126188-1996-Padilla v. Court of Appeals
126188-1996-Padilla v. Court of Appeals
126188-1996-Padilla v. Court of Appeals
Raval & Lokin; Robert A. Padilla and Philip Jurado; R.A.V. Saguisag and Gina C. Garcia for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; WHEN MAY BE AVAILED OF. — Bail is a
matter of right or discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
b y reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be
denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not
strong bail becomes a matter of right.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 2-92 BE APPLIED. —
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, applies in this case. The circular unequivocably provides
that when an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
con nement pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's application must, perforce, fail
as he is no longer entitled to bail.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO , J : p
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying
the aforequoted rule, we nd appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a
summary hearing for his bail of application for the sole purpose of determining whether or
not evidence is strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court
and the appeal before respondent court are more than suf cient in accomplishing the
purpose for which a summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear. Thus:
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"SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution."
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular
unequivocably provides that when an accused is charged with a capital or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
be placed in con nement pending resolution of his appeal . Appellant's application
must, perforce, fail as he is no longer entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for
his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has been said that while justice is the rst virtue of the
court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the badly
needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is
inadequately equipped, as certi ed to by its Chief Of cer, deserves attention. We recall
that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v. People's court , 1 0 a precedent on which
appellant now anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his continued
detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however, has changed with the
development of times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's factual
milieu. While appellant now shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to
his medical needs. And by granting appellant's request, the Court is merely performing its
supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper
accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is
AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's
request for an X-ray and MRI examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which should
be conducted at the rst opportune time to be arranged by the Director of the New Bilibid
prison with the responsible of cers of the hospital, provided that appellant shall be at all
times subject to the security conditions imposed by the prison's director. The
responsibility for the enforcement of the subject request, as well as the security of the
appellant, devolves upon the Director of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of the
medical examinations, appellant shall be recommitted to prison without delay. As much as
possible, any unnecessary publicity should be avoided.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C . J ., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal con nement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of ight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
6. Rule 114, Section 7.
9. Id., at p. 295.
10. 77 Phil. 461.