candidate countries at the time of writing are: Albania, Iceland,
Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; and potential
candidates are Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. No date has yet been set for their accession.
19.3.4 The Single European Act 1986

The Single European Act 1986 saw further significant developments in the Community. It
formalised as an objective the completion of the single European market envisaged in the EC
Treaty, and set a date for its achievement: 31 December 1992. This required enormous
legislative activity by the Community in an attempt to overcome remaining barriers to trade,
not least the problem of varying trading standards. In order to make this a manageable task,
the Single European Act introduced a streamlined legislative process. When single market
measures came to the Council for approval, unanimity was not to be required. Instead, only a
qualified majority would be needed (see Chapter 20). The Single European Act also extended
the areas which would be expressly within the Community’s competence, including areas
such as the environment and the health and safety of workers.
19.3.5 The European Economic Area Treaty 1992

The effect of the European Economic Area Treaty was to create a ‘European Economic Area’
(EEA) consisting of the Member States of the EC and the European Free Trade Agreement
(EFTA) countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria and Iceland, but not Switzerland which
decided in referendum not to ratify the Treaty). Within this area, EC law relating to free
movement and to competition law applies, together with all the related Regulations and
Directives. The EEA came into effect on 1 January 1994. However, on 1 January 1995, Sweden,
Finland and Austria all joined the European Union, leaving just Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein as members of the EEA but not of the EU. Switzerland remains in EFTA.
19.3.6 The Treaty on European Union 1992 (‘the Maastricht Treaty’)

The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed at Maastricht, came into force on 1 November
1993. It officially renamed the ‘EEC’ the ‘EC’ and founded, on the base of the European
Community, a European Union. It also renamed the Treaty of Rome the EC Treaty. It made a
number of important amendments to the Treaty, in particular:
(a) the EC undertook to act in any given area only if Community action was a better means
of achieving the desired end than action by the individual Member States (the principle
of subsidiarity);
(b) every EC national became a citizen of the European Union;
(c) the EC specifically assumed responsibility for developing policies in areas such as
public health, consumer protection and education. These had previously been dealt
with primarily as issues affecting free movement;
(d) the European Parliament was given greater powers (co-decision));
(e) the Council was to take decisions on a qualified majority basis on a wider range of
matters, such as consumer protection, using the co-decision procedure.
The Maastricht Treaty did not just amend the Treaty of Rome. It also set out Union objectives,
the most important being the promotion of economic and social progress to be achieved by
economic and monetary union. The Union also agreed to develop a common foreign and
security policy, and to cooperate in the fields of justice and home affairs. Importantly, the
Union also undertook expressly to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. Previous
European Court case law had already shown, however, that Member States must respect
human rights law when acting on a Community matter.
19.3.7 The Amsterdam Treaty

The Amsterdam Treaty entered into force at the beginning of May 1999. The Treaty paved the
way for EU enlargement. It also provided for greater cooperation in employment matters and
for incentive measures to help boost employment. It incorporated into the EC the TEU Social
Chapter, which means that all Member States are bound by its provisions. The Treaty also
established a new section on freedom, security and justice, which brings some areas into the
framework of the EC Treaty from the ‘third pillar’ (Justice and Home Affairs) of the Maastricht
Treaty. It also strengthened provisions relating to environmental protection. There was a
strengthening of public health and consumer protection, and the principle of subsidiarity was
clarified. Lastly, there was an increase in the number of matters to be decided under qualified
majority rules and a substantial increase in the use of the co-decision procedure (see 20.4.2).
In the TEU, there is a revised section on common foreign and security policy.
19.3.8 The Treaty of Nice

The Treaty of Nice came into force on 1 February 2003 and made changes to the Institutions
of the Community with a view to accommodating enlargement. In particular it reduced the
number of decisions where a power of veto may be used in the Council. This was felt necessary
due to its being less likely that unanimous agreement might be reached with an increased
number of countries. In addition, a change was made in the weighting of the votes which each
country has in Council meetings. The Treaty also made numerical changes to the Parliament
and the Commission, with each Member State having only one Commissioner each.
19.3.9 The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon brought to an end several years of negotiation about institutional issues.
Its main highlights include:
(a) the European Council (a body composed of the leaders of the Member States) became a
formal EU institution, with an independent President;
(b) the European Parliament became an equal co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in
the vast majority of cases;
(c) national vetoes were removed in a number of areas, including fighting climate change,
energy security and emergency aid;
(d) EU competencies widened to cover areas which were previously the realm of Member
States, eg international trade, energy policies, judicial and police cooperation;
(e) the European Union became a single organisation; there is no longer a European
Community. This means that it is no longer correct to speak of EC law; rather, it should
be referred to as EU law;
(f ) voting weights between the Member States in the Council of Ministers will be adjusted
between 2014 and 2017: qualified majority voting will be based on a ‘double majority’ of
55% of Member States’ votes, accounting for 65% of the EU’s population.
19.4 REGULATIONS
Article 288 TFEU envisages that secondary legislation is needed to put its broad objectives
into effect. It provides that the Council and the Commission ‘shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty make Regulations … ’. It goes on to state that a Regulation shall have
general application (ie, it will apply throughout the EU in exactly the terms in which it is
made). Further, Article 288 TFEU states that a Regulation shall be directly applicable in all
Member States, ie no Member State need pass any implementing measure to make the
contents of the Regulation form part of its own national law, except in the unusual situation
when the Regulation itself expressly requires the Member State to do so. In fact, according to
the European Court in Variola sPA v Amministrazione Italiana della Finanze [1973] ECR 981, it
would ordinarily be wrong for a Member State to disguise the EU origin of the measure by
introducing national legislation to enact it.
Many important EU legal measures have taken the form of Regulations, for example,
Regulation 1612/68, which sought to make a reality of the free movement of workers
provisions in the Treaty, and the Merger Regulation, Regulation 4064/89, under which big
multi-national mergers are vetted by the Commission for their effect on competition.
19.5 DIRECTIVES
Article 288 TFEU also gives the Council and the Commission power to issue Directives. It is
clear from that Article, however, that their legal effect is quite different from that of
Regulations. A Directive is stated to be ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods’. Unlike Regulations, Directives therefore do need a response from each
Member State. Unless the national law of the Member State already achieves the objective of
the Directive, the Member State must implement it within the specified time-limit. The form
of implementing measure may vary from State to State, as may the precise words used to give
effect to the Directive. This means that, unlike Regulations, Directives are not of general
application throughout the EU in the terms in which they are drafted. Typical UK
implementing measures are statutes and statutory instruments.
Directives have been issued across a wide range of areas, for example, Directive 2006/54,
known as the Equal Treatment Directive, the several Company Law Directives, the
Environmental Protection Directive (85/337) and the Product Liability Directive (85/374). In
order to bring the Single Market into being, the Commission drafted over 200 separate
Directives.
19.6 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE

The fundamental principles of EU law found in the TFEU and earlier versions of it are set out
in outline only, so the Court has inevitably played a leading role in developing EU law. The
Court has not been reluctant to assume this role and has made a major contribution to the
evolution of the EU. By interpreting the Treaty and secondary legislation according to the
overall purposes of the EU, the Court has often pushed governments further than they might
have initially intended to go.
Judgments of the Court are now vital to an understanding of the freedoms upon which the EU
is based and to the principles of competition law (another major field of EU activity). In
addition, the Court has developed certain general principles of EU law, of which the most
important are proportionality (see Chapter 25), legal certainty and respect for fundamental
rights (see Chapter 27). As far as the last of these is concerned, the Court’s approach can be
seen in Nold ( J) KG v EC Commission [1974] ECR 491, where it stated that fundamental rights,
derived from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the
international treaties to which they are signatories (in particular, the European Convention on
Human Rights), form an integral part of the general principles of EU law.
In applying ‘legal certainty’ the Court has sometimes ruled that its more surprising
interpretations of the Treaty should be non-retrospective, for example in Defrenne (Gabrielle) v
SABENA [1976] ECR 455 and Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1991] 1 QB 344
(see 21.3.1) where direct claims for equal pay and equal pensions were allowed under what is
now Article 157 TFEU. To have held otherwise would have had serious financial consequences
in the Member States. Ordinarily, Court judgments are retrospective, ie they go back to the
date of the original legislation that the Court is interpreting.
19.7 OTHER EU MEASURES

Apart from the measures already indicated, there exist two other EU measures which have
only limited legal effect under Article 288 TFEU.
Decisions are binding only on the parties to whom the Decisions are addressed (Article 288
TFEU). The best examples are Commission Decisions under the competition rules in Articles
101 and 102 TFEU. Their Decisions that an agreement or conduct infringes Article 101 or 102
TFEU, that an exemption should be given under Article 101(3) TFEU, or that fines be imposed
are all subject to review by the General Court. Subject to this, they bind the parties and must
be given effect by national courts. Thus, a Decision that an agreement is exempt will (subject
to review) validate the agreement before a national court.
The least effective measure of all is a Council Recommendation. This is certainly not legally
binding and cannot create any Community rights, but is still worth referring to as ‘persuasive
opinion’ on a particular issue. A good example is the Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment
set out at [1992] OJ L49/1. This can be referred to for guidance to determine whether
employers who have allowed such conduct are guilty of sex discrimination under the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 (see Wadman v Carpenter Farrer Partnership [1993] 3 CMLR 93 (EAT)).
19.8 CONCLUSION
If a client has a problem which has an EU dimension, this could be because it clearly raises
questions of substantive EU law, perhaps in relation to one of the freedoms such as free
movement of goods or workers. In this case, a solicitor must, of course, pay careful attention
to the TFEU itself. It will often be necessary to look at the secondary legislation which
supplements that particular area of the Treaty, as well as at decided cases on the subject.
On the other hand, a client’s problem may have an EU aspect because of the ever-increasing
pervasiveness of EU law: for example, a business client may be concerned about the
significance of the recent Directives on workplace safety. In this case, a detailed consideration
of the relevant legislation will be vital, including an appreciation of how it can interact with
relevant domestic law (see further Chapter 21).
For information as to how to research a problem of EU law and how to use the possible
sources, see Chapter 7 of Skills for Lawyers.
19.9 OVERVIEW OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION
(1) To create the internal market, the TFEU guarantees four freedoms:
(a) free movement of goods (Articles 34–36 TFEU);
(b) free movement of services (Article 56 TFEU);
(c) free movement of persons, ie workers (Article 45 TFEU) and firms (Article 49
TFEU right of establishment);
(d) free movement of capital (Articles 63–66 TFEU).
(2) To create the customs union, it imposes a common external tariff and prohibits internal
custom duties (Article 30 TFEU).
(3) To prevent distortion in the market, it:

(a) prohibits anti-competitive practices by undertakings (Articles 101, 102 TFEU);
(b) prohibits discrimination against EU nationals, both generally (Article 18 TFEU)
and under particular Articles (eg, on free movement), or through indirect taxes
(Article 110 TFEU);
(c) guarantees equal pay between men and women (Article 157 TFEU).
19.10 CONVERSION TABLE – NOTABLE ARTICLE NUMBERS

Pre-Amsterdam Post-Amsterdam Post-Lisbon
Article 5 (State obligations) Article 10 Article 4(3) TEU
Article 30 (goods) Article 28 Article 34 TFEU
Article 36 (goods – excl) Article 30 Article 36 TFEU
Article 48 (workers) Article 39 Article 45 TFEU
Article 52 (establishment) Article 43 Article 49 TFEU
Article 59 (services) Article 49 Article 56 TFEU
Article 85 (competition) Article 81 Article 101 TFEU
Article 86 (competition) Article 82 Article 102 TFEU
Article 119 (sex discrimination) Article 141 Article 157 TFEU
Article 177 (references) Article 234 Article 267 TFEU
The Institutions 253
CHAPTER 20
The Institutions

20.2 The Council 253
20.3 The European Council 254
20.4 The European Commission 254
20.5 The Parliament 255
20.6 The Court of Justice 256
20.7 The General Court 257
20.8 The Court of Auditors 257
20.9 The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 258
20.10 The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 258
20.11 The Committee of the Regions 258
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• the identity of the various institutions which make up the EU
• their composition
• their roles
• how they work together to create EU legislation.
20.1 INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Rome established the following institutions of the Community (now ‘Union’):
(a) the Council;
(b) the Commission;
(c) the Parliament;
(d) the Court.
The Single European Act created the Court of First Instance. This was renamed ‘the General
Court’ by the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty on European Union made the already existing Court
of Auditors into a fifth institution. Although they do not have the status of institutions,
mention will be made below of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the
Economic and Social Council and the Committee of the Regions (see 20.9–20.11). There will
also be a brief explanation of how EU law is made.
The Treaty of Lisbon made the European Council a formal institution for the first time.
20.2 THE COUNCIL

20.2.1 What is its membership?
The Council consists of one government representative from each Member State. The
representative need not be the same person at every Council meeting: it depends on the
matters on the agenda at that particular meeting. If, for example, the Council were discussing
the environment, the representatives would be the ministers responsible for the environment.
The Heads of State meet as a separate body – the European Council.
Each Member State takes it in turn to be the President of the Council; the Presidency rotates
every six months.
20.2.2 What is its role?

The Treaty of Rome gave the Council responsibility for ensuring that the Treaty’s objectives
were attained. The Council ensures the coordination of policies and, above all, takes decisions
within the Union. This means that it is the Council, acting with the Parliament, rather than
the Commission which is responsible for the final decision as to whether a Regulation should
be made or a Directive should be issued, although the Commission does have some decision-
making powers (see 20.4).
20.2.3 How does it take decisions?

After the Treaty of Lisbon, almost all policy areas are decided by qualified majority vote. A
qualified majority is obtained when at least 55% of Member States, comprising at least 65% of
EU citizens, vote in favour of a proposal. This does not apply, however, when the Council votes
on a matter not proposed by the Commission, where 72% of Member States must vote in
favour (while the population requirement remains the same).
Clearly, the population threshold has an element of weighted voting in it, with the larger
nations being able to contribute bigger populations to the calculation. For example, Germany
has 16.5% of the EU’s population within her borders, giving Germany a greater say under this
new system.
20.3 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States,
together with its President and the President of the Commission.

The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European
Union. However, it does not exercise legislative functions. It meets twice every six months
and, except where the Treaties provide otherwise, its decisions are by consensus. In some
cases, however, the Treaties provide for the European Council to adopt decisions by
unanimity or by qualified majority.
Article 15 TEU requires the President of the European Council to:
(a) chair it and drive forward its work;
(b) ensure the preparation and continuity of its work;
(c) endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within it; and
(d) present a report to the European Parliament after every European Council meeting.
20.4 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

There are 28 EU Commissioners, one from each Member State, each of whom is responsible
for a particular area of Union competence. The Commission is divided into 23 Directorates-
General which are responsible for such matters as the environment (Directorate-General XI)
and competition law (Directorate-General IV). The Commissioners are appointed by the
Council (ie effectively by the Member States), but once appointed they must be independent
of national loyalties. They cannot be recalled by their appointing State. They hold office for a
fixed term of five years, although this is subject to renewal. Each Commissioner’s
appointment must be approved by all Member States and, since Amsterdam, by the President
and by the European Parliament. The President of the Commission is appointed by the
Council and the European Parliament. The appointment is for a fixed term of two years,
although this also is renewable. The Commission is based in Brussels.

The Treaty of Rome required the Commission to pursue infringements of EU law. It can, for
example, take action before the European Court against Member States who breach EU law. It
is also responsible for enforcing EU competition policy and has the power to exact fines for
any breach. Above all, however, the Commission is responsible for initiating EU policy and
legislation. It has some delegated powers of law making, particularly in the field of
competition law, where (under the authority of an enabling Council Regulation 19/65) it has
issued Block Exemption Regulations (see Chapter 26).
20.4.3 How does it reach its decisions?

Within the Commission, decisions are taken on a simple majority basis.
20.5 THE PARLIAMENT

There are 751 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (750 plus a President). All MEPs
are directly elected, although the voting systems throughout the Union are not uniform. The
number of MEPs which each State has is set by the Council and the Parliament itself. A draft
decision fixing the numbers was annexed to the TFEU. Numbers per State are roughly in line
with the size of the State, eg Germany was allocated 96 seats, France 74, the UK 73 and so on,
down to Malta with 6 seats.
The MEPs sit in the Parliament according to their political sympathies (political groups)
rather than according to national origin. MEPs are elected for a five-year term. The Parliament
holds plenary sessions in Strasbourg for one week per month. Much of its work is, however,
done in committees (and plenary sessions) in Brussels. It is organised by an Executive
(including a President, ie Speaker) based in Luxembourg.

The Parliament’s role was traditionally a consultative one. In a number of areas, the Treaty of
Rome provided that once the Commission had initiated a proposal for legislation and the
Council had given its preliminary approval to it, the Parliament had to be given an
opportunity to comment. It had to respond to the proposal within a reasonable time and the
Council had to take its responses into account, although it was not bound by them.
The Single European Act developed the role of the Parliament by introducing a co-operation
procedure in certain areas, for example single market legislation. This meant that if the
Council did not wish to accept the Parliament’s comments, the Parliament had to be given a
second opportunity to respond. If it continued to object to the Council’s version of the
measure, the Council could adopt it in its original form only if it did so unanimously within
three months. The Single European Act also increased the number of matters on which the
Parliament had to be consulted so as to include most matters relating to the single market.
The Treaty on European Union further increased the role of the Parliament. In certain limited
areas it introduced a ‘co-decision’ procedure which involved the Parliament further in the
legislative process. If the Parliament proposed amendments to draft legislation and these
amendments were not accepted by the Council, the Parliament could veto the legislation. This
procedure applied to measures intended to develop the single market.
The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties greatly extended the areas in which the co-decision
procedure was used. They also streamlined this procedure.
The Treaty of Lisbon made further changes, so that virtually all decisions are now made under
the co-decision procedure. It also renamed this procedure the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’.
Consequently, the Parliament’s role has increased greatly over the years, from a simple
consultative role to being a major part of the decision-making process. Today, almost all
Regulations and Directive require Parliament’s approval or they do not become law.
The Parliament has the right to ask questions of the Commission and, in the last resort, it has
the power to remove the whole Commission, though not individual Commissioners. (This
almost happened at the beginning of 1999. The Commission actually resigned around four
weeks after the threat of censure.) The Council, too, must report to the Parliament.
20.6 THE COURT OF JUSTICE

There are currently 28 judges of the Court of Justice (one from each Member State), each of
whom must be eligible for appointment to the highest judicial office in the country from
which he or she comes. There must be at least one judge from each Member State. Each judge
is appointed for six years at a time. Their appointments are staggered, so they do not all retire
at once. There is no retirement age for a judge, nor can one be recalled by the Member State
which made the appointment. He or she can be removed only by the unanimous resolution of
the other judges and Advocates-General. The judges elect one of their number to be President
of the Court for a three-year term.
In addition to the judges, there are also nine Advocates-General. Their task is to assist the
judges in reaching their decisions. One Advocate-General will be assigned to each case, and
will hear the evidence and read the papers available to the Court. He will then prepare a
reasoned opinion indicating the conclusion to which he would come in that case. The Court is
not bound to follow that opinion. When the case is reported, the Advocate-General’s opinion
is reported, together with the decision of the Court. The Court sits in Luxembourg.

The Treaty of Rome required the Court to ensure that EC law (now EU law) is observed
throughout the EU. The three usual ways in which a case may come before it are:
(a) as a result of a reference by a national court under the Article 267 TFEU preliminary
rulings procedure (see 21.7);
(b) as a result of an action brought by the Commission against a Member State pursuant to
its powers under Article 258 TFEU;
(c) as a result of an action brought by one Member State against another under Article 259
TFEU.
If a Member State fails to comply with a judgment of the Court of Justice, the Treaty on
European Union allows the Court to impose a fine on that Member State.
20.6.3 How are such cases heard?

The Court of Justice usually sits in chambers and consists of three, five or seven judges. In
particularly important cases, 13 judges will hear the case. In very rare situations, they can sit
as a full court. The procedure is largely by means of written submissions, following a typical
civil law (as distinct from common law) pattern. There is very limited scope for oral argument.
Barristers and solicitors have a right of audience before the Court, although if a solicitor
wishes to appear in the Court following an Article 267 TFEU reference (see 21.7) he may do so
only if he had a right of audience before the court or tribunal which made the reference.
The working language of the court during deliberations is French, although, at hearings, the
parties present their arguments in their own language (with simultaneous translation). Each
case will have its own official language. One judge (le juge rapporteur) puts together a draft
judgment synthesising judicial opinions on which the judges then vote.
When the Court has reached a decision, it delivers a single, succinct judgment. No dissenting
judgments are delivered.
20.6.4 The nature of EU legal reasoning

The Treaty of Rome was drafted by States which shared a civil law heritage. The original
judges of the Court of Justice had been trained in civil law systems which, although they might
diverge significantly in their substantive provisions, shared a similar approach to legal
reasoning. In particular, such judges were familiar with legislation which provided a
framework of principles and which was not intended to be interpreted in an exclusively literal
way. They were therefore accustomed to drawing inspiration from the spirit behind
legislation. This approach was particularly necessary when interpreting the Treaty of Rome,
which is very much a framework treaty. In addition, the early judges of the Court were
conscious of the role entrusted to them by the Treaty and the accompanying responsibility to
ensure that EC law (now EU law) was a uniform body of legal principles which took effect in
the same way throughout the entire Community.
Thus, from a very early stage, it is possible to recognise the purposive (or ‘teleological’)
approach adopted by the Court of Justice. This entailed the Court interpreting the Treaty of
Rome, and later subordinate legislation, in accordance with the ethos of the Treaty of Rome.
In doing so it had to bear in mind the fundamental freedoms upon which the Community was
expressly stated to be based and, in particular, Article 12 EC (now Article 18 TFEU), which
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
20.6.5 Precedent
In accordance with the civil law tradition, there is no use of precedent as such in the Court of
Justice. However, although the Court is not bound by its own previous decisions, it has tended
to develop a body of consistent case law. The Court may cite earlier cases in its judgment, and
the Advocate-General is likely to discuss earlier decisions in his opinion.
Decisions of the Court are reported in an official set of reports, the European Court Reports
(ECR). There is also a commercial series of reports called the Common Market Law Reports
(CMLR).
20.7 THE GENERAL COURT

The Court of First Instance (CFI) was established by the Single European Act because of the
heavy work-load faced by the Court of Justice. Many of the cases before the Court of Justice
concerned disputes between Community institutions and their employees. These staff cases
were assigned to the CFI, as were competition law cases (ie, appeals from Commission
decisions banning agreements, imposing fines, etc). As a result of provisions in the Treaty on
European Union, the Council transferred to the CFI all of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction
apart from most preliminary references and cases involving infringement proceedings against
Member States. Appeals on points of law lay to the Court of Justice itself. The Treaty of Nice
contained provisions for the CFI to share more of the Court of Justice’s workload.
The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the CFI ‘the General Court’, but otherwise made few changes to
its role and the way it operates.
20.8 THE COURT OF AUDITORS

The Court of Auditors is responsible for auditing the accounts of the EU and its institutions. It
has 28 members appointed by the Council.
20.9 THE COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES (COREPER)

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) was created by the Merger Treaty.
It comprises ambassadors of the Member States. They undertake much of the detailed
analysis of Commission proposals on behalf of the Council. If COREPER can agree a response
to such a proposal, that response will be automatically approved by the Council. Only if there
is disagreement at COREPER level will a matter be actively discussed in the Council.
20.10 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ESC)

The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is a body which comprises representatives of
different sectional interests throughout the EU. There are 353 representatives, for example, of
business, of the trade unions and of consumers. The ESC’s role is purely consultative.
20.11 THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

The role of this Committee is purely advisory. It consists of 353 members appointed by the
Council.
SUMMARY
The four main institutions have the following primary responsibilities:
(1) the Commission develops policy and proposes legislation;
(2) the Council and the Parliament are the decision-making bodies;
(3) the Court ensures that the law which emerges from these three institutions is
interpreted correctly and consistently.
The Relationship Between EU Law and National Law 259
CHAPTER 21
The Relationship Between

EU Law and National Law

21.2 EU law and the EU citizen 259
21.3 The concept of direct effect 260
21.4 The supremacy of EU law 262
21.5 The concept of indirect effect 262
21.6 Action against a State for failure to implement a Directive 263
21.7 Article 267 TFEU reference procedure 264
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• what it means to be an EU citizen
• how EU laws can be applied directly in court
• how national courts can take EU law into account in making decisions
• which law has priority where there is a conflict between EU law and national law
• how courts resolve doubts about the meaning of EU law.
21.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary source of EU law is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Under English law, international treaties are not automatically part of national law, so when
the UK joined the (then) EC, the Treaty of Rome (as it was then known) had to be
incorporated into English law. This was done by the European Communities Act 1972.
However, the interrelationship between the EU and the national legal system is not entirely
the product of national statute. If it were, there might be a diversity of approach to EU law in
the various Member States. The Court of Justice has instead developed two key concepts:
(a) that EU law can, in certain circumstances, be relied on directly in national proceedings;
and
(b) that, when it is utilised, it takes priority over any conflicting national law.
Taken together, these two concepts can give a client a right of action and a remedy which
otherwise might not be available under national law.
21.2 EU LAW AND THE EU CITIZEN

European Union law, as incorporated into English law by the European Communities Act
1972 (ECA 1972), may have two possible effects on the citizen. First, it may have ‘direct effect’
(see 21.3), ie it can create rights which may be relied on in national courts directly against the
State or another legal person. Secondly, EU law (in particular, Directives) may have ‘indirect
effect’ (see 21.5) in that courts should comply with EU law when interpreting national
legislation.
21.3 THE CONCEPT OF DIRECT EFFECT

In Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 1 (see 22.2.1), the Court of
Justice recognised the existence of the Community as a ‘new legal order’. In that case, an
importer of goods from Germany into The Netherlands argued that Article 12 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 30 TFEU), which prohibited any increase in customs tariffs for goods passing
from one Member State to another, meant that a reclassification of his products into a higher
tariff was unlawful. Consequently, he sought to rely on Article 12 of the EC Treaty to claim
back from the Dutch customs authorities, which had extracted the increased tariff, the money
he had paid. The question for the Court was whether the Treaty could be used in that way by
an individual citizen rather than a Member State or the Commission. The Court of Justice held
that it could if the provision in question met certain conditions: it would have to be clear,
precise and unconditional; and it would have to leave the Member State with no discretion as
to how it should be implemented. In other words, if the provision in question is sufficiently
clear, precise and unconditional to create an ‘enforceable right’ for the client, as did Article 12
of the EC Treaty, that right can be enforced through the national courts in preference to
national law. In Van Gend en Loos itself, the Court found that an individual could rely on Article
12 of the EC Treaty directly to recover the extra tax from the government.
21.3.1 Direct effect and the provisions of the Treaty

It has now been established that, applying the criteria set out in Van Gend en Loos, all the
fundamental Treaty provisions have direct effect, in particular:
(a) Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC) on free movement of goods (Ianelli and Volpi sPA v
Meroni [1977] ECR 557);
(b) Article 45 TFEU (ex Article 48 EC) on free movement of workers (Van Duyn v Home Office
[1974] ECR 1337);
(c) Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 52 EC) on freedom of establishment (Reyners v The Belgian
State [1974] ECR 631);
(d) Article 56 TFEU (ex Article 59 EC) on freedom to provide services (Van Binsbergen ( JHM) v
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299);
(e) Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 85 EC) on anti-competitive agreements (Belgische Radio en
Televisie v SV SABAM [1974] ECR 313);
(f ) Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 86 EC) on abuse of a dominant position (Garden Cottage Foods
v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130); and
(g) Article 157 TFEU (ex Article 119 EC) on equal pay (Defrenne (Gabrielle) v SABENA [1976]
ECR 455).
In addition, Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 6 EC) (discrimination), Articles 63–66 TFEU (ex
Articles 73b–73g EC) (capital), Article 107 TFEU (ex Article 92 EC) (State aids) and Article 111
TFEU (ex Article 95 EC) (discriminatory indirect taxes on goods) are considered to have direct
effect.
21.3.2 Direct effect and Regulations

Regulations are said by Article 288 TFEU to be ‘directly applicable’, ie they are part of national
law and do not need implementing legislation. They are binding in the form in which they are
made. However, they still have to be sufficiently ‘clear, precise and unconditional’ to create
directly effective rights.
21.3.3 Direct effect and Directives

Directives are not of general application throughout the Community but require
implementing measures, which are likely to vary from one Member State to another. Despite
this, the Court of Justice has held, for example in Van Duyn v Home Office (see 21.3.1), that in
appropriate circumstances even Directives may be directly effective. The reason for this is that
Article 288 TFEU expressly states that a Directive is to be legally binding on the State to which
it is addressed; this would be meaningless unless there was some possibility that Directives
themselves could be relied on where the Member State failed to implement them. However, in
the case of Directives, any rights they contain can have direct effect only after the time-limit
for implementing the Directive has elapsed (see, eg, Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR
1629). Thereafter, again provided that the rights in the Directive are sufficiently clear, precise
and unconditional, they can be relied on against the State, even though not implemented in
national law.
21.3.4 ‘Horizontal’ direct effect

In the early cases on direct effect, the defending party was always the State or some State
agency, such as the customs authorities in Van Gend en Loos (‘vertical’ direct effect). Subsequent
cases have shown that a party may rely on a Treaty provision, or even a Regulation (but not a
Directive), where the other party is not a State body (‘horizontal’ direct effect). So, for
example, in Defrenne v SABENA (see 21.4.1) the plaintiff relied on Article 119 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 157 TFEU) against a private employer.
Again, Directives are different. A Directive can be used only against a Member State or an
‘emanation of the State’. This is clear from Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area
Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 723. The rationale here is that allowing the use of a
Directive against a Member State that is in delay encourages it to implement that Directive. A
non-State body, on the other hand, has no power to influence the implementation of a
Directive. If it is clear that the defendant is the State or a State body, it is also apparent from
Marshall that it makes no difference whether or not the State is fulfilling a public function in
the circumstances which gave rise to the case. In Marshall, the defendant health authority had
dismissed the female plaintiff because she had reached the age of 62, although a male
employee would not have been dismissed until the age of 65. The plaintiff argued that this
breached the Equal Treatment Directive. The defendant conceded that it was a State body but
argued that, as it was acting purely as an employer of the plaintiff, the Directive could not be
relied upon against it. This argument failed before the Court of Justice.
From cases following Marshall, it appears that other emanations of the State for this purpose
include a police force (Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651) and a local
authority (Re London Boroughs [1990] 3 CMLR 495 and East Riding of Yorkshire County Council v
Gibson [2000] 3 CMLR 329).
The Court of Justice has subsequently given guidance on the meaning of the term ‘emanation
of the State’. According to Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3133, it must be some body
(whatever its legal form) which is carrying out a public service under the control of the State,
or which has for that purpose special powers. In Foster, the English court applied that
definition to find that British Gas prior to privatisation was an emanation of the State. On the
other hand, it has since been held by the Court of Appeal in Doughty v Rolls Royce plc [1992]
IRLR 126 that Rolls Royce was not an emanation of the State when it was in public ownership
because it was not providing a public service. By contrast, the High Court has ruled that even
the privatised water boards are sufficiently controlled by State regulators to satisfy the criteria
in Foster (see Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15). Clearly even the privatised
British Gas or British Telecom could be regarded as State bodies if this case is correct.
This distinction between public and non-public bodies inevitably means that some
individuals will be protected by the provisions of a Directive while others will not. This is
especially evident in the employment field, where employees of the State or State bodies will
have an advantage over employees of a private employer. The Court of Justice in Marshall
pointed out that such unfairness is easily countered by the Member State: it can implement
the Directive.
Lastly, it should be remembered that even though enforceable only against the State, a
Directive may still have indirect consequences for private persons. In R v Durham, ex p
Huddleston [2000] 1 WLR 1484, a developer obtained from a planning authority permission to
develop a site. An objector argued that the development had not been subjected to an
environmental impact assessment as required by Directive 85/337. This had direct effect
against the local planning authority (an emanation of the State) which was compelled to
reconsider the permission. The effect was financially disastrous for the developer.
21.4 THE SUPREMACY OF EU LAW

The Court of Justice, in the seminal case of Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal
[1978] ECR 629, held that it was fundamental to EU law that EU law should be supreme over
the domestic law of the Member States. In this way, EU law would apply uniformly throughout
the EU. According to Simmenthal, ‘every national court must … accordingly set aside any
provision of national law which may conflict with’ EU law. The Court of Justice has reinforced
that message on numerous occasions.
The courts of individual Member States have, from time to time, found the concept of
supremacy difficult to accept. After the European Communities Act 1972, the English courts
tended to rely upon interpreting English law to comply with EU law as far as possible. In
recent years, however, the courts have been increasingly prepared to give effect to the
Simmenthal doctrine. This can be seen in the case of R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p
Factortame (No 2) [1990] 3 WLR 818, in which some Spanish fishermen challenged the
Merchant Shipping Act 1988 as being incompatible with EU law. The House of Lords referred
the matter to the Court of Justice under the procedure in Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 267 TFEU) (see 21.7). In the meantime, the fishermen sought interim relief to suspend
the operation of the Act until the Court of Justice replied to the reference. They argued that if
the Act continued to operate, their livelihoods would be so seriously affected that the ruling of
the Court of Justice might prove to be academic. The House of Lords refused relief, partly
because it had no power to suspend the effect of an Act of Parliament, and partly because
under English law an interim injunction could not be granted against the Crown. The House
of Lords did, however, refer to the Court of Justice a second question: Was it right to refuse
relief ? The Court responded that where an individual seeks to rely on EU law, a rule of national
procedure cannot be invoked in the national courts which would effectively deny the
individual that right. The English court then granted the interim relief (see further 22.4).
21.5 THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT EFFECT

It would therefore seem clear that when a national court is confronted by national legislation
and directly-effective EU legislation which conflict, the court should, under the principle of
the supremacy of EU law, apply EU law to the dispute. However, there may be situations in
which EU legislation does not have direct effect and a staightforward preference for it cannot
be made. This might be the case where a Directive lacks the qualities necessary to give direct
effect, as where it is being used against a non-State body.
In such cases, it may be possible to argue that the Directive has indirect effect. The national
court is not asked to apply the Directive instead of the national legislation, but is asked to
interpret the national legislation in the light of the EU Directive.
Accordingly, in Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546, the House of Lords
interpreted the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI
1981/1794) in the light of Directive 77/187, which the Regulations purported to implement,
even though that interpretation was contrary to the meaning on the face of the Regulations.
In Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, the Court of
Justice took the concept of ‘indirect effect’ a stage further by ruling that national law should be
interpreted, as far as possible, to give effect to an EU Directive, whether or not the Directive
pre-dates the national law. The Court of Justice expressly based the latter decision on Article 5
of the EC Treaty (now Article 4(3) TEU), which requires Member States to take all necessary
steps to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations. Contrary to its earlier ruling in Duke v GEC
Reliance Ltd ( formerly Reliance Systems) [1988] AC 618, the House of Lords later conceded that, in
interpreting the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, it must take account of the Equal Treatment
Directive 76/207 and Court rulings on its interpretation. See Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) [1994]
IRLR 482, where the House of Lords accepted that (from 1978 onwards) it was obliged to
interpret the Act in line with the later Directive, even though, in their Lordships’ view, the
result was not what Parliament had intended when passing the Act.
21.6 ACTION AGAINST A STATE FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT A DIRECTIVE

The European Commission has the responsibility of monitoring the implementation rates of
Member States, and it has the power to bring a State in default before the Court of Justice. An
individual cannot take this action. However, following Francovich and Bonifacti v Italy [1992]
IRLR 84, an individual may, in appropriate circumstances, sue a State for damages for failure
to implement a particular Directive. In that case, Italy had failed to implement Directive 80/
987 which would have established a fund available to employees dismissed by insolvent
businesses which could not pay them their arrears of salary. Although the Directive was
sufficiently precise in the rights it set out to create, these rights were conditional on there
being a relevant fund. They were thus not directly effective. However, the Court of Justice gave
a right of action against the State itself for non-implementation, relying on Article 5 of the EC
Treaty (now Article 4(3) TEU), which requires Member States to take all appropriate measures
to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations. The Court of Justice said that a right of action
arises where three conditions are met:
(a) the Directive confers rights on individuals;
(b) the content of the rights is identifiable from the Directive;
(c) there is a causal link between the failure to implement and the damage.
This is clearly what we would call in English law a claim in tort.
The action itself would be brought before the relevant national court in accordance with the
appropriate national procedure (in England, this would be a High Court action against the
Attorney-General). That procedure would have to ensure an effective remedy for the plaintiff.
In R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 4) [1996] 2 WLR 506, the Court ruled on
whether the Spanish fishermen could recover damages for breach of Article 52 of the EC
Treaty (now Article 49 TFEU) for being denied the right to form UK fishing companies (see
22.4–22.5). The Court introduced a further condition for State liability in this type of case, ie
damages are recoverable only where the breach of the Treaty is sufficiently serious, that is
where the State manifestly and gravely disregards the limits on its own powers. This extra
condition has also been applied in a case of an incorrectly implemented Directive. In R v HM
Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc [1996] All ER (EC) 411, it was held that no damages
are recoverable against the State if it has made a reasonable mistake in interpreting the
Directive when drafting its implementing legislation. This is a very important case for
governments, because the broad principles of EU law do provide plenty of scope for innocent,
non-negligent interpretation. This will not, however, excuse governments which rely on
negligent advice from their lawyers, as happened in the Factortame case. The British
Government was eventually required to pay damages; the House of Lords accepting that the
law on establishment and discrimination being clear, there was a sufficiently serious breach
(R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 5) [1999] 4 All ER 906, HL).
However, note that the non-implementation of a Directive will still be assessed under the
original Francovich test, since non-implementation is a sufficiently serious breach in itself (see
Dillenkofer and Others v Germany [1996] 3 CMLR 469).
21.7 ARTICLE 267 TFEU REFERENCE PROCEDURE

21.7.1 What is the purpose of this procedure?
The Article 267 TFEU reference procedure enables the Court of Justice to give a preliminary
ruling to a national court principally on the interpretation of the Treaty, although it can also
rule on the validity of acts of Union institutions. This means that the Court of Justice will not,
as such, rule on the compatibility of national law with EU law, or on the application of EU law
to particular facts. This is the national court’s responsibility. Thus, in Foster v British Gas [1990]
ECR I-3133 (see 21.3.4) the Court of Justice explained how an emanation of the State could be
recognised, and the English court then applied the definition to British Gas. It may be,
however, that in stating the principle, the Court of Justice, in effect, indicates how it must
apply to the facts before the national court. The advantage of Article 267 TFEU is that it
provides a mechanism which enables the Court of Justice to ensure that EU law develops along
parallel lines throughout the Union.
21.7.2 How does the procedure work?

Article 267 TFEU distinguishes two situations.
21.7.2.1 Where the case is being heard before a court from which there is no judicial remedy
In this case, the national court must make a reference if it believes that a clarification of the
EU point is necessary in order to decide the case. It may not be necessary where the point of
EU law is irrelevant to the case, where there is an existing Court of Justice judgment on the
matter, or where the court believes the correct interpretation to be obvious (see CILFIT Srl v
Ministro della Sanitro [1982] ECR 3415).
A particularly striking example of this is the case involving part-timers (Equal Opportunities
Commission v Secretary of State for Employment [1994] 1 All ER 910 (HL)). This is another
illustration of the point that discrimination, here in relation to pay between men and women
(Article 157 TFEU), always includes unjustifiable indirect discrimination. In this context,
paying part-timers less than full-timers means indirectly paying women less than men
because most part-timers are women. Thus, the House of Lords ruled that legislation
requiring part-timers to work for five years before qualifying for redundancy payments/unfair
dismissal compensation (whereas full-timers qualified after two years) was unlawful because
it was a breach of equal pay under Article 157 TFEU. There was no objective reason for the
discrimination. The House emphatically rejected Government arguments that it would create
new jobs by reducing the burdens on business, saying that there was no evidence that this was
the case. No reference was made to the Court of Justice because the position in EU law was
clear. The provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, which had
stood for 13 years, were declared unlawful without the need for a reference. The Act has since
been amended. In the light of subsequent cases (notably R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex p
Seymour-Smith [1999] 3 WLR 460), it is suggested that the House of Lords should have made a
reference.
21.7.2.2 Where the case is being heard before any other court or a tribunal that is exercising a
judicial function
In this case, the court or tribunal has a discretion whether to make a reference. Again, the
Court of Justice’s opinion must be necessary in order for a decision to be reached. Throughout
the Union, a wide range of lower courts and tribunals have made references under Article 267
TFEU (or its predecessors, Article 177 and Article 234 EC), including UK magistrates’ courts
and social security appeal tribunals.
In either case, the question whether a reference should be made is one for the court rather
than the parties to the case. Once the court has decided that a reference should be made, it
should then draft the questions to which it requires a reply. In certain cases, the Court of
Justice has reformulated these questions so that they more accurately reflect the issue that
needs to be addressed. Although the Court has no discretion, as such, as to whether it replies
to a reference, it has refused to respond where there is no genuine dispute between the parties
and where the reference was made in order to raise wider political issues (Foglia v Novello
[1980] ECR 745).
SUMMARY
If a client seeks advice on a problem where there could be an EU dimension, remember:
(1) EU law can also be used in its own right if it meets the criteria for direct effect (see
21.3);
(2) if there is EU legislation which has direct effect, an English court or tribunal must
prefer it to conflicting domestic law (see 21.4);
(3) EU legislation can affect the interpretation of domestic law (see Marleasing SA v La
Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 at 21.5);
(4) in case of doubt as to the meaning of EU law, consider a reference to the Court of
Justice under Article 267 TFEU (see 21.7).
Seeking a Remedy in National Courts 267
CHAPTER 22
Seeking a Remedy in
National Courts

22.2 EU law as a defence 267
22.3 Effective remedies 268
22.4 Injunctions/interim injunctions 268
22.5 Damages for breach of EU rights 269
22.6 Repayment of discriminatory tax/VAT 269
22.7 Statutory remedies 270
22.8 Time-limits 270
22.9 Limits on compensation 270
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• how to use EU law to defend yourself in a legal action
• how to use EU law offensively in court and what remedies you may be entitled to
• the limits on the use of EU law, both in terms of the amount of compensation and the
time limits for use.
22.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is an attempt to consolidate the rules and think more practically about how they
can be applied in English courts when acting for a client. It serves as a warning to English
solicitors who believe that they can advise their clients on English law alone. Ignoring relevant
EU law is undoubtedly solicitor’s negligence. Although there have been no reported cases in
England, lawyers have been successfully sued in other States for ignoring, say, the
competition rules (and thus putting their client at risk of a fine or void agreements), or for
ignoring EU Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction (and thus losing their client’s case by suing
in the wrong jurisdiction). A lawyer who advises on English law alone will thus often give
wrong advice on English law, because English law by definition includes EU law – lock, stock
and barrel.
22.2 EU LAW AS A DEFENCE

As EU law overrides conflicting national law, directly-effective EU law can always be used as a
defence to any civil claim, prosecution or tax claim that is based on that national law. Thus,
for example, since Article 101 TFEU makes restrictive agreements void, a defendant can plead
Article 101 TFEU when sued in a civil claim for breach of the agreement. Likewise, if Articles
34, 45, 49 and 56 TFEU make measures restricting free movement of goods, services and
working persons unlawful, a client prosecuted under such national measures can plead the
Articles of the Treaty as a defence. In tax claims, a client can plead the VAT Directive (77/388)
or the Treaty provisions on non-discrimination (Article 110 TFEU). Thus, where an
exemption from VAT exists in the Directive but not in the UK tax legislation, a taxpayer can
plead the Directive as defence to a demand for tax; VAT is very much an EU tax and cannot be
collected in circumstances not allowed for under the Directive.
22.3 EFFECTIVE REMEDIES

In relation to more active remedies, the Court of Justice has made it plain in cases like R v
Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1990] 3 WLR 818, that national courts must
provide a sufficient remedy to protect EU rights. In general, this would be the nearest
equivalent national remedy. Where no adequate remedy is available under national law, the
court must provide one to protect the EU right in question (as it did in Factortame). Thus, a client
may be better protected by asserting an EU right than he is under national law (examples being
Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority (No 2) [1993] 3 CMLR 293, discussed below at 22.9,
and R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 4) [1996] 2 WLR 506).
It should also be noted that administrative decisions affecting EU law must be reasoned,
‘proportional’ and subject to review by a higher tribunal. Neither the duty to give reasons nor
‘proportionality’ are well established under English administrative law, so that once again the
client asserting an EU right may be better protected when dealing with administrative
institutions.
22.4 INJUNCTIONS/INTERIM INJUNCTIONS

If one thinks of actual remedies available to protect EU rights, probably the first thing one
would think of would be an injunction. This is certainly available to be used against a private
person to restrain a breach of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU (see Garden Cottage Foods v Milk
Marketing Board [1984] AC 130). Thus, a client who feels he is being excluded from a particular
market because of a restrictive agreement breaching Article 101 TFEU, or an abuse of a
dominant position breaching Article 102 TFEU, can get an injunction to restrain such
unlawful behaviour, and get back into the market.
However, the remedy of injunction or interim injunction is also available against the
Government to restrain a breach of EU rules, despite the fact that under English law interim
injunctive relief is not normally available to suspend statutes or statutory instruments (see R v
Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1990] 3 WLR 818).
In Factortame, some Spanish fishermen had set up a UK company to operate UK trawlers with
the intention of exploiting the UK fishing quota in the North Sea. The Merchant Shipping Act
1988 provided that, in order to qualify as a UK company for this purpose, the company must
itself be owned at least 75% by UK nationals who were UK residents. Not surprisingly, the
Spanish fishermen who found themselves excluded by this rule complained that the Act was
contrary to the Treaty in that it denied their right of establishment as a UK company (Article
52 of the EC Treaty (now Article 49 TFEU)) and discriminated against them as EC (now EU)
nationals (Article 6 of the EC Treaty (now Article 18 TFEU)). Faced with this issue, the House
of Lords felt obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice, but the question then arose as
to whether the House of Lords would be bound to grant interim relief protecting the
fishermen’s rights until the Court could rule on the main issue. This issue, too, was referred to
the Court of Justice, which replied, somewhat more promptly than normal, that the national
court must grant an interim injunction to suspend the Act of Parliament where this was
necessary to protect the EC (now EU) rights pending the ruling from the Court. Eventually,
the ruling came back (R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 3) [1991] 3 All ER
769) that the 1988 Act did contravene the Treaty and therefore, in relation to EC (now EU)
nationals, the provisions concerned had to be suspended indefinitely.
It should be noted that Factortame involved an urgent case where the fishermen’s livelihood was
being threatened in circumstances where damages (at the time uncertain) would not have
been an adequate remedy. The ruling does not mean that in EU cases the court need not follow
the normal balance of convenience test when deciding when to grant an interim injunction,
nor that the court need not take into account other factors, for example public policy, when
exercising its discretion. In two other cases, a reference was made but an interim injunction
was refused in the meantime. These cases are R v HM Treasury, ex p British Telecommunications plc
[1994] 1 CMLR 621 and R v Heritage Secretary, ex p Continental TV (Red Hot TV) [1993] 2 CMLR
333. Both cases rested on the ‘balance of convenience’, with the adequacy of damages being a
particular fact in the first case and public policy (protecting sensitive viewers from
pornographic television) being a factor in the second.
22.5 DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF EU RIGHTS

Again, there seems little doubt that damages are available against private persons for breach
of their statutory duty, for example for anti-competitive behaviour under Articles 101 or 102
TFEU. Although there have been no reported court decisions of damages being awarded, the
House of Lords in Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130 was certainly of the
opinion that damages could be recovered. A large number of cases have been settled on the
basis that this is the case. It would seem, however, in the light of Factortame (No 4), that a purely
innocent, non-negligent infringement of the competition rules would attract no damages
from the national courts just as it would attract no fine from the Commission (see below).
Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse!
Where the defendant concerned is the Government, the claim for tort damages under English
public law is a little more complicated. According to the Court of Appeal in Bourgoin SA v
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1985] 3 WLR 1027, the Government cannot be liable
for damages for exercising its powers unlawfully unless it is guilty of deliberate abuse of
power (‘misfeasance in public office’). This may be a true reflection of English public law, but
the decision in Bourgoin itself (where the court refused to award damages for what was a
flagrant breach of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU), a ban on importing
French turkeys) is now clearly contrary to the Court of Justice rulings in Factortame and
Francovich. The House of Lords suggested as much (obiter) in Kirklees MBC v Wickes Building
Supplies Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 717, where their Lordships suggested that the Government would
have had to compensate Sunday traders if the Shops Act 1950 was found to be in breach of
Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU), ie the traders would have been entitled to
issue writs against the Attorney-General for damages for all the loss sustained through breach
of the statutory duty under Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU). Clarification of
the position in regard to damages was given finally by the Court of Justice in Factortame (No 4)
[1996] 2 WLR 506, where the question was whether the Spanish fishermen were entitled to
damages against the Government for the period in which they were prevented from operating
their trawlers before they got their interim injunction. The Court having given its ruling on EU
law that damages can be awarded where the breach is sufficiently serious (see 21.4), the
English courts then had to determine whether this was such a case. The House of Lords finally
awarded damages to the fishermen, thus bringing the long saga to an end (Factortame (No 5)
[1999] 4 All ER 906).
See also 21.6.
22.6 REPAYMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY TAX/VAT

Again, if the tax has been unlawfully collected in breach of Article 110 TFEU or in breach of
the VAT Directives, the requirement that an adequate remedy be given means that this tax
must be repaid in full with interest (see the Court’s ruling in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v Spa San Giorgio [1983] ECR 359). For reasons which will be explained at 22.8, it may be
that the normal time-limit for reclaiming tax under national tax law cannot run to protect the
Government until such time as the Government brings its own tax law into line with EU law.
This case does recognise a principle of ‘unjust enrichment’. Thus, tax should not be repaid
where it has been passed on to a customer who cannot himself be traced.
22.7 STATUTORY REMEDIES

Initially when asserting an EU right, one starts by looking at the nearest equivalent national
remedy. Thus, the client who asserts EU rights in the context of employment law, for example
equal pay under Article 157 TFEU, or sex discrimination under the Equal Treatment Directive
(2006/54), is effectively asserting statutory employment rights and therefore must take his
claim to an employment tribunal where the remedies and procedures he will be seeking will
be equivalent to those under the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. In
two respects, however, time-limits and limits on compensation, the remedies provided for
breach of these EU rights may be better than those for the equivalent rights under national
law.
22.8 TIME-LIMITS
Although initially the national time-limits will apply to the claim, the Court of Justice has
made it clear that these cannot be used to protect the Government where the claim is based on
a Directive which the Government has failed to implement. In other words, the claimant
cannot be deprived of a right by the Government delaying implementation for so long that he
is out of time. In such circumstances the Government is estopped from relying on its own
wrong, and therefore the time-limit begins to run only when it has righted that wrong by
introducing national legislation that complies with the Directive (see Emmott v Minister for Social
Welfare and Attorney-General [1991] IRLR 387). The Court seems to have reduced the
effectiveness of this ruling in Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer (No 2) [1995] IRLR 187, where it
indicates that a time-limit which limits back-payments of social security may be enforceable
even where the Government is in breach of a Directive. The same rule applies to tax (see now
Edilizia Industriale v Ministero delle Finanze [1999] 2 CMLR 995. The normal national time-limits
will of course be available to protect a private person, for example an employer faced with a
claim for equal pay under Article 157 TFEU. But even these may not start to run until the
employee is aware of his rights under Article 157 TFEU (see Cannon v Barnsley Metropolitan
Borough Council [1992] IRLR 474). The Court has made it clear in the case of Fischer [1994] IRLR
662, that the time-limit must not make it impossible to exercise the EU rights which national
courts and governments are obliged to protect. There are thus two basic rules that national
time-limits must satisfy (see Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1997] ECR 2043). First,
they must still leave the applicant with an effective remedy and not make recovery virtually
impossible. Secondly, they must be equivalent to time-limits in similar national claims. This
second principle of non-discrimination is well-illustrated by the case of Levez v TH Jennings
(Harlow Pools) Ltd [1999] IRLR 764, where the two-year time-limit on back pay in equal pay
cases was held to be unlawful as in other similar claims for race and disability discrimination
there was no such limit. The EAT’s ruling followed guidance from the Court of Justice in Levez
v TH Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd [1999] All ER (EC) 1. The time-limits for making these claims
are not, however, discriminatory. In Biggs v Somerset County Council [1996] ICR 364, the Court of
Appeal refused to allow a claim brought by a part-time employee for unfair dismissal
compensation as equal pay under Article 119 of the EC Treaty (now Article 157 TFEU), when it
was brought 18 years after the dismissal but within three months of the House of Lords ruling
in Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Employment [1994] 1 All ER 910 (see
21.7.2).
22.9 LIMITS ON COMPENSATION

As indicated above, EU rules like those protecting against sex discrimination under the Equal
Treatment Directive do require an adequate remedy. Thus, the Court of Justice has ruled that
the national limits on compensation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (now the Equality
Act 2010) (the maximum until November 1993 was £11,000) cannot be used to protect a State
employer in a claim based on an EU Directive. This is the now famous case of Marshall v
Southampton Area Health Authority (No 2) [1993] 3 CMLR 293. Mrs Marshall, who established her
right to compensation for breach of the EU Directive in Marshall v Southampton and West
Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), then went back to an industrial tribunal where her
compensation was assessed at over £20,000. This figure included an assessment of interest.
However, both the EAT and the Court of Appeal ruled that the compensation had to be
restricted to the limit set by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which not only restricted
compensation (at the time to £6,000) but also denied the award of interest. On a reference
from the House of Lords, the Court ruled that compensation must be awarded without limit
and that in assessing compensation the tribunal must, to give an adequate remedy, award
interest. The Government reacted promptly and commendably to this ruling by removing
both the upper limit and the restriction on interest for all discrimination and equal pay claims
with effect from November 1993 (see Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies)
Regulations 1993, SI 1993/2798). It should be noted that in relation to rights under English
law which do not implement EU rights, it is perfectly lawful for the law to provide an
inadequate remedy. Thus, ‘unfair dismissal’ compensation is still limited by statute.
Free Movement of Workers 273
CHAPTER 23
Free Movement of Workers

23.3 When does the Treaty allow Member States to deny entry? 275
23.4 Can the worker bring his family with him? 275
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• what EU nationality means
• what EU nationality grants in terms of rights for the workforce
• the extent to which a worker can take his family to another Member State whilst
working there
• the circumstances in which a worker and/or his family can be denied entry into a
Member State.
23.1 INTRODUCTION
The EC Treaty gave (and the TFEU now gives) the right of free movement within the Union to
people who wished to take up offers of employment made from outside their home State. This
fundamental Treaty right has been buttressed by a considerable amount of secondary
legislation. Further, EU law has developed to the stage where the rights of individuals to move
within the EU are not necessarily dependent on the desire to take up employment. Indeed, as
a consequence of the Single European Act, from 1 January 1993, internal barriers to
movement within the EU should have been removed. Further, Article 20 TFEU now states that
every EU national shall be a citizen of the European Union. Under Article 21 TFEU, the Union
citizen has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,
subject to the limitations and conditions in the Treaty and in other legislation.
23.2 WHAT DOES THE TREATY PROVIDE?

Free movement of workers is guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, which gives the EU worker the
right of entry and residence for the purpose of taking up employment. According to Article
45(2) TFEU, Member States must abolish
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
‘Work and employment’ has been interpreted very widely to include sportspeople. Hence, in
Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1996] All ER (EC) 97, the
Court of Justice made it plain that restrictions on the number of EU nationals in football
teams imposed by UEFA and requirements for large transfer fees in cross-border transfers
were both illegal.
23.2.1 How is nationality interpreted?

Nationality is entirely a matter for the domestic law of each Member State, which means that,
inevitably, rules vary. In particular, not all Member States permit their nationals to hold dual
nationality. One result of this was seen in Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992]
ECR I-4238. The case concerned a dual national of Argentina and Italy who sought entry into
Spain. Entry was refused because under Spanish law only the nationality of the State in which
the person had last been habitually resident was recognised, and in this case that was
Argentina. The Court of Justice found, however, that, as he was an Italian national under
Italian law, he was an EC (now EU) migrant worker protected by Article 48 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 45 TFEU), so that entry into Spain could not be denied.
23.2.2 What rights of residence does the EU national obtain under Article 45 TFEU?
The EU national has an absolute right of residence so long as he remains in work. If the worker
becomes involuntarily unemployed, Directive 2004/38 will continue to guarantee him a right
to reside in the host State. However, if he becomes voluntarily unemployed his position is
changed as (in accordance with most social security systems) he would be disqualified from
social security benefits. Under Directive 2004/38, he has a right of residence simply by being a
citizen of another Member State as long as he has sufficient resources not to be a burden on
the host State. If a worker becomes permanently disabled or reaches retirement age, his right
of permanent residence continues under this Directive as well.
An individual can claim the rights of a worker as long as he is genuinely employed, even if his
work is part time and obtained so that EU rights can be asserted, and even if the salary paid is
below a minimum wage limit (Levin v Secretary of State for Justice [1982] 1 ECR 1035).
A period of five years’ residence gives the worker and/or his family (see 23.4) a right of
permanent residence.
23.2.3 What terms of employment is an EU national entitled to expect?

An EU national can claim the same terms as those offered to a national of the host State.
Article 45(2) TFEU expressly refers to the right not to be discriminated against as regards
conditions of work. So, in the case of Allué (Pilar) and Coonan (Mary Carmel) v Università degli Studi
di Venezia [1991] 1 CMLR 283, an Italian law which provided that non-Italians who accepted
jobs in Italy to teach a language could only enter into fixed-term contracts for one year was
contrary to Article 48(2) of the EC Treaty (now Article 45(2) TFEU). In addition, Regulation
1612/68, Article 7, and Directive 2004/38, Article 24 prohibit discrimination in relation to
conditions of employment, dismissal, social and tax advantages, training and union
membership.
23.2.4 What about his social security rights?

Social security rights are governed by Regulation 1408/71, which basically guarantees to EU
nationals the social security benefits of the host State. However, where the benefits are
dependent on contributions, a worker’s entitlement will take into account contributions to
the equivalent benefit in his home State or other Member States in which he has worked. The
Regulation does not provide for harmonisation of benefits or of levels of benefits throughout
the Union.
23.2.5 Does an EU national have a right of entry to look for work?

Article 45 TFEU (or its predecessors) has been interpreted to mean that an EU national has a
right of entry to look for work and a reasonable period of residence to find it. This is
confirmed in Directive 2004/38, which grants a three-month right of residence without
qualifying as a worker. In the UK, the immigration rules used to allow such a person to be
deported if he did not succeed in finding work after six months. The Court of Justice held this
rule to be consistent with EU law in R v Immigration Appeals Tribunal, ex p Antonissen [1991] 2
Free Movement of Workers 275
CMLR 373, although it stressed that the job seeker might still have a right of residence if he
had reasonable prospects of finding work. (There is no longer a fixed time-limit for finding
work in the UK.) An EU national has a right to remain in the host State as an ordinary citizen if
his resources are adequate and he is covered by health insurance by virtue of Directive 2004/38
on the right to residence for EU citizens.
23.3 WHEN DOES THE TREATY ALLOW MEMBER STATES TO DENY ENTRY?
Article 45(3) TFEU permits derogations on grounds of public policy, public security and
public health. Because these are derogations from one of the fundamental freedoms of the
EU, the Court of Justice has interpreted them strictly. Further, Directive 2004/38 has made it
clear that only personal conduct can be taken into account. Even prior criminal convictions
will not necessarily entitle the Member State to deny entry. They will do so only where they
indicate that the individual represents a current threat to public security. For example, in
Astrid Proll v Entry Clearance Officer [1988] 2 CMLR 387, the former Baader Meinhoff terrorist
was allowed entry into the UK because she did not represent a present threat.
Article 45(4) TFEU provides that the rights granted earlier in the Article do not apply to
employment in the public service. This has been interpreted strictly by the Court of Justice in
Commission of European Communities v Belgium; Re Public Employees (No 1) [1980] ECR 3881 to mean
only ‘posts involving the exercise of official authority and functions related to safeguarding
the general interests of the State’.
23.4 CAN THE WORKER BRING HIS FAMILY WITH HIM?

Because a worker might be deterred from moving to another Member State if he could not
take his family with him, Directive 2004/38 enables him to do so. It does, however, limit the
family members who are entitled to entry to the spouse, registered partner, children under 21
and dependent relatives of the worker or spouse/partner. Member States do, however, have an
obligation to ‘facilitate entry and residence’ of any other family members who are dependants
or members of the household. It is not necessary for family members to be EU nationals. The
host State can refuse entry to family members only in those circumstances which allow it to
refuse entry to the worker himself (see 23.3 above). The rights of a spouse are not dependent
on his or her residing with the worker, and thus can terminate only if the worker leaves the
host State permanently (Diatta v Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567). Prior to Directive 2004/38 there
was no clear European authority as to whether deportation could follow divorce, but in
Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 the mother of children
was entitled to remain having been awarded custody. Directive 2004/38 provides for the
spouse (or unmarried cohabitee) to remain in the country if he or she has resided for three
years, or if they have been awarded custody or access to children, or alternatively if the court
feels that allowing them to remain is warranted in the circumstances.
Directive 2004/38 lays down formal requirements for entry (including visa) and for obtaining
residence documents. Thereafter, the family have the same rights as the worker himself to
jobs, social security and education.
SUMMARY
If an EU national or a family member is refused entry or residence rights by UK
immigration authorities, he will be allowed to invoke his EU rights before the appropriate
immigration authority or Appeal Tribunal, or as a defence in criminal proceedings where
deportation is being considered.
If an EU national believes that he has been discriminated against in relation to

employment, he should, as usual, follow the appropriate national procedure in the host
State to obtain a suitable remedy. In England, this would mean commencing proceedings
before an employment tribunal under the Equality Act 2010. It is important to remember
that, to comply with EU law, such national procedure must not discriminate, even
indirectly, against the EU national and must give an effective remedy for breach of EU law
(see 22.9).
Freedom of Establishment and Provision of Services 277
CHAPTER 24
Freedom of Establishment
and Provision of Services

24.2 The right of establishment: Article 49 TFEU 278
24.3 The right to provide services: Article 56 TFEU 278
24.4 Secondary legislation 279
24.5 Constraints under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 279
24.6 Can the self-employed person bring his family with him to the host State? 281
24.7 Derogations from Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 281
24.8 Rights of potential recipients of services under EU law 281
24.9 Summary and conclusion 281
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• the rights which a self-employed individual or business has to ply his or its trade in
another Member State temporarily
• the rights which a self-employed individual or business has to establish himself or
itself permanently in another Member State
• the possibility of persons relying on the above rights to bring their family with them
• what exceptions exist which may stop someone relying on his rights
• the right of the recipient of services to travel to another Member State to receive
services.
24.1 INTRODUCTION
The freedom of establishment is the right to base one’s business in another Member State
permanently. This right is guaranteed by the TFEU, with the important qualification that it
cannot give the establishing business greater rights than those enjoyed by businesses
operated by nationals of the host Member State. Thus a French business wishing to establish
itself in England would have to comply with laws affecting an English business relating, for
example, to employment, health and safety, and taxes and social security (except to the extent
that these might discriminate directly or indirectly against the foreign firm). The governing
Article in the TFEU is Article 49.
The freedom to provide services guarantees that a business can provide a service across an EU
frontier even if that business does not want to be permanently based outside its home State.
As with the right of establishment, the right to provide services is granted on the basis that
the services will be provided subject to the same conditions as apply to nationals of the State
in which the service is supplied (again subject to these rules constituting indirect
discrimination). The governing Article in the TFEU is Article 56.
Although under both Articles the firm concerned must comply with the same conditions
which apply to local nationals, those conditions are likely to be tighter for establishment. In
Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] All ER (EC) 139, it was
held that a German lawyer giving advice on German law in Italy was prima facie ‘established’
there by virtue of his permanent office and his adoption of the title Avvocato. Had he merely
been providing services, he could have relied on his home title as a German lawyer and the
earlier Directive on free movement of legal services. However, by establishing himself in Italy,
he had to requalify as an Italian lawyer.
In the cases taken to the Court of Justice under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, emphasis has often
successfully been placed on Article 18 TFEU which prohibits discrimination on the ground of
nationality, wherever the matter is covered by the Treaty.
Article 18 TFEU has direct effect, so that provisions of UK statutes can be disapplied by UK
courts in so far as they directly or indirectly discriminate against other EU nationals.
Residence requirements are a good example of indirect discrimination.
24.2 THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT: ARTICLE 49 TFEU

Article 49 TFEU provides that restrictions on the freedom of establishment by nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State must be abolished. This freedom is
stated to include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set
up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms, under the conditions laid
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where the establishment is effected.
24.2.1 What is the implication of this Article?

Article 49 TFEU means that no Member State can, through its legislation or administrative
practices, impose a nationality barrier to businesses which wish to be based permanently in
another Member State. In R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 3) [1991] 3 All ER
769, Article 52 of the EC Treaty (now Article 49 TFEU) was invoked by Spanish fishermen who
operated British-registered fishing boats but who were prevented from fishing the British
quota because the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 laid down nationality and residence
requirements for the owners of shares in companies operating such boats. The Court of
Justice held that such legislation was contrary to Article 52 of the EC Treaty (see 22.4).
24.2.2 Are there any limitations on the kind of undertaking which can benefit from
Article 49 TFEU?
Article 49 TFEU refers in particular to companies and firms. This phrase is defined in Article
54 TFEU to mean ‘companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law including co-
operative societies’. The meaning of company or firm is really a matter for the law of the home
State. A French company wishing to set up a branch or subsidiary in England can do so
provided it meets the requirements under French law for being a company. It must not hold
itself out as having been incorporated under English law. The only qualification here is that
EU law requires that an undertaking wishing to rely on Article 49 TFEU must be a profit-
making body.
It is particularly important to realise, however, that an entrepreneur wishing to set up a
company can choose the State with the least regulatory company regime and then establish a
branch back in the State he wishes to trade in. In Centros Ltd v Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen [1999]
2 CMLR 551, the Court of Justice recognised that it was legitimate to set up a company in the
UK and trade through a branch in Denmark, even though the purpose was to avoid the Danish
requirements for a minimum paid-up share capital.
24.3 THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE SERVICES: ARTICLE 56 TFEU

According to Article 56 TFEU, restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the EU
must be abolished in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of
the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. Services for
this purpose, according to Article 57 TFEU, are services normally provided for remuneration.
In Commission of European Communities v France [1991] ECR I-659, for example, it was held that a
French law which required tourist guides to hold a licence dependent on the passing of an
examination in France was contrary to Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 TFEU) as
being unnecessary and discriminatory. There are many similar cases. This Article also means
that a business providing services in another Member State had the right to bring its own
employees into the host State to enable it to perform those services, even where they would
not have been entitled to claim rights under Article 48 of the EC Treaty (now Article 45 TFEU)
(eg, because of transitional rules for nationals of new EU Member States or because the
workforce includes immigrants from outside the EU) (Rush Portuguesa v Office National
d’Immigration [1990] ECR I-1417, Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803). The workers would, of
course, need to be lawfully employed in the State where the employer is established and might
need visas to enter the host country; they would not need fresh work permits. The Court of
Justice, however, stresses that the host State can impose its own mandatory rules for workers’
protection. Since statutory protection for workers in some countries (eg, the UK) is less than
in other countries (eg, Germany), this might enable British firms to provide services to
Germany using their British workforce at cheaper rates than German firms which have to pay
their employees a higher minimum wage. A Directive on Posted Workers (96/71) was adopted
in September 1996 and implemented in the UK by the Equal Opportunities (Employment
Legislation) (Territorial Limits) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/3163). Under the Regulations, a
UK company posting its workers in another EU State (eg, whilst working on a building
contract) will have to comply with local employment laws where the posting is longer
(usually) than one month. The employees can enforce these rights in their UK employment
tribunal (as well as in local courts).
24.4 SECONDARY LEGISLATION

In 2006 the EU passed Directive 2006/123, the ‘Services Directive’, which was designed to
help service providers and recipients benefit from freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services across borders by simplifying administrative procedures and removing
obstacles for service activities.
The Directive also applies to freedom of establishment, and so is relevant to Articles 49 and 56
TFEU.
The provisions of the Directive are complex, and beyond the scope of this book; however, the
key highlights are:
• Industries are included within it unless expressly excluded (but there is a long list of
excluded industries within the Directive).
• The Directive includes an obligation on Member States to set up single points of contact
for those wishing to establish or provide services, to make it easier to obtain
information.
• Making applications and following procedures must be straightforward, including the
possibility of procedures to be completed at a distance and/or by electronic means.
• The Directive sets out restrictions on ‘authorisation schemes’, ie schemes by which
applicants must seek permission from the State before carrying out certain activities.
The aim is again to simplify, and to prevent unfair denial of business opportunities.
24.5 CONSTRAINTS UNDER ARTICLES 49 AND 56 TFEU

The in-coming business is subject to the laws that would apply to a business operated by
nationals of that State. This can create barriers to the business wishing to operate across a
frontier. The host State may require, perhaps, that all such businesses obtain the authority of
the State before they can start to operate. Professional people may be required to conform to
rules of professional conduct, professional qualifications or to the rules of a professional

body within the host State.
Article 57 of the EC Treaty (now Article 53 TFEU) envisaged that a series of Directives would
be issued dealing with mutual recognition and harmonisation of professional regulations. In
the light of this, the European Commission, recognising the public interest in maintaining
standards while wishing to minimise unnecessary barriers to cross-border enterprise, tried to
develop uniform codes in certain sectors which would apply throughout the Community.
These ‘sectoral’ Directives apply to medical professions such as doctors, nurses, dentists and
vets, but the development of harmonised professional training and qualifications in all
professions would have taken many years. So after the Court of Justice held that Articles 52
and 59 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 49 and 56 TFEU) were directly effective (see Reyners v The
Belgian State [1974] ECR 631 and Van Binsbergen ( JHM) v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 at 21.3.1), the Commission changed its approach to one of
encouraging mutual recognition of standards. Thus a professional qualified in one State
must, in principle, be recognised in another State to the extent that his qualification is
equivalent.
A particularly important Directive in this respect is Directive 89/48 on recognition of higher
education qualifications. The effect of the Directive is that where entry into a particular
profession depends upon the candidate having obtained a ‘diploma’ which proves that he has
completed at least three years’ professional education and training, a non-national cannot be
denied entry to that profession if he holds the equivalent ‘diploma’ which would entitle him to
enter the profession in his home State. However, if there are substantial differences in the
content of the course leading to the diploma in the home State, the Directive allows the host
State to require the candidate to follow an adaptation period of no more than three years. As
an alternative, the candidate could choose to take an aptitude test. The Directive makes
special provision regarding entry to the legal profession. It allows a State to specify whether a
candidate must take an aptitude test or follow a period of adaptation. Thus, in England and
Wales, qualified lawyers from other EU States must pass The Law Society’s Qualified Lawyers
Transfer Test (QLTT) before they can be admitted as solicitors. Solicitors from Ireland are,
however, admitted without a test, as their qualification is equivalent. The more recent
establishment Directive of 1998 (98/5) provides for automatic requalification after a period of
practise as a foreign lawyer.
The principle behind Directive 89/48 has been extended to cover diplomas awarded after one
year’s post-secondary education by Directive 92/51.
In Van Binsbergen ( JHM) v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299,
the Court of Justice held that professional rules of conduct regulating the legal profession
would not be in breach of Community (now EU) law provided they did not discriminate
against the non-national, they were objectively justifiable and they were not disproportionate
to the aim to be achieved. Hence, a lawyer established in France had the right to provide
services by representing clients before Belgian tribunals. He could not be forced to establish
himself in Belgium. Simply having an address for service in Belgium would be proportional to
any need for supervision of his activities. (A Directive has now adopted the Van Binsbergen line
and allows qualified EU lawyers to represent their clients before foreign tribunals within the
EU (see Directive 77/249).) A similar approach can be seen in the case of Commission of European
Communities v Germany [1988] ECR 5427, which was concerned with the regulation of the
German insurance sector. In that case, the Court held that restrictions on the right of an
insurance company to provide services in Germany would be acceptable only if they were
objectively justified, in the general public good and if they applied to all undertakings so far as
they were not regulated in their home State.
Lastly, it would seem that if there is only a tenuous link between the services being provided
and a particular restrictive provision, the latter will not be in breach of EU law (see Society for
the Protection of the Unborn Child (Ireland) v Grogan (Stephen) [1991] 3 CMLR 849). That case
concerned Irish legislation prohibiting the supply of information on abortion facilities
provided outside Ireland. The Court of Justice acknowledged that the overseas clinics
provided services within the meaning of Article 59 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 TFEU), but
went on to hold that since the information in question was being made available by student
unions rather than by the clinics themselves, there was an insufficient link between the
restriction and the provision of the services. Had the clinics been advertising directly
themselves (or through an advertising agency), the position would have been different. (The
ban on these leaflets may raise questions of freedom of speech under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights – see Chapter 27.)
24.6 CAN THE SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON BRING HIS FAMILY WITH HIM
TO THE HOST STATE?
Directive 2004/38 (as mentioned in Chapter 23) applies to freedom of establishment as it does
to workers (see 23.4).
24.7 DEROGATIONS FROM ARTICLES 49 AND 56 TFEU

It is possible to derogate from Articles 49 and 56 TFEU on grounds of public health, public
security and public policy (Articles 52 and 62 TFEU). The interpretation of these terms is the
same as that under Article 45(3) TFEU and Directive 2004/38 (see 23.3). Moreover, the right of
establishment does not apply to activities involving, even occasionally, ‘the exercise of official
authority’ (Article 51 TFEU). Thus a number of ‘legal professions’, for example judges,
magistrates, court registrars and notaries (but not lawyers), can be reserved to home
nationals.
24.8 RIGHTS OF POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES UNDER EU LAW

In Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, the Court of Justice interpreted Article
59 of the EC Treaty (now Article 56 TFEU) to mean that potential recipients of services had the
right to go to another Member State to receive those services and that tourists qualified as
potential recipients of services. This approach was further developed in Cowan v Le Trésor Public
(The Treasury) [1989] ECR 195, which concerned a British tourist who was the victim of a
criminal assault while in France. His claim for compensation from the French Criminal
Injuries Compensation Board was denied because he was not a French national. On an Article
267 TFEU reference, the Court of Justice held that compensation could not be denied to a
recipient of compensation services on grounds of nationality.
In a number of cases, the Court of Justice has considered whether this approach entitles a
national of a Member State to take advantage of education services elsewhere in the EU.
Strictly speaking, State education cannot constitute ‘services’ because, under Article 57 TFEU,
services must normally be paid for. In cases such as Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593,
however, it was held that students cannot be asked to pay an additional fee for educational
courses because they are non-nationals, provided the course represents vocational training, ie
it facilitates access to a particular trade or profession. Even if the courses are normally free (ie
not ‘services’) they still relate to a Treaty matter (training), and therefore any discrimination is
unlawful under Article 18 TFEU (see 24.1).
24.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

24.9.1 Distinguish between establishment and services
Establishment (Article 49 TFEU) implies permanence; services (Article 56 TFEU) are more
temporary. Hence, the presence of a permanent office implies establishment under Article 49
TFEU (see Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] All ER (EC) 139
at 24.1).
24.9.2 Restriction on free movement

Where services are involved, for Article 56 TFEU to apply there must be a restriction on free
movement. However, services may move in four different ways.
(a) The provider of services moves to another Member State to provide services on a
temporary basis (the normal case).
(b) The recipient of services moves to receive services (eg, as a tourist – see Cowan v Le Trésor
Public [1989] ECR 195 at 24.8).
(c) The provider moves to another Member State to provide services to nationals of his own
State (eg, a British interpreter/guide/ski instructor who accompanies a party of British
tourists abroad).
(d) Neither provider nor recipient moves, but services are provided by post, fax, telephone,
broadcast, etc.
This last situation arose in the instructive case of Alpine Investments BV v Minister Van Financien
[1995] All ER (EC) 543, which concerned Dutch financial services laws banning the cold-
calling of customers at home or abroad. The Dutch company prosecuted in this case argued
that the law banning the cold-calling of foreign clients infringed Article 59 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 56 TFEU). Clearly, the law in question did not discriminate against foreign
service providers, but it still restricted the export of services because it directly affected access
to the market in other States. Nevertheless, the restriction could be objectively justified in the
general interest on grounds of consumer protection or the good reputation of the industry.
Moreover, the restriction was proportional (the fact that other countries had no (or less strict)
controls on cold-calling was considered irrelevant). It should be noted that, as in the Cassis de
Dijon case (see 25.2.2), restrictions like this, which apply without distinction to all service
providers, could be justified on a wider range of grounds than those which appear in Article
52 TFEU (public policy, public security and public health).
24.9.3 Need to satisfy local conditions

Whether seeking establishment or providing services, the foreign national who tries to work
abroad must satisfy local conditions for pursuit of the activity in question. However
(according to Gebhard; see 24.9.1), these conditions:
(a) must be non-discriminatory;
(b) must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;
(c) must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and
(d) must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.
24.9.4 General approach to free movement under EU law

The approach of the Court of Justice in Gebhard is very similar to that already established by the
Court in relation to goods (see the key case of Cassis de Dijon at 25.2.2). It has been stressed that
the approach is common to all cases of free movement. It thus applies in relation to workers
under Article 45 TFEU (see Bosman at 23.2), to establishment under Article 49 TFEU (Gebhard),
and to services under Article 56 TFEU (Alpine Investments at 24.9.2).
Free Movement of Goods 283
CHAPTER 25
Free Movement of Goods

25.3 Are there circumstances in which Article 34 TFEU will not apply? 285
25.4 Summary of the position regarding trading measures 287
25.5 How to use Article 34 TFEU 288
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• what rights a producer of goods has to take his goods to another Member State in
order to sell them
• what rights a Member State’s government has to ban or restrict the importation of
undesirable goods
• the extent to which a producer is allowed to advertise his goods in another Member
State, and the extent to which the government can restrict this
• what a producer can do if he believes his rights to import, advertise and sell his goods
are illegally restricted.
25.1 INTRODUCTION
The free movement of goods is one of the fundamental freedoms on which the EU is based.
One of the most important aims of the original Treaty of Rome was to create a single market in
goods throughout all the Member States of the Community. Following amendments to the
Treaty by the Single European Act 1986, this aim was intended to be achieved by 31 December
1992. Because of the importance of this freedom, the Court of Justice has consistently
interpreted the relevant Treaty provisions in such a way as to give maximum effect to this
basic objective.
25.2 WHAT DOES THE TREATY PROVIDE?

The principal Treaty provision is Article 34 TFEU, which states that:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited
between Member States.
Article 35 TFEU makes similar provision in relation to exports, ie the requirement for or
refusal of an export licence.
25.2.1 What is meant by ‘quantitative restrictions’?

Quantitative restrictions are limitations on the import of goods fixed by reference to
quantitative criteria, ie amount or value (‘quotas’). A complete ban on the import of a
particular type of goods is also such a restriction (see Commission of European Communities v Italy
[1961] ECR 317).
25.2.2 What is meant by a ‘measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction’?

The phrase ‘a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction’ (MEQR) is not
defined in the Treaty itself but was defined by the Court of Justice in Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
In that case, the phrase was said to extend to ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States that
are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade’.
It is important to note the following about this definition.
(a) A measure having equivalent effect does not have to have an immediate or substantial
effect on intra-Community (now Union) trade. In particular, it is clear from Re Prantl
(Karl) [1984] ECR 1299 that the Court of Justice will not apply a de minimis principle
here. This means that any legislation which is capable of affecting trade between
Member States, even indirectly, because it is not the primary aim of the legislation, can
infringe Article 34 TFEU. However, the case of Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and
Mithouard [1995] 1 CMLR 101 shows that for ‘selling arrangements’ the measure must
have the effect of putting the imported goods at a disadvantage before it can be said to
restrict imports. Contrary to the view expressed earlier in cases involving Sunday
trading laws (Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc [1989] ECR 765), a restriction on volume
of imports (ie, the argument that with shops shut there will be fewer sales and therefore
fewer imports) is not enough if domestic goods are at the same disadvantage.
(b) A measure having equivalent effect must be taken by an ‘organ of the State’. Actions by
private individuals, companies or other undertakings cannot fall within this definition.
However, this requirement will be satisfied even if the Member State acts through
another undertaking. In Commission of European Communities v Ireland; Re ‘Buy Irish’ Campaign
[1982] ECR 4005, the Irish Government initiated a campaign to encourage Irish
consumers to buy home-produced goods. The campaign was launched by an Irish
Government Minister and was funded by the Government, but was actually managed by
a guarantee company set up for the purpose. The fact that it was not the Irish
Government which was directly running the campaign did not prevent it being a
measure having effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction. Likewise, other State
bodies, for example local authorities, licensing authorities or courts, may see their
‘measures’ (eg, injunctions) controlled in the same way.
(c) A measure having equivalent effect need not affect imported products alone, that is, be
‘distinctly applicable’ to imports. It could be a measure applying to all goods, domestic
and imported, without distinction (‘indistinctly applicable’), for example national
technical standards. The difference is that whereas the latter can be justified under the
‘rule of reason’ and so do not infringe Article 34 TFEU at all (see Cassis de Dijon below),
the former are justifiable only under Article 36 TFEU. The following cases involved
distinctly applicable measures. In International Fruit Co NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit (No 3) [1971] ECR 1107, a requirement that a licence be obtained before apples
could be imported into France was struck down by the Court of Justice as an
infringement of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU). Similarly, in Rewe-
Zentralfinanz e GmbH v Landwirtschaftskammer [1975] ECR 843, a requirement that apples
had to be inspected before they could be imported into Germany was also held to
breach Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Although these types of measure do not completely
prevent the marketing of the product, they do result in delay and inconvenience for the
importer, which may lead to fewer such products being imported. In both these cases,
the measures could not be justified under Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now Article 36
TFEU) which is restrictively interpreted.
Increasingly, the Court of Justice has found measures to be within the Dassonville definition,
and therefore caught by Article 34 TFEU, where the domestic product is also affected by the
measure in question. The leading case is Rewe Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. A German law required that spirits such as Cassis de Dijon
should be of a stipulated alcoholic strength. Cassis was significantly less strong and therefore
could not be sold on the German market. The Court held that the German law fell within the
Dassonville definition and was in breach of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU).
The case is considered vital to the development of a single market in that it shows that
imported products do not have to be changed to meet national technical standards unless the
need to do so is justified. The case is considered further in 25.3.1.
25.3 ARE THERE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ARTICLE 34 TFEU WILL

NOT APPLY?
25.3.1 The ‘rule of reason’
Although it is no answer to an Article 34 TFEU complaint to say that the measure in question
affects the equivalent domestic product as well as the imported one, it is important to know
whether or not this is the case. This is because only such a measure can benefit from the ‘rule
of reason’ approach of the Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon referred to above. The Court
recognised in that case that if goods were lawfully manufactured in a particular way in a given
Member State, they should ordinarily be entitled to move throughout the rest of the Union.
However, where the EU itself had not imposed Union-wide standards, disparities between
Member States’ legislation could be acceptable. In the words of the Court:
[O]bstacles to movement within the Community [now Union] resulting from disparities between the
national laws relating to the marketing of products must be accepted in so far as those provisions are
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence
of the consumer.
The list of mandatory requirements is not closed. The Court has since added to them the
protection of the environment (see Commission of European Communities v Denmark; sub nom Re
Disposable Beer Cans [1989] 1 CMLR 619), the protection of culture (eg, the cinema from the
threat of video cassettes in Cinethèque v Fédération Nationale des Cinemas Français [1986] 1 CMLR
B65) and employment in the Sunday trading cases. The list inevitably includes (but is much
wider than) the list of justifications in Article 36 TFEU.
In order for a measure to be ‘necessary’ to satisfy a mandatory requirement, the aim of the
measure in question must be justifiable in EU law and the measure taken must be proportionate
to that aim. Therefore, if the aim could be achieved by a measure which was less restrictive of
the free movement of goods, the measure taken will be held to be disproportionate. In Cassis de
Dijon, the German Government successfully argued that the law in question was for the
defence of the consumer, but the Court found that it was nevertheless disproportionate to its
objective: the same aim could have been achieved by a law requiring that such spirits should
be clearly labelled with their alcoholic strength.
25.3.2 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Where a government measure is distinctly applicable (ie, provides different conditions for
imported goods), it can only be justified under the terms of the Treaty, ie Article 36 TFEU.
Article 36 TFEU provides a number of important exceptions to Article 34 TFEU. It states that:
The provisions of Articles 34 to 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports
or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures
possessing artistic, historical or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial or commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
As this Article derogates from a fundamental principle of the EU, the Court construes it
strictly; in particular, no further justifiable restrictions can be read into the list given above.
Further, the burden of establishing that a measure does come within Article 36 TFEU will fall
on the relevant Member State.
The following points should be borne in mind when considering the exceptions in Article 36
TFEU.
25.3.2.1 Public morality

The Court of Justice will not seek to impose its own standards of morality; what is required in
this area will be a matter for each Member State (see DPP v Darby; DPP v Henn [1979] ECR
3795). It is important to appreciate the significance of the final sentence of Article 36 TFEU, ie
the measure taken by the Member State must not amount to arbitrary discrimination against
the imported product, or to a disguised restriction on trade. In Darby and Henn, the seizure of
imported pornography by UK customs was not in breach of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 34 TFEU) as that type of pornography could not be lawfully sold in the UK. On the
other hand, in Conegate v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1986] ECR 1007, the import of
rubber dolls into the UK could not be prevented because if they had been produced in this
country they could lawfully have been sold here.
25.3.2.2 Public policy

A Member State cannot invoke public policy whenever it is convenient to do so to avoid falling
foul of Article 34 TFEU. The Court of Justice has made it clear that this exception can be used
only where there is a serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. See, for example, R v
Thompson (Brian Ernest) [1978] ECR 2247, where it was applied to the right to mint coinage.
Economic reasons, for example protection of industry from competition, are never, however,
acceptable.
25.3.2.3 Public security

Similarly, public security cannot be readily called upon in defence of a breach of Article 34
TFEU. It seems clear only that it extends to the need to safeguard essential public services.
Note Campus Oil Ltd v The Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, where the Irish
Government required importers of petrol to buy a percentage of their needs from an Irish
refinery to ensure that the refinery remained viable. It seems that it can relate to the State’s
internal as well as external security (Minister of Finance v Richardt [1992] 1 CMLR 61).
25.3.2.4 Public health

In the absence of EU standards, Member States are entitled to decide what is appropriate for
their own citizens in the field of public health. In the case of Aragonesa de Publicidad v
Departmamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluna [1991] OJ C220/8, the
Court of Justice upheld on public health grounds Spanish legislation which prohibited
roadside advertisements for strong spirits. Despite the later case of Keck and Mithouard (see
25.4.1), this case may still involve a measure equivalent to quantitative restriction (MEQR) as
it may be indirectly discriminatory against imported spirits not known to the Spanish public.
It is, however, clearly justified.
Again, it is essential to pay close attention to the last sentence of Article 36 TFEU. For
example, in Commission of European Communities v United Kingdom; sub nom Re Imports of Poultry
Meat [1982] ECR 2793, where the UK Government prohibited the import of French poultry
into the UK, ostensibly in order to avoid the spread of Newcastle Disease, the evidence
indicated that the prohibition was unnecessarily restrictive and in reality was intended to
protect the English poultry industry. It should be noted that in most areas there are now
Directives laying down the minimum requirements for health or animal welfare. For example,
EU Directives lay down minimum rules for the carriage of live animals and their stunning
before slaughter. It is not a sufficient justification for the refusal of an export licence for live
animals that these rules may be ignored in the importing State (see R v Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, ex p Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] All ER (EC) 493). The refusal will breach
Article 35 TFEU.
25.3.2.5 The protection of national treasures and intellectual property rights

The exception for the protection of national treasures, although not yet used, is likely to be of
value where a Member State wishes to impose an export ban on items representing part of its
national heritage, ie in breach of Article 35 TFEU.
Intellectual property rights have posed difficulties for the Court of Justice. In the absence of
Union-wide regimes, such rights are granted by individual Member States and relate only to
the territory of the State in question. This offers enterprises an opportunity to divide up the
market on national lines. This is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Union. Because of this the
Court of Justice has been careful not to over-extend the protection given to intellectual
property rights in Article 36 TFEU. Accordingly, the Court has distinguished between the
existence and the exercise of intellectual property rights. Thus, measures (eg, court
injunctions keeping out imports of goods infringing a patent) are not caught by Article 34
TFEU even if their effect is to restrict imports (because of Article 36 TFEU).
In order to protect the existence of intellectual property rights, however, the Court has had to
decide what the existence of each right amounts to. It has done this by developing the concept
of the ‘specific subject matter’ of a right. Thus, for example, the specific subject matter of a
patent is the exclusive right to use an invention for the manufacture of products and to be the
first to market them (Centrafarm BV and De Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 1147). This
means that once a company has marketed (or consented to the marketing of ) a drug in, say,
France, it cannot thereafter purport to use its patent rights in, say, the UK to prevent the
import of the patented product. The products marketed in France could therefore be re-
imported into the UK and the patent holder or UK court could not interfere with their free
movement. The company’s rights over that particular product were ‘exhausted’ when it
consented to its marketing in France. The Court of Justice has adopted a similar approach to
trade mark rights and copyright. This protection of ‘parallel imports’ through exhaustion of
rights applies only where the goods are marketed within the EU. The Court has ruled in
Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1998] 3 WLR
1218 that following the harmonisation of trade mark rights through the 1989 Directive,
Member States’ laws can no longer recognise a wider principle of world-wide exhaustion (ie,
through marketing outside the EU). Thus manufacturers can use their national trade marks to
keep out goods which they authorised for sale only in countries outside the EU.
25.4 SUMMARY OF THE POSITION REGARDING TRADING MEASURES

The problem may be tackled by asking a series of questions.
25.4.1 Is the measure an MEQR (Dassonville test)?

To be an MEQR, the rule in question must affect the product itself, ie require some change,
before it can be sold in the territory. In general, rules about selling arrangements (ie, the
arrangements for selling the product once it is imported), for example Sunday trading,
licensing hours, and prohibitions on selling at a loss (Keck and Mithouard), do not come within
the Dassonville formula and thus (in the absence of discrimination) need no justification.
Although they may restrict the volume of imports (if you sell less, you import less), these
measures do not put imports at a disadvantage and thus cannot count as MEQRs.
Advertising restrictions, for example bans on leaflets (GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du Commerce
Luxembourgeoise Asbl [1991] 2 CMLR 801) or comparative advertising (Unwesen in den Wirtschaft
eV v Yves Rocher GmbH (1994) Financial Times, 9 June), may well put the imported product at a
disadvantage because advertising is the most effective way for new imported products to
penetrate a market. The rival domestic products may well be better known. It would, however,
seem that restrictions on retailers advertising their sales (eg, Hünermund v Landespothekerkammer
Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-6787, where German pharmacists were prohibited from
advertising off the premises, or Leclerc v TFI Publicité [1995] ECR I-179, where French retailers
could not advertise at all on French television and thus were restricted in advertising their
cheap foreign fuel) are to be treated as selling arrangements under Keck and Mithouard. By
contrast, a blanket ban on advertising a particular product, for example alcoholic products or
toys, would be seen, it is felt, as either a restriction to be justified under the ‘rule of reason’ in
Cassis de Dijon or a case of indirect discrimination against imports which would have to be
justified on similar objective criteria (see Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini (Svenska)
Forlag AB; Konsumentom-budsmannen (KO) v TV-Shop I Sverige AB (De Agostini) [1997] All ER (EC)
687).
25.4.2 If it is an MEQR, does it apply only to imports (ie distinctly applicable measures)
or directly discriminate (as selling arrangements)?
The best example of this is the French ban on British beef. This could only be justified under
Article 30 EC (now Article 36 TFEU) (eg, protection of public health) but the French failed to
prove a sufficient health risk. It therefore was a distinctly applicable breach which the French
had failed to justify.
Likewise, an injunction prohibiting the imports of goods said to infringe a national patent
could only be justified under Article 36 TFEU (protection of intellectual property rights).
25.4.3 Does the measure apply to all products (ie indistinctly applicable measures) or (if
a selling arrangement) indirectly discriminate?
Measures which apply to all goods (domestic and imported) without distinction will be caught
by Article 34 TFEU only if they put the imported goods at a disadvantage compared with
domestic goods. Thus, where the imported product has to be adapted before it can be sold on
the domestic market it is prima facie at a disadvantage compared with domestic products
which are made to domestic specifications. Here, because we are dealing with indirect
discrimination, the measure infringes Article 34 TFEU unless it can be shown to be justified
by a public interest objective (eg, consumer protection, health, environment, etc – the list
given in Cassis de Dijon is not exhaustive) which is proportional and takes precedence over the
free movement of goods. If so justified, there is no Article 34 TFEU infringement. Measures
falling into this category would be German measures on purity of spirits (Cassis de Dijon),
sausages, beer, etc; packaging rules (eg, Danish or German rules on recyclable bottles or
containers – these may be justified on environmental protection grounds (see Commission of
European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark; sub nom Re Disposable Beer Cans [1989] 1 CMLR 619)),
rules on labelling, weight, trade marks, etc. In Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Clinique
Laboratories SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics (Case C-315/92) [1994] ECR I-317, the cosmetic
‘Clinique’ could not be marketed under that mark in Germany because it was considered to
suggest therapeutic properties which it did not have. Since the cosmetic had to be repackaged
for sale in Germany, there was clearly an indirect restriction on imports which could not be
justified on the basis of protecting consumers from confusion.
Since the effect of Cassis de Dijon is that Member States must mutually recognise different
product standards which give equivalent protective effect, modern product standard
Directives under the ‘1992’ campaign (and after) have merely set a minimum level of
protection (‘the essential requirements’) which different national products can satisfy. The
obligatory Euro standard is a thing of the past, except for hazardous products like drugs and
motor cars where full harmonisation of the specification requirements may be needed. In
other areas, Euro standards are considered optional.
25.5 HOW TO USE ARTICLE 34 TFEU

Article 34 TFEU is directly effective; this means it can be relied upon before national courts and
tribunals. It can therefore be used defensively, for example in response to a criminal
prosecution for breach of trading standards in another Member State, or offensively, for
example to challenge a ‘buy national’ campaign. In the latter case, the challenger must follow
the most appropriate national procedure and claim the most effective national remedy. The
Court of Justice has made it clear that a Member State is under an obligation to provide an
effective remedy for infringement of EU rights. Thus, a challenge to a Government-sponsored
‘buy national’ campaign in the UK would be made by judicial review proceedings for a
declaration that the Government was acting ultra vires, accompanied by a claim for an
injunction (see R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) (Case C-213/89) [1990] 3
WLR 818) or possibly damages (see R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 4) [1996]
2 WLR 506). The case of Brasserie du Pêcheur, decided with Factortame (No 4), concerned a damages
claim under Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 34 TFEU) by beer importers who fell foul
of Germany’s purity laws. Since the particular restrictions (relating to a ban on additives) were
not manifestly unlawful at the time, no damages were payable.
It should be noted that all new national rules on product standards have to be notified to
Brussels under Directive 83/189. The failure to do so will invalidate the national law because
Directive 83/189 has direct effect. (See CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA [1996] 2 CMLR
781.) This, too, may be used as a defence.
Competition Law 291
CHAPTER 26
Competition Law

26.2 Anti-competitive agreements: Article 101 TFEU 291
26.3 Abuse of a dominant position: Article 102 TFEU 297
26.4 Chapter Summary 299
LEARNING OUTCOMES

• what restrictions there may be on a business’s ability to make arrangements with
other businesses which relate to how they ply their trade
• what restrictions there may on a business’s ability to make decisions which impact on
other businesses
• what consequences there may be for breach of legislation is this area
• what exceptions may be relied upon to escape liability.
26.1 INTRODUCTION
The regulation of competition between businesses is as important to the Union as the
attainment of the freedoms discussed in the previous chapters. It is of little use to provide that
goods can move freely throughout the Union unless at the same time businesses are able to
trade across frontiers without facing improper competition. Improper competition,
particularly where it has the effect of dividing up markets along national lines, must be
controlled. Thus, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU states that one of the activities of the Union is the
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted. This
system is principally established in two Articles of the Treaty: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
Article 101 TFEU controls anti-competitive agreements, while Article 102 TFEU regulates an
abuse of a dominant position. It should be remembered that the object of any competition law
is greater customer choice, either of manufacturers (different brands) or of dealers supplying
the same brand. More competition equals more choice; this in turn compels competing
manufacturers (or dealers) to cut costs and improve quality of goods or services.
26.2 ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS: ARTICLE 101 TFEU

26.2.1 What does Article 101 TFEU provide?
Article 101 TFEU provides that:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market …
It then gives examples of the types of conduct which would be caught by this definition, such
as fixing prices, controlling production and sharing markets. To discover what other practices
may be within Article 101 TFEU, it is necessary to look at the Article in detail.
26.2.1.1 Agreements between undertakings

The term ‘undertaking’ is not defined in the Treaty but is taken to include any business
enterprise, whatever legal form it may take. In particular, under English law it will include a
company or a partnership, a sole trader or a trade association. A parent and a subsidiary
company are usually taken to amount to a single undertaking for this purpose. Likewise,
agreements between a company and its employees or agents are unlikely to be agreements
‘between undertakings’ as they lack the necessary independence.
Not only written agreements between two or more such undertakings but also less formal
arrangements, such as a mere understanding or ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, may breach Article
101 TFEU (see the Quinine Cartel case, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission of the European
Communities [1970] ECR 661). It was originally thought that Article 85 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 101 TFEU) applied only to agreements between potential competitors, ie ‘horizontal
agreements’ between undertakings at the same level of the production process, for example
the traditional cartel where manufacturers meet in secret to carve up markets or fix prices.
The agreement may, however, be a ‘vertical’ one, that is between undertakings involved at
different stages of the manufacturing or trading process, for example an agreement between a
wholesaler and a retailer. Even if the manufacturer is not involved in distribution itself,
restrictions, eg on prices or exports, can affect competition between distributors (see, for
example, Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH (Etablissements) v EEC Commission [1996] CMLR
418).
26.2.1.2 Decisions by associations of undertakings

The phrase ‘decisions by associations of undertakings’ would include, for example, decisions
taken by a trade association, whether or not they were legally binding.
26.2.1.3 Concerted practices

An enterprise may breach Article 101 TFEU if it deliberately co-ordinates its behaviour with
another business in the same market, for example if they agree to raise prices at the same time
and by the same amount. It is not necessary to be able to prove an agreement that they should
do so; the fact of synchronised activity may be enough, so that, in the words of the European
Court in Dyestuffs [1972] ECR 619, ‘the parties have substituted practical co-operation for the
risks of competition’. It is important to appreciate that a business is entitled to respond to
market conditions, including the behaviour of its competitors. This may well mean that
enterprises operating within the same market do show similar behaviour without there being
a ‘concerted practice’.
26.2.1.4 How much of an effect does there have to be on trade between Member
States?
Article 101 TFEU states that it is necessary that the agreement, etc ‘may’ have an effect on
trade. According to the Court of Justice in STM v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235:
it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective
factors of law or fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States.
Such an effect may result even where the parties to the agreement or concerted practice are
based within one Member State if the effect is to distort competition elsewhere in the EU, for
example because a company based in another Member State is unable to break into that
market (see Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities (No 2) (Case
8/72) [1972] ECR 977 (the Dutch Cement case)).
It can even occur where the parties are based outside the EU, provided the agreement or
practice is implemented within it (Re Wood Pulp Cartel [1988] ECR 5193).
Competition Law 293
It has been held by the Court of Justice that Article 101 TFEU can apply to exclusive
distribution agreements in countries outside the EU (here Russia, the Ukraine and Slovenia),
which contain restrictions on exporting into the EU. Here, the distribution agreements for
Yves St Laurent Perfumes were subject to French law and jurisdiction. The French courts
therefore would be entitled to rule that the agreements were invalid under Article 81(2) EC
(now Article 101(2) TFEU) (see Javico v Yves St Laurent (1998) Financial Times, 13 May).
This part of Article 101 TFEU therefore determines the jurisdiction of the EU competition
authorities. But it also sets out clearly the policy of EU competition law, which is partly to
create a single market. Agreements which have the effect of partitioning the single market
(eg, exclusive territories for dealers) are prima facie likely to infringe Article 101 TFEU.
26.2.1.5 ‘. . . which have as their object or effect’

If, objectively, the parties intend the agreement or the practice to prevent, restrict or distort
competition, there is no need to consider further what the effect of the agreement might be.
On the other hand, if that is not the object, but it would be its effect, then Article 101 TFEU
will still be breached.
26.2.1.6 ‘the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’

The words ‘the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’ are given their ordinary
meaning. However, if the effect is likely to be minimal, Article 101(1) TFEU will not be
breached (Volk v Verwaecke [1969] ECR 295). See further the Commission’s Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance in 26.2.4.
It should be remembered that even if the agreement has no effect on competition between the
parties, it may still be prohibited by Article 101 TFEU if its effect is to restrict competition
with third parties. This is the case with vertical agreements such as the exclusive distribution
agreement which may restrict intra-brand competition between the different dealers.
26.2.2 Can an undertaking apply for clearance that its arrangements are outside
Article 101 TFEU?
This possibility was removed as from 1 May 2004, except that the Commission does have the
power ‘to adopt a decision of a declaratory nature finding that the prohibition in Article [101]
or Article [102] of the Treaty does not apply’. Indications are that this power will be used
sparingly. Parties must generally now ‘self-assess’, ie decide for themselves whether their
arrangement is permitted by Article 101(3) TFEU. Their decision may be challenged by
national competition authorities, the Commission, or by national courts, should it be relevant
in court proceedings.
26.2.3 What is the result if there is a breach of Article 101 TFEU?

According to Article 101(2) TFEU, any agreement or decision prohibited by Article 101(1)
TFEU is automatically void. This means that any agreement is unenforcable. It may be
possible to sever offending clauses from the agreement and leave the rest of it standing.
Whether this is possible depends on the domestic law to which the agreement is subject.
Thus, under English law, such clauses can be severed if the remaining agreement still reflects
accurately the agreement reached by the parties (Chemidus Wavin v Société pour la Transformation et
l’Exploitation des Resines Industrielles SA [1978] 3 CMLR 514). Because Article 101(1) TFEU has
been held to be directly effective, it seems that a party whose business interests are being or
have been harmed by the anti-competitive agreement may seek an injunction to restrain
operation of the agreement and may be able to claim damages (Garden Cottage Foods v Milk
Marketing Board [1983] 3 WLR 143). In addition, the Commission and national competition
authorities have the power to levy fines upon the parties to an anti-competitive agreement,
the size of the fine (up to a maximum of 10% of turnover) being dependent on the degree of
fault. A recent fine for Microsoft was in the sum of £335 million.
26.2.4 Are there any ways out for a business which seems to be at risk of breaching this
Article?
There are primarily three ways in which a business may avoid breaching Article 101 TFEU.
26.2.4.1 The Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance

The Commission, which is responsible for implementing the EU’s competition policy, has
issued a Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance. According to this Notice, only
agreements which have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States should be
taken as breaching Article 101 TFEU. The questions parties must ask themselves to decide
whether they fit within the Notice are:
• Does the parties’ combined market share exceed 10% in the case of a horizontal
arrangement (ie between those at the same level of the supply chain, such as
competitors) or 15% in the case of a vertical arrangement (such as between supplier and
distributor, or distributor and wholesaler)? If it does, the Notice does not apply.
• Is competition in the market restricted by the cumulative effect of similar agreements
entered into by a number of suppliers or distributors? If so, the Notice will not apply if
the parties’ market share is not less than 5%.
• If the arrangement is horizontal, does it have provisions which have as their object the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, such as those fixing prices,
limiting exports or sales, or allocating markets or customers? If so, the Notice will not
apply.
• If the arrangement is vertical, does it contain any ‘hardcore’ restrictions prohibited by
the vertical restraints block exemption (see 26.2.5)? If not, the Notice will not apply.
If the parties meet the requisite criteria, the Notice will apply and the arrangement will be
assumed not to have an appreciable effect on trade and so will be taken as not breaching
Article 101.
The Notice does not give complete legal protection because the market may be a very
specialised one where even small companies (especially with patent protection) may have
more than the relevant percentage.
26.2.4.2 Article 101(3) TFEU

It may be possible to avoid the effects of Article 101(2) TFEU for a particular agreement
because of the operation of Article 101(3) TFEU. This provides for exemption for any
agreement which:
(a) contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods, or to promoting
technical or economic progress; and
(b) allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; and
(c) does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and
(d) does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.
Thus, to satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU, the agreement must bring with it certain benefits while
at the same time not including excessive restriction of competition.
As mentioned at 26.2.2 above, parties must decide for themselves whether they fit within
Article 101(3) TFEU.
26.2.4.3 Using a block exemption

The Commission in the early years of the Community was inundated with individual
notifications, and it was not unusual for years to go by without a reply being received from the
Competition Law 295
Commission. To try to deal with this volume of agreements, the Commission began to
introduce block exemptions (as Article 101(3) TFEU and its predecessors allow them) for
particular categories of agreement which fulfil the conditions for an exemption.
Note that since the Commission alone can give an exemption, severance by national courts is
not possible as the parties must stick to the terms of the block exemption before it can apply
(see Delimitis v Henninger Braü [1991] ECR 1-935). Thus, firms which wish to have the certainty
of a valid agreement must take particular care to draft their agreements to fit the relevant
block exemption. If they include restrictions which are not allowed by the block exemption,
the block exemption cannot apply and the national court generally cannot sever restrictions
before applying the block exemption.
26.2.5 Using a typical block exemption: vertical restraints

In May 2010, a block exemption was passed which covered all types of vertical arrangements,
such as exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing (eg, beer ties) and franchising. This is
Regulation 330/2010. It exempts in Article 2(1) all vertical agreements (ie, between two or
more parties at different levels of the production or distribution chain). There are basically
four things to check.
26.2.5.1 Is it vertical?
Under the exemption in Article 2(1), the parties to the agreement must be at different levels,
but this would take in a number of different agreements involving goods or services, such as
exclusive distribution, selective distribution, franchises and exclusive purchasing.
Exemptions would also cover exclusive supply agreements (eg, where a large retailer
persuades a supplier of parts to supply only him). Unlike previous block exemptions, it is no
longer necessary to identify which type of vertical agreement one is dealing with.
The exemption can apply to multi-party agreements provided they are still vertical. Thus
Article 2(2) specifically refers to agreements between a supplier and a trade association of
small retailers. There is no reason why a British manufacturer wishing to distribute his
product in France should not agree to supply the various retailers in such a trade association
and achieve national retail coverage that way rather than supply an individual distributor.
It can also apply even though the chosen distributor is another manufacturer and thus a
potential competitor. There is a danger here of the arrangements operating as a horizontal
cartel, but provided the arrangements are not reciprocal the exemption can still apply (Article
2(4)).
The exemption does not apply to agreements which are primarily concerned with licensing
intellectual property (IP) rights, for example patent, trade mark, copyright or software
licences (Article 2(3)). Licensing of ‘technology’ (patents, software copyright, know-how) is
covered by a Technology Transfer Block Exemption (Regulation 316/2014).
26.2.5.2 Prohibited list

Assuming that the agreement is vertical then the exemption under Article 2(1) applies to all
vertical restraints otherwise prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, unless the agreement contains
prohibited clauses. So, the second stage is to check the prohibited list in Article 4. Some of the
prohibited clauses are directed to particular types of agreement, so it may be helpful to see
how this applies to exclusive distribution and selective distribution.
If it is exclusive distribution the clauses to avoid are as follows:
(a) Article 4(a) – price fixing. This includes minimum prices (which effectively prevent
discounts) as well as fixed prices. It does not include maximum or recommended prices
unless the price has become in practice fixed through pressure from the supplier. It may
be worth considering why prices would be recommended – this may be more justified in
selective distribution or franchising than in exclusive distribution.
(b) Article 4(b) – Restrictions on the buyer’s resales to customers or into other territories. It
should be noticed that only restrictions on the buyer (the distributor) are prohibited; the
block exemption would certainly cover restrictions on the supplier selling into the
buyer’s territory (the essence, of course, of exclusive distribution).
As far as restrictions on the buyer are concerned, it is permissible to prohibit the distributor
from actively marketing the goods in territories reserved to the supplier or allocated to other
distributors. Passive sales (where the customer approaches the dealer unsolicited) can never
be restricted. The enterprising customer must always be allowed to shop around the network
to get the cheapest deal. With new methods of marketing over the Internet, which knows no
frontiers, the distinction between active and passive sales into other territories becomes a fine
one. Fortunately, the Commission’s guidelines make it clear that having a website is not
actively selling outside the territory. A UK customer can thus check the websites of the dealers
in, say, France, Germany and Italy, and order from the cheapest. That is a passive sale and the
agreement cannot prohibit the dealer from meeting that order without imperiling the validity
of the agreement itself.
Although the agreement can stop the distributor from actively selling to a reserved territory or
customer group, it cannot stop him from selling to a customer who would resell to such
customers (see Article 4(b), first indent). This is the parallel importer (or exporter), the
enterprising dealer who buys from the distributor with the cheapest prices with a view to
reselling in those territories where prices are highest. Any restrictions on such sales would lose
the block exemption.
If it is selective distribution the supplier must again avoid price fixing, but he is even more
restricted in the limitations he can put on dealers’ customers. The definition of ‘selective
distribution’ appears in Article 1(c). The dealers must be selected on the basis of specified
criteria. These might be their qualifications to handle the product (eg, computers or other hi-
tech products), or to give the right ambience to accord with the image of the brand (eg,
perfumes). The dealers in the network undertake, therefore, not to sell to unauthorised
dealers, but other restrictions on sales are all black-listed. Thus dealers must be permitted to
supply other selected dealers (Article 4(d)) and selected retailers cannot be prevented from
supplying end-users, whether actively or passively (Article 4(c)). Thus, it is not possible to give
selected dealers any territorial protection at all from other dealers, who will all compete,
whether actively or passively, for the customers of each other.
26.2.5.3 Market share

Once it is clear there are no prohibited clauses, the agreement (and all its restrictions) is
covered by the exemption, but it is still necessary to check whether either party has more than
30% of the relevant market. If either has, the block exemption cannot apply (Article 3). The
rationale for this is that the Commission needs to be satisfied that the agreement does not
substantially eliminate competition. Equally, the bigger the market share, the closer the firm
comes to being dominant on that market, at which point many of the restrictions permitted
under the block exemption would be seen as abuses under Article 102 TFEU. Thirty per cent
has always been taken as the bottom line for dominance. So, even though most cases would
be well over 40%, the Commission would still want to vet these agreements individually to be
sure.
26.2.5.4 Severable restrictions

This leaves one final step, which is to check through Article 5 to see whether there are any
severable restrictions in the agreement. These restrictions, which all concern non-compete
obligations, do not destroy the exemption given to other vertical restraints. The national court
is permitted to sever them from the agreement (assuming this is possible under its own
national rules). The restrictions are:
Competition Law 297
(a) Non-compete obligations (including exclusive purchase). These must be for a fixed term under
five years, although, for beer ties with tenanted pubs, the duration could be the length
of the lease. Any indefinite exclusive purchase obligation will thus be void but severable.
Article 1(b) defines such clauses to include those where the buyer has to take more than
80% of his purchases from the supplier. Thus, in beer ties, the pub may well be taking a
guest beer. If guest beers make up less than 20% of the beer supply, the supplier needs
to be wary of Article 5.
(b) Post-term restrictive covenants. As under English law, these are void if unjustified. But,
under Article 5(b), they benefit from the exemption only if they are confined to the
same premises, the same goods and a maximum duration of one year. Moreover, and
most importantly, they can be justified only if they are there to protect trade secrets
(‘know-how’). It is unlikely that such covenants could ever be justified in exclusive
distribution. There will, however, be trade secrets to protect in franchises, and possibly
in selective distribution.
(c) Lastly, selective distribution dealers can never be prevented from selling competing
goods, but such clauses are severable.
26.2.6 Agency agreements

The Commission has stated in its Guidance Note to the Vertical Restraints Regulation that
such agreements will be outside Article 101 TFEU provided the agent accepts no financial
risks and the principal is responsible for setting prices and terms. The point here is that such
an agent is integrated into the principal’s business and thus is not an independent
undertaking. The Commission has now put the Notice in its new guidelines on vertical
agreements.
26.2.7 Mergers
In principle, when two companies merge (eg, one takes over the other) they cease to be
independent undertakings and thus the agreement between them cannot be caught by Article
101 TFEU.
26.3 ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION: ARTICLE 102 TFEU

26.3.1 What is the general effect of Article 102 TFEU?
Article 102 TFEU renders unlawful any behaviour which amounts to an abuse of its position by
an undertaking which is dominant in its particular market. It will therefore be crucially
important, when faced with a potential breach of Article 102 TFEU, to identify the relevant
market; it will be seen that undertakings with quite small shares of one market can be
dominant in a section of that market and so be at risk from Article 102 TFEU. It will also be
seen that a distinction has to be drawn between an undertaking legitimately taking advantage
of what may be a hard-won dominant position and an undertaking which illegitimately abuses
that position.
26.3.2 What does Article 102 TFEU provide?

According to Article 102 TFEU:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may
affect trade between Member States.
The Article then goes on to give a non-exclusive list of the types of behaviour which might
amount to such an abuse, for example an undertaking imposing unfair trading conditions,
such as unfair prices.
26.3.2.1 What is a dominant position within the internal market?

It is by no means essential for an undertaking to be in a monopoly position throughout the
EU. The guiding principle here is that an undertaking is likely to be dominant where its
economic strength allows it to behave independently of other operators within the market
(United Brands Co (New Jersey, USA) and United Brands Continentaal B (Rotterdam, The Netherlands) v EC
Commission [1978] ECR 207). An example of the principle is where a manufacturing company
can set prices or conditions of supply to retailers of its product without regard to the prices or
conditions imposed by its competitors. This is more likely to be the case where the
undertaking has a larger market share. (In Hilti v Commission of the European Communities [1992] 4
CMLR 16, for example, an undertaking was held to be dominant with a 70–80% share of its
market.) However, a relatively low market share does not necessarily mean that the
undertaking is not dominant. In United Brands, dominance was established although the
company had a market share of only 40–45%. A particularly important factor to take into
account here is whether there are barriers to entry for other undertakings who might wish to
enter the market. Does the allegedly dominant undertaking, for example, possess intellectual
property rights which would create such a barrier? Whether or not an undertaking is
dominant can be considered only in relation to a particular market. In order to identify the
relevant market it is important to look at two things: the product market and the geographic
market.
How is the product market recognised?

The key question in recognising the product market is ‘what other product, if any, can be
substituted for the product in question, given the nature of it, its price and its intended use?’.
If a number of products are interchangeable, from the point of view of the user, it is arguable
that they are all part of one market. On the other hand, if there is no acceptable alternative to
the product in question then it can form a market on its own. In United Brands, the Court of
Justice found that bananas represented a single market because, in certain respects, bananas
could not easily be replaced by another fruit. In particular, children and the elderly or the
infirm might find it easier to digest bananas than any other fruit.
Similarly, in Hugin Kassareregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers v EC Commission [1979] ECR 1869,
the Court of Justice found that spare parts for Hugin cash registers represented a separate
market in their own right because, once a customer had bought a Hugin machine, no other
spare parts could be used. Clearly, if the product market is drawn so narrowly, an undertaking
may find itself dominant even if its share of, say, the fruit market or the market for spare parts
for cash registers generally is very small.
How is the geographic market recognised?

It is important to look at the geographic area within which the undertaking markets the
product where the conditions of competition are the same. Here, too, the definition of the
geographical scope of the market is based on substitutability; how far will customers look for
their substitute product if the firm’s product is unobtainable or too pricey. In many cases, this
will be the whole of the single market, but factors such as cultural preferences, the personal
nature of services contracts and the costs of transporting heavier goods may restrict the
market to a particular region or country.
Article 102 TFEU applies where an undertaking is dominant in the common market or a
substantial part of it. Dominance within a single Member State is likely to be within a
substantial part of the common market.
26.3.2.2 What amounts to an abuse of a dominant position?

There are broadly two types of abusive behaviour: one affects competitors or potential
competitors in the field; the other affects consumers. Abuse affecting competitors would
Competition Law 299
include pricing the undertaking’s products so low that those competitors are forced out of the
market, or requiring purchasers of one type of product to buy other products produced by the
same undertaking in order to tie them in to a single supplier. Examples of abuses affecting
consumers would be setting prices extortionately high, or requiring the product to be sold in
certain outlets only.
26.3.3 Are there any exceptions to Article 102 TFEU?

There is no equivalent in Article 102 TFEU of Article 101(3) TFEU (see 26.2.4.2); the
Commission cannot grant an individual exemption from Article 102 TFEU, nor are there block
exemptions. Even if an undertaking is entitled to claim the benefit of a block exemption under
Article 101(3) TFEU for its activities, that does not necessarily mean that such activities do not
amount to an abuse of a dominant position (Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission of the European
Communities [1991] FSR 654). The Commission will, in theory, give guidance letters on
whether an action represents a breach, but it is thought that such guidance letters will be few
and far between.
26.3.4 What are the sanctions for breach of Article 102 TFEU?
The Commission and national competition authorities have the power to fine undertakings
for breaches of Article 102 TFEU. As there is no possibility of exemption, there is no
equivalent of Article 101(3) TFEU. Behaviour in breach of Article 102 TFEU may also give rise
to civil liability. It seems that under English law, an injunction can be granted to restrain
breaches of Article 102 TFEU, and it is arguable that damages could also be sought (see Garden
Cottage Foods at 26.2.3).
26.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

Article 102 TFEU cases are likely to be rare for most solicitors. Article 101 TFEU, however, is
likely to be of much greater relevance.
In drafting commercial agreements, such as licensing agreements for intellectual property
rights, distribution agreements, joint ventures (or other arrangements with potential
competitors), franchise agreements and exclusive purchasing arrangements (eg, beer ties
with public houses or solus agreements for petrol stations), the practitioner has to take
Article 101 TFEU into account. He should consider in turn:
(1) whether the restrictive agreement might affect trade between Member States, but
remember that many agreements between UK parties have such potential;
(2) whether it is covered by the Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance (but this is only
limited security as market share may change). The determination of the relevant market
is as critical here as under Article 102 TFEU;
(3) for full certainty that the agreement is valid; however, the parties must draft their
agreement to fit the relevant block exemption Regulation (eg Regulation 330/2010);
(4) if the parties wish to include clauses which are not permitted by a block exemption, the
agreement is likely to be void under Article 101(2) TFEU and thus (subject to severance)
unenforceable in the national courts, unless the parties show that the agreement fits
within the exemption contained in Article 101(3) TFEU.
The following is an illustration of how Article 101 TFEU might apply to an exclusive
distribution agreement (based on Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v EEC Commission
[1996] CMLR 418).
EXAMPLE
Widgets Ltd, a UK manufacturer with 15% of the EU widgets market, has a network of
exclusive distributors at the wholesale level in France, UK and Germany (see diagram
below). It sells to its distributors at £5 per widget and they then mark the price up when
selling on to retailers. The UK distributor (a wholly-owned subsidiary) charges £10,
whereas the German distributor charges only £6. To protect its position in the UK,
therefore, Widgets Ltd imposes clauses on the German wholesaler which prevent it selling
to customers outside its territory (export bars) and from selling to dealers in Germany who
could resell outside (ie sales to parallel importers). It is hoped that it would thus have
absolute territorial protection from competition on prices with its other EU distributors.
Such protection is, however, contrary to Article 101 TFEU and will attract fines, potential tort
claims and void agreements. The block exemption on vertical agreements (Regulation 330/
2010) allows territorial exclusivity and a ban on active sales (advertising, etc) outside the
territory, but not a ban on passive sales (ie to unsolicited customers who place orders on their
own initiative), nor a ban on sales to parallel exporters (see Article 4(b), first indent).
Retailers across the EU are perfectly entitled to buy from the cheapest wholesaler in the
network.
A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Exclusive Widgets Ltd

Distribution £5 £5
Agreement
Wholesale A (France) SARL Widgets (UK) Ltd B (Germany) GmbH

(wholly-owned
subsidiary)
£8 £10 £6
Passive sale
Active sale
Retailers X
BRITISH PARALLEL Z Retailers
RETAILERS £8 IMPORTS
Consumers C C C
Competition Law
301
303
PART IV
HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Convention on Human Rights 305
CHAPTER 27
The European Convention

on Human Rights
27.1 Introduction to human rights 305

27.2 Introduction to the Convention 305
27.3 The relationship between the ECHR and English law 306
27.4 The relationship between the ECHR and the EU 306
27.5 The substantive law of the ECHR 306
27.6 Petitioning the Court in Strasbourg 326
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• the background to the Convention
• how the Convention relates to English and EU law
• how to interpret the Convention
• the main rights that are protected by the Convention
• when a right has been interfered with
• how to petition the European Court of Human Rights.
27.1 INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS

Since the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) came into force, the subject of human rights
has been treated as a pervasive topic on the Legal Practice Course. Perhaps more than any
other pervasive topic, its reach is long, and it has begun to make its presence felt in almost
every area of law and practice. A copy of the HRA 1998 may be found at Appendix 1 to Part IV.
Before starting a Legal Practice Course students are expected to have a ‘basic knowledge and
understanding of the relevant human rights conventions and legislation’ (see Appendix to the
Solicitors Regulation Authority, Legal Practice Course Outcomes, 2007). This part of this
book is intended to act as a reminder of the key points and put them in a practical context.
This chapter re-introduces you to the European Convention on Human Rights and some of
the most important Convention rights. Chapter 28 deals with the mechanism by which the
HRA 1998 makes those rights enforceable in the UK.
27.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONVENTION

The UK was instrumental in drafting the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (European Convention on Human Rights) (ECHR).
The Convention was drafted by members of the Council of Europe (a body unrelated to the
European Union) in the aftermath of the Second World War and the human rights abuses
which took place during it. The UK was one of the original signatories on 4 November 1950.
The Convention came into force on 3 September 1953. However, unlike many of the other
signatories, the UK did not incorporate the Convention into its own legal system. The
Government believed that incorporation was unnecessary because the rights contained in the
Convention already existed in British common law.
The original ECHR contained the civil and political rights to be found in classical liberal
thought, such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom from interference
with privacy. A series of protocols, some of which have been ratified by the UK, deal with
certain other matters including the right to education and the right to peaceful enjoyment of
private property (First Protocol) and the prohibition of the death penalty (Sixth Protocol).
The most imaginative feature of the ECHR was that it imposed an international judicial
system for the protection of human rights on Europe. It is the most developed of regional
systems for the protection of human rights.
27.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECHR AND ENGLISH LAW

The HRA 1998 (which came into force in October 2000) has bridged the gap between
domestic and international law so far as the Convention is concerned. Domestic English
courts are now empowered to enforce Convention rights. Exactly how they may do so will be
discussed in Chapter 28.
27.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECHR AND THE EU

While there is a close relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the two are distinct and
should not be confused. In particular, bear in mind the following differences.
(a) Far more countries are signatories to the ECHR than are members of the EU.
(b) The EU’s concern with human rights has traditionally been limited. Some rights are
protected. Article 157 TFEU, for example, deals with sex discrimination.
(c) The ECHR confers rights on everyone within the jurisdiction of a State which is party to
the Convention, and not just those who are nationals of the State in question. This is
important for asylum seekers, for example: EU law is usually concerned only with the
rights of nationals of Member States.
(d) The ECHR has its own institutions and procedures, in particular the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) which sits in Strasbourg, not Luxembourg or Brussels.
There have been suggestions since 1977 that the EU might become a party to the ECHR. So far
this has not happened, and indeed the Court of Justice ruled that the Council has no power to
accede to the ECHR under the Treaty as currently drafted (see Opinion No 2/94 [1996] ECR I-
1759, 28 March 1996). But the Court of Justice has said that EU law will draw upon the
jurisprudence of the ECHR because it represents the common traditions of the EU Member
States in the field of human rights. Note that the Maastricht Treaty makes an express
reference to human rights and in particular to the ECHR: see the Recitals and TEU, Article 6.
27.5 THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE ECHR

27.5.1 The Convention rights
These are the main rights protected by the Convention:
(a) right to life (Article 2);
(b) prohibition of torture (Article 3);
(c) prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4);
(d) right to liberty and security (Article 5);
(e) right to a fair trial (Article 6);
(f ) no punishment without lawful authority (Article 7);
(g) right to respect for family and private life (Article 8);
(h) right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9);
(i) right to freedom of expression (Article 10);

( j) right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11);
(k) right to marry (Article 12);
(l) prohibition of discrimination (Article 14);
(m) right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (First Protocol, Article 1);
(n) right to education and right of parents to educate children in accordance with religious
and philosophical convictions (First Protocol, Article 2).
The most important of these rights are described below (27.5.3–27.5.9).
27.5.2 Some general considerations when dealing with Convention rights

27.5.2.1 Drafting
The Convention is drafted in quite a different way from a United Kingdom statute. In the UK,
legislative drafting tends to be very tight and exhaustive. The rights in the Convention are
deliberately left open-ended, and the Strasbourg organs do not interpret the Convention in
the same way as English judges interpret domestic legislation. Lawyers in the UK must
appreciate this different way of working.
27.5.2.2 Absolute and limited rights

Some of the Convention rights are absolute. For example, the right to freedom from torture:
the Convention allows no circumstances in which torture could be legitimate. But most of the
rights are subject to limitations and qualifications. For example, the right to freedom of
expression may be interfered with where the matters being expressed are defamatory or
harmful to national security. Much of the argument in Convention cases turns not on whether
there has been an interference with Convention rights, but on whether that interference is
justifiable. In considering the interference, the ECtHR has invented a number of tools with
which UK lawyers need to be familiar.
27.5.2.3 Judicial method

Once it has been established that a Convention right has been interfered with, the court must
consider whether the interference is justified (unless the right is one which is absolute, in
which case no interference is allowed).
There are four key concepts which the ECtHR uses.
The rule of law

No matter how desirable the end to be achieved, any interference with a Convention right
must be based on some ascertainable law, and not on an arbitrary executive decision. Without
detailed authorisation by law, any interference, however justified, will violate the Convention.
For example, telephone tapping by the police in the 1970s was regulated by nothing more
than an internal police guidance note which was not available to the public. The interference
with the right to respect for correspondence (Article 8) was not therefore justified by law and
was contrary to the Convention (Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14).
Legitimate aims
The defendant must say why the right is being interfered with, and the reason must be a
legitimate one. Many of the Articles (eg, Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11) set out what sorts of aims are
legitimate, for example the interests of public safety, national security or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. For example, if a prisoner’s correspondence is being read by
the prison authorities then the prevention of disorder or crime within the prison would be a
legitimate reason for the interference with Article 8 if there was a genuine belief that there was
a risk. But the routine reading of mail would not be legitimate (Campbell v United Kingdom (1992)
15 EHRR 137).
Proportionality
The cliché usually used to describe the doctrine of proportionality is that the State cannot use
a sledgehammer to crack a nut. In the more formal language of the court, any restriction on a
right must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ or based on some ‘pressing social need’. For
example, in the domestic UK case of Lindsay v Customs & Excise Commissioners [2002] EWCA Civ
267, [2002] STC 588, the defendant had been caught by customs officers driving his Ford
Focus car into the UK containing 18,400 cigarettes, 10 kilos of handrolling tobacco, 31 litres
of beer and 3 litres of spirits. The goods were for members of his family, for which he had
received payment. This was unlawful. As well as seizing the goods, the customs officers seized
his car and refused to return it to him. The Court of Appeal held that the interference with the
defendant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions by the forfeiture of his car,
although within the legal powers of the customs officers, was disproportionate for small-scale
smuggling of this nature.
Note that the principle of proportionality in EU law is neither expressed nor applied in the
same way as the principle of proportionality under the ECHR. Although there is some
common ground, the so-called four-stage analysis of proportionality which was explained in
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 at [20] and [72]–[76], in relation to the
justification under domestic law (in particular, under the Human Rights Act 1998) of
interferences with fundamental rights, is not applicable to proportionality in EU law (see R (on
the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41 at [26]).
Margin of appreciation
This is the Strasbourg equivalent of what in Brussels is called subsidiarity. It means that the
States which are party to the Convention are allowed a degree of leeway out of sensitivity to
their own political and cultural traditions. For example, the case of Handyside v United Kingdom
(1976) 1 EHRR 737 concerned the publication in England in 1971 of The Little Red School Book, a
children’s book including a section on sex. The publisher had been convicted under the
Obscene Publications Act 1959. The ECtHR had to consider the UK Government’s argument
that the interference with the publisher’s right to freedom of expression was necessary for the
purpose of the ‘protection of morals’. The Court accepted that such a matter was within the
competence of national authorities and a standard could not be imposed by an international
body:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion. (para
48)
The majority of commentators agree that, by its nature, the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation will not be relevant to cases decided under the HRA 1998 by UK courts. The
doctrine exists to take account of the geographical and cultural gaps between an international
court and the various countries it supervises. Within a unitary domestic legal system it will
serve no purpose.
27.5.3 Article 5: The right to liberty and security

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence
or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or

fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f ) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to
deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of
this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Article 5 is the most lengthy of the Convention rights. To determine whether there is a
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of and engaging the protection of Article 5(1), three
conditions must be satisfied:
(a) an objective element of ‘a person’s confinement to a certain limited place for a not
negligible length of time’;
(b) a subjective element, namely that the person has not ‘validly consented to the
confinement in question’; and
(c) the deprivation of liberty must be one for which the State is responsible. See generally A
Local Authority v A, B, C, D and E [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam), P (by his litigation friend The
Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West & Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19 and Secretary of State for
Justice v Staffordshire County Council [2016] EWCA Civ 1317.
Can a control order amount to a deprivation of liberty? In AH v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2011] EWCA Civ 787, the control order included the following obligations: a
14-hour curfew between 6pm and 8am in a flat in Norwich; a prohibition on communications
equipment other than a landline telephone; and a geographical boundary comprising the
centre and inner suburbs of Norwich. At first instance the judge concluded that a curfew of
14 hours was not, by itself, tantamount to a deprivation of liberty. He then addressed
10 individual features of the control order relied upon by the appellant in order to see whether
their cumulative effect, when taken with the length of the curfew, was such as to amount to a
deprivation of liberty. He concluded that this was not a case of deprivation of liberty but that it
‘falls just on the restriction on liberty side of the line and so does not engage Article 5’. The
decision was upheld on appeal. Also see AP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 3
WLR 51, where Lord Brown said at (para 4): ‘I nevertheless remain of the view that for a
control order with a 16 hour curfew to be struck down as involving a deprivation of liberty, the
other conditions imposed would have to be unusually destructive of the life the controlee
might otherwise have been living.’
Can an adult, in the exercise of parental responsibility, impose, or authorise others to impose,
restrictions on the liberty of his or her child? Yes, but the restrictions so imposed must not in
their totality amount to deprivation of liberty that engages the Article 5 rights of the child: see
Neilson v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175, Re K [2002] 2 WLR 1141 and RK (by her litigation friend
the Official Solicitor) v BCC [2011] EWCA Civ 1305. As to the actions of the police in restraining
an autistic, epileptic young man when such restraint was in the circumstances hasty, ill-
informed and damaging to him, see ZH (a protected party by his litigation friend, GH) v Commissioner
of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 69.
Does the opportunity for a prisoner, who is subject to an indeterminate sentence, to
rehabilitate himself and demonstrate that he no longer presents a danger to the public fall
within Article 5? Yes, held the ECtHR in James v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 12. However, the Supreme
Court refused to follow that judgment in R (on the application of Hanley) v Secretary of State for
Justice [2014] UKSC 66. The Court held that it was only implicit in the scheme of the Article
that the State had a duty to provide a reasonable opportunity for a prisoner subject to an
indeterminate sentence to rehabilitate himself and demonstrate that he no longer presented a
danger to the public. However, that is an ancillary duty, which cannot be brought within the
express language of the Article and does not therefore affect the lawfulness of detention.
Article 5 is of particular importance to criminal litigation practitioners, especially in
challenging arrests and detentions. Its overall purpose is to ensure that no one is deprived of
his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion (Engel v Netherlands (1979–80) 1 EHRR 647, para 58
and Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5).
The Article has two distinct limbs. Paragraph 1 prohibits interference with liberty or security
of person except in certain, well-defined circumstances. No distinction tends to be made in
Strasbourg jurisprudence between the two concepts of liberty and security of person.
Paragraphs 2–5 provide a set of procedural rights for detainees.
27.5.3.1 Lawful detention

Paragraph 1 insists in particular that any detention must be ‘lawful’ (the word is used in each
of subparas (a)–(f )). This requires that the domestic law upon which a detention is based must
be accessible and precise. The paragraph also requires that the detention be ‘in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law’. This calls for a consideration of how the detainer has
gone about detaining the individual rather than why. Where there is no procedure prescribed
by domestic law, or where the detainer has failed to follow it, Article 5 will have been breached
(see Secretary of State for Justice v RB [2011] EWCA Civ 1608).
The attempt made in Article 5(1)(a) to (f ) to codify the exceptions more precisely makes it
unusually inflexible if applied according to its literal meaning in a situation of armed conflict.
In some circumstances, some of the six grounds may adventitiously accommodate military
detention. But as the Strasbourg Court recognised in Hassan v UK (2014) 38 BHRC 358, they
are not designed for such a situation and are not well adapted to it. Moreover, Hassan does not
add a notional seventh ground of permitted military detention in the course of armed conflict.
Its effect is rather to recognise that sub-paragraphs (a) to (f ) cannot necessarily be regarded as
exhaustive when the Convention is being applied to such a conflict, because their exhaustive character
reflects peacetime conditions. This means that where the armed forces of a Convention state are acting
under a mandate from the Security Council to use all necessary measures, article 5(1) cannot be taken
to prevent them from detaining persons for imperative reasons of security. (per Lord Sumpton in Abd
Ali Hameed Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2 at para 68)
As a result, in an international armed conflict, a system of judicial control over detention may
not always be required.
Is there a breach if the person is detained in the ‘wrong’ place, for example in prison rather
than in a detention centre for deportees? This happened in R (on the application of Dritan Krasniqi)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 1549. The Court held that a claim
cannot be based solely on an irregularity in the selection of the place of detention. It might be
different if it was shown that the conditions of detention were unduly harsh, as in Mayeka v
Belgium [2007] 1 FLR 1726. There, a 5-year-old child was detained for two months, alone
among strangers, in an adult detention centre. This caused her such distress and potential
psychological damage that it amounted both to inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 and
to a violation under Article 5 of the principle that the place and conditions of detention must
be related to the permitted ground of deprivation of liberty. See also R (on the application of Idira)
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1187.
Can Article 5(1)(c) apply in a case of detention for preventive purposes followed by early
release, that is, before the person could practicably be brought before a court? Yes – see R (on
the application of Hicks) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 9.
27.5.3.2 Reasons
Paragraph 2 provides a right for those placed under arrest to be given reasons. These do not
need to be in writing, and formal notification is not necessary if the reasons are made clear
during the arrest (X v Netherlands 5 YB 224, at 228).
27.5.3.3 Judicial supervision

Paragraph 3 requires that the person under arrest be brought promptly before a judge (usually
a magistrate in the UK). The paragraph also provides for trial within a reasonable time, or for
release pending trial (ie bail). There is a presumption that bail will be granted unless there are
good reasons not to grant it (for example, because there is a risk that the accused will fail to
appear at the trial: Stögmüller v Austria (1969) 1 EHRR 155).
27.5.3.4 Challenge and review

Paragraph 4 requires that a speedy procedure must be available by which detention can be
challenged. The habeas corpus procedure in the UK fulfils this requirement, so long as it
concludes swiftly. The ECtHR has also held that where the circumstances of detention vary
over time a regular reviewing procedure must exist.
Many cases turn on the question of whether or not a period of detention is reasonable. In
O’Dowd v UK [2010] ECHR 1324, the ECtHR stressed that this cannot be assessed in the
abstract. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be considered
in each case according to its special features. Continued detention may be justified in a given
case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual
liberty laid down in Article 5. The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested
has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued
detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish
whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the
deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were relevant and sufficient, the Court must also
be satisfied that the national authorities displayed special diligence in the conduct of the
proceedings. In judging whether the special diligence requirement has been met, the Court
will have regard to periods of unjustified delay, to the overall complexity of the proceedings
and to any steps taken by the authorities to speed up proceedings to ensure that the overall
length of detention remains reasonable.
In R (on the application of Whiston) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 39, a prisoner was
released before he became automatically entitled to release. He was recalled, still within the
custodial period of his sentence, because his whereabouts could no longer be monitored in the
community. The Secretary of State’s recall decision was not subject to judicial control. The issue
was whether the recall constituted a fresh deprivation of liberty so as to engage Article 5(4) and
provide a right of review, or whether the renewed detention remained justified by the original
sentence of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held the latter. In doing so the Court refused to
follow its previous decision in R (on the application of Smith) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1.
27.5.3.5 Compensation
Paragraph 5 provides a right to compensation for any interference with Article 5 rights. In
practice, this is unlikely to add anything to the availability of damages (and possibly
exemplary damages) in tort for wrongful arrest or unlawful detention.
The enforceable right to compensation is not intended to provide compensation for claimants
whose convictions were reached by a lawfully constituted court but which were quashed on
appeal: W v Ministry of Justice [2015] EWCA Civ 742.
The right to compensation will be important where there is no entitlement to damages at
common law, eg the applicant is ordered to remain in custody by a civil court. This happened
in Stellato v Ministry of Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 1435 where the applicant was unlawfully
detained under an order of the Court of Appeal for 14 days until released by the Supreme
Court. That he was subsequently unlawfully detained by the defendant for a further 59 days
also entitled him to damages at common law.
27.5.4 Article 6: The right to a fair trial

1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court
in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has
not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against
him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
Article 6 is arguably the most important, and certainly the most utilised, of all the Convention
rights. It provides for a right to fair criminal and civil trials, and lays down certain procedural
standards. It is of direct importance to all litigators, and therefore indirectly to all lawyers.
27.5.4.1 Determination of civil rights or a criminal charge
Paragraph 1 lays down the basic ‘due process’ standards for the determination of civil and
criminal matters. The phrase ‘in the determination of his civil rights’ needs some explanation.
It does not simply cover every issue which might be the subject of a trial in civil law as an
English lawyer would understand that expression. The Strasbourg case law on this is complex.
All proceedings between private individuals and private bodies are included. Not all
proceedings involving public authorities are, and here further research may be necessary.
Broadly, a distinction is made between those decisions of public bodies which affect private
law rights (which are within the scope of the Article) and those affecting public law rights
(which are not). For example, disciplinary proceedings that might result in the removal of
professional status (Le Compte v Belgium [1982] ECC 240) are included. Likewise, planning
decisions affect property rights and are included. Actions to sue public authorities for
compensation will be included, because private law rights in tort or contract are involved. The
fact that a claim depends on a failure to comply with the terms of a government policy, rather
than of legislation, is not in itself a reason why it cannot involve the determination of a civil
right (R (on the application of K) v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 1149).
Decisions of public authorities affecting education involve public law, not private law rights,
and are not subject to Article 6 requirements (Simpson v United Kingdom (1989) 64 DR 188). For
the same reason, decisions on the categorisation of prisoners for security purposes are not
covered (Brady v United Kingdom (1979) 3 EHRR 297), neither are government decisions on
asylum (R (K)(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 115), or decisions
by a local housing authority under s 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996 that it has discharged its
duty to secure accommodation available for occupation by a homeless applicant (Ali v
Birmingham CC [2010] UKSC 8), or decisions of an independent appeal panel as to whether a
pupil should be permanently excluded from school (R (on the application of V) v Independent Appeal
Panel for Tom Hood School [2010] EWCA Civ 142).
What is a criminal charge for the purposes of Article 6? To determine this, three questions
must be answered. How is the offence classified in domestic law? What is the nature of the
offence? What is the nature and purpose of the penalty; how severe is it? See Engel v Netherlands
(1979–80) 1 EHRR 647. However, the minor nature of a penalty does not prevent it from
being ‘criminal’ under the Convention and classification under national law is not decisive
(Glantz v Finland [2014] STC 2263).
Is there a right to legal representation in civil proceedings? The more the proceedings are akin
to criminal proceedings, the more positive the answer is yes. For the purposes of Article 6,
there is no clear-cut dividing line between civil and criminal proceedings, so the courts
approach the issue on the basis of a sliding scale, at the bottom of which are civil wrongs of a
relatively trivial nature, and at the top of which are serious crimes meriting substantial
punishment. So civil disciplinary proceedings that might lead to a person being barred from
practising his profession are likely to attract this right: see R (on the application of G) v Y City
Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1 and R (on the application of G) v X School Governors [2011] UKSC 30.
27.5.4.2 A fair trial
Paragraph 1 sets out the minimum requirements for a fair trial. These are:
(a) a fair and public hearing;
(b) an independent and impartial tribunal;
(c) trial within a reasonable period;
(d) public judgment (with some exceptions); and
(e) a reasoned decision.
As the most litigated Article, a great deal of case law has grown up around these requirements.
The approach of the ECtHR in interpreting and applying Article 6(1) is generous to
applicants, and the Court reaches its decisions ‘bearing in mind the prominent place which
the right to a fair trial holds in a democratic society’ (Delcourt v Belgium (1979–80) 1 EHRR
355). Not only have these decisions built on the requirements expressly contained in the
paragraph set out above, they have read other rights into the paragraph. These include:
(a) the right of access to a court (eg, Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245: police
immunity a denial of the right of access to a court);
(b) equality of arms (Dombo Beheer BV v Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213); and
(c) the right to participate effectively in proceedings (Stanford v United Kingdom (Case A/282)
(1994) The Times, 8 March: poor court room acoustics; Re L (a child) (2013) LTL 4
February, CA: refusal to adjourn hearing for legal representation to be obtained; R v JP
[2014] EWCA Crim 2064: refusal to allow cross-examination of child witness).
Should a fugitive from justice be denied these Convention rights? In Conde Nast Publications Ltd
v UK (2008) Application No 00029746/05, LTL 29 February, the applicant publishers had been
sued successfully for defamation. The claimant had left America and moved to France before
being sentenced for an offence in respect of which he had pleaded guilty. The High Court had
allowed the claimant to give his evidence by video link from a Paris hotel. The House of Lords
had upheld that decision. The applicants argued that the principle of equality of arms was
broken and so the proceedings were unfair. The ECtHR held that the UK Government could
not be condemned under Article 6 for providing the claimant with facilities that were available
to other litigants simply because of his status as a fugitive from justice. Why? Because the
deprivation of such facilities would run counter to the Convention guarantee of equal
treatment that is inherent in the principle of equality of arms.
Until 2010 there had been a presumption against requiring a child to attend court to give
evidence in family proceedings. However, in Re W (Children) [2010] UKSC 12, the Supreme
Court held that this could not be reconciled with the need to strike a fair balance between the
rights protected by Articles 6 and 8 (see 27.5.5). So a court considering whether to call a child
as a witness has to weigh the advantages this will bring to the determination of the truth
against the damage it might do to the welfare of that or any other child. Striking that balance
in care proceedings might mean that a child is not called in the great majority of cases, but
that must be the result of the court’s considered judgment and not a presumption.
Furthermore, in civil litigation, paragraph 1 has been held to require a right to legal aid should
the circumstances of the case demand it, especially ‘by reason of the complexity of the
procedure of the case’ (Airey v Ireland (Case A/32) (1979) 2 EHRR 305; see also Steel and Morris v
United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 68416/01 (the so-called ‘McDonald’s libel case’). Article 6(3)(c)
expressly requires legal aid in criminal litigation.
27.5.4.3 Presumption of innocence

Paragraph 2 provides for the presumption of innocence in criminal trials. ‘Reverse onus’
provisions, which place the burden of proof upon a defendant to demonstrate his innocence,
do not necessarily violate Article 6(2) (Lingens v Austria (1981) 26 DR 171; also R v Director of
Public Prosecutions, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, the first HRA 1998 case to reach the House of
Lords (now the Supreme Court)). In Murray v United Kingdom (Right to Silence) (1996) 22 EHRR
29, the ECtHR ruled that the drawing of adverse inferences from the exercise by the accused of
his right to silence did not violate the Article either. However, in Saunders v United Kingdom
(1996) 23 EHRR 313, the use of statements obtained by compulsion by inspectors exercising
statutory powers under the Companies Act 1985 was held to be a violation of Article 6(2).
Since the HRA 1998 came into force the issue of reverse onus provisions has been raised in
domestic UK litigation in several motoring cases. For example, in R v Drummond [2002] EWCA
Crim 527, [2002] 2 Cr App R 25, the defendant was accused of causing death by dangerous
driving and driving with excess alcohol. He tried to rely on the ‘hip flask’ defence, that he had
drunk alcohol after the accident and before the arrival of the police to steady his nerves. The
legislation placed the burden upon him to prove that this was the case rather than requiring
the prosecution to show that he had drunk the alcohol before the accident. The Court of
Appeal held that the imposition of this burden on the defendant was justified and he lost his
appeal against conviction.
In R v Keogh [2007] EWCA Civ 528, the Court of Appeal held that the reverse burdens of proof
contained in s 2(3) and s 3(4) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 were incompatible with Article
6. Why? Because the Act can operate effectively without the imposition of those reverse
burdens. The Court held that it was not necessary to impose them and to do so would be
disproportionate and unjustifiable.
27.5.4.4 Procedural safeguards in criminal trials

Because of the serious nature of criminal litigation, paragraph 3 provides specific procedural
rights in this context. These are rights for the defendant:
(a) to be informed promptly of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence;
(c) to choose his legal representative and to receive legal aid if necessary;
(d) to call witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses against him; and
(e) to have free access to an interpreter if necessary (see R v Foronda [2014] NICA 17).
CASE EXAMPLE
In a criminal trial, if hearsay evidence is admitted against the accused, there is no
opportunity to cross-examine that witness. So is the trial still fair? Yes, provided there is a
good reason for the non-attendance of the witness. But what if his statement is the only or
decisive evidence against the accused? Then there must be sufficient counterbalancing
factors, including strong procedural safeguards, to ensure a fair trial.
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR applied these tests in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK
(Application Nos 26766/05 and 22228/06) (2011) The Times, 22 December.
Mr Al-Khawaja was a consultant physician. He was charged with indecently assaulting two
female patients. Both made statements to the police. However, one complainant
committed suicide before the trial. Her statement was admitted as hearsay evidence and
read to the jury. The Grand Chamber held that had been necessary as there was no other
way the evidence could be given. Moreover, the trial was fair as: (a) the judge directed the
jury that her hearsay evidence should carry less weight because she had not been seen,
heard or cross-examined; and (b) the jury also heard evidence from the other complainant
and two of deceased woman’s friends in whom she had confided soon after the incident.
Mr Tahery was charged with stabbing another man in the back during a gang fight. Only
one witness claimed to have seen him do this. The witness gave a statement to the police.
This was admitted as hearsay evidence and read to the jury because the judge found the
witness was afraid of giving evidence. Whilst that may have been a good reason, the Grand
Chamber found the trial to have been unfair. The hearsay evidence amounted to an
uncorroborated eyewitness statement. The fact that Mr Tahery could challenge the
statement himself and the trial judge's clear and forceful warning to the jury in his
summing up did not sufficiently counterbalance the difficulties caused to the defence by
the admission of the untested evidence.
These rights have caused a great deal of litigation. Reference to the case law or to a specialist
work is needed to understand them fully.
27.5.5 Article 8: The right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
Article 8 has been used creatively by lawyers and judges. Its essential object is to protect the
individual against arbitrary action by public authorities (Kroon v Netherlands (1994) 19 EHRR
263). It has been used in cases where it might seem quite at home, such as those involving
phone tapping or interference with prisoners’ mail. But it has also been used in contexts
which might come as a surprise to those who drafted it, such as the rights of transsexuals to
have official records amended to recognise their status, the right to an environment
unpolluted by noise and chemicals, and the right to practise one’s sexuality freely.
Paragraph 1 protects four distinct rights.
27.5.5.1 Private life

This encompasses:
(a) noise pollution issues (Rayner v United Kingdom (1986) 47 DR 5);

(b) pollution by waste (López Ostra v Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277);
(c) sexual orientation (Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 548 and Bull v Hall
[2013] UKSC 73);
(d) the unauthorised disclosure of confidential data to third parties (MS v Sweden (1999) 28
EHRR 313);
(e) covert police surveillance (Wood v United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 23414/02);
(f ) the monitoring by an employer of office telephone calls without warning (Halford v United
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523);
(g) the opening and censoring of prisoner’s confidential correspondence with a court
(Klyakhin v Russia [2004] ECHR 46082/99);
(h) administration of medication against wishes (Glass v United Kingdom [2004] ECHR 61827/
00);
(i) a State’s obligation to make adequate and effective efforts to assist a person in his
attempt to have his child returned to him with a view to exercising his parental rights
(Monory v Romania [2005] ECHR 71099/01);
( j) unauthorised publication of photographs (Douglas v Hello! [2003] 3 All ER 996; RocknRoll
v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) and Weller v Associated Newspapers Limited
[2015] EWCA Civ 1176);
(k) the retention of fingerprint and DNA data after a person is acquitted of a criminal
offence (Marper v UK [2007] ECHR 110);
(l) the taking and retention of photographs by the police of a member of the public in the
street (Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414);
(m) legal professional privilege relating to the seeking and giving of legal advice by a
qualified lawyer but not by an accountant (R (on the application of Prudential Plc) v Special
Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1);
(n) the reputation of an individual (In the Matter of Guardian News & Media Ltd v HM Treasury
[2010] UKSC 1);
(o) the prohibition or restriction on the ability to work (Sidabras v Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR
6 and R (on the application of MA) v National Probation Service [2011] EWHC 1332);
(p) the dignity and privacy of prisoners in their cells (Grant v Ministry of Justice [2011] EWHC
3379) and their ability to exercise (Malcolm v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA Civ
1538), and the same-sex relationship between two prisoners (Bright v Secretary of State for
Justice [2014] EWCA Civ 1628);
(q) the administration of a police caution and the requirement to disclose it (R (on the
application of T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2014] UKSC 35);
(r) in limited circumstances, the decision to prosecute an individual (SXH v CPS [2014]
EWCA Civ 90);
(s) the potential humiliation and embarrassment of being searched by a police officer (R (on
the application of Roberts) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ 69);
(t) an exclusion zone imposed by a prison governor as a condition of a prisoner’s release on
licence (R (on the application of Bentham) v Governor of Usk & Prescoed Prison [2014] EWHC
2469 (Admin));
(u) the systematic collection and retention by police authorities of electronic data about
individuals (R (on the application of Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015]
UKSC 9);
(v) the retention and use of gender data by the State (R (on the application of C) v Secretary of
State for Work & Pensions [2016] EWCA Civ 47);
(w) the denial of a right to a free abortion, thereby putting stress and pressure on women
who cannot afford to pay (R (on the application of A) (A Child By Her Mother and Litigation
Friend) v Secretary of State for Health [2015] EWCA Civ 771); and
(x) the denial of citizenship (R (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2016] UKSC 56).
The touchstone for Article 8(1)’s engagement is whether the claimant enjoys on the facts a
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’. So is it engaged by a teenage boy, involved in an incident
of public disorder and rioting, when the police release CCTV still images of some of those
involved that include the boy to local newspapers for publication appealing to the public for
help in identifying the suspects? The question split the Supreme Court in In the matter of an
application by JR38 For Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2015] UKSC 42. By 3:2 the Court
answered the question in the negative.
27.5.5.2 Family life

It is disruption of the family unit which is most likely to offend against this aspect of Article 8.
This might include, for example, a situation in which the State wishes to take a child into care
or make an adoption order against the wishes of a parent (see Re Q (a child) [2011] EWCA Civ
1610). It is also an extremely important issue for immigration lawyers, as deportation,
extradition and immigration controls may often result in families being broken up.
In Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application No 30141/04, 24 June 2010) and Oliari and Others v Italy
(Application Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015), the ECtHR recognised that, even
absent a legal status, stable and committed same-sex relationships amount to family life. In
Schalk’s case (at para 94) it was held that ‘the relationship of the applicants, a co-habiting
same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”,
just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would’. In Vallianatos and
Others v Greece (Application Nos 29381/09 and 32684/09, 7 November 2013) (at para 81), the
Court stated that civil partnerships ‘as an officially recognised alternative to marriage have an
intrinsic value for applicants irrespective of the legal effects, however narrow or extensive,
that they would produce’. Earlier in its judgment the court found that the measures, in that
case making provision for civil partnerships for different-sex couples only, fell squarely within
the ambit of Article 8, and stated at para 73 that ‘in view of the rapid evolution in a
considerable number of member States regarding the granting of legal recognition to same-
sex couples, “it [would be] artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex
couple, a same-sex couple [could not] enjoy ‘family life’ for the purposes of Article 8”’.
‘Family’ clearly includes those with blood and marital links, but has also been extended by the
ECtHR to include other emotional ties. In K v United Kingdom (1986) 50 DR 199, the ECtHR
said ‘the question of the existence or non-existence of “family life” is essentially a question of
fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties’.
Does a private or family life include such interests as an individual’s social life; a person’s life
being centred, or work being dependent on, a particular activity; family involvement in a
particular activity; the social and economic impact on a local community of the loss of a
particular activity; cultural heritage; loss of job or loss of business? In R (on the application of the
Countryside Alliance and Others) v AG [2007] UKHL 52, the claimants put forward these interests
as part of their case that the ban on hunting wild mammals with dogs under the Hunting Act
2004 engaged Article 8. However, the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) observed that
these arguments stretched the ambit of Article 8 far wider than had ever been recognised in
Strasbourg jurisprudence and the House held that Article 8 was not engaged.
27.5.5.3 Home
Clearly, there is some overlap between private life, family life and home life. This element of
Article 8(1) specifically protects the right to occupy one’s home without harassment or
interference. Noise nuisance can violate this right (Arrondelle v United Kingdom (1982) 26 DR 5).
So can entry by the police to search or for other purposes. In McLeod v United Kingdom (1999) 27
EHRR 493, the police accompanied an estranged husband into the former matrimonial
home. As there was little risk of disorder, the ECtHR held that this was a disproportionate
interference with the applicant’s right to home life.
In the context of housing law, the Article does not extend to the right to have a home (Buckley v
United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 101). But might it constitute a defence to possession
proceedings? Yes, any public sector occupier at risk of losing his home must have the
opportunity to have the proportionality of that step considered by the county court, and that
consideration can include factors such as his personal circumstances: see Kay v UK [2010]
ECHR 1322 and Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45. There is no clear and
constant jurisprudence of the ECtHR that the proportionality test implied into Article 8(2)
applies where there is a private landlord. In McDonald (by her litigation friend) v McDonald [2014]
EWCA Civ 1049, a private landlord obtained a possession order of a property held on an
assured shorthold tenancy after serving a statutory notice to quit. The Court held that Article
8(2) did not apply.
27.5.5.4 Correspondence
It was under this provision that Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14 was brought,
successfully challenging telephone tapping by the police without statutory authority. This
resulted in the enactment of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 to grant the police
statutory powers. Similar issues were raised in the Halford case (see 27.5.5.1). The Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is an important piece of legislation in this area which now,
amongst other things, governs interference with communications by employers. As for
interference with written correspondence, most of the case law concerns prisoners’ rights.
Broadly they may correspond freely with their lawyers, but prison authorities may interfere
with other correspondence so long as this is justified (Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR
524; Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347).
27.5.5.5 Justification for interference

Article 8 is not absolute. Paragraph 2 sets out reasons which may justify interference with para
1 rights. The principle of proportionality requires that the interference must be the minimum
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim (for example, see R (on the application of M) v Chief
Constable of Hampshire [2014] EWCA Civ 1651 and the McLeod case at 27.5.5.3 above).
27.5.6 Article 10: The right to freedom of expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
The ECtHR has described this right as ‘one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society and one of the conditions of its progress’ (Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR
737). It is particularly useful to the press and broadcast media, as well as other publishers and
political organisations. The right extends to receiving as well as imparting information.
However, this does not oblige public authorities to disclose information against their will (The
Gaskin Case [1990] 1 FLR 167, no right of access to fostering records held by a local authority).
It merely prohibits restrictions on the receipt of information, for example information about
abortion in Ireland (Open Door Dublin Well Women v Ireland (1992) 15 EHRR 244).
Justice should be open to public scrutiny, and the media are the conduit through which most
members of the public receive information about court proceedings (R v Cornick [2014] EWHC
3623 (QB)). So it follows that the principle of open justice is inextricably linked to the freedom
of the media to report court proceedings (see A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25). It is therefore a
general principle that, in the vast majority of cases, a defendant in a criminal case can be
expected to be named, unless there is an absolute necessity for anonymity. Similar
considerations apply in civil proceedings (PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1132).
Where there is an interference with Article 10 rights, it will be incompatible with the
Convention unless:
(a) it is prescribed by law;
(b) it pursues a legitimate aim (see para 2);
(c) it is necessary in a democratic society; and
(d) it is proportionate.
EXAMPLE
The Video Recordings Act 2010 requires the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) to
classify all video works, subject to exemptions in respect of educational, sporting or
musical works which are not supplied for profit. The purpose of the legislation is to
provide information for the public so as to enable choices in viewing material unsuitable
for children, or extreme violence or pornography. The classifications of U, PG, 12, 15 and
18 are familiar to all. In R v Dryzner [2014] EWCA Crim 2438, the Court held that the
classification requirements that the Act imposed are lawful, necessary and proportionate
for the protection of public health and morals.
For a more contentious case that split the Supreme Court, see R (on the application of Lord Carlile of
Berriew QC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60.
27.5.6.1 Defamation
The ECtHR recognises that individuals have a right to have their reputations protected. But
defamation claims are an interference with Article 10 rights and so must be justified using the
criteria listed above on a case-by-case basis. In Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom; Lord
Aldington v Watts (1995) 20 EHRR 442, for example, the ECtHR found that a damages award of
£1.5 million was disproportionate.
The ECtHR has also recognised, however, that criticism of public figures, especially
politicians, is more easily justifed under Article 10. In Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 it
said:
The limits of acceptable criticism are ... wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private
individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of
every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a
greater degree of tolerance. (para 42)
What about pressure groups? In Steel and Morris v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 68416/01 (the
so-called ‘McDonald’s libel case’) the ECtHR stated that
[t]he Court considers, however, that in a democratic society even small and informal campaign groups
... must be able to carry on their activities effectively and that there exists a strong public interest in
enabling such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the public debate by
disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public interest such as health and the
environment ... If, however, a State decides to provide such a remedy [defamation] to a corporate body,
it is essential, in order to safeguard the countervailing interests in free expression and open debate,
that a measure of procedural fairness and equality of arms is provided for. ... (paras 89 and 95)
27.5.6.2 Prior restraint

The use of injunctions to prevent publication of material in advance is viewed with suspicion
by the ECtHR. In the Spycatcher case (Guardian Newspapers v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 153)
it said:
[T]he dangers inherent in prior restraint are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny ... News is
a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all
its value and interest. (para 60)
For example, a journalist was denied an injunction restraining the BBC from broadcasting his
image as part of a documentary exposing alleged wrongdoing in investigative journalism,
because the evidence had not demonstrated that the risk of harm to him would be materially
increased (Mahmood v BBC [2014] EWHC 4207 (QB)). However, in OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA
Civ 1277, an injunction was granted restraining the defendant, a talented performing artist,
from publishing a book describing his traumatic upbringing, which included the suffering of
sexual abuse. The claimant was the defendant’s autistic young son, and the Court held that he
had sufficiently favourable prospects of establishing at trial his claim that publication would
constitute intentional conduct causing him psychiatric harm.
The concern which the Strasbourg Court has is reflected in s 12 of the HRA 1998 (see the
Appendix to Part IV).
In Cream Holdings Ltd and Others v Banerjee and Others [2004] UKHL 44, the House of Lords stated:
Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at trial an essential element in the court’s consideration
of whether to make an interim order. … There can be no single, rigid standard governing all
applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3)
is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of
success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular
circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently
favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim
restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’)
succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court
embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10
and any countervailing Convention rights. But there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to
depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite.
Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse
consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable
the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or
any relevant appeal.
The Supreme Court in PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26 held that: (i) neither
Article 8 nor Article 10 has preference over the other; (ii) where their values are in conflict,
what is necessary is an intense focus on the comparative importance of the rights being
claimed in the individual case; (iii) the justifications for interfering with or restricting each
right must be taken into account; and (iv) the proportionality test must be applied.
27.5.7 Article 11: The right to freedom of assembly and association

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police
or of the administration of the State.
This Article contains two distinct rights: freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
association.
27.5.7.1 Freedom of peaceful assembly

This extends to anyone who intends to organise a peaceful march or static assembly. The
possibility of violence arising because of the intentions of counter-demonstrators or extremist
infiltrators does not affect the right (Christians Against Racism and Fascism v United Kingdom (1980)
21 DR 138). By exercising the right on a public highway, the protesters’ activities must not
become a nuisance nor unreasonably impede the right of others to pass (see Secretary of State for
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11). So whilst protesters might
assemble peacefully in a public place such as St Paul’s Cathedral in London, they are not
entitled to establish a substantial encampment of tents on the highway there (see City of
London v Tammy Samede (representative of those persons taking part in a protest camp at St Paul’s
Churchyard, London EC4) [2012] EWHC 34).
The sorts of restrictions which para 2 envisages include limitations on the location of a
demonstration or the route of a march.
Does the right to peaceful assembly under Article 11 mean that the police force has a
responsibility to facilitate peaceful protests even if they are technically unlawful? No, held the
Supreme Court in DB v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland [2017] UKSC 7. At para
60 the Court quoted with approval the decision in Eva Molnar v Hungary (Application No 10346/
05), where the ECtHR considered a complaint that the applicant's rights under Article 11 had
been infringed by police dispersing a peaceful demonstration in which she had participated,
merely because prior notification of the protest had not been given. At paras 34–38 the ECtHR
said this:
34. The Court observes that paragraph 2 of article 11 entitles States to impose 'lawful restrictions'
on the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly. The Court notes that restrictions on
freedom of peaceful assembly in public places may serve the protection of the rights of others
with a view to preventing disorder and maintaining the orderly circulation of traffic.
35. The Court reiterates that a prior notification requirement would not normally encroach upon
the essence of that right. It is not contrary to the spirit of article 11 if, for reasons of public order
and national security, a priori, a High Contracting Party requires that the holding of meetings be
subject to authorisation (see Nurettin Aldemir v Turkey, nos 32124/02, 32126/02, 32129/02, 32132/
02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and 32138/02 (joined) [2007] ECHR 1121, para 42, 18 December
2007).
36. However, in special circumstances when an immediate response might be justified, for example
in relation to a political event, in the form of a spontaneous demonstration, to disperse the
ensuing demonstration solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any
illegal conduct by the participants, may amount to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of
peaceful assembly (see Bukta, cited above, paras 35 and 36). It is important for the public
authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of
assembly guaranteed by article 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance (see
Nurettin Aldemir, cited above, para 46).
37. Nevertheless, in the Court's view, the principle established in the case of Bukta cannot be
extended to the point that the absence of prior notification can never be a legitimate basis for
crowd dispersal. Prior notification serves not only the aim of reconciling, on the one hand, the
right to assembly and, on the other hand, the rights and lawful interests (including the right of
movement) of others, but also the prevention of disorder or crime. In order to balance these
conflicting interests, the institution of preliminary administrative procedures is common
practice in member states when a public demonstration is to be organised. In the Court's view,
such requirements do not, as such, run counter to the principles embodied in article 11 of the
Convention, as long as they do not represent a hidden obstacle to the freedom of peaceful
assembly protected by the Convention (see Balcik v Turkey, no 25/02, para 49, 29 November
2007).
38. The Court therefore considers that the right to hold spontaneous demonstrations may override
the obligation to give prior notification to public assemblies only in special circumstances,
namely if an immediate response to a current event is warranted in the form of a demonstration.
In particular, such derogation from the general rule may be justified if a delay would have
rendered that response obsolete.
27.5.7.2 Freedom of association

This covers the right of individuals to join together, especially in organisations like political
parties and trade unions. It also extends to the right not to join such organisations. For
example, compulsory membership of a union (a ‘closed shop’) will usually be contrary to the
Convention (Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 38).
The right does not extend to a right to negotiate with employers via collective bargaining
(Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden (1976) 1 EHRR 617). Neither does it include a right to
strike (Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden (1979–80) 1 EHRR 632). But it does include the right to
claim for unfair dismissal from employment based on political affiliation or opinion (Redfearn
v UK [2012] ECHR 1878).
27.5.8 Article 14: The prohibition on discrimination

The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Article 14 is not as important as it may at first appear. It is vital to realise that the right not to
be discriminated against cannot be relied upon on its own. It may only be invoked in
conjunction with another Convention right.
As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive
provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect
solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’ safeguarded by those provisions.
Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this
extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within
the ambit of one or more of the latter. (Van Raalte v Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 503 at para 33)
A claimant relying on Article 14 must first establish that a substantive Convention right is in
issue. There need not necessarily have been a breach of that right. It must only be shown that
the facts fall within the ambit of that provision. What Article 14 prohibits is discrimination.
What this means is that if there is a prejudicial difference in treatment of persons in relevantly
similar situations on the facts of the particular case, the difference in treatment must have an
objective and reasonable justification (see, for example, R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice
[2013] UKSC 63). In deciding whether there has been discrimination in this sense, the
position of the claimant must be compared with that of those in ‘relevantly similar or
analogous’ situations (Larkos v Cyprus (1990) 30 EHRR 597). If there is a prejudicial difference
in treatment, that difference in treatment must pursue a legitimate aim and bear a reasonable
relationship to the aim sought to be realised (Belgian Linguistic Case (No 2) (1979–80) 1 EHRR
252). There are, therefore, two distinct questions: (i) has there been disadvantageous
treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations; and (ii) if so, does it have reasonable and
objective justification?
CASE EXAMPLES
(1) Abdulaziz v United Kingdom; Cabales v United Kingdom; Balkandali v United Kingdom
(1985) 7 EHRR 471, an immigration case. The exclusion from the UK of spouses of
new entrants in certain circumstances was held not to breach Article 8. However, the
admission of the spouses of male entrants but the exclusion of spouses of female
entrants breached Article 14.
(2) R (on the application of Chapti) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011]
EWHC 3370, an immigration case. The requirement that a foreign spouse applying
to settle in the UK with his or her partner had to produce a test certificate of
knowledge of the English language engaged Article 8. However, the aims of the rule,
namely to promote integration and to protect public services, were legitimate aims
and did not amount to a disproportionate interference with family life. Was Article
14 breached because nationals of English-speaking countries and those with
educational qualifications that were taught in English or obtained from institutions
in English-speaking countries were exempt from the requirement? No, held the
court, this was rational in the light of the aims of the rule. Further, there was no
evidence that the rule indirectly discriminated on the grounds of nationality, ethnic
origins or disability.
(3) Humphreys v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2010] EWCA Civ 56, a social security
case. The claimant was the father of a child for whom he claimed child tax credits.
The refusal of that claim engaged Article 1 of the First Protocol (see 27.5.9). The
refusal was based on the fact that he was the child’s minority carer. His mother was
awarded the child tax credit as she cared for the child more nights each week. Whilst
this was discrimination for the purposes of Article 14, the Court of Appeal held that
it was justified. See also R (on the application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 156.
You will have noted that Article 14 ends with the words ‘other status’. Who might fall within
that category? The ECtHR has interpreted this as meaning a personal characteristic (see
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) 1 EHRR 711, para 56). It is therefore
necessary to examine whether the ground for different treatment in a case amounts to a status
in the sense of a personal characteristic (see R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39). This led the Court of Appeal, for example, in R (on the application of
RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 614, to hold that a person who
chooses to be homeless or to sleep rough does not fall within this provision. ‘Impecuniosity’,
at any rate if defined by reference to an inability to pay a particular government fee, is not a
relevant status for the purposes of Article 14: R (on the application of Williams (by his litigation
friend)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 98.
27.5.9 Protocol 1, Article 1: The right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
‘Possessions’ in this Article has a wide meaning. It includes, amongst other things, land,
money, shares and goodwill.
The Article contains two distinct rights:
(a) the right not to be deprived of possessions, subject to certain conditions; and
(b) the right not to have the State control possessions, subject to certain conditions.
Deprivation covers situations in which title is transferred or extinguished, for example the
creation of a presumption of title in land in favour of the State (Holy Monasteries v Greece (1994)
20 EHRR 1). Control covers situations falling short of this, for example limiting the amount of
rent which a landlord may charge, placing restrictions upon developing property and rules
restricting rights of inheritance.
In both cases interference with the right is permissible in the public interest or the general
interest (a distinction which is of little importance). The guiding principle is one of fair
balance between individual and community interests. In striking this balance regard must
always be had to the principle of proportionality (see 27.5.2) and the split Court of Appeal
decision upholding the legislation banning the sale of tobacco from automatic vending
machines: R (on the application of Sinclair Collis Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWCA Civ
437.
In Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478, it was held that at common law a
periodic joint residential tenancy is terminated automatically if one joint tenant unilaterally
serves a notice to quit on the landlord. Is that incompatible with the other joint tenant’s rights
under Protocol 1, Article 1? No, held the Supreme Court in Sims v Dacorum BC [2014] UKSC 63.
A husband had no right to remain in a local authority property as a sole tenant after his wife
had left and given notice to the local authority landlord quitting the joint tenancy.
27.5.10 Identifying and addressing Convention rights

27.5.10.1 Has there been an interference with a Convention right?
Do the facts complained of disclose an interference with the enjoyment of any particular right
or rights?
CASE EXAMPLE 1
Assume that you are a solicitor and a court has made a wasted costs order against you.
What rights might be relevant? Is the order a determination of your civil rights such that
Article 6 is engaged? Or is it a criminal charge for the purposes of that Article? Otherwise,
is it an interference with your possessions for the purposes of the First Protocol, Article 1?
In fact the ECtHR has already answered all these questions in the negative (see, eg, Tormala
v Finland (2004) Application No 41528/98).
CASE EXAMPLE 2
Assume that you are protesting peacefully against an arms fair being held in London. You
are stopped by two police officers and searched. You are handed a copy of Stop/Search
Form 5090 which records that you were stopped and searched under s 44 of the Terrorism
Act 2000. The search was said to be for ‘articles concerned in terrorism’. The whole
incident lasts about 20 minutes. What rights might be engaged? Have you been deprived
of your liberty under Article 5? Has there been a lack of respect for your private life such
that Article 8 is engaged? Have your rights to free expression and free assembly protected
by Articles 10 and 11 been infringed? The House of Lords (now the Supreme Court)
answered all of these questions in the negative (or otherwise felt that the measures were
justified): see R (on the application of Gillan and Another) v Commissioner of Police for the
Metropolis and Another [2006] UKHL 12. However, for a similar case where the House of
Lords held that Articles 10 and 11 were infringed, see R (on the application of Laporte) v Chief
Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55. Moreover, when the Gillian case was heard by
the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, it held that Article 8 was engaged and infringed (see
[2010] ECHR 28 (Application No 4158/05)).
CASE EXAMPLE 3
In R (on the application of Naik) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ
1546, the applicant was a leading Muslim writer and public speaker. In 2010, two days
before he was due to arrive in the UK on a lecture tour, the Secretary of State excluded him
and revoked his existing visa on the basis that he had made a number of statements
supporting terrorism. As a foreign national outside the UK, could he rely on Article 10?
The Court of Appeal held that Article 10 was engaged in respect of the applicant’s
supporters in the UK and (without deciding the issue) possibly also in respect of the
applicant personally.
How are you going to be able to identify relevant rights in the future? You need to have in mind
the structure of the Articles. A breakdown of the key Articles by way of a checklist appears in
the Appendix to Part IV.
Once any particular qualified right has been identified, the following questions need to be
answered. The detail may be found at 27.5.2.3 above:
(a) Is the interference prescribed by law?
(b) Does the interference have a legitimate aim under the relevant Article?
(c) Is the interference proportionate?
(d) Is the interference within any appropriate margin of appreciation?
CASE EXAMPLE
In Connors v UK (2004) Application No 66746/01, the applicant, a gypsy, complained that
he and his family had been evicted by a local authority from its gypsy caravan site in
breach of Article 8.
The parties were agreed that Article 8 was engaged as the eviction of the applicant from
the site on which he had lived with his family in his caravan disclosed an interference with
his right to respect for his private life, family life and home. The parties were also agreed,
in the context of the second paragraph of Article 8, that the interference was in accordance
with the law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the protection of the rights of other
occupiers of the site by the local authority which owned and managed the site. The
question for the Court was whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic
society’ in pursuit of that aim, ie if there was a ‘pressing social need’ and, in particular, if it
was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. As to the scope of the margin of
appreciation, the Court indicated that this depends on the context of the case, with
particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of
the applicant. The procedural safeguards available to the individual are especially material
in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework,
remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the court must examine whether
the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to
afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8.
The Court found that the eviction of the applicant and his family from the local authority
site was not attended by the requisite procedural safeguards, namely the requirement to
establish proper justification for the serious interference with his rights. Consequently it
could not be regarded as justified by a ‘pressing social need’ or proportionate to the
legitimate aim being pursued. There had, accordingly, been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
27.5.10.2 Everyday situations in which the HRA 1998 might apply

In June 2009 the Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR – see 28.5) published a
report entitled, Human Rights Inquiry. At Chapter 1, section 3, it produced a list of everyday
situations in which the HRA 1998 might apply. This is reproduced in the Appendix to Part IV.
27.5.10.3 Business and human rights

The publication entitled ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ recognises the important role
that business plays in society and the need for business to respect human rights. In particular,
it identifies that business enterprises should:
(a) avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human
rights impacts with which they are involved;
(b) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own
activities, and address such impacts when they occur;
(c) prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not
contributed to those impacts;
(d) put in place policies and processes that include a policy commitment to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights; a human rights due diligence process to identify,
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights; and
processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or
to which they contribute.
A copy of the document is available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>.
Legislation is starting to push this agenda forward. For example, the Modern Slavery Act 2015
requires certain businesses to prepare and publish a slavery and trafficking statement for each
financial year from the year ending 31 March 2016. Further examples of how businesses can
impact certain human rights can be found in the ‘Reference Annex to the IBA Practical Guide
on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers’. This is reproduced in the Appendix to
Part IV. A copy of the entire document is available at <http://www.ibanet.org/LPRU/Reference-
Annex-to-the-IBA-Practical-Guide.aspx>.
See also the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s publication, ‘Business and human
rights: a seven-step guide for managers’. A copy of the document is available at <https://
www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights/business-and-human-rights-seven-step-
guide-managers>.
27.6 PETITIONING THE COURT IN STRASBOURG

27.6.1 Introduction
Despite the HRA 1998, there will be situations where an individual is denied a remedy under
UK law, for example because primary legislation is clearly incompatible with the Convention,
or because there is some gap in the legislation which cannot be filled by the common law and
in either case the Government will not make amends. In such cases, the individual can
petition the ECtHR in Strasbourg. This will be the last resort, however, as the Convention
requires the applicant to exhaust domestic remedies (including the HRA 1998) before going
to Strasbourg.
27.6.2 Procedural law of the ECHR

A complaint will be addressed to the Secretary of the Court of Human Rights. The initial
complaint does not need to be on a special form, although one would have to be completed
eventually. Under the rules made under the Eleventh Protocol, a chamber of the court will
determine admissibility. Around 90% of complaints are ruled inadmissible, usually because of
failure to exhaust domestic remedies, or because they are ‘manifestly ill-founded’ or because
they fail to meet the time-limit of six months from the exhaustion of the final domestic
remedy. The initial decision on admissibility will be taken by a committee of three.
Once the committee has judged a complaint admissible, the ECtHR will try to reach a friendly
settlement with the government concerned, which must include the reform of any offending
rules. Failing a settlement, there will be further submissions, including an oral hearing at
which, as well as the parties, relevant organisations like Liberty or Justice may be represented.
The ECtHR (usually a chamber of seven, but exceptionally a Grand Chamber of 17) may award
compensation as part of its judgment, but the judgment itself does not change the law in the
UK. That is a matter for the UK Government. There is also a right of appeal to the Grand
Chamber on issues of general importance (subject to the permission of the first chamber).
The Rules of Court were published in January 2014 and can be found on the ECtHR website. A
flowchart summarising the procedure follows.
Simplified case-processing flow chart by judicial formation
INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS
SINGLE JUDGE COMMITTEE CHAMBER

1 Judge 3 Judges 7 Judges
Inadmissibility Inadmissibility Inadmissibility Admissibility

decision decision decision decision
Judgment
Judgment
on the admissibility Judgment
on the admissibility
and the merit on the merit
and the merit
Referral
Referral
Relinquishment
GRAND CHAMBER
17 Judges
COMMITTEE Judgment
OF MINISTERS
The Human Rights Act 1998 329
CHAPTER 28
The Human Rights Act 1998

28.2 Convention rights 330
28.3 The mechanisms of the Act 330
28.4 Procedure for using the Act 338
28.5 The Commission for Equality and Human Rights 341
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After reading this chapter you will have learned:
• how the Convention affects statutory interpretation
• when a declaration of incompatibly may be made
• what public authorities fall within the HRA 1998
• what is meant by the doctrine of direct effect
• the procedure for using the HRA 1998
• when damages might be awarded under the HRA 1998
• the role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
28.1 INTRODUCTION
It is clear that the 1998 Act must be given its full import and that long or well entrenched ideas may
have to be put aside, sacred cows culled. (per Lord Slynn in R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 at para 6)
In brief, the effect of the HRA 1998 is to make it possible for litigants in the UK to rely on
Convention rights in our own domestic courts without the delay and expense incurred by
taking the case to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. The constitutional issues which are raised by this
are potentially momentous. Giving the judiciary a yardstick against which they can measure
UK legislation and find it to be wanting has obvious impacts on the traditional conception of
parliamentary supremacy. The HRA 1998 attempts to defuse this by the device of the
declaration of incompatibility (see 28.3.3). It also shifts power towards the judiciary, giving
them greater scope to determine difficult, perhaps emotive and politically charged questions.
This raises questions about the accountability of our judges.
28.1.1 Five central planks

There are five central planks of the HRA 1998. First, all legislation, whether primary or
subordinate, must, if possible, be interpreted so as to be compatible with the ECHR. Secondly,
where it is not possible to interpret primary legislation so as to be compatible with the ECHR,
certain courts can make a declaration of incompatibility. Thirdly, where it is not possible to
interpret subordinate legislation so as to be compatible with the Convention, the courts have
power to disapply it. Fourthly, all public authorities, including courts and tribunals, must, if
possible, act in a way that is compatible with the ECHR. Lastly, individuals who believe that their
ECHR rights have been infringed by a public authority can rely on the ECHR to take proceedings
in English courts rather than having to apply to Strasbourg.
28.1.2 Practice areas

All lawyers in the UK must bear Convention rights in mind. These rights have much more
impact in some areas of law than others. For example, criminal law and immigration
practitioners need to have regard to the HRA 1998 on a day-to-day basis. However, the HRA
1998 requires that all legislation be read in accordance with Convention rights and that all
public authorities make their decisions in accordance with them: any lawyer who makes use of
legislation or who has dealings with organs of the State does so against the backdrop of the
HRA 1998.
28.2 CONVENTION RIGHTS

The concept of Convention rights is central to the HRA 1998. There are certain rights from
the ECHR which are listed in Sch 1 to the 1998 Act. The most important are those discussed
in Chapter 27.
Section 2 requires that any court or tribunal determining a Convention right must take into
account any decision of the Strasbourg institutions, in particular judgments of the ECtHR.
Notice that these decisions are not binding in the same way that decisions of higher courts
within the UK are, or even decisions of the Court of Justice in the context of EU law. Decisions
of the Strasbourg Court need only be taken into account. Clearly, they will be highly
persuasive, but should a UK court feel the need to decide the matter differently then it is free
to do so. See, for example, R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14.
Decisions on the meaning to be given to Convention rights may involve UK courts and lawyers
looking further afield than Strasbourg. The House of Lords (now the Supreme Court)
accepted that it is appropriate to look to case law from other jurisdictions in determining such
matters (R v Khan [1997] AC 558). Most other countries have an established constitutional
human rights document with a well-developed jurisprudence, especially those from common
law jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Canada.
28.3 THE MECHANISMS OF THE ACT

28.3.1 Introduction
The HRA 1998 seeks to give Convention rights effect in UK law through two pathways.
Whenever legislation is relevant, lawyers are able to rely on a rule of statutory interpretation
that legislation should be read in line with Convention rights. Even where there is no
legislation in issue, all public authorities have an obligation to act in accordance with
Convention rights.
28.3.2 The interpretative obligation

Section 3(1) reads:
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given
effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
This interpretative obligation applies whether the legislation in question was passed before or
after the HRA 1998. All legislation must be read in such a way as to be compatible with
Convention rights, even if it is unambiguous, so long as the wording will bear such an
interpretation.
CASE EXAMPLES
(1) In Re S [2002] 2 AC 313, Lord Nicholls described s 3 as ‘a powerful tool whose use is
obligatory’ (para 38). He acknowledged, however, the difficulty of ‘identifying the
limits of interpretation in a particular case’, adding (at para 40): ‘For present
purposes it is sufficient to say that a meaning which departs substantially from a
fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary
between interpretation and amendment. This is especially so where the departure
has important practical repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate
…’. In that case it was held that the proposed re-interpretation (favoured by a
majority of the Court of Appeal) would have departed fundamentally from the
legislative scheme. Where Parliament had entrusted to local authorities, not the
courts, the responsibility for looking after children subject to care orders, the
proposed interpretation (involving a so-called ‘starring system’) would have
enabled the court to exercise a ‘newly created supervisory function’ (para 42).
(2) The case of R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 concerned the provisions of the Youth and
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 that protected complainants in proceedings for sexual
offences. Section 41 placed strict limits on the scope for evidence or cross-
examination of complainants about their own sexual behaviour. As Lord Steyn said,
the practically ‘blanket exclusion’ of prior sexual history between the complainant
and the accused posed ‘an acute problem of proportionality’ (para 30).
Notwithstanding the apparently clear language of the section, it was held that it
could be re-interpreted under s 3 to the extent that justice required the admission of
such evidence or cross-examination. Lord Steyn said: ‘In my view section 3 requires
the court to subordinate the niceties of language of section 41(3)(c), and in
particular the touchstone of coincidence, to broader considerations of relevance
judged by logical and common sense criteria of time and circumstance. After all, it is
realistic to proceed on the basis that the legislature would not, if alerted to the
problem, have wished to deny the right to an accused to put forward a full and
complete defence by advancing truly probative material.’ It was held that the section
should be read as subject to an implied provision that ‘evidence or questioning
required to ensure a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention should not be treated
as inadmissible’ (para 45).
28.3.2.1 Nature of opponent irrelevant

This principle applies whether the other party is public or private. So long as a litigant can
find a piece of legislation to which the Convention right can be pinned, the nature of his
opponent does not matter. For example, R (on the application of Sacker) v HM Coroner for the County
of West Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 11 involved an inquest into a prisoner’s death. The House of
Lords (now the Supreme Court) had to rule on the interpretation of the word ‘how’ in s 11(5)
of the Coroners Act 1988, in the context of ‘how’ the prisoner had died. In order to protect
Article 2 rights, the House of Lords held that it was not simply to be interpreted as meaning
‘by what means’, but rather ‘by what means in and in what circumstances’.
28.3.2.2 Ministerial statements

Section 19 gives judges an extra spur to find a construction which is compatible with
Convention rights. It provides that all Bills introduced into Parliament must be accompanied
by a statement from the sponsoring Minister on the compatibility or otherwise of the Bill with
Convention rights. Clearly, Ministers will almost invariably make statements of compatibility:
were a Minister to stand up and state that a Bill did not comply with Convention rights, some
very good reasons why it should be enacted in spite of this would have to be provided. The
doctrine in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 59 allows the courts to look to such ministerial statements
in Hansard as background evidence of parliamentary intention (see Wilson v Secretary for Trade
and Industry [2003] UKHL 40). Equipped with such evidence, courts may feel especially
justified in straining legislative wording where necessary to give it a meaning compatible with
Convention rights. Indeed, in R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45, Lord Hope observed (at para 69):
These statements may serve a useful purpose in Parliament. They may also be seen as part of the
parliamentary history, indicating that it was not Parliament’s intention to cut across a Convention
right ... No doubt they are based on the best advice that is available. But they are no more than
expressions of opinion by the minister. They are not binding on the court, nor do they have any
persuasive authority.
28.3.3 Declarations of incompatibility

Section 4 applies to higher courts (the High Court, Crown Courts, the Employment Appeals
Tribunal and above). It empowers them to make declarations of incompatibility. This provides
a fallback for situations in which a court recognises that legislation does not comply with
Convention rights but, because of the clear words used by the legislator, does not feel that it is
possible to give it a purposive interpretation. For example, the Divisional Court, the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court all agreed to make a declaration of incompatibility in respect
of s 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (see R (on the application of F) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2010] UKSC 17). Why? The section imposes on all who are sentenced to 30
months’ imprisonment or more for a sexual offence a duty to keep the police notified of where
they are living and if they travel abroad. As there is no provision in the Act for any individual
review of these requirements, the duty was a disproportionate interference with the Article 8
rights of those individuals.
What approach should the court take? In R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63,
the Supreme Court strongly urged any court that was considering remedies under the HRA
1998 to adopt the practice of asking in what way the particular claimant’s Convention rights
had been violated. As Baroness Hales observed at [102]:
That leaves the possibility of a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) of the Human Rights
Act 1998. This applies ‘in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of primary
legislation is compatible with a Convention right’: section 4(1). This does appear to leave open the
possibility of a declaration in abstracto, irrespective of whether the provision in question is
incompatible with the rights of the individual litigant. There may be occasions when that would be
appropriate. But in my view the court should be extremely slow to make a declaration of
incompatibility at the instance of an individual litigant with whose own rights the provision in
question is not incompatible. Any other approach is to invite a multitude of unmeritorious claims.
See also R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35.
28.3.3.1 Declaration must be necessary
Any declaration must be ‘necessary’. In R v HM Attorney General, ex p Rusbridger [2003] UKHL 38,
[2003] 3 All ER 784, a newspaper sought a declaration as to the proper construction of s 3 of
the Treason Felony Act 1848 (which made it an offence punishable by imprisonment for life or
any shorter period to ‘compass by publication to deprive or depose the Queen from the
Crown’). No prosecution had been brought under the section since 1883. The newspaper
wished to publish a series of articles urging abolition of the monarchy and asked the Attorney-
General to clarify the legal position under s 3. He refused. The House of Lords (now the
Supreme Court) held that it was not appropriate to bring proceedings against the part of s 3 of
the 1848 Act that appeared to criminalise the advocacy of republicanism since it was a relic of
a bygone age. The idea that it could survive scrutiny under the HRA 1998 was unreal. It was
clear that no one who advocated the abolition of the monarchy by peaceful and constitutional
means was at any risk of prosecution or conviction. The litigation was therefore unnecessary
and the application was dismissed.
28.3.3.2 Applicant must benefit from declaration

In Lancashire County Council v Taylor [2005] EWCA Civ 284, the Court of Appeal had to determine
if a litigant can obtain a declaration of incompatibility on a ground from which he cannot
benefit. The Court stated that the primary objective of the ECHR is to secure for individuals
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The HRA 1998 and the Convention also
play an educative role by promoting the observance of human rights and thus the Convention.
One way in which this objective is achieved is by requiring a Minister to make a statement of
compatibility with regard to any new legislation in accordance with s 9 of the HRA 1998. But it
is not the intention of the HRA 1998 or the Convention that members of the public should use
these provisions if they are not adversely affected by them to change legislation because they
consider that the legislation is incompatible with the Convention.
28.3.3.3 Effect
These declarations are a compromise between the need to provide a remedy in such cases and
the attachment of the UK to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy which prevents courts
from striking down Acts of Parliament. They flag up the incompatibility but provide no
further redress. They do not affect the continuing operation of the offending legislation
(s 4(6)).
Clearing up the aftermath of such a declaration is left to the politically accountable organs of
State: the Government and Parliament. Section 10 and Sch 2 allow Ministers to amend an
incompatible Act by a ‘fast track’ procedure rather than having to put amending legislation
through the full process in both Houses of Parliament. Broadly speaking, this allows Ministers
to lay before Parliament a ‘remedial order’ amending the offending legislation. The order will
take effect after 120 days, so long as no objections are made by either House. In emergencies
the remedial order can take effect immediately, but will automatically cease to have effect if
not given positive approval by both Houses within 120 days. See, for example, the Terrorism
Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011 (SI 2011/631) which followed the ECtHR’s decision in the
case of Gillian, detailed in Case Example 2 at 27.5.10.1.
However, remedial action is optional. The HRA 1998 places no obligation on Ministers to do
anything after a declaration of incompatibility is made. Even if they decide to take action, they
do not have to do so via the fast track. Remember, though, that the road to Strasbourg is not
closed. If a UK court declares legislation to be incompatible with Convention rights and the UK
Government does not take adequate steps to put matters right, then a judgment could be
sought in the ECtHR. The Government would then have an obligation in international law to
act.
28.3.3.4 Subordinate legislation as ultra vires

Declarations of incompatibility are reserved in the main for primary legislation, that is Acts of
Parliament. Delegated or subordinate legislation (usually made by Ministers under an
enabling power in an Act of Parliament) is more easily attacked. Striking out such subordinate
legislation does not offend against the principle of parliamentary supremacy. In fact by
ensuring that Ministers only use enabling powers in an appropriate way it reinforces the will
of Parliament. Because of this, courts have never shied away from ruling subordinate
legislation to be ultra vires and therefore inoperative. They will continue to do so in
circumstances in which subordinate legislation is incompatible with Convention rights and it
is not possible to place a purposive interpretation upon it in accordance with s 3.
28.3.3.5 Worked example

In Westminster City Council and The First Secretary of State v Morris; R (on the application of Badu) v
London Borough of Lambeth and The First Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 1184, the Court of
Appeal declared s 185 of the Housing Act 1996 incompatible. The Court arrived at its decision
by taking the following steps.
(a) The provision made by s 185(4) of the Housing Act 1996 precluding a British parent
from establishing a priority need for housing assistance where the claim is based on a
resident dependent child who is ineligible for UK citizenship and, therefore, subject to
immigration control, was within the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR.
(b) The effect of s 185(4), when read with Article 8, was plainly discriminatory within the
meaning of Article 14 of the Convention because the differential treatment for which it
provides turns on national origin, or on a combination of one or more of the following
forms or aspects of status: nationality, immigration control, settled residence and social
welfare.
(c) Regardless of the precise basis of the differential treatment, it could only be justified,
particularly under Article 8, if there were ‘very weighty’ or ‘solid’ grounds for it, or if it
could be shown that it is a proportionate and reasonable response to a perceived need to
discourage ‘benefit tourism’ by British citizens or the ‘overstaying’ of any of their
dependent children subject to immigration control.
(d) The justification advanced in the proceedings on behalf of the Secretary of State was
neither ‘very weighty’ nor ‘solid’, nor did it amount to a proportionate and reasonable
response by him to his concerns.
(e) It was not apparent that the Executive in proposing, or Parliament in enacting, s 185(4)
gave consideration to its potential discriminatory impact in any of the respects
proscribed by Article 14 or to the justification, if any, for it; but even if they did, the
enactment of such a provision, with such effect, could not have fallen within even the
very wide ambit of discretion allowed to the Government and Parliament in such
matters.
(f ) On the issue of compatibility and whether a court should, in the exercise of its
discretion under s 4(2) of the HRA 1998, make a declaration of incompatibility, it is
immaterial that there may be other forms of statutory protection, and the Court should
grant a declaration.
28.3.3.6 Declarations made

In September 2011 the Ministry of Justice published a report detailing the 27 declarations that
had been made since the HRA 1998 came into force. The details are reproduced in the
Appendix to Part IV.
28.3.3.7 ‘Wait and see’

Increasingly, courts appear reluctant to address the issue of formal remedies. In two high
profile cases in 2017, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal side-stepped human rights
issues respectively as follows:
So far as concerns the [Home Office Immigration] instructions, we have indicated those aspects which
require revision. However, given the passage of time, including new legislation, it would be wrong for
this court to attempt to indicate how those defects should now be corrected. It is preferable to adjourn
the question of remedies to allow time for the Secretary of State to consider her position, and to
indicate to the appellants and to the court how she proposes to amend the instructions or other
guidance to accord with the law as indicated in this judgment. The court will receive written
submissions on such proposals, and consider whether a further hearing is necessary. (R (on the
application of MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at para 110)
It is not the role of the court to set a deadline for compliance and the function of the court is certainly
not to micro-manage areas of social and economic policy, particularly in sensitive areas such as this
where changes will affect society as a whole. It is the court's role to say whether or not the
discriminatory measure and the Government's decision to undertake a proper assessment of the
optimum way forward in the light of the demand by couples (whether same-sex or different-sex) for
civil partnerships as well as marriage is objectively justified now. I therefore do not think it is
appropriate to set a deadline for the Government or to give any concrete indication as to when the
discriminatory measure will no longer be justified. I do, however, note that as time passes it will
become increasingly difficult to persuade the court that there is still a need to ‘wait and see’ or that an
approach to civil partnership primarily based on the demand for that status by same-sex couples alone
is justifiable. The Government will have to decide whether to abolish the status of civil partnership or
extend it to different-sex couples and it is for the Government and for Parliament to decide how to keep
the matter under active review. (per Beatson LJ at para 162 in Keidan v Secretary of State for Education
[2017] EWCA Civ 81)
28.3.4 Public authorities

Public authorities may find themselves challenged because the statutory framework within
which they operate gives rise to the indirect application of Convention rights via the
interpretative obligation as described in 28.3.2. However, in addition, the Convention can be
applied directly to their activities: it is not necessary for a litigant first to find a legislative
provision to interpret purposively. Section 6(1) provides simply:
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
28.3.4.1 What is a public authority?

Section 6 does not fully define public authority but does say that it includes ‘any person
certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’. The dividing line between public
and private bodies is a difficult one to draw. The question has exercised the minds of judicial
review lawyers for some time because only public bodies are susceptible to judicial review (eg,
R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc [1987] QB 815). It has also been an issue for EU
lawyers because of the important distinction between the horizontal and vertical effect in EU
law (eg, Foster v British Gas Case (C-188/89) [1990] ECR I-3133). For the purposes of the HRA
1998 there is no doubt that the departments of central government are public authorities, nor
that local government is a public authority. Large companies which exercise quasi-public
regulatory authorities are likely to be regarded as public authorities when exercising their
public functions. But there are many grey areas which will doubtless be a fertile ground for
litigation.
There are two decisions of the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) which inform the
approach courts should take when determining whether a body is a public body within the
meaning of the HRA 1998. These are Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billisley Parochial Church
Council v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 and YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27. In R (on the
application of Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587, Elias LJ
summarised the following principles from these cases:
(1) The purpose of section 6 is to identify those bodies which are carrying out functions which will
engage the responsibility of the UK before the ECtHR.
(2) In conformity with that purpose, a public body is one whose nature is, in a broad sense,
governmental. However, it does not follow that all bodies exercising such functions are
necessarily public bodies; many functions of a kind historically performed by government are
also exercised by private bodies, and increasingly so with the growth of privatisation. Moreover,
this is only a guide since the phrase used in the Act is public function and not governmental
function.
(3) In determining whether a body is a public authority, the courts should adopt what Lord Mance
in YL described as a ‘factor-based approach’ (para 91). This requires the court to have regard to
all the features or factors which may cast light on whether the particular function under
consideration is a public function or not, and weigh them in the round.
(4) In applying this test, a broad or generous application of section 6(3)(b) should be adopted.
(5) In Aston Cantlow Lord Nicholls said (para 12) that the factors to be taken into account ‘include
the extent to which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is
exercising statutory powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or
is providing a public service.’
(6) As to public funding, it was pointed out that it is misleading to say that a body is publicly
subsidised merely because it enters into a commercial contract with a public body (Lord Scott,
para 27; Lord Neuberger para 141). As Lord Mance observed (para 105): ‘Public funding takes
various forms. The injection of capital or subsidy into an organisation in return for undertaking
a non-commercial role or activity of general public interest may be one thing; payment for
services under a contractual arrangement with a company aiming to profit commercially
thereby is potentially quite another.’
(7) As to the second matter, the exercise of statutory powers, or the conferment of special powers,
may be a factor supporting the conclusion that the body is exercising public functions, but it
depends why they have been conferred. If it is for private, religious or purely commercial
purposes, it will not support the conclusion that the functions are of a public nature: see Lord
Mance in YL at paragraph 101. However, Lord Neuberger thought that the ‘existence of wide
ranging and intrusive set of statutory powers … is a very powerful factor in favour of the
function falling within section 6(3)(b)’ and he added that it will often be determinative (para
167).
(8) The third factor, where a body is to some extent taking the place of central government or local
authorities, chimes with Lord Nicholls' observation that generally a public function will be
governmental in nature. This was a theme running through the Aston Cantlow speeches, as Lord
Neuberger pointed out in YL, para 159. That principle will be easy to apply where their powers
are formally delegated to the body concerned.
(9) The fourth factor is whether the body is providing a public service. This should not be confused
with performing functions which are in the public interest or for the public benefit. As Lord
Mance pointed out in YL (para 105), the self-interested endeavour of individuals generally works
to the benefit of society, but that is plainly not enough to constitute such activities public
functions. Furthermore, as Lord Neuberger observed (para 135), many private bodies, such as
private schools, private hospitals, private landlords, and food retailers, provide goods or
services which it is in the public interest to provide. This does not render them public bodies,
nor their functions public functions. Usually the public service will be of a governmental nature.
28.3.4.2 Examples
So, for example, the BBC is to be regarded as a public authority under the HRA 1998. When it
takes a decision not to broadcast certain matter it must have regard to Article 10, the right to
freedom of expression (R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation
[2002] EWCA Civ 297, [2002] 2 All ER 756). Similarly, the police, when they exercise their
powers at common law to arrest to prevent a breach of the peace, must have regard to Article
5, the right to liberty and security of the person. However, a large and flourishing private-
sector provider of residential care homes was not a public authority, and did not have to act in
accordance with Convention rights when deciding to close a care home, despite the applicant
having lived there for 17 years (R (on the application of Heather and Others) v Leonard Cheshire
Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366). See also YL (by her litigation friend) v Birmingham City Council
[2007] UKHL 27.
28.3.4.3 Defences
Sometimes a public authority will attempt to argue that it had no choice but to act in the way it
did because it was merely obeying obligations imposed by an Act of Parliament. In such cases
there are two possibilities. The court may use the interpretative obligation in s 3 to read the
offending legislation in such a way that the public authority was not restricted as it thought; in
such a case, the public authority will be regarded as having made an error of law and an
appropriate remedy will be awarded against it. Alternatively, the court may agree with the
public authority’s reading of the legislation, which may be so clear that it cannot be
purposively interpreted in line with Convention rights. In this case, the public authority will
have the defence that as a result of the legislation in question it could not have acted
differently (s 6(2)) and the other party will have to content themselves with a declaration of
incompatibility against the legislation.
28.3.4.4 Acts of a public authority outside the UK

What is the territorial scope of s 6? Does it apply to a public authority that acts both within and
outside the UK? In R (on the application of Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26,
the claimants were relatives of Iraqi citizens who, it was claimed, had been unlawfully killed
by members of British armed forces in southern Iraq in 2003. The Secretary of State argued
that the 1998 Act did not apply outside the territory of the UK and that the deceased had not
been within the jurisdiction of the UK for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention when
they were killed. The House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) rejected these arguments. It
held that s 6 should be interpreted as applying not only when a public authority acted within
the UK, but also when it acted within the jurisdiction of the UK for the purposes of Article 1 of
the Convention but outside the territory of the UK. Why? The House of Lords stated that the
purpose of the 1998 Act was to provide remedies in domestic law to those whose human
rights had been violated by a UK public authority. Making such remedies available for acts of a
UK authority in the territory of another State is not offensive to the sovereignty of the other
State.
The exception to the territoriality principle acknowledged in Al-Skeini in the case of physical power and
control over a person depends on the fact of such physical power and control. Its significance is that it
enables the contracting state to act to secure certain Convention rights depending on the
circumstances and the degree of physical power and control it possesses. (per Lloyd Jones LJ in Al-
Saadoon v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811 at para 105)
Do British troops operating on foreign soil fall within the jurisdiction of the UK? In R (on the
application of Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29, the Supreme Court held that
the answer is yes, but only when a soldier is on a British base. Note, however, that when the
ECtHR heard the Al-Skeini case referred to above (see [2011] ECHR 1093, Application No
55721/07), the Grand Chamber held (at paras 149 and 150):
It can be seen, therefore, that following the removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and until the
accession of the Interim Government, the United Kingdom (together with the United States) assumed
in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government.
In particular, the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the maintenance of
security in South East Iraq. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that the United
Kingdom, through its soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in question,
exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as
to establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of
Article 1 of the Convention.
Against this background, the Court recalls that the deaths at issue in the present case occurred during
the relevant period: the fifth applicant’s son died on 8 May 2003; the first and fourth applicants’
brothers died in August 2003; the sixth applicant’s son died in September 2003; and the spouses of the
second and third applicants died in November 2003. It is not disputed that the deaths of the first,
second, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ relatives were caused by the acts of British soldiers during
the course of or contiguous to security operations carried out by British forces in various parts of
Basrah City. It follows that in all these cases there was a jurisdictional link for the purposes of Article 1
of the Convention between the United Kingdom and the deceased. The third applicant’s wife was killed
during an exchange of fire between a patrol of British soldiers and unidentified gunmen and it is not
known which side fired the fatal bullet. The Court considers that, since the death occurred in the
course of a United Kingdom security operation, when British soldiers carried out a patrol in the vicinity
of the applicant’s home and joined in the fatal exchange of fire, there was a jurisdictional link between
the United Kingdom and this deceased also.
28.3.5 Direct effect in cases not involving public authorities

There is a significant gap in the way in which the HRA 1998 allows Convention rights to be
enforced. It would appear from s 6 that Convention rights can only be applied directly against
public authorities. Experience from the domain of EU law has shown that this can lead to
unfairness. For example, employees of public authorities may enjoy more rights than
employees of private authorities. Such an interpretation of s 6 would not prevent claimants

against private defendants from relying on the interpretative obligation in s 3. But, to take
advantage of the interpretative obligation, they would have to be litigating a point which was
dealt with by UK legislation which itself was capable of a Convention-compatible
interpretation. Claimants against public authorities would have a simpler solution by applying
Convention rights directly under s 6.
However, it would seem that a doctrine of direct effect in cases involving private bodies is
being developed by the courts. For example, Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd
and Others [2001] 2 WLR 1038 involved an application to the court by the two boys convicted of
murdering Jamie Bulger. After their release from prison, they wanted an injunction preventing
the press from revealing their new identities. Their application was based partly on Article 2
because they feared for their lives should their identities become public. It was argued on their
behalf that, because the court is a public authority (the HRA 1998 says so in s 6(3)), the court
has a duty under s 6(1) to ensure that Convention rights are protected even when it decides
cases involving private litigants. This was accepted by Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss. She said
(para 24):
It is clear that, although operating in the public domain and fulfilling a public service, the defendant
newspapers cannot sensibly be said to come within the definition of public authority in s 6(1) of the
1998 Act. Consequently, Convention rights are not directly enforceable against the defendants … That
is not, however, the end of the matter, since the court is a public authority, see s 6(3), and must itself
act in a way compatible with the Convention, see s 6(1), and have regard to European jurisprudence …
The injunction was granted.
28.4 PROCEDURE FOR USING THE ACT

One principal achievement of the Act is to enable the Convention rights to be directly invoked in the
domestic courts. In that respect the Act is important as a procedural measure which has opened a
further means of access to justice for the citizen, more immediate and more familiar than a recourse to
the Court in Strasbourg. (per Lord Clyde in R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 at para 135)
The s 3 interpretative obligation (see 28.3.2) may be raised in any court or tribunal hearing in
which the meaning of a legislative provision needs to be construed.
Many HRA points are raised in criminal proceedings by defendants. This may be on the basis
that an Act upon which the prosecution seeks to rely does not bear the meaning which the
prosecution attributes to it when s 3 is applied. Alternatively, it may be that the defence wish
to raise a ‘freestanding’ HRA point, not linked to any legislation, that the police or the Crown
Prosecution Service have acted contrary to Convention rights and therefore have broken s 6.
The other procedure which is commonly used to raise Convention rights against public
authorities is judicial review under CPR, Part 54. Under this procedure, the Divisional Court is
well accustomed to scrutinising the decisions of public authorities and measuring them
against a variety of standards of legality and procedural fairness. The HRA 1998 adds another
string to the bow of judicial review lawyers.
28.4.1 Locus standi test

The HRA 1998 introduces some special procedural rules for s 6 challenges to public
authorities. Section 7(1) introduces a locus standi test for such challenges. The claimant must
be a ‘victim’ of the unlawful act. Existing Strasbourg case law on this expression says that to
qualify a person must be actually and directly affected by the act or omission which is the
subject of the complaint. This is a narrower gateway than the usual judicial review test of
‘sufficient interest’.
28.4.2 Limitation
Section 6 challenges are also subject to a one-year limitation period from the date on which
the offending act took place (s 7(5)).
As a matter of ordinary language, the wording of section 7(5)(a) contemplates that an ‘act’ is a single
event which occurred on a single date. No express provision is made for an act which extends over a
period of time. There is no difficulty in applying this approach in the paradigm case of a single act
which takes place at a clearly identifiable point of time. The act should not be confused with its
consequences. If it takes place more than one year before proceedings are brought, the claim is barred
by section 7(5)(a) even if its consequences do not appear until later. (per the Master of the Rolls in
O’Connor v Bar Standards Board [2016] EWCA Civ 775 at para 19)
The period may be extended if the court considers it equitable having regard to all the
circumstances. As for the approach to the exercise of discretion, see Williams v London Borough
of Hackney [2017] EWCA Civ 26. At para 85 the Court of Appeal referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Rabone v Pennine NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 1 where Lord Dyson at para 75
identifies the principles that should guide the court in these terms:
The relevant principles are not in dispute. The court has a wide discretion in determining whether it is
equitable to extend time in the particular circumstances of the case. It will often be appropriate to take
into account factors of the type listed in section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 as being relevant
when deciding whether to extend time for a domestic law action in respect of personal injury or death.
These may include the length of and reasons for the delay in issuing the proceedings; the extent to
which, having regard to the delay, the evidence in the case is or is likely to be less cogent than it would
have been if the proceedings had been issued within the one-year period; and the conduct of the public
authority after the right of claim arose, including the extent (if any) to which it responded to requests
reasonably made by the claimant for information for the purpose of ascertaining facts which are or
might be relevant. However, I agree with what the Court of Appeal said in Dunn v Parole Board [2009] 1
WLR 728, paras 31, 43 and 48 that the words of section 7(5)(b) of the HRA mean what they say and the
court should not attempt to rewrite them. There can be no question of interpreting section 7(5)(b) as if
it contained the language of section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980.
The time limit is also subject to any stricter time-limit imposed by the particular procedure
being used. If judicial review is used, an application must usually be made ‘promptly and in
any event within three months’ (CPR, Part 54).
The s 3 interpretative obligation is not subject to these special provisions for locus standi or
limitation period. The usual rules will apply for whatever procedure is chosen.
28.4.3 Remedies
Section 8 provides for remedies in s 6 challenges to public authorities. It empowers a court to
award such remedies within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. This will include
injunctions to restrain breaches of Convention rights and damages.
28.4.4 Damages
28.4.4.1 General principles
The role of damages in human rights litigation has significant features which distinguish it
from the approach to the award of damages in a private law contract or tort action. As Lord
Woolf CJ stated in Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] QB 1124:
The following points need to be noted.
(a) The award of damages under the HRA is confined to the class of unlawful acts of public
authorities identified by section 6(1): see section 8(1) and (6).
(b) The court has a discretion as to whether to make an award (it must be ‘just and appropriate’ to
do so) by contrast to the position in relation to common law claims where there is a right to
damages: section 8(1).
(c) The award must be necessary to achieve ‘just satisfaction’; language that is distinct from the
approach at common law where the claimant is invariably entitled, so far as money can achieve
this, to be restored to the position he would have been in if he had not suffered the injury of
which complaint is made. The concept of damages being ‘necessary to afford just satisfaction’
provides a link with the approach to compensation of the Court of Human Rights under article
41.
(d) The court is required to take into account in determining whether damages are payable and the
amount of damages payable the different principles applied by the Court of Human Rights in
awarding compensation … (para 55)
In the following paragraph Lord Woolf said that in considering whether to award
compensation and, if so, how much, ‘there is a balance to be drawn between the interests of
the victim and those of the public as a whole’ and that the court has ‘a wide discretion in
respect of the award of damages for breach of human rights’. He described damages as ‘not an
automatic entitlement but … a remedy of last resort’. Later, at para 66, in discussing the
principles applied by the Strasbourg Court, he said that the approach is an equitable one and
that ‘the “equitable basis” has been cited by the Court of Human Rights both as a reason for
awarding damages and as a basis upon which to calculate them’.
Lord Woolf ’s analysis was approved by the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) in R
(Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673 and the Court of Appeal
in Dobson v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 28. To summarise, the Convention
serves principally public law aims; the principal objective is to declare any infringement and
to put a stop to it. Compensation is ancillary and discretionary. The interests of the individual
are part of the equation, but so are those of the wider public.
Note that when the Dobson case was tried (see [2011] EWHC 3253), the court held that the
defendant was liable to the claimants for its negligent failure to control odour from its
sewerage facility. However, the award of damages at common law was made only to the
claimants who were property owners, and this was said to constitute just satisfaction for the
purposes of s 8(3) of the HRA 1998. As a result, no additional compensation was payable to
those claimants who did not have a proprietary interest, such as children living in an affected
property. See also R (on the application of Infinis Plc) v Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2011]
EWHC 1873 (Admin).
Section 9 of the HRA 1998 prevents damages being awarded in respect of a judicial act done in
good faith. In order to show that a judicial act was not done in good faith, a claimant has to
show that there was an ulterior purpose (Webster v Ministry of Justice [2014] EWHC 3995 (QB)).
28.4.4.2 ECtHR principles
The fundamental principle underlying the award of compensation by the ECtHR is that the
Court should achieve what it describes as restitutio in integrum. The applicant should, insofar as
this is possible, be placed in the same position as if his Convention rights had not been
infringed.
Where the breach of a Convention right has clearly caused significant pecuniary loss, this will
usually be assessed and awarded. For example, awards of compensation were made to
homosexuals, discharged from the armed forces, in breach of Article 8, for loss of earnings
and pension rights in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 601 and Smith and Grady v UK
(2001) 31 EHRR 620. But a problem arises in relation to the consequences of the breach of a
Convention right which are not capable of being computed in terms of financial loss.
None of the rights in Part 1 of the Convention are of such a nature that their infringement will
automatically give rise to damage that can be quantified in financial terms. Infringements
may involve a variety of treatment of an individual which is objectionable in itself. The
treatment may give rise to distress, anxiety and, in extreme cases, psychiatric trauma. The
primary object of the proceedings will often be to bring the adverse treatment to an end. If
this is achieved, it may constitute ‘just satisfaction’, or it may be necessary to award damages
to compensate for the adverse treatment that has occurred.
More particularly, damages may be awarded for anxiety and distress that has been occasioned
by the breach. However, an admission of the breach and an apology may be a sufficient
remedy where no damage measurable in financial terms has occurred: see R (on the application
of Degainis) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 137, where the defendant failed promptly
to secure a review of the applicant’s release from prison, thereby breaching his Article 5(4)
rights, but the judge found that that did not cause him to spend longer in custody nor suffer
the sort of frustration or anxiety that might otherwise have merited an award of damages
under Article 5(5). Contrast that with R (on the application of Hester) v Secretary of State for Justice
(2011) LTL, 20 December. Here, the breach of Article 5(4) was admitted and the court found
that the applicant had been unlawfully detained for 12 weeks. However, the court was not
satisfied that the applicant had suffered any distress or medical problems, and assessed the
appropriate award of damages at £500 per week. That amounted in total to £6,000, but as the
Secretary of State had already offered precisely that sum to the applicant, the court ordered
that he should pay the defendant’s costs from the date of that offer. See also ZH (a protected
party by his litigation friend, GH) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2013] EWCA Civ 69.
28.4.4.3 Domestic comparators

Where a court decides that it is appropriate to award damages, the level might be assessed by
reference to any existing domestic comparators. These might include guidelines issued by the
Judicial College, as well as the levels of awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman. These may
all provide some rough guidance where the consequences of the infringement of human
rights are similar to that being considered in the comparator selected.
28.4.4.4 Modest awards

In cases where there is no ready domestic comparator to assist in the assessment of damages
(see 28.4.4.3), the general principle is that the scale of damages should be modest and not
aim to be significantly more or less generous than the ECtHR would award (see R (Greenfield) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 673).
See further, for example, Northamptonshire CC v AS, KS and DS (by his children’s guardian) [2015]
EWFC 7 (where the local authority agreed to pay what appear to be modest damages to a child
and his mother for breaches of Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, arising from its failures in the
conduct of care proceedings) and Re H (a child: breach of Convention rights: damages) [2014] EWFC
38 (where the amount of damages is discussed at [84] to [91]).
28.4.5 Other claims

Claims which introduce Convention rights indirectly via the interpretative obligation are not
subject to s 8. If they are civil claims, they will have available whatever remedies are available
for the cause of action being used (eg, tort).
28.5 THE COMMISSION FOR EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The CEHR is a non-departmental public body that is intended to act as a central point of
advice and guidance on all equality and human rights issues in Great Britain. Its remit is to
promote awareness and understanding of human rights, and to encourage good practice by
public authorities in meeting their obligations under the HRA 1998. The CEHR has powers to
take human rights cases on behalf of minorities who suffer discrimination (see Equality Act
2006, s 30(3)). The Commission’s web address is <www.equalityhumanrights.com>.
Since February 2009 the CEHR has intervened in several cases before the ECtHR involving
issues about housing, immigration, family law, employment law, the right to a fair trial and
other matters, including whether the concept of family life under the ECHR includes same-
sex couples; whether the ban on the use of intercept evidence in court should be lifted;
whether persons subject to immigration control who wish to marry outside the Church of
England (whether in a civil or religious ceremony) should be subject to requirements that do
not apply to those who have a Church of England wedding; and whether the protections of the
HRA 1998 extend to the actions of UK troops abroad.
Human Rights Act 1998 343
APPENDIX TO PART IV
Human Rights Act 1998

Introduction
1. The Convention Rights
(1) In this Act ‘the Convention rights’ means the rights and fundamental freedoms set out
in—
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention,
(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and
(c) Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol,
as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.
(2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any designated
derogation or reservation (as to which see sections 14 and 15).
(3) The Articles are set out in Schedule 1.
(4) The Secretary of State may by order make such amendments to this Act as he considers
appropriate to reflect the effect, in relation to the United Kingdom, of a protocol.
(5) In subsection (4) ‘protocol’ means a protocol to the Convention—
(a) which the United Kingdom has ratified; or
(b) which the United Kingdom has signed with a view to ratification.
(6) No amendment may be made by an order under subsection (4) so as to come into force
before the protocol concerned is in force in relation to the United Kingdom.
2. Interpretation of Convention rights
(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a
Convention right must take into account any—
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of
Human Rights,
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the
Convention,
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the
Convention, or
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention,
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to
the proceedings in which that question has arisen.
(2) Evidence of any judgment, decision, declaration or opinion of which account may have
to be taken under this section is to be given in proceedings before any court or tribunal
in such manner as may be provided by rules.
(3) In this section ‘rules’ means rules of court or, in the case of proceedings before a
tribunal, rules made for the purposes of this section—
(a) by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State, in relation to any proceedings
outside Scotland;
(b) by the Secretary of State, in relation to proceedings in Scotland; or
(c) by a Northern Ireland department, in relation to proceedings before a tribunal in
Northern Ireland—
(i) which deals with transferred matters; and

(ii) for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force.
Legislation
3. Interpretation of legislation
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
(2) This section—
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted;
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any
incompatible primary legislation; and
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of
revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility.
4. Declaration of incompatibility
(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a
provision of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right.
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may
make a declaration of that incompatibility.
(3) Subsection (4) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a
provision of subordinate legislation, made in the exercise of a power conferred by
primary legislation, is compatible with a Convention right.
(4) If the court is satisfied—
(a) that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, and
(b) that (disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary legislation concerned
prevents removal of the incompatibility,
it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.
(5) In this section ‘court’ means—
(a) the Supreme Court;
(b) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council;
(c) the Court Martial Appeal Court;
(d) in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or
the Court of Session;
(e) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the Court of Appeal;
(f ) the Court of Protection, in any matter dealt with by the President of the Family
Division, the Chancellor of the High Court or a puisne judge of the High Court.
(6) A declaration under this section (‘a declaration of incompatibility’)—
(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision
in respect of which it is given; and
(b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.
5. Right of Crown to intervene
(1) Where a court is considering whether to make a declaration of incompatibility, the
Crown is entitled to notice in accordance with rules of court.
(2) In any case to which subsection (1) applies—
(a) a Minister of the Crown (or a person nominated by him),
(b) a member of the Scottish Executive,
(c) a Northern Ireland Minister,
(d) a Northern Ireland department,
is entitled, on giving notice in accordance with rules of court, to be joined as a party to

the proceedings.
(3) Notice under subsection (2) may be given at any time during the proceedings.
(4) A person who has been made a party to criminal proceedings (other than in Scotland) as
the result of a notice under subsection (2) may, with leave, appeal to the House of Lords
against any declaration of incompatibility made in the proceedings.
(5) In subsection (4)—
‘criminal proceedings’ includes all proceedings before the Court Martial Appeal Court;
and
‘leave’ means leave granted by the court making the declaration of incompatibility or by
the Supreme Court.
Public Authorities
6. Acts of public authorities
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a
Convention right.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if—
(a) as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could
not have acted differently; or
(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which
cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.
(3) In this section ‘public authority’ includes—
(a) a court or tribunal, and
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in
connection with proceedings in Parliament.
(4) ...
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.
(6) ‘An act’ includes a failure to act but does not include a failure to—
(a) introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for legislation; or
(b) make any primary legislation or remedial order.
7. Proceedings
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which
is made unlawful by section 6(1) may—
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or
tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only
if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) ‘appropriate court or tribunal’ means such court or tribunal as may
be determined in accordance with rules; and proceedings against an authority include a
counterclaim or similar proceeding.
(3) If the proceedings are brought on an application for judicial review, the applicant is to
be taken to have a sufficient interest in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would
be, a victim of that act.
(4) If the proceedings are made by way of a petition for judicial review in Scotland, the
applicant shall be taken to have title and interest to sue in relation to the unlawful act
only if he is, or would be, a victim of that act.
(5) Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of—
(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of
took place; or
(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all
the circumstances,
but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure
in question.
(6) In subsection (1)(b) ‘legal proceedings’ includes—
(a) proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority; and
(b) an appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal.
(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a victim of an unlawful act only if he would
be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if proceedings were brought
in the European Court of Human Rights in respect of that act.
(8) Nothing in this Act creates a criminal offence.
(9) In this section ‘rules’ means—
(a) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal outside Scotland, rules made
by the Lord Chancellor or Secretary of State for the purposes of this section or
rules of court,
(b) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal in Scotland, rules made by the
Secretary of State for those purposes,
(c) in relation to proceedings before a tribunal in Northern Ireland—
(i) which deals with transferred matters; and
(ii) for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force,
rules made by a Northern Ireland department for those purposes,
and includes provision made by order under section 1 of the Courts and Legal Services
Act 1990.
(10) In making rules, regard must be had to section 9.
(11) The Minister who has power to make rules in relation to a particular tribunal may, to the
extent he considers it necessary to ensure that the tribunal can provide an appropriate
remedy in relation to an act (or proposed act) of a public authority which is (or would be)
unlawful as a result of section 6(1), by order add to—
(a) the relief or remedies which the tribunal may grant; or
(b) the grounds on which it may grant any of them.
(12) An order made under subsection (11) may contain such incidental, supplemental,
consequential or transitional provision as the Minister making it considers appropriate.
(13) ‘The Minister’ includes the Northern Ireland department concerned.
8. Judicial remedies
(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or
would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its
powers as it considers just and appropriate.
(2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, or to
order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings.
(3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of
the case, including—
(a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in
question (by that or any other court), and
(b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act,
the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person
in whose favour it is made.
(4) In determining—
(a) whether to award damages, or
(b) the amount of an award,
the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human
Rights in relation to the award of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention.
(5) A public authority against which damages are awarded is to be treated—
(a) in Scotland, for the purposes of section 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 as if the award were made in an action of damages
in which the authority has been found liable in respect of loss or damage to the
person to whom the award is made;
(b) for the purposes of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 as liable in respect
of damage suffered by the person to whom the award is made.
(6) In this section—
‘court’ includes a tribunal;
‘damages’ means damages for an unlawful act of a public authority; and
‘unlawful’ means unlawful under section 6(1).
9. Judicial acts
(1) Proceedings under section 7(1)(a) in respect of a judicial act may be brought only—
(a) by exercising a right of appeal;
(b) on an application (in Scotland a petition) for judicial review; or
(c) in such other forum as may be prescribed by rules.
(2) That does not affect any rule of law which prevents a court from being the subject of
judicial review.
(3) In proceedings under this Act in respect of a judicial act done in good faith, damages
may not be awarded otherwise than to compensate a person to the extent required by
Article 5(5) of the Convention.
(4) An award of damages permitted by subsection (3) is to be made against the Crown; but
no award may be made unless the appropriate person, if not a party to the proceedings,
is joined.
‘appropriate person’ means the Minister responsible for the court concerned, or a
person or government department nominated by him;
‘court’ includes a tribunal;
‘judge’ includes a member of a tribunal, a justice of the peace (or, in Northern Ireland, a
lay magistrate) and a clerk or other officer entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of a court;
‘judicial act’ means a judicial act of a court and includes an act done on the instructions,
or on behalf, of a judge; and
‘rules’ has the same meaning as in section 7(9).
Remedial Action
10. Power to take remedial action
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a provision of legislation has been declared under section 4 to be incompatible
with a Convention right and, if an appeal lies—
(i) all persons who may appeal have stated in writing that they do not intend to
do so;
(ii) the time for bringing an appeal has expired and no appeal has been brought
within that time; or
(iii) an appeal brought within that time has been determined or abandoned; or
(b) it appears to a Minister of the Crown or Her Majesty in Council that, having regard
to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights made after the coming into
force of this section in proceedings against the United Kingdom, a provision of
legislation is incompatible with an obligation of the United Kingdom arising from
the Convention.
(2) If a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for proceeding
under this section, he may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he
considers necessary to remove the incompatibility.
(3) If, in the case of subordinate legislation, a Minister of the Crown considers—
(a) that it is necessary to amend the primary legislation under which the subordinate
legislation in question was made, in order to enable the incompatibility to be
removed, and
(b) that there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this section,
he may by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as he considers
necessary.
(4) This section also applies where the provision in question is in subordinate legislation
and has been quashed, or declared invalid, by reason of incompatibility with a
Convention right and the Minister proposes to proceed under paragraph 2(b) of
Schedule 2.
(5) If the legislation is an Order in Council, the power conferred by subsection (2) or (3) is
exercisable by Her Majesty in Council.
(6) In this section ‘legislation’ does not include a Measure of the Church Assembly or of the
General Synod of the Church of England.
(7) Schedule 2 makes further provision about remedial orders.
Other Rights and Proceedings
11. Safeguard for existing human rights
A person’s reliance on a Convention right does not restrict—
(a) any other right or freedom conferred on him by or under any law having effect in any
part of the United Kingdom; or
(b) his right to make any claim or bring any proceedings which he could make or bring
apart from sections 7 to 9.
12. Freedom of expression
(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.
(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (‘the respondent’) is
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is
satisfied—
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court
is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be
allowed.
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the
respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic
material (or to conduct connected with such material), to—
(a) the extent to which—

(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.
‘court’ includes a tribunal; and
‘relief ’ includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings).
13. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(1) If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the exercise
by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the
importance of that right.
(2) In this section ‘court’ includes a tribunal.
…
21. Interpretation, etc
(1) In this Act—
‘amend’ includes repeal and apply (with or without modifications);
‘the appropriate Minister’ means the Minister of the Crown having charge of the
appropriate authorised government department (within the meaning of the Crown
Proceedings Act 1947);
‘the Commission’ means the European Commission of Human Rights;
‘the Convention’ means the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November
1950 as it has effect for the time being in relation to the United Kingdom;
‘declaration of incompatibility’ means a declaration under section 4;
‘Minister of the Crown’ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act
1975;
‘Northern Ireland Minister’ includes the First Minister and the deputy First Minister in
Northern Ireland;
‘primary legislation’ means any—
(a) public general Act;
(b) local and personal Act;
(c) private Act;
(d) Measure of the Church Assembly;
(e) Measure of the General Synod of the Church of England;
(f ) Order in Council—
(i) made in exercise of Her Majesty’s Royal Prerogative;
(ii) made under section 38(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; or
(iii) amending an Act of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c);
and includes an order or other instrument made under primary legislation (otherwise
than by the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales, the Counsel General to the
Welsh Assembly Government, a member of the Scottish Executive, a Northern Ireland
Minister or a Northern Ireland department) to the extent to which it operates to bring
one or more provisions of that legislation into force or amends any primary legislation;
‘the First Protocol’ means the protocol to the Convention agreed at Paris on 20th March
1952;
‘the Eleventh Protocol’ means the protocol to the Convention (restructuring the control
machinery established by the Convention) agreed at Strasbourg on 11th May 1994;
‘the Thirteenth Protocol’ means the protocol to the Convention (concerning the
abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances) agreed at Vilnius on 3rd May 2002;
‘remedial order’ means an order under section 10;
‘subordinate legislation’ means any—
(a) Order in Council other than one—
(i) made in exercise of Her Majesty’s Royal Prerogative;
(ii) made under section 38(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 1998;
(iii) or amending an Act of a kind mentioned in the definition of primary
legislation;
(b) Act of the Scottish Parliament;
(ba) Measure of the National Assembly for Wales;
(bb) Act of the National Assembly for Wales;
(c) Act of the Parliament of Northern Ireland;
(d) Measure of the Assembly established under section 1 of the Northern Ireland
Assembly Act 1973;
(e) Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly;
(f ) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made
under primary legislation (except to the extent to which it operates to bring one or
more provisions of that legislation into force or amends any primary legislation);
(g) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made
under legislation mentioned in paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) or made under an
Order in Council applying only to Northern Ireland;
(h) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument made by a
member of the Scottish Executive, Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales,
the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly Government, a Northern Ireland
Minister or a Northern Ireland department in exercise of prerogative or other
executive functions of Her Majesty which are exercisable by such a person on
behalf of Her Majesty;
‘transferred matters’ has the same meaning as in the Northern Ireland Act 1998; and
‘tribunal’ means any tribunal in which legal proceedings may be brought.
(2) The references in paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 2(1) to Articles are to Articles of the
Convention as they had effect immediately before the coming into force of the Eleventh
Protocol.
(3) The reference in paragraph (d) of section 2(1) to Article 46 includes a reference to
Articles 32 and 54 of the Convention as they had effect immediately before the coming
into force of the Eleventh Protocol.
(4) The references in section 2(1) to a report or decision of the Commission or a decision of
the Committee of Ministers include references to a report or decision made as provided
by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of Article 5 of the Eleventh Protocol (transitional provisions).
(5) …
22. Short title, commencement, application and extent
(1) This Act may be cited as the Human Rights Act 1998.
(2) Sections 18, 20 and 21(5) and this section come into force on the passing of this Act.
(3) The other provisions of this Act come into force on such day as the Secretary of State
may by order appoint; and different days may be appointed for different purposes.
(4) Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 7 applies to proceedings brought by or at the
instigation of a public authority whenever the act in question took place; but otherwise
that subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the coming into force of that
section.
(5) This Act binds the Crown.
(6) This Act extends to Northern Ireland.
(7) …
SCHEDULE 1
The Convention Rights
Article 2
Right to life
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Article 3
Prohibition of Torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 4
Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional
release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory
military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or
well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
Article 5
Right to Liberty and Security
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by
law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f ) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a
view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of
this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law
to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
Article 6
Right to a Fair Trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
Article 7
No Punishment Without Law
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
Article 8
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Article 10
Freedom of Expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Article 11
Freedom of Assembly and Association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
Article 12
Right to Marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according
to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
Article 14
Prohibition of Discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth
or other status.
Article 16
Restrictions on Political Activity of Aliens
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties
from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
Article 17
Prohibition of Abuse of Rights
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in
the Convention.
Article 18
Limitation on Use of Restrictions on Rights
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be
applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.
The First Protocol
Article 1
Protection of Property
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Article 2
Right to Education
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.
Identifying and Addressing Convention Rights 355
Identifying and
Addressing Convention
Rights: a Checklist
Article 2
• Was there an intentional deprivation of life?
• Was it in execution of a court sentence following conviction of a crime for which the
sentence is the death penalty?
• Was it for a ground permitted under para 2?
• Did it comply with the conditions set out in para 2?
Article 3
• Was there torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment?
Article 4
• Was there slavery or servitude (para 1)?
• Was there forced or compulsory labour (para 2) save as excluded by para 3?
Article 5 (para 1)
• Was there a deprivation of liberty?
• Was it in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law?
• Was it for any of the grounds permitted by paras (a) to (f )?
Article 6, civil matters
• Was a civil right or obligation determined?
• Were the rights under para 1 met?
Article 6, criminal matters
• Did the proceedings concern a criminal charge?
• Were the rights under para 1 met?
Article 7
• Did the act or omission constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed?
Article 8
• Was there an interference with a person’s private or family life, home or
correspondence?
• Was any interference lawful (para 2)?
• Was any interference necessary pursuant to the reasons set out in para 2?
• Article 9
• Was there an interference with a person’s freedom of thought or conscience?
• Was there an interference with a person’s religion? If so, was it lawful and necessary
(para 2)?
Article 10
• Was there an interference with a person’s right to freedom of expression?
Article 11
• Was there an interference with a person’s freedom of peaceful assembly or association?
Article 12
• Was the person of marriageable age?
• Did the person comply with national laws?
• Was there an interference with a person’s right to marry or found a family?
First Protocol, Article 1
• Was there an interference with a person’s peaceful enjoyment of his possessions?
• Was any interference lawful?
• Was any interference necessary pursuant to any of the specified grounds?
First Protocol, Article 2
• Was there a denial of the right to education?
• Was there a lack of respect of parents’ religious or philosophical views?
Article 14
• Is another ECHR right or freedom in issue?
• Has there been discrimination on any of the specified grounds?
Everyday situations in which the HRA 1998 might apply 357
Everyday situations in which

the HRA 1998 might apply
Not being able to eat properly while in hospital or a care home (Articles 2 and 8).
Provision of facilities or food which do not meet religious or cultural needs (Article 9).
Abuse or neglect of older people, those who are learning disabled or other vulnerable people
(Articles 2 and 3).
Lack of respect for privacy on a hospital ward (Article 8).
Disproportionate use of stop-and-search powers against young black males and other ethnic
minorities (Article 14).
Not respecting gay and lesbian partners as next-of-kin and inheritors of tenancies (Articles 8
and 14).
Excessive surveillance of law-abiding people (Article 8).
Loss of personal data by public officials (Article 8).
Curfews preventing law-abiding young people from going out at night (Article 8).
Failures by the authorities to protect people from being stalked and harassed (Articles 2, 3
and 8).
Not being sufficiently protected from domestic violence (Articles 2, 3 and 8).
Not being allocated suitable housing for special needs that have been identified (Article 8).
Bullying of all kinds in schools (Articles 3 and 8).
Disregard of gay and lesbian couples in adoption policies (Article 14).
Unexplained death in prisons, police stations and psychiatric hospitals (Article 2).
Wearing religious symbols or dress at work or in schools (Article 9 and Protocol 1, Article 2).
Inadequate provision for children with special educational needs (Protocol 1, Article 2 and
Article 14).
Refusal to permit the staging or broadcasting of artistic works (Article 10).
Refusal to allow people to attend a demonstration (Articles 10 and 11).
Responding to Human Rights Judgments 359
Responding to Human
Rights Judgments
Cm 8162
Annex A: Declarations of incompatibility
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000, 27 declarations of
incompatibility have been made. Of these:
• 19 have become final (in whole or in part) and are not subject to further appeal;
• 8 have been overturned on appeal; and
Of the 19 declarations of incompatibility that have become final:
• 12 will have been remedied by later primary legislation;
• 2 will have been remedied by a remedial order under section 10 of the Human Rights
Act;
• 4 related to provisions that had already been remedied by primary legislation at the time
of the declaration;
• 1 is under consideration as to how to remedy the incompatibility.
Information about each of the 27 declarations of incompatibility is set out below in
chronological order. All references to Articles are to the Convention rights, as defined in the
Human Rights Act 1998, unless stated otherwise.
This information was last updated on 8 August 2011, and will not reflect any changes after
that date.
Contents
R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport
and the Regions (Administrative Court; [2001] HRLR 2; 13 December 2000)
R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the North and East London Region & The
Secretary of State for Health (Court of Appeal; [2001] EWCA Civ 415; 28 March 2001)
Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) (Court of Appeal; [2001] EWCA Civ 633; 2 May 2001)
McR’s Application for Judicial Review (Queen’s Bench Division (NI); [2002] NIQB 58; 15 January
2002)
International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Court of Appeal;
[2002] EWCA Civ 158; 22 February 2002)
Matthews v Ministry of Defence (Queen’s Bench Division; [2002] EWHC 13 (QB); 22 January
2002)
R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (House of Lords; [2002]
UKHL 46; 25 November 2002)
R (on the application of D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Administrative Court; [2002]
EWHC 2805 (Admin); 19 December 2002)
Blood and Tarbuck v Secretary of State for Health (unreported; 28 February 2003)
R (on the application of Uttley) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Administrative Court;
[2003] EWHC 950 (Admin); 8 April 2003)
Bellinger v Bellinger (House of Lords; [2003] UKHL 21; 10 April 2003)
R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for Health (Administrative Court; [2003] EWHC 1094
(Admin); 16 April 2003)
R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners (Court of Appeal; [2003] EWCA
Civ 814; 18 June 2003)
R (on the application of Hooper and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Court of Appeal;
[2003] EWCA Civ 875; 18 June 2003)
R (on the application of MH) v Secretary of State for Health (Court of Appeal; [2004] EWCA Civ 1609;
3 December 2004)
A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (House of Lords; [2004] UKHL 56; 16
December 2004)
R (on the application of Sylviane Pierrette Morris) v Westminster City Council & First Secretary of State (No
3) (Court of Appeal; [2005] EWCA Civ 1184; 14 October 2005)
R (Gabaj) v First Secretary of State (Administrative Court; unreported; 28 March 2006)
R (on the application of Baiai and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another
(Administrative Court; [2006] EWHC 823 (Admin); 10 April 2006)
Re MB (Administrative Court; [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin); 12 April 2006)
R (on the application of (1) June Wright (2) Khemraj Jummun (3) Mary Quinn (4) Barbara Gambier) v (1)
Secretary of State for Health (2) Secretary of State for Education & Skills (Administrative Court; [2006]
EWHC 2886 (Admin); 16 November 2006)
R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of State for the Home Department v
Hindawi and another (House of Lords; [2006] UKHL 54; 13 December 2006)
Smith v Scott (Registration Appeal Court (Scotland); [2007] CSIH 9; 24 January 2007)
Nasseri v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Administrative Court; [2007] EWHC 1548
(Admin); 2 July 2007)
R (Wayne Thomas Black) v Secretary of State for Justice (Court of Appeal; [2008] EWCA Civ 359; 15
April 2008)
R (on the application of (1) F (2) Angus Aubrey Thompson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Administrative Court; [2008] EWHC 3170 (Admin); 19 December 2008)
R (on the application of Royal College of Nursing and others) v Secretary of State for Home Department
(Administrative Court; [2010] EWHC 2761; 10 November 2010)
Examples of How Business Can Impact Certain Human Rights 361
Examples of How Business

Can Impact Certain Human
Rights
Relevant The right explained How business might impact
human right that right
Right to life • Right not to be deprived of life • Lethal use of force by security
arbitrarily or unlawfully; forces (State or private) to
• right to have one’s life protect company resources,
protected, for example from facilities or personnel;
physical attacks or health and • operations that pose life-
safety risks. threatening safety risks to
workers or neighbouring
communities through
accident/exposure to toxic
chemicals;
• manufacture and sale of
products with lethal flaws or
dual-use products.
Right to be free • Slavery occurs when one • Business operations that take
from slavery, human effectively owns place in certain countries or
servitude and another; cultural contexts may,
forced labour • freedom from servitude covers knowingly or unknowingly,
other forms of egregious benefit from forced labour,
economic exploitation, like either directly or through
trafficking of workers or debt supply chains;
bondage; • business practices that put
• rights to freedom from slavery workers in a position of debt
and servitude are absolute bondage through company
rights; loans, payment of fees or other
means;
• forced or compulsory labour is
defined by the ILO as all work • transportation of people/
or service that is extracted goods that facilitates the
under menace of any penalty trafficking of forced or bonded
and for which the person has labour.
not voluntarily offered
themselves;
• providing wages does not
necessarily mean that work is
not forced labour if the other
aspects of the definition are
met.

Right to • Individuals have a right to be • Failing to protect the

privacy protected from arbitrary, confidentiality of personal
unlawful or unreasonable data on employees, customers
interference with their privacy, or other stakeholders;
family, home or • providing information to
correspondence and from government authorities
attacks on their reputation. without the individual’s
permission, in response to
government requests that do
not follow required national
procedures and/or that are not
in line with international
human rights law.
Right to health • Individuals have a right to the • Pollution from business
highest attainable standard of operations creates negative
physical and mental health; health impacts on workers and
• this includes the right to surrounding communities;
control over one’s health and • sale of products that are
body and freedom from hazardous to the health of end
interference. users/customers;
• failure to implement effective
OH&S standards.
Rights of • Children are in need of special • Business activities might be
protection for protection because of their relying on child labour, either
the child potentially vulnerable status as directly or through their
minors; supply chains;
• a child has the right to a name, • where child labour is
to be registered and to acquire discovered, businesses can
a nationality; impact other rights (such as
• children must be protected the right to an adequate
from sexual and economic standard of living) if they fail
exploitation; to take account of the best
interests of the child in
• ILO standards set minimum
determining the appropriate
employment ages for
response.
hazardous work (18 years) and
regular work (15 years, unless
the country exercises the
exception for developing
States, which is 14 years),
though there are some
carefully prescribed
exceptions.
Examples of How Business Can Impact Certain Human Rights 363

Right of self- • Right of peoples, rather than • Any activity that might have
determination individuals; impacts on indigenous
• Peoples are entitled to peoples or their lands whether
determine their political through acquisition,
status, pursue economic, construction or operation.
social and cultural
development, dispose of their
land’s natural resources and
not be deprived of their own
means of subsistence;
• The right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination
has been specifically
recognised by the
international community.
365
PART V
PROBATE AND
ADMINISTRATION
Succession to Property on Death: The Background Law 367
CHAPTER 29
Succession to Property on
Death: The Background Law

29.2 What property can pass under a will and the intestacy rules? 367
29.3 What property passes independently of the will and intestacy rules? 368
29.4 The requirements for a valid will 369
29.5 How a will takes effect 375
29.6 The effect of the intestacy rules 379
29.7 The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 384
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• identify what property is capable of passing by will
• identify whether a will is valid
• decide the effect of a will
• explain the intestacy rules and decide who is entitled to property under the rules
• identify the circumstances in which a person can make a claim under the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 and the factors the court will take
into account when considering a claim.
29.1 INTRODUCTION
When a person dies, one of the most important questions is who will inherit that person’s
property. This chapter explains the matters that are relevant when answering that question.
The first thing people usually ask is whether or not there is a will. However, many valuable
assets pass independently of the terms of the will; and even if there is a will, the court may
override its terms under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 if it
concludes that reasonable financial provision was not made for a close relative or dependant.
This chapter therefore looks at all the ways in which property can pass on death and the
circumstances in which the court can alter the disposition of property under the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. It also looks at how to make a valid will and
at the way in which wills take effect.
29.2 WHAT PROPERTY CAN PASS UNDER A WILL AND THE INTESTACY RULES?
When an individual dies, he may have provided for the disposition of his property on death by
leaving a valid will. A will can operate to dispose of most types of property which an individual
may own on death. A gift in a valid will of ‘all my estate to my son, John’ would include
property held in the sole name of the testator at the time of his death in a variety of different
forms, such as cash, money in bank and building society accounts, stocks and shares and
other investments, land and chattels.
If an individual does not dispose of such property by will, it passes on his death according to
the intestacy rules.
However, there are some important types of property which pass on death independently of
the terms of the will and the intestacy rules. For many people the bulk of their property will
pass in this way.
29.3 WHAT PROPERTY PASSES INDEPENDENTLY OF THE WILL AND

INTESTACY RULES?
A number of different kinds of property pass independently of the terms of any will or the
intestacy rules, some much more significant than others.
29.3.1 Joint property

Where property is held by more than one person as joint tenants in equity, on the death of one
joint tenant his interest passes by survivorship to the surviving joint tenant(s).
EXAMPLE
George makes a will leaving all his estate to a charity. He and his brother Harry have a joint
bank account and own a house as joint tenants in equity. On George’s death his interests
in the house and the bank account pass automatically to Harry, not to the charity under
the terms of George’s will.
The doctrine of survivorship does not apply to land held on a tenancy in common. The share
of each tenant in common passes on his death under his will (or under the intestacy rules).
29.3.2 Nominated property

There are statutory provisions allowing individuals to ‘nominate’ what is to happen to certain
types of funds after the nominator’s death. The statutory provisions apply to deposits not
exceeding £5,000 in certain trustee savings banks, friendly societies, and industrial and
provident societies.
A nomination is a direction to the institution to pay the money in the account, on the death of
the investor, to a chosen (‘nominated’) third party.
If an individual has an account to which these provisions apply and has made a nomination,
on his death the property passes to the chosen nominee regardless of the terms of the will (if
any) or intestacy rules. If no nomination has been made, the money in the account will pass
under the will or intestacy in the usual way.
There are very few statutes which allow new nominations to be made, although those already
made will continue to be valid unless and until revoked.
29.3.3 Insurance policies

Where a person takes out a simple policy of life assurance, the benefit of that policy belongs to
him. On his death, the policy matures and the insurance company will pay the proceeds to his
representatives who will distribute the money according to the terms of his will or the
intestacy rules.
However, a person may take out a life assurance policy expressed to be for the benefit of
specified individuals. This is effectively a gift on trust for those individuals. It may be done in
two ways:
(a) Under the terms of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, s 11. Under this section, a
person taking out a life assurance policy on his own life may express the policy to be for
the benefit of his spouse and/or children. This creates a trust in favour of the named
beneficiaries.
(b) Alternatively, a policy may be expressly written in trust for or assigned to named
beneficiaries.
In either case, once given away, the benefit of the policy does not belong to the policy holder.
On the policy holder’s death, the policy matures and the insurance company will pay the
proceeds to the named beneficiaries (or to trustees for them) regardless of the terms of the
deceased’s will. The policy holder makes a transfer of value of the policy at the date of the gift,
but usually this is very low.
29.3.4 Pension benefits

Many pension schemes provide for the payment of benefits if an employee dies ‘in service’.
Commonly, a lump sum calculated on the basis of the employee’s salary at the time of his
death is paid by the trustees of the pension fund to members of the family or dependants
chosen at their discretion. Such discretionary schemes usually allow the employee to leave a
letter of wishes for the trustees indicating which people he would like to benefit. The
employee’s choice is not binding on the pension fund trustees, but they will normally abide by
his wishes.
Such pension benefits do not belong to the employee during his lifetime and pass on death
independently of the terms of any will and of the intestacy rules.
A few pension schemes provide that the lump sum must be paid to the employee’s personal
representatives (PRs). The PRs must then distribute the money according to the terms of the
employee’s will or the intestacy rules.
PRACTICAL POINT
When trying to decide who is entitled to take assets following a death, always deal with
assets in the following order:
(a) property passing independently of the will and intestacy rules;
(b) property passing by will;
(c) property undisposed of by will and therefore passing under the intestacy rules.
29.4 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID WILL

In order to create a valid will, a testator must have the necessary capacity and intention, and
must observe the formalities for execution of wills laid down in the Wills Act 1837. Once the
will is made, it may be revoked by subsequent marriage or the formation of a civil partnership,
by destruction or by a later will.
29.4.1 Capacity
In order to make a valid will, an individual must be aged 18 or over (with certain limited
exceptions) and must have the requisite mental capacity. This testamentary capacity was
defined in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 as ‘soundness of mind, memory and
understanding’. The testator must understand:
(a) the nature of his act and its broad effects;
(b) the extent of his property (although not necessarily recollecting every individual item);
and
(c) the moral claims he ought to consider (even if he decides to reject such claims and
dispose of his property to other beneficiaries).
In addition, the testator must not be suffering from any insane delusion which affects the
disposition of property.
29.4.1.1 Proof and presumptions

At common law, the person who puts forward a will has to prove that all necessary elements,
including mental capacity, are present. This is normally not particularly burdensome as,
where a person generally showed no sign of mental confusion, it will be presumed that he
retained that capacity when he made his will. If, however, there is anything to put his capacity
in doubt, the presumption will not apply and the PRs will have to prove capacity on the basis
of the Banks v Goodfellow test.
The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 came into force on 1 April 2007. It introduced a
statutory test to determine whether a person had capacity to take a decision. Section 1(2)
provides that ‘for the purposes of this Act a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it
is established that he lacks capacity’. There was some uncertainty as to whether the Act
applied to capacity to make a will.
In Scammell v Farmer [2008] EWHC 1100 (Ch), which was the first case to consider the effect of
the Act, the judge concluded that the Act applies only to decisions taken under the Act by the
Court of Protection on behalf of another, so it ought not to apply to the assessment of a
person’s capacity to make his own will. Some later cases doubted this. However, in Kicks v Leigh
[2014] EWHC 3926 (Ch), Judge Stephen Morris QC reviewed all the cases and said that he
preferred the analysis in Scammell. In Walker v Badmin [2014] All ER (D) 258 (Nov), Judge
Nicholas Strauss QC also reviewed the case law and concluded that the Banks v Goodfellow test
for testamentary capacity applied rather than the MCA 2005 test. Although the Court of
Appeal might take a different view, it seems likely that this is the correct answer and the MCA
2005 has not affected the common law test.
29.4.2 Intention
When the will is signed, the testator must have both general and specific intention. This
means that the testator must intend to make a will (as opposed to any other sort of
document), and must also intend to make the particular will now being executed (ie the
testator must know and approve its contents).

The burden of proving the testator’s knowledge and approval falls on the person putting
forward the will, but there is one presumption which will usually assist.
A testator who has capacity and has executed his will, having read it, is presumed to have the
requisite knowledge and approval. However, this presumption does not apply in the situations
listed below.
Testator blind/illiterate/not signing personally
The presumption that the testator knew and approved the contents of his will does not apply if
the testator was blind or illiterate, or another person signed the will on the testator’s behalf
(eg, because he had an injured hand).
In these cases, the probate registrar will require evidence to prove knowledge and approval. It
is usual in such cases to include a statement at the end of the will stating that the will was read
over to the testator, or read by the testator who knew and approved the contents.
Suspicious circumstances
Similarly, the presumption of knowledge and approval does not apply if there are suspicious
circumstances surrounding the drafting and/or execution of the will (eg, the will has been
prepared by someone who is to be a major beneficiary under its terms or who is a close
relative of a major beneficiary).
In such cases, because the presumption does not apply, the person putting forward the will
must remove the suspicion by proving that the testator did actually know and approve the
will’s contents.
In Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430, the Court of Appeal found that the presumption did
not apply where Mrs Gill, a Yorkshire farmer, who was on excellent terms with her daughter
and grandson, left everything to the RSPCA after leading her daughter to believe that she
would inherit everything. Mrs Gill suffered from a severe anxiety disorder. The Court of
Appeal held that the circumstances of the case were so unusual that the presumption did not
apply, and that the RSPCA had not proved that Mrs Gill had known and approved the contents
of her will.
Note: Conduct issues for those regulated by the SRA
Those regulated by the SRA are required to act with integrity and in the best interests of
clients (Principles 2 and 4). They must not act if there is a significant risk that the duty to act
in the best interests of the client conflicts with their own interests. There is such a risk where
someone prepares a will which benefits himself or someone close to him.
The SRA’s Code of Conduct 2011 in Chapter 1 (Client Care) includes as an Indicative
Behaviour:
refusing to act where your client proposes to make a gift of significant value to you or a member of your
family, or a member of your firm or their family, unless the client takes independent legal advice
29.4.2.2 Undue influence and mistake

Where a testator with capacity appears to have known and approved the contents of the will,
any person who wishes to challenge the will (or any part of it) must prove one or more of the
following to prevent some or all of the will from being admitted to probate. (There are no
presumptions, so the person claiming invalidity on one of these grounds must prove it.)
Force, fear, fraud or undue influence

A will is invalid if it is shown that the testator made the will (or part of it) as a result of force or
fear (through actual or threatened injury), or fraud (eg, after being misled by some pretence)
or undue influence (where the testator’s freedom of choice was overcome by intolerable
pressure, even though his judgement remained unconvinced).
Notice that it is necessary to prove undue influence in relation to a will. This is different from
the position in relation to a lifetime gift. If a donor makes a lifetime gift which requires
explanation (for example, because it is large in relation to the donor’s other assets) to a person
who is in a position of trust and confidence, there is a presumption of undue influence. The
donee will be able to keep the gift only if he can provide the court with a satisfactory
explanation. The need for proof of undue influence in relation to wills makes it very difficult
for someone challenging the will to succeed. The person alleging undue influence will need to
collect evidence from family, friends and carers.
Mistake
All or part of the will may be included by mistake. Any words included without the knowledge
and approval of the testator will be omitted from probate. In this respect, it is important to
distinguish between actual mistake (ie absence of knowledge and approval) and
misunderstanding as to the true legal meaning of words used in the will. In the latter case
mistaken words will not be omitted.
29.4.3 Formalities for execution

Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 (as substituted by Administration of Justice Act 1982, s 17)
provides:
No will shall be valid unless—

(a) it is in writing, and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his
direction; and
(b) it appears that the testator intended by his signature to give effect to the will; and
(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses
present at the same time; and
(d) each witness either—
(i) attests and signs the will; or
(ii) acknowledges his signature,
in the presence of the testator (but not necessarily in the presence of any other witness),
but no form of attestation shall be necessary.
There is one exception to the rule that wills must comply with the requirements of s 9. A will
made on actual military service or by a mariner or seaman at sea is valid and may be in any
form, including a mere oral statement: Wills Act 1837, s 11. The only requirement is that the
‘testator’ intends to dispose of his property after his death. It is the circumstances in which
the will is made that are important, not the circumstances of death. In Ayling v Summers [2010]
1 All ER 410 the testator made an oral statement of wishes in 1990 while he was under orders
to join his ship, and died, retired, in 2005; his statement was held to be a valid privileged will.

If the will includes a clause which recites that the s 9 formalities were observed, a
presumption of due execution is raised. The will is valid unless there is proof that the
formalities were not observed. Such a clause is called an attestation clause.
An example of an attestation clause is:
Signed by the testator in our joint presence and then by us in his/hers.
If the will does not contain an attestation clause, the district judge (or registrar) must require
an affidavit of due execution from a witness or any other person who was present during the
execution, or, failing that, an affidavit of handwriting evidence to identify the testator’s
signature, or refer the case to a judge (all of which involve time and expense).
29.4.3.2 Witnesses
There are no formal requirements relating to the capacity of witnesses, although they must be
capable of understanding the significance of being the witness to a signature.
If either of the witnesses is a beneficiary under the will or is the spouse or a civil partner of a
beneficiary, the will remains valid but the gift to the witness or to the witness’s spouse fails
(Wills Act 1837, s 15; see 29.5.3).
It is important for solicitors preparing wills to give clear instructions to their clients
explaining how to sign and witness the will, and warning that beneficiaries and those married
to beneficiaries should not be witnesses.
If the will is returned to the solicitor for storage, the solicitor is under a duty to check the
signatures to see whether ss 9 and 15 appear to have been complied with.
Failure to carry out these duties may lead to liability in negligence.
29.4.4 Revocation
Testators can always revoke a will during their lifetime, provided they have testamentary
capacity. There are three ways of revoking a will.
29.4.4.1 By a later will or codicil

Under the Wills Act 1837, s 20, a will may be revoked in whole or in part by a later will or
codicil. Normally, a will contains an express clause revoking all earlier wills and codicils.
If a will does not contain an express revocation clause, it operates to revoke any earlier will or
codicil by implication to the extent that the two are inconsistent.
Exceptionally, the court may decide that a testator’s intention to revoke an earlier will by an
express revocation clause was conditional upon a particular event (eg, the effectiveness of a
gift in the new will). If that condition is not satisfied, the revocation may be held to be invalid
so that the earlier will remains effective (this is sometimes called the doctrine of ‘dependent
relative revocation’).
29.4.4.2 By marriage or formation of a civil partnership
If the testator marries or forms a civil partnership after executing a will, the will is
automatically revoked (Wills Act 1837, s 18, as substituted by the Administration of Justice
Act 1982). The rule does not apply where a testator makes a will prior to a forthcoming
marriage or civil partnership if it appears from the will that the testator was expecting to
marry or form a civil partnership with a particular person and does not intend the will to be
revoked (s 18(3)). Unless the will states that it is conditional on the marriage or civil
partnership taking place, it will take effect unless expressly revoked, even if the expected
marriage/civil partnership does not happen.
For example, Fred and Frances are engaged. They make wills in expectation of marriage and
then have a row and break off the engagement. Fred dies 10 years later without changing his
will. Frances will take his estate.
Note that as a result of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 a marriage may, since 29
March 2014, be between a same sex couple as well as an opposite sex couple.
It is possible for civil partners to convert a civil partnership into a same sex marriage. A new
subsection (5) was inserted into s 18 of the Wills Act 1837 to provide that, where a civil
partnership is converted to a marriage, the conversion will not revoke an existing will of either
party nor affect any dispositions in the wills.
If the testator makes a will and is later divorced, or if the civil partnership is dissolved (or the
marriage or civil partnership is annulled or declared void), then under the Wills Act 1837,
s 18A (amended by the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 with effect from 1 January 1996)
the will remains valid but:
(a) provisions of the will appointing the former spouse or civil partner as executor or
trustee take effect as if the former spouse or civil partner had died on the date on which
the marriage or civil partnership is dissolved or annulled; and
(b) any property, or interest in property, which is devised or bequeathed to the former
spouse or civil partner passes as if the former spouse or civil partner had died on that
date. See 29.5.3.1 below.
This means that substitutional provisions in the will which are expressed to take effect if the
testator’s spouse/civil partner predeceases him will also take effect if the marriage/civil
partnership is dissolved or annulled.
29.4.4.3 By destruction
A will may be revoked by ‘burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same by the testator or
by some person in his presence and by his direction with the intention of revoking the same’
(Wills Act 1837, s 20). Physical destruction without the intention to revoke is insufficient; a
will destroyed accidentally or by mistake is not revoked. If its contents can be reconstructed
(eg, from a copy), an order may be obtained allowing its admission to probate as a valid will.
Physical destruction is required: symbolic destruction (eg, simply crossing out wording or
writing ‘revoked’ across the will) is not sufficient, although if a vital part (eg, the signature) is
destroyed, this partial destruction may be held to revoke the entire will. If the part destroyed is
less substantial or important, then the partial destruction may revoke only that part which
was actually destroyed.
Note that the destruction must be in the testator’s presence and by his direction. Destruction
in another room is ineffective to revoke the will. Where a will is destroyed without the
intention to revoke, it is possible to obtain probate of a copy, draft or reconstruction. See
30.5.2.4.
Occasionally, the court may apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to save a will,
on the basis that the testator’s intention to revoke his will by destruction was conditional
upon some future event (eg, upon the later execution of a new will). If that event did not in
fact take place, the original will may be valid even though it was destroyed. The contents of the
original will may be reconstructed from a copy or draft.
29.4.5 Alterations
If a will has been altered, the basic rule is that the alterations are invalid unless it can be
proved that they were made before the will was executed, or unless the alterations are
executed like a will (the initials of the testator and witnesses in the margin beside the
alteration are sufficient for this purpose).
If a will includes invalid alterations, the original wording will stand if the original words are
‘apparent’, ie can still be read. If the original words have been obliterated in such a way that
they can no longer be read, those words have effectively been revoked by destruction. The rest
of the will remains valid, and takes effect with the omission of the obliterated words.
Again, the court may decide that the testator’s intention to revoke the obliterated words was
conditional only. This inference is most likely to be drawn where the testator attempted to
replace the obliterated words with a substitution. The implied condition is that the testator
intended to revoke the original words only if the substitution was effective. As it is not, the
original words remain valid and, if they can be reconstructed (eg, from a copy or draft), they
will take effect.
EXAMPLE
Tamal makes a professionally drawn will which leaves ‘£10,000 to my nephew, Nalin’. After
executing the will, Tamal decides he wants to change the legacy to Nalin:
(1) He draws a thin line through ‘£10,000’ and writes above it ‘£20,000’.
This is an unexecuted alteration and will have no effect. The gift remains a gift of
£10,000.
(2) He does exactly the same thing but writes his name next to the alteration and gets
two people to witness his signature.
This is an executed alteration and takes effect to alter the gift to £20,000.
(3) He draws a thick line through ‘£10,000’ in such a way that the original wording is
wholly unreadable.
This is an obliteration and will be treated as revoking the original gift. The gift is
treated as a gift of nothing.
(4) He does exactly the same thing but writes ‘£20,000’ above the obliteration.
This is an obliteration and would be treated as revoking the original gift were it not
for the fact that Tamal has substituted words. A court is likely to conclude that
Tamal’s intention to revoke the original gift was conditional on the substitution
being able to take effect. As the substitution is not effective, the original gift will take
effect (provided it is possible to discover what the original gift was).
29.5 HOW A WILL TAKES EFFECT

When a testator dies, the people dealing with the estate must decide (usually with the help of
a solicitor) the effect of the will in the light of the circumstances at the date of the testator’s
death. They will need to consider what property the testator owned when he died and which of
the people named in the will have survived the testator in order to decide the effect of the
gifts.
If the will refers to beneficiaries by description, it will be necessary to identify the people
fulfilling the description.
The people dealing with the estate will be called executors, if they were appointed by the will,
and administrators, if there was no appointment in the will. There are statutory rules as to
who is able to act as an administrator (see Chapter 30). Both executors and administrators may
be referred to generically as ‘personal representatives’.
29.5.1 What property passes under the gifts in the will?

As seen in 29.2 above, certain types of property pass independently of the will either because
they have their own rules of succession (eg, joint property), or because the testator did not
own them beneficially at death (eg, life assurance policies written in trust).
When the PRs have decided what property is capable of passing under the will, they must
apply the terms of the will to the property.
29.5.1.1 Basic rule

The basic rule is stated in the Wills Act 1837, s 24, which provides:
every will shall be construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to
speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a
contrary intention shall appear by the will.
This means that a gift of ‘all my estate’ or ‘all the rest of my estate’ takes effect to dispose of all
property the testator owned when he died, whether or not the testator owned it at the time the
will was made.
29.5.1.2 Ademption
A specific legacy, ie a gift of a particular item or group of items of property, will fail if the
testator no longer owns that property at death. The gift is said to be ‘adeemed’. Ademption
usually occurs because the property has been sold, given away or destroyed during the
testator’s lifetime.
EXAMPLE
In her will Ellen gives ‘my engraved gold bracelet’ to her sister Grace and the rest of her
estate to her husband Harry. Ellen no longer owns the bracelet when she dies. Grace
receives nothing: her legacy is adeemed. All Ellen’s estate passes to Harry under the
residuary gift.
Problems may arise where the asset has been retained but has changed its nature since the will
was made. For example, where the will includes a specific gift of company shares, the
company may have been taken over since the will was made so that the testator’s shareholding
has been changed into a holding in the new company. In such a case, the question is whether
the asset is substantially the same, having changed merely in name or form, or whether it has
changed in substance. Only if there has been a change in substance will the gift be adeemed.
Another area of potential difficulty occurs where the testator disposes of the property
described in a specific gift but before his death acquires a different item of property which
answers the same description; for example a gift of ‘my car’ or ‘my piano’ where the original
car or piano has been replaced since the will was made. It has been held that the presumption
in such a case is that the testator meant only to dispose of the particular asset he owned at the
date of the will so that the gift is adeemed. By referring to ‘my’ car or piano, the testator is
taken to have shown a contrary intention as specified in s 24. It has been suggested that this
construction may vary according to the circumstances and that the respective values of the
original and substituted assets may be taken into account.
If the property given is capable of increase or decrease (eg, ‘my shares’, ‘my jewellery’), the
testator will normally be taken to have made a gift of any items satisfying the description at
death.
EXAMPLE
Thea makes a will leaving ‘all my jewellery’ to her niece, Nepota. After the date of the will,
all her jewellery is stolen. Six months later she receives money from her insurance
company and buys new jewellery. Then she dies.
(1) Because Thea has used a phrase which is capable of increase and decrease, she is
treated as intending to pass whatever jewellery she has at the date of her death.
Nepota will, therefore, take the replacement items.
(2) Had the gift been of ‘my pearl necklace’, Thea would probably be treated as
intending to pass only the necklace she owned at the date of the will. Nepota would
not have taken any replacement necklace.
(3) Had Thea died after receiving the insurance money but before buying replacement
assets, Nepota would have taken nothing. She has no right to the insurance money
under the terms of the gift.
A testator may wish to add to or change a will in a minor way and so may execute a
supplementary codicil. A codicil is a supplement to a will which, to be valid, must be executed
in the same way as a will. The significance of a codicil in the context of a gift of property is that
it republishes the will as at the date of the codicil. Thus, if the testator makes a will in 1990
leaving ‘my gold watch’ to a legatee, loses the watch in 2000 and replaces it, the gift of the
watch in the will is adeemed. If, however, the testator executes a codicil to the will in 2003, the
will is read as if it had been executed in 2003 and so the legatee will take the replacement
watch.
29.5.2 Has the beneficiary survived the testator?

29.5.2.1 Basic rule
A gift in a will fails or ‘lapses’ if the beneficiary dies before the testator. If a legacy lapses, the
property falls into residue, unless the testator has provided for the possibility of lapse by
including a substitutional gift. If a gift of residue lapses, the property passes under the
intestacy rules, unless the testator has included a substitutional gift in the will. Where no
conditions to the contrary are imposed in the will, a gift vests on the testator’s death. This
means that provided the beneficiary survives the testator, for however short a time, the gift
takes effect. If the beneficiary dies soon after the testator the property passes into the
beneficiary’s estate.
It is possible to show a contrary intention, for example by wording a gift to make it clear that
the property is to pass to whoever is the holder of a position or office at the date of the
testator’s death.
There is a presumption that, as regards people, a will is construed at the date it is made. A gift
made to ‘the eldest son of X’ is construed as a gift to the person fulfilling that description at
the date the will is made. If that person dies, the gift does not pass to the eldest surviving son.
However, if the testator makes a codicil to the will, it republishes the will and the will is
treated as made at the date of the republication. Hence, if the eldest son dies between the date
of the will and the codicil, the will is construed as referring to the person who is the eldest son
at the date of the codicil.
29.5.2.2 Law of Property Act 1925, s 184

The principle outlined above means that if the deaths of the testator and beneficiary occur
very close together, it is vital to establish who died first. The law of succession does not accept
the possibility that two people might die at the same instant. If the order of their deaths
cannot be proved, s 184 provides that the elder of the two is deemed to have died first. If the
testator was older than the beneficiary, the gift takes effect and the property passes as part of
the beneficiary’s estate.
29.5.2.3 Survivorship clauses

Commonly, gifts in wills are made conditional upon the survival of the beneficiaries for a
specific period of time, such as 28 days. These survivorship provisions prevent a gift from
taking effect where the beneficiary survives the testator for only a relatively short time or is
deemed to have survived by s 184. As with any other contingent gift, if the beneficiary fails to
satisfy the contingency, the gift fails.
29.5.2.4 Lapse of gifts to more than one person

A gift by will to two or more people as joint tenants will not lapse unless all the donees die
before the testator. If a gift is made ‘to A and B jointly’ and A dies before the testator, the
whole gift passes to B.
If the gift contains words of severance, for example ‘everything to A and B in equal shares’,
this principle does not apply. If A dies before the testator, A’s share lapses and B takes only one
share. The lapsed share will pass under the intestacy rules unless the testator included a
substitutional gift to take effect if one of the original beneficiaries predeceased.
If the gift is a class gift (eg, ‘to my children equally if more than one’), there is no lapse unless
all the members of the class predecease the testator.
29.5.2.5 Wills Act 1837, s 33: gifts to children and remoter issue
This section applies to all gifts by will to the testator’s children or remoter issue (for the
meaning of ‘issue’, see 29.6.2.1) unless a contrary intention is shown in the will and its effect
is to incorporate an implied substitution provision into such gifts. It provides that where a will
contains a gift to the testator’s child or remoter descendant and that beneficiary dies before
the testator, leaving issue of his own who survive the testator, the gift shall not lapse but shall
pass instead to the beneficiary’s issue. The issue of a deceased beneficiary take the gift their
parent would have taken in equal shares.
EXAMPLE
Tom’s will includes a gift of £40,000 to his daughter, Caroline. Caroline and her daughter
Sarah both die before Tom, but Caroline’s son, James, and Sarah’s children, Emma and
Daniel, all survive him. Under s 33, the legacy is saved from lapse. James takes half the gift
(£20,000). Sarah would have taken the other half but, as she has predeceased Tom, her
half passes to her own children equally. Thus, Emma and Daniel take £10,000 each.
Section 33 does not apply if the will shows a contrary intention. This is usually shown by
including an express substitution clause.
The Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Act 2011 inserted a
new s 33A into the Wills Act 1837, with the result that in certain circumstances for the
purposes of the Wills Act a person may be deemed to have predeceased the testator. See
29.5.3.5 below.
29.5.3 Does the gift fail for any other reason?

29.5.3.1 Divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership
Under the Wills Act 1837, s 18A (as substituted by the Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995),
where after the date of the will the testator’s marriage or civil partnership is dissolved or
annulled or declared void, ‘any property which, or an interest in which, is devised or
bequeathed to the former spouse or civil partner shall pass as if the former spouse or civil
partner had died’ on the date of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or civil
partnership.
EXAMPLE
Fauzia makes a will in which she leaves all her estate to her husband, Sabiq, with a
substitutional provision that, if Sabiq dies before her, the property should pass to her
children equally. Fauzia and Sabiq are later divorced but Fauzia does not change her will.
She dies, survived by Sabiq and the children. Under s 18A, the gift to Sabiq fails. Even
though Sabiq in fact survived Fauzia, the substitutional gift takes effect and Fauzia’s estate
passes to the children.
29.5.3.2 Beneficiary witnesses will

Under the Wills Act 1837, s 15, a gift by will fails if the beneficiary, his spouse or civil partner
witnesses the will.
29.5.3.3 Disclaimer
A beneficiary need not accept a gift given to him by will. He can disclaim the gift, which will
then fall into residue or, in the case of disclaimer of a gift of residue, pass on intestacy.
However, a beneficiary who has received a benefit from a gift (eg, a payment of income) is
taken to have accepted the gift and may no longer disclaim.
29.5.3.4 Forfeiture
The forfeiture rule provides that, as a matter of public policy, a person should not be able to
inherit from a person he has been convicted of killing. The rule applies in cases both of
murder and manslaughter, but not in cases where the killer was insane within the meaning of
the McNaghten rules.
In cases of manslaughter (but not murder) the killer may apply within three months of
conviction for relief from forfeiture under the Forfeiture Act 1982. The time-limit is strict and
the court has no discretion to extend the period.
29.5.3.5 The Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Act 2011
This Act came into effect on 1 February 2011. Section 2 inserts a new s 33A into the Wills Act
1837 which provides, subject to contrary intention in the will, that a person who disclaims or
forfeits an entitlement under a will is to be treated for the purposes of the Wills Act as having
predeceased the testator.
EXAMPLE
Terry is murdered by his daughter, Denise. His will leaves everything to Denise who has a
son, Sean.
Denise forfeits her entitlement under the will but she will be treated as if she had
predeceased Terry, with the result that s 33 of the Wills Act 1837 will apply and Terry’s
property will pass to Sean.
29.5.4 Identifying the beneficiaries

Where the beneficiaries are referred to by name, identification is usually just a matter of
locating them.
Where the will refers to a class of beneficiaries, for example ‘my children’, ‘my nieces’, there
may be some doubt as to who fulfils that description. Unless the will provides otherwise, such
a gift will be a gift only to the testator’s own children or nieces and not to the children or
relatives of the testator’s spouse or civil partner (so-called step-children), or to those of a
cohabitee.
In Reading v Reading [2015] EWHC 946 (Ch) the court found that there was sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that the testator had intended his step-children to share a pecuniary legacy
with his own children: the will included a substitutional gift of residue to both his own
children and his step-children in the event that his second wife predeceased him, the general
wording suggested step-children were intended to share in both cases, and the solicitor who
prepared the will had recorded in his attendance note that the step-children were to share but
had failed to word the will correctly.
The normal meaning of issue is direct descendants of any generation so, as well as the
testator’s children, it will include grandchildren, great-grandchildren and so on.
Adopted children are normally treated as children of the adoptive parents, although the will
may provide otherwise. In the case of succession to property under modern wills, it is
irrelevant whether or not a child’s parents are married to each other.
There are special rules which apply to determine the parentage of children born as a result of
assisted reproduction (see Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008). These are beyond
the scope of this book.
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force on 4 April 2005. Transsexuals who have
obtained a full gender recognition certificate from the Gender Recognition Panel are legally
recognised in their acquired gender. Hence a gift to ‘my nieces’ would include a nephew who
had changed gender and obtained a certificate.
29.6 THE EFFECT OF THE INTESTACY RULES

The intestacy rules contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (AEA 1925) apply to
decide who is entitled to an individual’s property when he dies without disposing of it by will.
This may occur because the deceased has died intestate (ie, without a valid will), or because
his will failed to dispose of all his estate (partial intestacy).
The intestacy rules apply only to property which is capable of being left by will (see 29.2).
EXAMPLE
Laura dies intestate, survived by her husband, Michael, and their two children. Laura and
Michael owned their house as beneficial joint tenants. Laura had taken out a life
assurance policy for £100,000 which is written in trust for the children, and she owned
investments worth £150,000. The intestacy rules do not affect Laura’s share of the house
(which passes to Michael by survivorship) or the life policy (which passes to the children
under the terms of the trust). Only the investments pass under the intestacy rules.
Note that the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 made significant changes to the
entitlement of surviving spouses and civil partners on intestacy in the case of deaths
occurring on or after 1 October 2014. The previous rules made more limited provision for
spouses and civil partners. These earlier rules are not considered here.
29.6.1 Statutory trust for payment of debts, etc

The intestacy rules impose a trust over all the property (real and personal) in respect of which
a person dies intestate (AEA 1925, s 33). This trust is similar to the usual express trust found
in a will and includes a power of sale: it provides that the PRs must pay the funeral,
testamentary and administration expenses, and any debts of the deceased. The balance
remaining (after setting aside a fund to meet any pecuniary legacies left by the deceased in the
will) is the ‘residuary estate’ to be shared among the family under the rules of distribution set
out in s 46 of the AEA 1925. The PRs have power under s 41 to appropriate assets in or towards
satisfaction of a beneficiary’s share (with the beneficiary’s consent).
29.6.2 Spouse or civil partner and issue

29.6.2.1 Definitions
Under the intestacy rules, a spouse is the person to whom the deceased was married at his
death, whether or not they were living together. A same sex spouse has exactly the same rights
as an opposite sex spouse.
A divorced spouse is excluded. A cohabitee has no rights under the intestacy rules.
Civil partners are treated in the same way as spouses.
The term ‘issue’ includes all direct descendants of the deceased: ie, children, grandchildren,
great grandchildren, etc. Adopted children (and remoter descendants) are included, as are
those whose parents were not married at the time of their birth. Descendants of the deceased’s
spouse or civil partner (‘step’ children) are not issue of the deceased unless adopted.
29.6.2.2 Entitlements
Where the intestate is survived by both spouse or civil partner and issue, the ‘residuary estate’
(as defined in 29.6.1) is distributed as follows:
(a) The spouse or civil partner receives the personal chattels absolutely. ‘Personal chattels’
are defined in s 55(1)(x) of the AEA 1925 as tangible movable property, other than any
such property which—
(i) consists of money or securities for money, or
(ii) was used at the death of the intestate solely or mainly for business purposes, or
(iii) was held at the death of the intestate solely as an investment.
(b) In addition, the spouse or civil partner receives a ‘statutory legacy’ of £250,000 free of
tax and costs plus interest from death until payment. The rate of interest payable is the
Bank of England rate that had effect at the end of the day on which the intestate died.
(c) The rest of the residuary estate (if any) is divided in half. One half is held on trust for the
spouse or civil partner absolutely. The other half is held for the issue on the statutory
trusts.
The intestate’s spouse or civil partner must survive the intestate for 28 days in order to inherit.
The Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 provides that, where the intestate’s spouse or civil
partner dies within 28 days of the intestate, the estate is distributed as if the spouse or civil
partner has not survived the intestate.
29.6.2.3 Applying the statutory trusts

The statutory trusts determine membership of the class of beneficiaries, and the terms on
which they take, as follows.
(a) The primary beneficiaries are the children of the intestate who are living at the
intestate’s death. Remoter issue are not included, unless a child has died before the
intestate.
(b) The interests of the children are contingent upon attaining the age of 18 or marrying or
forming a civil partnership under that age. Any child who fulfils the contingency at the
intestate’s death takes a vested interest.
(c) If any child of the intestate predeceased the intestate, any children of the deceased child
(grandchildren of the deceased) who are living at the intestate’s death take their
deceased parent’s share equally between them, contingently upon attaining 18 or earlier
marriage or formation of a civil partnership. Great grandchildren would be included
only if their parent had also predeceased the intestate. This form of substitution and
division is known as a ‘per stirpes’ distribution.
(d) If children or issue survive the intestate but die without attaining a vested interest, their
interest normally fails and the estate is distributed as if they had never existed. However,
s 3 of the Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Act 2011
provides that if they die without attaining a vested interest but leaving issue, they will be
treated as having predeceased the intestate so that they can be replaced by their own
issue (see 29.6.5.1).
EXAMPLE
Joanne dies intestate survived by her husband, Kenneth, and their children, Mark (who
has a son, Quentin) and Nina. Their daughter, Lisa, died last year. Lisa’s two children,
Oliver and Paul, are living at Joanne’s death.
J=K
L (deceased) M N
(22) (16)
O P Q
(6) (4) (1)
Joanne’s estate consists of her share in the house, held as joint tenants with Kenneth, and
other property worth £570,000 after payment of debts, funeral and testamentary
expenses. This figure includes personal chattels worth £20,000.
DISTRIBUTION
Joanne’s share in the house passes to Kenneth by survivorship. The rest of her estate
passes on intestacy.
£
20,000 personal chattels to Kenneth
250,000 statutory legacy to Kenneth
The remaining £300,000 is divided in half.
150,000 for Kenneth absolutely
150,000 for the issue on the statutory trusts
570,000
The statutory trusts apply to determine the distribution between Joanne’s issue as follows.
Mark and Nina, Joanne’s children, are living at her death and take one share each. The
share Lisa would have taken had she survived is held for her children, Oliver and Paul, in
equal shares. The interests of Nina, Oliver and Paul are contingent upon attaining 18 or
earlier marriage or formation of a civil partnership.
Thus, Mark has a vested interest in one-third of the issues’ half. He is entitled to £50,000
on Joanne’s death. If Mark should die shortly after Joanne, his share would form part of his
estate on death. Quentin has no entitlement under Joanne’s intestacy.
Nina has a contingent interest in one-third of the issues’ half, which will vest when she is
18 or if she marries or forms a civil partnership before 18. If Nina should die under the age
of 18 and without marrying or forming a civil partnership, her interest would fail. One half
of Nina’s share would pass to Mark and the other half would be held for Oliver and Paul
equally. However, if Nina has a child who survived her, the child would take Nina’s place as
a result of s 3 of the Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession)
Act 2011.
Oliver and Paul have contingent interests in one-sixth of the issues’ half, which will vest at
18 or earlier marriage or formation of a civil partnership. If Oliver should die under the age
of 18 and without marrying or forming a civil partnership (or having an illegitimate child),
his share would pass to Paul (and vice versa). If both Oliver and Paul were to die under the
age of 18 and without marrying or forming a civil partnership (or having an illegitimate
child), their shares would be divided equally between Mark and Nina (provided she
reaches 18, marries or forms a civil partnership).
29.6.2.4 Right of spouse or civil partner to require appropriation of the matrimonial home
If the matrimonial home forms part of the estate passing on intestacy, the surviving spouse or
civil partner can require the PRs to appropriate the matrimonial home in full or partial
satisfaction of any absolute interest in the estate (Intestates’ Estates Act 1952, s 5).
If the property is worth more than the entitlement of the spouse or civil partner, the spouse or
civil partner may still require appropriation provided he or she pays the difference, ‘equality
money’, to the estate.
The election must be made in writing to the PRs within 12 months of the grant of
representation.
29.6.3 Spouse or civil partner and no issue

Where the intestate leaves a surviving spouse or civil partner but no issue, the whole estate,
however large, passes to the spouse or civil partner absolutely. Other relatives, such as
parents, brothers and sisters, grandparents and cousins, are not entitled.
The spouse or civil partner must survive the intestate for 28 days in order to take. If the spouse
or civil partner dies within that period, the estate is distributed as if the spouse or civil partner
had not survived the intestate.
29.6.4 Distribution where there is no surviving spouse or civil partner

Where there is no surviving spouse or civil partner (or, for deaths after 1 January 1996, where
the spouse or civil partner dies within 28 days of the intestate), the ‘residuary estate’ is divided
between the relatives in the highest category in the list below:
(a) issue on the ‘statutory trusts’ (see 29.6.2), but if none,
(b) parents, equally if both alive, but if none,
(c) brothers and sisters of the whole blood on the ‘statutory trusts’, but if none,
(d) brothers and sisters of the half blood on the ‘statutory trusts’, but if none,
(e) grandparents, equally if more than one, but if none,
(f ) uncles and aunts of the whole blood on the ‘statutory trusts’, but if none,
(g) uncles and aunts of the half blood on the ‘statutory trusts’, but if none,
(h) the Crown, Duchy of Lancaster, or Duke of Cornwall (bona vacantia).
29.6.4.1 The statutory trusts

Each category other than parents and grandparents takes ‘on the statutory trusts’. This means
that members of the specified class share the estate equally (children under 18 take their
interest contingently upon attaining 18 or marrying earlier), and that issue of a deceased
relative may take that relative’s share. This means that relatives not mentioned in s 46 (eg,
nephews, nieces and cousins) may inherit on intestacy if their parents died before the intestate.
EXAMPLE 1
Tom dies intestate. He was not married to his partner, Penny, although the couple have a
son, Simon, aged 13, Tom’s only child. Tom’s parents predeceased him but he is survived
by his only sibling, his brother, Bob, aged 40.
Tom’s estate is held on trust for Simon, contingently upon attaining 18 or marrying earlier.
If Simon dies before the contingency is fulfilled, Tom’s estate passes to Bob absolutely.
EXAMPLE 2
Vera, a widow aged 80, is cared for by her step-daughter, Carol (the child of her deceased
husband’s first marriage). Her only living blood relatives are cousins, the children of her
mother’s brothers and sisters. Vera dies intestate. Her estate is divided ‘per stirpes’
between her cousins (and the children of any cousins who predeceased her). Carol
receives nothing from Vera’s estate.
Section 3 of the Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Act 2011
provides that a person with an interest on the statutory trusts who dies before reaching the
age of 18 or marrying or forming a civil partnership will be treated as having predeceased. The
effect is that if such a person has an illegitimate child, the child can take the share his or her
parent would have taken provided the child fulfils the statutory trusts.
29.6.4.2 Adopted and illegitimate children

Adopted children are treated for intestacy purposes as the children of their adoptive parents
and not of their natural parents. If a person who was adopted dies intestate without spouse or
issue, his estate will be distributed between the closest relatives in the adoptive family. An
adopted child may also inherit on the intestacy of any member of his adoptive family.
Similarly, the intestacy rules are applied regardless of whether or not a particular individual’s
parents were married to each other. However, on the intestacy of an individual whose parents
were not married to each other, it is presumed that the individual has not been survived by his
father or by any person related to him through his father unless the contrary is shown (Family
Law Reform Act 1987, s 18(2)). This presumption avoids any necessity for the PRs to make
enquiries where the identity or whereabouts of the father is unknown. The presumption does
not apply where the father is named on the intestate child’s birth certificate (Family Law
Reform Act 1987, s 18(2ZA)).
EXAMPLE
Jessica, whose parents did not marry, dies intestate. Her only known relative is a half
brother, the child of her mother’s later marriage. Nothing is known of Jessica’s father or
any other children he may have had. Jessica’s PRs may distribute her estate to her half
brother, relying on the presumption in s 18(2).
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 makes it possible for a child to have a
second female parent (where a child is conceived using donated sperm and/or eggs and the
mother is in a civil partnership or where the parties have agreed that this is to be the case).
The Family Law Reform Act 1987, s 18(2) and s 18(2ZA) apply in the same way to a second
female parent as they apply to a father.
If a child with a contingent interest in the estate of an intestate relative is adopted before
fulfilling the statutory trusts, he loses his entitlement. The Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers
Act 2014 introduced a limited saving. Section 4 provides that any contingent interest (other
than a contingent interest in remainder) which the adopted person had immediately before
the adoption in the estate of a deceased parent is preserved. The change applies also to gifts in
a will of a deceased parent as well as on intestacy, for example ‘£100,000 to be divided
amongst such of my children as reach 18’. The change is limited to parents, so an adopted
child will still lose a contingent entitlement to the estate of other relatives.
The Adoption and Children Act 2002 already preserved vested interests of children who are
adopted before their interest falls into possession.
There are provisions in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 which apply to
children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements and techniques of assisted reproduction.
The details are beyond the scope of this book.
29.6.4.3 Bona vacantia

Where an estate passes bona vacantia, the Crown, Duchy of Lancaster or Duke of Cornwall has
a discretion to provide for dependants of the intestate, or for other persons for whom the
intestate might reasonably have been expected to make provision.
Genealogists say that it is rare for an estate to be truly bona vacantia. They can usually trace
some relatives (provided the estate is large enough to meet their fees).
29.7 THE INHERITANCE (PROVISION FOR FAMILY AND DEPENDANTS) ACT

1975
The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975) allows
certain categories of people who may be aggrieved because they have been left out of a will, or
are not inheriting on an intestacy, to apply for a benefit from the estate following the testator’s
or intestate’s death. The I(PFD)A 1975 may also be used by a person who has received some
benefit under the will or intestacy but is dissatisfied with the amount of the inheritance.
Note that the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 made some limited changes to the
I(PFD)A 1975 in the case of deaths occurring on or after 1 October 2014. The previous
legislation is not considered here.
The I(PFD)A 1975 applies only where the deceased died domiciled in England and Wales. It
does not apply where a person originally domiciled in England and Wales has acquired a
domicile of choice elsewhere.
Section numbers below refer to the I(PFD)A 1975 unless otherwise stated.
29.7.1 When should a claim be made?

An application must be brought within six months of the date of issue of the grant of
representation to the deceased’s estate (s 4). However, the court has a discretion to extend
this time-limit. In the case of deaths on or after 1 October 2014 (the date on which the
Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 came into force) it is possible to make an
application before the grant is issued.
29.7.2 Who can make a claim?

The following persons can make a claim (s 1(1)):
(a) the spouse or civil partner of the deceased;
(b) a former spouse or civil partner of the deceased who has not remarried (except where,
on the granting of the decree of dissolution or nullity, the court made an order barring
the former spouse or civil partner from making a claim);
(c) a child of the deceased (whatever the child’s age);
(d) any person treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to any marriage or
civil partnership of the deceased, or otherwise in relation to any family in which the
deceased at any time stood in the role of a parent (eg, a step-child or child of a
cohabitee);
(e) any person who, immediately before the death of the deceased, was being maintained
by him either wholly or in part. A person is ‘maintained’ if ‘the deceased was making a
substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards the reasonable needs of
that person, other than a contribution made for full valuable consideration pursuant to
an arrangement of a commercial nature’ (s 1(3));
(f ) any person who, during the whole of the period of two years ending immediately before
the date when the deceased died, was living:
(i) in the same household as the deceased, and
(ii) as the husband or wife of the deceased;
(g) any person who, during the whole of the period of two years ending immediately before
the date when the deceased died, was living:
(i) in the same household as the deceased, and
(ii) as the civil partner of the deceased.
29.7.3 What must the applicant prove?

The only ground for a claim is that ‘the disposition of the deceased’s estate effected by his will
or the law relating to intestacy, or a combination of his will and that law, is not such as to
make reasonable financial provision for the applicant’. Section 1(2) sets out two standards for
judging ‘reasonable financial provision’:
(a) ‘the surviving spouse standard’, which allows a surviving spouse or civil partner such
financial provision as is reasonable in all the circumstances ‘whether or not that
provision is required for his or her maintenance’ (s 1(2)(a)); and
(b) ‘the ordinary standard’, which applies to all other categories of applicant and allows
‘such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances … for the
applicant to receive for his maintenance’ (s 1(2)(b)).
29.7.4 What factors does the court take into account?

Section 3 contains guidelines to assist the court in determining whether the will and/or
intestacy does make reasonable financial provision for the applicant. Some matters should be
considered for every claimant (ie, the common guidelines). There are also special guidelines
for each category of applicant.
The common guidelines in s 3(1) are:
(a) the financial resources and needs of the applicant, other applicants and beneficiaries of
the estate now and in the foreseeable future;
(b) the deceased’s moral obligations towards any applicant or beneficiary;
(c) the size and nature of the estate;
(d) the physical or mental disability of any applicant or beneficiary;
(e) anything else which may be relevant, such as the conduct of the applicant.
The special guidelines vary with the category of applicant. For example, where the applicant is
the surviving spouse or civil partner, the court takes into account the applicant’s age and
contribution to the welfare of the family, the duration of the marriage or civil partnership and
the likely financial settlement if the marriage or civil partnership had ended in divorce or
dissolution rather than death. On an application by a child of the deceased the applicant’s
education or training requirements are considered. (The courts have shown a reluctance to
award financial provision to adult, able-bodied children unless there is a particular need.)
When considering the common and special guidelines, the court takes into account:
(a) the facts at the date of the hearing (s 3(5)); and
(b) with regard to the financial resources and needs of the applicant:
(i) his earning capacity; and
(ii) his financial obligations and responsibilities (s 3(6)).
29.7.5 What orders can the court make?

The court has wide powers to make orders against the ‘net estate’ of the deceased, including
orders for periodical payments, lump sum payments or the transfer of specific property to the
applicant.
The ‘net estate’ against which an order can be made includes not only property which the
deceased has, or could have, disposed of by will or nomination, but also the deceased’s share
of joint property passing by survivorship if the court so orders.
In making an order, the court will declare how the burden of the order is to be borne, ie which
beneficiary is to lose part or all of the property he would otherwise have taken.
For inheritance tax (IHT) purposes, the altered disposition of the estate is treated as taking
effect from death.
If the order alters the amount passing to the deceased’s spouse, the amount of any inheritance
tax payable on the estate will be affected.
29.7.6 Protecting the PRs

Personal representatives should be advised not to distribute the estate until six months have
elapsed from the issue of the grant. In any event, they must not distribute once they have
notice of a possible claim. If PRs do distribute within the six-month period and an applicant
subsequently brings a successful claim, the PRs will be personally liable to satisfy the claim
if insufficient assets remain in the estate. Where a court permits an application out of time,
the PRs will not be liable personally if they have distributed the estate, but the claimant may
be able to recover property from the beneficiaries.
SUMMARY
(1) Important types of property pass independently of a will or the intestacy rules.
(2) To be valid a will must:
(a) be made by a testator with capacity who knows and approves the contents and
is not subject to undue influence;
(b) be properly executed in accordance with Wills Act 1837, s 9;
(c) remain unrevoked.
(3) Gifts in wills may fail as a result of:
(a) ademption;
(b) lapse;
(c) divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership;
(d) beneficiary witnesses will disclaimer;
(e) forfeiture.
(4) The intestacy rules apply to property which is undisposed of by will. The rules are
contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925.
(5) Family members and dependants can ask the court to alter the disposition of the
deceased’s estate if they feel that reasonable financial provision has not been made
for them. The relevant legislation is contained in the Inheritance (Provision for
Family and Dependants) Act 1975.
Probate Practice and Procedure 389
CHAPTER 30
Probate Practice and

Procedure

30.2 Who are the PRs? 390
30.3 First steps after receiving instructions 390
30.4 Deciding whether a grant of representation is necessary 393
30.5 Applying for grant 394
30.6 Completing the IHT account 396
30.7 The requirement for an IHT account 399
30.8 Oaths: general background 404
30.9 Oath for executors 405
30.10 Oath for administrators with will annexed 407
30.11 Oath for administrators 411
30.12 Effect of grant 416
30.13 Limited grants 416
30.14 The chain of representation and grant de bonis non administratis 391
30.15 Caveats and citations 418
30.16 An alternative to citation 419
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• decide whether a grant of representation is required and, if so, who has the best right
to take it
• decide what probate papers are required to obtain the grant
• explain the effect of a grant of representation
• recognise situations in which a limited grant is required
• recognise situations in which the chain of representation is required
• identify situations in which it is appropriate to use caveats and citations.
30.1 INTRODUCTION
When someone dies, it is necessary for assets in his name to be transferred into the names of
his beneficiaries. To do this, it is normally necessary to obtain a court document authorising
the deceased’s personal representatives (PRs) to transfer his assets. This document is called a
grant of representation.
This chapter deals with the process of obtaining a grant of representation and, in particular,
with the various documents that the PRs must produce to the Probate Registry and with
whether inheritance tax is payable.
The final paragraphs look at how to deal with problems that arise where PRs die before
completing the administration and at disputes.
At the time of writing, the process of applying for a grant is governed by the Non-contentious
Probate Rules 1987 (NCPR 1987) (SI 1987/2024). However, they will be replaced by new
Probate Rules which are currently available in draft form. The new Rules do not make
substantive changes but modernise and simplify the process of obtaining a grant: for
example, all Latin names are dropped, so caveats become objections, and oaths are replaced
by Statements of Truth. As yet we do not have a date for the introduction of the new Rules.
30.2 WHO ARE THE PRS?

The PRs will be either the deceased’s executors, or intended administrators. ‘Personal
representative’ is a generic term which covers both.
30.2.1 The executors

If the will is valid and contains an effective appointment of executors of whom one or more is
willing and able to prove the deceased’s will, a grant of probate will be issued to the
executor(s) willing to act (see 30.9).
30.2.2 Administrators with the will annexed

If there is a valid will but there are no persons willing or able to act as executors, then the next
persons entitled to act are administrators with the will annexed, who should be appointed in
accordance with the NCPR 1987, r 20 (see 30.10).
30.2.3 Administrators (simple administration)

If a deceased left no will, or no valid will, the estate will be administered in accordance with
the law of intestacy by administrators appointed by the application of NCPR 1987, r 22 (see
30.11).
30.2.4 Number of PRs required

One executor may obtain a grant and act alone. This is so, even if the estate contains land
which may be sold during the administration, because a receipt for the proceeds of sale from
one executor is sufficient for the purchaser. This is in contrast to the position of trustees
where, if a good receipt for the proceeds of sale of land is to be given to a purchaser, it must be
given by at least two trustees (or a trust corporation).
In the case of administrators (with or without the will), it is normally sufficient for one to act
in the administration of the estate. However, where the will or intestacy creates a life or
minority interest, two administrators are normally required.
30.2.5 Authority of PRs before the grant

An executor derives authority to act in the administration of an estate from the will. The grant
of probate confirms that authority. Although the executor has full power to act from the time
of the deceased’s death, the executor will be unable to undertake certain transactions (eg, sale
of land) without producing the grant as proof of authority.
An administrator (with or without the will) has very limited powers before a grant is made.
His authority stems from the grant which is not retrospective to the date of death.
30.3 FIRST STEPS AFTER RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS

Following a person’s death, the PRs and their professional advisers will have to deal with a
number of matters quickly.
30.3.1 The deceased’s will

Ascertain whether the deceased made a will. If so, ensure all executors named in the will
receive copies of it.
30.3.2 Directions as to cremation, etc

Give immediate consideration to the terms of the will to ascertain any special directions by
the deceased as to cremation, or the use of his body for medical research or other purposes. It
is desirable for testators to make their relatives aware of any such wishes before death.
30.3.3 Details of assets and liabilities

Obtain details of the deceased’s property and of any debts outstanding at the date of death, by
obtaining building society passbooks, share certificates and details of bank accounts, etc. Ask
the deceased’s bank manager whether the bank holds in safe custody any share certificates or
other property owned by the deceased (the bank manager will require sight of the death
certificate before giving such information).
From these details, it is possible to begin to evaluate the size of the deceased’s estate, and the
amount of any liability to inheritance tax.
30.3.4 Details of the beneficiaries

If there is a will, the adviser must establish the identity of the beneficiaries and the nature and
extent of their entitlements (eg, whether as legatee or as residuary beneficiary). If specific
legacies have been given, it is important to ascertain whether the property given by those
specific gifts is part of the estate (if not the gift(s) will have adeemed) (see 29.5.1.2). If the
deceased has died intestate, it is necessary to establish which members of the family have
survived so that the basis of distribution of the estate may be established in accordance with
the rules discussed at 29.6.
30.3.5 Missing and/or unknown creditors and beneficiaries

Personal representatives are responsible for administering the estate correctly. This means
that they have to collect in all the assets, pay all the debts and transfer the remaining funds
and assets to those entitled under the will or intestacy.
If the PRs fail to pay someone who is entitled either as a creditor or as a beneficiary, they will
be personally liable to that person.
They may have two problems:
(a) There may be creditors of whom they are unaware or unknown relatives (eg, children
born outside marriage whose existence has been kept secret).
(b) They may not know the whereabouts of some beneficiaries who may have lost contact
with the deceased’s family.
They can protect themselves against unknown claims by advertising for claimants under the
Trustee Act 1925, s 27. Provided they wait for the time period specified in the section (at least
two months), the PRs will be protected from liability if an unknown claimant later appears.
However, the claimant will have the right to claim back assets from the beneficiaries who
received them.
In relation to unknown claims, the following procedure should be adopted.
30.3.5.1 Early advertisement

In view of the minimum notice period of two months, PRs should advertise as early as
possible in the administration. If they are executors, they may advertise at any time after the
death; if they are administrators, they have power to advertise at any time after obtaining their
grant.
30.3.5.2 Placing the advertisement

The PRs should give notice of the intended distribution of the estate, requiring any person
interested to send in particulars of his claim, whether as a creditor or as a beneficiary, by:
(a) advertisement in the London Gazette;
(b) advertisement in a newspaper circulating in the district in which land owned by the
deceased is situated; and
(c) ‘such other like notices, including notices elsewhere than in England and Wales, as
would, in any special case, have been directed by a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action for administration’.
If the personal representatives are in any doubt as to what notices should be given, they
should apply to the court for directions. Printed forms for the advertisements may be obtained
from law stationers.
30.3.5.3 Time for claims

Each notice must require any person interested to send in particulars of his claim within the
time specified in the notice, which must not be less than two months from the date of the
notice.
30.3.5.4 Searches in case of land

The PRs should also make searches which the prudent purchaser of land would make in the
Land Registry, the Land Charges Register and the Local Land Charges Registry, as
appropriate. The purpose of these searches is to reveal the existence of any liability in relation
to the deceased’s ownership of an interest in land, for example a second mortgage.
30.3.5.5 Distribution after notices

When the time-limit in the notice has expired, the PRs may distribute the deceased’s estate,
taking into account only those claims of which they have actual knowledge, or which they
discover as a result of the advertisements. The PRs are not personally liable for any other
claim, but a claimant may pursue the claim by following the assets into the hands of the
beneficiaries who have received them from the PRs.
The Trustee Act 1925, s 27 will not give any protection to PRs who knows that there is a
person with a claim but cannot find him. It protects only against unknown claims.
30.3.5.6 Missing known creditors and beneficiaries

Where PRs cannot trace a known beneficiary, they must consider one of the following:
(a) Keeping back assets in case the claimant appears. This is unpopular with the other
beneficiaries.
(b) Taking an indemnity from the beneficiaries that they will meet any claims if the
claimant reappears. This is dangerous for the PR as the beneficiaries may have no assets
when the claimant appears.
(c) Taking out insurance to provide funds. This can be expensive and, as the claimant may
be entitled to interest, it is difficult to know what sum to insure.
(d) Applying to the court for an order authorising the PRs to distribute the estate on the
basis that the claimant is dead. This is referred to as a Benjamin order after the case in
which it was first ordered (Re Benjamin [1902] 1 Ch 723). This protects the PRs from
liability, although the claimant retains the right to recover the assets from the
beneficiaries. Applying to court is an expensive process, but it is the only solution that
offers the PR full protection.
30.4 DECIDING WHETHER A GRANT OF REPRESENTATION IS NECESSARY

A grant enables the PRs to prove their authority to deal with the deceased’s assets which
passes under the will or the intestacy rules. However, it is not always necessary to obtain a
grant of representation to deal with assets. The ability to access assets without a grant is
particularly useful where the deceased’s family needs funds immediately for paying
inheritance tax or other purposes.
A fee must be paid to the Probate Registry. The current fee is a flat fee charged irrespective of
the size of the estate. However, in March 2016 the Government issued a Consultation Paper
which proposed introducing a banded system linked to the size of the estate. The intention is
to increase the ‘take’ from probate fees and use the surplus to contribute to the general cost of
running the courts.
A grant may not be required in the three situations which follow.
30.4.1 Assets which may pass to the PRs without a grant

30.4.1.1 Administration of Estates (Small Payments) Act 1965
Orders made under this Act permit payments to be made under various statutes and statutory
instruments to persons appearing to be beneficially entitled to the assets without formal
proof of title. This facility is restricted, in that it is not available if the value of the asset exceeds
£5,000; in addition, as the payments are made at the discretion of the institutions concerned,
it is not possible for PRs to insist that payments should be made. If payment is refused, the
PRs will have to obtain a grant before the asset can be collected. This can present practical
problems where inheritance tax is payable, as the tax normally has to be paid before obtaining
the grant and there may be no funds accessible to the personal representatives. Subject to
these points, payments can be made in respect of, for example:
(a) money in the National Savings Bank and Trustee Savings Bank (but not in other bank
accounts);
(b) National Savings Certificates and Premium Bonds; and
(c) money in building societies and friendly societies.
30.4.1.2 Chattels
Movable personal property such as furniture, clothing, jewellery and cars can normally be sold
without the PRs having to prove formally to the buyer that they are entitled to sell such items.
30.4.1.3 Cash
Normally, the PRs do not require a grant when taking custody of any cash found in the
deceased’s possession (ie found in the home of the deceased as opposed to deposited in a
bank or other account).
30.4.2 Assets not passing through the PRs’ hands

30.4.2.1 Joint property
On death, any interest in property held by the deceased as beneficial joint tenant with another
(whether it is an interest in land or personalty, eg a bank account) passes by survivorship to
the surviving joint tenant. As it does not pass via the PRs, any grant is irrelevant. The survivor
has access to the property and can prove title to the whole of it merely by producing the
deceased’s death certificate. Since it is common for married couples and civil partners to own
property jointly, there are many occasions where a grant is not required for this reason.
(Conversely, if the property is held by persons as beneficial tenants in common, the share of
each tenant in common passes on his death to his PRs for distribution, and a grant will be
required.)
30.4.3 Property not forming part of the deceased person’s estate

The deceased may have insured his/her own life, but in such a way that the policy and its
proceeds are held in trust for others. This trust may be established by writing the policy under
the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, s 11 (‘a Married Women’s Property Act policy’) for
the spouse or children of the deceased, or by making a separate declaration of trust for those
or other beneficiaries. On death, the policy money is payable to the trustees of the policy on
production of the death certificate. A grant is not required since the money does not form part
of the estate. As the deceased had no beneficial interest in the policy or its proceeds (because
of the trust), no inheritance tax will be payable on the proceeds. Such a policy is particularly
advantageous, as the proceeds make tax-free provision for dependants of the deceased and
can be collected in immediately following the death.
30.4.3.1 Pension benefits

Death in service benefits under a pension scheme are often payable to persons to be selected
at the discretion of the pension fund trustees. Payments are made to the beneficiaries on
production of the death certificate. A grant is not required, since the pension benefits do not
form part of the deceased’s estate. This is another method of making tax-free provision for
dependants, and such provision can also be collected in immediately following the death.
30.5 APPLYING FOR GRANT

Where a grant is required, it is necessary to apply to the Principal Registry of the Family
Division or to a district probate registry. The application is made by lodging such of the
following documents as are appropriate to the particular case:
(a) receipted HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) Form IHT421 confirming payment of any
inheritance tax or Form IHT205 if the estate is ‘excepted’ (see 30.7);
(b) the deceased’s will and codicil, if any, plus two A4 photocopies. The original will and
codicil(s), if any, must be marked (ie, signed for identification purposes) by the
executors (or administrators if there are no proving executors) and the solicitor before
whom the supporting oath is sworn or affirmed;
(c) the oath, sworn or affirmed by the executors or administrators;
(d) any affidavit evidence which may be required (see 30.5.2);
(e) probate court fees. At the time of writing this is a flat fee of £155 but may be increased
(see below).
On 24 February 2017 the Ministry of Justice announced that to help reduce the funding
shortfall on the cost of the general court system, probate fees would be increased significantly
from May 2017 and payable on a sliding scale.
The proposed new fees

Value of probate estate (before inheritance tax) Proposed fee
Up to £50,000 £0
Exceeds £50,000 but does not exceed £300,000 £300
Exceeds £300,000 but does not exceed £500,000 £1,000
Exceeds £500,000 but does not exceed £1m £4,000
Exceeds £1m but does not exceed £1.6m £8,000
Exceeds £1.6m but does not exceed £2m £12,000
Above £2m £20,000
The Joint Select Committee on Statutory Instruments rejected the draft regulation
implementing the increase on the basis that increases of this order amounted to taxation and,
as such, required the consent of Parliament. The General Election was called before this could
happen so at the time of writing the future is uncertain.
30.5.1 Admissibility of will to probate

It is important to check the will carefully to make sure that it is valid and admissible to
probate. If it is not, application will be made instead for a grant of simple administration.
To ensure that the will is admissible, check the following:
(a) the will is the last will of the testator;
(b) that it has not been validly revoked;
(c) that it is executed in accordance with the Wills Act 1837, s 9; and
(d) that it contains an attestation clause which indicates that the will was executed in
accordance with the requirements of the Wills Act 1837 and raises a presumption of
‘due execution’.
30.5.2 The registrar’s additional requirements

If the application is in order, the registrar will issue the original grant, sealed with the court seal
and signed by him. In some cases, before issuing the grant, the registrar may require further
evidence. At present evidence to the probate registry is presented in the form of oaths and
affidavits, which are sworn statements. These will be replaced by Statements of Truth when the
new Probate Rules come into effect, but at the time of writing there is no date for the change.
30.5.2.1 Affidavit of due execution

If there is no attestation clause, if the clause is in some respect defective, or if there are
circumstances raising doubt about the execution of the will, the registrar will require affidavit
evidence, usually from an attesting witness, to establish that the will has been properly
executed. The evidence is provided by means of an affidavit of due execution.
If there is doubt about the mental capacity of the testator to make the will, the affidavit of a
doctor may be necessary. In such cases, it is helpful if a doctor examined the testator to
ascertain whether he had sufficient capacity at the time the will was made.
30.5.2.2 Affidavit as to knowledge and approval

It may appear to the registrar that there is doubt as to whether the testator was aware of the
contents of the will when he executed it. This may arise through blindness, illiteracy or frailty
of the testator, or because of suspicious circumstances, for example where the person who
prepared the will for the testator benefits substantially by its terms.
In any of these circumstances, the attestation clause should have been suitably adapted,
ideally by indicating that the will was read over to the testator or was independently explained
to him. In the absence of this, the registrar will require to be satisfied that the testator had
knowledge and approval of the contents of the will. The evidence is provided by means of an
affidavit of knowledge and approval of contents made by someone who can speak as to the
facts. Normally, this will be one of the attesting witnesses, but it could be an independent
person who explained the provisions of the will to the testator.
30.5.2.3 Affidavit of plight and condition

If the state of the will suggests that it has been interfered with in some way since execution,
the registrar will require further evidence by way of explanation. This may arise:
(a) where the will has been altered since its execution;
(b) where there is some obvious mark on it indicating a document may have been attached
to it (eg, the marks of a paper clip, raising a suggestion that some other testamentary
document may have been attached); or
(c) where it gives the appearance of attempted revocation.

Generally, the explanation required will take the form of an affidavit of plight and condition
made by some person having knowledge of the facts.
30.5.2.4 Lost will

A will which was known to have been in the testator’s possession but which cannot be found
following the death is presumed to have been destroyed by the testator with the intention of
revoking it.
However, if the will has been lost or accidentally destroyed, probate may be obtained of a copy
of the will, such as a copy kept in the solicitor’s file, or a reconstruction. In such a case,
application should be made to the registrar, supported by appropriate affidavit evidence from
the applicant for the grant of probate.
30.6 COMPLETING THE IHT ACCOUNT

30.6.1 Purpose of an IHT account
One of the first steps towards obtaining the grant of representation is the preparation of the
appropriate IHT account and the calculation of any inheritance tax payable.
If the estate is not an ‘excepted estate’ (see 30.7), the PRs will prepare an IHT400 and
whichever of the supporting schedules are relevant to the estate. For example, if the deceased
made lifetime gifts, the PRs must complete schedule 403 which deals with lifetime gifts.
The IHT400 is an inventory of the assets to which the deceased was beneficially entitled and
of his liabilities, and is the form for claiming reliefs and exemptions and calculating the
inheritance tax payable. It should be delivered within 12 months of the end of the month in
which the death occurred. Usually PRs aim to deliver the account within six months to comply
with inheritance tax time-limits for the payment of interest. Until the account is submitted no
grant of representation can be issued.
Where inheritance tax is payable, it is necessary to apply for a reference number before
submitting the IHT400. Application may be made online or by post using schedule IHT422.
Inheritance tax is payable on all property to which the deceased was beneficially entitled
immediately before his death, whether or not such property vests in his PRs. Certain types of
property qualify for tax relief, for example business or agricultural property, or an exemption
may apply because of the identity of the beneficiary (ie the surviving spouse or a charity) (see
4.4.3).
The rate of inheritance tax is 0% on transfers within the nil rate band (£325,000 for tax year
2017/18) and 40% on the balance, unless at least 10% of the chargeable estate is passing to
charity in which case the reduced rate of 36% is charged.
Where surviving spouses or civil partners die on or after 9 October 2007, they can inherit any
unused proportion of the nil rate band of the first spouse or civil partner to die. The PRs of the
survivor must make a claim using schedule 402.
EXAMPLE
Paul died in January 2008 (when the nil rate band was £300,000). He left £60,000 to his
sister and everything else to his civil partner, Leo.
Paul therefore had four-fifths of his nil rate band unused.
Leo dies in August 2020 when the nil rate band is £500,000, leaving everything to his
nephews and nieces. Leo’s PRs can claim an additional four-fifths of the 2020/21 nil rate
band. As a result the nil rate band available on Leo’s death will be £500,000 + ( 4-5- x
£500,000) = £900,000.
For deaths on or after 6 April 2017, there is an additional nil rate band (the ‘RNRB’) available
to those who leave a residence or interest in a residence to lineal descendants. The value of the
new RNRB is £100,000 in tax year 2017/18, rising by £25,000 a year until 2020/21, after which
it will rise in line with the Consumer Prices Index. A surviving spouse or civil partner can
inherit unused RNRB from a predeceased spouse or civil partner.
30.6.1.1 Paying the inheritance tax

Inheritance tax on property without the right to pay by instalments (see 4.8.1.2) must be paid
within six months of the end of the month in which the death occurred. Failure to do so causes
interest to become payable. For example, if a person dies on 10 January, inheritance tax is due
on 31 July, or on delivery of the IHT400 if this is earlier. Until this tax has been paid, no grant
can issue to the deceased’s estate.
Where there is property which qualifies for the right to pay the tax by instalments, none of the
tax on that property is due until the expiry of the six-month period. If the option is exercised,
only the first instalment of one-tenth must then be paid. In an estate where it is not possible
to deliver the IHT400 within that period, all tax on non-instalment option property plus the
appropriate number of instalments on property with the option and interest must be paid on
delivery of the account. Interest runs on all tax not paid on the due date.
The tax payable on the estate is apportioned between the instalment and non-instalment
option property using the method described in 4.7.2.
30.6.2 Valuations
30.6.2.1 General principles
Assets in the estate are valued at ‘the price which the property might reasonably be expected
to fetch if sold in the open market’ immediately before the death (IHTA 1984, s 160).
30.6.2.2 Jointly-owned assets

There is a special valuation rule where the deceased was the co-owner (as tenant in common
or as beneficial joint tenant) of land at his death. The market value of the land at the date of
death will normally be discounted to reflect the difficulty of selling a part interest in land. The
probate value of the deceased’s interest is the discounted market value at the date of death
divided proportionately between the co-owners. A discount of 15% is normally considered
reasonable for residential property and a discount of 10% for investment property. A share in
a residential property is relatively unattractive because of the rights of the other co-owner to
occupy the property. Buying a share in an investment property is less unattractive as it is
relatively unimportant whether the capital sum spent buys the whole or part of an income
stream.
EXAMPLE
Mary and her sister, Nellie, owned a house as joint tenants, in which they live together. The
value of the house at Mary’s death was £400,000. Apply a 15% discount.
The discount is £400,000 × 15% = £60,000
and her half share £400,000 – £60,000 = £340,000 ÷ 2 = £170,000.
The probate value of Mary’s share is £170,000.
The discount is not available where the co-ownership is of an asset other than land. For such
assets, for example bank and building society accounts, the probate value is the account
balance as at the date of death (plus interest) divided proportionately between the joint owners.
Where the co-owners of land are spouses or civil partners, the related property rules (see
4.4.2.1) apply. HMRC has always refused to allow any discount in value on the basis of these
rules. This normally means that each spouse or civil partner will be treated as owning a
proportionate part of the value of the whole. Arkwright v IRC [2004] WLTR 181 suggested that if
one spouse or civil partner is terminally ill, the value of his or her share might be reduced. So
far there is no reported case in which such a discount has been obtained.
30.6.3 Funding the inheritance tax

Where there is tax to pay on delivery of an IHT400, the PRs must arrange for the appropriate
amount of money to be sent to HMRC with the account. When this tax is paid, the receipted
Probate Summary (IHT421) is sent with the other documents (see 30.5) to the appropriate
Probate Registry so that the grant can issue. Funding the tax bill may be problematic as all the
deceased’s assets vesting in the PRs are ‘frozen’, and therefore may be untouchable, until the
grant issues giving the proof of title to the PRs.
The options which may be available to raise funds to pay the inheritance tax are set out below.
30.6.3.1 Direct payment scheme

HMRC has reached an agreement with the British Banker’s Association and the Building
Societies Association on a procedure allowing PRs to arrange payment of inheritance tax to
HMRC directly from the deceased’s accounts.
The scheme is voluntary on the part of the institutions, so PRs must check whether the
relevant banks and building societies are part of the scheme.
The procedure is as follows:
(a) The PRs must provide whatever identification the relevant banks and building societies
require. They should do this well in advance of applying for a grant so as to avoid any
unnecessary delay in the application.
(b) The PRs complete a separate IHT423 for each bank and building society from which
money is to be transferred.
(c) The PRs send each IHT423 to the relevant bank or building society at the same time that
they send the IHT400 and supporting schedules to HMRC. The IHT423 includes an IHT
reference number provided by HMRC to allow HMRC to match up the payment with the
correct estate.
(d) The bank or building society will send the money direct to HMRC. Once HMRC has
received the money and is satisfied that the amount is correct, it will return the
receipted Probate Summary (IHT421) to the solicitor.
The process is not quick, so where there is an urgent need for a grant PRs will want to find an
alternative source of funding.
Solicitors have for many years had private arrangements with banks and building societies
under which the bank or building society transfers funds directly to HMRC from the
deceased’s accounts. These arrangements can continue.
30.6.3.2 Life assurance

Where the proceeds of a policy of insurance on the deceased’s life are payable to the estate, the
life assurance company, like a bank, may be willing to release funds to pay the inheritance tax
directly to HMRC and not to the PRs or their solicitors.
30.6.3.3 Assets realisable without production of the grant

By applying the Administration of Estates (Small Payments) Act 1965 (see 30.4.1), assets may,
in some cases, be realised without production of a grant. The maximum value of any one asset
that may be realised is £5,000. The Act gives discretion to the institution to allow assets to be
realised in this way. Where an estate is large or complex, this discretion will often not be
exercised. In such cases, a grant must first be obtained and produced to release the asset
concerned.
30.6.3.4 Loans from beneficiaries

Wealthy beneficiaries may be prepared to fund the tax from their own resources, on condition
that they will be repaid from the deceased’s estate once the grant issues. Alternatively,
beneficiaries may already have received assets as a result of the death which they are prepared
to use to pay the tax, such as money from a jointly held bank account, or the proceeds of a life
policy vested in them under the Married Women’s Property Act 1882. However, many
beneficiaries may not be able to afford to make a loan.
30.6.3.5 Bank borrowing

Banks which do not participate in the voluntary scheme will still usually lend against an
undertaking to repay the loan given by the PRs. A bank may also require an undertaking from
the solicitor to repay the loan from the proceeds of the estate. Whether or not the solicitor is a
PR, any undertaking should be limited to ‘such proceeds as come into the solicitor’s control’.
Undertakings to pay money should be carefully worded so as to ensure payment is not due from
the solicitor personally.
Bank borrowing is expensive, because the bank will charge an arrangement fee and interest on
the amount borrowed. Money borrowed should be repaid at the earliest opportunity so as to
honour any undertaking and to stop interest running. Income tax relief is available to the PRs
for interest paid on a separate loan account in respect of inheritance tax payable on personalty
vesting in them.
30.6.3.6 National Savings and Government stock

Payment of tax may also be made from National Savings Bank accounts or from the proceeds
of National Savings Certificates, any Government stock held on the National Savings register
or any other National Savings investment.
30.6.3.7 Heritage property in lieu of tax
Taxpayers can offer HMRC an asset in lieu of tax (IHTA 1984, s 230(1)). The Secretary of State
must agree to accept such assets and the standard required of such objects is very high. The
item must be ‘pre-eminent for its national, scientific, historic or artistic interest’.
30.6.3.8 Obtaining a grant on credit
In exceptional cases where the PRs can demonstrate that it is impossible to pay the
inheritance tax in advance, HMRC will allow the grant to be obtained on credit.
30.7 THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN IHT ACCOUNT

30.7.1 Inheritance Tax (Delivery of Accounts) (Excepted Estates) Regulations 2004
If the estate is an excepted estate, there is no need for an IHT400 to be submitted, although
HMRC can demand one within 35 days of the date of issue of the grant of representation. If an
estate which initially appears to be excepted is subsequently found not to be so, the PRs must
submit the IHT400 within six months of the discovery.
The precise requirements for qualifying as an excepted estate change each year and are
becoming extremely complex. You will find it easier to focus on the broad description of the
requirements rather than on the detail.
For deaths on or after 1 September 2006 there are three categories of excepted estate, and the
requirements are as follows:
• Category 1 – ‘small’ estates
Broadly, estates falling into this category are those where the gross value of the estate
for inheritance tax purposes, plus the chargeable value of any ‘specified transfers’
(defined below) in the seven years prior to death, does not exceed the current nil rate
threshold.
For deaths before 6 April 2010 the nil rate threshold for this purpose included only the
deceased’s own nil rate band and ignored any nil rate band transferred from a
predeceased spouse or civil partner. For deaths on or after that date the nil rate
threshold is increased to take account of transferred nil rate band, but only if the whole
of the nil rate band of the first spouse or civil partner was transferred. If the first spouse
or civil partner had used any part of their nil rate band, nothing is added for this
purpose.
(For applications between 6 April and 1 August each year the threshold will be the
threshold for the previous tax year.)
In full, the Regulations for this category require the following:
(a) the deceased died, domiciled in the United Kingdom;
(b) the value of the estate is attributable wholly to property passing:
(i) under his will or intestacy,
(ii) under a nomination of an asset taking effect on death,
(iii) under a single settlement in which he was entitled to an interest in
possession in settled property, or
(iv) by survivorship in a beneficial joint tenancy or, in Scotland, by survivorship
in a special destination;
(c) of that property:
(i) not more than £150,000 represents property which, immediately before that
person’s death, was settled property; and
(ii) not more than £100,000 represents property situated outside the United
Kingdom;
(d) the deceased made no chargeable transfers in the seven years before death other
than specified transfers (defined below) where the aggregate value transferred
(ignoring business or agricultural relief ) did not exceed £150,000; and
(e) the aggregate of:
(i) the gross value of the deceased’s estate, plus
(ii) the value transferred by any specified transfers (defined below), plus
(iii) the value transferred by any specified exempt transfers (defined below),
did not exceed the nil rate threshold for the deceased (increased to take account of
a full nil rate band transferred from a deceased spouse or civil partner in the case
of deaths on or after 6 April 2010).
• Category 2 – ‘exempt’ estates
These are estates where the bulk of the estate attracts the spouse (or civil partner) or
charity exemption. The gross value of the estate plus specified transfers (defined below)
must not exceed £1 million and the net chargeable estate after deduction of liabilities
and spouse and/or charity exemption must not exceed the nil rate threshold.
As with Category 1 estates, transferred nil rate band can increase the nil rate threshold
for this purpose, but only if the death is on or after 6 April 2010 and on the first death
the whole nil rate band was transferred to the surviving spouse.
(a) the deceased, domiciled in the United Kingdom;
(b) the value of the estate is attributable wholly to property passing:
(i) under his will or intestacy,
(ii) under a nomination of an asset taking effect on death,
(iii) under a single settlement in which he was entitled to an interest in
possession in settled property, or
(iv) by survivorship in a beneficial joint tenancy or, in Scotland, by survivorship
in a special destination;
(c) of that property:
(i) not more than £150,000 represents property which, immediately before that
person’s death, was settled property (settled property passing on death to a
spouse or charity is ignored for this purpose); and
(ii) not more than £100,000 represents property situated outside the United
Kingdom;
(d) the deceased made no chargeable transfers during the period of seven years
ending with his death other than specified transfers (defined below) where the
aggregate value transferred (ignoring business or agricultural relief ) did not
exceed £150,000;
(e) the aggregate of:
(i) the gross value of that person’s estate, plus
(ii) the value transferred by any specified transfers (defined below) made by
that person, plus
(iii) the value transferred by any specified exempt transfers (defined below),
did not exceed £1,000,000;
(ea) there is property left after deduction of liabilities to pass to spouse or charity; and
(f ) the aggregate of:
(i) the value of the estate after deducting allowable liabilities, spouse and
charity exemptions, plus
(ii) specified transfers (defined below), plus
(iii) specified exempt transfers (defined below),
did not exceed the nil rate threshold.
‘Specified transfers’ for Categories 1 and 2
These are chargeable transfers of cash, personal chattels or tangible moveable property, quoted
shares or securities, or an interest in or over land (unless the land becomes settled or is subject
to a reservation of benefit) made in the seven years before death. This means that if someone
makes a gift which does not fall within this category in the seven years before death (for
example, a transfer of unquoted shares), the estate cannot be excepted under Categories 1 or 2.
When valuing the specified transfers, business and agricultural property relief is ignored so
the unrelieved value has to be taken into account.
‘Specified exempt transfers’ for Categories 1 and 2
These are transfers of value made during the seven years before death which are exempt under
one of the following exemptions:
(a) s 18 (transfers between spouses (or civil partners));
(b) s 23 (gifts to charities);

(c) s 24 (gifts to political parties);
(d) s 24A (gifts to housing associations);
(e) s 27 (maintenance funds for historic buildings, etc); or
(f ) s 28 (employee trusts).
In the case of deaths occurring on or after 1 March 2011, gifts which are exempt under the
normal expenditure out of income exemption are treated for this purpose as chargeable if they
exceed £3,000 in any one tax year.
• Category 3 – ‘non-domiciled’ estates
The third category is where the deceased was never domiciled or treated as domiciled in
the United Kingdom, with only limited assets in the United Kingdom.
(a) he was never domiciled in the United Kingdom or treated as domiciled in the
United Kingdom by s 267 of the IHTA 1984; and
(b) the value of the estate situated in the United Kingdom is wholly attributable to
cash or quoted shares or securities passing under his will or intestacy or by
survivorship in a beneficial joint tenancy or, in Scotland, by survivorship in a
special destination, the gross value of which does not exceed £150,000.
EXAMPLE 1
Adam has just died. His will leaves his estate to his wife Brenda and daughter Clare in
equal shares. He is UK domiciled and has made no lifetime transfers.
His estate consists of: £
House owned jointly with Brenda (half share) 80,000
Building society a/c (sole name) 100,000
Personal chattels 2,000
Life interest in a trust fund set up in his father’s will (value of capital assets) 30,000
Debts (funeral bill and credit cards) (2,000)
This is a Category 1 (‘small’) excepted estate. This fact will also be noted on the oath.
Adam’s estate satisfies the criteria and it has an inheritance tax value of £212,000 gross
(note that inheritance tax exemptions and reliefs are ignored when ascertaining the gross
inheritance tax estate).
EXAMPLE 2
Davina has just died. Her will leaves £50,000 to her son, Ernst, and the residue to her
husband, Ferdinand. She is UK domiciled. Her only specified transfer was made two years
ago when she gave £100,000 to Ernst.
Her estate consists of: £
House owned jointly with Fernando (half share) 400,000
Quoted Investments 100,000
Bank and building society accounts 50,000
Personal chattels 15,000
Specified transfer 100,000
Debts (funeral bill and credit cards) (5,000)
This is a Category 2 (‘exempt’) excepted estate. The aggregate of the gross value of the
estate, plus the chargeable value of specified transfers in the seven years prior to death
does not exceed £1 million; the net chargeable estate after deduction of liabilities and the
spouse exemption does not exceed the current nil rate threshold of £325,000
EXAMPLE 3
Fred has just died leaving his estate to his two children. His wife Freda died last year and
left everything to Fred.
Fred’s gross estate is £600,000, and consists of a house and money in the bank. He has
made no lifetime gifts.
This is a Category 1 (‘small’) excepted estate because Fred’s nil rate threshold is increased
to £650,000 as a result of inheriting Freda’s nil rate band.
EXAMPLE 4
Assume the facts were the same as in Example 3, except for the fact that Freda had left a
legacy of £5,000 to her grandson. Because Fred did not inherit the whole of Freda’s nil rate
band, his nil rate threshold is not increased for the purposes of the excepted estates
regulations.
His estate is therefore not excepted.
EXAMPLE 5
Eduardo is an Italian who has never been domiciled in the UK. He dies with £100,000 in a
UK bank account. Under his will, his entire estate passes to his nephew.
The estate is excepted as a ‘non-domiciled’ estate because it fulfils the requirements:
• Eduardo was never domiciled in the UK.
• The value of his UK estate is wholly attributable to cash.
• His whole UK estate passes by will and does not exceed £150,000.
Note that an estate cannot be excepted if one of the alternatively secured pension provisions
applies to it. However, alternatively secured pensions are beyond the scope of this book and
are not considered further.
30.7.1.1 Procedure
In England and Wales and Northern Ireland all applications for probate in relation to excepted
estates must be accompanied by Form IHT205 (or Form IHT207 for those domiciled abroad).
The IHT205 is a short form based on the document completed by applicants in person. The
Probate Service will forward the forms to HMRC on a weekly basis.
HMRC will select a random sample to review. In addition, it ‘will use other information
sources to identify those estates nearer to the IHT threshold’ where it feels that there is a risk
that inheritance tax may be payable.
30.7.2 Form IHT400

Form IHT400 must be used whenever the deceased dies domiciled in the UK and the estate is
not an ‘excepted’ estate.
The PRs must complete Form IHT400 and relevant supporting schedules, and sign a
declaration that the contents are true. They must calculate the amount of any inheritance tax
payable and ensure that any inheritance tax due on delivery of the account is paid. HMRC will
receipt and return the accompanying IHT421.
When the PRs apply to the Probate Registry they must file the receipted IHT421 with the
probate papers as proof that the relevant inheritance tax has been paid.
30.8 OATHS: GENERAL BACKGROUND

30.8.1 Types and purpose of oaths
Every application for a grant of representation must be supported by the appropriate form of
oath. The three most common types of oath are as follows:
(a) oath for executors;
(b) oath for administrators with will annexed;
(c) oath for administrators.
The oaths differ from each other in detail but they have a common purpose, namely:
(a) to give details of the deceased;
(b) to set out the basis of the applicant’s claim to take the grant;
(c) to require the applicant to swear that he will administer the estate correctly;
(d) in the case of oaths for executors and oaths for administrators with the will annexed, to
identify and exhibit the will and any codicils;
(e) to swear to the value of the estate passing under the grant.
Unless the appropriate oath is accurately completed and submitted to the Probate Registry by,
or on behalf of, those PRs who may properly make an application, no grant of representation
will be issued.
30.8.2 Swearing or affirming the oath

Before the oath is submitted to the Probate Registry, the PRs must swear or affirm the truth of
its contents. This must be done before a commissioner for oaths or a solicitor holding a
current practising certificate, neither of whom is connected with the firm of solicitors acting
for the PRs. The PRs may prefer to affirm, in which case they say ‘I do solemnly sincerely and
truly declare and affirm that …’. A PR who swears the oath will be required to hold the New
Testament or Bible whilst saying ‘I swear by Almighty God that …’.
Once the oath has been sworn or affirmed it should be sent to the Probate Registry with any
will, the IHT account and the appropriate probate court fees.
When the new Probate Rules are in force, a statement of truth will replace an oath or
affirmation.
30.8.3 The value of the estate passing under the grant

The oath must include the gross value of the property passing under the grant and the net
value (ie after deduction of debts of the estate). The net figure is the probate estate on which
probate fees are payable. The figures given will be repeated on the grant of representation
issued by the Probate Registry.
The Probate Registry is not concerned with property passing otherwise than under the grant,
so the value of joint property passing by survivorship or property passing under a trust is not
included. The full value of property passing under the grant must be included. Inheritance tax
exemptions and reliefs are irrelevant for this purpose.
If the estate is a Category 1 (‘small’) excepted estate, the PRs must swear that it is not
necessary to deliver an IHT account. They do not need to give the exact value of the property
passing under the grant.
In relation to the gross value, they need only state that it does not exceed the nil rate band
threshold.
In relation to the net value, they must round it up to the nearest whole thousand and state on
the oath that it does not exceed that figure. This assists government departments, such as the
DWP, that may need to check the deceased’s eligibility for benefits received, and charities,
who may want an indication of their likely entitlement where they are residuary beneficiaries.
If the estate is a Category 2 (‘exempt’) excepted estate, the PRs again swear that it is not
necessary to deliver an IHT account, but this time they must give the exact figures for the
gross and net property passing under the grant.
30.9 OATH FOR EXECUTORS

30.9.1 Entitlement to act
Executors are appointed by a valid will. They take a grant of probate. One executor may obtain
a grant and act alone.
EXAMPLE 1
Alex by his will appoints Brian and Colin to be his executors and leaves his entire estate to
a named charity.
Brian and/or Colin can apply for a grant of probate by lodging an oath for executors, and
the will, with the Probate Registry.
The appointment of executors is not affected by the fact that the will may fail to dispose of
some or all of the deceased’s estate.
EXAMPLE 2
Diana has just died. Her will appoints Eric as her executor and leaves her entire estate to
Freda. Freda died before Diana whose estate will therefore be distributed according to the
intestacy rules. Eric is alive and prepared to act as executor. Eric will apply for a grant of
probate by swearing an oath for executors.
30.9.2 Capacity to act

Capacity to act as executor is judged at the time of the application for the grant.
30.9.2.1 Executor lacking capacity to act

A person appointed as an executor by the will but who, at the testator’s death, does not have
the mental capacity to act, cannot apply for the grant.
30.9.2.2 Minors
There is no prohibition on a testator naming a minor as his executor. However, if the executor
is still a minor at the testator’s death he cannot act as an executor nor obtain a grant of probate
until he attains majority.
Where one of several executors is a minor, the other(s) being adults, probate can be granted to
the adult executor(s) with power reserved to the minor to take a grant at a later date (for an
explanation of ‘power reserved’, see 30.9.4). If the administration of the estate has not been
completed by the time the minor attains 18 years, he can then apply for a grant of double
probate to enable him to act as executor alongside the other proving executor(s).
EXAMPLE
George dies appointing his wife, Ingrid and his son Harry (aged 16) as his executors.
probate granted to Ingrid
G dies
power reserved to Harry grant of double

probate to Harry
2 years administration
later completed
Where the minor is the only executor appointed by the will (or the adult executors are not able
or willing to act), someone must take the grant on behalf of the minor as it would be
impracticable to leave the testator’s estate unadministered until the executor reaches 18 years.
A grant of letters of administration with will annexed for the use and benefit of the minor will
be made, usually to the parent(s) or guardian(s) of the minor, until the minor attains 18 years.
On obtaining majority the executor may apply for a cessate grant of probate.
30.9.2.3 The former spouse or civil partner

If the testator appointed his spouse or civil partner as his executor and the marriage or civil
partnership subsequently ends, that appointment will fail unless the testator has shown a
contrary intention in the will (Wills Act 1837, s 18A: see 29.4.4.2).
If the spouse or civil partner was one of several executors, the others may apply for the grant of
probate without him or her. If the spouse was appointed as a sole executor, application should
be made for a grant of letters of administration with will annexed. In either case, the oath to
lead to the appropriate grant should cite the fact and date of the divorce.
30.9.3 Renunciation
Persons appointed as executors may renounce their right to take the grant, provided that they
have not intermeddled in the estate. Intermeddling consists of doing tasks a PR might do, for
example notifying the deceased’s bank of the death. By intermeddling, executors accept their
appointment. Once executors have intermeddled, they must take the grant.
Provided there has been no intermeddling, executors who do not wish to act can renounce
their rights. Rights as executor then cease and the administration of the estate proceeds as if
the executor had never been appointed.
The renunciation must be made in writing, signed by the person renouncing (the signature
must be witnessed), and the renunciation must be filed at the Probate Registry. This is
normally done by the PRs who are applying for a grant when they lodge their application at the
Probate Registry.
Executors who are also appointed as trustees will remain trustees despite renouncing the
executorship. They will have to disclaim the trusteeship as well if they want to act in neither
capacity.
30.9.4 Power reserved

There is no limit on how many executors can be appointed by the will, but probate will be
granted to a maximum of four executors. Power may be reserved to the other(s) to take out a
grant in the future if a vacancy arises.
EXAMPLE 1
Alan’s will appoints B, C, D, E and F to be his executors. All are willing and able to act. C, D,
E and F apply for a grant of probate. ‘Power is reserved’ to B. If F dies before the
administration is complete, B can then apply for a grant. B must apply if he wishes to act;
there is no automatic substitution.
If there is a dispute between the executors as to which of them should apply for a grant,
this may be resolved by summons before a registrar (NCPR 1987, r 27(6)).
There is no need for every executor to act. A person appointed as one of several executors may
not wish to act initially, but he may not want to take the irrevocable step of renouncing his
right to a grant of probate.
EXAMPLE 2
Alan appoints Ben and Charles as his executors. When Alan dies, Ben is working in
Germany but is due to return to England in 12 months’ time. Ben does not feel that he
should act as executor whilst abroad and is happy to let Charles act alone initially, but he
does want to help in the administration if it has not been completed by the time he returns
to England.
Charles should apply for the grant ‘with power reserved’ to Ben to prove at a later stage.
One executor is always sufficient. As we shall see later, this is not the case for administrators.
30.10 OATH FOR ADMINISTRATORS WITH WILL ANNEXED

As the title of this oath suggests, it is used in an estate where there is a valid will but no
executor willing and able to apply for a grant of probate.
There may be no executor because:
(a) the will fails to appoint executors; or
(b) the appointment was of the testator’s spouse or civil partner and has failed as a result of
the testator’s divorce (Wills Act 1837, s 18A; see 29.4.4);
(c) the executor has predeceased the testator;
(d) the executor has died after the testator but before taking the grant; or
(e) the executor has renounced.
If there is a valid will but no executor and the will does not dispose of all the estate, the
appropriate grant is still letters of administration with will annexed. The property undisposed
of by the will is distributed according to the intestacy rules (see 29.6).
30.10.2 NCPR 1987, r 20

The order of priority of the person(s) entitled to a grant of letters of administration with will
annexed is governed by NCPR 1987, r 20. The rule states as follows:
Where the deceased died on or after 1 January 1926 the person or persons entitled to a grant in respect
of a will shall be determined in accordance with the following order of priority, namely—
(a) the executor … ;
(b) any residuary legatee or devisee holding in trust for any other person;
(c) any other residuary legatee or devisee (including one for life) or where the residue is not wholly
disposed of by the will, any person entitled to share in the undisposed of residue (including the
Treasury Solicitor when claiming bona vacantia on behalf of the Crown), provided that—
(i) unless a registrar otherwise directs, a residuary legatee or devisee whose legacy or devise
is vested in interest shall be preferred to one entitled on the happening of a contingency,
and
(ii) where the residue is not in terms wholly disposed of, the registrar may, if he is satisfied
that the testator has nevertheless disposed of the whole or substantially the whole of the
known estate, allow a grant to be made to any legatee or devisee entitled to, or to share
in, the estate so disposed of, without regard to the persons entitled to share in any
residue not disposed of by the will;
(d) the personal representative of any residuary legatee or devisee (but not one for life, or one
holding in trust for any other person), or of any person entitled to share in any residue not
disposed of by the will;
(e) any other legatee or devisee (including one for life or one holding in trust for any other person)
or any creditor of the deceased, provided that, unless a registrar otherwise directs, a legatee or
devisee whose legacy or devise is vested in interest shall be preferred to one entitled on the
happening of a contingency;
(f ) the personal representative of any other legatee or devisee (but not one for life or one holding in
trust for any other person) or of any creditor of the deceased.
30.10.2.1 Clearing off

Each applicant is listed in priority in r 20. When applying for the grant, any person falling into
categories (b) and below must explain on the oath why there is no applicant from a higher-
ranked category. This is called ‘clearing off ’. A person in a lower-ranked category may apply
only if there is nobody in a higher category willing and able to take the grant. The applicant
must explain the basis of his own claim to the grant.
The categories will now be considered in detail with examples of clearing off.
‘(a) the executor …’

The NCPR 1987, r 20 in fact provides the ‘order of priority for grant where deceased left a will’.
This covers both grants of probate and letters of administration with the will annexed. An
executor who has been appointed in the will and is able and willing to act has first right to a
grant.
The remaining categories assume that, for whatever reason, no executor is available.
‘(b) any residuary legatee or devisee holding in trust …’
EXAMPLE
Arthur has died leaving a will. Although he failed to appoint executors, he left his residue
to Brian and Claire on trust for Debbie. Brian and Claire are the residuary legatees (or
devisees, depending on the type of trust property) holding on trust and so they have first
right to a grant. Clearly, Arthur was happy for them to deal with his property otherwise he
would not have appointed them as trustees. They will have to state that ‘no executor was
appointed in the will and we are the residuary legatees holding on trust named in the will’.
‘(c) any other residuary legatee or devisee …’
EXAMPLE 1
Amanda has died leaving a will appointing Boris as her executor and giving the residuary
estate to Carol, ie Carol is the residuary legatee and devisee.
Carol can apply for a grant only if Boris is unable or unwilling to act. She must ‘clear off’
Boris by saying, ‘the executor named in the will has [renounced probate] or [predeceased
the deceased] and I am the residuary legatee and devisee named in the will’ or as the case
may be.
Note: strictly it is also necessary to clear off trustees of residue by stating that there is ‘no
residuary legatee or devisee holding on trust for any other person’. However, as the lack of
appointment is apparent from the face of the will, this is often not done. Such practice is
acceptable to the probate registrars.
EXAMPLE 2
The facts are the same as in Example 1, but Boris was appointed ‘executor and trustee’ and
the residue was given to Carol for life.
Carol must clear off Boris in both capacities by saying, ‘the executor and trustee named in
the will has [renounced probate] etc …’.
‘… or … any person entitled to share in the undisposed of residue’

If a partial intestacy arises because the will fails to dispose of all or part of the residuary estate,
those people entitled to the residue by virtue of the intestacy rules (see 29.6) may apply for a
grant under NCPR 1987, r 20, but they must show why they are entitled to the grant by clearing
off all persons in higher-ranked categories.
EXAMPLE
Damien’s will appoints Errol to be his sole executor and residuary beneficiary. Errol died
last month and Damien has just died. Damien’s closest living relative is his mother,
Florence.
As the sole residuary beneficiary has predeceased the deceased (and the gift is not saved
by any substitutional gift), the residue is undisposed of and will be distributed according
to the intestacy rules. Damien has left no spouse or civil partner and no issue but is
survived by his mother, Florence, who is next entitled to the property.
Florence will apply for a grant of letters of administration with will annexed by clearing off
the executor. She must also establish her entitlement to the undisposed of property and,
therefore, to the grant. She will say ‘the executor and residuary legatee and devisee has
predeceased the deceased [and the deceased died a bachelor without issue] and I am the
mother of the deceased’.
‘(d) the personal representative of a deceased residuary legatee or devisee …’

Where there is no proving executor and, for example, the residuary beneficiary survives the
testator to take a vested interest in the estate but then dies without having taken the grant,
that beneficiary’s PR may apply for the grant. This is because the gift under the will forms part
of the beneficiary’s estate and needs to be collected by his PR.
EXAMPLE
Gazala died last week leaving a will appointing Hafsa as executrix and giving the residuary
estate to Imran absolutely. Hafsa has predeceased Gazala; Imran died yesterday. Imran’s
will appoints Jamila as his sole executrix and beneficiary.
Jamila may apply for a grant of letters of administration with will annexed to Gazala’s
estate. To do so the oath must clear off Hafsa and Imran by saying, ‘the sole executrix
predeceased the deceased and the sole residuary legatee and devisee named in the said
will survived the deceased and has since died without having proved the said will and I am
the executrix of the deceased residuary legatee and devisee’.
‘(e) any other legatee or devisee … or any creditor of the deceased …’

This category covers any other beneficiary under the will, for example, a specific devisee who
has been left the deceased’s house, or a pecuniary legatee who has been left money by the
deceased. It also covers creditors of the deceased.
‘(f ) the personal representative of any other legatee or devisee … or of any creditor …’
This category works on the same principles as category (d) above.
30.10.2.2 Beneficiary with vested interest preferred

Where there is more than one person of equal rank but one has a vested and one a contingent
interest in the estate, the court generally prefers an application by the beneficiary with the
vested interest.
EXAMPLE
Kalima’s will leaves her residuary estate to her two children, Laila and Masoud, contingent
on their attaining 25 years of age. There is no executor appointed in the will and at
Kalima’s death Laila is 30 years old and Masoud 23 years old.
Laila and Masoud can make a joint application, but if they were to apply separately the
court would prefer Laila because Masoud’s interest is still contingent.
30.10.3 Minors
A minor cannot act as administrator with will annexed, nor can he apply for a grant. His
parent(s) or guardian(s) may apply for a grant ‘for his use and benefit’ on his behalf. The grant
is limited until he attains the age of 18.
If there is a person not under a disability who is entitled in the same degree as the minor then
that person will be preferred to the guardian of the minor (NCPR 1987, r 27(5)).
30.10.4 The number of administrators

30.10.4.1 Maximum number
If there are several people entitled to act as administrators, the grant will not issue to more
than four of them (Senior Courts Act 1981, s 114). It is not possible for an administrator to
have power reserved to him.
If a person is entitled to act as administrator but does not obtain a grant (eg, because there are
four other applicants), this does not affect that person’s beneficial entitlement to the estate.
30.10.4.2 Number in the same category

Subject to the provisions of s 114 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (see 30.14.1 below), where
two or more people are entitled in the same degree, a grant can be made on the application of
any one of them without notice to the other or others (NCPR 1987, r 27(4)).
EXAMPLE
Jane dies leaving her residuary estate by will to her two adult brothers, Ken and Larry.
Jane’s will does not appoint an executor. Larry does not wish to act.
Ken can apply for a grant alone. This does not affect Larry’s beneficial entitlement to half
the estate.
30.10.4.3 Need for two administrators

Where there is a life interest, or property passes to a minor (whether the interest is vested or
contingent), the court normally requires a minimum of two administrators to apply for the
grant (Senior Courts Act 1981, s 114).
EXAMPLE 1
Abhijeet has just died leaving a valid will which:
(a) appoints Balinder his executor;
(b) gives £1,000 to Fraz (aged 6) contingent on reaching 21;
(c) gives the residue of his estate to Pardeep and Parminder.
As executor, Balinder has the best right to take a grant. If Balinder renounces probate, at
least two people must apply for a grant of letters of administration because there is a
minority interest, ie the legacy to Fraz. Pardeep and Parminder have the best right to take
a grant.
EXAMPLE 2
Quentin’s will fails to appoint an executor. He leaves his estate to his wife Rose for life,
remainder to his adult son, Sam.
Two administrators are required because of Rose’s life interest. Rose and Sam should both
apply.
EXAMPLE 3
Tahir’s will leaves his residuary estate to his friend Una, whom he has also appointed
executrix. Una has predeceased Tahir. Tahir is divorced and has three children, Varisha
(21), Wahid (19), and Zafir (15).
Tahir therefore dies partially intestate. By virtue of the intestacy rules his children take the
residuary estate on the statutory trusts.
Two administrators are required because part of the estate goes to Zafir who is a minor.
Varisha and Wahid should both apply.
Section 114(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 gives the court power, where it appears to the
court to be expedient in all the circumstances, to appoint an individual as sole administrator
despite the existence of a minority or life interest.
30.10.5 Renunciation
Any person entitled to apply for a grant of letters of administration with will annexed can
renounce in the same way as an executor, except that an administrator does not lose the right
to renounce by intermeddling. Renunciation does not affect any beneficial entitlement of the
administrator or any appointment as a trustee.
30.11 OATH FOR ADMINISTRATORS

This oath is required if the deceased has died totally intestate.
The person or persons entitled to the grant are listed in NCPR 1987, r 22 as set out below. The
order is the same as the order or entitlement on intestacy:
(1) Where the deceased died on or after 1 January 1926, wholly intestate, the person or persons
having a beneficial interest in the estate shall be entitled to a grant of administration in the
following classes in order of priority, namely—
(a) the surviving spouse or civil partner;
(b) the children of the deceased and the issue of any deceased child who died before the
deceased;
(c) the father and mother of the deceased;
(d) brothers and sisters of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of
the whole blood who died before the deceased;
(e) brothers and sisters of the half blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of
the half blood who died before the deceased;
(f ) grandparents;
(g) uncles and aunts of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the
whole blood who died before the deceased;
(h) uncles and aunts of the half blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the half
blood who died before the deceased.
(2) In default of any person having a beneficial interest in the estate, the Treasury Solicitor shall be
entitled to a grant if he claims bona vacantia on behalf of the Crown.
(3) If all persons entitled to a grant under the foregoing provisions of this rule have been cleared
off, a grant may be made to a creditor of the deceased or to any person who, notwithstanding
that he has no immediate beneficial interest in the estate, may have a beneficial interest in the
event of an accretion thereto.
Some of the descriptions of relations require further explanation, as follows.
30.11.1.1 ‘Children’
On an intestacy, no distinction is drawn between those who have been born legitimate or have
been adopted, or those whose parents were not married (subject to the qualification in the
Family Law Reform Act 1987, s 18(2) – see 29.6.5.2).
Equally entitled with the deceased’s children are the children or grandchildren of any child
who predeceased the deceased. Step-children (ie, children of the deceased’s spouse or civil
partner) are not children for this purpose unless the deceased adopted them.
30.11.1.2 ‘Brothers and sisters’

Brothers and sisters of the deceased are also known as ‘siblings’. A sibling is of the ‘whole
blood’ where they share both parents in common with the deceased, and of the ‘half blood’
where they have only one common parent.
EXAMPLE
Susan has been married twice. By Tom she had two children, Una and Victoria, and by
Arshad she had a son, Wisan.
Tom = Susan = Arshad
Una Victoria Wisan
Una and Victoria are sisters of the whole blood.

Wisan is their brother of the half blood.
30.11.1.3 ‘Uncles and aunts’

Uncles and aunts of ‘the whole blood’ are the children of both grandparents of the intestate.
Aunts and uncles of the ‘half blood’ are the children of only one of the deceased’s
grandparents.
EXAMPLE
David has died recently and his closest living relations are his uncles, Ben and Charles.
David’s mother, Ann, and his uncle, Ben, were children of the same parents; Charles was
the son of David’s grandfather, Fred, and Fred’s mistress, Joan.
Martha (d) = Fred (d) Joan (d)
Ann (d) Ben Charles
David
Ben is David’s uncle of the whole blood.

Charles is David’s uncle of the half blood.
30.11.2 Clearing off

Each category is listed in priority in NCPR 1987, r 22. Like the applicant under NCPR 1987,
r 20 (see 30.10.2), an applicant under r 22 must explain on the oath why nobody in a higher
category is able to apply for the grant (again, this is called ‘clearing off ’) and describe his own
relationship to the deceased.
Where there is a surviving spouse or civil partner and he or she is applying for the grant either
alone or with others, there is nobody with a higher priority to clear off and therefore there is
no need to add any clearing off words to the oath.
Where there is no surviving spouse or civil partner, this fact must be stated by saying that the
deceased died intestate, ‘a bachelor’, or ‘a spinster’, or ‘a widower’, or ‘a widow’, or a surviving
civil partner, as the case may be. There is no need to indicate whether a marriage was between
same sex or opposite sex partners. It is sufficient to refer to a widow or widower.
Where the applicant needs to clear off categories of relation in addition to the spouse or civil
partner, he will do so by stating that the deceased died intestate ‘without issue’ or ‘parents’ or
‘brothers and sisters of the whole blood’ or ‘their issue’ etc.
EXAMPLE 1
Alice, a widow, has died intestate, survived by her son who will take the grant.
The oath will read:
died INTESTATE a widow.
EXAMPLE 2
Barraq, who is unmarried, has just died intestate aged 92 years. He is survived by his two
brothers who will take the grant.
The oath will read:
died INTESTATE a bachelor without issue or parents.
Later in the oath the applicant will explain his own relationship to the deceased.
30.11.3 The need for a beneficial interest in the estate

Unless the applicant is the Treasury Solicitor or a creditor, he must have a beneficial interest
in the estate (or would have such an in interest if there was an accretion to the estate) by virtue
of the intestacy rules; hence there is a similarity of entitlement under NCPR 1987, r 22 and
under AEA 1925, s 46 (see 29.6).
EXAMPLE 1
Chandra, who is unmarried, dies intestate survived by her mother and one brother.
Only the mother can apply for the grant because she is solely and absolutely entitled to
Chandra’s estate under the intestacy rules.
EXAMPLE 2
David dies intestate survived by his wife, Eve, and adult son, Fred. Excluding personal
assets, David’s estate is valued at £500,000.
As Eve and Fred share the estate by virtue of the intestacy rules, Fred can apply for the
grant if Eve does not, although Eve ranks in priority and must be cleared off if Fred applies
for the grant.
EXAMPLE 3
The facts are the same as in Example 2 but David’s estate is £190,000. Prima facie, Fred
would seem to have no interest and would therefore be unable to apply for a grant if Eve
failed to do so. But Fred can apply in these circumstances on the basis that if additional
assets were found in David’s estate, Fred would then share the estate with Eve. It is
irrelevant that David’s estate never actually increases above £190,000. Again, Eve ranks in
priority.
30.11.4 Minors
A minor cannot act as administrator, neither can he apply for a grant. The same procedure as
that discussed at 30.10.3 above should be followed.
30.11.5 Renunciation
A person entitled to a grant under NCPR 1987, r 22 can renounce his right to the grant in the
same way as an administrator with the will annexed. If he is the only relative of the deceased
with a beneficial entitlement, the grant will be made to a creditor of the deceased.
Renunciation does not affect any beneficial entitlement of the administrator.
EXAMPLE
Graeme dies intestate survived by one brother, Henry, and an uncle, Jack. Graeme owes
Kalya £100.
Henry has the best right to a grant under r 22. As Jack has no beneficial interest in the
estate under the intestacy rules, he cannot apply for the grant if Henry fails to do so. In
that event Kalya should apply for the grant of letters of administration.
It is common for a creditor to take the grant if the estate is insolvent.

30.11.6 The number of administrators

The rules applying to the number of administrators with will annexed apply equally to
administrators of a totally intestate estate.
30.11.6.1 Maximum number

The grant will issue to a maximum of four administrators. If there are more than four people
with an equal entitlement, it is not possible to have ‘power reserved’ to a non-proving
administrator.
30.11.6.2 Number in the same category

Where two or more people are entitled in the same degree, a grant can be made on the
application of any one of them without notice to the other(s).
30.11.6.3 Need for two administrators

A minimum of two administrators is generally required where the intestacy creates minority
interests through property being held for minors on the ‘statutory trusts’. The court may
dispense with the need for two administrators in special circumstances.
EXAMPLE 1
John dies intestate in March 2015 with a net estate for probate purposes of £300,000, and
is survived by his wife, Kala, and children, Laksha (20) and Madesh (16).
Kala and Laksha must take the grant. Two administrators are needed because the intestacy
creates a minority interest. Madesh cannot be an administrator because he is a minor.
EXAMPLE 2
Nigel dies intestate, a bachelor without issue. Both his parents are dead.
M = F
(died 1984) (died 1979)
Nigel Olive Peter (died 1990

(70) (68) aged 60)
Quentin Rachel
(20) (15)
His sister and the issue of his deceased brother are equally entitled to apply for the grant
as they share the estate under the intestacy rules. Both Olive and Quentin must apply
because Rachel is a minor.
PRACTICAL POINT
What documents may have to be filed with the Probate Registry to get a grant? For a
deceased domiciled in England and Wales, the following:
• an oath sworn or affirmed by the PRs explaining their right to take a grant
• any will and codicils
• affidavits explaining any unusual features
• an IHT400 or IHT205
• if inheritance tax is due, a receipted IHT421 as proof that inheritance tax due has been
paid
• probate fee
• any renunciations of the right to act.
Note: If the direct payment scheme is being used, the PRs must send an IHT423 to each
bank or building society from which funds are to be transferred.
30.12 EFFECT OF GRANT

30.12.1 Grant of probate
A grant of probate confirms the authority of the executor(s) which stems from the will and
arises from the time of the testate’s death (see 30.2).
The grant provides conclusive evidence of the title of the executor(s) and of the validity and
contents of the will.
30.12.2 Grant of administration (with or without will)

A grant of administration (with or without will annexed) confers authority on the
administrator and vests the deceased’s property in the administrator. Until the grant is issued,
the administrator has no authority to act and the deceased’s property is vested in the President
of the Family Division.
The grant provides conclusive evidence of the administrator’s title and of the validity and
contents of any will (or intestacy). Normally, the grant is not retrospective to the date of the
deceased’s death.
30.13 LIMITED GRANTS

A grant of representation is normally general, ie it is expressed to relate to ‘all the estate which
by law devolves to and vests in the personal representatives of the deceased’.
When necessary, a grant may be limited; for example, it may be:
(a) limited as to a specified part of the deceased’s property. For example, a novelist might
appoint literary executors to administer his literary estate; general executors would be
responsible for his general estate;
(b) limited to settled land. Any settled land vested in the deceased is usually excepted from
a general grant if the land remains settled after his death. The trustees of the settlement
will submit an oath limited to the settled land;
(c) limited to a special purpose. For example, if the person entitled to apply for a grant is a
minor then application should be made by his parent(s) or guardian(s) for a grant for his
use and benefits. The practice in making such grants is governed by NCPR 1987, r 2.
30.14 THE CHAIN OF REPRESENTATION AND GRANT DE BONIS NON

ADMINISTRATIS
30.14.1 Introduction
If there are several proving PRs administering an estate and one dies after taking the grant but
before the administration has been completed, the surviving PRs continue to act. The
continuing PRs’ powers remain unaffected. Where the death leaves a sole surviving PR, the
court may exercise its powers to appoint an additional PR. This might happen, for example,
where there is a life or minority interest and the court wishes there to continue to be two PRs
(Senior Courts Act 1981, s 114).
If a person entitled to be the PR (either as the executor under a will, or by virtue of NCPR
1987, r 20 or r 22) survives the deceased but then dies himself without taking out a grant of
representation, the AEA 1925, s 5 provides that his rights concerning the grant die with him
(unless it is an exceptional case where his PR may apply for a grant under NCPR 1987, r 20).
EXAMPLE 1
Abdul dies, appointing Eman as his executrix and leaving his estate to Rafi. Eman dies a
few days after Abdul and without having proved his will. Rafi should apply for a grant of
letters of administration with will annexed to Abdul’s estate.
The position is more complicated on the death of a sole or sole surviving PR if the
administration is incomplete.
EXAMPLE 2
Anthony died six months ago, appointing Edward as his sole executor.
Edward obtained a grant of probate to Anthony’s estate and had begun to deal with the
assets when he died. The house is on the market but unsold and the final inheritance tax
assessment cannot be agreed because tax is being paid on the house by instalments. The
administration is therefore incomplete. What happens? That depends on whether or not
the chain of representation applies. See 30.14.2.
30.14.2 Chain of representation

The office of executor is personal to the executor appointed by the testator in his will. Because
it is an office of personal trust an executor cannot assign that office (although he can appoint
an attorney). However, the AEA 1925, s 7 provides that in one case the office of executor will
pass automatically to someone else. This is called the ‘chain of representation’. This happens
only where an executor who has taken out a grant of probate dies without completing the
administration and appoints someone as his own executor. If that person takes out a grant of
probate he will automatically become the executor of both estates.
30.14.2.1 Unbroken chain
The chain of representation is applicable only where there is an unbroken sequence of proving
executors.
EXAMPLE
Colin died, leaving a will appointing Diane as his executrix.
Diane proved the will and obtained a grant of probate.
Diane died before she had completed the administration of Colin’s estate.
Diane’s will appointed Eric to be her executor. If Eric applies for probate of Diane’s will, he
automatically becomes executor of Colin’s estate.
It is not possible to accept the office of executor to Diane’s estate and refuse to be
executor by representation of Colin’s estate.
30.14.2.2 AEA 1925, s 7

Section 7 provides that an executor by representation:
(a) has the same rights in respect of the testator’s estate as if he was the original executor;
and
(b) is, to the extent to which the testator’s estate has come into his hands, answerable as if
he was the original executor.
30.14.2.3 Broken chain

If for any reason there are no successive executors, the chain of representation will be broken.
EXAMPLE 1
Fiona appointed Graham to be her executor. Graham obtained probate to Fiona’s estate.
Graham then died intestate. Graham’s PR under NCPR 1987, r 22 is Ian, who obtains a
grant of letters of administration to Graham’s estate. Ian will not become the executor of
Fiona’s estate.
EXAMPLE 2
Jaan died intestate and Kaleema obtained a grant of letters of administration to his estate.
Kaleema died leaving a will appointing Laila to be her executrix. Laila proved Kaleema’s
will and obtained probate. Laila does not become the executrix of Jaan’s estate.
30.14.3 Grant de bonis non administratis

In situations where the chain of representation does not apply because there are no successive
proving executors, a grant de bonis non administratis must be obtained to the original estate
(usually known as a ‘grant de bonis non’). The grant de bonis non may be one of administration
with the will or one of simple administration, depending on the circumstances.
It is issued in estates where the sole, or sole surviving, PR has died after obtaining the grant
but without having completed the administration, and it relates only to the unadministered
part of the estate. Two requirements apply:
(a) there must have been a prior grant of probate or letters of administration to a PR who
has now died; and
(b) the chain of representation must not apply.
The grant de bonis non will issue to the person who would have been entitled had the original
PR never taken the grant. The order of priority will depend on NCPR 1987, r 20 or r 22, as
appropriate.
30.15 CAVEATS AND CITATIONS

Caveats and citations are available under the NCPR 1987 to assist in the event of a dispute over
the right to take out a grant of representation to an estate.
30.15.1 Caveats (NCPR 1987, r 44)

The effect of a caveat is to prevent the issue of a grant of representation. The person lodging or
entering a caveat is called a ‘caveator’. A caveat might be used, for example, where a
beneficiary believes the executor named in the will lacks the mental capacity to act, or where
the validity of the will is questioned.
EXAMPLE 1
The will appoints Eric as executor, gives a legacy to Ann and the residue to Ben.
Eric wants to act as executor but Ann challenges his capability. Ann should enter a caveat
before a grant of representation is issued so that the court can decide who should act as
PR.
EXAMPLE 2
On Dinar’s death a homemade will is found appointing Eisaz as executor and sole
beneficiary. Fahima would be entitled to Dinar’s estate under the intestacy rules and
Fahima believes the will is invalid. She should enter a caveat to prevent any grant of
representation issuing until the court has decided the validity or otherwise of the will.
30.15.2 Citations (NCPR 1987, r 46)

Only executors or persons specified under NCPR 1987, r 20 or r 22 can take a grant of
representation. If the person initially entitled to take the grant refuses to do so and also
refuses to renounce, the estate would remain unadministered and the beneficiaries would be
left waiting indefinitely for their inheritance. In such circumstances, a citation provides a
remedy.
There are several types of citation which may be issued by the Probate Registry at the request
of a beneficiary (‘the citor’).
30.15.2.1 Citation to take probate

A citation to take probate may be used where an executor has lost his right to renounce
probate by intermeddling in the estate (eg, by informing the deceased’s bank of his death, see
30.9.3) but has not applied for a grant of probate and shows no signs of so doing. Once cited,
the executor must proceed with an application for a grant of probate. If he does not (without
good reason) the citor can apply to the court for an order allowing the executor to be passed
over and a grant of letters of administration with will annexed to issue to the person(s)
entitled under NCPR 1987, r 20.
30.15.2.2 Citation to accept or refuse a grant

A citation to accept or refuse a grant is the standard method of clearing off a person with a prior
right to any type of grant who has not applied, and shows no intention of applying, for a grant.
If the person cited does not take steps to take out the grant, a grant may be issued to the citor.
EXAMPLE
Adam’s will appoints Bert his executor and Clare the residuary beneficiary. Bert takes no
steps towards administering the estate or proving the will. Clare may cite Bert to act and, if
Bert does nothing, Clare may apply by virtue of NCPR 1987, r 20 for a grant of letters of
administration with will annexed.
30.15.3 The new Probate Rules

When the new Probate Rules are in force, caveats will become known as ‘objections’. The
person entering an objection to the issuing of a grant is called an ‘objector’.
Citations will be replaced by notifications. The old citation to an intermeddling executor to
take a grant of probate is subsumed into a notification to accept or refuse to take a grant, or to
give reasons why a person should not be ordered to take a grant in accordance.
30.16 AN ALTERNATIVE TO CITATION

To compel an unwilling person to take a grant is likely to produce more problems than it
solves. If a person is unwilling to act as executor in the administration of an estate, it is often
preferable to apply to the Probate Registry under the Senior Courts Act 1981, s 116 for an
order passing over that person in favour of someone else. For example, in Re Biggs [1966] 1 All
ER 358, an executor had intermeddled but then refused to have anything to do with the estate.
The Probate Registry ordered that he be passed over.
SUMMARY
(1) When a person dies, someone must deal with the administration of the estate.
Those who take on this task are referred to generically as ‘personal representatives’
(PRs). They may be executors or administrators.
(2) Executors are appointed by the will and take a grant of probate.
(3) If there is no executor able and willing to act, those entitled to property take a grant
of administration (with the will annexed if there is one). Priority is governed by the
Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987.
(4) Some assets (eg joint property, life policies assigned or written in trust during the
deceased’s lifetime) do not pass through the hands of the PRs.
(5) The process for obtaining a grant involves completing an IHT400 or, if the estate is
excepted, an IHT205, and sending it to HMRC with any tax due.
(6) The following should be sent to the Probate Registry:
• an oath sworn or affirmed by the PRs explaining their right to take a grant
• any will and codicils
• affidavits explaining any unusual features
• if inheritance tax is due, a receipted IHT421 as proof that inheritance tax due has
been paid
• probate fee
• any renunciations of the right to act.
(7) One executor is always sufficient. Two administrators are required if there is a
minority or life interest.
Administration of an Estate 421
CHAPTER 31
Administration of an Estate

31.2 The administration period 421
31.3 Duties of the PRs 422
31.4 Protection against liability 422
31.5 Administrative powers of PRs 422
31.6 Collecting the deceased’s assets 432
31.7 Paying the deceased’s funeral and testamentary expenses and debts 433
31.8 Paying the legacies 435
31.9 Completing the administration and distributing the residuary estate 437
LEARNING OUTCOMES
• explain the meaning of the ‘administration period’
• explain the duties of a PR during the administration period
• protect the PRs from personal liability
• identify the powers of PRs when dealing with the administration
• identify the steps necessary to administer the estate and complete the
administration.
31.1 INTRODUCTION
Once the PRs have obtained the grant, they are able to start the administration of the estate.
The work involved in administering an estate is basically the same whether the deceased left a
will or died intestate. However, in the latter case, the beneficiaries will be ascertained by
application of the law of intestacy rather than from construction of the will.
Broadly speaking, the PRs have to:
• collect the deceased’s assets;
• pay the deceased’s funeral and testamentary expenses and debts;
• distribute the legacies; and
• complete the administration and distribute the residuary estate.
This chapter looks at the different aspects of the PRs’ duties and at how they can protect
themselves from personal liability.
31.2 THE ADMINISTRATION PERIOD

The ‘administration period’ commences at the moment immediately following the death and
ends when the PRs are in a position to vest the residue of the estate in the beneficiaries, or the
trustees if a trust arises under the will or the intestacy law.
Note, however, that a PR holds office for life. If further assets or liabilities are discovered after
the residue has all been transferred, the PRs will still have to deal with them.
31.3 DUTIES OF THE PRS

The Administration of Estates Act 1925 (AEA 1925), s 25 (as substituted by AEA 1971, s 9)
states that the PRs of a deceased person shall be under a duty to ‘collect and get in the real and
personal estate of the deceased and administer it according to law’.
The duties to be undertaken by a PR are onerous. A PR who has accepted liability is personally
liable for loss to the estate resulting from any breach of duty he commits as PR (although he is
not generally liable for breaches committed by a co-PR). There are several types of breach of
duty, including:
(a) failing to protect the value of assets;
(b) failing to pay the people entitled to assets.
The Trustee Act 1925 (TA 1925), s 61 gives the court power at its discretion to relieve a PR
from liability for breach of duty if satisfied that the PR ‘has acted honestly and reasonably and
ought fairly to be excused for the breach’. Alternatively, an executor may be able to rely on a
clause in the deceased’s will providing protection from liability for mistakes made in good
faith.
31.4 PROTECTION AGAINST LIABILITY

As we saw at 30.3.5, PRs can protect themselves against personal liability to unknown
beneficiaries by complying with the requirements of the TA 1925, s 27.
31.4.1 Missing beneficiaries

As we saw at 30.3.5, the TA 1925, s 27 will not protect PRs against claims from beneficiaries
whose existence is known but who cannot be traced. The only way they can fully protect
themselves in such a case is to apply to court for a Benjamin order.
Before making an order, the court will require evidence that the fullest possible enquiries were
made to trace the missing person. If the court considers the advertisements made in addition
to the TA 1925, s 27 are insufficient, it will direct that further enquiry be made.
An application to court is expensive so, as an alternative, PRs may take out insurance to cover
the risk.
31.4.2 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975

The PRs will be personally liable where an applicant under the I(PFD)A 1975 successfully
obtains an order for ‘reasonable financial provision’ from the estate. They can protect
themselves against such liability by waiting more than six months following the date of the
grant of representation before distributing the assets. If earlier distribution is required, PRs
should ensure they retain sufficient assets to satisfy an order should an applicant be
successful within six months of the grant.
31.5 ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF PRS

31.5.1 Statutory powers of PRs and trustees
The PRs have a wide range of powers which they may exercise in carrying out the
administration of an estate. These powers are largely conferred on them by statute. The AEA
1925 gives some powers specifically to PRs. The TA 1925 and the Trustee Act 2000 (TA 2000)
confer powers on trustees for use in administering a trust. Since ‘trustee’ in the TA 1925 and
TA 2000 includes a ‘personal representative’, PRs (executors and administrators) have these
powers as well.
The TA 2000 modifies in various ways powers previously available to PRs and trustees. The
main purpose of the Act is to remedy certain deficiencies by bringing the law into line with
what has been regarded as good drafting practice for some years.
The TA 2000 deals with powers to invest trust property, appoint agents and nominees,
remuneration of trustees (and PRs) and to insure trust property. A duty of care requires
trustees (and PRs) when exercising many of their powers under the Act to exercise the skill
and care reasonable in the circumstances, having regard to any special knowledge or expertise
of the trustee.
31.5.2 Powers granted by a will

31.5.2.1 Modification of statutory powers
Many of the statutory powers may be modified by express provision contained within a will. If
there are no executors who prove the will but the will is proved by administrators with the will
annexed, they also have these modified powers available to them.
31.5.2.2 Additional powers

In addition to modification of statutory powers, a will often grants powers which are not
available at law, for example power to advance capital to a person to whom a life interest has
been given, or to lend capital to such a person; in the absence of any such express power, the
executors have no implied power to advance or lend capital to a life tenant.
31.5.2.3 Will drafting

It is good drafting practice for a will to set out in full all the powers of the executors so that the
position is clear on the face of the will, thus avoiding the possibility of a particular power
available at law being overlooked. Whether the following powers are available to the PRs at all,
or in modified form, will depend on the terms of the particular will and the circumstances of
the estate.
31.5.3 Provisions concerning the administration of the estate

The provisions which follow may be included in the will to simplify the administration of the
estate. However, in a homemade will or a very simple professionally-drafted will, the
draftsman may decide not to extend the executors’ statutory powers.
31.5.3.1 Power to appropriate assets without consent of beneficiary

The statutory provisions
The AEA 1925, s 41 gives PRs the power to appropriate any part of the estate in or towards
satisfaction of a pecuniary legacy or share in the residuary estate provided that the
appropriation does not prejudice any specific beneficiary. Thus, if the will gives a pecuniary
legacy to a beneficiary, the PRs may allow that beneficiary to take chattels or other assets in
the estate up to the value of his legacy, provided that these assets have not been specifically
bequeathed by the will. The section provides that the beneficiary (or his parent or guardian if
he is a minor) must consent to the appropriation.
Specimen clause
Power to exercise the power of appropriation conferred by section 41 of the Administration of
Estates Act 1925 without obtaining any of the consents required by that section.
This provision is commonly included in order to relieve the PRs of the duty to obtain formal
consent. Nevertheless, the PRs would informally consult the beneficiaries concerned.
There is no statutory power for trustees to appropriate assets so, if they are to have power to
appropriate, an express clause must be included.
31.5.3.2 Power to insure

The statutory provision
The TA 1925, s 19 (as substituted by TA 2000, s 34) gives PRs and trustees power to insure
trust property against any risks, to the full value of the property, and to pay premiums out of
either capital or income.
Before the TA 2000, the statutory power of insurance was inadequate, and so it was normal to
extend it by including an express power. However, this is no longer necessary.
The TA 2000 only provides trustees with a power to insure trust property. If trustees wish to be
able to insure the life of a beneficiary or of the settlor (eg, where there is a risk of a charge to
inheritance tax if death occurs within seven years), they will require an express power.
31.5.3.3 Power to accept receipts from or on behalf of minors

Under the general law, an unmarried minor could not give a good receipt for capital or
income. A married minor can give a good receipt for income only (LPA 1925, s 21). Parents
and guardians used not to be able to give a good receipt on behalf of minors unless
specifically authorised to do so in the will.
The Children Act 1989 provides that parents with parental responsibility have the same rights
as guardians appointed under the Act. These rights are set out at s 3 and include the right to
receive or recover money for the benefit of the child. Therefore, since the Children Act,
parents and guardians have been able to give a good receipt to PRs.
Extended statutory power

There are often tensions within families, and a client may not be happy for a parent or
guardian to give a good receipt for a legacy. In such a case, it may be preferable to leave the
legacy to another adult to hold on trust for the minor.
Other alternatives are:
(a) leaving a legacy to trustees to hold for the benefit of the minor rather than to the child
directly;
(b) including a clause allowing the PRs to accept the receipt of the child himself if over 16
years old – the provision may be incorporated into the legacy itself, or may be included
in a list of powers in the will.
31.5.4 Provisions concerning the administration of a trust

At the end of the administration of an estate, the PRs may be able to distribute the residue to
the beneficiaries, thus completing their task. However, in some cases distribution will be
delayed and the PRs will hold the residue (or part of it) as trustees. This may happen:
(a) where the beneficiary has a contingent interest, and so cannot be given the property
until the interest vests; or
(b) where the interests in the property are divided, for example between income and
capital.
In either of these cases, the statutory powers of the trustees may also be extended.
31.5.4.1 Power to invest trust funds

Under the general law, trustees have a duty to invest trust money. The TA 2000, s 3 gives
trustees a ‘general power of investment’ enabling them to invest as if they were absolutely
entitled to the trust property themselves. This wide power excludes investment in land, other
than by mortgage, but further powers in relation to land are contained in s 8 (see 31.5.4.2). In
exercising the investment power, trustees are required to take proper advice and to review
investments of the trust from time to time. They must have regard to the standard investment
criteria, namely the suitability to the trust of any particular investment and to the need for
diversification of investments of the trust.
An express investment clause can be included but is no longer necessary.
31.5.4.2 Power to purchase land

The TA 2000, s 8 gives trustees power to acquire freehold or leasehold land in the UK for
‘investment, for occupation by a beneficiary or for any other reason’. When exercising their
power, the trustees are given ‘all the powers of an absolute owner in relation to the land’.
The statutory power does not authorise the purchase of land abroad, nor does it allow trustees
to purchase an interest in land with someone else (eg, a beneficiary). An express power will be
needed if the trustees are to have such powers.
Specimen clause
My trustees may apply trust money in
— the purchase of land or an interest in land anywhere in the world, and
— the improvement of such land.
31.5.4.3 Power to sell personalty

Trustees holding land in their trust have the power to sell it under their powers of an absolute
owner. However, there is some doubt whether trustees who do not hold land have an implied
power of sale. For this reason, some wills may continue to impose an express trust for sale
over residue. The alternative solution is to include power in the will (among the administrative
provisions) giving the trustees express power to sell personalty.
Specimen clause
Power to sell mortgage or charge any asset of my estate as it they were an absolute beneficial
owner.
31.5.4.4 Power of maintenance

The statutory powers of maintenance and advancement (see 31.5.4.5) are extremely important
to PRs and trustees.

Where trustees are holding a fund for a minor beneficiary, the TA 1925, s 31 gives them power
to use income they receive for the minor’s maintenance, education or benefit. The section
provides that if the trustees continue to hold the trust funds after the beneficiary reaches 18
(for example, where the interest is contingent on reaching 21 or 25), they must pay the
income to the beneficiary from 18 onwards.
The TA 1925, s 31 (as amended by the TA 2000 and the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act
2014) states (inter alia):
(1) Where any property is held by trustees in trust for any person for any interest whatsoever,
whether vested or contingent, then, subject to any prior interests or charges affecting that
property—
(i) during the infancy of any such person, if his interest so long continues, the trustees may,
at their sole discretion, pay to his parent or guardian, if any, or otherwise apply for or
towards his maintenance, education, or benefit, the whole or such part, if any, of the
income of that property as the trustees may think fit, whether or not there is—
(a) any other fund applicable to the same purpose; or
(b) any person bound by law to provide for his maintenance or education; and
(ii) if such person on attaining the age of eighteen years has not a vested interest in such
income, the trustees shall thenceforth pay the income of that property and of any
accretion thereto under subsection (2) of this section to him, until he either attains a
vested interest therein or dies, or until failure of his interest:
(2) During the infancy of any such person, if his interest so long continues, the trustees shall
accumulate all the residue of that income by investing it, and any profits from so investing it,
from time to time in authorised investments, and shall hold those accumulations …
(3) This section applies in the case of a contingent interest only if the limitation or trust carries the
intermediate income of the property …
As originally drafted, s 31 allowed the trustees to apply only so much of the income as was
‘reasonable’. This was an objective test and it was common to vary the statutory provision to
allow the trustees an unfettered discretion. For trusts ‘created or arising’ on or after 1 October
2014, this amendment is no longer required. If a trust is created by will, it is the date of death
not execution that is significant.
Application of section 31
EXAMPLE – TRUST 1
The trustees are holding £100,000 for Mary (16) who has a vested interest in the capital.
Under s 31(1), the trustees have the power to pay all or part of the income to Mary’s parent
or guardian, or ‘otherwise apply’ it for Mary’s maintenance, education or benefit. This
could include paying bills (eg, school fees) directly.
Section 31(2) directs the trustees to accumulate any income not used for maintenance and
invest it.
EXAMPLE – TRUST 2
The trustees are holding £100,000 for Dora (14) who has an interest in the capital
contingent on reaching 21. They may pay or apply the income for Dora’s maintenance,
education or benefit in the same way as the trustees of Trust 1.
The trustees are holding £100,000 for Charles (19) who also has an interest in the capital
contingent on reaching 21. Section 31(1)(ii) directs them to pay all the income to Charles
until his interest vests (ie until he is 21), when he will receive the capital, or fails (ie if he
dies before he is 21). The same will apply to the income from Dora’s share from her 18th
birthday onwards.
EXAMPLE – TRUST 3
The trustees are holding £200,000 for Henry for life with remainder to Stephen (10). They
have no power to use the income for Stephen’s benefit as Henry is entitled to it. If Henry
dies while Stephen is still a minor, s 31 will apply to allow the trustees to apply income for
Stephen’s maintenance, etc during the period from Henry’s death until Stephen is 18
(when they will transfer the capital to Stephen).
PRACTICAL POINT
Summary of the effect of the Trustee Act 1925, s 31:
(1) Beneficiaries under 18 with vested or contingent interests. These beneficiaries cannot
insist on receiving income as the trustees have a discretion to apply income or
accumulate it, ie add it to the capital of the trust fund.
(2) Beneficiaries reaching 18 who become entitled to capital at that age. These beneficiaries
are entitled to receive capital and any accumulated income.
(3) Beneficiaries reaching 18 who have a right to income but not capital, eg a life tenant. These
beneficiaries are entitled to receive the available income each year, plus any income
from previous years which was accumulated instead of being paid to them.
(4) Beneficiaries reaching 18 who become entitled to capital at a later age. From age 18 these
beneficiaries have a right to the available income. When they reach the age at which
they are entitled to receive the capital, they will get the capital plus any income
accumulated before they reached 18.
Extending section 31 – specimen clause

Section 31 of the Trustee Act 1925 shall apply as if the age of 21 years were substituted for all
references to the age of 18 wherever they occur in s 31 (references to ‘infancy’ being
construed accordingly).
The clause removes the right for a contingent beneficiary to receive all the income from the
age of 18. The trustees’ discretion under s 31 to pay or apply income for maintenance, or to
accumulate any surplus will continue until the beneficiary is 21. Thus in Trust 2 the trustees
would have a discretion over the payment of income to Charles even though he is over 18.
31.5.4.5 Power to advance capital

The TA 1925, s 32 (as amended by the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014) allows
trustees in certain circumstances to permit a beneficiary with an interest in capital to have the
benefit of his capital entitlement sooner than he would receive it under the basic provisions of
the trust.
Section 32 states:
(1) Trustees may at any time or times pay or apply any capital money subject to a trust, or transfer or
apply any other property forming part of the capital of the trust property, for the advancement
or benefit, in such manner as they may, in their absolute discretion, think fit, of any person
entitled to the capital of the trust property or of any share thereof, whether absolutely or
contingently on his attaining any specified age … and whether in possession or in remainder or
reversion …
Provided that—
(a) property (including any money) so paid, transferred or applied for the advancement or
benefit of any person must not, altogether, represent more than the presumptive or
vested share or interest of that person in the trust property; and
(b) if that person is or becomes absolutely and indefeasibly entitled to a share in the trust
property the money or other property so paid, transferred or applied shall be brought
into account as part of such share; and
(c) no such payment transfer or application shall be made so as to prejudice any person
entitled to any prior life or other interest, whether vested or contingent, in the money or
other property paid, transferred or applied unless such person is in existence and of full
age and consents in writing to such payment or application.
As originally drafted, s 32 only allowed the trustees to advance up to one half of a beneficiary’s
vested or presumptive share. It was common to vary the statutory provision to allow the
trustees an unfettered discretion. For trusts ‘created or arising’ on or after 1 October 2014, this
amendment is no longer required. If a trust is created by will, it is the date of death not
execution that is significant.
Where more than one beneficiary has an interest in a trust fund, any advance made must be
brought into account on final distribution (s 32(1)(b)). Advances are brought into account at
their cash value at the date of the advance, unless the trustees make the advance on the basis
that it is be treated as a proportionate part of the capital (s 32(1A)).
Application of section 32
EXAMPLE – TRUST 1
Madhu has a vested interest in £100,000 capital. Section 32 allows the trustees to release
some of the capital for Madhu’s benefit. ‘Benefit’ is widely construed: money could be
used to pay educational or living expenses. The trustees may advance the whole of
Madhu’s entitlement, ie £100,000.
EXAMPLE – TRUST 2
Charles and Dora have contingent interests in capital, their presumptive shares being
£100,000 each. Section 32 applies to allow the trustees to release up to £100,000 for the
benefit of either beneficiary. The trustees could transfer money or assets directly to
Charles as he is old enough to give a valid receipt. The power applies even though the
interests of Charles and Dora are contingent. If either beneficiary dies before the age of 21
there is no right to recover any advance even though that beneficiary’s interest in capital
has failed.
If the trustees give £50,000 to Charles now, he will receive £50,000 less than Dora when
the fund is finally distributed to them, unless the trustees make the advance on the basis
that he is to be treated as having received 25% of the value of the fund, in which case he
will receive 25% less.
EXAMPLE – TRUST 3
Henry has only an interest in income and s 32 does not permit the release of capital to
him. The section does apply to Stephen’s vested interest in remainder, and permits the
trustees to apply up to £100,000 (half his interest) for Stephen’s benefit.
Such an advance would prejudice Henry since his income would be substantially reduced.
Section 32(1)(c) provides that no advance may be made without Henry’s written consent.
Extending section 32 – specimen clause 1

I leave it within the discretion of my trustees whether and to what extent the beneficiary shall
bring into account any payments received under this clause.
This clause supersedes s 32(1)(b) and means that if, in Trust 2, £50,000 was advanced to
Charles, the trustees could on distribution still divide the remaining fund equally between
Charles and Dora.
Extending section 32 – specimen clause 2

Power to pay or apply capital money from my residuary estate to any extent to or for the
benefit of my husband.
Power to advance capital money from my residuary estate to my husband by way of loan to
any extent upon such terms and conditions as my trustees may in their absolute discretion
think fit.
These provisions would permit the trustees in Trust 3 to give or lend capital from the fund to
Henry even though he has only an interest in income, not capital. Such a clause may be
included to give more flexibility in case the income proves insufficient for Henry’s needs.
Henry still remains dependent on the discretion of the trustees.
31.5.4.6 Power to accept receipts from and on behalf of minors

Where a trust arises in favour of a beneficiary who is a minor, the trustees have statutory
powers of maintenance and advancement under ss 31 and 32 of the TA 1925. Section 31
specifically allows the trustees to pay income to the child’s parent or guardian or ‘otherwise
apply’ it for the child’s maintenance, education or benefit. Similarly, s 32 empowers the
trustees to pay ‘or apply’ capital for the beneficiary’s advancement or benefit. Thus, even
before the Children Act 1989, the trustees had no difficulty in obtaining a good receipt when
exercising these powers.
31.5.4.7 Control of trustees by beneficiaries

The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA 1996), s 19 provides that
where beneficiaries are of full age and capacity and together entitled to the whole fund, they
may direct the trustees to retire and appoint new trustees of the beneficiaries’ choice. This
means that in a case where the beneficiaries could by agreement end the trust under the rule
in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, they now have the option of allowing the trust to
continue with trustees of their own choice. The provision may be expressly excluded by the
testator. If, under the terms of the trust, the position could arise where all the beneficiaries
are in existence and aged over 18 but the trust has not ended, the testator may wish to prevent
the beneficiaries from choosing their own trustees.
Specimen clause
The provisions of section 19 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 shall
not apply to any trust created by this will so that no beneficiary shall have the right to require
the appointment or retirement of any trustee or trustees.
31.5.4.8 Trusts of land

The TLATA 1996 gives special powers (see below) to a beneficiary under a trust of land who
has an interest in possession. If, under the terms of the will, a trust with an interest in
possession could arise the will may amend those powers. The Act does not define ‘interest in
possession’, so it presumably has its usual meaning; a beneficiary has an interest in
possession if he is entitled to claim the income of the fund as it arises (normally either
because he has a life interest, or because he is over 18 and entitled to claim income under the
TA 1925, s 31).
Duty to consult beneficiaries

Trustees exercising any function relating to the land must consult any beneficiary who is of
full age and beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in the land and, so far as
consistent with the ‘general interest of the trust’, give effect to the wishes of any such
beneficiary (TLATA 1996, s 11). The duty to consult may be excluded by the will and often is.
Specimen clause
The provisions of section 11 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 shall
not apply so that it shall not be necessary for my trustees to consult any beneficiaries before
carrying out any function relating to land.
Beneficiary’s rights of occupation

A beneficiary with a beneficial interest in possession, even if not of full age, has the right to
occupy land subject to the trust if the purposes of the trust include making the land available
for occupation by him, or if the trustees acquired the land in order to make it so available
(TLATA 1996, s 12). There is no power to exclude s 12, but a declaration that the purpose of
the trust is not for the occupation of land may be included in the will.
Specimen clause
The purposes of any trust created by this will do not include making land available for
occupation of any beneficiary [although my trustees have power to do so if they wish].
31.5.4.9 Holding the balance between beneficiaries

One of the duties of trustees is to ensure that a fair balance is kept between the interests of the
beneficiaries. This is particularly important where different beneficiaries are entitled to
income and capital, for example where property is left on trust for X for life with remainder to
Y, as in Trust 3 at 31.5.4.5 above. The trustees must ensure that the investments they choose
produce a reasonable income for X, the life tenant, and preserve the capital reasonably safely
for Y, the remainderman.
The trust instrument may authorise trustees to treat the interests of one beneficiary as of
paramount importance and relieve them of the duty to treat beneficiaries impartially. This is
particularly common where a trust is created for the benefit of a surviving spouse and others.
Specimen clause
In exercising the powers conferred by clause [ ] my Trustees shall be entitled to have regard
solely to the interests of my surviving spouse and to disregard all other interests or potential
interests under my Will.
31.5.4.10 Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013

The requirement to preserve a fair balance between income and capital beneficiaries led to
the development of various rules, equitable and statutory, requiring apportionment of income
and capital.
For example, the Apportionment Act 1870, s 2 provides that income such as rent and
dividends is to be treated as accruing from day to day and apportioned accordingly. Thus,
where interest is received after death but part relates to the pre-death period, the income
would have to be apportioned. The part accruing before death would be capital, while that
accruing after death is income.
While designed to achieve fairness between different classes of beneficiaries, the various
apportionment rules led to lengthy and expensive calculations, and it was generally accepted
that they were more trouble than they were worth. They were routinely excluded in
professionally drawn wills.
The Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013, s 1 disapplies these apportionment rules for trusts
created or arising on or after 1 October 2013, so it is unnecessary to include an express clause
in wills prepared after that date.
It will still be necessary to look at earlier trusts to check whether an exclusion is included.
31.5.5 Miscellaneous additional powers

31.5.5.1 Charging clause
Background law
The rule of equity that a trustee may not profit from his trust applies both to trustees and
executors. Its effect is that an executor or trustee may claim only out-of-pocket expenses and
may not charge for time spent in performing his office unless expressly authorised.
The TA 2000, ss 28–31 have made various changes to the general rule of law governing the
remuneration of ‘professional’ trustees.
Professional trustees are defined as those whose business includes the provision of services in
connection with the management or administration of trusts.
A professional trustee charging for services is now entitled to charge for all services, even if
they are services which are capable of being provided by a lay person (TA 2000, s 28(2)).
Previously, express authority was required.
Where a will or trust instrument does not contain a charging clause, a professional trustee
acting in a non-charitable trust can charge reasonable remuneration if authorised to do so in
writing by each of the co-trustees (s 29(2)). This means that it is still desirable to include a
charging clause as a sole trustee will be unable to charge and a co-trustee will be able to do so
only with the permission of co-trustees.
A charging clause used to be regarded as a legacy, but this is no longer the case (s 28(4)). This
means that a partner in a firm authorised by the will to charge can witness the will without
losing the entitlement to charge. If there are insufficient funds to pay the pecuniary legacies
in full, the legacies will abate proportionally unless the will provides otherwise. As a charging
clause is no longer a legacy, it is not necessary to provide that the charges be paid in priority to
other legacies.
Note that, if a person engaged in a profession or business not connected with the
administration of trusts is to have power to charge for time spent dealing with the trust, there
must be express authority in the trust instrument.
In any case where a professional executor or trustee is appointed such as a bank, a firm of
solicitors, an individual solicitor or an accountant, a power to charge should be included in
the will so that the testator is aware of the position.
Power to charge – specimen clause
Any of my trustees being a solicitor or other person engaged in any profession or business
may charge and be paid his usual professional charges for work done by him or his firm in the
administration of my estate and the trusts arising under my will including acts which a trustee
not engaged in any profession or business could have done personally.
Power to appoint a trust corporation – specimen clause

Power to appoint a trust corporation to be the sole trustee or one of the trustees of my will upon
such terms and conditions in all respects as may be acceptable to the corporation so appointed.
Provision of this latter kind is not commonly included in practice. Its purpose is to ensure
that, if individual trustees wish to retire and no substitutes can readily be found, a bank (or
other trust corporation) may be appointed even though there may be minor beneficiaries who
are unable to give the required consent to the bank’s usual terms and conditions, particularly
in relation to charging.
31.5.5.2 Power to carry on business

Where an estate includes a business which was run by the deceased as a sole (unincorporated)
trader, the powers of the PRs to run the business are limited. For example, they may only run
the business with a view to selling it as a going concern and may use only those assets
employed in the business at the date of death. These powers may be extended by will,
although in practice PRs are unlikely to wish to involve themselves in the detailed running of a
business. It may be preferable to bequeath the business by specific legacy and to appoint the
legatee as a special PR of the business.
31.6 COLLECTING THE DECEASED’S ASSETS

31.6.1 Duty of the PRs
As you saw at 29.2, some assets pass independently of the will and intestacy rules. The PRs
have no obligation, or indeed power, to deal with these assets.
Assets which pass under the will or intestacy rules devolve on the PRs, who are under an
obligation to collect and administer it for the benefit of those entitled.
In order to collect the property, the PRs generally produce their grant of representation to
whoever is holding the various assets, for example to the deceased’s bank or building society.
If the bank is holding share certificates or documents of title to land, these also will be
handed over to the PRs once the grant has been produced. In most cases, an office copy grant
will be accepted as evidence of title.
In some cases, a grant is not required to collect certain assets. As explained at 30.4.1, it may
be possible to realise assets without production of a grant under the Administration of Estates
(Small Payments) Act 1965.
31.6.2 Property not devolving on the PRs

The following examples illustrate types of property which do not devolve on the PRs and
which therefore will not pass under any will or under the intestacy law.
31.6.2.1 Life interest
EXAMPLE
Terry died some years ago having by his will left property to Henry and Ian on trust for sale
‘for Andrew for life, remainder for Ben’. Andrew has recently died. Assuming Ben is of full
age and capacity, Henry and Ian will transfer the property to him in accordance with the
terms of Terry’s will.
31.6.2.2 Joint tenancy
EXAMPLE
Aamir and Barack own property as beneficial joint tenants at law and in equity. On Aamir’s
death his interest passes by operation of the right of survivorship to Barack the surviving joint
tenant.
31.6.2.3 Policy held in trust for others

As explained at 29.2.3, any proceeds of an insurance policy written in trust for third parties, or
written under the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, s 11 for the benefit of the deceased’s
spouse and/or children, will be paid to the trustees of the policy on proof of death, usually by
production of the death certificate. The trustees will then distribute the proceeds among the
beneficiaries in accordance with the trusts of the policy.
31.6.2.4 Pension schemes

As you saw at 29.3.4 and 30.4.3, death in service benefits payable under an occupational
pension scheme established by the deceased’s former employers, where the trustees have a
discretion as to whom to pay the benefits, do not devolve on the deceased’s PRs and do not
form part of his estate for succession purposes. In exercising their discretion as to payment,
the trustees will have regard to any ‘letter of wishes’ given to them by the deceased person
during his lifetime; however, they are not bound to give effect to these wishes.
31.7 PAYING THE DECEASED’S FUNERAL AND TESTAMENTARY

EXPENSES AND DEBTS
31.7.1 Preliminary considerations
31.7.1.1 Immediate sources of money
As soon as monies can be collected from the deceased’s bank or building society, or realised
through insurance policies etc, the PRs should begin to pay the deceased’s outstanding debts
and the funeral account. Administration expenses, for example estate agents’ and valuers’
fees, will arise during the course of administration of the estate and will have to be settled
from time to time while the administration is proceeding.
31.7.1.2 Repayment of loan to pay inheritance tax

It may be necessary to raise money to repay a loan from the deceased’s bank to pay inheritance
tax to obtain the grant. If an undertaking has been given to the bank in connection with the
loan, it will probably be a ‘first proceeds’ undertaking. This means that the PRs must use
money first realised by them during the administration to repay the bank. Failure to do so will
be a breach of the terms of the undertaking.
31.7.1.3 Which assets to sell?

The PRs must take considerable care when deciding which assets they will sell to raise money
for payment of the various outgoings from the deceased’s estate. They should consider the
following points.
Provisions of the deceased’s will

The will may direct from which part of the deceased’s estate the debts, funeral account,
testamentary and administration expenses should be paid; usually they will be paid from the
residue. In the absence of such direction, the PRs must follow the statutory rules for the
incidence of liabilities as outlined below. In any event, it will be generally incorrect for PRs to
sell property given specifically by will (eg, a gift of the testator’s valuable stamp collection to his
nephew) unless all other assets in the estate have been exhausted in payment of the debts, etc.
The beneficiaries’ wishes

Where possible, the wishes of the beneficiaries of the residuary estate should be respected by
the PRs. Although the PRs have power to sell any assets in the residuary estate, it is clearly
appropriate that the residuary beneficiaries should be consulted before any sale takes place.
Generally, beneficiaries have clear views as to which assets they desire to be retained for
transfer to them; other assets may be sold by the PRs to raise the necessary money, possibly
following receipt of professional advice as to particular sales.
Tax consequences
Before selling assets, the PRs should consider the amount of any capital gains (or losses) likely
to arise as a result of the sale, and the availability of any exemptions, etc. Full use should be
made of the annual exemption for CGT. If assets are to be sold at a loss (compared to their
value at the date of death) CGT loss relief may be available for the PRs, as may ‘loss relief ’ for
inheritance tax purposes. An explanation of these reliefs is contained at 31.9.6.
31.7.2 Funeral and testamentary expenses and debts

31.7.2.1 Funeral expenses
Reasonable funeral expenses are payable from the deceased’s estate. In all cases, it is a
question of fact what funeral expenses are reasonable.
31.7.2.2 Testamentary expenses

The phrase ‘testamentary and administration expenses’ is not defined in the AEA 1925, but it
is generally considered to mean expenses incident to the proper performance of the duties of
a PR. The phrase will include:
(a) the costs of obtaining the grant;
(b) the costs of collecting in and preserving the deceased’s assets;
(c) the costs of administering the deceased’s estate, for example solicitors’ fees for acting
for the PRs, valuers’ fees incurred by PRs in valuing the deceased’s stocks and shares or
other property; and
(d) any inheritance tax payable on death on the deceased’s property in the UK which vests in
the PRs (IHTA 1984, s 211).
31.7.3 Administration of assets: solvent estate

The rules applying to the payment of funeral and testamentary expenses and debts depend on
whether the estate is solvent or insolvent. The insolvent estate is considered at 31.7.4.
31.7.3.1 The statutory order for payment of debts

Section 34(3) of the AEA 1925 states:
Where the estate of a deceased person is solvent his real and personal estate shall, subject to rules of
court and the provisions hereinafter contained as to charges on property of the deceased, and to the
provisions, if any, contained in his will, be applicable towards the discharge of the funeral,
testamentary and administration expenses, debts and liabilities payable thereout in the order
mentioned in Part II of the First Schedule to this Act.
Part II of the First Schedule lays out an order which the PRs must follow when deciding which
part of the deceased’s estate should be used for the purposes of payment of the funeral and
testamentary expenses and debts. Under the order generally, assets forming part of the
residue are to be used before using property given to specific legatees.
‘Subject … to’
However, the effect of the proviso ‘subject to’ is that the operation of s 34(3) is expressly
subject to two important rules or provisions, as follows:
(a) The AEA 1925, s 35, which deals with secured debts, ie debts owing by the deceased
which are charged on particular items of property. A common example is a loan secured
by legal mortgage on the deceased’s house. The effect of this rule is that a beneficiary
taking the asset takes it subject to the debt and will be responsible for paying the debt.
(b) The deceased’s will can vary the provisions implied by the AEA 1925, ss 34(3) and/or 35.
To vary s 35 it is necessary to have an express reference to the mortgage.
A suitable clause would be:
I GIVE my country cottage to my daughter free of mortgage.
A direction to pay ‘debts’ from residue is not sufficient to vary s 35. It will be construed
as a direction to pay from residue debts other than those charged on particular assets.
31.7.4 The insolvent estate

31.7.4.1 Meaning of insolvency
An estate is insolvent if the assets are insufficient to discharge in full the funeral,
testamentary and administration expenses, debts and liabilities. In such cases, the creditors
will not be paid in full (or at all) and the beneficiaries under the will or the intestacy provisions
may receive nothing from the estate. In doubtful cases, the PRs should administer the estate
as if it is insolvent. Failure to administer an insolvent estate in accordance with the statutory
order is a breach of duty by the PRs.
In the case of an insolvent estate which is being administered by the deceased’s PRs out of
court (this being the most common method of administration), the order of distribution in
the Administration of Insolvent Estates of Deceased Persons Order 1986 (SI 1986/1999)
should be followed.
Secured creditors, for example those holding a mortgage or charge over the deceased’s
property, are in a better position than unsecured creditors in that they may (inter alia) realise
the security, ie sell the property by exercising a power of sale as mortgagee or chargee.
31.8 PAYING THE LEGACIES

31.8.1 Introduction
Once the funeral, testamentary and administration expenses and debts have been paid, or at
least adequately provided for by setting aside sufficient assets for the purpose, the PRs should
consider discharging the gifts arising on the death, other than the gifts of the residuary estate.
They may also consider making interim distributions to the residuary beneficiaries on
account of their entitlement.
31.8.2 Specific legacies

It is unusual for property given by specific bequest or devise to be needed for payment of the
deceased’s funeral and testamentary expenses and debts. Once the PRs are satisfied that the
property will not be so required, they should consider transferring it to the beneficiary, or to
trustees if a trust arises, for example if the property is given to a beneficiary contingently on
attaining a stated age and the beneficiary has not yet reached that age.
The method of transferring the property to the beneficiary or trustee will depend on its
particular nature. For example, the legal estate in a house or flat should be vested in a
beneficiary by a document known as an assent. If the specific legacy is of company shares, a
stock transfer form should be used.
In the case of specific gifts only, the vesting of the asset in the beneficiary is retrospective to the
date of death, so that any income produced by the property, for example dividends on a specific
gift of company shares, belongs to the beneficiary. He is not entitled to the income as it arises
but must wait until the PRs vest the property in him. As the beneficiary is entitled to the income
he will be liable to be assessed for any income tax due on that income since the death.
Any costs of transferring the property to a specific legatee, and the cost of any necessary
insurance cover taken to safeguard the property are the responsibility of the legatee who
should reimburse the PRs for the expenses incurred (subject to any contrary direction in a will
indicating that such expenses should be paid from residue). If the deceased’s title to the asset
is disputed by a third party, the specific legatee will be responsible for the cost of litigation to
establish ownership.
31.8.3 Pecuniary legacies – provision by will for payment

Set out below is an example of a clause dealing expressly with the payment of pecuniary
legacies:
I GIVE all my estate both real and personal whatsoever and wheresoever not hereby or by any
codicil hereto otherwise specifically disposed of (hereinafter called ‘my residuary estate’)
unto my trustees UPON TRUST to raise and discharge thereout my debts and funeral and
testamentary expenses and all legacies given hereby or by any codicil hereto and any and all
taxes payable by reason of my death in respect of property given free of tax and subject
thereto UPON TRUST to pay and divide the same equally between …
There is clear intention shown by the testator to pay the pecuniary legacies from the fund of
general residue described as ‘my residuary estate’. The result would be the same if the clause
gave the residuary estate ‘subject to’ or ‘after payment of ’ the pecuniary legacies. In both cases
the legacies should be paid from the fund of residue before the division of the balance
between the residuary beneficiaries.
31.8.4 Pecuniary legacies – no provision by will for payment

Where the will makes no provision for the payment of pecuniary legacies, they are paid
primarily from residuary personalty.
EXAMPLE
A will leaves a legacy of £5,000 to Dawn. There is no direction as to payment of the legacy.
Residue consisting of personalty and realty is given by the will to ‘Edward if he shall survive
me by 28 days’. He does so survive the testator, and residue is, therefore, fully disposed of.
The PRs should pay the legacy from the personalty, with the proceeds of the realty being
used afterwards if necessary.
If a partial intestacy arises, for example where part of a gift of residue fails because one of the
beneficiaries dies before the testator, it is often unclear as a matter of law which is the
appropriate part of the estate for the payment of the pecuniary legacies. It is preferable,
therefore, to make express provision for payment of legacies (as in 31.8.3).
31.8.5 Time for payment of pecuniary legacies

31.8.5.1 The executor’s year
The general rule is that a pecuniary legacy is payable at the end of ‘the executor’s year’, ie one
year after the testator’s death. The AEA 1925, s 44 provides that PRs are not bound to
distribute the estate to the beneficiaries before the expiration of one year from the death. It is
often difficult to make payment within the year and, if payment is delayed beyond this date,
the legatee will be entitled to interest by way of compensation. The rate of interest will either
be the rate prescribed by the testator’s will, or, in default of such provision, the rate payable on
money paid into court. If the testator stipulates that the legacy is to be paid ‘immediately
following my death’, or that it is payable at some future date, or on the happening of a
particular contingency, then interest is payable from either the day following the date of
death, the future date or the date the contingency occurs, as may be appropriate.
31.8.5.2 Interest payable from the date of death

There are four occasions when, as an exception to the normal rule, interest is payable on a
pecuniary legacy from the date of the death. These occur when legacies are:
(a) payable in satisfaction of a debt owed by the testator to a creditor;
(b) charged on/and owned by the testator;
(c) payable to the testator’s minor child (historically this was so that provision was made for
maintenance of the child, and interest is not payable under this provision if other funds
exist for the child’s maintenance); or
(d) payable to any minor (not necessarily the child of the testator) where the intention is to
provide for the maintenance of that minor.
31.9 COMPLETING THE ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTING THE

RESIDUARY ESTATE
31.9.1 Introduction
Once the PRs have paid the deceased’s funeral, testamentary expenses and debts and any
legacies given by the will, they can consider distribution of the residuary estate in accordance
with the will or the intestacy rules.
The PRs may have made interim distributions to the residuary beneficiaries on account of
their entitlements, at the same time ensuring that they have retained sufficient assets to cover
any outstanding liabilities, particularly tax.
Before drawing up the estate accounts and making the final distribution of residue, the PRs
must deal with all outstanding matters. Such matters relate mostly to inheritance tax liability,
but there will also be income tax and capital gains tax (CGT) to consider.
31.9.2 Adjusting the inheritance tax assessment
Adjustment to the amount of inheritance tax payable on the instalment and non-instalment
option property in the estate may arise for a number of reasons, including:
(a) discovery of additional assets or liabilities since the IHT account was submitted;
(b) discovery of lifetime transfers made by the deceased within the seven years before death;
(c) agreement of provisionally estimated values, for example with the shares valuation
division of HMRC (in the case of shares in private companies) or the district valuer (in
the case of land). The shares valuation division and the district valuer are official
agencies established for the formal agreement of valuations on behalf of HMRC with
PRs and others. Especially in the case of private company shares, but also in the case of
land, valuations may require long negotiations and can often delay reaching a final
settlement of inheritance tax liabilities;
(d) agreement between the PRs and HMRC of a tax liability or repayment, in relation to the
deceased’s income and capital gains before the death;
(e) sales made by the PRs after the deceased’s death which have given rise to a claim for
inheritance tax ‘loss relief ’.
31.9.2.1 Inheritance tax loss relief

The PRs are often forced to sell assets because they need cash to meet debts, tax liabilities or
legacies. The value of quoted shares and land fluctuates depending on market conditions, and
PRs may find that they sell these assets for less than their value at the date of death. Loss on
sale relief can reduce the inheritance tax liability of the estate in such cases. Where ‘qualifying
investments’ are sold within 12 months of death for less than their market value at the date of
death (ie ‘probate value’) then the sale price may be substituted for the market value at death
and the inheritance tax liability adjusted accordingly (IHTA 1984, ss 178–189). ‘Qualifying
investments’ are shares or securities which are quoted on a recognised stock exchange at the
date of death and also holdings in authorised unit trusts. The relief must be claimed; it is not
automatic. It is normally available only when the PRs make the sale and not where a
beneficiary to whom assets have been transferred does so.
If the PRs claim the relief, the value of the qualifying investments at death must be reduced for
CGT purposes (s 187). This has the effect of preventing the PRs claiming a loss for CGT
purposes where they have claimed inheritance tax loss relief. It would, therefore, be foolish to
claim the relief if the estate is passing to a surviving spouse or civil partner as the inheritance
tax reduction would be pointless and the estate would no longer be able to claim a CGT loss.
When claiming the relief, PRs must report all sales of qualifying investments made within the
12-month period, including those sold for more than death value, and must substitute the
aggregate sale proceeds for the original values.
EXAMPLE
PRs are dealing with an estate which includes holdings in three quoted companies. They
sell all the shares in the first 12 months after the death; they make a loss on two of the
companies and a gain on the third.
Value at death Sale price
£ £
Shares in XX plc 20,000 10,000
Shares in YY plc 20,000 5,000
Shares in ZZ plc 20,000 40,000
Total value 60,000 55,000
The aggregate sale price is £55,000 so the PRs can reduce the inheritance tax value of the
shares from £60,000 to £55,000 saving the inheritance tax on £5,000. Obviously the
reduction would have been greater had the PRs not sold the ZZ shares. The CGT
acquisition value for the PRs of the XX and YY shares will be reduced to £10,000 and
£5,000 respectively.
Loss on sale of shares relief is intended to help those who have to sell investments at a loss to
raise money to pay tax, debts, administration expenses or legacies.
To stop PRs selling shares to create a loss and then either buying them back (‘bed and
breakfasting’) or reinvesting the proceeds in other shares, s 180 restricts the relief where the
appropriate person buys new qualifying investments within the period starting with death and
ending two months after the date of the last sale.
There are similar, though separate, provisions allowing claims for loss relief in relation to the
sale of land within four years of a death at a loss (IHTA 1984, ss 190–198).
31.9.3 PRs’ continuing inheritance tax liability

31.9.3.1 Inheritance tax by instalments
The PRs may have opted to pay inheritance tax by instalments on the property in the
deceased’s estate attracting the instalment option. By the time they are ready to transfer the
assets to those entitled, probably only one or two instalments will have been paid. The PRs
continue to be liable for the remaining instalments. They would be foolish to transfer all the
assets to the beneficiaries in reliance on a promise that the beneficiaries will pay the tax. If the
beneficiaries become insolvent or disappear, the PRs will be liable for the unpaid tax but will
have no assets of the estate to meet the liability. They should consider retaining sufficient
assets in the estate. Details of the instalment option facility are discussed at 4.8.1.2. If any
instalment option property is sold, any outstanding inheritance tax on the property sold
becomes due immediately.
31.9.3.2 Inheritance tax on lifetime transfers
If the deceased dies within seven years of making either a potentially exempt transfer (PET), or
a chargeable transfer, inheritance tax (if a PET) or more inheritance tax (if a chargeable
transfer) may become payable. Although the general rule is that the donees of lifetime
transfers are primarily liable for the tax, the PRs of the donor’s estate may become liable if the
tax remains unpaid by the donees 12 months after the end of the month in which the donor
died. However, the PRs’ liability is limited to the extent of the deceased’s assets which they
have received, or would have received in the administration of the estate, but for their neglect
or default.
In addition, if the deceased gave away property during his lifetime but reserved a benefit in
that property, such property is treated as part of his estate on death (see 4.3.1.3). The donee of
the gift is primarily liable to pay the tax attributable, but if the tax remains unpaid 12 months
after the end of the month of death, the PRs become liable. Again the PRs should consider
how they can protect themselves in case this liability materialises.
31.9.4 Corrective account

When all variations in the extent or value of the deceased’s assets and liabilities are known, and
all reliefs to which the estate is entitled have been quantified, the PRs must report all
outstanding matters to HMRC. This report is made by way of a corrective account on Form C4.
31.9.5 Inheritance tax clearance

31.9.5.1 Certificate or letter of clearance
The last step for the PRs to take in relation to inheritance tax is to obtain confirmation from
HMRC that there is no further claim to inheritance tax. If HMRC is satisfied that inheritance
tax attributable to a chargeable transfer has, or will be, paid, it can, and if the transfer is one
made on death must, confirm that this is the case. The effect is to discharge all persons, thus
in particular the PRs, from further liability to inheritance tax (unless there is fraud or non-
disclosure of material facts). It also extinguishes any charge imposed by HMRC on the
deceased’s property for the inheritance tax.
31.9.6 Income tax and CGT

31.9.6.1 The deceased’s liability
Immediately following the death, the PRs must make a return to HMRC of the income and
capital gains of the deceased for the period starting on 6 April before the death and ending
with the date of death. Even though the deceased died part way through the income tax year,
the PRs, on his behalf, may claim the same reliefs and allowances as the deceased could have
claimed had he lived throughout the whole year. Any liability to tax is a debt of the deceased
which must be paid by the PRs during the administration. The debt will be deductible when
calculating the amount of inheritance tax. Alternatively, if a refund of tax is obtained, this will
represent an asset, so increasing the size of the estate for inheritance tax purposes.
31.9.6.2 The administration period
For each income tax year (or part) during the administration period, the PRs must make a
return to HMRC of the income they receive on the deceased’s assets, and any gains they make
on disposals of chargeable assets for administration purposes, for example to raise money to
pay inheritance tax or the pecuniary legacies. These returns for the estate are distinct from the
PRs’ returns of their own income and capital gains.
31.9.6.3 Income tax
Rate of tax
The rates at which PRs pay income tax depends on the type of income they receive.
PRs do not pay income tax at any higher rate(s) but nor do they benefit from the personal
savings and dividend allowances. They do not have a personal allowance.
They will therefore pay tax at the following rates on all income received:
dividends 7.5%
other income 20%
Calculation of PRs’ liability
In calculating any income tax liability on the income of the administration period, the PRs
may be able to claim relief for interest paid on a bank loan to pay inheritance tax. If the PRs
use this loan to pay the inheritance tax on the deceased’s personal property in the UK which
devolves on them in order to obtain the grant, income tax relief is generally available to them.
EXAMPLE
PRs’ only income is gross interest of £4,000 for a tax year in the administration period.
They pay £1,000 interest to the bank on a loan to pay inheritance tax to obtain their grant.
Gross income £4,000
Less: interest paid £1,000
Taxable income £3,000
Less: tax (20%) £600
Net income for the beneficiaries £2,400
Beneficiary’s income tax liability

Once the PRs’ tax position has been settled, the remaining net income will be paid to the
beneficiary. The grossed up amount of this income should be included by the beneficiary in
his return of income for the income tax year to which it relates.
EXAMPLE
PRs have completed the administration of an estate and there is bank deposit account
interest which, after payment of tax at 20% by the PRs, amounts to £800. That sum is paid
by the PRs to the residuary beneficiary.
When the beneficiary makes his return of income he must declare the estate income
grossed up at 20%, ie
£800 × 100
--------- = £1,000.
80
The PRs must supply the beneficiary with a certificate of deduction of tax, on Form R185,
which the beneficiary should send to his own inspector of taxes as evidence of the payment of
the tax by the PRs. Beneficiaries whose income, including the estate income, is not above the
level of the personal allowance can reclaim the tax paid.
31.9.6.4 Capital gains tax

No disposal on death
On death, there is no disposal for CGT purposes, so that no liability to CGT arises. The PRs
acquire all the deceased’s assets at their probate value at death. This has the effect of wiping
out gains which accrued during the deceased’s lifetime so that these gains are not charged to
tax. Although there is no disposal, the probate value becomes the PRs’ ‘base cost’ of all the
deceased’s assets for future CGT purposes.
Calculation of PRs’ liability
If the PRs dispose of chargeable assets during the administration of the deceased’s estate to
raise cash (eg, to pay inheritance tax, or other outgoings or legacies), they are liable to CGT on
any chargeable gains that they make. For gains arising in 2017/18 the rate is 20% except for
gains on residential property which are taxed at 28%. The rates are flat rates irrespective of the
level of income and gains of the estate.
In addition to deducting their acquisition cost (probate value), the PRs may deduct from the
disposal consideration the incidental costs of disposal (eg, stockbroker’s commission on sale
of shares). In addition, they may deduct a proportion of the cost of valuing the deceased’s
estate for probate purposes. Calculations may be based either on a scale published by HMRC,
or on the actual expenditure incurred if this is higher.
The PRs may claim the annual exemption for disposals made in the tax year in which the
deceased died and the following two tax years only (if the administration lasts this long). The
exemption is the same as for an individual (ie, £11,300 for 2017/18). Maximum advantage will
be taken from this exemption if the PRs plan sales of assets carefully so that gains are realised
in stages in each of the three tax years for which it is available.
EXAMPLE
In May 2017 PRs realise they will need to raise £50,000 to pay administration expenses.
The investments they are advised to sell will realise a net gain of £21,300. They have no
unused losses.
(1) If all sales occur in the same tax year, their CGT position is as follows:
£)
gain 21,300)
annual exemption (11,300)
taxable 10,000) at 20% = £2,000
(2) If the sales are spread evenly over two tax years, their CGT position is as follows:
£)
Year 1 gain 10,650)
taxable nil)
Year 2 gain 10,650)
taxable nil)
Sales at a loss
If the PRs sell assets for less than their value at death, an allowable loss for CGT will arise. This
loss may be relieved by setting it against gains arising on other sales by the PRs in the same, or
any future, tax year in the administration period. Any loss which is unrelieved at the end of the
administration period cannot be transferred to the beneficiaries. In view of this limitation,
the PRs should plan sales carefully to ensure they can obtain relief for all losses which they
realise. If there is a possibility of losses being unused, the PRs should either plan sales of
other assets, or consider transferring the assets worth less than their probate value to the
beneficiaries (see below).
Transfer of assets to the legatees

If, instead of selling assets, the PRs vest them in the legatees, ie in the beneficiaries (or
trustees if a trust arises), no chargeable gain or allowable loss arises. The beneficiary or
trustee is assumed to acquire the asset transferred at its probate value. This ‘base cost’ of the
asset will be relevant to the CGT calculation on a future disposal.
EXAMPLE 1
A testator by will leaves his residuary estate to Parvez. Among the assets forming residue
are 1,000 shares in XYZ plc. Probate value of these was £5,200. By the time they were
transferred to Parvez the value had risen to £10,000. Five years after death Parvez sells
them for £18,500.
£)
Disposal consideration 18,500)
Less: acquisition (probate) value (5,200)
Gain 13,300)
Less: annual exemption (11,300)
Chargeable gain 2,000)
EXAMPLE 2
If Parvez sells the shares for £3,400, ie £2,000 less than their probate value, his position
would be as follows:
£)
Disposal consideration 3,400)
Less: acquisition (probate) value 5,400)
Loss (2,000)
The loss of £2,000 is available to Parvez to set against chargeable gains he may have in the
same, or any future, tax year.
PRACTICAL POINTS
Remember the following points on CGT and death:
(1) No CGT is payable on death itself.
(2) If PRs sell assets, they make a disposal. Their acquisition value is the market value at
the date of death. They have an annual exemption equal to an individual’s in the tax
year of death and the two following tax years, so there will often be no tax liability on
their disposals.
(3) The rate of tax payable by PRs is 20% except for gains on residential property which
are taxed at 28%.
(4) If PRs transfer assets to beneficiaries, they do not make a disposal. The beneficiary
acquires the asset at market value at the date of death.
31.9.7 Transferring assets to residuary beneficiaries

31.9.7.1 Interim distributions
Once the outstanding tax, legal costs and other matters have been disposed of, PRs should
consider transferring any remaining assets to the residuary beneficiaries. In doing so they
must remember that payments may have been made already to the beneficiaries as interim
distributions on account of their entitlement. If so, these will be taken into account when
determining what and how much more should be transferred to those beneficiaries. These
interim distributions will also be shown in the estate accounts.
31.9.7.2 Adult beneficiaries

If the beneficiaries are adults, and have a vested entitlement to property in the residuary estate,
their entitlement can be transferred to them. If they have a contingent entitlement, the property
cannot be transferred to them but will instead be transferred to trustees to hold on their behalf
until the contingency is satisfied.
31.9.7.3 Minor beneficiaries

If any beneficiaries are under 18 years of age, whether the interest enjoyed is vested or
contingent, the property will usually be held in trust for them until the age of majority is
reached or the contingency is satisfied. If a minor beneficiary has a vested interest the PRs
may be able to transfer his entitlement to him (if expressly authorised in the will), or to
parents and guardians on behalf of the minor.
31.9.7.4 Transferring property to the residuary beneficiaries

The manner in which the property is transferred to residuary beneficiaries, or to trustees of
their behalf, will depend on the nature of the property remaining in the estate.
Personal property
The PRs indicate that they no longer require property for administration purposes when they
pass title to it by means of an assent. Generally, no particular form of assent is required in the
case of personalty so that often the property passes by delivery. The beneficiary’s title to the
property derives from the will; the assent is merely the manner of giving effect to the gift by
the PRs. Company shares are transferred by share (stock) transfer form. The PRs must
produce their grant to the company as proof of title to the shares. They, as transferors,
transfer the shares ‘as PRs of X deceased’ to the beneficiary (the transferee), who then applies
to be registered as a member of the company in place of the deceased member.
Freehold or leasehold land

Personal representatives vest the legal estate in land in the person entitled (whether
beneficially or as trustee) by means of an assent, which will then become a document of title
to the legal estate. If PRs are to continue to hold property in their changed capacity as trustees
under trusts declared by the will, or arising under the intestacy law, an assent will again be
appropriate. The PRs should formally vest the legal estate in themselves as trustees to hold for
the beneficiaries.
By the AEA 1925, s 36(4), an assent must be in writing, it must be signed by the PRs, and it
must name the person in whose favour it is made. It then operates to vest the legal estate in the
named person. A deed is not necessary to pass the legal estate, but PRs may choose to use a
deed, for example if they require the beneficiary to give them the benefit of an indemnity
covenant. If the title to the land is registered, the assent must be in the form specified by the
Land Registration Rules 2003.
Any person in whose favour the PRs make an assent or conveyance may require notice of it to
be endorsed on the original grant of probate or administration. In view of this entitlement, it
is good practice that the endorsement should be made by the PRs, or solicitors on their
behalf, as a matter of routine at the same time as the assent is given. Indeed, if the PRs have
made an assent where the title is unregistered in favour of a beneficiary, endorsement is
essential for that beneficiary’s protection in view of the provisions of the AEA 1925, s 36(6)
benefitting any later purchaser from the PRs.
If the title to the land is registered, two options are open to the PRs:
(a) they can apply to be registered as proprietor in place of the deceased, in which case they
must produce the grant of representation when making the application; or
(b) they can transfer the property by assent without being registered as proprietor
themselves, in which case the beneficiary must be given a certified copy of the grant of
representation so that he can present it with his application for registration.
As the register is conclusive as to title, the provisions in the AEA 1925 regarding
endorsements on the grant are of no relevance.
31.9.8 Estate accounts

31.9.8.1 Purpose of the accounts
The final task of the PRs is usually to produce estate accounts for the residuary beneficiaries.
The purpose of the accounts is to show all the assets of the estate, the payment of the debts,
administration expenses and legacies, and the balance remaining for the residuary
beneficiaries. The balance will normally be represented by a combination of assets transferred
to the beneficiaries in specie, and some cash. The residuary beneficiaries sign the accounts to
indicate that they approve them. In the absence of fraud or failure to disclose assets, their
signatures will also release the PRs from further liability to account to the beneficiaries.
31.9.8.2 Presentation of the accounts

There is no prescribed form for estate accounts. Any presentation adopted should be clear and
concise so that the accounts are easily understood by the residuary beneficiaries. If interim
distribution payments were made to the residuary beneficiaries during the administration
period, these must be taken into account and shown in the estate accounts.
Vertical presentation
Estate accounts may be presented vertically, disclosing assets less liabilities, etc, and a
balance for the beneficiaries, or on a double-sided basis, disclosing receipts opposite the
payments. It is customary to use the probate values of the assets for accounting purposes.
Narrative introduction
The accounts generally start with a narrative statement of the date of death, the date of the
grant of representation, a summary of the will or succession under the intestacy law, and the
value of the deceased’s gross and net estate. All this information is provided to make the
understanding of the accounts easier for the beneficiaries.
Capital and income accounts

Normally accounts show capital assets, and income produced by those assets during the
administration period, in separate capital and income accounts. In small estates this may not
be necessary, so that one account showing both capital and income will be sufficient.
However, it is always necessary to prepare separate accounts if the will (or the intestacy rules)
creates a life or minority interest, since the different interests of the beneficiaries in the
capital and income need to be distinguished throughout the period of the trust, and when it
ends.
SUMMARY
(1) When PRs administer an estate, they are under a statutory duty to administer it
correctly (Administration of Estates Act 1925, s 25 as substituted).
(2) They are personally liable for any errors and so must be careful to protect
themselves.
(3) They have various statutory powers contained mainly in the Trustee Acts 1925 and
2000. These powers are sometimes extended by the will. Sections 31 and 32 of the
Trustee Act 1925 are particularly important.
(4) As well as paying inheritance tax, PRs may have to pay CGT and income tax:
(a) The PRs have an individual’s CGT annual exemption for the tax year of death
and the two following tax years.
(b) Death is not a disposal but the PRs are deemed to acquire the assets at market
value at the date of death.
(c) If they sell, they make a disposal.
(d) If they transfer to beneficiaries, there is no disposal; the beneficiaries acquire
at market value at the date of death.
(e) The PRs are liable to income tax on income of the administration period at
basic and dividend ordinary rate.
(5) At the end of the administration, PRs prepare estate accounts for approval by the
residuary beneficiaries.
Part V Summary – Probate and Administration 445
PART V SUMMARY
Probate and Administration
What happens to People usually think that where property goes See 29.2
property when depends on whether or not there is a will. However, and 29.3.
someone dies? many assets pass independently of a will. For
example, property held as beneficial joint tenants
passes by survivorship; trust property passes under
the terms of the trust. Money due from a pension
scheme will be subject to the terms of the scheme
which normally give the trustees power to choose
who to pay it to. Often, the bulk of a person’s wealth
passes independently of any will.
What are the A testator must be at least 18 and have See 29.4.
requirements of a testamentary capacity. The testator must know and
valid will? approve the contents of the will and must not have
been subjected to undue influence, force, fear or
fraud. The will must be signed and witnessed in
accordance with s 9 of the Wills Act 1837.
How are wills Wills can be revoked by a later will or codicil, by See 29.4.4.
revoked? destruction or by a later marriage or the formation
of a later civil partnership.
Failure of legacies A gift in a will fails if the beneficiary predeceases the See 29.5.
testator, witnesses the will or is a spouse or civil
partner of a witness. A gift of a specific item will fail
if the testator no longer owns the item at death. A
gift to a spouse or civil partner fails if the marriage
or civil partnership is dissolved.
What if there is no If there is no valid will or if there is property See 29.6.

valid will? undisposed of by the will, the undisposed of
property passes under the intestacy rules. The
deceased’s personal representatives hold the
property on trust. They pay any debts and
inheritance tax due and then pay what is left to the
closest members of the deceased’s family following
the order set out in s 46 of the Administration of
Estates Act 1925.
What if a family Family members and dependants can apply to the See 29.7.
member or court under the Inheritance (Provision for Family
dependant is and Dependants) Act 1975 for a redistribution of
inadequately assets if they feel that the deceased did not make
provided for? reasonable provision for them. The court is limited
to providing for the reasonable maintenance of the
applicant except in the case of spouses and civil
partners who can claim a reasonable share of the
deceased’s assets.
Who deals with Someone has to deal with the assets of the
the estate of a deceased. The generic name for people doing this
deceased person? job is ‘personal representatives’. There are two
types: executors and administrators. Executors are
people appointed in the will. If there are no
executors able and willing to act then beneficiaries
of the estate will act as administrators. The order of
entitlement for administrators is set out in rules 19
and 20 of the Non-contentious Probate Rules 1987.
Both executors and administrators need proof that
they are entitled to act. They need to apply to the
Probate Registry for a grant of representation.
Executors get a grant of probate; administrators get
a grant of administration. Note that personal
representatives deal only with assets capable of
passing by will. Other assets such as property held
as beneficial joint tenants pass directly to the
person entitled.
Procedure for This varies depending on what type of grant is See 30.5–
applying for a involved, but all personal representatives must 30.11.
grant of swear an oath and pay any inheritance tax due.
representation
What do the Once the grant is obtained, the personal See

personal representatives must pay the debts, finalise the Chapter
representatives inheritance tax position and distribute the assets to 31.
do once they have the people entitled. This is a burdensome task as
obtained the personal representatives are personally liable for
grant of errors in payment. They can get limited protection
representation? under s 27 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925
by advertising for claimants to the estate. For full
protection against later claims, they must apply to
the court.
Index 447
Index
abuse of dominant position administration of estate – continued

action amounting to 298–9 estate accounts
dominant position meaning 298 presentation 444
exceptions 299 purpose 443
extortionate pricing 299 funeral expenses 434
general effect of Article 102 TFEU 297 income tax
geographic market 298 administration period 439
product market 298 beneficiary’s liability 440
provisions of Article 297–9 deceased’s liability 439
sanctions for breach 299 PRs’ liability 439–40
Accession Treaties 247 inheritance tax
accountant’s report 203 adjusting assessment 437–8
ademption 375–6 certificate of clearance 439
administration of estate continuing liability 438–9
acceptance of receipts for/from minors 424 instalment payment 68, 438
administration period 421 lifetime transfers 438–9
appointment of trust corporation 431 loss relief 437–8
assets Inland Revenue account, corrective account 439
appropriation of 423 insolvent estates 435
collection 432–3 insurance 424
freehold or leasehold land 443 legacies
joint tenancy 432 interest 436
life interest 432 payment 435–6
not devolving to PRs 432 pecuniary 435–6
pension schemes 432–3 specific 435
personal property 443 liabilities
residuary beneficiaries 442–3 funeral expenses 434
sale 433 IHT loan 433
sales at loss 441 payment 433
transfer to legatees 441 testamentary expenses 434
trust property 432 payment of legacies see legacies
beneficiaries payment of liabilities
adult 442 funeral expenses 434
minors 442 IHT loan 433
missing 391–2, 422 statutory order 434
residuary 442–3 testamentary expenses 434
capital gains tax pecuniary legacy payment
administration period 439 no provision by will 436
deceased’s liability 439 provision by will 435–6
no disposal on death 440 time for 436
PRs’ liability 440–1 powers
sales at loss 441 additional 423
transfer to legatees 441 appropriation of assets 423
carrying on business 431–2 granted by will 423
charging clauses 431 insurance 424
children modification of statutory powers 423
acceptance of receipts for/from 424, 429 statutory 422–3
see also administration of trust will drafting 423
collection of assets 432–3 repayment of IHT loan 433
completion sale of assets 433
estate accounts 443–4 solvent estates 434
taxes see capital gains tax; income tax; inheritance tax statutory powers 422–3
transfer of assets 442–3 testamentary expenses 434
distribution see also administration of trust
delayed 424 administration of trust 424–32
interim 442 acceptance of receipts for/from minors 429
duties of personal representatives 422 advancement of capital 427–9
administration of trust – continued anti-competitive agreements – continued

appointment of trust corporation 431 effect on trade 292–3
apportionment rules 430 exclusive distribution 295–6
charging clauses 431 exclusive purchase agreement 297
control of trustees by beneficiaries 429 market share 296
holding balance between beneficiaries 430 mergers 297
investment 424–5 non-complete obligations 297
maintenance 425–7 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 294
purchase of land 425 objective or effect 293
sale of personalty 425 prevention, restriction or distortion 293
Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013 430 restrictive covenants 297
trusts of land 429–30 selective distribution 296
administrators 390 severable restrictions 296–7
children 412, 414 vertical restraints 295–7
clearing off 413–14 assembly see freedom of assembly and association
entitlement to act 411–12 association see freedom of assembly and association
need for beneficial interest 414 associations of undertakings
need for two 415 decisions by 292
numbers 415
oath for 411–16 barristers see counsel
renunciation 414 beneficiaries
siblings 412 administration of estate 442
uncles and aunts 413 as administrators with will annexed 410
administrators with will annexed 390 adult 442
beneficiary with vested interest 410 control of trustees 429
clearing off 408–10 holding balance between 430
entitlement to act 407 identification 379
minors 410 income tax liability 440
need for two 411 loan for IHT 399
numbers 410–11 minors 442
oath for 407–11 missing 391–2, 422
order of priority 407–8 obtaining details 391
renunciation 411 residuary 442–3
advertisements solicitors and 179
emails 109 surviving testator 376–7
letterheads 109 unknown 391–2, 422
phone calls 109 as witness to will 378
purpose 108 Benjamin order 422
responsibility for 110 blind person’s allowance 17
social media 109–10 block exemptions
solicitor’s practice 108–10 anti-competitive agreements 294–5
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 108–10 bona vacantia 384
unknown creditors or beneficiaries, for 391–2, 422 bribery 87–8
unsolicited visits and calls 109 business property relief 49, 55
websites 109
agency capital gains tax
agent’s costs 180 administration of estate
competition law 297 administration period 439
financial dealing as agent 187 deceased’s liability 439
other solicitor’s clients 180 no disposal on death 440
agreements of minor importance 294 PRs’ liability 440–1
agricultural property relief 49, 55 sales at loss 441
Amsterdam Treaty 248 transfer of assets to legatees 441
anti-competitive agreements annual exemption 32, 37–8, 42
agency agreements 297 assessment 33
agreements between undertakings 292 assets
agreements of minor importance 294 owned on 31 March 1982 36
Article 101 TFEU 291–7 sales at loss 441
beneficial agreements 294 transfer to legatees 441
block exemption 294–5 wasting 36
breach of Article 293 business assets, replacement 37
clearance applications 293 calculation
concerted practices 292 of gain 32, 34–6
Index 449
capital gains tax – continued civil partnerships – continued

more than one disposal 38–9 see also spouses/civil partners
of tax due 32–3 client
charge to tax 31 best interests of 104, 117, 119
chargeable assets 31 client care 104, 119, 123
disposal see disposals informed decisions 124
chargeable persons 31–2 level of service 124
damages for personal injury relief 37 responsibilities 124
death of taxpayer 34 restrictions on acting 124–5
disposals 32 complaints see complaints against solicitors
between spouses/civil partners 42 conflicts between 151
more than one 38–9 costs information 119, 125–7
part of asset 34, 41 disclosure see disclosure
sale or gift 33–4 duty to when instructing advocate 178
entrepreneurs’ relief 37 former 148
gain, calculation of 32, 34–6 identity
hold-over relief 37 confidentiality 138
incorporation of business 37 money laundering 162–5
indexation allowance 35–6 information to 125
losses 36 best possible 125–6
unabsorbed 39–41 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 127
payment 33 costs 119, 125–7
private dwelling house relief 37 regulation 125
rates of tax 32, 77 taking advantage of client 119
reinvestment in unquoted shares 37 see also retainer
reliefs 32, 36–7 Commission for Equality and Human Rights 341–2
see also individual reliefs Commission (European)
replacement of business assets 37 decision making 255
roll-over relief 37 membership 254–5
sources of law 31 President 255
spouses/civil partners role 255
annual exemptions 42 commission (insurance) 133–4, 193
disposals between 42 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 258
tax planning 42 Committee of the Regions 258
summary 80–1 Compensation Fund
tangible moveable property 36 Solicitors Regulation Authority 101–2
unabsorbed losses 39–41 competition law
wasting assets 36 abuse of dominant position
case law action amounting to 298–9
European 249–50 dominant position meaning 298
caveats 418–19 exceptions 299
children extortionate pricing 299
as administrators 412 general effect of Article 102 TFEU 297
as administrators with will annexed 410 geographic market 298
beneficiaries 442 product market 298
disclosure of confidential information 138–9 provisions of Article 297–9
as executors 405–6 sanctions for breach 299
see also administration of trust anti-competitive agreements
Chinese walls 141 agency agreements 297
citations (probate) 419 agreements between undertakings 292
citizenship (European) 259 agreements of minor importance 294
civil partnerships Article 101 TFEU 291–7
dependants 384 beneficial agreements 294
executors 406 block exemption 294–5
intestacy breach of Article 293
appropriation of family home 382 clearance applications 293
close relatives 382–3 concerted practices 292
definition 380 effect on trade 292–3
distribution of remainder 382–3 exclusive distribution 295–6
entitlement 380, 382 exclusive purchase agreement 297
statutory trusts 380–2 market share 296
revocation of will by 373, 378 mergers 297
termination of partnership 378 non-complete obligations 297
competition law – continued conflict of interests – continued

Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance professional embarrassment 142, 152
294 public office 179
objective or effect 293 reasonable to act 142, 151
restrictive covenants 297 same or related matters 148
selective distribution 296 significant risk of 148–9
severable restrictions 297 SRA Code of Conduct 2011 147–8
vertical restraints 295–7 two or more clients 148–51
concerted practices 292 Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 127
complaints against solicitors 95–6 contentious business
adjudication 97, 99 fees 128, 132, 133
Compensation Fund 101–2 continuing professional development 202–3
complaints about professional services, negligence conveyancing
distinguished 99 conflict of interest 153
court’s powers 101 correspondence
delivery of files 101 client care letter 127
intervention 101 contacting third parties
investigation accountants 100 represented 179–80
jurisdiction of court 101 unrepresented 180
Legal Ombudsman 96–7 letterheads 109
performance of undertakings 158 offensive letters 179
negligence 101 privacy right 318
complaints about professional services distinguished costs
99 Compensation Fund 101–2
insurance 101 complaints against solicitors 101–2
steps to be taken 101 solicitor’s lien 121
performance of undertakings 156, 158 undertakings 157
procedure at solicitor’s practice 132 costs information
professional misconduct 97 best possible 125–6
Solicitors Regulation Authority form 127
powers 98–9 funding arrangements 126
role 98 to client 119, 125–7
see also disciplinary action Council (European)
concerted practices 292 decision making 254
conditional fee agreement 129 membership 253–4
confidentiality President of Council 254
adverse interest 140–1 role 254
client’s identity 138 counsel
client’s will 138 discrimination and 178
conflict of interest and 151 fees 178
disclosure and 139–40 immunity for advocacy work 178
duration of duty 137 instructing 177–8
exceptions 138–9 solicitor’s duty to 177
former clients 148 court
information at risk 140–3 solicitor’s duty to 175–6
material received by mistake 139 Court of Auditors 253, 257
personal representatives 137 Court of Justice (European) 246
privilege and 143 Advocates-General 256
proceeds of crime and 170, 171–2 hearings 256–7
professional conduct 87, 119 judgments 257
wills 138 jurisprudence 249–50
conflict of interests language 257
between solicitor and client 151–2 membership 256
between two existing clients 151 precedent 257
commercial exception 150 reasoning 257
common interest exception 149–50 reference procedure
confidential information 151 lower courts 264–5
conveyancing 153 no remedy in national court 264
exceptions 149–51 purpose 264
former clients 148 role 256
identifying 152 cremation 391
information barriers 141–2 criminal offences
informed consent 142, 150 disclosure of confidential information 139
Index 451
damages-based agreement 129 due diligence – continued

Decisions 250 beneficial owner 163–5
declaration of incompatibility 332–5 enhanced 165
applicant must benefit 333 ongoing monitoring 165
effect 333 simplified 163
necessary requirement 332 standard 163–5
subordinate legislation as ultra vires 333 duty solicitor scheme 92
defamation 319–20 duty to court 175–6
dependants
civil partners 384 Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 258
factors taken into account 385–6 employed solicitors 91–2
legislation 384 Enterprise Investment Scheme
orders available 386 deferral relief on reinvestment 75
ordinary standard 385 tax-efficient investments 73–4, 75
personal representatives and 386, 422 entrepreneurs’ relief 37
persons able to claim 384–5 equality and diversity policy 105
proof required 385 establishment, right of see freedom of establishment
reasonable financial provision 385 estate accounts
succession to property 384–6, 422 presentation 444
surviving spouse standard 385 purpose 443
time limit for claim 384 EU law
direct effect Accession Treaties 247
concept 260 Amsterdam Treaty 248
Directives 260–1 citizenship 259
free movement of goods 288–9 competition see competition law
horizontal 261–2 Court of Justice 264–5
Regulations 260 Decisions 250
TFEU provisions 260 direct effect
Directives 249 concept 260
direct effect 260–1 Directives 260–1
failure to implement 263 free movement of goods 288–9
indirect effect 262–3 horizontal 261–2
disciplinary action Regulations 260
appeals 100 TFEU provisions 260
application to tribunal 100 Directives 249
court’s powers 101 direct effect 260–1
delivery of files 101 failure to implement 263
Legal Ombudsman 158 indirect effect 262–3
performance of undertakings 156, 158 public and non-public bodies 261
powers of tribunal 100 State Body 261
procedure of tribunal 100 European Economic Area Treaty 1992 247
restoration to roll 100 free movement of goods see free movement of goods
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 98, 99–100 free movement of workers see free movement of workers
see also complaints against solicitors freedom of establishment see freedom of establishment
disclosure 119 freedom to provide services see freedom to provide services
civil cases 177 indirect effect
confidentiality duty and 139–40 concept 262–3
defence 177 Directives 262–3
duty 139–40 jurisprudence of European Court 249–50
limitations 139 Merger Treaty 1965 246–7
material information 140 in national courts
prosecution 177 compensation limits 270–1
see also money laundering; proceeds of crime damages 269
discrimination as defence 267–8
equality and diversity policy 105 injunctions 268–9
European Convention prohibition 322–3 interim injunctions 268–9
instructing counsel 178 remedies 268
solicitor’s practice 105 repayment of discriminatory tax 269
disposal of body 391 statutory remedies 270
Dividend Allowance 18, 22–3 time limits 270
dividends ordinary legislative procedure 256
income tax 14, 18, 22–5 qualifications, recognition of 280
due diligence 162 Recommendations 250
EU law – continued European Council – continued

reference procedure 264–5 role 254
Regulations 249 European Court of Human Rights
direct effect 260 admissibility check 327
Single European Act 1986 247 appeals 327
sources 246–50 exhaustion of domestic remedies 326
case law 249–50 friendly settlement 327
Decisions 250 judges 327
primary legislation 246–8 judicial method 307–8
Recommendations 250 legitimate aims 307–8
secondary legislation 249 margin of appreciation 308
see also Directives petitioning court 326
supremacy 262 procedural law 326–7
treaties see individual treaties proportionality 308, 318, 319, 320
Treaty on European Union 1992 247–8 rule of law 307
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 245, European Court of Justice see Court of Justice (European)
250–1, 260 European Economic Area Treaty 1992 247
Treaty of Lisbon 248 European law see EU law
Treaty of Nice 248 European Union
Treaty of Rome 1957 246 citizenship 259
paragraph number conversion table 251 co-decision procedure 255
European Convention on Human Rights 305–6 co-operation procedure 255
case processing flowchart 327 Commission
convention rights 306–7, 330 decision making 255
absolute rights 307 membership 254–5
drafting 307 President 255
identifying and addressing 324–6, 355–6 role 255
interference with 324–5 Committee of Permanent Representatives 258
limited rights 307 Committee of the Regions 258
see also individual rights Council
court see European Court of Human Rights decision making 254
direct effect 337–8 membership 253–4
discrimination prohibition 322–3 President 254
English law and 306 role 254
EU and 306 Court of Auditors 257
peaceful enjoyment of possessions 323–4 Court of Justice
right to fair trial 312–15 Advocates-General 256
criminal trial 312–13 hearings 256–7
determination of civil rights 312–13 judgments 257
minimum requirements 313 jurisprudence 249–50
presumption of innocence 314 language 257
procedural safeguards 314–15 membership 256
right to freedom of assembly and association 320–2 precedent 257
freedom of association 322 reasoning 257
peaceful assembly 321–2 role 256
right to freedom of expression 318–20 Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 258
defamation 319–20 General Court 257
prior restraint 320 institutions see individual institutions
right to liberty and security 308–12 law see EU law
challenge and review 311 Parliament
compensation 311–12 membership 255
judicial supervision 311 role 255–6
lawful detention 310–11 executors 390
reasons to be given 311 capacity to act 405–6
right to respect for private and family life civil partners 406
315–18 entitlement to act 405
correspondence 318 former spouse 406
family life 317 mental incapacity 405
home life 317–18 minors 405–6
justification 318 oath for 405–7
private life 315–17 power reserved 406–7
European Council 253 renunciation 406
membership 254 expression see freedom of expression
Index 453
fair trial, right to financial services – continued

criminal trial 312–13 permitted activities 191–2
determination of civil rights 312–13 personal representatives 189
minimum requirements 313 professional firms exemption 190–2
presumption of innocence 314 financial promotion 195
procedural safeguards 314–15 regulated activities 191–2
family life see private and family life prohibited activities 192
fee sharing 111 regulated activity
fees four tests 186
assessment of bill 131–2 restrictions 186
challenging bill 131–2 specified activities 187–8
commission 133–4, 193 specified investments 186–7
conditional fee agreement 126, 129 regulation 184–5
contentious business 128, 132, 133 safeguarding investments 187
counsel’s 178 Solicitors’ Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules
damages-based agreement 129 192–3
fixed 128 source material 184
hourly rate 128 specified activities 187–8
interest on bill 131 exclusions 188–90
no win no fee agreement 129 status disclosure 192
non-contentious business 128, 132, 133 takeover exclusion 189
overcharging 133 transactions 192
payment on account 130 trustees 189
solicitor’s bill 130–1 types of work 183
right to challenge 131–2 free movement of goods
success 129 advertising restrictions 287–8
variable 128–9 direct effect of Article 288–9
fiduciary relationships 119 exemptions
Financial Conduct Authority 184, 185 intellectual property rights 287, 288
Financial Policy Committee 184 national treasures 287
financial promotion public health 286–7, 288
exemptions 195 public morality 286
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 194–5 public policy 286
introducers 195–6 public security 286
non-real time 195 rule of reason 285, 288
one-off 195 general approach 282
professional firms exemption 195 intellectual property rights 287, 288
real time 195 measures having equivalent effect 284–5
restrictions 186 Dassonville test 287–8
financial services 112 distinctly applicable breach 288
advising 187–8 indistinctly applicable breach 288
arranging 187 national treasures 287
ATP exclusion 188 quantitative restrictions 283
authorised third persons 188 selling arrangements 288
best execution rule 192 trading measures 287–8
commission 133–4, 193 treaty provisions 283–5
consumer credit activity 193 free movement of persons
dealing as agent 187 workers see free movement of workers
execution-only clients 188–9, 193 free movement of workers
Financial Conduct Authority 184, 185 derogations 275
financial promotion families of workers 275
exemptions 195 general approach 282
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 194–5 jobseekers 274–5
introducers 195–6 looking for work 274–5
non-real time 195 nationality 274
one-off 195 rights of residence 274
professional firms exemption 195 social security rights 274
real time 195 terms of employment 274
restrictions 186 treaty provisions 273–5
‘incidental tests’ 191 freedom of assembly and association
managing 187 Convention right 320–2
’necessary’ exclusion 189 freedom of association 322
pecuniary advantages 191 peaceful assembly 321–2
freedom of establishment 277–8 Human Rights Act 1998 – continued

constraints 279–81 nature of opponent irrelevant 331
derogations 281 practice areas 330
families 281 private bodies 338
free movement restriction 282 private litigants 338
general approach 282 procedure 338–41
implications 278 public authorities 335–7
limitations on undertakings 278 defences 336
local conditions 282 meaning 335–6
potential recipients of services 281 outside UK 337
right 278 remedies 339
service provision distinguished 281 text 343–54
Services Directive 279 ‘wait and see’ approach 334–5
freedom of expression
Convention right 318–20 income tax
defamation 319–20 administration of estate
prior restraint 320 administration period 439
freedom to provide services 277 beneficiary’s liability 440
constraints 279–81 deceased’s liability 439
derogations 281 PRs’ liability 439–40
establishment distinguished 281 rates 439
families 281 allowable reliefs 14–15
free movement restriction 282 anti-avoidance legislation 11
general approach 282 blind person’s allowance 17
local conditions 282 calculation of tax due 11–12
potential recipients 281 specimen calculation 26–7
professional conduct 280 collection
qualifications 280 deduction at source 27
right 278–9 HM Revenue & Customs 27
Services Directive 279 self-assessment 27–30
funding deduction at source 27
conditional fee arrangements 126, 129 Dividend Allowance 18, 22–3
costs information 126 dividends 14, 22–5
public 126 employment income 14
third party costs 126 Enterprise Investment Scheme 73–4
funeral expenses exempt income 13
payment 434 grossing up 13
importance 9
General Court 246, 253, 257 income
allowable reliefs 14–15
HM Revenue & Customs 27 exempt 13
see also Inland Revenue account meaning 10
honesty net 15
professional conduct 87 tax free 74–5
human rights taxable 12–13
business and 326, 361–3 total 12–14
English law see Human Rights Act 1998 interest 14
European Convention see European Convention on loans
Human Rights interest payments on 15
European court see European Court of Human Rights qualifying 15
Human Rights Act 1998 306 marriage allowance 17
applicability 326, 357 net income 15
Convention rights 330 nil-rate bands 18
damages 339–41 order of taxation 19
domestic comparators 341 personal allowances 15–16
modest awards 341 Personal Savings Allowance 17–18
principles 339–40 persons liable to pay 10
declarations of incompatibility 332–5, 359–60 qualifying loans 15
five central planks 329 rates of tax 77
interpretative obligation 330–2 dividend income 22–3
limitation period 339 non-savings, non-dividend income 20
locus standi test 338 savings income 20
ministerial statements 331–2 salaries 14
Index 455
income tax – continued inheritance tax – continued

savings income 20–2, 24–5 excepted estates 396, 399–403
Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 74 excluded property 47
self-assessment exemptions 44
dates for payment 28 annual 56
penalties for default 29 charities 49, 55
tax return 28 lifetime only 56
sources of law marriage gifts 56
anti-avoidance legislation 11 normal expenditure 56
case law 9–10 potentially exempt transfers 57
extra-statutory concessions 10 small gifts 56
official statements 10 spouses/civil partners 48–9, 55
Statements of Practice 10 Form IHT 400 403
statute 9 funding IHT
summary 79–80 assets realisable without grant 399
tax year 10–11 bank or building society assets 398
taxable income 12–13 borrowing from bank 399, 433
types 18–19 on credit 399
total income 12–14 direct payment 398
calculating 13–14 government stock 399
Venture Capital Trusts 74, 75 heritage property in lieu 399
incorporation of business life assurance 398
CGT relief 37 loan from beneficiaries 399
indemnity insurance national savings 399
amount of cover 204 repayment of loan 433
negligence claims 101 gifts
requirement for 203–4 in consideration of marriage 56
SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 203 into discretionary trust 44
independence 104 to company 44
indirect effect within seven years of death see potentially exempt
concept 262–3 transfers
Directives 262–3 grossing up 67–8
Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) 74–5 Inland Revenue account
information barriers corrective account 439
conflict of interest 141–2 excepted estate 396
inheritance tax IHT payable 397
administration of estate payment 397
adjusting assessment 437–8 purpose 396–7
certificate of clearance 439 instalment payment 68, 438
continuing liability 438–9 interest 68–9
instalment payment 68, 438 sale of property 69
lifetime transfers 438–9 liability on death
loss relief 437–8 example 51–2, 53–4
agricultural property relief 49, 55 liability meaning 64–5
annual exemption 56 lifetime chargeable transfers 67–8
anti-avoidance legislation 44 non-settled estate 65–6
assessment adjustment 437–8 payment of tax 68
burden 64–5, 68 personal representatives 65–6
business property relief 49, 55 potentially exempt transfers 66–7
calculation 49–54, 396–7 settled property 66
charging provisions 44–5 trustees 66
charities exemption 49, 55 lifetime chargeable transfers 57–9
clearance certificate 439 calculation 57–9
cumulation 45, 50 cumulation 57–9
death of transferor death of transferor 62–4
lifetime chargeable transfers 62–4 payment 67–8, 69, 438–9
potentially exempt transfers 59–61 loss relief 437–8
transfers on 43, 45–54 marriage gifts 56
see also liability on death nil-rate band 49–50
estate payment 397
non-settled 65–6 instalment option 68, 438
settled property 66 lifetime chargeable transfers 67–8, 69
estate rate 65 potentially exempt transfers 69
inheritance tax – continued Inland Revenue account – continued

time for 68–70 procedure 403
transferor 67–8 exempt estate 400–1
trustee 67 Form IHT 400 403
payment of loan to pay 433 non-domiciled estate 402
personal representatives payment of IHT 396–7
additional liability 66 purpose 396–7
lifetime gifts 65–6 requirement for 399–403
non-settled estate 65–6 small estate 400
potentially exempt transfers 43, 54–7 innocence, presumption of 314
calculation of tax 59–61 insolvent estates 435
death of transferor 59–61 instructing counsel 177–8
exemptions 55–7 instructions
liability 66–7 acceptance 115–16
payment 69 advertising 108–10
reliefs 55–7 declining instructions 116–18
tapering relief 61 duress and undue influence 116–17
transfer of value 54 general principle 107
value transferred 54–5 identity of client 116
property subject to reservation 46–7 obtaining 107–13
rates of tax 44–5, 78 refusing instructions 177
estate rate 65 acceptable reasons 116–18
related property rules 55 restrictions 116
reliefs 44 retainer see retainer
agricultural property 49, 55 third parties 116
business property 49, 55 see also introductions and referrals
potentially exempt transfers 55–7, 61 insurance
tapering relief 61 commission 133–4, 193
residence nil rate band 52–3 mediation 193–4
reversionary interest 47 negligence claims 101
small gifts exemption 56 personal representatives’ power 424
spouse/civil partner exemption 48–9, 55 see also indemnity insurance
summary 81–3 insurance policy
tapering relief 61 succession to 368–9, 394
transfer of value integrity 104
on death 45–54 interception of communications
estate 45 human rights and 318
excluded property 47 interest
identification of 45–7, 54 income tax 14
outside estate 47 instalment payment of IHT 68–9
potentially exempt transfers 54 intestacy
property subject to reservation 46–7 bona vacantia 384
trust property 45–6 children
value transferred 45, 47–8 adopted and illegitimate 383–4
transferor, death of 59–64 and spouse see spouse and issue
lifetime chargeable transfers 62–4 civil partners 380–2
potentially exempt transfers 59–61 appropriation of family home 382
transfers on 43, 45–54 close relatives 382–3
see also liability on death distribution of remainder 382–3
transferor payment 67–8 entitlement 382
trustees entitlements 380
payment of tax 67 statutory trusts 380–2
settled property 66 distribution of remainder 382–3
value transferred 45 family home 382
debts 48 Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 384
expenses 48 matrimonial home 382
potentially exempt transfers 54–5 no surviving spouse/civil partner 382
quoted shares 48 distribution of remainder 382–3
valuation principle 47 statutory trusts 383
Inland Revenue account payment of debts 380
calculation of IHT payable 396–7 spouse but no issue 382
corrective account 439 entitlement of spouse 382
excepted estates 396, 399–403 spouse and close relatives 382–3
Index 457
intestacy – continued letters

spouse and issue client care letter 127
appropriation of matrimonial home 382 letterheads 109
definition 380 offensive 179
entitlements 380 privacy right 318
statutory trusts 380–2 liberty and security, right to 308–12
statutory trusts 380–2, 383 challenge and review 311
succession of property by 368, 379–84 compensation 311–12
see also probate judicial supervision 311
introductions and referrals lawful detention 310–11
fees 111 reasons to be given 311
financial services 112 licensed bodies 91
interests of client 110 authorisation 91
limitations 111 eligibility criteria 91
payment for introducer 112 liens, solicitor’s 121
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 110–11 limited liability partnerships 90
third parties 112 limited retainer 153
investigation accountants 100 loans
income tax, qualifying 15
joint property to pay inheritance tax 399, 433
succession to 368, 393, 397–8
jurisdiction of court Maastricht Treaty 247–8
undertakings 158 margin of appreciation
justice human rights 308
rule of law 104 markets
geographic 298
law centres 92 product 298
Law Society 88 marriage
administration 89 divorce and succession 378
complaints see complaints against solicitors IHT exempt gifts 56
Council 89 revocation of will by 373, 378
governance 89 marriage allowance 17
local societies 89 Merger Treaty 1965 246–7
membership 88 mergers
powers 89 competition law 297
regulation 88 minors see children
representation 88 missing beneficiaries 391–2, 422
services provided 88 money laundering
Solicitors Regulation Authority client identification 162–5
adjudication 99 due diligence 162–5
misconduct powers 98–9 identity of client 116
powers 98–9 Money Laundering Regulations 2007 161–6
regulation of profession 93–5 nominated officers 162
role 98 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 text 217–30
written rebuke 98 record keeping 166
see also practising certificates reporting procedures 162
legacies training 166
interest 436 see also proceeds of crime
payment 435–6
pecuniary 435–6 national courts, EU law in
specific 435 compensation limits 270–1
legal advice centres 92 damages for breach 269
Legal Aid Agency 126 EU law as defence 267–8
Legal Ombudsman 93, 96–7 injunctions 268–9
adjudication 99 interim injunctions 268–9
determination 97 remedies 268
performance of undertakings 158 repayment of discriminatory tax 269
role 96 statutory remedies 270
time limits 96–7 supremacy 262
legal privilege time limits 270
confidentiality and 142–3 National Crime Agency
Legal Services Board 88 money laundering 162
legitimate aims 307–8 proceeds of crime 167, 170, 171
negligence practising certificates – continued

complaints against solicitors 101 appeal against refusal 202
no win no fee agreement 129 conditions 202
nominated property 368 continuing professional development 202–3
non-contentious business issue 201–2
fees 128, 132, 133 persons needing 201
non-SRA firms 91 refusal to issue 202
Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 294 requirement to hold 201
suspension 202
obtaining instructions see instructions President of Council 254
offensive letters 179 presumption of innocence 314
Office for Legal Complaints 96 private and family life 315–18
overcharging 133 correspondence 318
family life 317
Parliament (European) home life 317–18
co-decision procedure 255 justification 318
co-operation procedure 255 private life 315–17
consultative role 255 privilege
Executive 255 confidentiality and 142–3
membership 255 proceeds of crime and 170
ordinary legislative procedure 256 probate
role 255–6 administration of estate see administration of
partnerships estate
income tax 15 administrators 390
limited liability 90 children 412, 414
loan to 15 clearing off 413–14
loan to buy into 15 entitlement to act 411–12
responsibilities 204 need for beneficial interest 414
solicitors in 90 need for two 415
supervision of office 124 numbers 415
see also recognised bodies oath for 411–16
peaceful enjoyment of possessions renunciation 414
Convention protocol 323–4 siblings 412
pension benefits uncles and aunts 413
estate assets 432–3 administrators with will annexed 390
succession to property 369, 394 beneficiary with vested interest 410
personal allowances clearing off 408–10
income tax 15–16 entitlement to act 407
personal injury minors 410
CGT relief on damages 37 need for two 411
personal representatives numbers 410–11
acceptance of receipts for/from minors 424, 429 oath for 407–11
administration of estate see administration of estate order of priority 407–8
administration of trust see administration of trust renunciation 411
appropriation of assets 423 application for grant 394–6
authority before grant 390 additional requirements 395–6
claims by dependants see dependants admissibility of will 395
confidentiality 138 affidavit of due execution 395
distribution of estate 392, 424 affidavit of plight and condition 395–6
financial services 189 affidavit as to knowledge and approval 395
insurance powers 424 lost will 396
missing beneficiaries 391–2, 422 oaths see oaths
numbers 390 assets
see also administrators; executors; probate obtaining details 391
Personal Savings Allowance 17–18 valuations 397
possessions assets not part of deceased’s estate
deprivation 324 insurance policy 394
interference with 324 pension benefits 369, 394
meaning 323 assets passing without grant 393
peaceful enjoyment 323–4 cash 393
practising certificates chattels 393
accountant’s report 203 funding IHT 399
annual enrolment 201 small estates 393
Index 459
probate – continued probate – continued

beneficiaries payment 397
as administrators with will annexed 410 Inland Revenue account
loan from to fund IHT 399 corrective account 439
missing 391–2, 422 excepted estates 396, 399–403
obtaining details 391 Form IHT 400 403
unknown 391–2, 422 IHT payable 396–7
caveats 418–19 payment of IHT 397
chain of representation 416–18 purpose 396–7
broken 418 requirement for 399–403
unbroken 417 insurance policies 394
children joint property 393, 397–8
as administrators 412, 414 land registers search 392
as administrators with will annexed 410 liabilities
as executors 405–6 obtaining details 391
citations 419 unknown creditors 391–2
alternative to 419 limited grant 416
to accept or refuse grant 419 new Rules 390, 395, 404, 419
to take probate 419 non-domiciled estates 402
creditors, unknown 391–2 notifications 419
cremation 391 oaths
deceased’s will 390 for administrators 411–16
see also wills for administrators with will annexed 407–11
disposal of body 391 affirming 404
donation of body 391 for executors 405–7
excepted estates 396, 399–403 swearing 404
exempt estates 400–1 types and purpose 404
non-domiciled estates 402 value of estate passing under grant 404–5
procedure 403 objections 419
small estates 400 pension benefits 369, 394
executors 390 personal representatives 390
capacity to act 405–6 assets not going through PRs hands 393
civil partner 406 authority before grant 390
entitlement to act 405 chain of representation 416–18
former spouse 406 grant of representation 393
mental incapacity 405 number 390
minors 405–6 receiving instructions, actions on 390–2
oath for 405–7 reform of law 390, 395, 404, 419
power reserved 406–7 small estates 400
renunciation 406 unknown creditors or beneficiaries 422
exempt estates 400–1 advertisement 391–2
fees 394–5 distribution after notice 392
funding IHT land registers search 392
assets realisable without grant 399 time for claims 392
bank or building society assets 398 valuations
borrowing from bank 399, 433 general principles 397
on credit 399 jointly owned assets 397–8
direct payment 398 proceeds of crime
government stock 399 acquisition, use or possession 169, 218–19
heritage property in lieu 399 adequate consideration defence 169
life assurance 398 arrangements 166–8
loans from beneficiaries 399 authorised disclosure 167–8, 170, 228
national savings 399 confidentiality and 170, 171–2
grant 393, 416 defences 171
administration 416 definitions 166–7
administration with will annexed 416 failure to disclose 169–70, 219–23
application for 394–6 litigation proceedings 168
de bonis non administratis 418 National Crime Agency 167, 170, 171
limited 416 non-disclosure, reasonable excuse 168, 170
see also assets passing without grant objective test 169
inheritance tax overseas defence 168, 170
calculation 396–7 penalties 168, 170, 171, 225
funding see funding IHT privilege and 170
proceeds of crime – continued recognised bodies – continued

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 217–30 supervision of office 204–5
reasonable excuse for non-disclosure 168, 170 see also partnerships; solicitor’s practice
regulated sector 169, 171 Recommendations 250
tipping off 171, 223 recovery of charges
training 166, 170 interest on bill 131
see also money laundering references 179
profession referrals see introductions and referrals
conduct see professional conduct Regulations
distinguishing characteristics 87 direct effect 260
meaning 87 EU law 249
regulation of 93–5 related property rules 55
reputation of 105 retainer
professional conduct authority to bind client 120
breach of rules 88 client care 119
bribery 87–8 client’s authority 120
compliance 204 confidentiality 119
confidentiality see confidentiality conflicts arising during 153
conflicts see conflict of interests costs information 119, 125–7
continuing professional development 202–3 duty to client during 118–19
discipline see disciplinary action fiduciary relationships 119
disclosure duty 177 identity of client 116
duty to court 175–6 keeping client informed 124, 125–7
financial services see financial services liens 121
misconduct, reporting 206 limited 153
negligence 101 taking instructions 115
personal qualities 87 termination 120–1
pervasive nature 95 by client 120
reporting serious misconduct 206 by operation of law 120
reputation of profession 105 by solicitor 120
responsibility 124 good reason 120
Solicitors Regulation Authority 93–5 notice 120
principles 94, 103–6 responsibilities 121
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 94–5 terms 115
striking off 88 see also client
supervision over staff 124, 204–5 revenue law
wills 371 capital gains tax see capital gains tax
witnesses 176 income tax see income tax
see also solicitor’s practice inheritance tax see inheritance tax
professional embarrassment 142, 152 tax-efficient investments see tax-efficient investments
property VAT see value added tax
joint property 368, 393, 397–8 right to fair trial see fair trial, right to
nominated 368 right to freedom of assembly and association see freedom of
pension benefits 369, 394 assembly and association
succession to see succession to property right to freedom of expression see freedom of expression
property selling see conveyancing right to liberty and security see liberty and security, right to
proportionality 308, 318, 319, 320 right to respect for private and family life see private and
Prudential Regulatory Authority 184, 185 family life
public funding 126 rights of audience 203
duty solicitor scheme 92
public office Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme
conflict of interest 179 tax-efficient investments 74, 75
solicitor holding 179 separate businesses 205
publicity see advertisements service provision
rights of potential recipients 281
qualifications, recognition 280 see also freedom to provide services
Single European Act 1986 247
recognised bodies 89–90 social media 109–10
authorisation 89–90 sole practitioner 89
eligibility criteria 90 solicitors
form 90 criminal advocacy 203
requirements 90 higher rights of audience 203
services 90 holding public office 179
Index 461
solicitors – continued solicitor’s practice – continued

Law Society 88–9 fiduciary relationships 119
local law societies 89 financial services see financial services
personal qualities 87, 104 gifts of significant value 117–18
practice see solicitor’s practice incorporated practices 90
professional status 87 indemnity insurance 101
‘roll’ 201 amount of cover 204
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 94–5 negligence claims 101
supervision over staff 124, 204–5 requirement for 203–4
see also profession; professional conduct SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2013 203
solicitor’s bill 130–1 introductions see introductions and referrals
assessment by court 131–2 law centres 92
challenging 131–2 legal advice centres 92
confidentiality 138 lien over costs 121
enforcement 131 negligence 101
interest on 131 non-SRA firms 91
interim 130–1 obtaining instructions see instructions
right to challenge 131–2 offensive letters 179
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 99 other solicitors 180
appeals 100 overcharging 133
application to 100 partnership see partnerships
performance of undertakings 156, 158 practising certificates
powers of tribunal 100 accountant’s report 203
procedure 100 annual enrolment 201
reference to 98 appeal against refusal 202
restoration to roll 100 conditions 202
Solicitors’ Financial Services (Conduct of Business) Rules continuing professional development 202–3
192–3 issue 201–2
solicitor’s practice persons needing 201
accountant’s report 203 refusal to issue 202
advertising 108–10 requirement to hold 201
agents see agency suspension 202
alternative business structures 91, 93–4 protection of client assets 106
best interest of client 104, 117, 119 public trust 105
charges see costs; fees reasonable care and skill 118–19
client care 104, 119, 123 referrals see introductions and referrals
information provision 125–7 regulatory compliance 105
client care letter 127 reputation of profession 105
commission 133–4, 193 responsibilities 124
complaints see complaints against solicitors retainer see retainer
compliance with Code 118 separate businesses 205
confidentiality see confidentiality sole practitioner 89
conflicts see conflict of interests SRA Suitability Test 2011 199–201
Consumer Contracts Regulations 2013 127 standard of service 104
costs see costs; fees supervision of office 124, 204–5
costs information 119, 125–7 termination of retainer see termination of retainer
criminal activity 118 third parties see third parties, solicitors and
discipline see disciplinary action undertakings see undertakings
discrimination 105 undue influence 116–17, 371
duty solicitor scheme 92 vulnerable clients 116–17
duty to client 178 see also professional conduct; recognised bodies
duty to cooperate with SRA 206 Solicitors Regulation Authority 88
duty to counsel 177 adjudication 99
duty to court 175–6 Compensation Fund 101–2
civil cases 177 delivery of files to 101
defence 177 duty to cooperate with 206
prosecutor 177 intervention 101
duty to third parties 178–80 investigating claims for redress 206
effective business management 105 investigation of accounts 100
employed solicitors 91–2 misconduct powers 98–9
equality and diversity policy 105 performance of undertakings 156, 158
fee sharing 111 powers 98–9
fees see costs; fees principles 94, 103–6
Solicitors Regulation Authority – continued tax-efficient investments

regulation of profession 93–5 capital gains relief 75
reporting serious misconduct 206 Enterprise Investment Scheme 73–4, 75
role 98 income tax relief 73–4
SRA Accounts Rules 2011 95 Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) 74–5
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 94–5, 209–15 Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 74, 75
SRA Handbook 94–5, 103 tax-free income 74–5
SRA Overseas Rules 2013 95 Venture Capital Trusts 74, 75
SRA Practising Regulations 2011 202 termination of retainer 120–1
SRA Suitability Test 2011 199–201 by client 120
written rebuke 98 by operation of law 120
spouses/civil partners by solicitor 120
capital gains tax good reason 120
annual exemptions 42 notice 120
disposals between 42 third parties, solicitors and
tax planning 42 agents see agency
inheritance tax 48–9, 55 beneficiaries 179
see also intestacy clients of other solicitors 180
SRA Accounts Rules 2011 95 costs 179
SRA Code of Conduct 2011 94–5 duty to counsel 177
text 209–15 duty to court 176
SRA Handbook 94–5, 103 instructions 116
SRA Overseas Rules 2013 95 offensive letters 179
SRA Practising Regulations 2011 202 other solicitors 180
SRA Suitability Test 2011 199–201 references 179
applicability 199 unfair advantage 178
assessment offences 200 unrepresented parties 180
behaviour not compatible 200 tipping off
criminal offences 200 proceeds of crime and 171, 223
disclosure 200 training
financial behaviour 200 money laundering 166
outcomes 199–200 post-admission 202–3
regulatory history 201 proceeds of crime 166, 170
requirements 200 treaties
striking off 88 Accession Treaties 247
success fee 129 Amsterdam Treaty 248
succession to property European Economic Area Treaty 1992 247
administration of estate see administration of estate Maastricht Treaty 247–8
dependants Merger Treaty 1965 246–7
civil partners 384 Single European Act 1986 247
factors taken into account 385–6 Treaty on European Union 1992 247–8
legislation 384 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 245,
orders available 386 250–1, 260
ordinary standard 385 Treaty of Lisbon 248
personal representatives and 386, 422 Treaty of Nice 248
persons able to claim 384–5 Treaty of Rome 1957 246
proof required 385 paragraph number conversion table 251
reasonable financial provision 385 Treaty on European Union 1992 247–8
surviving spouse standard 385 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 245,
time limit for claim 384 250–1, 260
insurance policies 368–9, 394 direct effect and 260
intestacy see intestacy see also Treaty of Rome 1957
joint property 368, 393, 397–8 Treaty of Lisbon 248
nominated property 368 Treaty of Nice 248
pension benefits 369, 394 Treaty of Rome 1957 246
probate see probate paragraph number conversion table 251
wills see wills trial, fair see fair trial, right to
supervision of office 124, 204–5 trustees
qualified to supervise 204–5 control by beneficiaries 429
responsibilities 205 financial services 189
supremacy of EU law 262 see also administration of trust
survivorship doctrine 368 Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013 430
Index 463
undertakings wills – continued

acts outside control 157 admissibility for probate 395
ambiguity 157 affidavit of due execution 395
breach 156 affidavit of plight and condition 395–6
change of circumstances 158 affidavit as to knowledge and approval 395
client’s authority 157–8 alterations 374
costs 157 attestation clause 372
definition 155 beneficiary
enforcement 158 missing or unknown 391–2, 422
jurisdiction of court 158 surviving testator 376–7
liability of others 158 as witness 378
necessity for 156 blind testator 370
‘on behalf’ of client 157 capacity to make 369
oral 156 presumptions 370
personal liability 156, 157 proof 370
‘reasonable endeavours’ 157 children, gifts to 377
standard forms 159 confidentiality requirement 138
terms 156–7 destruction 396
timescale 157 disclaimer 378
wording 157 effect of will 375–9
written 156 Estate of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of
undertakings (firms) Succession) Act 2011 378
agreements between 292 execution 371–2, 395
clearance applications 293 failure of gift
decisions by associations of 292 ademption 375–6
undue influence 116–17, 371 divorce 378
unrepresented parties 180 forfeiture 378
lapse 377
value added tax termination of civil partnership 378
breach of regulations 6 forfeiture 378
business 5 formalities for execution 371–2
charge to tax 3–4 affidavit of due execution 395
in course of business 5 affidavit of plight and condition 395–6
default surcharge 7 affidavit as to knowledge and approval 395
definition 4 illiterate testator 370
exempt supplies 5–6 intention
failure to register 6 presumptions 370–1
fraudulent evasion of tax 6 proof 370–1
input tax 3, 5 suspicious circumstances 370–1
output tax 3, 5 lapse of gifts, to more than one person 377
payment 5–6 lost 396
penalties 6–7 mistake 371
rates of tax 5, 77 order of deaths 377
registration probate and see probate
failure to register 6 professional conduct issues 371
voluntary 6 property passing under 375–6
sources of law 3 revocation 372–4
supply of goods 4 civil partnership 373
supply of services 4 destruction 373–4
tax invoices 6 later will or codicil 372–3
taxable person 4–5 marriage 373, 378
taxable supply 4, 6 survivorship clauses 377
time of supply 5 suspicious circumstances 370–1
value of supply 5 testamentary expenses 434
voluntary registration 6 undue influence 371
zero-rated supplies 5–6 validity 369–74
Venture Capital Trusts 74, 75 witnesses 372
vulnerable adults beneficiary as 378
disclosure of confidential information 138–9 witnesses
solicitors and 176
websites 109 wills 372, 378
wills 367 workers, free movement see free movement of workers
ademption 375–6 written rebukes 98

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i

© The University of Law 2017

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

ISBN: 978 1 911269 82 3

Typeset by Style Photosetting Ltd, Mayfield, East Sussex

TABLE OF PRIMARY LEGISLATION xxiii

TABLE OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION xxix

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxiii

Part I REVENUE LAW 1

Chapter 2 INCOME TAX 9

Chapter 3 CAPITAL GAINS TAX 31

Chapter 4 INHERITANCE TAX 43

Chapter 5 TAX-EFFICIENT INVESTMENTS 73

5.4 Investment to escape a CGT liability 75

Part I Summaries – Revenue Law 79

Part II PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 85

Chapter 7 REGULATING THE PROFESSION 93

Chapter 8 THE PRINCIPLES 103

Chapter 9 OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS 107

Chapter 10 THE RETAINER 115

Chapter 11 CLIENT CARE AND COSTS 123

Chapter 12 CONFIDENTIALITY 137

Chapter 13 CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 147

Chapter 14 UNDERTAKINGS 155

Chapter 16 DUTIES OWED TO THE COURT AND THIRD PARTIES 175

Chapter 17 FINANCIAL SERVICES 183

Chapter 18 REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICE 199

Appendix to Part II 209

PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 217

Part II Summaries – Professional Conduct 231

Part III EU LAW 243

19.4 Regulations 249

Chapter 20 THE INSTITUTIONS 253

Chapter 21 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 259

Chapter 22 SEEKING A REMEDY IN NATIONAL COURTS 267

Chapter 23 FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 273

Chapter 24 FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND PROVISION OF SERVICES 277

Chapter 25 FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 283

Chapter 26 COMPETITION LAW 291

Part IV HUMAN RIGHTS 303

Chapter 28 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 329

Appendix to Part IV 343

Part V PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 365

Chapter 30 PROBATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 389

30.11 Oath for administrators 411

Chapter 31 ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE 421

Part V Summary – Probate and Administration 445

CILFIT Srl v Ministro della Sanitro [1982] ECR 3415 264

Guardian Newspapers v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 153 320

Marper v UK [2007] ECHR 110 316

Wadman v Carpenter Farrer Partnership [1993] 3 CMLR 93 250

Table of Primary Legislation

EC Treaty 247, 248 International

Table of Secondary Legislation

ABS alternative business structure

LPA 1925 Law of Property Act 1925