8 Crime as pollution: proposal

for market-based incentives to

reduce crime externalities
Graham Farrell and John Roman

Introduction1
Noise pollution and industrial pollution are well-known phenomena. The
more technical term for such pollution is ‘externalities’. In both instances,
the producer of the pollution creates a social cost that is borne by
others. Unwilling recipients, such as residents on a noisy airport flight-
path or downstream recipients of water pollution, bear the cost. For some
types of pollution, such as greenhouse gases dispersed in the atmosphere,
society as a whole bears the cost of the emissions.
That crime can also be examined as a form of pollution is the subject of
this chapter. It is proposed that various agents, whether manufacturers
of frequently stolen products, or owners and managers of premises that
are crime prone because of poor design or policies, can produce costly
criminal opportunities for which other parts of society bear the cost. In
furthering the study of ‘crime as pollution’ (Roman and Farrell 2002), this
chapter discusses the nature and definition of externalities, and seeks a
preliminary mapping of how the notion of pollution applies to different
types of crime. Crime reduction that utilized rewards and market-based
incentives as proposed herein would be adopting a radically different
philosophy to ‘traditional’ punitive approaches to crime control and crim-
inal justice. The chapter also undertakes a preliminary examination of
control instruments that have been developed in environmental economics.
A range of instruments have been proposed for climate control, and these
are examined for possible lessons for crime reduction.
With regard to the implementation of crime-reduction efforts based
around an understanding of crime as pollution, the possibility of an
Enhanced Crime Doctrine is considered. It is adapted from the existing
Enhanced Injury Doctrine applied to the motor vehicle industry whereby,
since it is highly predictable that many traffic crashes will occur, vehicle
manufacturers are accountable for safety standards to reduce any addi-
tional (enhanced) injury. Since aggregate levels of crime can be predicted
with reasonable accuracy for many crime types, it is argued that it should
legally behove crime polluters to recognize this and adopt anti-crime
136 Graham Farrell and John Roman

measures. Since many of the teething problems associated with such an

approach have been overcome in relation to motor vehicle injuries, this
approach may pave the way for rapid progress for the prevention of crime
pollution.
A couple of simple examples of crime pollution will set the scene. First,
mobile phone manufacturers make millions in profits. Yet, theft and
robbery of mobile phones produces the equivalent of many millions in lost
property, pain and suffering to victims, investigation and criminal justice
costs. However, mobile phone companies and telecoms networks typically
do not cover any of the costs of crime resulting from their products. If they
more fully incorporated the anticipation of crime, manufacturers would
incur only small increased costs, while society would experience a reduced
crime rate and a significant net benefit. Second, alcohol manufacturers and
licensees make millions from sales of alcohol at bars and clubs. Bars and
clubs are the sites of frequent alcohol-related crime and disorder. Assaults
and disorder produce massive costs to society in terms of damage to victims
(physical and emotional, with significant health system costs) as well as
costs of vandalism and property damage, and the costs to taxpayers of
policing and criminal justice. Yet, alcohol producers and distributors incur
few of the costs that are the result of sales of their products. At relatively
little cost to licensees, changes to the design and management policies of
bars and clubs could be introduced to reduce such crimes significantly. The
costs of the crime reduction effort would be massively outweighed by
the overall benefit to society.
The next section explores more traditional forms of pollution and their
control. This is followed by a closer examination of crime as pollution and
potential crime reduction approaches.

Controlling traditional forms of pollution

A variety of instruments have developed to control pollutants. To control
noise pollution, there are restrictions on decibel levels, on time and place (no
loud noise after 11 p.m. in residential areas), and requirements for sound-
proofing. To reduce air and water pollutants, regulations on the time, place
and level of emissions have been similarly adopted. Taxation of industry to
pay for pollution is known as a Pigouvian Tax after economist Arthur
Pigou (1877–1959) who is credited with the proposal. Breaches of regula-
tions can result in punitive fines. Technological innovations such as catalytic
converters are sometimes mandated or otherwise encouraged. In addition,
in some arenas, incentives such as tax-breaks for good behaviour are
becoming increasingly common.
The scope of regulation or other response depends upon the particular
externality. Local ordinances may be appropriate for local problems, and
national laws or regulations for others. In contrast, greenhouse gases are
frequently argued to require an international response because the external
 Crime as pollution 137

cost is shared around the world, as the gases diffuse in the Earth’s atmo-
sphere. In an effort to address this, the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is currently a contro-
versial effort to introduce international regulation (see, for example,
Barrett and Stavins 2002). Since February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol has
legally obliged industrialized nations to reduce worldwide emissions of
greenhouse gases to 5 per cent below their 1990 levels by 2012.

Less traditional types of pollution

Yet, noise and industrial pollution are just the well-known tip of the exter-
nality iceberg. In other walks of life, some of society’s more hidden
externalities have begun to be recognized. A building designed such that
people cannot escape in the event of fire, or a comfy chair that is not made
from fire-retardant material, is now acknowledged to produce a negative
externality; that is, a risk to life and limb. As a result, there are fire regula-
tions, minimum safety standards for buildings, product safety checks and
Safety Commissions. In general, many types of consumer product meet more
stringent standards than in the past, thus reducing overt risk of injury to
consumers. Consumer pressure groups have become increasingly widespread,
thus increasing market pressure on polluters and inducing political pres-
sure to develop protective legislation. Overall, recent years have seen a shift
away from caveat emptor towards product liability and consumer safety.

The role of litigation

Where political pressure and lobbying are insufficient, or where pollution
is flagrant yet unrecognized, lawsuits have played an important role in
promoting consumer protection legislation. The Ford Pinto car is an infa-
mous example from the United States. The Pinto was a fire risk whose
poor design was responsible for deaths that could have been avoided. The
car design was eventually changed so that the petrol tank was protected by
a shield and located where it would not be prone to puncture by the rear
axle (see Cullen et al. 1987). Stephens and Stephens (2000) list 24
instances of legislation that have improved car safety. Such legislation has
been particularly prominent in the United States, but because of that
country’s widespread economic influence, many of the benefits have spread
to the UK and elsewhere, and this is arguably true for many areas in addi-
tion to motor vehicle manufacture.

Legislation prompting manufacturers to improve car safety

1. Several cases filed in California in the early 1960s together with
resulting publicity by Ralph Nader contributed to cessation of produc-
tion of the Corvair with its unstable rear suspension system.
138 Graham Farrell and John Roman

2. ‘Paddle Door Latch’ litigation in Iowa and Pennsylvania in the mid

1960s contributed significantly to the introduction of recessed door
handle designs in current use today.
3. Crashworthiness cases beginning as early as Larson v. General Motors
in 1968 have substantially contributed to the development of what the
automotive industry refers to as energy-absorbing ‘crush zones’.
4. Litigation beginning as early as 1969 arising out of excessive roof
crush in rollover accidents has been a substantial factor in the improve-
ment of roof strength including what General Motors currently refers
to as its ‘rugged safety cages’.
5. As a result of the Ford Pinto fire litigation, Ford added a fuel tank
shield to prevent puncture by the rear axle bolts and discontinued its
drop-in fuel tank design in which the top of the fuel tank also serves as
the floor of the trunk.
6. Two adverse verdicts in 1979 forced Ford Motor Company to elimi-
nate an ‘illusory park’ position hazard that had resulted in a number
of park-to-reverse design defect injuries.
7. Litigation in 1980 arising from a side impact with a steel pole,
resulting in severe injuries to a police officer, substantially contributed
to the incorporation of side impact door beams.
8. Litigation in the early 1980s contributed to the discontinuation of the
Firestone 500 tyre.
9. Adverse verdicts in Florida and California in Ford Motor Company
Pinto fire cases significantly contributed to increasing the collision
speed of crash tests to more accurately reflect real-world collisions.
10. Litigation in the mid-1980s contributed to the identification and
correction of the Audi sudden acceleration problems.
11. Several substantial verdicts resulting from rollovers caused by insta-
bility problems in the Jeep CJ-5 and CJ-7 led to the development of
the Jeep Wrangler with its substantially wider track and lower centre
of gravity.
12. Litigation arising out of a Minnesota woman’s collision with the rear
of a tractor trailer rig helped spur new regulations improving the
safety of underride guards.
13. The fuel tank location litigation in the 1980s contributed to the relo-
cation of all front wheel drive fuel tanks and many rear wheel drive
fuel tanks to a more protected position in front of the rear axle.
14. Combined with the 1986 Report of the National Transportation
Safety Board, a series of suits against the automotive industry arising
from severe abdominal injuries, lumbar spine fractures and paraplegia
from rear seat lap belts ultimately resulted in the transition to signifi-
cantly safer three-point lap belt/shoulder harness seat restraint systems.
15. A series of successful lawsuits in the late 1980s contributed to the
discontinuation of the windowshade slack-inducing device in GM and
Ford restraint systems.
 Crime as pollution 139

16. A large verdict in Ketchum v. Hyundai led to the discontinuance of the

1988–9 Hyundai shoulder harness only restraint system.
17. A substantial verdict in Colorado in Miller v. Solaglas in 1991 led the
entire aftermarket glass industry to revise its practices to require
glued-in aftermarket windshield glass.
18. Litigation arising out of a series of injuries from collapsing seat backs
in rear-end collisions including adverse verdicts against General
Motors in Arizona and Illinois led GM to adopt more realistic seat
back strength standards in the early 1990s.
19. Litigation and resulting publicity involving the instability of the Suzuki
Samurai caused it to be pulled from the market.
20. Following extensive litigation involving General Motors side-saddle
C/K pickup fuel tank design including the large punitive damage
verdict in Moseley v. General Motors in 1993, essentially, all fuel
tanks are now located within the protective confines of the frame rail.
21. A substantial punitive damage verdict against General Motors in
Alabama in 1996 significantly contributed to design improvements in
the General Motors Type III door latch.
22. A series of lawsuits combined with pressure from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration led to redesign and voluntary
replacement of door latches in the Chrysler minivan.
23. More recently, litigation in Missouri involving the ‘electronic gas-
brake’ joystick device in vans specially equipped for handicapped
drivers has resulted in the incorporation of several safety design modi-
fications recommended by the plaintiff’s expert.
24. Litigation arising from injuries caused by overly aggressive airbags
together with pressure from NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration) has led to the development of safer and less aggressive
airbag systems.
Stephens and Stephens (2000)

An aside is warranted here, on the seemingly widely held opinion in the

UK and elsewhere that the USA is an overly litigious society. However,
even from this cursory glimpse at the subject, it is apparent that the legal
process has produced significant benefits, in terms of consumer protection,
that would not have been otherwise realized. It is likely that public opinion
is biased against such litigation if it is tainted by a few seemingly absurd
high-profile cases such as Stella Liebeck’s prosecution of McDonald’s,
where the jury tried to award nearly $3 million after Liebeck scalded
herself with hot coffee in February 1992.2

Monitoring and enforcement agencies

The enforcement of anti-pollution measures takes various forms.
Monitoring and enforcement agencies administer and/or enforce legislation.
140 Graham Farrell and John Roman

Such agencies include the Environment Agency in the United Kingdom and
the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States.3 Efforts to restrict
potentially damaging products are widespread. Toys with parts on which
children could choke are banned. Imports from a source country without
the same level of regulation are closely checked and, if necessary, rejected.
A Consumer Product Safety Commission exists to oversee the development
and enforcement of control instruments to tackle these externalities.

The philosophy of control

The usual formal definition of externalities is that they are goods people
care about that are not sold in a market. They are not sold but they are
received anyway, for better (positive externalities) or for worse (negative
externalities). Policy is typically concerned with reducing negative exter-
nalities or pollutants. Strategic frameworks exist to tackle negative
externalities. Broadly speaking, however, command-and-control instru-
ments (restrictive regulations and fines) are being supplemented by, or even
making way for, market-based instruments such as tradeable permits.
Command-and-control strategies are characterized by their punitive nature
that can disrupt market incentives and economic growth. In contrast,
market-based incentives seek to reward good practice, thereby harnessing
market forces to reduce externalities without the threat to economic
growth (see Portney and Stavins 2000).
When located solely in the terminology of criminology and criminal
justice, command-and-control measures can be characterized as ex post
punishment and market incentives as ex ante rewards. However, this may
not capture the key distinction. The fact that incentives harness market
forces is arguably the critical difference between the approaches to control.
It is via market forces that incentives seek to promote efficiency by
increasing the motivation of those responsible for pollution. Efficiency is
increased because the pollution is avoided in the first place (rather than
produced then followed by punishment). Such motivation has shifted the
goal from being one of seeking to avoid punishment to one of proactively
seeking to reduce pollution. Command-and-control techniques can be used
in conjunction with market incentives, and the precise combination would
be determined by the presenting pollution problem and its context.
Market-based instruments include the use of tradeable permits and the
encouragement of research and development for new technologies.
Tradeable permits work on the basis that potential polluters are ‘allowed’
to produce a certain amount of pollution but no more. Those who fail are
allowed to purchase (trade) additional permits from those who successfully
keep within their prescribed limits. Hence, over-polluters pay extra while
safe practices produce extra profit. This produces an incentive to stay
within limits and to promote practices that lower emissions further in
order to free up tradeable allowance. Research and development can be
 Crime as pollution 141

encouraged via the use of encouragements, particularly patents. Patents

allow those who make significant new developments that are widely
adopted, to licence and benefit from them, thus recouping and potentially
benefiting from the investment in research.
Developing and introducing techniques such as tradeable permits and
other incentives for crime reduction will require significant effort and
political skills. However, having traditionally relied upon regulation and
punishment, the possibility of a crime reduction philosophy based around
incentives may prove an exciting prospect that warrants further examina-
tion and experimental testing.

Crime as pollution
Many of the categories of pollution discussed so far are defined as crimes
in certain circumstances. It might, therefore, be concluded that the rela-
tionship between crime and externalities has been fully charted and its
implications realized. However, this would be a wrong conclusion. Most of
the activities discussed above (air and noise pollution, fire safety and
consumer product safety) were only legally proscribed after they were
recognized as externalities. In contrast, the focus here relates to behaviours
that are already legally proscribed as crime but where the role of externali-
ties goes largely unrecognized. There is a fundamental difference between
the notion of ‘crime as pollution’ and that of ‘pollution as crime’.
The simplest examples of crime pollution are probably those with close
parallels in the consumer safety examples discussed above. Products that
are poorly made in such a way as to effectively encourage crime are the
easiest to fathom. Cars with door locks that can be opened by a bent coat
hanger (an accusation often levelled at the 1970s Ford Cortina) could be
said to encourage crime. A more recent example is afforded by mobile
phones. The rapid growth of mobile phones in the 1990s led to a mini-
crime wave of robbery and theft resulting in ‘CRIME U.K.’ according to
the Daily Mirror newspaper and ‘Panic on the Streets’ (BBC 2002). The
phones were highly portable, highly valuable and easily stolen items that
made, to use the terminology of Routine Activity Theory, particularly suit-
able targets. Robbery and theft increased not because the youth population
suddenly became more deprived, less well off or less educated, but because
a very good criminal opportunity presented itself. However, it is possible
that this criminal opportunity did instigate many new criminal careers.
Violent crime and disorder can be viewed as pollution in many instances.
Assaults, robberies and disorder in and around bars and nightclubs are
arguably externalities caused by profit-seeking alcohol manufacturers,
retailers (and even, perhaps, local governments who receive taxation).
Perhaps a case could even be made that alcohol manufacturers hold some
liability for domestic violence. Alcohol is certainly commonly understood
to be present in many instances. Of course, alcohol is frequently used as an
142 Graham Farrell and John Roman

excuse for domestic violence but most commentators would deny that it can
justifiably be cited as a cause. However, if the alcohol industry as a whole
were taxed and the resources poured into services for victims/survivors of
domestic violence, it is likely that many commentators would view this as
an advance on the current situation, and would not require any reduction
in the culpability of a violent offender. This is only raised here as a possi-
bility that warrants further discussion. The intention here is to raise the
possibility that, since alcohol is a commonly cited factor in domestic
violence (if not an excuse), then the industry which is the primary benefi-
ciary might, in some fashion, be made to return some of its profits to the
victims who incur a major cost which few would hold to be unrelated.
Child pornography, and hence perhaps child sexual abuse, are arguably
facilitated by the Internet. The Internet and e-mail facilitate the adver-
tising, exchange and purchase of illegal pornography (and other illegal
products and services) of various types. It has also been suggested that the
Internet facilitates the illegal sex trade as well as the illegal drugs trade and
other forms of crime and organized crime. Perhaps Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), who benefit financially from subscriptions, could be
considered as crime polluters. If their service promotes illegal activities, a
case could be made that they should be held responsible. At the very least,
it could be argued that ISPs should be more formally encouraged to
rapidly develop monitoring and tracing technologies that deter and detect.
While there may be some public pressure on major ISPs to do so (so that
many have password protection to reduce the possibility of minors
accessing certain types of site), it is likely that legislation that recognizes e-
crimes as pollution caused by the Internet and by ISPs (as those who profit),
will accelerate this process. Perhaps the process could be incentivized so
that ‘safe’ ISPs benefit from their improved software and practices.
A tentative and preliminary list of crime types, possible polluters, and
possible solutions is presented in Table 8.1. It is extremely preliminary, and
at this stage represents more of an attempt to brainstorm the issue than to
develop a comprehensive list. It is certainly not intended to be exhaustive
but, rather, to set the ball rolling. It is also recognized that some of the
elements it contains may, upon closer examination, prove to be erroneous
or to require significant revision. This is normal in the development of a
concept that is likely to require many iterations of revision.
How is crime pollution recognized? The first step in examining a crime
type appears to be the identification of possible polluters. Often, but not
necessarily always, there is a link via the question of ‘Who benefits?’
directly or indirectly from this type of crime. The identification of possible
control mechanisms is a next step. Whether or not control mechanisms can
incorporate market incentives, which should be more efficient than tradi-
tional command-and-control techniques, is a different question. Some
combination of approaches seems the most likely possibility – that is, stick
and carrot in combination to produce maximum effect.
 Crime as pollution 143

(continued on next page)

144 Graham Farrell and John Roman
Crime as pollution 145
146 Graham Farrell and John Roman
Table 8.2 Costs of crime (£) for two crime types

Robbery/ Wounding
mugging (serious and slight)
Security expenditure 0 2
Insurance administration 40 -
Property stolen or damaged 310 -
Emotional and physical impact on victims 2,400 12,000
Lost output 420 2,000
Victim Services 6 6
Health services 190 1,200
Criminal Justice System (incl. police) 1,400 2,700
Total average cost 4,700 18,000
Total UK cost 2,000,000,000 15,600,000,000

Source: Brand and Price (2000).

Who benefits from crime?

The possible list of polluters is large once the penny drops. It appears that
a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, means of identifying polluters is
to ask ‘Who benefits?’ and ‘Who pays?’ in relation to particular crime
types. Identifying the scale of the pollution involves examining the differ-
ence between the benefits and the costs. Some crimes produce far greater
overall social cost than others, particularly when intangible costs (pain and
suffering) as well as police and criminal justice costs are incorporated.
Car manufacturers may save (benefit) on production costs by excluding
some anti-theft devices. Yet their savings are likely to be small when
compared with the overall cost to the victim and society from car crime
(particularly when emotional and psychological damage are considered as
well as fear of crime and insurance costs). The beneficiaries from alcohol-
related crime and disorder are alcohol manufacturers and retailers. Retailers
may fail to follow safe practices regarding alcohol sales, may promote rapid
consumption of alcohol via ‘happy hours’ and other promotions (thus
boosting sales), and thereby maximize their profits while incurring little of
the overall cost of resultant crimes. Since many crimes will take place off the
licensed premises, retailers argue that they are not their responsibility,
while victims can incur major costs in terms of lost property, and perhaps
physical damage that may result in hospital bills, psychological damage and
even lost productivity and wages due to absence from work. The improved
measurement and understanding of the costs of crime, which has occurred
as part of the growth of cost-benefit analysis within criminal justice, is
possibly fundamental in promoting an understanding of crime as pollution.

The role of cost–benefit analysis

The identification of crime externalities is located within the field of
cost–benefit analysis (Roman and Farrell 2002). The field of cost–benefit
 Crime as pollution 147

analysis has made significant steps forward in relation to criminal justice

in recent years. Of particular relevance are advances in the measurement of
the costs of crime (see Cohen 2000 for a review; and Brand and Price 2000
for UK national estimates). The latest estimates are based on Willingness-
to-Pay (WTP) or contingent valuation estimates (Cohen et al. 2004). WTP
uses a survey asking respondents how much they would be willing to pay
to avoid crime, and such methods have not been used previously in this
context.
A key insight deriving from recent advances in cost estimation method-
ology has been the greater understanding of both the types of cost item
relating to crime as well as their cost to victims and society. Table 8.2
shows the various cost components for only two crime types. The data are
taken from Brand and Price’s influence study (Brand and Price 2000). Note
that these cost estimates are now viewed as relatively conservative and that
those produced by the method adopted by Cohen et al. (2004) are some-
times many times greater.
While cost–benefit analysis may be a necessary vehicle for the further-
ance of the specification of the costs of crime (and hence of the extent of
pollution), it is not sufficient to ensure the implementation of such efforts.
The next section considers issues relating to implementation via a discus-
sion of the possibility of an Enhanced Crime Doctrine.

An ‘Enhanced Crime Doctrine’

In consumer product legislation, the Enhanced Injury Doctrine is promi-
nent. Citing the influential case of Larsen v. General Motors of 1968,
Whelan (1999) captures the essence of the doctrine in relation to the
liability of USA car manufacturers for injuries to vehicle occupants:

Larsen [v. General Motors] held that collisions are foreseeable to

vehicle manufacturers and therefore cars must be reasonably crash-
worthy. Hence, injuries caused by the lack of crashworthiness are
separate and apart from the accident-caused injuries inasmuch as the
manufacturer has a duty to design for foreseeable crashes, which occur
‘with or without the fault of the victim’.
(Whelan 1999)

This doctrine suggests that, even though some crashes may be caused by
(‘with or without the fault of’) the victims, the manufacturers know that
crashes will occur and are obliged to minimize damage. The same principle
should arguably apply to consumer goods, since manufacturers know that
some of them will be stolen. Therefore, regardless of whether theft occurs
‘with or without the fault of the victim’, manufacturers should have a
responsibility to design products in ways that minimize risk and the resul-
tant cost of crime. An Enhanced Crime Doctrine would be the appropriate
148 Graham Farrell and John Roman

criminological parallel. In relation to stolen consumer products, it could

run thus:

The theft of certain types of products is clearly foreseeable. Hence,

manufacturers should have a duty to design for foreseeable theft and
resale which occurs with or without the fault of the victim.
Therefore, frequently stolen consumer products must be reasonably
difficult, unattractive, or unrewarding propositions for theft and
resale.

Yet crime pollution is more widespread than solely via consumer products.
It would also apply to bars and clubs with high rates of assaults, disorder
and other crimes. Such crimes are similarly predictable, and so the appro-
priate enhanced crime doctrine would be along the lines of:

In and around licensed premises, certain types of assault, disorder and

other crimes are clearly foreseeable. Hence licensees should have a
duty to design and practise business for foreseeable assault, disorder
and other crime. Such premises must have designs, policies and prac-
tices that ensure they are reasonably free from such crimes.

The same Enhanced Crime Doctrine could be applied to other types of

businesses, and perhaps public and private spaces. The identification of a
potential polluter is the prerequisite to the formulation of the appropriate
Enhanced Crime Doctrine.

Implementing crime–pollution reduction

Whereas most people talk of aiming to avoid reinventing the wheel, Paul
Ekblom refers, in his driest tone, to the need to avoid reinventing the flat
tyre. This captures the need to avoid known bad practices, but more
importantly, the fact that ‘new’ policies which fail to learn from previous
ones often turn out worse. In the present context, the Enhanced Injury
Doctrine may prove a useful model for an Enhanced Crime Doctrine in
several practical ways. The issue of how to implement anti-crime-pollution
measures is a critical aspect for any progress in crime reduction. When
discussing the possibilities of making polluters pay for crime reduction,
Ekblom (2005) notes 15 obstacles to overcome in his section ‘Making it
Work’. Ekblom’s list includes the need to establish:

• Principles. (How would we decide if a company is responsible?)

• Levels of fines. (How much do they pay?)
• A level playing field (Are competing companies all equally liable?)
• Whether or when an industry or an individual company is liable.
• What to do with any money raised from fines.
 Crime as pollution 149

However, there may already be established frameworks to answer these

questions and more. Crime reduction might avoid the need to reinvent the
wheel if it can poach proven methods, techniques and practices that are
derived from the Enhanced Injury Doctrine and elsewhere. This is neither
cynical nor lazy: It is good practice to learn from success and mistakes else-
where. Others have been tackling these practical questions for many years
and have made significant progress in overcoming them. Crime reduction
should overtly seek to plunder such sources of knowledge and good practice.

The architecture of control instruments

Instruments are the policies and tactics for the control of pollution. They
take different forms. Barrett and Stavins (2002) review the architecture of
the various types of instruments developed in environmental economics for
climate control. The instruments are (briefly, but hopefully not too rudely)
summarized in the list below. The specifics of the various proposals will
not be discussed here, and the reader is referred to Barrett and Stavins for
the complete review and to the additional original sources.

Fourteen designs (architectures) for climate control instruments

adapted to crime reduction
Barrett and Stavins (2003) reviewed 14 types of proposal for environmental
control instruments. Here, the 14 are simply taken and, where appro-
priate, switched to read as if they were crime reduction instruments while
retaining key references from the climate control literature:

1. Producer emissions limits and market-based trading incentives (Kyoto

Protocol to United Nations FCCC, 1992).
2. As (1) but with fixed-price permits available. Proceeds of permit sales
fund research on safe design and crime risk management (Aldy et al.
(2001), and others).
3. No emissions commitments or market-based instruments; Incentives
for safe design and management research, developing common standards
for technology and management (as a way to ensure participation)
(Barrett 2003, 2001a, b).
4. A portfolio of policies: development of design and management stan-
dards (aimed at long-term emission reduction), and incentives for
technology innovation and diffusion; emissions targets (small at first
then increasing); crime tax to fund research (Benedick 2001).
5. Emissions trading – no fixed limits; permits for business-as-usual emis-
sions. Periodical purchase (and retirement) of emissions allowances
(Bradford, 2001).
6. Negotiation on a set of standard to achieve lower emissions (within
industry or crime type?). A harmonized crime tax (Cooper 1998, 2001).
150 Graham Farrell and John Roman

7. Experimentation with multiple ‘case studies’ of policy instruments

including: coordinated measures; emissions tax; tradeable emissions
permits; hybrid system (Hahn 1998).
8. Price-based approach with two markets for tradeable permits: annual
market and perpetuity (endowment) market (McKibbin and Wilcoxen
1997, 2000).
9. Crime tax system harmonized through dynamic cost–benefit analysis;
import duties on non-compliant goods and services; graduated fines
increase over time (Nordhaus 1998).
10. A ‘Marshall Plan’ of mutually agreed actions (e.g. by key manufac-
turers in an industry emitting criminal opportunities) (Schelling 1997,
1998, 2002).
11. Two-step plan: first, introduce low crime taxes (for easy implementa-
tion) with broad coverage – broad and shallow approach; second,
gradually build depth of impact on crime pollution (Schmalensee
1996, 1998).
12. Three-part architecture: 1. Initial broad coverage with taxes ‘means
tested’; 2. Moderate yet rigid short-term targets, then ambitious yet
flexible long-term targets (to induce technological and other change
and to adapt to learning); 3. Market-based tradeable permit instruments
possibly with government safety-vale (further sales) (Stavins 2001).
13. A Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – big polluters receive
credit for assisting smaller ones; voluntary participation in emissions
permit trading; mechanisms for voluntary accession to emissions
quota system; automatic graduation to emissions quota system for
companies (etc.) beyond a certain size (Stewart and Weiner 2001).
14. Tradeable emissions permits initially target at key polluters (above a
relevant threshold), with quotas or growth-targets for others (Victor
2001).

Barrett and Stavins synthesize the information from the various proposals
for climate control. They identify four key factors which are presented here
as they contain lessons for any possible crime reduction enterprise along
these lines. It is concluded that the most successful instruments will have:

• moderate short-term goals;

• provision for later expansion beyond key polluters;
• the use of market mechanisms to maintain economic incentives (trade-
able permits; hybrid quota-tax schemes) and encourage technological
responses;
• incentives for participation and compliance.

While this is a gross simplification of the Barrett and Stavins work, the
intent here is to unashamedly steal lessons that may inform the development
of crime reduction.4 Moderate short-term goals are necessary because
 Crime as pollution 151

everything cannot change at once. There will be little support for immediate
extensive change. This is also why the second factor, that is, provision for
later expansion, is also critical. Assuming that crime-pollution-reduction
instruments are considered, their development would need to be cautious
at first. The low-hanging fruit of crime types and legislation that will
encounter little political opposition would be approached at first (that is,
crime reduction probably shouldn’t start with the gun control lobby in the
USA). Crime types where existing measures are akin to anti-pollution
measures should be identified and developed. Many of these exist already;
efforts to promote safe building designs for residences and businesses, as
well as secure car parks, have become increasingly widespread. The UK’s
Secured Car Parks Scheme has, after a decade, grown into the Safer
Parking Scheme, continuing as an initiative of the Association of Chief
Police Officers (British Parking Association 2005). Secured By Design
(ACPO Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited, 2005) already seeks to apply
security standards and the principles of designing-out-crime to residential
and business premises and areas as well as schools, railway stations,
caravan parks, children’s play areas, and sheltered accommodation. Such
efforts have shown to be effective in at least one evaluation of anti-residential
burglary initiatives (Armitage 2000). Extending such efforts to incorporate
a more extensive pollution approach, perhaps initially with market incen-
tives at the fore (more carrot than stick, at least at first) would seem
appropriate. This fits well with Barrett and Stavins’s third factor cited
above; that is, the incorporation of market mechanisms where possible as
well as incentives to encourage participation and compliance.
It is also possible that other aspects of knowledge relating to crime anal-
ysis might be fruitfully integrated into the approaches used in climate
control. It is known that crime clusters along various dimensions. Crime is
disproportionately committed by prolific repeat offenders, disproportion-
ately experienced by repeatedly victimized targets (whether persons, places
or other targets), and crime is concentrated geographically into hotspots.
Accommodating such knowledge into instruments in ways that focus them
upon these crime clusters is a possibility that should be considered if it
does not occur as a natural part of the process.

The role of the police service

Currently, the police service deflects much responsibility away from local
or national government and other community agencies. The police are
effectively the organizational whipping boy, and receive criticism for crime
that is, in the framework proposed herein, more appropriately categorized
as an externality produced by others. A preferable role for the police might
be as enforcers of legislation against crime-pollution. This would shift
some of the police role to being more akin to that of quality control and a
trading standards agency. Whether or not such work fell within the role of
152 Graham Farrell and John Roman

the traditional police agency or led to the establishment of a new crime-

pollution agency, is a different question. In the long run it would be hoped
that it would lead to a decline in demand for traditional police work. In
the short to medium term, however, it would undoubtedly be viewed as
competing for existing limited resources. Perhaps a separate crime-pollution
agency to develop, administer and enforce anti-pollution efforts against
crime, would be more appropriate.

Conclusion
This chapter has continued work begun in Roman and Farrell (2002).
That study noted how crime is an instance where market failure is
common. Many agents in society (such as manufacturers and businesses)
have little or no economic incentive to act in ways that reduce crime risks
for others. They may, rather, save production costs or business costs in
ways that, whether inadvertently or not, serve to effectively increase the
risk of crime to others. Hence the normal market mechanism, which often
serves to protect consumers, frequently fails when it comes to crime. The
result is that crime costs to society are immensely greater than if the crim-
inal opportunities had been stemmed at source.
Crime reduction seeking to tackle externalities must do so in ways that
do not otherwise hinder the market. Crime reduction should not, for
example, increase the costs of businesses in ways that make them less prof-
itable. It is useful to reiterate the statement from Roman and Farrell about
the need for caution in developing crime reduction measures based on this
approach:

[C]learly, such an approach should not be so interventionist so as to

interfere with the market, its incentives and its profits. Reducing market
efficiency is, firmly, not the aim of these proposals. The avoidance of a
specific instance of market failure as it relates to crime – where manu-
facturers impose large external costs on society in order to reap small
rewards for themselves – is a more desirable objective.
(Roman and Farrell 2002: 78)

Crime control is traditionally punitive. It uses fines and other punishments

across a range of custodial and non-custodial sentences after detecting
perpetrators. The possibility of introducing a different orientation to crime
control philosophy may be an exciting prospect. Market-based incentives,
that is, using combinations of rewards and incentives (such as tax breaks
and tradeable permits) to encourage crime reduction activity of various
sorts, may produce an actual and perceived shift in the philosophy of
crime control. More practically, it could present the possibility for efficient
and effective crime reduction efforts that are developed and implemented
by those who might be more appropriately viewed as the root causes of
 Crime as pollution 153

crime – that is, those agents who generate criminal opportunities or facili-
tate crime in various ways that often go unrecognized. The further
exploration of the nature of crime-types as forms of pollution, the drafting
of appropriate legislation and the introduction of experimental trials of
various market incentives, may be the appropriate next steps.

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 Crime as pollution 155

Notes
1 Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of this work were presented to the
American Society of Criminology in Denver, November 2003, and to the
Midlands branch of the British Society of Criminology, at the Galleries of
Justice, in Nottingham on 31 March 2004. We thank Kate Moss for the latter
of those two opportunities.
2 Even this case is more complex than many people believe from the poorly
informed anecdotes – see Greenbaum (2005).
3 The UK’s Environment Agency is at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk.
The US EPA is at http://www.epa.gov
4 We apologise to Barrett and Stavins for the brevity of coverage of their exten-
sive review, as well as for any possible misrepresentation incurred in its transfer
to this context. It is our worry that the brevity of this section does not
adequately convey the respect that their work warrants.