JRC Reference Report 2009 10 Geol Disposal

J R C R E F E R E N C E R E P O R T S
Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste:

Moving Towards Implementation
W.E. Falck and K.-F. Nilsson
2 0 0 9
Report EUR 23925 EN

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JRC 45385
EUR 23925 EN
ISBN 978-92-79-12697-0
ISSN 1018-5593
DOI 10.2790/12387
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Table of contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
1. Introduction 8
Objectives 8
Paradigm 8
Current status of work supporting the safety case 9
Topical areas of concern 10
2. The Technical Concept of Geological Disposal 10

Overview 10
Waste inventory 10
Waste forms 11
Waste containers 11
Buffer and backfill materials 12
Host rocks 13
Rock types 13
Geomechanical properties 14
Hydraulic properties 15
Processes affecting radionuclide behaviour 16
Overview 16
Thermochemical properties 17
Heterogeneous reactions 17
Redox-processes 18
Colloids and organic complexation 18
Biological activity 19
Gas generation and multi-phase flow processes 20
Interaction between repository components 20
3. Siting of Repositories 21
Regional geological setting 21
Selection strategies 22
Human intrusion risk as a criterion 23
4. Regulating Geological Disposal 23

Fundamental observations 23
Policy making and radiation protection 24
Differing needs of stakeholders 24
Enabling regulators 25
Regulatory gaps and inconsistencies 25
Towards a common understanding 26
5. The Safety Case 27
Conceptual overview 27
Simplification issues 29
Upscaling issues 29
The issue of timescales 30
Process relevance 30
Performance indicators 30
Conceptual and parameter uncertainty 30
The management of the safety case 31
Emerging issues 31
Best Available Technology (BAT) 31
Optimisation 32
Feedback from operational safety 32
6. Alternative Concepts 32
7. Confidence Building 33
Closing the issue 33
The use of natural analogues 33
Monitoring 34
Step-wise decision making 34
Continuing research 34
8. Knowledge Management 35
9. Other issues 36
Retrievability, reversibility and long-term storage 36
Advanced fuel cycles and partitioning & transmutation 36
10. Governance 37
11. Conclusions and Recommendations 37
12. Acknowledgements 40
13. References 40
JRC Reference Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report analyses the state-of-the-art of science, reached a state of maturity that will allow to proceed
technology and procedures needed to implement the with confidence towards a step-wise implementa-
desired end-point in (high-level) radioactive waste tion. This does not mean that research will stop at
management: deep geological disposal. A range of this point. Generic research will have to continue
topical areas of relevance has been identified: in response to general scientific developments and
to results from site specific investigations. Generic
• technical concepts research by its very nature has considerable scope
• regulatory issues for international collaboration and harmonisation
• confidence building of concepts and approaches and this will increase
• knowledge management confidence in the ensuing results. In fact, collabo-
• site selection ration and harmonisation has been practice since
• safety cases the early days of the EU Framework Programmes.
• alternative concepts Site specific investigations have to be repeated
• governance for each national programme, but harmonisation
of concepts and approaches will aid in confidence
However, this report does not address the engineer- building among stakeholders.
ing, construction or operation of a repository, such
as excavation, stabilisation, ventilation and drain- This study did not identify major conceptual and
age, waste transportation and waste emplacement research gaps for the host rocks and repository
equipment, or the pre-closure operational safety. systems currently envisaged, namely those in (indu-
rated) clays, fractured hard rocks and salt. It is ex-
Overall it has been observed that a certain level pected that the final reports on the EC programmes
of maturity has been reached in many scientific FUNMIG and NF-PRO will provide a comprehensive
and technical areas important to geological dis- picture of our knowledge of far-field and near-field
posal. There is a world-wide scientific consensus processes respectively. It is already sure that cer-
that safe geological disposal is technically feasi- tain processes still require better quantification
ble. This observation is supported by the fact that and for various coupled (thermal-hydraulic-me-
several countries, including Sweden and Finland, chanical-chemical) processes models still require
have defined road-maps for implementation with further development. However, the forthcoming re-
specific dates. Other countries, such as Germany sults are not likely to change the principal conclu-
or the UK, may be technically as advanced, but sions on the feasibility of geological disposal.
have not made much progress towards concrete
implementation steps or programmes have (tem- The report examines in broad terms the various
porarily) foundered, mainly for reasons of public elements of a deep geological repository system
acceptance. In other countries, particularly those for high-level waste and/or spent fuel, if the latter
that have more recently joined the EU, there are is declared a waste. These elements include the
still important deficits in knowledge acquisition waste forms, the containers, buffers and backfills,
and in funding all activities related to the develop- as well as host rocks. The respective safety func-
ment of waste management programmes with geo- tions, such as retention and buffering, are exam-
logical disposal as end-point. ined with respect to their conceptual development
and quantitative knowledge.
Research activities can be divided into site specific
and generic R&D activities. Generic research ad- The safety case is the major instrument to guide
dresses fundamental physical and chemical proc- and assess the development of a geological re-
esses as well materials properties and behaviour. pository. The conceptual approaches and remain-
It may also concern (knowledge) management and ing unresolved issues are examined. Overall it can
governance processes as well as regulatory proc- be concluded that this instrument has already at-
esses of relevance to geological disposal. Site tained a high degree of maturity and further work
specific research concerns the generation and col- mainly addresses confidence building issues. How-
lation of data and information on sites that may be ever, not all EU Member States have yet attained
considered for hosting a repository. Usually there is the same level of procedural understanding and
no clear-cut distinction between these two types of level of application for various socio-economic and
research. Generic research in a variety of areas has political reasons.
5
Site selection remains a contentious issue and has A number of terms, such as ‘Best Available Technol-
to balance technical requirements with constraints ogy’ (BAT) or ‘optimisation’ have been brought into
imposed by the availability of suitable host rock the discussions on radioactive waste management
formation on a national basis as well as socio-po- from other technical or regulatory areas. It may be
litical constraints. Repositories shared by two or argued that these are implicitly covered by the de-
more Member States may overcome some of the velopment of safety cases.
above constraints, but face various legal as well as
public acceptance challenges. In any case these is- Retrievability, reversibility and long-term storage
sues can only be resolved at the political level. as management options have entered the discus-
sion and respective socio-political or economic re-
Demonstration tests are an important instrument in quirements will have their bearing on the repository
confidence building, both within the scientific com- design and the timing of disposal programmes. The
munity and with respect to outside stakeholders. implications for the safety case are not yet clear,
Such tests are mainly carried out in the various Un- but it is well understood that these must not com-
derground Research Facilities (URFs), which in fact promise safety.
are the focal points for intensive collaboration.
Governance issues, i.e. the way a society arrives
While the scientific and technical community might at accepted waste management decisions, are
be quite confident that implementation can be- strongly related to confidence building. In the wake
gin, the situation with the regulator and the public of various failed national programmes a para-
in general may be different. Confidence building digm shift to more participatory decision making
among all stakeholders with a view to ‘close’ is- processes has occurred and it is also advocated
sues remains an important conceptual and prac- in international guidance documents. Such gov-
tical challenge. Two important instruments for ernance issues have been studied in a number of
confidence building are (natural) analogues and projects supported within both the Euratom and
monitoring activities. EC Framework Programmes over the years. It may
be noted, however, that there appears to be only
It is important to note that continuing R&D activities limited direct interaction between these sociology
are not a sign of immaturity or lack of confidence. oriented projects and the technical R&D projects.
General scientific developments may require to re-
visit even ‘closed’ issues from time to time in order The critical step in implementing waste manage-
to demonstrate that the scientific basis for deci- ment solutions is regulatory approval. This re-
sions is still valid or with a view to further increase quires an adequate set of regulations, criteria
margins of safety. for evaluation and that regulators are adequately
enabled. A paradigm shift away from a focus on
Knowledge management issues have found consid- human protection only towards environmental
erable attention in the past few years. While strate- protection is being observed. Harmonisation of
gies for corporate knowledge preservation and for the regulatory framework in Member States meets
preserving general scientific knowledge are being with some difficulties owing to varying historical
successfully developed in various other industries, and cultural traditions. However, the NEA LTSC-
strategies for the preservation of knowledge about project, for instance, concluded that such harmo-
a repository site over time-scales exceeding a few nisation would not be necessary, if consensus can
centuries are less clear. The most promising ap- be achieved over regulatory objectives. It may be
proach appears to be to develop an ‘active’ rela- noted that national regulations are typically based
tionship between the host community and the site, on ICRP and IAEA recommendations, which are
so that knowledge is continuously renewed. also reflected in EC guidance. A possible benefit
6
from harmonisation of regulatory criteria would be • mechanisms to demonstrate equivalency be-

that it may help to prevent risk displacement from tween Member States’ regulations might be a
one country to another through the development more efficient way forward than harmonised
of shared disposal solutions in countries with less or unified regulations;
stringent regulations.
• the awareness of the need to involve all stake-
As to the concern that EC, NEA and IAEA have over- holders in the decision making processes to-
lapping constituencies and possibly overlapping wards implementation of geological is now
areas of work and interest, one may note that the high throughout Europe;
de facto roles of the EC can be seen as providing the
policy framework and R&D funding, of the IAEA as • there are still unresolved issues on how to in-
providing regulatory guidance, and of the NEA as volve stakeholders in practice;
providing the conceptual framework.
• supporting more advanced countries in their
Overall it can thus be observed that effort to move to implementation is likely to
have synergetic effects in other countries by
• our scientific understanding of the processes increasing stakeholders confidence;
relevant for geological disposal is devel-
oped well enough to proceed with step-wise • the de facto roles of the EC can be seen as
implementation; providing the policy framework and R&D
funding, of the IAEA as providing regula-
• scientific and regulatory co-operation, e.g. tory guidance, while the NEA compiles and
through the Framework Programmes, ensures analyses the national experience with the
a Europe-wide harmonised level of scientific strategic principles and technical and social
understanding and regulatory oversight; aspects of implementation.
7
1. Introduction
Objectives • identify areas where harmonisation will help

to reduce resources use and increase stake-
Research and Development into the various as- holder acceptance, and to
pects of geological disposal of radioactive waste
can look back to a history of some four decades. • help to decide when enough research is
The question may be asked with justification which ‘enough’ vis-à-vis regulatory acceptance and
areas are sufficiently well understood so that the implementation of a repository.
issue can be ‘closed’ and where further work is
needed. In other words: how close are we to pro- The structure of the report is based on a deduc-
ceed to implementation. Of course, the different tive concept that begins with a descriptions of the
Member States of the European Union that have ac- objectives of geological disposal, the natural and
cumulated radioactive wastes are at rather differ- engineered system properties by which these ob-
ent stages of development as geological disposal jectives are to be achieved, the means by which this
is concerned. On the other hand, international or- is tested and demonstrated, namely in so-called
ganisations such as the IAEA and the OECD-NEA safety cases, and finally how these criteria are to
provide a forum for exchange and thus making ac- be used in selecting a suitable site. Added are ob-
cessible the know-how to all. servations on various overarching issues, such as
on confidence building within the scientific/techni-
Implementation is understood here to begin when cal community and among the various stakehold-
concrete steps to establish a final repository are ers, on governance issues and the implications for
taken, for instance by filing an application to con- the regulators. Given the fact that research on geo-
struct a repository, either as an individual national logical disposal has been going on for more than 40
effort or in the context of shared facilities. On the years and will continue for perhaps another 50 to
other hand, many national programmes are gradu- 100 years, knowledge management can become a
ally homing in on particular host rock formations, critical issue that is also discussed in this report.
with the generic research focussing on it and thus
making a gradual transition into site specific re- Note on the use of this report: the key findings in
search. From when on a programme can be called each section are highlighted by printing them in
‘implementing’ would also depend on the Member ‘bold’ typeface. In addition to the references cited
State’s regulatory philosophy and framework: in in the various sections, the reference list contains
some programmes intensive interaction between additional material for further reading.
operator and regulator takes place. At some stage
during this iterative process a formal license appli-
cation is submitted. In other countries the opera- Paradigm
tor develops the safety case without or only with
very limited interaction with the regulator and at It is widely agreed in the scientific and technical
the end submits a license application that is then community that geological disposal is the desir-
either granted or rejected by the regulator. able management end-point for highly radioactive
materials that arise from nuclear energy systems
Considering this backdrop, the present report and are considered waste. Deep geological dis-
was compiled to posal appears to be the most reliable post-closure
‘passively’ safe option as stipulated by Require-
• provide an overview over the recent past, cur- ment 5 of the draft Safety Requirements for geo-
rent and planned programmes of the IAEA, logical disposal (IAEA, in prep. f). Research into
OECD-NEA and the EU in the area of radio- the technical feasibility, the scientific implications
active waste disposal and to assess them with and the safety requirements has been going on for
respect to the completeness of coverage; more than three decades. While one major obstacle
against implementation of such management solu-
• identify those areas that can be covered by tions appears to be their public acceptance, one
generic research and thus can be supported may also ask at this point, whether generic RTD
by international collaborative research vis-à- world-wide up until now has adequately covered all
vis those areas that require site specific in- relevant aspects, which open questions are still be-
vestigations and thus need to be carried out ing addressed or need to be addressed, and what
by national organisations; further work is needed to demonstrate safety. It is
8
understood that in practical terms there will be no ability, long-term storage, as well as security
clear distinction between generic research and de- issues, resulting e.g. in different potential
tailed site characterisation work. radionuclide source terms or the reaction of
repository components to long exposure to
It is also important to note that ‘safety’ is a neces- the atmosphere,
sary pre-condition, though in practice the decision
of what is an acceptable safety is not necessar- • innovations in nuclear energy conversion sys-
ily made only by the regulator, but public accept- tems, such as a move to higher burn-ups or
ance may have a bearing on it. At the same time, new reactor types with different wastes,
the regulator has to ensure that other stakehold-
ers’ wishes do not compromise safety. In essence, • to confirm that previous work is still valid
a broad societal consensus is needed to enter into given new insights coming from other areas
the implementation phase. of research,
A stocktaking exercise and gap analysis will also • the desire to further increase the already
be valuable in the preparation of the next Frame- identified safety margins, and finally,
work Programme.
• scientific curiosity.
Current status of work supporting The first five are drivers coming immediately from
the safety case within the community of those concerned with
the safe disposal of radioactive waste, namely
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, a ‘safety the operators and regulators. The last driver re-
case’ may be broadly defined as a structured pres- fers to academic research that may not be direct-
entation of the evidence, analyses, and lines of rea- ed to the immediate needs of the safety case or
soning related to the long-term radiological safety performance assessment.
of a proposed or actual radioactive waste reposi-
tory. Research and development in supporting safe- It is important to stress that continuing research
ty cases has been going on for the past 30+ years does not indicate a lack of confidence in the princ-
and has reached a certain maturity in various topi- iple of geological disposal as such.
cal areas. The work has been funded largely by the
national programmes (operators and regulators) in The aim of international organisations, such as the
more advanced Member States, but a considerable OECD-NEA and IAEA, is to provide a sounding board
amount of resources has also been invested by the for national programmes and to organise collab-
European Commission. orative work on generic topics so that efforts can
be distributed and resources applied efficiently. In
Progress has been thus that scientists and engin- addition particularly the IAEA is working towards a
eers in general are confident that repositories that harmonisation of standards with a view to increase
will perform as expected over the projected time (public) acceptance of waste management solu-
horizon of 105 or even 106 years can be built. Never- tions. The membership in these organisations is
theless the long periods of time for which safety different, the OECD-NEA membership being nearly
has to be demonstrated remains a key challenge the same as that in EU25 plus Japan, Canada and
in the development of safety cases for geological the USA, while the IAEA addresses explicitly the
repositories (OECD-NEA, 2006i). needs of the less developed countries of their 145
strong membership.
While disposal research has reached a certain level
of maturity in a number of topical areas, continuing Implementation of any geological disposal project
work is driven by six main factors: will depend on the preparation of an adequate
safety case and on the licensing authorities deter-
• previously identified knowledge gaps, mining what is adequate and accepting the safety
case. It is therefore useful to review the status from
• changes in the overall radioactive waste man- both perspectives.
agement concepts, including the introduction
of the requirements for reversibility/retriev-
9
Topical areas of concern • providing for the scientific-technical basis to

support the chosen concepts, and
The tasks towards implementation of disposal so-
lutions can be subdivided into • undertakings to ensure confidence among
stakeholders.
• ensuring that an adequate regulatory frame-
work is in place This will be supported by a number of cross-cutting
or overarching areas of research an implementation
• development of a conceptual model, work, including resolving governance issues and
ensuring efficient knowledge management.
2. The Technical Concept of Geological Disposal
Overview to be placed on the integrity of the waste packages,

the buffer/backfill and other engineered elements
The fundamental objective of geological disposal of the repository itself. Granitic systems are under
is to retain radionuclides in either the engineered investigation in Sweden, Finland and Switzerland
repository or in the host rock so that they do not (as a second option), and are also considered by
enter the biosphere over a pre-defined time span. the Czech Republic as well as Spain.
Geological disposal relies on a sequence of com-
plementary and/or redundant barriers (a ‘defence- Clay formations are chosen such that discrete path-
in-depth’ concept), namely the waste form, the ways in form of fractures etc. will be minimal. Thus
container, the buffer/backfill, and the host rock the retention capacity of the host rock can play an
(cf. IAEA, 2003j). Each natural or engineered com- important role in retaining any radionuclides and
ponent of the disposal system is assumed to fulfil less emphasis can be placed in relative terms on
certain functions, either alone or in combination. the other system components. Belgium, France and
The relative degree of complementarity and redun- Switzerland are investigating this option in various
dancy required depends on the national legisla- types of plastic or indurated clays.
tion and the chosen host rock (see also OECD-NEA
2007g for a discussion on this subject). It may be In rock salt the main vector for radionuclide migra-
noted here that this teleological, engineering-type tion, the pore waters, is virtually absent. Thus the
concept has come under scrutiny and a more ho- various barrier elements can have a more equal
listic view of how the natural systems will react weighting, although their failure would be due to
to the disturbance introduced by the repository is any residual water present. Germany is the only
gradually being developed among geoscientists. European country that in earnest considers a
This view is guided inter alia by insights into how disposal option in salt.
for instance natural mineralisations are preserved
over very long time-scales.
Waste inventory
Three principal types of host rock are currently
under investigation in Europe: hardrocks such as The radioactive wastes due for disposal in a deep
granite, sedimentary rocks such as plastic or indu- repository have been in some instances accumulat-
rated clays, and rock salt. In the USA also volcanic ed over a period of more than six decades. Due to
tuffs are considered (Yucca Mountain). Depending poor record keeping and a lack of awareness of the
on the host rock, different emphasis has to be placed importance to be able to describe source terms ad-
on different elements of the disposal system. equately, the nuclide composition of many wastes
is not known or not known very precisely. In addi-
In granites discrete migration pathways will exist, tion to radionuclides, certain wastes destined for
but their frequency and length is difficult to assess deep disposal also contain chemo-toxic elements
quantitatively. For this reason more emphasis has or compounds.
10
Analysis of the elemental composition of legacy Given the limited number of principal disposal
wastes is often not possible for safety or com- concepts and the limited number of glass formu-
mercial reasons. Therefore, estimation techniques lations, harmonised approaches to process de-
based on the knowledge of previous processes and scription would be warranted. Research into glass
practices are being developed. The NEA currently corrosion in different types of environments and
has a project on the isotopic composition of spent due to the interaction with the various components
fuel under way (see http://www.nea.fr/html/sci- of a repository systems appears have reached a
ence/wpncs/ADSNF/index.html). certain maturity.
Spent fuel consists mainly of UO2-pellets with the

Waste forms fission products contained within. These pellets are
contained in the fuel cladding. Such fuel bundles
Two main types of high-level waste, respectively are placed in containers made of steel or a combi-
waste forms, are under consideration for deep nation of copper and steel. Thus the interaction of
geological disposal in Europe: vitrified high-level the fuel with the other components of the near-field
waste and spent nuclear fuel, should it be declared need to be investigated. Similar to glass, an exten-
a waste. In other countries (Australia, USA) ceram- sive body of research has been accumulated on this
ic- (e.g. VANCE , 2007) or phosphate-bonded (OEL- subject. This work indicates rapid dissolution of the
KERS & MONTEL , 2008) high-level waste forms are fuel in natural environments and in the absence of
also under investigation. In addition certain other geochemical buffers, such as the alkaline environ-
wastes containing long-lived radionuclides are also ment provided by concrete in the repository. Much
destined for geological disposal in some countries, of the basic research into spent fuel dissolution is
e.g. Switzerland. of generic nature and equally applicable to several
countries’ disposal systems. However, processes
A considerable amount of research has been and respective models need to be verified using
undertaken to understand the dissolution behav- site specific materials during the development of
iour of glass in the presence of different types of the safety case.
groundwater and other repository components. As
the choices of repository systems were narrowed Disposal concepts to date assume waste forms and
down, glass compositions were developed to suit spent fuel associated with past and current types
the anticipated geochemical conditions. All reposi- of reactors. New reactor types and changes in the
tory systems assume that the vitrified waste will fuel design will necessitate research into the be-
be emplaced in steel cylinders. Most of the current haviour of the respective spent fuels under reposi-
near-field designs assume that some argillaceous tory conditions, should they be declared waste and
material, either bentonite, bentonite/sand, ben- destined for direct disposal. Given the rising prices
tonite/crushed rock or crushed clay host rock will of uranium and general notions of resources con-
be in immediate contact with the steel, while in the servation together with the expectation that more
salt case this will be a mixture of crushed salt and new reactors will be built, it is not unlikely that the
bentonite. The chemical interaction of these three Member States concerned will review their policies
systems components has been extensively stud- on direct disposal. However, waste management
ied. The FP6 project NF-PRO in particular aimed to organisation have to be prepared for all eventual-
sum up the current knowledge of glass and fuel dis- ities and, hence, such research is needed.
solution and to identify and address any remaining
gaps. While there are indications that this research
area has reached a certain level of maturity, a var- Waste containers
iety of detail questions remain open and the unex-
pected behaviour of steel corrosion products (see The main function of the containers or canisters,
below) may require further investigation with re- once emplaced in the repository, is to provide the
spect to waste form dissolution. However, experts first physical and geochemical barrier against dis-
seem to agree that these questions mainly concern solution of the vitrified waste or spent fuel. Surface
the optimisation of the near-field of a disposal sys- temperatures of the waste packages will have been
tem, but would not compromise its fundamental let to drop below the boiling point of water in most
functioning (HODGKINSON, 2007). Member States, but the interactions between the
glass matrix and the argillaceous backfill materials
11
are difficult to assess under such conditions. In the behaviour of corrosion products at the interface
order to provide this function over the specified life between steel canisters and backfill require further
time, the canisters must also be able to resist the investigation (HODGKINSON, 2007).
geomechanical forces that will be exerted on them
after the closure of the repository. This is particular- Corrosion gases generated and their migration
ly an issue with the casks for spent fuel. While all- is being addressed in various national and EC
steel casks are designed to provide the strength in projects, e.g. DECOVALEX (http://www.decovalex.
themselves, copper canisters require steel inserts com/) or PAMINA (http://www.ip-pamina.eu/). For
to provide more strength against deformation. In the NEA-IGSC (http://www.nea.fr/html/rwm/igsc.
certain disposal systems, such as that envisaged html) gas generation and migration was identified
by Belgium, the primary carbon steel canister is as an important study subject.
surrounded by an overpack consisting of a layer of
portland cement cast into a stainless steel canister. More recent developments in the nuclear world,
This ‘supercontainer’ thus provides alkaline buf- such as a move to higher burn-up and the
fering in addition to mechanical strength and low introduction of mixed oxide (MOX) fuels, have
hydraulic conductivity. In general, the introduction necessitated the revision of container designs,
of foreign materials, such as alkaline cements, giving rise for a need for new research in this field.
is being reconsidered as the benefit of lowering New and revised designs have to accommodate
radionuclide solubilities and corrosion passivation higher thermal loads and are exposed to higher risks
is off-set by difficult to predict detrimental effects of radiation-induced embrittlement of structural
on argillaceous materials in the repository system. parts. The changed criticality risks – lower risks of
In other systems chemical buffering is provided by criticality, during the life-cycle of the canister can
the backfill. also be taken into account.
The number of types of canisters needed is deter- Additional references: IAEA (1987,1997,2003).
mined by the various reactor types and their asso-
ciated fuel assemblies that must be accommodated
in the canisters. As with most aspects of the dis- Buffer and backfill materials
posal system, one can group the research work into
generic type of research and work that has to be un- In virtually all repository designs the residual
dertaken on country-specific problems. There will space around wastes as well as the drifts and
be, however, groups of countries that require the shafts excavated for operational purposes must
same type of canister for a similar type of disposal be backfilled. This backfill is needed to prevent un-
environment. The project CATT (http://catt.jrc. controlled settling of the host rock onto the waste.
ec.europa.eu/) inter alia investigates how transfer- In addition the backfill may have various additional
able waste packaging designs might be. Materials safety functions attributed to it. Thus argillaceous
properties’ and structural strength analy-sis and backfill materials will provide a hydraulic and sorp-
modelling have reached a certain maturity. Current tion barrier against radionuclide migration. It also
research addresses specific design issues and fail- serves to ‘key in’ the repository into the excavation
ure modes and probabilities. damaged zone (EDZ), preventing rapid transport
pathways. These safety functions are challenged
There have been extensive research programmes by the inevitable drying out after the emplacement
over the past decades into the behaviour of of the hot waste canisters.
various types of steel and of copper in the different
engineered repository types. The long-term In clay and granite systems bentonite or bentonite/
behaviour of these materials has also assessed crushed host rock-mixtures are the buffer and back-
using man-made analogues, such as archaeological fill material of choice in most national programmes,
copper artefacts. Research into corrosion of steel while in salt systems mixtures of crushed rock salt
and copper in aqueous solutions appears to and bentonite are likely to be used. As there is only
have also reached a certain maturity, judging by one country left that considers disposal into salt
the smaller number of projects on the subject in formations, namely Germany, there is not much
recent years. While corrosion as such appears to scope for collaborative research and harmonisa-
be reasonably well understood, rate determining tion in this particular area. This applies to both, the
processes, and the behaviour at interfaces, such as geochemical and the geomechanical aspects.
12
Since the principal clay buffer and backfill systems other, and to a lesser degree radiolysis, can pro-
are largely site independent, they has provided duce significant amounts of hydrogen in a reposi-
ample scope for collaborative research, which is tory. This goes in hand with the thermal loading of
reflected particularly in the programmes of the buffer and backfill material. This complex scenario
NEA and the EC and in joint undertakings of these of corrosion under changing degrees of saturation
two organisations. and the fate of the corrosion products is not yet
fully understood and subject of ongoing research
Mineralogical, geochemical, hydraulic and geome- e.g. in the DECOVALEX project and new projects to
chanical aspects are closely related in clays and be initiated during FP7.
often several macroscopic phenomena are control-
led by the same microscopic process. The NEA in While much of the basic phenomena in clays are
particular has focused for many years the research understood, their quantification for given cases
in this field through the ‘Clay-Club’ and their work remains difficult. The complexity of the clay
on the engineered barrier zone (EBZ, OECD-NEA, mineralogy makes is often difficult to arrive at
2007a and earlier reports). A comprehensive and unique explanations and quantitative predictions.
scholarly review of clay as barrier was commis- Sources for suitable bentonites are not too
sioned by NEA and may have become the ultimate frequent around the World and many have been
word, if it had not been cut short by the unexpected extensively studied by now, but the situation is
death of its main author. The NEA will have the re- different with clay as host rock (see below). While
port completed, but also taking into account the the response of bentonite to changing conditions,
more practical aspects. such as water saturation at its boundaries,
temperature, salinity/pH of engrossing water etc.
Elevated temperatures will change the mineral-ogi- are reasonably well understood the combined
cal, geomechanical and hydraulic properties of clays effect and possible interactions between
and it is intended to keep the surface temperatures different mechanisms are still difficult to predict
of waste packages at the time of emplacement be- quantitatively. It can be expected that the project
low 100°C. Indeed, storage period and repository NF-PRO will provide a good picture of the current
layout is selected to keep the surface temperature status of knowledge and further research needs.
of canisters below this value that has been found to
be critical. The buffer and backfill materials will be It appears that no major phenomena have been
put in place with a water content that is at the opti- overlooked and further research will aid in quanti-
mum from a geomechanical point of view, allowing fying the functioning of buffers and backfills, rath-
e.g. maximum compaction. The heat emitted from er than putting the system as such into question.
the waste will dry out the materials and alter their
suction potential. A complex sequence of dehydra- Additional references: IAEA (1990,1992), OECD-
tion and rehydration of the materials will result. NEA (2003c,2003d,2004c,2005c, 2007a).
Elevated temperatures and the presence of corro-
sion products from waste and containers will also
alter the mineralogical assemblage in the clays, Host rocks
possibly changing the hydraulic properties due to
precipitation or dissolution of minerals. Such proc- Rock types
esses have been studied in small scale laboratory
experiments as well as in demonstration mock- In Europe salt as an envisaged host rock is
ups in laboratories and in underground research unique to Germany and therefore does not offer
laboratories, including the FEBEX in the Grimsel much scope of collaborative research, though
Laboratory (http://www.grimsel.com/pdfs/flg_ the Netherlands may be looking into this op-
febex_de.pdf). Many of these studies are not only tion also. Rock salt in massive formations, e.g.
relevant for buffer and backfill material, but clay as diapirs, offers some special properties, such as
a host rock in general. The new work programme convergence, which is effecting the sealing of a
of the NEA-IGSC acknowledges this in setting up repository. Particularly the geomechanical prop-
relevant cross-cutting activities. erties without and with thermal loading have
been studied extensively in Germany, both in the
Corrosion processes at the interface between can- laboratory and underground facilities (the Asse
isters and structural steel on side and clays on the former salt mine).
13
The following is mainly concerned with crystalline (coupled THM) over a few hundreds of years from
rocks and clays. There are three aspects of excavation to post-closure. While the development
the host rock that need to be investigated, its of numerical modelling tools can be undertaken
geomechanical properties, its hydraulic properties, on international level, much of the actual process
and its mineralogy and geochemistry. As has been investigations have to be site specific, taking into
noted before in the case of clay, these properties account the specificities of the geology selected.
are closely related to each other. This is less the
case for granite. Tunnels and other excavations in hard rock are usu-
ally stable over prolonged periods of time and do
Geomechanical properties not require any lining for geomechanical reasons.
In clays and salt the convergence, which is a de-
Waste packages, buffer, backfill and surrounding sired property during and after closure, requires
host rock form a complex system. Excavation of a built structures to keep the excavations open. This
repository causes changes in the stress patterns in will introduce considerable amounts of steel and
the rock, which in turn causes deformation. Some concrete into the repository environment. While
of the deformation will be passed onto other com- the concrete has desirable effects on the geochem-
ponents of the repository after closure. ical environment by lowering the solubility of many
radionuclides, its effect on the various clays can be
Mining and tunnelling techniques can look back to detrimental and their properties have to be care-
a centuries long tradition and the practical aspects fully chosen. Overall there seems to be a growing
are well established. Each host rock type and the consensus that at least in repositories that are con-
specific geological setting requires the appropri- structed in clays as host rocks only a minimum of
ate tunnelling technique. Tunnelling techniques additional foreign material should be introduced.
have to balance speed and economy with the spe-
cific requirements of a repository. Even more so By the same token, alteration processes that occur
than in conventional tunnel projects, it is impor- during the operational phase, such as oxidation of
tant during excavation to keep the disturbance of sulfidic minerals, will have some influence on both,
the surrounding rock to a minimum. The properties the geomechanical properties and the geochemical
of the resulting excavation damaged zone (EDZ) properties of the near-field. Such processes are the
have been and continue to be investigated in de- subject of the IP NF-PRO.
tail, as they will influence the overall permeability
of the backfilled and sealed repository. As several Considerations of constructability have several
waste management programmes move towards implications for the repository design. When
actual implementation, such construction and con- locating a repository, or parts of it, at the chosen
structability issues find more attention in the re- location one will generally aim for areas that are as
spective R&D programmes. homogeneous and undisturbed as possible. This
has both advantages for the isolation of the waste
Excavation will result in stress release and in- and the safety of construction. Fault zones would
creased permeability due to the opening frac- provide pathways for migration and may also provide
tures etc. These can be sealed to some extent additional challenges during the construction of
using geo-engineering techniques, but the seals drifts and other excavations. Geotechnical measures
may be subject to erosion over long time scales. to make safe certain parts of the excavations, for
Some clays exhibit self-healing properties e.g. instance by rock anchors, will introduce additional
due to convergence and this advantageous prop- foreign material into the repository and may have
erty has been investigated in detail from both, the to be considered in the safety case. As the actual
scientific and geo-engineering point of view. The construction of the repository proceeds generally
self-sealing and self-healing properties of rock an optimisation process will have to be put into
salt due to creep and convergence also have an place that weighs the various technical constraints
important safety function in repositories in this and safety objectives.
type of host rock.
The introduction of new operational concepts, such
The DECOVALEX project investigates the heat as retrievability and long-term (> 100 year) under-
transfer, fluid flow and stress/deformation/ ground storage, results in increased requirements
failure in rocks and buffer, and their interactions for the geomechanical stability of the open spaces
14
in a repository. Processes such as convergence statistical techniques. Even more difficult to cap-
and the ‘weathering’ of exposed rock surfaces will ture are time- and scenario-depended changes in
have to be approached in a slightly different way permeability due to, for instance, blocking of flow-
under those circumstances. The implications of paths by the precipitation of secondary minerals or,
delayed closure have been recognised, but not yet conversely, corrosive dissolution. The net effect of
fully investigated. the respective variability in parameter value distri-
bution can be investigated by developing ‘what if’-
Additional references: IAEA (2001,2003), OECD- type scenarios and sampling the system response.
NEA (2004d,2005b). A variety of models for this purpose has been de-
veloped over the past decades both, within the rad-
Hydraulic properties waste community and in other geoscientific areas.
This kind of uncertainty is also the subject of col-
Concerning their permeability, geological materials laborative project PAMINA (http://www.ip-pami-
are usually classified either as conducting in their na.eu/). While there is considerable added value
porous matrix or along discreet features, such as in international collaboration in the development
fractures. This distinction, which was originally de- of the respective techniques, actual assessments
veloped in the context of water resources investi- will have to be repeated at each planned repository
gations, is not so clear-cut in the low-permeability site in the context of detailed site investigation.
rocks chosen as host rocks for a geological reposi-
tory. Even granites that are typically considered to Depending on the geographical location, hydraulic
conduct on fractures only, can have a considerable conditions and other properties are expected to vary
water-filled ‘porosity’, though no or only negligible over longer time-scales. For instance, a glaciation
water movement may take place in this porosity do- is likely to reduce horizontal permeability as some
main. Conversely, there are also indurated clays in fracture systems will close due to an overburden of
which there can be considerable water movement several kilometres of ice. In any case, the ice cover
along fractures. will change the regional flow patterns by provid-
ing additional head and by modifying the recharge
The average permeability of rocks is scale de- areas and recharge rates. Akin to all climatological
pendent or in other words a reflection of the het- models, predicting the extent and distribution of
erogeneities in the rock. Single, high-permeability an ice cover over Scandinavia or the Alps is fraught
features may dominate the permeability at any with many uncertainties. For constructing the safe-
scale. While the properties of such features can ty case for repositories located in areas that may be
be assessed in the laboratory and the field, their subject to glacial conditions at some time, it may
frequency, spatial persistence and distribution is be more effective to understand whether and how
more difficult to elucidate. the flow patterns at repository depth would be sig-
nificantly changed. Various national and projects
For fractured rocks various in situ experiments under the IP FUNMIG have targeted this question
such as those at the Grimsel and Äspö sites are utilising for instance various isotope techniques.
aimed to develop methods for describing quan-
titatively the distribution of fractures and their The movement of water in clays is more controlled
hydraulic functioning using modern borehole geo- by physico-chemical effects rather than by classical
physical techniques in combination with tomo- fluid mechanics. Unless fractures provide a fast
graphic imaging. Tomographic imaging techniques pathway, water movement in clays is very slow.
in combination with modern analytical techniques This is confirmed on a long time scale and over
such as positron emission tomography (PET, e.g. considerable distances by salinity and isotopic
GRÜNDIG et al., 2007), or the permeation of rock studies. The bulk permeability of clays can be
samples with acrylic resins doped with radiotrac- significantly changed by ingressing fluid whose
ers followed by autoradiography (LESKINEN et al., constituents may interact with the clay minerals.
2007), help to better understand flow-path distri- Saline or high pH solutions, such as those
bution on the cm-scale. resulting from contact with concrete, can increase
permeabilities by disaggregation and reduced
This distribution, their interconnectivity and per- swelling pressure. Rearrangement of the mineral
meability at a regional scale cannot be known assemblage due to corrosion and newly formed
with certainty, but has to be approximated using minerals can lead to permanent changes. Some of
15
these changes may be considered detrimental to the While geochemical processes in clays have been
retention capacities of the clays for radionuclides. studied extensively for the past three decades,
These processes have been extensively studied and these processes have found less attention in gran-
continue to be studied under the IPs NF-PRO and ites. The general notion has been that the major
FUNMIG. Not all of the mineralogical processes are retention capacity is provided by fracture infills,
yet quantitatively understood. Once a repository that may be similar to clays or by a largely physical
site has been selected and site investigation work process that was dubbed ‘matrix diffusion’. Owing
has begun, some of the interaction studies will have to the generally lower geochemical retention ca-
to be repeated with the actual materials present in pacity in granites, compared to clays, safety cases
the area where the repository will be excavated. for repositories in such rocks place more emphasis
on the engineered barriers.
Additional references: IAEA (1999a), OECD-NEA
(1997b,1999b,2001a,2001b), Advection, hydrodynamic dispersion and diffusion
are the physical processes that shape the con-
centration distributions of radionuclides released
Processes affecting radionuclide behaviour from a repository. In soft clays diffusion will be the
dominating process, while in indurated clays there
Overview may be also advective transport along fractures.
Advective transport dominates in fractured rock,
Permeability and the mechanisms controlling provided there are no significant fracture infills. On
the migration of (dissolved) constituents in the the macroscopic level the presence of an assem-
porewaters are closely related. There is a wide blage of flowpath of differing length as well as the
spectrum of physical and chemical processes that velocity distribution within open fractures leads to
lead to the distribution and effects the retention of the phenomenon that is dubbed as hydrodynamic
constituents. The scale of the responsible features dispersion. These dispersion phenomena lead to
and associates processes may range from the a lower peak of absolute concentrations, but not
kilometre-scale to the molecular level. Thus the to retention sensu strictu, meaning that the total
migration behaviour of radionuclides is determined mass of migrating radionuclides is not lowered.
by the hydraulic properties of the respective host
rocks, the chemical properties of the element in The physical process that leads to retention and on
question and by the mineralogical and geochemical which safety cases for repositories in host rocks
properties of the material, buffer/backfill material such as granites have increasingly come to rely
or host rock, in which migration occurs. on is the one called ‘matrix diffusion’. Here one or
more classes of water-filled ‘pores’ are observed,
The way how the water itself moves in the various in which no advective movement takes place. Ra-
types of materials on a laboratory scale (cm to dm) dionuclides diffuse into these pores driven by con-
is becoming reasonably well understood. With concentrations gradients. When concentrations in the
siderable success tracer migration has also been in- adjacent fractures drop below those in the matrix,
vestigated in small domains, such as single fracture, the radionuclides are released again. As in the case
utilising rock laboratories such as those in Grimsel or of dispersion, this phenomenon lowers the peaks
Mol. One RTD component of the IP FUNMIG (http:// of absolute concentrations, but does not reduce
www.funmig.com/) is directed to investigate the re- the total mass of migrating radionuclides, unless
spective processes and their upscaling. Processes these are fixed by e.g. precipitation.
at the molecular level find increasing attention.
While in the past diffusion processes were studied
Clays, as buffers and backfill materials as well as using short rock columns that were treated largely
host rocks, have been studied extensively with re- as ‘black boxes’, progress in analytical and model-
spect to their mineralogy and how it may change ling methods is leading to a better understanding
when in contact with different repository materials. of processes at the microscopic level. IP FUNMIG
Various national programmes and namely the Clay has a dedicated RTD component on this area that
Club (http://www.nea.fr/html/rwm/clayclub.html) has fostered significant progress. These investiga-
participants studied how radionuclides are retained tions focus less on the purely physical processes,
and how this retention is changed in contact with rather than on their combination with sorption and
different repository materials (OECD-NEA, 2005b). (co-)precipitation processes.
16
There appears to be a wide consensus in the sci- some of these gaps explicitly now. This work is also
entific world that argillaceous materials and rock driven by the needs and findings of performance
salt as host rocks are capable of sufficiently retain- assessment calculations. Thus in recent years certain
ing the relevant radionuclides. Ongoing research fission products, such as selenium, have come
is mainly directed towards further increasing the into focus. The underlying causes for this change
safety margins and to demonstrate the overall re- in focus are a better definition of the repository
silience of the disposal systems to abnormal devel- radionuclide inventory and an improved design of
opments in the near field. the repository barriers that are expected to retain
efficiently uranium and transuranic elements. Work
The retention capacities of fractured rocks are low- towards better understanding the (geo-)chemistry
er and more difficult to predict quantitatively over of those ‘new’ radionuclides is ongoing.
the long term.
A major gap throughout the thermochemical
Additional references: GRENTHE & PUIGDOMENECH databases continues to be temperature correction
(1997), IAEA (1989,1999f, 2005a, 2005c, in press), data for equilibrium constants. The majority of
OECD-NEA (1997b,1998,1999b,2000a,2001a- speciation experiments have been and are carried
c,2002a,2005b,2005g). out under standard laboratory conditions, i.e. at
25°C and ambient pressure. A limited set of high-
Thermochemical properties temperature data are available for some major ions
that are found to be of interest for hydrothermal
At the beginning of the research into geological systems. While these would be relevant for the im-
disposal many fundamental thermo-chemical mediate area of the engineered repository, there is
properties of the majority of radionuclides were still a gap for the temperature range between 25
not known or not known quantitatively. Thus the and 150°C that would be expected in the backfill
occurrence of certain oxidation states of plutonium, and the host rock.
neptunium and americium was debated. A wide
field of research has been the chemical forms, or Another well-known gap are data to support ad-
speciation, of uranium and transuranic elements in vanced models for activity correction at higher
such complex media, as are porewaters in geological ionic strengths, such as that proposed by PITZER
materials. Most of the fundamental research into (1991). Currently only data for some major ions are
the chemistry of these elements has been carried available. These corrections will be needed when
out under conditions far from those occurring in the drying out of the buffer/backfill is to be mod-
nature with respect to element concentrations, elled and for far-field migration calculations with
ionic strengths, and ligands present. salt as host rock.
Various projects had been initiated over the past The IP FUNMIG comprises work packages to fill
two decades at EU and NEA level to address this gaps in the thermodynamic data, with particular
problem of missing and inconsistent thermo- emphasis on compounds relevant to geological
dynamic data, e.g. the CHEMVAL-project (FALCK disposal. Further work on actinides will be carried
et al., 1996). The NEA Thermodynamic Database out under FP7.
Project (http://www.nea.fr/html/dbtdb/) in partic-
ular has helped to improve this situation by critically Heterogeneous reactions
reviewing the available data, by identifying gaps and
by providing the rationale for targeted research. In Precipitation of pure phases, co-precipitation and
addition significant progress has been made in the sorption as processes can be reasonably well de-
development of a variety of spectroscopic techniques fined under equilibrium and laboratory conditions.
that allow the observation of speciation under con- In many natural systems, however, the respective
ditions that are close to those found in nature. reactions will be neither instantaneous nor revers-
ible; it becomes difficult to distinguish between the
It was found that there were knowledge gaps not three processes.
only in the chemistry of uranium and transuranic
elements, but also in the chemical properties of Sorption on near- and far-field materials has been
various common major elements. The workplan for studied for decades by now. In the early years pre-
the NEA TDB project for 2008 and beyond addresses dominantly batch experiments were carried out,
17
but it was soon realised that the conditions inves- reaction kinetics need to be considered in a given
tigated were far from any realities in the field. The system, but very few heterogeneous reaction kinetic
usual method of evaluating these experiments, re- data are available to this date for natural systems.
sulting in a single value for the distribution co-effi-
cient (Kd-value) was recognised as not reflecting in Redox-processes
situ conditions and not to have any prediction ca-
pabilities. Nevertheless, Kd-values are still widely The majority of the radionuclides of interest in the
produced and then used in performance assess- context of nuclear waste disposal occur in several
ment (PA) calculations. The underlying reason is valence states that may have distinctively differ-
that (probabilistic) PA calculations require simple ent geochemical mobilities. In general, the reduced
models in order to keep CPU-times at a reason- state is less mobile than the oxidised state, for in-
able level. More mechanistic descriptions of sorp- stance U(IV) vs. U(VI). It has been the objective
tion with a larger number of adjustable parameters of all near-field engineering designs to provide a
would result in a calculational complexity that high-pH environment, as under high pH values the
would be difficult to manage. A wide range of mod- solubilities of most metals are relatively low. Con-
els to describe sorption and its various controlling versely, there have been not been such decided at-
factors, including competing individual ions, major tempts to control the redox environment. It is tacitly
ion concentration, pH-value, has been developed assumed that the corrosion of structural steel and
over the years. Obviously, the more variables a ferrous metal packages would result in a reducing
model has, the better it can be adjusted to a given near-field environment.
reality, but in practice it is impossible to parameter-
ise all of these variables over the whole domain to Experimental investigations, whether on the near-
be investigated. The NEA Sorption Project intends field or on the far-field, are frequently hampered
to find a compromise between the sophistication of by the fact that it is difficult to achieve anaerobic
thermodynamic sorption models and the practical conditions in the laboratory or even in tests in un-
requirements of performance assessment. Hybrid derground research laboratories.
models that bound possible changes and provide a
parameterisation within these boundaries are be- In any case, the construction and operation of a
ing developed. deep repository will result in a redox anomaly un-
derground that is likely to take considerable time to
Simple pure phases involving radionuclides other dissipate. This process requires a sufficient redox
than uranium are not likely to occur in the far-field. buffering capacity of the surrounding host rock and
Along the potential migration pathways of radionu- of the far-field as a whole. While this may be not so
clides a wide variety of precipitation and dissolu- much of concern in the context of clay host rocks,
tion reactions between major system constituents as these frequently contain significant amounts of
can and will occur as the system develops and time reducing minerals such as pyrites, the situation is
progresses. Studies on natural systems have prov- different for fractured hard rock. The question here
en very valuable in helping to understand the fate is also whether the radionuclides experience suf-
of e.g. uranium. However, many other radionuclides ficiently long residence to become reduced.
do not occur in nature or have suitable analogues.
The structure of many of various naturally occurring These and related processes and properties re-
solid phases will be such that radionuclides can be main to be studied in depth in FP7 under the
accommodated in their lattice. In other words solid project ReCosy.
solutions and co-precipitation can occur. A compre-
hensive review of solid solutions as a process and Colloids and organic complexation
a state-of-the-art proposals for its description have
recently be completed on behalf of the NEA (BRUNO While complexation by simple inorganic and
et al., 2007). small organic ligands is being treated within the
various TDB projects, complexation by organic
Reactions within the aqueous phase are fast on macromolecules has been treated as a separate
the time-scale of interest for a repository. For het- issue owing to the wide variety of possible inter-
erogeneous reactions this is not necessarily so and actions and of molecule species involved. These
reaction kinetics can become a controlling factor. fulvic or humic acid molecules may range in size
The Damköhler-number would indicate, whether from small dissolved molecules to large ones
18
that would classify as colloidal particles. Colloi- Inorganic colloid formation was recognised as an-
dal particles, which range in size between 1 nm other vector for enhanced radionuclide migration.
and 1 μm, can also have inorganic sources, such Since colloids are not an entity, but rather a state
as eroded clay minerals or precipitates of major of matter in the aqueous phase, their state is easily
ions or radionuclides from porewaters. A variety disturbed by sampling procedures. A range of so-
of models to describe the binding behaviour in- phisticated analytical techniques have been devel-
cluding interaction with discrete binding sites and oped to investigate the interaction of radionuclides
unspecific interaction due to their polyeletrolytic with colloidal particles.
properties (surface complexation) have been pro-
posed. At the same time it has been attempted A major source of colloids in a repository system
to devise sampling and analytical techniques to is the bentonite buffer and backfill. Many experi-
investigate colloids and macromolecules as such ments aimed to understand the migration of such
as well as their complexing behaviour without colloids into the surrounding hard host rock have
disturbing the natural state. These activities had been carried out and continue to be carried out.
been harnessed together under EU and NEA aus- Colloid generation is a function of the very specific
pices in what became known as the CoCo-Club, geochemical conditions at a site and in the mate-
the Colloids and Complexes Club. rial under investigation. For this reason it is likely
that such investigations have to repeated for each
Owing to the difficulties in working with (redox- chosen repository design and assemblage of ma-
sensitive) transuranic elements and fission prod- terials. Colloid transport is also a function of the
ucts, much of the work on complexation by fulvic geochemical and flow conditions.
and humic substances to date was carried out with
uranium. In consequence, there are still consider- Colloid mediated transport of radionuclides is of
able knowledge gaps as far as the other elements particular concern as experimental evidence points
are concerned. to effects such as size exclusion, which may consid-
erably speed up the migration of colloids. The actu-
Another field that still is not very well understood al distribution of radionuclides in the three-phase
is the trilateral interaction between micro-organ- system water-colloid-rock is still difficult to predict
isms, organic (macro)molecules and radionuclides. and subject of continuing studies. While there is
The body of research on this subject is limited. clear evidence for colloid-mediated transport of
some radionuclides from laboratory experiments,
Many of the knowledge gaps with respect to or- the real importance of this mechanisms over long
ganic macromolecules are attributable to the very distances and long times scales needs to be as-
complex and changeable nature of these mole- sessed quantitatively in the context of a sensitivity
cules. Unlike other constituents, such as inorganic analysis, e.g. by making assumptions about en-
molecules or simple organic molecules, they do not hanced solubility or size exclusion effects.
re-appear necessarily as the same identifiable com-
pound. Important parameters, such as conforma- Biological activity
tion or molecular mass, can also easily be changed
by sampling and measuring procedures. The potential importance of microbial activity
for the evolution of the repository-relevant geo-
Thus, while the problems and their origin have chemical systems has long been underrated.
been established, a solution is not straightforward. This is not so much due to the neglect by those
There is still much more experimental work re- specifically involved in research on geological
quired to quantitatively understand the behaviour disposal, but rather a phenomenon common to
of transuranic elements and fission products (and all work on geochemical systems. It has often
indeed most metals) in waters containing fulvic and been reasoned that microbial activity cannot al-
humic substances. However, a sensitivity analysis ter thermodynamics and thus the end points of
within the performance assessment will show to chemical reactions are independent of microbial
what extent these uncertainties will influence the activity, which only would effect reaction rates.
final outcome of the PA. Projects such as PAMINA However, there may be several possible reaction
(http://www.ip-pamina.eu/) will offer some guid- pathways, each with a different end-point. As
ance for determining when enough research in the the actual pathways being followed may depend
context of a particular site has been done. on the reaction progress per time unit, microbes
19
might well be a determinant factor in outcome of of the saturation process after closure, counter-
a reactive chemical system. acted by the heat dissipation from the waste. The
dissipation of any gases generated depends on the
In comparison to other geochemical research, bio- geomechanical and geochemical repository evolu-
geochemical research has found comparatively tion as a whole, with many closely coupled proc-
little attention in the context of deep geological esses and process feedback. Individual processes
disposal. This in spite of the fact that over the past may be reasonably well understood, but not so the
twenty years viable microbial communities have complexity of the system.
been found even at great depth in geothermal sys-
tems on land and off-shore. There is only a limited number of conceptual and
numerical modelling tools available for such com-
Biogeochemical processes are one work package plex and transient processes. Hence, gas genera-
of the IP FUNMIG. The existence of micro-organ- tion and transport has been earmarked for further
isms in rocks at sites considered for deep reposi- investigation in FP7 as well by the NEA IGSC in their
tories has been demonstrated nearly ten years ago work programme for 2008 and beyond.
(e.g. PEDERSEN, 1999). Only a few laboratories are
undertaking research on the interaction of micro-
organisms with radionuclides of interest (e.g. MOLL Interaction between repository
et al., 2007). components
Overall the quantitative role of micro-organisms in The processes discussed above do not occur in iso-
repository development and far-field migration is lation, but interact in a variety of ways. Particularly
not fully understood yet. in the near field mechanical, hydraulic, thermal and
chemical processes are interacting in order to dis-
sipate the various man-made disturbances. These
Gas generation and multi-phase processes are mostly far from steady state and
flow processes rather transient in nature. Several international
projects currently address these problems from an
There are several situations in or around a reposi- experimental and modelling perspective, including
tory, where the flow of more than one phase has the DECOVALEX project.
to be considered. Corrosion of ferrous compo-
nents will change not only the geochemical redox An engineered repository effectively constitutes
environment, but will be also, together with ra- a geomechanical, hydraulic and geochemical
diolysis, a possible source of gases within a re- anomaly within the host rock body. A considerable
pository for high-level radioactive waste and/or thermal and chemical potential is stored within the
spent fuel. Significant amounts of hydrogen can waste and other components of the engineered
be produced in a repository. repository. These potentials will lead to a wide
variety of interaction of the components with each
As these corrosion processes go in hand with de- other and the surrounding rock. This has been rec-
hydration resulting from the decay heat emitted ognised for a long time and a considerable amount
from the waste, there has been a concern about of research in the national and international pro-
a possible fast dissipation of the hydrogen and grammes has been directed towards understand-
other, radioactive gases through cracked backing these interactions.
fill materials and the surrounding host rock. It is
still not clear whether the production of corrosion The different engineered repository components
gases would result in a three-phase system and are either put in place to fulfil different ‘safety
whether the overpressure could result in frac- function’ or are necessary for constructional and
tures opening which then would provide fast mi- operational reasons. Thus concrete may be used
gration pathways. in waste packages to create an alkaline environ-
ment that exhibits low solubilities for the radionu-
The amount produced and time distribution of the clides in question. At the same time the alkaline
gases arising depends on various factors during plumes originating in the cementitious compo-
repository evolution. Corrosion firstly depends on nents of the repository are of concern as they may
the availability of water, which in turn is a function alter the (e.g. swelling) properties of argillaceous
20
backfill materials and host rocks in a detrimental NF-PRO. While the geochemical and mineralogical
way. Hence, the interaction between alkaline solu- aspects of the alkaline transformations of the clays
tions and different types of clays has been exten- are reasonably well understood, the interaction
sively studied in past. The further interaction with with steel corrosion products and other feedback
corrosion products from steel waste packages and and coupling mechanisms into the geomechanical
structural materials forms part of the work under properties deserve further investigation.
3. Siting of Repositories
Regional geological setting In addition, the actual site within a geological for-
mation can be chosen so that flowpath lengths to
A geological repository will form together with the the surface and mixing/dilution are maximised. For
wider surrounding geology the system that is nec- instance, in an earlier UK site selection programme
essary to prevent radionuclides from reaching the one of the pre-stated conditions was that hydraulic
biosphere. Therefore, system parameters and ma- gradients and regional groundwater movements
terials properties not only in the immediate vicinity would be pointing towards the sea. Low perme-
of the repository are of relevance, but also those of ability formations in basin structures with recharge
the surrounding ‘catchment area’. from the margins only would be of similar advan-
tage, as discharge can only occur as ‘leakage’
Given a planning horizon in the order of 1 million across layers or fault zones. Current groundwater
years, a first general site selection criterion would flow patterns can be evaluated using numerical re-
be geological setting that has been stable for sev- gional hydrogeological models.
eral millions of years and is expected to remain
stable for several more millions of years. Stable Significant changes in climate, such as glacial peri-
does not necessarily mean ‘no change’, but rather ods, will have a profound effect on regional and lo-
settings with slow, steady and predictable changes cal groundwater circulation patterns. Groundwater
can be of advantage. Relevant changes can be of ages in the order of millions of years in argillaceous
tectonic or climatic nature. formations for instance foreseen for geological
repositories indicate, however, that these areas
The climate provides important boundary con- have not been affected by the last glaciations. The
ditions – past, present, and future one, for the situation is different for repositories planned to be
hydrogeological system (IAEA, 1999a). Ground- built at the margins of the Fenno-Scandian shield.
water is expected to be the main vector for ra- Glaciation is expected to profoundly change circu-
dionuclide migration. Slow rates of recharge lation patterns in fractured hard rock. The scientific
and discharge and, hence, slow rates of turn- debate is going on about how deep oxidising melt
over are of advantage. Over the past decades waters would penetrate and how the transients of
groundwater dating techniques using various accumulating and retreating iceshields will affect
stable isotopes and radionuclide decay chains actual circulation patterns.
have been developed. Such methods can not
only be applied to groundwater samples, but A further subject of deliberation and debate are in-
also to fluid inclusions in newly-formed miner- frequent tectonic or volcanic events. These issues
als for instance. Using such methods, it could be are usually addressed by expert opinion in conjunc-
demonstrated at sites considered for the con- tion with statistics. While a geologist or geophysi-
struction of deep geological repositories that cist may have a good ‘feeling’ for such issues, it is
ground- and porewaters have ages of several difficult to quantify such aggregate personal expe-
million years. This indicates that effectively no rience for use in safety assessments.
exchange or movement of water has taken place
over this period of time, that the main vector for In Europe, after 150+ years of geological research
radionuclide migration is absent. we have accumulated a wealth of information that
21
allows us to draw quite a detailed picture of the Selection strategies

geological formations in the top few hundred
metres of the Earth’s crust. Further relevant de- On a purely scientific and technical basis, two
tails have to be gathered during the site selec- strategies for site selection are thinkable: one can
tion and site investigation process. In the first pick a single site that is likely to be suitable and
instance preference is given to non-invasive tech- then attempt to demonstrate its suitability through
niques, such as seismics. Seismic techniques safety cases. Scientific logic has it, however, that
have greatly profited from the extensive devel- ‘suitability’ cannot be demonstrated, only unsuit-
opments in computing hard and software, which ability. It is largely a question of how ‘suitability’
are needed for the modelling and interpretation is defined. In the simplest instance it could mean
of the recorded signals. Much of the relevant that a given set of repository related parameters do
technology has been developed in the context of comply with a set of pre-defined objectives. This
hydrocarbon exploration. This and other fields of assumes, of course, that the pre-defined targets
geological research are concerned with develop- are relevant and adequate. It may not be possible
ing a three-dimensional picture of geological for- to be sure of the latter.
mations. Other such fields include facies analyses
that use knowledge of the genesis of sedimentary Alternatively, one can subject a range of potential
formations to make predictions about the lateral sites to a series of preliminary safety cases that
extent and distribution of internal structures in are designed to eliminate those that are unsuitable
sedimentary rock bodies. Such analyses are also or less suitable than others in the set. In practical
supported by geostatistical techniques, includ- cases the choices tend to be bounded by the types
ing for instance kriging. Such geostatistical tech- of host rocks available in the particular Member
niques are also used to make predictions about State. A possible outcome of such strategy is that
the spatial distribution of discontinuities such as no suitable site exists on the territory of the Mem-
faults and fractures. ber State in question. In practice, the site selection
process is complemented by preliminary design
It should be noted that invasive techniques, such studies. Site selection is a process that iterates
as drilling, have to be used judiciously in order between identifying desirable site properties and
not to compromise barriers. Pre-existing bore- engineering features that complement the natu-
holes from earlier explorations for raw materials, rally available site properties (IAEA, 1990, 2004c).
including water, can pose a significant problem Based on the concept of multiple, complementary
as standards and requirements for backfilling and redundant barriers host rock and engineered
were not adequate or have not been obeyed. Such repository features together prevent that radionu-
boreholes can provide short-circuits between dif- clides reach the biosphere. Ideally, the engineered
ferent geological formations that are difficult to features would only increase the safety margin, but
evaluate quantitatively. considering the availability of suitable host rocks,
some countries will have to put relative more em-
Overall the techniques and (numerical) models to phasis on the engineered features.
investigate the regional and local geological and
hydrogeological situation are sufficiently mature It is possible to develop a catalogue of criteria by
for the needs of geological disposal. which suitable regions can be identified. This cata-
logue would be based on the catalogue of FEPs (Fea-
Strategies for using all available geological and tures, Events, Processes) by trying to identify sites
hydrogeological information are being currently that have a maximum of desirable FEPs while mini-
developed with a view of an integrated assessment mising those that are undesirable. Fundamental cri-
in the context of the development of safety cases. teria include, for instance, long geological stability,
low hydraulic gradients and permeabilities, low ge-
It may be noted that this emphasis on ‘integration’ ochemical and other potentials, etc. In other words,
reflects a paradigm shift in approaching the prob- a geological system is sought out that exhibits in
lem of deep disposal, away from an engineering its natural state a low potential for change and very
approach towards an approach that tries to under- slow rates of change. In most Member State there is
stand repository evolution as a response of the ge- a certain amount of knowledge about the geology
ological systems to the foreign body ‘repository’. already available that directs the search and elimi-
nates particular regions at a very early stage.
22
The basic criteria for site selection are host rock in- systems, siting history, etc. vary among countries,
dependent and, therefore, can be developed on an sharing of best practice is considered more appro-
international basis. A harmonisation of the basic cri- priate than would be a harmonising approach.
teria would also ensure equal treatment of regions
within a country and the European Community as Given the fact that three major groups of promising
a whole. It would also facilitate trans-national so- host rocks have already been identified and basic
lutions, whether these involve shared repositor- repository designs developed, the iterative proce-
ies (cf. project SAPIERR, http://www.sapierr.net/) dure of site selection can probably be shortened for
or shared designs and other facilities (cf. project Member States newly entering into this phase.
CATT, http://catt.jrc.nl/). Due consideration has
to be given to the fact that repository programmes
are quite far advanced in several countries already; Human intrusion risk as a criterion
establishing such harmonised criteria should not
put these programmes in jeopardy. Site selection may also be the only viable strategy
to minimise the risk of inadvertent human intrusion
In practice, site selection is likely to be bounded also beyond a time-frame within which institutional
by non-scientific and non-technical criteria, such as control can be reasonably assured. Thus reposi-
the local acceptance, the availability of infrastruc- tory sites are chosen such that, based on today’s
ture, pre-existing nuclear activities, and a range of knowledge and needs, they would have as little
other socio-political and economic factors. In the potential as possible for raw materials (minerals,
past these considerations were often not made ex- ores, coal, oil, gas), (drinking) water or geothermal
plicit. However, many national programmes now are energy. This criterion would apply to all formations
introducing features to allow such considerations above and below the host formation and, of course,
to be made explicit, in appropriate partnership the host formation itself. Certain repository design
with local and regional stakeholders (OECD-NEA features also aim to minimise the consequences of
2007b). Because value systems, perceptions, legal inadvertent intrusion.
4. Regulating Geological Disposal
Fundamental observations mean less adequate protection in some countries,

but rather differing desired levels of confidence in
A recent NEA report summarises the regulatory ap- the ensuing safety. In fact, the effect of a repository
proaches to geological disposal and the underlying would not be detectable statistically even in the most
radiation protection criteria and societal processes exposed critical group for any of these constraints.
ranging from the policy making to the implementa-
tion level (OECD-NEA, 2007d). This report provides Radiation protection principles have seen a sig-
a concise yet comprehensive overview over its Mem- nificant evolution over the past decades, with
ber States’ regulatory systems and the underlying various general ethical notions, such as intergen-
regulatory philosophies. Significant differences in erational equity and protection of the environment,
the regulatory criteria between different countries being included. It is increasingly being realised that
were found. Thus dose constraints span a range a prescriptive approach focusing on one specific
from 0.1 to 0.3 mSv/year, while risk constraints are numerical value for one exposure model does not
either set at 10 -5 or 10 -6 per year. The IAEA stipulates necessarily provide optimal protection under all
0.3 mSv/year and 10 -5 per year (IAEA, in prep. f). It circumstances and may result in quite high societal
was concluded that when comparing the approaches costs without entailing adequate benefits. Radiation
in different countries not only the different numerical protection, as all other human activities, has to oper-
criteria need to be considered, but also the philoso- ate in a socio-economic context and certain trade-offs
phy and societal consensus that determine what ac- may provide overall benefits. However, for a number
ceptable consequences are and what not. However, of reasons, not the least political ones, this is only
it was also concluded that these variations do not slowly being acknowledged among regulators.
23
As has been noted in OECD-NEA (2007d) and else- ‘safety’ and what constitutes ‘protection’ is still lack-
where, the ethical dimension of radioactive waste ing to date (OECD-NEA, 2007d). The authors of this
management choices in general and of geological report concluded that is not possible to draw a picture
disposal in particular is gaining importance. Both, of an idealised, or even a typical, regulatory model for
international guidance and national regulations the different countries. It is also interesting to review
increasingly adopt concepts and language, such OECD-NEA (2007f), which contains a discussion of
as ‘intergenerational equity’ or ‘no undue burden the current thoughts on the state and future develop-
to future generations’ that reflect certain ethical ment of radiation protection that move away from the
notions and programmes. The ‘Joint Convention’ paradigms of dose as main measure and away from
(IAEA, 1997d) imposes in that way moral and legal humans as the only species to be protected.
obligation onto the signatory and ratifying states.
The development of safety cases iterates between
The traditions of the approach to implementing implementers and regulators. The implementers
regulations in different Member States are quite act within a given regulatory framework, while on
different. Some countries prefer a prescriptive ap- the other hand the regulators have to take realities
proach, whereby a given target value, e.g. a dose and real-life constraints into consideration. Regu-
is set and the safety case must be constructed to latory requirements must be practical. It must be
meet this target. Other countries prefer a collabora- possible to demonstrate that the requirements are
tive approach, whereby implementer and regulator met. At the same time, as science is progressing,
(and perhaps other stakeholders) work together to radiation protection and environmental legislation
arrive at a solution that is not only optimised with is being further developed.
respect to a specific regulatory target value.
Regulating a geological repository involves judge-
The increasing importance of stepwise decision ments on events and developments far into the
making and of reversibility and retrievability are future. For this reason it does not only involve tech-
changing the nature of repository design to a proc- nical judgements, but also value judgements and
ess that itself may span several generations. This ethical considerations, even though regulatory
poses difficulties for the regulatory decision mak- bodies might consider this outside their realm.
ing process and for the ability to maintain transpar-
ency (OECD-NEA, 2007d). The NEA compiles a database on the respective
regulatory framework in their Member States. The
signatory states to the ‘Joint Convention’ (IAEA,
Policy making and radiation protection 1997d) also have submitted information on the
regulatory framework to the secretariat, the IAEA.
Waste management in general and geological In their Net-Enabled Waste Management Data-
disposal in particular operate within a policy base (NEWMDB; http://www-newmdb.iaea.org/)
framework determined at a lever higher than the IAEA collects in addition to information about
that of the technical regulator. At this policy level the waste itself information on how the waste is
fundamental decision are made, such as those on managed and regulated.
the continued use of nuclear energy, reprocessing
vs. direct disposal of spent fuel, on disposal vs.
long-term storage and so forth. It is, however, Differing needs of stakeholders
not so straightforward to draw a border between
national policy questions and regulatory matters. The three main groups of stakeholders in geologi-
cal disposal, namely the implementer, the regulator
The role and competencies of national technical and the general public (which is understood here
regulators can vary considerably, reflecting the cul- as an all inclusive term), have differing needs and
tural differences and traditions and evolved with requirements for regulations.
time (OECD-NEA, 2003f). This has resulted in varying
radiation protection criteria and methods of demon- The implementer needs clear and preferably quan-
strating compliance with regulations (OECD-NEA, titative guidelines by which the process and its
2004k,2005i). Indeed, the bases for approaching risk end product can be designed. In principle the im-
and for setting these criteria vary as well (VARI, 2004). plementer would also prefer to have in place from
A commonly accepted definition of what constitutes the outset a clear set of regulations, requirements
24
and guidelines. However, as has been pointed out Peer reviews of regulatory bodies and participa-
at several places, regulating geological disposal is tion of regulators in international activities, such
in fact an ongoing process. as those organised by the IAEA and the NEA will
help to keep regulators at the forefront of develop-
The regulator, in principle, would also prefer clear ments and point to further enabling needs.
and quantifiable guidelines for which compliance
can be demonstrated easily. However, due to the
timescales involved compliance can only be dem- Regulatory gaps and inconsistencies
onstrated for the operational phase of the reposi-
tory, while there is no guarantee that monitoring The regulatory process for geological disposal has
to demonstrate compliance will be carried beyond been largely driven by radiation protection consid-
several generations. Regulators in general also erations, but various radionuclides are also rel-
seem to prefer solutions involving (active) institu- evant from a chemotoxicological point of view as
tional control and still seem to struggle somewhat has been pointed out earlier. No international or
with the concept that there cannot be active ongo- national legislation provides guidance on permissi-
ing control to assure safety. For this reason, regula- ble environmental concentrations for radionuclides
tors tend to require a reasonable demonstration of other than uranium (in some countries) and radon.
confinement, rather than that no harm is done to Improved engineering design has resulted in the
humans and the environment. predicted retention of the most important nuclides,
such as uranium and plutonium, with the effect
The actual needs of the general public at any that now long-lived, more ‘exotic’ nuclides, such as
time of the process are difficult to assess and, those of selenium, show up in performance assess-
hence, may be difficult to meet. Over the years ment calculations.
a number of tools to identify stakeholder con-
cerns have been developed and experience has Much of the existing radiation protection guidance
been gained with various techniques for involv- and legislation was originally drafted for medical,
ing the public in decision-making processes and laboratory and industrial exposures to discrete and
in addressing these concerns (e.g. OECD-NEA directly controllable sources of radiation. Hence,
2003e,2003k,2004e,2004f,2004m). Transparency the traditional basic measure in radiation protec-
of the decision making and licensing process is an tion is dose. However, calculating a ‘dose’ requires
overarching criterion. This transparency also needs knowledge, or assumptions, about possible expo-
to extend to the bases of the criteria for decision sure scenarios. The radiation protection commu-
making (OECD-NEA 2003e,2004e,2004i). nity has been very slow in accepting the fact that
humans live rather different lives in different parts
of the World and therefore would be subject to
Enabling regulators rather different exposure scenarios given the same
environmental concentrations. Making predictions,
Having regulations in place alone is not sufficient. or even assumptions, about life-styles beyond a
It must be assured that the regulatory bodies are few hundred years becomes rather speculative and
adequately equipped with competent and capable on the scale of millennia even meaningless. There-
staff. The regulatory and supporting activities, fore, a consensus is developing (ICRP, 2000; IAEA,
such as independent research, must be adequate- 2006a) that numerical criteria should only be used
ly funded. The regulators must be given the nec- as a reference or an indicator, rather than absolute
essary executive powers or the competence to limits in a legal sense. It should also be noted that
invoke executive support from other government the objective of radiation protection is not the ab-
bodies, if needed. In order to instil confidence solute prevention of harm, but rather the reduction
among all stakeholders, the regulator must be in- of the potential of harm to acceptable levels.
dependent. These points are also stipulated in Re-
quirement 1 of the draft IAEA Safety Requirements Regulators and implementers alike continue to
for geological disposal (IAEA, in prep. f) and in the struggle with the phenomenon that the public may
‘Joint Convention’ (IAEA, 1997d). Regulators must be less inclined to accept high-consequence/low-
be continuously trained so that they are enabled probability events than low-consequence/high-
to judge and challenge proposals put forward by probability events, though both may entail the
the implementer. same risk. Regulators have been responding to this
25
by prescribing different risk or target constraints. Member States have subject themselves to inter-
national peer review procedures of their respective
Exposures to disperse sources of low concentra- regulatory infrastructure.
tion and over potentially very long periods of time
is a comparatively new challenge and guidance and Overall there do appear to be no significant regu-
legislation is still being adapted. latory gaps in Member States. However, there are
differences in the regulatory approaches.
Further, as OECD-NEA (2007d) points out, the
‘Joint Convention’ leaves a number of important
terms and concepts undefined, for instance what Towards a common understanding
is exactly meant by ‘future generation’, which
leads to differing interpretations in different Though the regulatory approach might be differ-
Member States. ent in different Member States, it appears to be
important that some basic criteria and underly-
Not only do protection criteria and the methods of ing concepts are harmonised, for instance along
demonstrating compliance differ from country to the lines of thought developed by the RWMC
country, but the bases for setting the criteria ap- (OECD-NEA, 1997c). Framing common ideas on
pear to vary as well. In fact, the difference may our obligations to future generations may be an
even reflect difference in fundamental protection important conceptual and ethical issue to resolve
objectives. Within the NEA RWMC Regulators’ Fo- here. Otherwise such differences might raise con-
rum ’Long Term Safety Criteria (LTSC) group the ini- cern among stakeholders, who might consider
tial idea of arriving at a ‘collective opinion’ evolved themselves less protected in one Member State
to one of fostering a common understanding of the than in another. In the light of shared facilities
bases for regulation that countries have formulat- or services varying protection criteria might also
ed or are adopting (OECD-NEA, 2007d). A number raise concerns over risk displacement, as opera-
of important contributing factors were identified. tors might want to opt for solutions in countries
Among them are with less stringent regulations. However, there
will be limitations to harmonisation, as differing
• the complexity and non-uniformity of the de- approaches also reflect national regulatory cul-
cision making processes across nations, ture, values and technical differences in the Mem-
ber States’ programmes.
• a lack of consensus on how to characterise
and measure protection in the distant future, The need for an internationally harmonised ap-
proach to assessing safety cases has been recog-
• the range of institutions involved in decision nised by the regulatory authorities. At European
making, level the ‘European Pilot Study’ (BESNUS et al.,
2006; L ACOSTE , 2007) and at wider international
• not fully worked-out fundamental ethical is- level, the IAEA GEOSAF project have been initiat-
sues related to the nature of current society ed. In addition, a Working Party on Nuclear Safety
obligations to the future, and, reflecting all (WPNS) in the European Union is currently analys-
of this, ing to what extent common approaches to waste
management are implemented by its Member
• international guidance that has been evolving States. A preliminary conclusion from these efforts
with time and still is. is the observation that, while the regulatory frame-
work may differ considerably, the regulatory prac-
One of the goals of the IAEA has been to ensure tices do much less so. The latter is certainly owed
that radiation protection and subsidiary regula- to the intensive exchange between different regu-
tions are in place in all of its Member States. This latory authorities, implementers and international
is certainly now true in principle for the EU Member organisations as facilitators.
States, where many of the newer members appear
to have followed the IAEA guidelines and recom- Efforts to harmonise safety criteria in the industrial
mendations, while at the same time complying with aspects of the nuclear industry are somewhat more
both, the IAEA (FAO et al., 1996) and the European advanced, as is evidenced by WENRA’s (http://
(EURATOM, 1996) Basic Safety Standards. Some www.wenra.org/) efforts (WENRA, 2006).
26
The majority of EU regulators are represented in Rather than trying to unify at EU level all regula-
international groups, such as the WPNS or the RW- tions pertaining to geological disposal, it might
MC-Regulators’ Forum, which ensures, as it does be also more efficient to ensure through some
for the scientific community, a comparable level of international review process that these regula-
understanding in all Member States. tions are adequate and have a common set of
safety objectives.
Due to the wide variability in the regulatory ap-
proaches, it appears to be more efficient to develop Additional references: IAEA (1999b,2001,2005b,in
a common understanding of these approaches and prep. b), OECD-NEA (2000, 2002f)
the underlying safety objectives, but to abstain
from recommending a unified approach.
5. The Safety Case
Conceptual overview Many Member States face the difficulty that the
regulatory framework from which the accept-
Requirement 3 of the draft IAEA Safety Require- ance criteria are derived has to be developed
ments for geological disposal stipulates that “The concurrently with the safety case (see also Sec-
operator shall carry out safety assessments and tion 13). There is a good reason for this, as both
develop a safety case, ...”. A ‘safety case’ may be are informed by the same type of fundamental
broadly defined as a structured presentation of the research; as process and system understanding
evidence, analyses, and lines of reasoning related improve, the regulatory framework as well as the
to the long-term radiological safety of a proposed safety case are refined.
or actual radioactive waste repository (OECD-NEA,
2004g). It aims to demonstrate that the repository The NEA, together with the EC and the IAEA, organ-
will function according to prescribed requirements ised in January 2007 an international symposium
and to expectations over a range of conditions in- (OECD-NEA, 2008c) that was aimed to be a stock-
cluding ones that are deemed unlikely or extreme. taking exercise with respect to the development
The safety case will be the basis for licensing a re- of safety cases. It was noted in particular that key
pository. Thus the safety case has to demonstrate evolutions over the past decade included:
that all possible features, events and processes
(FEPs) that might be of relevance over the pre- • Improved and structured documenta-
scribed time frame have been taken into account tion to favour clarity and traceability of
(OECD-NEA, 2000a; MAZUREK et al. 2003) and that argumentation;
adequate levels of protection are achieved (Require-
ment 13; IAEA, in prep. f). Moreover these FEPs have • argumentation that demonstrates the know-
to be understood quantitatively with a certain level ledge base accumulated by the project;
of confidence in order to be able to demonstrate in
safety assessments that acceptance levels are met. • the development of more sophisticated ana-
lytical tools and databases,
Establishing a safety case consists of three major
activities, namely the development of a conceptual • the introduction of new conceptual tools, such
site model, collating site and process data to sup- as the concept of safety function, that embody
port the model, and making predictions about the key aspects of performance of the geological
future development of the site using these data disposal system and from which internal re-
and models. Considering and quantifying concep- quirements can be developed that relate the
tual and data uncertainties is a vital element in this ability of the disposal system to fulfil these
process. The quantifiable information will be com- functions, thus making more transparent the
plemented by scientific reasoning and expert opin- role of various components (and their syner-
ion, thus providing multiple lines of evidence. gies) in the disposal concept;
27
• the utilisation of performance and safety in-

dicators besides the traditional radiological used as performance indicators and for comparison
dose and risk indicators; of alternatives, but not as limits or targets. The last
observation also implies that a dose calculated for
• the open discussion – in the safety case itself a given repository system and evolution scenario
– of extant issues of concern and the identifi- will not be the only criterion for accepting or reject-
cation of a path forward to their resolution. ing a particular site and repository system. Further,
the decade-old paradigm that the environment will
Natural systems are usually complex and often be protected, if man is being protected has been
‘chaotic’ and therefore difficult or even impossible questioned and new guidelines for protecting the
to predict in quantitative terms over extended time environment and non-human species are being de-
scales. In order to capture possible outcomes, two veloped currently (OECD-NEA, 2007f).
conceptually somewhat different approaches to de-
veloping a safety case are possible and have been The term ‘safety case’ (or equivalent wording) is
used around the World: not used in all national regulatory frameworks.
Nevertheless, the internationally developed con-
a) the range of possible realities is captured by cepts and criteria for safety cases are important
parameter variation in numerical models and benchmarking tools. Whether and how safety
statistical sampling of the results; this is the cases could be made comparable has been exten-
domain of probabilistic performance assess- sively discussed in international fora. Various NEA
ment modelling. Alternatively, reports (e.g. OECD-NEA, 2007d) have given very
strong cautions that the results of different safety
b) no probabilistic performance modelling is cases cannot be compared directly due to the many
used, but a system of logical reasoning and ways in which they differ – the criteria, the sites,
bounding of system performance parameters the range of scenarios considered, the statistical
is developed. measured used to judge compliance, the various
assumptions and stylisations, etc. However, it may
The actual approach chosen by the respective be valuable in the European context for the purpose
waste management organisation depends on the of comparison and confidence building to develop
regulatory requirements. In practice often elements a translation scheme for the results from different
of both approaches are combined into a stream of types of safety cases. Putting a specific national
multiple evidence. safety cases into an international context would
certainly help to increase local confidence and ac-
The development of the fundamental concepts for a ceptance. Considering the already well-developed
safety case has been a truly international collabora- regulatory framework and repository programmes
tive effort and is largely independent of the host rock in several Member States, such procedure certainly
to be chosen. The country specific differences arise would be preferable over harmonisation. Interna-
from the differing regulatory requirements. In ad- tional efforts, such as the ‘European Pilot Study’
dition to the two fundamental approaches outlined (BESNUS et al., 2006; L ACOSTE , 2007) and at wider
above, the selected target measures may also dif- international level the GEOSAF project are aiming
fer. In some countries such measures may be doses to prepare the ground for more harmonisation. The
to particular critical groups, while in other countries NEA INTESC initiative (http://www.nea.fr/html/
these may be fluxes or concentrations of radionu- rwm/igsc_coreactivities.html#intesc) is aimed at
clides in particular environmental compartments. assessing recent experience in developing safety
cases and to identify areas of consensus and diver-
The concept of using doses alone to assess perform- gence, as well as ongoing challenges and emerging
ance and safety far into the future is being increas- trends, by comparing the approaches and results
ingly criticised, as it adds the additional uncertainty achieved in the various Member States.
of having to make assumptions about exposure sce-
narios for times far into the future. The history of The development of a safety case is an iterative and
modern man (homo sapiens) goes back only about recursive procedure that aims to optimise overall
200,000 years, therefore, it is not very likely that safety, taking into account the natural situation,
in a million years from now there will be a human engineering features and the applicable regula-
species with feeding and other habits similar to tory requirements. There may be several pathways
present-day man. Therefore, doses should only be to safety and different mixes of safety functions
28
that arrive at the same overall level of safety. For Upscaling issues
instance, repositories to built in argillaceous or
salt formation can put less emphasis on the long- Most natural processes are scale-dependent. Proc-
term performance of waste forms, packages and esses and parameter values derived from laboratory
the engineered near-field than a repository to built experiments have to be extrapolated to field condi-
in fractured hard-rock. Using, for instance, dose a tions (OECD-NEA, 1997b). Different processes may
measure, different repository concepts in different be dominating at different scales. For instance, in a
host rocks will achieve different levels of safety. small rock sample transport processes may governed
However, all currently investigated disposal con- by the porosity, while on the field scale transport in
cepts are capable of achieving dose levels are be- the same material may be dominated by fractures
low current regulatory requirements. that do not occur in the small sample. Drawing conclu-
sions from permeability measurements on the small
NEA is undertaking a review of safety assessment sample to the host rock bulk permeability would lead
methods and first results are expected in 2009; to erroneous results. The upscaling issue is closely
the project will be coordinated with PAMINA, and related to the question of heterogeneity. Given the
one possible product is a joint OECD-NEA/EC bro- limitations in resources, accessibility and others,
chure on the topic. These issues will also be dis- heterogeneous systems cannot be investigated in
cussed in more detail in the companion report on all details, but their behaviour must be inferred us-
the Safety Case. ing statistical techniques. Respective sampling strat-
egies and required sampling densities as well as a
Additional references: IAEA (1988,1993,1997,1999 quantitative assessment of the associated uncertain-
d,2000,2002,2003c2005a,2006,in press), OECD- ties continues to be the subject of research within
NEA (1997,1999,2001,2004d,2004g,2004h,2004m, and outside of the radioactive waste community.
2005f,2006c,2007c)
Many practical questions around repository design,
construction and operation cannot be resolved on a
Simplification issues theoretical basis, but practical experience is need-
ed (IAEA, 2001d). For this reasons several Mem-
For practical reasons numerical models that may ber States and other countries around the World
be used in probabilistic safety assessments have have constructed Underground Research Facilities
to be based on rather simple mechanistic models. (URFs) or have converted existing mines for this
For instance and as discussed above, these models purpose. These research facilities allow to confirm
still employ unconditional retardation factors for in situ concepts and data that have been developed
the radionuclide migration vector that are derived on small sample recovered from drill cores for in-
from distribution coefficients (Kd-values), though stance. The facilities are also used to test various
the conceptual problems and mechanistic limita- emplacement design etc. using non-radioactive
tions of Kd-values are well recognised. It needs to mock-ups. Examples include the simulation of
be quantitatively assessed for each case whether decay heat-loads by electric heaters. At some stage
and how simplifying assumptions will influence the the waste emplacement and sealing techniques
outcome of performance assessment calculations. will be also tested in situ using inactive compo-
It needs to be shown in particular that for a given nents. Realising that for the various groups of host
scenario the underlying assumptions are robust rocks synergies between the different research
and keep the overall model within a certain enve- undertakings can be generated and with a view to
lope, meaning that a more mechanistic model could increase the utilisation of URFs by opening them up
change the magnitude of the result, but not its ba- to partners with less advanced programmes, the
sic outcomes, such as calculated pathways. IAEA initiated a Network of Centres of Excellence
(http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/
The project PAMINA will help to clarify the picture wts_network.html). The objectives of the network
on simplification issues. are to encourage the transfer and preservation of
knowledge and technologies, to work on solutions
for Member States currently without URFs, to sup-
plement national efforts and promote public confi-
dence in waste disposal schemes, and to contribute
to the resolution of key technical issues.
29
The issue of timescales PAMINA (http://www.ip-pamina.eu/)is currently

investigating such issues and a cohesive strategy
As predictions about the post closure-future of the for dealing with this aspect will be developed at
repository are to be made, two questions about European level.
timescales automatically arise, namely for what pe-
riod of time do we need to make such predictions
and over what period of time can we make predic- Performance indicators
tions with some confidence (IAEA, 2000a). The de-
cision for which time horizon predictions have to be The traditionally used overall safety and perform-
made is largely an ethical one, though it is informed ance indicator is dose. Dose, however, depends on
by scientific research into overall future site devel- the scenario and receptor chosen, the evolution of
opment and associated probabilities. For instance, which over large timescales is highly uncertain. In
a possible criterion is the development of radio- recent years this concept has been criticised for be-
toxicity of the high-level waste or spent fuel. It will ing not very robust and because it may not neces-
take in the order of 100,000 years to reach natural sarily protect species other than humans (http://
levels. Implementers will have to show compliance www.nea.fr/html/rwm/safety_case/). More direct
with respective regulatory requirements, which and exposure scenario independent measures are
are ultimately based on ethical considerations. In provided by radionuclide concentrations in envi-
particular the NEA has been discussing this issue ronmental compartments or respective fluxes of
(OECD-NEA 2004j, 2006i), but it is concluded that radionuclides. The latter could also be compared
the ultimate decision rests with the national regu- with natural (geochemical) fluxes of comparable
lators. The issue is closely linked with that of con- elements. The project PAMINA is currently critically
fidence building. Scientist will have to successfully reviewing the complex of performance indicators
communicate to stakeholders their confidence in (BECKER & WOLF, 2008).
their own predictions of site development.
For certain radionuclides and depending on their
concentration not radiation dose but chemotoxic-
Process relevance ity can be of concern. Except for uranium in some
countries, there are no regulatory standards for
It is important that all relevant features, events and radionuclide concentrations in environmental com-
processes (FEPs) that might affect the safety case partments. Therefore, no performance indicators
are adequately captured. The basis for this is a can be built currently on this basis. This may re-
catalogue of FEPs. Which processes from the cata- quire some action on EU level.
logue of FEPs will be relevant is also closely related
to the questions of scale and simplifications made.
The NEA developed such a catalogue on a generic Conceptual and parameter uncertainty
basis (OECD-NEA, 2000a) and recently updated it.
Such catalogue will be universally applicable to all Each safety case will have a range of different
types of host rocks in all countries, though not all uncertainties associated with it. Some of the un-
actual FEPs are expected to occur in any one coun- certainties are reducible, e.g. the magnitude and
try. The catalogue of FEPs will serve as benchmark distribution of permeabilities, while others es-
for testing national safety cases for relevance sentially are not reducible, such as the future de-
and completeness. The use of ‘safety functions’ velopment of the climate. Reducibility is bounded
is emerging as an important tool to asses the rel- by numerous considerations, such as economical
evance of various processes and to define key sce- feasibility, the desire not to disturb the host rock
narios to be assessed. in question, or practicability of obtaining data. In
addition, there remains always a certain level of
If the output variability of a system, such as the uncertainty over whether the chosen conceptual
results of transport calculations, can be explained models are adequate and sufficient.
with a reasoned variability of input parameters at
a given scale level, then processes at a more de- Thus, it will not be possible to investigate in every
tailed level would not need to be investigated, if detail a repository site for reasons of limited re-
they do not result in a change in the variability of sources and in order not to disturb the natural sys-
the output at the higher level. Again the project tem unduly. It will also not be possible to quantify
30
in 3-D space all features and processes that may are organised in the context of the NEA task group
influence repository performance and develop- on Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC). In
ment over time. Therefore, the conceptual model the interest of confidence building among stake-
for the system as well as its parameterisation has holders, harmonised guidelines to the manage-
a certain amount of uncertainty associated with it. ment of safety cases and harmonised objectives
Quantitative methods to describe system variabil- may be desirable.
ity (OECD-NEA, 1998) and to decide on what level
of confidence is needed for an acceptable safety
case are required. Undue safety margins can be Emerging issues
very costly.
Best Available Technology (BAT)
These uncertainties impact on the safety case in
a variety of ways. It is important to quantify this This term originates in the engineering and project
impact in order to ensure that the system per- management field, where it refers to the process
formance remains within the expected limit for all that is designed to ensure that the best technical
interactions of the system components and for all solution is selected and implemented. The process-
states of the system parameters. It may be noted es formalises technology selection according to a
that propagation of uncertainties is likely to result predefined set of criteria. The purpose is to ensure
in ‘variant explosion’, which is usually contained by that e.g. technology selection is need driven, rather
expert judgement. than vendor driven.
Current internationally sponsored research aims As the concept of BAT is also being referred to in
to minimise the range of uncertainties, to capture the Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention
them quantitatively and to develop strategies to and Control (CEU, 1996) some cross-reference be-
handle them and to facilitate regulatory decision tween this Directive and regulations for geological
making (IAEA, 1997c; OECD-NEA, 2005f). This disposal of radioactive waste might be needed.
research includes the activities under PAMINA
(http://www.ip-pamina.eu/) and work sponsored One could argue, however, that the whole process
by the NEA. Hopefully, this work will result in of developing a safety case together with the feed-
greater confidence that uncertainties have been back into repository design in fact constitutes a
adequately captured. process to select BATs, though not the same termi-
nology is being used. Implicitly, the concept of BAT
may also be present in ICRP Publication 81 (ICRP,
The management of the safety case 2000). Recently the NEA Radioactive Waste Man-
agement Committee’s Regulators’ Forum has taken
Much of the current work around safety cases is up the subject and produced a first review of perti-
concerned with the management of its develop- nent literature (OECD-NEA, 2008b).
ment. The scientific communities that develop the
safety case as such and its modelling tools are In order to put safety cases into perspective, it
different from the communities that develop the may be worthwhile to examine and compare BAT
supporting scientific process and materials knowl- selection processes applied to other environ-
edge. Strategies and mechanisms have to be put mental projects. This might also contribute to
into place that ensure that all the available (geo-) confidence building.
scientific knowledge is utilised in developing the
safety case. This includes quantitative as well as There are, however, a number of conceptual ques-
qualitative information. The information has to be tions around BAT. For instance, how is it defined
utilised in a structured way so that individual ele- what constitutes a ‘best’ technology and how is
ments of information are given due weight and to ‘availability’ defined ? In the past this has led to
avoid bias. Conversely, knowledge gaps identified exaggerated demands by certain groups of stake-
from the perspective of the safety case have to be holders. For this reason in some countries the BAT
translated into research programmes. The AMIGO concept has been replaced by the BPO (Best Practi-
series workshops (OECD-NEA, 2007e), for instance, cal Option) concept. This in turn leads to a discus-
is intended to sample Member States practice and sion of what is to be considered ‘practical’. In all
experience in this particular area. The workshops cases there will be elements of judgement that are
31
driven by budgetary constraints as well as societal disposal this term may describe other features or
negotiations on acceptability. processes that are weighed against each other.
It should be noted that some countries that origi- Thus optimisation should be an inherent result of
nally championed this approach, which was bor- the safety case and the process leading to its de-
rowed from the well-established construction velopment and implementation.
engineering realm, are now backing away from the
use classical BAT/BPO concepts in emerging fields Feedback from operational safety
such as radioactive waste disposal. However, as re-
lying on numerical performance indicators is also As several national waste management pro-
being questioned considering the long timescales grammes move closer to implementation, the as-
involved, procedures are being developed that in- pect of operational safety becomes more relevant,
tend to demonstrate that sound scientific and engi- which is also reflected in the 2009ff work pro-
neering principles have been applied. gramme of e.g. the NEA IGSC. An operating repos-
itory will be a licensed nuclear facility and subject
Other parameter optimisation concepts and poli- to regulations in accordance with the Basic Safety
cies borrowed from adjacent fields of science and Standards of European Union (EURATOM, 1996)
industry include ALARA (As Low As Reasonably and/or the IAEA (FAO et al., 1996), The safety case
Achievable), which suffers from similar quantifica- has to consider any feedback from operational
tion issues as BAT and, hence, may not offer any safety requirements into the design and layout of
advantages over the processes and criteria used in a repository and its infrastructure. For instance,
developing safety cases. the need for ventilation may worsen the effects of
the EDZ and therefore have repercussions on the
Optimisation (long-term) performance of the repository. In the
same way the actual feasibility of construction
In the context of radiation protection this term re- is to be considered. Within the scope of generic
fers to a very specific process of judging various workplace and industrial safety standards there
costs and benefits that should lead to a minimisa- will be scope for a Europe-wide harmonisation in
tion of exposure while not resulting in other soci- safety requirements for repository construction
etal detriments. In the wider context of geological and operation.
6. Alternative Concepts
As has been recently emphasised by a collective generation (e.g. http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/

statement of the NEA RWMC (OECD-NEA, 2008d), ST/NE/NEFW/documents/BOSS_Flyer.pdf). In-
the preferred concept for the end point of radio- deed, the NEA LTSC group has considered the
active waste management is disposal in inland various options from different perspectives, rec-
deep geological formations (see also IAEA 2007f, ognising that isolation or dispersal strategies
in prep. f). For many countries deep geological over geological timescales are two end-members
disposal is the reference long-term management of a strategy to re-distribute risks in time and
solution. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile in space (OECD-NEA, 2007d).
the interest of confidence building to periodically
re-assess the overall reasoning that lead to this When scientific and societal knowledge have
concept. In the past other concepts have been grown, it may be valuable to re-visit decisions that
discussed and investigated, such as now aban- have been made mainly on the basis of technical
doned deep-sea seabed disposal. Deep borehole or political considerations. A step-wise decision
disposal concepts are considered as a disposal making approach during the implementation al-
solution for certain types of wastes and may be lows to accommodate scientific, technical and so-
applicable in countries with very limited waste cietal developments.
32
7. Confidence Building
Closing the issue to when a site is understood well enough. The use
of such non-quantitative methods and criteria is
A repository project is likely to go ahead when all being critically reviewed in the context of the IGSC
groups of stakeholders – scientists, engineers, of the NEA. As each site is different, it would be dif-
operators/implementers, regulators, local admin- ficult to develop generally applicable closing crite-
istrators and the general public – are sufficiently ria. It is likely that closure of scientific issues will be
confident that the repository will perform as de- an iterative procedure whereby a case is presented
signed (OECD-NEA, 2002e). In other words, confi- to the regulator/stakeholders once the implement-
dence needs to be established so that enough is er has enough confidence in the scientific findings
known to close the respective scientific and tech- and technical solutions to proceed. If not accepted
nical issues. There is no room here to enter into a by the regulator and/or stakeholders, a further
discussion of the epistemology of the science that round of refinement would be necessary. As far it
provides the basis for geological disposal. Much of concerns site-specific properties, this process is
the controversies over geological disposal is cen- largely driven by the local regulatory and political
tred on issues of truth, belief and trust. In prac- situation and, hence, may have limited scope for
tice, confidence building is made up of various harmonisation. Nevertheless guidance on how to
elements, including quality management, outreach proceed in generic terms might be helpful for those
and stakeholder interaction activities, manage- Member States that enter this phase. International
ment of uncertainties, and monitoring. NEA’s Forum fora and research projects help to define the state-
on Stakeholder Confidence (FSC) attempts to eluci- of-art of generic scientific issues and whether they
date experience in confidence building by “promot- can be considered ‘closed’ for the purpose of the
ing open discussion across the entire spectrum of safety case.
stakeholders in an atmosphere of trust and mutual
respect” (OECD-NEA, 2002f). Confidence building Confidence is the result of trust in the implement-
and providing multiple lines of evidence are essen- ing organisation. Trust is built by providing the
tial components supporting safety cases. assurance that the organisation is set up appropri-
ately to meet the requirements and to cover all the
No clear mechanisms and criteria exist to date to relevant issues.
determine quantitatively when an issue can be
closed. One also needs to distinguish between
site specific and generic aspects for which closure The use of natural analogues
needs to be sought. While in practice closure of ge-
neric issues is indicated by diminishing numbers of Natural (and anthropogenic) analogues have been
new research proposals in the field, this may not used for several decades in the development of
be a sufficient criterion from a regulatory point of process understanding and to test conceptual and
view. Notwithstanding the epistemological dimen- process models (e.g. MILLER et al., 2000; IAEA
sions, in practice more quantitative guidelines can 1989, 1999f, 2005c). More recently the potential
be derived from probabilistic performance assess- value of analogues for communicating with stake-
ment, whereby sensitivity analyses can demon- holders has been recognised.
strate whether a more precise knowledge would
improve the level of certainty in the safety case or While in the early years the use of natural
not. From a harmonisation and stakeholder trust analogues concentrated on understanding and
point of view, it would be desirable that the same parameterising processes as such, in more
level of confidence in scientific and technological recent years local and regional fluxes of natural
knowledge be achieved at international level. The (radioactive) geochemical constituents are being
development of closing criteria and mechanisms is used to deduct information on long-distance and
one of the open issues for the NEA and will be ad- long-time migration phenomena (e.g. IAEA 2005a,
dressed in 2009. in press; HELLMUTH et al., 2007) and the long-term
behaviour of the geological systems in general.
There are quantitative (geo)statistical methods For obvious reasons these phenomena are not
that can help to decide on the scope and extent accessible in another way.
of site investigation needed (cf. PAMINA, http://
www.ip-pamina.eu/). However, there is also a con- Nevertheless, detailed process analogues continue
siderable amount of expert judgement involved as to be studied under various programmes (e.g. IAEA
33
2005c). In these newer studies research focuses In the context of phased repository implementation
inter alia on how well the analogues actually repre- and delayed closure, for instance in the interest of
sent the processes for which they are chosen. retrievability, monitoring may become an important
management measure. Here it has to be shown that
It is expected that analogue studies will continue the repository does not degrade prematurely and
throughout the implementation phase and there that the safety functions are not compromised by
will be various synergies with generic material flux its prolonged open phase.
and element cycling studies.
Monitoring has also been included in the current FP7
call for proposals. It will be also addressed, to a de-
Monitoring gree, in the upcoming NEA RWMC project on revers-
ibility and retrievability. In addition a possible NEA
There is some confusion in the usage of the term IGSC workshop would focus on technological as-
‘monitoring’, which sometimes is applied to certain pects and advancements in monitoring techniques.
phases of and activities under the site investigation
process. Indeed, it can be difficult to discern between
e.g. baseline environmental monitoring and site in- Step-wise decision making
vestigations, as the two would run concurrently.
It becomes increasingly recognised that a step-wise
Strictly speaking monitoring activities are carried decision making process that allows for review and
out in order to confirm that individual natural or en- modification or even reversal of previous decisions is
gineered system features or the system as a whole likely to increase confidence into the overall project
behave as expected. Thus in the early phases of (OECD-NEA, 2004i). A step-by-step approach is also
implementation engineered systems may be moni- endorsed by the relevant draft IAEA Safety Require-
tored for their performance, e.g. for settling or the ments (Requirement 12; IAEA, in prep. f). While a
re-establishment of the natural hydraulic situation. step-wise approach has several benefits for both im-
Monitoring is particularly carried out during those plementer and regulator, as it reduces the reliance
phases of the implementation where there is still the on strict compliance with protection criteria at each
possibility for intervention (e.g. OECD-NEA, 2005n). step, it has also been accused of a sneaking approach
to implementation without overall assurance of com-
(Environmental) monitoring is also carried out as pliance, as in practice certain decisions are difficult
a confidence building measure with a view to dem- to revert. Overall, a step-wise approach, however,
onstrate to stakeholders that the disposal system will make the complex implementation process more
performs as expected, for instance to demonstrate tractable and therefore more transparent. Similar
that no releases of radionuclides occur. While such approaches are current practice in licensing complex
monitoring can be hardly justified on scientific projects, such as nuclear power stations. It should be
grounds, it can provide considerable reassurance noted that still a clear vision of the process, a ‘road
to the public. map’, is needed right from the beginning.
Long-term monitoring does provide considerable A stepwise decision making process that can
challenges for a variety of reasons: the probes have span several generations may be also seen in
to perform over very long periods of time under the ethical context of intergenerational equity.
very difficult conditions and without the possibil- A step-by-step approach allows succeeding gen-
ity for maintenance or replacement. The necessary erations to modify decisions according to their
connections from the surface to metering equip- expectations and needs, thus not prejudicing
ment also must not provide preferential pathways their freedom of choice.
for radionuclides. In other words the monitoring in-
stallations must not compromise safety functions.
However, it forms an integral part of the licensing Continuing research
procedure in some countries. For instance, Swit-
zerland plans to operate a special section of the The notion that an issue can be closed for the pur-
repository as underground research laboratory for poses of building a safety case leading to a license
monitoring its performance. application does not necessarily mean that re-
search on this particular issue will stop completely.
34
It is just an indication that there is sufficient confi- of understanding or confidence, but rather a con-
dence to proceed. As science continues to develop fidence building measure. This message needs to
in related and adjacent areas, an issue may need be conveyed to stakeholders (OECD-NEA, 1999a).
to be revisited taking into account these new sci- Continuing research also ensures that at any one
entific insights. This revision will help to decide, time the best available technical solution is chosen
whether there is still enough confidence to further and helps to increase safety margins by reducing
proceed with implementation in the chosen way, uncertainties. Furthermore, continuing research
or whether the issue needs to be reopened. Thus in all relevant areas is necessary to train new gen-
continuing research in particular areas that have erations of scientists, who will be working on the
been designated as ‘closed’ is not a sign of lack safety cases in decades to come.
8. Knowledge Management
Knowledge management has become a fashionable Scientific knowledge appears to have a life cycle of
term, but it lacks a clear definition. It appears that around 10 years, when issues tend to be revisited.
three distinct, but related processes are covered by Driving force frequently is the rate of innovation in
this term: first, the maintenance and preservation supporting technologies, for instance analytical
of knowledge within a particular organisation, i.e. techniques. Another driving force not to be ignored
corporate knowledge; secondly, preservation of is the cycle of rejuvenation in academia. Thus we
scientific knowledge about processes and phenom- currently see significant numbers of researcher,
ena in general, with a view to prevent ‘re-inventing who have driven the programmes over the past
wheels’; lastly, the passing on of information about three decades, leave the field to retire, and at the
a specific repository to ‘future’ generations. same time scientific subject are being re-opened by
younger generations. The problem of diminishing
The issue of how knowledge about a repository expertise is probably more acute in nuclear engi-
site might (need to) be communicated to future neering and in waste treatment technology than in
generations has been debated in various fora research into near- and far-field processes. In latter
extensively, but no final conclusions on the best areas a strong cross-linking with the generic geo-
way forward have been drawn. There are numerous and materials science community can be observed
examples from thousands of years of human history so that there is likely to be always a sufficiently
where people have left to posterity written or large pool of expertise and knowledge.
symbolic messages, but now we often cannot read
them anymore or do not understand their meaning. Maintaining and preserving corporate knowledge
Even in the case of symbols the effectiveness is can become an issue, if the time of active repository
rather questionable – who understands all the operation would be extended beyond a few decades
pictograms (e.g. for ‘Exit’, ‘Elevator’ and so on) perhaps (IAEA, 2007b). This type of knowledge
that are so fashionable today? The same symbol preservation is not unique to nuclear waste man-
may have different meanings in different cultures. agement organisations. A variety of strategies have
All this does not instil a great deal of confidence in been developed for other industries that would be
our capability to transfer knowledge intentionally applicable in the present context. The concerns of
beyond a few centuries and across significant knowledge management in the nuclear industry have
cultural borders. Semiotics will have to go a long been highlighted by a recent conference organised
way to arrive at messages and symbols that are by the IAEA in conjunction with other major players
universally understood. An emerging and important in the field (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meet-
way to preserve the knowledge about a site is by ings/Announcements.asp?ConfID=153).
building an active and durable relationship between
it and the hosting community (OECD-NEA 2007b; Additional references: IAEA (2001c, in prep c).
MAYS & PESCATORE, 2007).
35
9. Other issues
Retrievability, reversibility These new demands and concepts can have po-
and long-term storage tentially fundamental impacts on the safety case
and repository design (IAEA, in prep. g). Most of
The draft IAEA Safety Requirements (IAEA, in the original concepts for geological disposal as-
prep. f) state that “Disposal refers to the em- sumed more or less tacitly a comparatively short
placement of radioactive waste ... with no inten- operational phase between the actual construc-
tion of retrieving the waste” (original emphasis). tion of a repository and its final closure; at least
Recent discussions arising from considerations the filled parts of a repository would be backfilled
that range from resources conservation and re- and sealed as soon as possible. A repository de-
utilisation concerns to concerns over our current signed for (easy) retrievability may in fact consti-
ability to ensure long-term safety have started to tute an underground long-term storage facility.
question this paradigm (e.g. OECD-NEA, 2001e). This can have a number of implications for the
However, the draft Safety Requirements insist system performance and needs to be considered
that “No relaxation of safety standards or require- in the safety case. It is important that the system
ments could be allowed on the grounds that waste is designed in a way that both, retrievability and
retrieval may be possible or facilitated by a par- reversibility options do not compromise a reposi-
ticular provision. It would have to be assured that tory’s long-term safety. It may be noted that the
any such provision would not have an unaccept- waste can be always retrieved by ‘mining’ tech-
able adverse effect on safety or performance”. niques, albeit at significant cost and possibly risk
to (underground) workers.
Though not necessarily linked conceptually, the
terms retrievability and reversibility are often
mentioned together. Retrievability refers to tech- Advanced fuel cycles and partitioning
nical and management measures that would al- & transmutation
low to retrieve waste packages that have already
been emplaced in a repository and possibly back- Reactor systems and fuel cycles are under con-
filled (IAEA, 2001a, in prep. g). Conversely, revers- tinuous development and new systems may entail
ibility refers to measures and designs that ensure wastes and hence waste forms different from those
that each step of repository implementation can that arise from current nuclear energy systems. Re-
be retraced and different decisions taken. Thus processing, partitioning and transmutation change
reversibility may be an enabling element in step- the type and the amount of wastes that will have to be
wise decision making. There are various technical disposed of as well as the associated thermal load-
and management as well as political reasons why ing (IAEA, 2004a, OECD-NEA, 2003a,2005a,2006j;
these two concepts have been brought onto the EC project RED-IMPACT, http://www.red-impact.
agenda, but the discussion of which is beyond proj.kth.se/). This can have effects on the layout
the scope of the present report. The paradigm of and operation of a repository. There is a certain in-
‘stepwise decision making and implementation’ clination to adopt a delayed approach/long-term
was developed to reconcile some of the underly- storage and/or options of retrievability in order to
ing concerns. The safety and sustainability of de- keep waste management options open so that one
laying disposal beyond operational needs is still may eventually benefit from P&T or to accommo-
being debated (IAEA, 2002b,2003f,2006d). NEA’s date wastes from new fuel cycles. However, these
RWMC strongly advised against undue delays developments should not been used as an excuse
(OECD-NEA, 2008d) and the NEA plans to exam- to delay implementation of waste management
ine strategic and technical aspects of reversibility systems with geological disposal as the end-point
and retrievability. for residual wastes (OECD-NEA, 2008d).
36
10. Governance
Governance is the process whereby societies or or-

ganizations make important decisions, determine It is interesting to note in this context that little in-
whom they involve and how they render account teraction between the natural science and social
(PLUMTRE , 2006). An European Commission White science communities has taken place in the past.
Paper defined good governance as characterised Their main interface indeed has become the devel-
by excellence, independence, transparency, par- opment of the safety case. Some activities, such as
ticipation and accountability (CEC, 2001). the Forum on Stakeholder Confidence (FSC; http://
www.nea.fr/html/rwm/fsc.html) of the OECD-
A gradual shift from a purely technical to a socio- NEA feed directly into the process of developing
technical framing of the radioactive waste issue the bases for safety cases (OECD-NEA, 2002f).
can be observed over the past decades (e.g. BERG- COWAM in Practice (CIP; http://www.cowam.com/
MANS et al., 2008). Major crises and events seem spip.php?rubrique28) brings together stakehold-
to lead to cross-national reactions, but it is striking ers from various horizons to perform collaborative
that similar crises in RWM emerge in several coun- research in five European countries, while ARGONA
tries in spite of international exchange of informa- investigates how approaches of transparency and
tion and experience. deliberation relate to each other and also how they
relate to the political system in which decisions are
The importance of governance issues for the over- ultimately taken. The project aims to study the role
all implementation process is reflected by a variety that is played by mediators who facilitate public
of past and current (http://www.radwastegovern- engagement with nuclear waste management is-
ance.eu/) projects that aim to elucidate the soci- sues. Furthermore, the project investigates how
etal processes and to improve interaction between well risk communication can be organized taking
all stakeholders concerned: cultural aspects and different arenas of discourse
into account.
TRUSTNET http://www.trustnetinaction.
com/ Overall these projects indicate that certain lessons
COWAM http://www.cowam.org/ have been learnt in the larger context of radioac-
RISCOM II http://www.karinta-konsult.se/ tive waste management. It is now widely under-
RISCOM.htm stood that appropriate governance processes have
RISKGOV http://www.riskgov.com/ to be put in place so that desired final solutions
CETRAD http://www.grc.cf.ac.uk/cetrad/ in radioactive waste management can be brought
OBRA http://www.obraproject.eu/ closer to implementation.
ARGONA http://www.argonaproject.eu/
CIP http://www.cowam.com/spip. Additional references: IAEA (2002c), OECD-NEA
php?rubrique28) (2000,2002c-e,2003e,2003g,2003i-k, 2004a-b,
CARL http://www.carl-research.org/ 2004e-f,2004l-m,2005e,2005m,2006f-g, 2007b)
VARI & PESCATORE (2007).
11. Conclusions and Recommendations
It can be observed that a certain level of maturity level of detail or precision. Such reflections and
has been reached in many scientific and technical quantitative assessments are the subject of, for
areas relevant to geological disposal. The term instance, the PAMINA project. It is envisaged that
maturity means that those features, events and the results from this project will provide guidance
processes that are likely to be of importance have on when we can proceed to actual implementation
been identified. Maturity does not mean that all of with sufficient technical and scientific confidence.
these FEPs can now be sufficiently parameterised. The close scientific co-operation on a European
Therefore, research continues and has to continue and indeed world level ensures that all waste
for some time. By its very nature, research is curi- management programmes can draw on up-to-date
osity driven, but at the same time reflections are scientific knowledge. An added benefit is that sci-
undertaken on what we really need to know at what entific work contributing to national waste disposal
37
programmes and that is published in scientific implementation, the importance of involving stake-
journals is automatically subject to a peer review holders in an effective way has been recognised.
process. The objectives and means of effective stakeholder
involvement are reasonably well-established for at
• Overall, it appears that our scientific under- least some socio-cultural contexts. However, cer-
standing of most processes relevant to geo- tain scientific concepts are intrinsically difficult to
logical disposal is developed well enough communicate, most notably the concepts of prob-
to proceed with implementation in a step- ability and risk. As the Berne Conference (http://
wise fashion. www.icgr2007.org/) and the NEA RWMC (OECD-
NEA, 2008d) concluded, it is important and worth-
• Scientific co-operation, e.g. through the while to take the time necessary for an inclusive
Framework Programmes, ensures a Europe- and rigorous process of stakeholder involvement.
wide harmonised level of scientific under- Both, the EC and the NEA are addressing this deci-
standing. Such co-operation should continue sive issue explicitly. Within cultural limits, it seems
to be supported. to be important that the same concepts of govern-
ance be applied throughout the EU.
Given the conceptual and scientific maturity of geo-
logical disposal in principle, it would appear to be • The awareness of the need to involve all
important to proceed to construction in those Mem- stakeholders in the decision making proc-
ber States that have sufficiently advanced the site esses towards implementation of geological
selection programme. This step is needed to test in disposal is now high throughout Europe.
practice the paradigm of step-wise decision mak-
ing. At the same time it allows the real-scale testing • Experience on how to involve stakeholders in
of the various scientific and technical hypotheses practice is still being built up.
and proposed technologies.
• Design and operational requirements (such as
• A real example will demonstrate that imple- e.g. retrievability or access for monitoring) in-
mentation of geological disposal is feasi- troduced through the public participation proc-
ble. International support to national pro- ess may not compromise (long-term) safety.
grammes that are far advanced are likely to
have Europe-wide spin-off benefits.
• For less advanced Member States and for The regulator has the task to balance the needs and
those with more limited resources it would be interests of the public and the implementers. The
beneficial to support the development of joint main objective of regulations is the protection of hu-
solutions, either in the form of shared reposi- mans and of the environment from potential adverse
tories or in the form of sharing technology. effects ensuing from the chosen nuclear waste man-
agement solution. The ultima ratio in regulation is
The key element in moving towards implementation the respective national law, which has to be in place
is the development of safety cases. A safety case is before any implementation can take place. A har-
a structured presentation of the evidence, analyses, monised European regulatory framework could be
and lines of reasoning related to the long-term of some advantage, but would be difficult to bring
radiological safety of a radioactive waste repository. about, considering the diverse regulatory ‘cultures’
and that some Member State already have national
• In the interest of confidence building in the regulations in place. Re-opening this process would
process as such and among stakeholders, a certainly set back some national programmes and
harmonised strategy to the management of entail considerable expenditure.
safety cases would be desirable. Support
to the various harmonisation initiatives • Mechanisms to demonstrate that regulatory
should continue. objectives in the different Member States are
comparable will help to increase confidence
An important element in confidence building is among all parties concerned. Respective
interaction with stakeholders. Owing to major Europe- and world-wide initiatives should
set-backs in some Member States on the road to be supported.
38
• Mechanisms to demonstrate that Member financial means that can be used to fund targeted
States’ regulations provide comparable pro- research. Many important nuclear waste disposal
tection might be a more efficient way forward R&D projects have been co-funded over the past
than fully harmonised or unified regulations. decades by the Euratom Framework Programmes.
One aspect of concern can be the question wheth- The IAEA is formulating technical guidance and reg-
er regulators in Member States are actually ready ulatory guidance based on consensus. In addition,
and capable to handle license applications. The Member States may subject themselves voluntarily
application review process requires that adequate to binding agreements, such as the ‘Joint Conven-
numbers of staff with an appropriate training are tion’ (IAEA, 1997d) for which the IAEA provides the
available. Enabling and resourcing regulators is secretariat. IAEA guidance is frequently used to in-
likely to become an important task in the near form and in drafting national guidance and (bind-
future in some Member States and could become ing) legislation. However, the IAEA does not have
an obstacle to implementation, if not addressed executive powers and non-compliance can only be
in due time. sanctioned by publicly exposing the culprit. The
IAEA has limited amounts of funds that can be used
• The European Commission needs to ensure to stimulate research in particular areas for instance
that National regulators are capable to per- in the form of ‘Co-ordinated Research Projects’ and
form the needed tasks. Joint programmes be- to provide seed money for joint projects funded by
tween the international organisations aimed national means.
at enabling the regulators in less advanced
countries would help to reach an adequate The NEA provides more of a forum of exchange and
level of preparedness in all Member States. a ‘think tank’. It does not issue documents that are
intended to inform or draft national regulation or
There is a considerable overlap between the con- guidance documents, but rather documents that
stituencies of the EC, NEA and IAEA. All EU and NEA intend to conceptualise the issues under discus-
Member States are members of the IAEA, while the sion. These issues can be of scientific, technical,
majority of EU Member States are in turn also mem- governance or regulatory nature. The NEA does not
bers of the NEA. While for this reason an overlap in have any research budget of its own, but solicits
the interests and working areas between the three voluntary contributions from interested parties in
organisations can be expected, in practice the man- member states to fund targeted research.
date and working practices are quite different.
• Thus the de facto roles of the EC can be seen
The EC, unlike the other two organisations, has as providing the policy framework and R&D
legislative powers (right of initiative) and EU ‘Di- funding, of the IAEA as providing regulatory
rectives’ have to be implemented in national leg- and technological guidance, and of the NEA as
islation. In its role as defender of the Treaties, the compiling and analysing national experiences
EC has executive powers that can be exercised in terms of strategic principles and scientific
e.g. via sanctions. The EC also has considerable and societal aspects of implementation.
39
12. Acknowledgements
A number of individuals kindly reviewed the draft for this document and provided their comments; these
include G. Bruno (DG-TREN), S. Webster (DG-RTD), E. Forinash and C. Mays (OECD-NEA), as well as N.
Taylor and R. Burcl (IE, DG-JRC).
13. References
Note: Below a rather comprehensive list of reports produced by the relevant international organisations
is given. It lists additional reports to those cited in the above text.
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40
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41
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42
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51
European Commission
EUR 23925 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy
Title: Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Moving Towards Implementation
Authors: W.E. Falck and K.-F. Nilsson
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

2009 – 52 pp. – 21.0 x 29.7 cm
EUR – Scientific and Technical Research series – ISSN 1018-5593
ISBN 978-92-79-12697-0
Catalogue number LD-NA-23925-EN-C
DOI 10.2790/12387
Abstract
The present report reviews the current state of science and technology that form the basis for implementing geological repositories for
high-level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel. It is concluded that enough is known about the relevant natural and man-made systems to
proceed with a step-wise implementation. The scope for harmonisation of procedures and regulations on a European level is investigated.
Public acceptance of the scientifically preferred solution of deep disposal is still low in many European countries and more needs to be done
to involve stakeholders in decision making processes in a meaningful way. It also needs to be ensured that national regulators are enabled
to adequately process license applications for deep repositories.
The mission of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical sup-
port for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of European Union policies. As a
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for
LD-NA-23925-EN-C
the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the Member States, while
being independent of special interests, whether private or national.

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J R C R E F E R E N C E R E P O R T S

Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste:

W.E. Falck and K.-F. Nilsson

Report EUR 23925 EN

This publication is a Reference Report by the Joint Research Centre

Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11

Luxembourg: Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities

© European Communities, 2009

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

Printed in the Netherlands

2. The Technical Concept of Geological Disposal 10

4. Regulating Geological Disposal 23

11. Conclusions and Recommendations 37

from harmonisation of regulatory criteria would be • mechanisms to demonstrate equivalency be-

Objectives • identify areas where harmonisation will help

Topical areas of concern • providing for the scientific-technical basis to

2. The Technical Concept of Geological Disposal

Overview to be placed on the integrity of the waste packages,

Spent fuel consists mainly of UO2-pellets with the

allows us to draw quite a detailed picture of the Selection strategies

4. Regulating Geological Disposal

Fundamental observations mean less adequate protection in some countries,

5. The Safety Case

• the utilisation of performance and safety in-

The issue of timescales PAMINA (http://www.ip-pamina.eu/)is currently

As has been recently emphasised by a collective generation (e.g. http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/

Governance is the process whereby societies or or-

11. Conclusions and Recommendations

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON R ADIATION PROTECTION (2000): Radiation Protection Recommendations as

OECD-NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (1999b): Water-conducting Features in Radionuclide Migration. Workshop

OECD-NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (2002a): GEOTRAP: Radionuclide Migration in Geologic, Heterogeneous

OECD-NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (2006i): Consideration of Timescales in Post-Closure Safety of Geological

PLUMTRE , T. (2006): What is Governance?.- Institute on Governance (http://www.iog.ca/).

EUR 23925 EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for Energy

Title: Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Moving Towards Implementation

Authors: W.E. Falck and K.-F. Nilsson

Luxembourg: Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities

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