Herma Shipyard Inc. & Esguerra vs. Oliveros et. al.

G.R. No. 208936

April 17, 2017
Topic: Project employees

Facts:
On June 17, 2009, the respondents filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch
III, San Fernando City, Pampanga a Complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, and
non-payment of service incentive leave pay with prayer for the payment of full
backwages and attorney's fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are
Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks
usually necessary and desirable in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners
dismissed them from employment. Respondents further alleged that as a condition to
their continuous and Uninterrupted employment, petitioners made them sign
employment contracts for a fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it
appear that they were project-based employees. Per respondents, petitioners resorted to
this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time
when they ceased working for Herma Shipyard due to expiration of project-based
employment contracts. For their defense, petitioners argued that respondents were its
project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for
which they were hired had already been completed.

Issue:
Are the respondents project-based employees?

Ruling:

Yes. A project employee under Article 280 (now Article 294) of the Labor Code, as
amended, is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee. The records of this case reveal that respondents were hired for each and every
project. They were adequately informed of their employment status as project-based employees
at least at the time they signed their employment contracts. They were fully apprised of the
nature and scope of their work whenever they affixed their signature to their employment
contract. Here, a meticulous examination of the contracts of employment reveals that while the
tasks assigned to the respondents were indeed necessary and desirable in the usual business of
Herma Shipyard, the same were distinct, separate, and identifiable from the other projects or
contracts services. The nature of Herma Shipyard's business is only to hire workers when it has
existing contracts for shipbuilding and repair. It is not engaged in the business of building
vessels for sale which would require it to continuously construct vessels for its inventory and
consequently hire a number of permanent employees. The completion of work or project
automatically terminates their employment, in which case, the employer is, under the law, only
obliged to render a report on the termination of the employment. Hence, Herma Shipyard
should be allowed to reduce its work force into a number suited for the remaining work to be
done upon the completion or proximate accomplishment of each particular project. As to the
requirement that the completion or termination of the specific project or undertaking for which
respondents were hired should be determined at the time of their engagement, it is enough that
Herma Shipyard gave the approximate or target completion date in the project employment
contract. Given the nature of its business and the scope of its projects which take months or
even years to finish, the court does not expect Herma Shipyard to give a definite and exact
completion date. In sum, considering their employment contracts and all other circumstances
present, the respondents are deemed project employees.

Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas vs PLDT

G.R. No. 190389-190390
April 19, 2017
Topic: Redundancy, Authorized Cause

Facts:
Manggawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), representing the employees of
PLDT, filed two notices of strike and charged PLDT of unfair labor practices for
PLDT’s alleged transfer of several employees of its Provisioning Support division from
Bicutan to Taguig, abolition of a division, farming out of jobs to casuals and contractual,
unreasonable refusal to provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to
personnel downsizing/ reorganization and closure of exchanges, continued hiring of
"contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed
by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union membership and in the
denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned employees, alleged
restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services and its closure of
traffic operations at various regional operator services. MKP then went on strike. PLDT
declared only 323 employees as redundant as it was able to redeploy 180 of the 503
affected employees to other positions. The Secretary of Labor certified the labor dispute
for compulsory arbitration. All striking workers were directed to return to work within
twenty four (24) hours except those who were terminated due to redundancy. MKP
challenged the SOLE’s order insofar as it created a distinction among the striking
workers in the return-to-work order. Meanwhile the NLRC dismissed the charges of
ULP against PLDT and ruled that PLDT’s redundancy program was valid and did not
constitute ULP.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the redundancy program of PLDT is valid
 2. Whether the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
was rendered moot when the National Labor Relations Commission upheld the
validity of the redundancy program

Ruling:
1. Yes. Redundancy exists when the services of an employee are in excess of what
is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Redundancy is
one of the authorized causes for the termination of employment provided for in Article
298 of the Labor Code, as amended. For the implementation of a redundancy program
to be valid, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice
served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair
and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and
accordingly abolished. To establish good faith, the company must provide substantial
proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required of the
company, and that fair and reasonable criteria were used to determine the redundant
positions. In order to prove the validity of its redundancy program, Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company has presented data on the decreasing volume of the
received calls by the Operator Services Center for the years 1996 to 2002. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company's declaration of redundancy was backed by
substantial evidence showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both
local and international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services,
and the growth of wireless communication. With these, the court ruled that the
redundancy program of PLDT is valid. Nonetheless, there is a need to review the
redundancy package awarded to the employees terminated due to redundancy. For
either redundancy or retrenchment, the law requires that the employer give separation
pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay of the affected employee, or at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The employer must also serve
a written notice on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment
at least one (1) month before the effective date of termination due to redundancy or
retrenchment.
While the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company complied with the notice
requirement, the same cannot be said as regards the separation pay received by some of
the affected workers.

2. No. A return-to-work order is issued by the Secretary of Labor and

Employment when he or she assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
that is considered indispensable to the national interest. Article 278(g) of the Labor
Code provides that the assumption and certification of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall automatically enjoin the intended or impending strike. When a strike
has already taken place at the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes
jurisdiction over the labor dispute, all striking employees shall immediately return to
work. Moreover, the employer shall immediately resume operations, and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Return-to-
work and reinstatement orders are both immediately executory; however, a return-to-
work order is interlocutory in nature, and is merely meant to maintain status quo while
the main issue is being threshed out in the proper forum. In contrast, an order of
reinstatement is a judgment on the merits handed down by the Labor Arbiter pursuant
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction provided for under Article 224(a) of the Labor
Code. In the case at bar, there is no basis to reinstate the employees who were
terminated as a result of redundancy. The order of the Secretary of Labor is proper
while the main issue is still being threshed out.

Catotocan v. Lourdes School of Quezon

GR No. 213486
April 26, 2017
Topic: Retirement

Facts: Catotocan was a music teacher at the Lourdes School of Quezon. She has taught for 35
years in that school. She is now 53 years old. The school made an addendum to its
retirement policy stating that the employee will be retired upon reaching 60 years old or
upon having served for 30 years, whichever comes earlier. Not wanting to retire yet,
Catotocan opposed the addendum and requested that they be retired only upon
reaching 60 years old. The school did not grant her request. Since she has already served
for more than 30 years, she was considered retired by the school. She then made use of
the money from her retirement. The school re-hired her three times as a contractual
employee but refused to do so on the fourth year. She filed for illegal dismissal. She
argued that she was illegally dismissed when the school made her retire.

Issue: Is an employee illegally dismissed when she retired pursuant to a retirement plan and
availed of its benefits?

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the employer has the prerogative to lower the retirement age
subject to the consent of the employees. It must be embodied in a mutually instituted
retirement plan. The Court also ruled that as long as there is a mutually instituted
retirement plan, there is no need for the employer to consult the employee afterwards if
she really wants to retire since this would constrict the management’s prerogative in
making their employees retire. A notice is only needed. In this case, there was a
retirement plan. Catotocan ratified her consent to the retirement plan when she availed
of the benefits under it.
RE: Dropping from the Rolls of Rowie A. Quimno
A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC
April 17, 2017
Topic: Absence Without Leave

Facts: Rowie was a utility worker for an MCTC in Ipil, ZamboangaSibugay. He has been on
absence without official leave (AWOL) since February 1, 2016.

Issue: Should a court personnel on AWOL for over a year be separated from service?

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, “[a]n official or
employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30)
working days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.” Since Rowie
has been on AWOL since February 1, 2016, he should be separated from service.

The Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Justin Aventurado

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212
April 18, 2017
Topic: Irregularity and Serious Misconduct of Judges; Retirement

Facts: Administrative Circular No. 43-2004 states that when a judge files his application for
optional retirement, he shall cease from performing his functions as a judge. Judge
Aventurado filed his application on January 30, 2009, but he asked for an extension until
February 20, 2009 in order to decide 12 cases. He failed to decide those cases, while he
decided other cases where he either dismissed the case or acquitted the accused. His
extension was not ruled upon by the Court.

Issue: Is Judge Aventurado liable for irregularity and serious misconduct and for violation of
Administrative Circular No. 43-2004?

Ruling: Yes. “Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandated that cases or matters
filed in the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the time
they are submitted for decision or resolution.” Judge Aventurado disregarded the
litigants’ constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their cases. It was also odd for
Judge Avenurado to fail in deciding the 12 cases where he even asked for an extension
to do so. He decided other cases instead where he either dismissed the case or acquitted
the accused.
 Judge Aventurado also violated Administrative Circular No. 43-2004. It states that "if on
the date specified in the application as the date of the effectivity of the retirement, the
applicant has not yet received any notice of approval or denial of his application, he
shall cease working and discharging his functions unless directed otherwise.” Hence,
Jude Aventurado’s retirement was already effective the moment he filed the application.
Since he continued working after that, he is liable for violating Administrative Circular
No. 43-2004.

Sumifru Corporation v. Baya

G.R. No. 188269
April 17, 2017
Topic: Constructive Dismissal

Facts: Baya was a supervisor of AMS Farming Corporation (AMSFC). He founded an agrarian
reform cooperative of the regular employees of AMSFC. He was reassigned as
supervisor to DFC, a sister company. He remained active with the coop he founded in
AMSFC. Later on, the coop filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The banana plantation of AMSFC was then covered by the Agrarian Reform and
awarded to the beneficiaries, including Baya. AMSFC tried to convince Baya to transfer
to the pro-company cooperative. He refused. Baya was then transferred back to AMSFC.
When Baya returned to AMSFC, he was told that there are no more available
supervisory positions in the company so he was transferred to a rank-and-file position
instead. Both AMSFC and DFC knew that there were no available supervisory positions
in AMSFC at that time. This happened on August 30, 2002. A month later, on September
20, 2002, the DAR went to the plantation to effect the takeover of the land by the
beneficiaries. The next day, the rank-and-file employees where no longer allowed to
work because they have been replaced by contract workers. The employees who were
members of the pro-company cooperative were allowed to work. AMSFC argued that
the terminations were a result of the takeover of the plantation.

Issue: Is an employee constructively dismissed when the company transfers him from
supervisory to rank-and-file position as a result of an agrarian reform dispute?

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that constructive dismissal exists when an employee ceases to
work because continuing to work for the employer is unreasonable, impossible or
unlikely. This happens when there is demotion or a diminution in salary, wages or
benefits. In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer or demotion was an exercise of management prerogative and not a means to
remove the employee. If the employer fails to prove it, he will be liable for constructive
dismissal. In this case, both companies knew that there were no more supervisory
positions available in AMSFC. It was alleged that the company also employed tactics to
bust the cooperative which included harassing Baya and the other employees. The
company also tried to convince Baya to transfer to the pro-company cooperative in order
 to secure his employment. These allegations by Baya was not refuted by AMSFC. Lastly,
AMSFC argued that the dismissal was a result of the takeover of the plantation.
However, the instances indicating constructive dismissal was already present on August
30, 2002 (when Baya was demoted to a rank-and-file position). The takeover only
happened a month later on September 20, 2002. The two companies are then liable or
constructive dismissal.

University of Santo Tomas v. SamahangManggagawang UST

G.R. No. 184262
April 24, 2017
Topic: Regular, Project Employee

Facts: The SamahangManggagawang UST were composed of workers who maintained the
classrooms and facilities of the University of Santo Tomas (UST). They were laborers,
electricians, masons, etc. They were repeatedly hired for ten years. They alleged that
they are regular workers because they perform services which are necessary and
desirable to the business of UST. On the other hand, UST argues that they are project
employees since they were hired on a per-project basis as evidenced by the Contractual
Employee Appointments (CEA) they signed. The contracts they signed stated that they
are tasked “to assist” in various carpentry, electrical and masonry work.

Issue: Are the workers project employees when they signed a contract stating the term of their
employment but the description of the job is vague?

Ruling: No. They are not project employees. A valid project or fixed term employment is when
the terms of the employment were agreed upon by the parties without any force or
duress upon the employee or where it appears that the employer or employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former over the latter. However, when it appears that the periods were
used to evade the employee’s right to security of tenure it will be stricken down for
being contrary to public policy. The contract they signed appears that they were
engaged for all-around maintenance work. Their jobs were not clearly delineated. The
contract only tried to compartmentalize their jobs as projects in order to evade their right
to security of tenure.

They are regular employees. There are two types of regular employees: (a) those who are
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of
service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are
employed. The workers under the SamahangManggagawang UST belong to the second
category. They have been employed for at least one year. In fact, they have been
continuously engaged for ten years already.
Ramon Manuel T. Javines Vs. Xlibris A.K.A. Author Solutions, Inc., Joseph
Steinbach, And Stella Mars Ouano
G.R. No. 214301
June 1, 2007
Topic: Dismissal for Just Cause

Facts: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager. Approximately 10

months after, J a vines was terminated for falsifying/tampering three meal receipts. The
falsification was discovered when Javines submitted the meal receipts for
reimbursement to the finance department. On July 27, 2012, Xlibris terminated Javines'
employment through an end of employment notice. Javines then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the NLRC'S finding that Javines was dismissed for just
cause

Ruling: NO. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC uniformly held that Javines' employment was
terminated for just cause under Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code. It is
undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javinesfailed to move for reconsideration
nor challenged said ruling before the CA. Consequently, the NLRC decision finding
Javines to have been dismissed for just cause became final. For failure to file the requisite
petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained finality and had been placed
beyond the appellate court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of
judicial process, the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is
merely a statutory privilege. Settled are the rules that a decision becomes final as against
a party who does not appeal the same and an appellee who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in
the decision of the court below. Hence, the finding that Javines was dismissed for just
cause must be upheld.

Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. ArjanHassaram

GR No. 217730
June 5, 2017
Topic: Retirement Benefits; Article 287.

Facts: Hassaram filed a case against PAL for illegal dismissal and payment of retirement
benefits, damages and attorney’s fees. He applied for retirement from PAL in August
2000 after rendering 24 years of service as a pilot, but his application was denied. PAL
thereby informed him that he lost his employment as of June 9, 1998, by his failure to
comply with a Return to Work Order on June 7, 1998. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
Hassaram by awarding retirement benefits and attorney’s fees to Hassaram. It ruled that
 he did not defy a Return to Work Order, as he was already on leave when the order was
implemented. The LA arbiter applied Art. 287 in the computation of benefits.Hassaram’s
other claims were dismissed. PAL appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s
decision to award retirement benefits based on Article 287 of the Labor Code. PAL filed
an MR, which the NLRC granted. The NLRC reversed its earlier decision by setting
aside the ruling of the LA on account of Hassaram’s receipt of retirement benefits.
Hassaram sought reconsideration of the new NLRC Resolution but his motion was
denied. Hassaram elevated the matter to the CA via Petition for Certiorari. The CA
reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the ruling of the LA. It ruled that the
funds received under the Plan were not the retirement benefits contemplated by law.
Hence, Hassaram was still entitled to receive retirement benefits in the amount of
Php2,111,984.60 pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code. PAL sought for
reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether Hassaram is entitled to received retirement benefits under Art. 287 of the Labor
Code.

Ruling: No. Article 287 would entitle a retiring pilot to the equivalent of only 22.5 days of his
monthly salary for every year of service. This scheme was thus considered by the Court
as inferior to the retirement plans granted by PAL to the latter’s pilots in the alike cases
Elegir and PAL. It is to his advantage that PAL’s retirement plans were applied in the
computation of his retirement benefits.

Luis S. Doble, Jr. vs. ABB Inc. / NitinDesal

G.R. No. 215627
June 5, 2017
Topic: Security of Tenure; Illegal Dismissal; Voluntary vs. Constructive Dismissal

Facts: Petitioner Luis Doble, a licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB, Inc. as Junior
Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted
from Design Engineer in 1994 to Vice-President and Local Division Manager of Power
System Division in March 2010. ABB Inc. conducts yearly Performance and
Development Appraisal of all its employees. In all years prior to 2008, Doble was rated
with grades 3 or 4, equivalent to Strong Performance or Superior Results. In 2008 to
2010, he received a performance rating of 4 for superior results. In March 2, 2012, the
company manager and president, informing him that his performance rating for 2011 is
1, equivalent to unsatisfactory performance, called Doble. On March 13, 2012, Doble was
called to a meeting where he was informed of a change in leadership due to the extent of
losses and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Doble was given the
option to resign as Local Division Manager of the PS Division, in exchange for a
separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service,
provided he would submit a letter of resignation, giving him until 12:45pm within
which to decide. Doble was shocked by the abrupt decision of the management. Doble
narrated in his Position Paper how he was constructively dismissed and forced to resign.
 On March 26, 2012, Doble filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary claims and damages. The
Labor Arbiter ruled that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was
involuntary, and ordered ABB Inc and Desai to pay his backwages and separation pay,
since reinstatement is no longer feasible. ABB Inc. and Desai filed an appeal, and Doble
filed a partial appeal from the dismissal of his monetary claims. In June 26, 2013, the 2
Commissioners of the NLRC 6th Division granted the appeal filed by ABB Inc. and
Desai, and dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. The resignation of Doble was voluntary,
hence there was no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary
claims, damages and attorney’s fees. One NLRC Commissioner dissented. Doble filed an
MR, but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution dated Aug. 14, 2013, for lack of
compelling reason to disturb its findings and conclusions. Dissatisfied, Doble filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed outright Doble’s Petition for
Certiorari. Doble then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Was Doble illegally dismissed?

Ruling: No. He voluntarily resigned. In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that
when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the
employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. Constructive
dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile and unfavorable
conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his
employment/position under the circumstances. Resignation is the voluntary act of an
employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to
dissociate oneself from employment. Considering the abovementioned, the Court agrees
with the NLRC that ABB Inc and Desai were able to prove by substantial evidence that
Doblevoluntarility resigned. Doble’s defenses and allegations were all not proven by
him, and Doble failed to present substantial documentary or testimonial evidence to
corroborate the same. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated
by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Even if the option to resign
originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be deemed voluntary
is that the employee’s intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment.
Sumifru Philippines Corp. vs. NagkahiusangMamumuosaSayapa Farm
G.R. No. 202091
June 7, 2017 Topic: Unions; Employer-Employee Relationship; Four-Fold Test

Facts: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with
Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). FBAC was engaged in the buying,
marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. The private respondent
NagkahiusangMamumuosaSuyapa Farm (NAMASUF A-NAFLU-KMU), a legitimate
labor organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department of
Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to
represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing
plant 90 (PP 90) of Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUFA
claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC
filed an Opposition to the Petition. It argued that there exists no employer-employee
relationship between it and the workers involved. It alleged that members of
NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed
independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter. NAMASUFA,
in its Comment to Opposition countered, among others, that its members were former
workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. It further
alleged that the members of NAMASUF A were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came.
Pending resolution of the petition, FBAC was merged with SUMIFRU, the latter being
the surviving corporation. The DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the Petition
for Certification Election of NAMASUF A and declared that Sumifru was the employer
of the workers concerned. The Med-Arbiter held that the “four-fold test” will show that
respondent FBAC is the employer of petitioner’s members. The most important element
is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work
to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. On the first factor,
(selection and engagement of the employer), it is that the staff of FBAC advised that
those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first of
CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor (payment of wages),
while the FBAC tried to impress that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this
at best is but an administrative arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does not
contain the relevant information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions made
and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor (the power of
dismissal), it is very clear that FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures
against erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them.
Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC
gives instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication
that it exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what
time they are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were
required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the materials
which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC. Sumifru appealed to the
 DOLE Secretary and in a Resolution dated Feb. 8, 2010, the DOLE Secretary dismissed
the appeal. The DOLE Secretary ruled that Sumifru is the true employer of the workers.
Sumifru then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA raising the issue of whether the
DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring it as the employer of
the workers at PP 90. The CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the DOLE
Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion because the latter’s ruling that
Sumifru was the employer of the workers was anchored on substantial evidence. The
CA, after reviewing the records, accorded respect to the findings of facts of the DOLE
Secretary, which affirmed the Med-Arbiter, as they have special knowledge and
expertise over matters under their jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship when the company required
monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary actions for non-compliance with “No
Helmet – No Entry” “No ID – No Entry” policies.

Ruling: Sumifru gave instructions to the workers on how to go about their work, what time they
were supposed to report for work, required monitoring sheets as they went about their
jobs, and provided the materials used in the packing plant. In affirming the Med-
Arbiter, the DOLE Secretary relied on the documents submitted by the parties and
ascertained that Sumifru indeed exercised control over the workers in PP 90. The DOLE
Secretary found that the element of control was present because Sumifru required
monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary actions for non-compliance with “No
Helmet – No Entry” “No ID-No Entry” policies.

Spectrum Security Services V. David Grave

GR No. 196650
June 07, 2017
Topic: Illegal Dismissal

Facts: The petitioner – a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing security
services – employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden Philippines,
Inc. (Ibiden.) The controversy started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as
part of its operational and manpower supervision enhancement program geared
towards the gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. On August 14, 2008, the
respondents filed their complaint against the petitioner for constructive dismissal in
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, claiming that the implementation of the
action plan was a retaliatory measure against them for bringing several complaints
along with other employees of the petitioner to recover unpaid holiday pay and 13th
month pay. Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC denied the
motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. The petitioner assailed the adverse ruling of
the NLRC in the CA on certiorari. The CA promulgated its assailed decision upholding
the NLRC, hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred in finding that the petitioner was guilty of illegally dismissing the
respondents despite the fact that the totality of the circumstances negated such finding

Ruling: Yes. The NLRC and the CA concluded that there was illegal or constructive dismissal in
this case as the private respondents were not given new assignments immediately after
being placed on reserved status; that the lack of any indication from the "Notices to
Return to Unit" of their re-assignments was a badge of bad faith; and that the timing was
off because the action plan was implemented by the petitioner after the respondents had
filed the complaints for their monetary claims against the petitioner and received a
favorable decision thereon. Security guards, like other employees in the private sector,
are entitled to security of tenure. Indeed, there should be no indefinite lay-offs. After the
period of six months, the employers should either recall the affected security guards to
work or consider them permanently retrenched pursuant to the requirements of the law;
otherwise, the employers would be held to have dismissed them, and would be liable for
such dismissals.

Yolando T. Bravo Vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Uri Os

University) And/Or Fr. John Christian U. Young
G.R. No. 198066
June 7, 2017
Topic: Just Cause, Procedural Due Process, & Payment of Separation Pay, Backwages and
Attorney’s Fees

Facts: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher by Urios College, now called Father
SatuminoUrios University. In addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was
designated as the school's comptroller. Urios College organized a committee to
formulate a new ranking system for non-academic employees for school year 2001-2002.
Under the proposed ranking system, the position of Comptroller was classified as an
office head while the position of Vice-President for Finance was classified as middle
management. Bravo suggested that since he assumed the duties of Comptroller and
Vice-President for Finance, his salary scale should be upgraded. The committee
allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations. Later, Bravo obtained
his employee ranking slip, which showed his evaluation score and the change of his
rank from office head to middle manager-level IV. The change, however, was merely
superimposed. In October 2004, Urios College organized a committee to review the
ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002. The committee found that
the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions among several
employees. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two
(2) other employees. The committee recommended that Bravo be administratively
charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 28227 of the
Labor Code. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate
his services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the
termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
 illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and
attorney's fees.

Issues:
1. WON petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause
2. WON petitioner was deprived of procedural due process
3. WON petitioner is entitled to the payment of separation pay, backwages, and attorney's fees

Ruling:
1. Yes. To warrant termination of employment under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the
misconduct must be serious or of such grave and aggravated character. In addition, the
misconduct must relate to the performance of the employee's duties that would render
the employee unfit to continue working for the employer. Thus, to warrant the dismissal
from service of a rank-and-file employee under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the
misconduct (1) must be serious, (2) should relate to the performance of the employee's
duties, (3) should render the employee unfit to continue working for the employer, and
(4) should have been performed with wrongful intent. In this case, it appears that
petitioner was neither induced nor motivated by any wrongful intent. He believed in
good faith that respondent had accepted and approved his recommendations on the
proposed ranking scale. Nevertheless, due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's
employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not
Article 297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of
trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two
(2) conditions. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper
authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition,
there was no reason for the Comptroller's Office to undertake the preparation of its own
summary table because this was a function that exclusively pertained to the Human
Resources Department. Thus, it was reasonable that he should be held liable by
respondent on the basis of command responsibility.

2. Yes. In termination based on just causes, the employer must comply with procedural due
process by furnishing the employee a written notice containing the specific grounds or
causes for dismissal. The notice must also direct the employee to submit his or her
written explanation within a reasonable period from the receipt of the notice.
Afterwards, the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself or herself. A hearing, however, is not a condition sine qua non. A formal
hearing only becomes mandatory in termination cases when so required under company
rules or when the employee requests for it. In this case, respondent complied with all the
requirements of procedural due process in terminating petitioner's employment.
Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for
dismissal. The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by
submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner that he mayavail
the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a thorough investigation. Three (3)
hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the investigation
 committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of
termination containing respondent’s final decision. Hence, there is no merit in
petitioner's claim that he was deprived of due process.

3. No. Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, the reliefs of an illegally dismissed employee are
reinstatement and full backwages. Backwages is a form of relief that restores the income
that was lost by reason of the employee's dismissal from employment. It is computed
from the time that the employee's compensation was withheld until his or her actual
reinstatement. However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is
awarded. Considering that there was a just cause for terminating petitioner from
employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are
also no factual and legal bases to award attorney's fees to petitioner.

Mario C. Madridejos Vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management Inc.

G.R. No. 204262
June 7, 2017
Topic: Seafarer Disability Benefits

Facts: Petitioner Madridejos was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent NYK-Fil Ship
Management, Inc. (NYK-FIL), a registered local manning agency operating by virtue of
Philippine laws for its foreign principal, International Cruise Services, Limited.
Madridejos signed an employment contract with NYK-FIL as a Demi Chef. Madridejos
commenced to work aboard the vessel. Two (2) weeks after, he claimed that he suddenly
slipped on a metal stairway and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal
pipe. He was brought to the ship doctor and was diagnosed to have a sebaceous cyst to
the right of the umbilicus. After two (2) months, NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos'
services through its foreign principal. Madridejos insisted that he did not finish his
employment contract with NYK-FIL due to his unwanted health condition. Not being at
fault for the pre-termination of his employment contract, he made demands upon NYK-
FILto pay his disability benefits

Issue: Is Madridejos entitled to disability benefits?

Ruling: No. Madridejos cannot claim disability benefits since he was not medically repatriated.
Even assuming that Madridejos was medically repatriated, he still cannot claim for
disability benefits since his sebaceous cyst was not work-related. Illnesses not listed as
an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment
of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels are disputably presumed to be
work-related. However, seafarers must prove through substantial evidence the
correlation between their illness and the nature of their work for their claim for
disability benefits to prosper. For an illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that
the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the
 seafarer. It is enough that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by
the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have
contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had. Madridejos cannot solely rely on the disputable
presumption. For his failure to substantiate his claim that his cyst was either work-
related or work-aggravated, this Court cannot grant him relief. For this reason, this
Court cannot presuppose that it is work-related. Furthermore, it was already settled that
Madridejos was not repatriated due to his alleged medical condition but due to the
expiration of his contract as a probationary employee. Clearly, it becomes unnecessary
for NYK-FIL to overcome the disputable presumption that Madridejos' illness was
work-related.

Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.

And/Or Ms. Eileen Morales Vs. Heirs Of Ricardo S. Ganal, Gemma B.
Boragay,
G.R. No. 220168
June 7, 2017
Topic: Seafarer entitlement to death and other benefits and Damages

Facts: Petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt
Hamburg. Ganal commenced his employment. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April
15, 2012, a party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship
was anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh. Ganal joined the party. The ship captain
noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to return to his cabin and take
a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. The crewmembers attempted to
accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They tried to restrain him but he
resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran towards the ship's railings and,
without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crewmembers
immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direction where he jumped and
the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms thereafter. Contact was also
made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for Ganal, to no avail. Ganal
was later found dead and floating in the water.

Issue: Are respondents entitled to death and other benefits as well as damages by reason of the
demise of their predecessor-in-interest during the effectivity of his contract of
employment?

Ruling: No. In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in the
course of his employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place where he was
working. However, the accident, which produced this tragic result, did not arise out of
such employment. The necessary question that follows then is whether Ganal's act was
willful. The term "willful" means "voluntary and intentional", but not necessarily
 malicious. In the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed an
unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own
defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman. This Court held that
the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and
willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. In the same manner, Ganal's act of
intentionally jumping overboard, while in a state of intoxication, could be considered as
a deliberate and willful act on his own life, which is directly attributable to him. Indeed,
Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was just being
playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has been
defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it
signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. In any
case, regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners were able to prove that his act of jumping
was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should not be held responsible for the logical
consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard.

Ravengar Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and Marietta Vallespin
G.R. No. 221085
June 19, 2017
Topic: Constructive Dismissal

Facts:
Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security
Services. He was initially assigned to certain Mr. Solis in New Manila, Quezon City. He
was transferred to the 5th Avenue Condominium. Later, he was transferred to the Aspen
Tower Condominium which was his last duty on Oct. 4, 2010. Thereafter, Genghis Khan
Security promised to provide him a new assignment, which, however, did not happen.
On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against Genghis Khan Security for illegal
dismissal and money claims. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post
after his last duty. For his part, Genghis Khan Security denied that Ibon was placed on a
floating status for more than 6 months. It claimed that he was suspended on Oct. 4, 2010
for sleeping on the job. Genghis Khan Security added that Ibon was endorsed to another
client for re-assignment, which the latter refused because his license was due for
renewal. Since then, Ibon failed to report for work. Sometime in Nov. 2010, Ibon went to
Genghis Khan Security’s office to claim his 13th month pay, but the same was not given
to him because it was not yet due. Genghis Khan Security then received a call from
DOLE regarding Ibon’s claim for 13th month pay, which was later on settled during the
proceedings before the DOLE. It then sent letters to Ibon requiring him to report for
work, but he did not show up. Hence, Genghis Khan Security was surprised to receive
summons regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue:
 Whether or not the notice to report to work by a security agency to a security
guard during the 6-month off-detail period should include deployment to specific client
to prevent constructive dismissal from setting in.

Ruling:
Yes. The SC held that in Reyes vs. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was ruled
that temporary off-detail of a security guard is generally allowed, but is tantamount to
constructive dismissal if the floating status extends beyond 6 months. Citing Tatel vs.
JLFP Investigation, the court held that the SC in such case initially found that the
security guard was constructively dismissed notwithstanding the employer’s letter
ordering him to report back to work. It expounded that in spite of the reort-to-work
order, the security guard was still constructively dismissed because he was not given
another detail or assignment. On motion for reconsideration, however, the court
reversed its ruling after it was shown that the security guard was in fact assigned to a
specific client, but the latter refused the same and opted to wait for another posting.
A holistic analysis of the court’s disposition in JLFP Investigation reveals that: (1)
an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within 6 months from
his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and
(2) the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general
return-to-work order does not suffice.
Referring to Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation vs. Serrano, the SC
held that the employer was absolved even if the security guard was on a floating status
for more than 6 months because the latter refused the reassignment to another client.
Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, Genghis Khan Security
should have deployed Ibon to a specific client within 6 months from his last
assignment. The correspondences sent to Ibon merely required him to explain why he
did not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if Ibon
actually received the letters of Genghis Khan Security, he was still constructively
dismissed because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
Unlike in Exocet Security and JLFP Investigation, Genghis Khan Security is
guilty of constructive dismissal because it never attempted to redeploy Ibon to a
definite assignment or security detail.

Norman Panaligan, et. Al. v PHYVITA Enterprises Corporation

G.R. No. 202086
June 21, 2017
Topic: Illegal Dismissal
Facts: PanaliganEt. Al. (petitioners) were the employees of Phyvita assigned as Room boys at
“Starfleet” which was engaged in the business of health club massage parlor, spa and
other related services. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation reported an alleged theft
incident to the Police Station but the latter was not able to gather sufficient information
that would lead them as to who committed said theft. While the police investigation was
pending, Petitioners together with other employees filed a complaint against Starfleet
for underpayment of wages. Subsequently, Starfleet’s Assistant Operations Manager
issued individual Office Memoranda against Petitioners directing them to explain in
writing for the alleged violation Starfleet's rules and regulations, particularly any act of
dishonesty, more specifically their alleged involvement in a theft wherein important
documents and papers including cash were lost which happened. Petitioners were,
likewise, placed on preventive suspension. Petitioners contend that the charge of theft
against them was baseless. In fact, the said criminal complaint against them was
dismissed by the City Prosecutor for the simple reason that there was no direct, solid or
concrete proof directing them to the commission of theft. Starfleet also has no basis to
terminate them on the ground of loss of trust and confidence since said ground for
dismissal was without any basis or proof. Starfleet, on the other hand, claim that
petitioners' dismissal was legal since the commission of theft is a serious misconduct
and an act which gives rise to fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. Thus, it is a sufficient
ground to justify their dismissal. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against
petitioners is immaterial since they were still validly dismissed based on breach of trust.
They even alleged that the filing of the instant labor complaint was a mere afterthought.

Issue: whether or not there exists just and valid cause for the termination of PANALIGAN et
al.'s employment by PHYVITA?

Ruling: No. In order to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the
employee must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of duty duly supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence, which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In termination cases,
the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause.
In the case at bar, PHYVITA failed to adduce substantial evidence that would clearly
demonstrate that PANALIGAN, et al., have committed serious misconduct or have
performed actions that would warrant the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon
them by their employer. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Labor
Arbiter, no substantial evidence supports the allegation of theft leveled by PHYVITA
against PANALIGAN, et al. - the said criminal act being the underlying reason for the
dismissal of the latter from being employees of the former.

Zambrano, et. Al. v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation

G.R. No. 224099
June 21, 2017
Topic: illegal dismissal; unfair labor practice
Facts: Zambrano, et. Al. averred that they were employees of private respondent Philippine
Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (Phil Carpet). They were notified of the termination
of their employment on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business
losses. The petitioners argue that Phil Carpet did not totally cease its operations; that
most of the job orders of Phil Carpet were transferred to its wholly owned subsidiary,
Pacific Carpet; and that the signing of quitclaims did not bar them from pursuing their
case because they were made to believe that the closure was legal. On the other hand,
Phil Carpet averred that the termination of the petitioners' employment as a
consequence of its total closure and cessation of operations was in accordance with law
and supported by substantial evidence; that the petitioners could only offer bare and
self-serving claims and sham evidence such as financial statements that did not pertain
to Phil Carpet; and that under the Labor Code, any compromise settlement voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the regional office of the DOLE was
final and binding upon the parties. In their Reply, the petitioners alleged that the losses
of Phil Carpet were almost proportionate to the net income of its subsidiary, Pacific
Carpet; and that the alleged sale, which transpired between Phil Carpet and Pacific
Carpet, was simulated.

Issue: Were the petitioners terminated from employment for an authorized cause? Did the
dismissal of the petitioners’ amount to unfair labor practice?

Ruling: Yes, Under Article 298 of the Labor Code, closure or cessation of operation of the
establishment is an authorized cause for terminating an employee. Closure of business,
as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent further financial
drain upon an employer who cannot pay anymore his employees since business has
already stopped. In such a case, the employer is generally required to give separation
benefits to its employees, unless the closure is due to serious business losses. Phil
Carpet continuously incurred losses starting 2007, as shown by the Audited Financial
Statements, which were offered in evidence by the petitioners themselves. The
petitioners, in claiming that Phil Carpet continued to earn profit in 2011 and 2012,
disregarded the reason for such income, which was Phil Carpet's act of selling its
remaining inventories. Notwithstanding such income, Phil Carpet continued to incur
total comprehensive losses in the amounts of P9,559,716 and P12,768,277 for the years
2011 and 2012, respectively Thus, when an employer complies with the foregoing
conditions, the Court cannot prohibit closure "just because the business is not suffering
from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.

No, the dismissal dis not amount to unfair labor practice (ULP). Unfair labor practice refers to
acts that violate the workers' right to organize. There should be no dispute that all the
prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers' right to
self-organization. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if
it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-
organize. The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of
 proving it. Although there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of unfair labor
practice, the alleging party has the burden of proving it. In order to show that the
employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to
support the claim. Moreover, good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has
the duty to prove the same. The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty
imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet, which, they claimed,
constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific provisions,
which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court pronounce that Phil
Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground that they were dismissed from
employment simply because they were union officers and members. The constitutional
commitment to the policy of social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that
every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.

Claudia’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Ma. Realiza S. Tanguin

G.R. No. 221096
June 28, 2017
Topic: illegal dismissal; separation pay in lieu of reinstatement

Facts: Ma. RealizaTanguin, a billing supervisor of Claudia’s Kitchen, was placed on preventive
suspension by the Human Resources Manager, for allegedly forcing her co-employees to
buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the company premises.
Tanguin denied that she was selling during office hours but Claudia’s Kitchen contends
that some employees reported the same and eventually discovered her habitual
tardiness and gross negligence in the computation of the total number of hours worked
by her co-employees. Subsequently, they sent letters of notice to her. Tanguin filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Hence the appeal at bar, Claudia’s Kitchen argued that
the CA erred in awarding separation pay in the absence of any authorized cause for
termination of employment; and that its conclusion that it sought to terminate
respondent due to loss of confidence was refuted by the evidence on record. Tanguin
averred that the petitioners sent her notices to return to work only after she had filed an
illegal dismissal complaint against them before the Labor Arbiter; that on October 27,
2010, she was barred from entering her workplace by the Cost Comptroller; and that the
charges of negligence in computing the number of hours worked by her co-employees
and habitual tardiness were merely concocted.

Issue: Was there proper dismissal of employment? Was there abandonment on the part of
tanguin? And is the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement proper?

Ruling No, Tanguin was not dismissed but merely placed in preventive suspension. In cases of
illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause.16 But before the employer must bear the burden of
proving that the dismissal was legal, the employees must first establish by substantial
evidence that indeed they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no
question as to the legality or illegality thereof. Tanguin miserably failed to discharge this
 burden. She simply alleged that a security guard barred her from entering her
workplace. Yet, she offered no evidence to prove the same. Absent any evidence that she
was prevented from entering her workplace, what remained was her bare allegation,
which could not certainly be considered substantial evidence. At any rate, granting that
she was barred, there was a lawful basis therefor as she had been placed under
preventive suspension pending investigation. On the other hand, the petitioners were
able to prove that they did not dismiss Tanguin from employment because she was still
under investigation as evidenced by several notices20 requiring her to report to work
and submit an explanation as to the charges hurled against her

No, Tanguin was not guilty of abandonment. To constitute abandonment there must be a clear
and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of
returning. In this regard, two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. In this case, records are bereft of any
indication that Tanguin 's failure to report for work was with a clear intent to sever her
employment relationship with the petitioners. Mere absence or failure to report for
work, even after a notice to return to work has been served, is not enough to amount to
an abandonment of employment. Moreover, Tanguin's act of filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement negates any intention to abandon her
employment.

NO, the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement has no legal basis. Separation pay is
warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault,
such as those provided in Articles 298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of
illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an
employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the same
Code, being causes attributable to the employee's fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled
to separation pay. There was neither dismissal nor abandonment. The complaint had no
basis at the time Tanguin initiated the illegal dismissal case. The status quo ante was that
she was being asked to explain the accusation against her. Instead of complying, she
opted to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. It was premature, if not pre-emptive,
which the Court cannot tolerate or accommodate. At this time, her plea for
reinstatement, backwages and/or separation pay cannot be granted. Respondent should
return to work and answer the complaints against her and the petitioners should accept
her, without prejudice to the result of the investigation against her.