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What does ‘nature’ mean?

Frédéric Ducarme1* & Denis Couvet1

ABSTRACT
The idea of ‘nature’ is at the very core of science, considered as its flagship and deepest link
with human societies. However, while nature preservation has become a major social con-
1234567890():,;

cern, the idea of nature remains elusive. We examine here the origins, etymology, and
historical semantics of this word and its different meanings in contemporary European lan-
guages. It appears that this word aggregated successively different and sometimes conflicting
meanings throughout its history. One of the main present occidental meanings of “nature”,
designating what is opposed to humans, currently used in public policies, conservation sci-
ence, or environmental ethics, hence appears rare and recent, and contradictory with most
other visions of nature, including former European representations and contemporary foreign
ones. Nature preservation ought to take into account this semantic diversity when proposing
policies, integrating the relativity and potential inaccuracy of the currently dominating occi-
dental definition.

S
Introduction
ince at least the 1970s, a wide scientific, political, and public consensus has emerged about
the crucial necessity of “protecting nature” (Worster, 1994). Since early whistle-blowers
such as John Muir or Rachel Carson to the theorization of a whole scientific discipline
coined as “conservation biology” (Soulé, 1985), the conservation of nature has reached both wide
popular concern and scientific maturity. Intense debates, significant thinkers and prominent
scientific advances have made this field one of the most important socially in contemporary
science, having a strong influence on national and international politics. However, the appealing
concept of “nature” has never been really theorized during all this time, and has been used to
name more and more diverse things, as well as their opposite, at the risk of becoming another
meaningless panchreston (Simberloff, 2014). As scientific knowledge of nature is (and will always
remain) incomplete, scientists have to rely on mental representations and theoretical concepts,
but these must be identified as such, and clearly defined (Demeritt, 2002). Many close and
successful new technical words have been born in the same lexical field, such as “ecosystem”,
“biodiversity”, “biosphere”, and even “Gaia”, but none of them ever really supplanted “nature”,
even in scientific literature, and it is still the title of one of the most important scientific journals.
However, “nature” is not such an easy word, and it actually fits the definition of an abstract
concept, hence a mental construction rather than a concrete notion, which is situated both
historically and geographically, and needs definition in context (Ellen, 1996), just like what has
been done about “wilderness” (Rolston III, 1997, Callicott & Nelson, 1998, Callicott, 2008a) or
more recently about the idea of a “balance [of nature]” (Simberloff, 2014).

1 Centre d’Ecologie et des Sciences de la Conservation (CESCO lab, UMR 7204) at the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle (Paris), Paris, France.
*email: Frederic.Ducarme@gmail.com

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Hence, studying the concept of “nature” itself and its rela- success for this word given the importance of this book in western
tionship with practical objects and social projects is crucial for philosophy and sciences. Surprisingly, Aristotle, who was not
conservation sciences and derived policies: many linguists, phi- born Greek, obviously struggles with this word in his texts,
losophers, and historians have already shown that its meaning is especially in several extensive sections dedicated to the numerous,
far from being unified or self-evident (Larrère and Larrère, 2015), often contradictory and sometimes obscure meanings and uses of
but such works have had little popularization in biological sci- this word, for example the beginning of the second book of
ences so far. Nevertheless, these works have already stressed out Physics (II, 1). In this book, he defines nature as the essence of
that the word “nature” is very difficult to define, and has gone things, what they are made of and entail their destiny: the nature
through many changes of meaning during its history (Lenoble, of a bed or of a tree is wood (here this meaning is close to
1969). Moreover, some punctual studies showed that, as for substance and entelechy). However, he concedes that this
“wilderness” (Callicott, 2000), the word “nature” does not always definition is only partial, and that the word is used in many
have a translation in other languages (Philippe Descola, 2005), or very different meanings, often contradictory such as “the form
can embody different meanings within a language. and the matter”, or an abstract principle and its concrete
In this study, we analyze the origins and evolution of the word realization. In his Metaphysics (Δ4, 1014b), he goes even further
“nature” in European languages, from its ancient Greek equiva- and proposes four different definitions: the generation of what
lent to Latin and then to modern meanings, showing that this grows (as a process), the primordial element from which things
word, already deemed vague and ambiguous since its most grow (as a principle), the principle of movement (a spontaneous
ancient uses, overwhelmingly changed in meaning several times cause), and the matter from which things are made (substance).
in its history, which is at the basis of its current vagueness and Here, phusis already appears as a panchreston, “a term that means
ambiguity. Such ambiguity may constitute the very source of so many different things to different people that it is useless as a
many raging debates among ecologists, such as the “balance of theoretical framework or explanatory device” (Simberloff, 2014):
nature” debate (Simberloff, 2014) and many others. As a con- this text is hence the source of a long-lasting tradition of
slusion, we compare the semantic clusters stemming from these suspicion of philosophers towards this word. More importantly,
analyses with the contemporary scientific vision of nature in Aristotle talks in these two books about theoretical physics and
conservation science, in order to see how this semantic diversity metaphysics, and these two books are not the most closely related
can be an obstacle or a chance for the global conservation of to what we now call “nature”: on the contrary, we find only very
“nature”. few theoretical uses of this word in his numerous treatises on
animals, plants and ecosystems. More generally, phusis is a
philosophical and nearly technical word, mostly used by scholars
Origins and development of an abstract concept in an urbanistic context, but does not appear to be widely used in
Ancient Greece. The apparition of the word translating the idea other contexts, especially in the rural world or in nature-
of “nature” has been traced back by linguists in many languages: influenced poetry. To finish, it is noteworthy that most definitions
at least Latin (Pellicer, 1966; Rolston, 1997), ancient Greek of phusis do not exclude mankind. Only one—and the most
(Benveniste, 1948) and Chinese (Zhang, 2011), but also some less famous—of Aristotle’s definitions opposes phusis to tecnè
widespread languages such as Finnish (Jämsä, 1999). Surprisingly (technique, artifice), but mankind remains a part of nature,
enough, this word seems in every case to be quite “recent”, which though able of making artifices. An opposed concept to nature
means that its most ancient records for this meaning are present would rather be chaos (as there is order in nature) : hence,
mostly in classical texts, but never in archaic ones. Both the Greek civilized men are more “natural” in this point of view, as they live
and Latin words all seem to have come into use when all these under laws, than “barbarian” peoples, submitted to disorder and
languages had already reached their linguistic and philosophical then oblivious of their human nature (a man living like a beast is
maturity (Berque, 2014). as unnatural as a beast living like a man) (Lenoble, 1969). This is
In Greek, the word that later got translated into “nature” is why “nature” is not a synonym of wild, wildness or wilderness: it
phusis (φύσις), based on the verbal root for “growing, producing”, is initially not a state, but a spontaneous process. From this point
phuein (derived from the Indo-European root bheu, ancestor of of view, the epicurean and stoic traditions will add a moral vision
the English verb “be”), with a suffix indicating the “objective of nature as a model to follow (Hadot, 2004), an idea still present
realization of an abstract concept” (Benveniste, 1948). Its oldest nowadays through accusations of “un-natural” deeds (Dagognet,
known mention is in the Odysseus, but still with a primitive 1990).
meaning (“appearance”); the classical meanings seemed to appear
between Heraclitus (sixth century BC) and Aristotle (fourth
century BC), already with an ambiguity between the process of Ancient Rome. The Latin word natura is quite recent in Roman
growth and its result (Hadot, 2004). Pre-socratic uses such as history (Ernout and Meillet, 1994), and was still only seldom used
Heraclitus’, known only from short fragments of text, and the at the time of Terence (second century BC), with a concrete,
actual meaning of phusis at that time are still unclear (from primitive meaning of “birth, initial character” (its etymological
Heidegger, 1922 to Hadot, 2004) all the more so that it appears as meaning, derived from the verb nascor, “to get born”), still far
a widely inclusive concept, difficult to render in any other from modern uses (Gaffiot, 2000). It got its philosophical, Greek-
language but referring to a general property of being (Heidegger, influenced meaning at the classical period (first century BC) while
1935), linked to religion and metaphysics in such a way that it used by Greece-inspired philosophers such as Cicero (first cen-
could be compared to some modern usages of “Nature” with a tury BC), translating the Greek word (Pellicer, 1966). Hence, the
capital N. idea stays quite the same between Greece and Rome, but the word
Aristotle (384–322 BC) is known as one of the world’s most changes—and will stay the same until today. The change of word
influential thinkers, and the founder of most academic disciplines, allows new plays on words: especially, Cicero introduces a clas-
including “natural sciences” such as biology (through his treatises sical opposition between nature and culture, the first being an
on animals, plants, the human body…) as well as earth sciences, initial state devoid of human influence, and the second one
and coined, though unintentionally, physical sciences, in his corresponding to an appropriation by human societies. The
major opus Physics, entitled long after his death on the basis of Romans did not share the same vision of cities as the Greeks:
the same word phusis, which was probably the main source of cities (and especially Rome) were seen as places of filth and sin,

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and the “good life” was in the countryside villas (an ideal of (Goethe, Schelling), and later America, first with arts (from W.
bucolics), in a manner surprisingly close to the modern American Wordsworth to the Hudson River School) and then with
view of insane cities contrasting with safe residential suburbs. philosophy, notably through the transcendentalist movement, as
When the Christian view of the perverted Babylon, opposed to illustrated by Emerson and Thoreau, who influenced seminal
the enchanting wilderness as the place of encounter with God, conservationists like John Muir (Callicott, 1990). Interestingly
spread in the Roman culture, this stark opposition between evil enough, some kind of moral valuation of the “material” nature
cities and holy nature got even more fortified. However, nature recently seemed to enter Catholicism, through the ecologically
and culture were still seen as dynamic processes rather than fixed aware encyclical Laudato si’ from Pope Francis (Francis, 2015),
states: nature in a spatial view was still the place where nature as a proving that conceptions are still evolving, even in religions.
process happened.

The modern ages and the withdrawal of academics. In parallel

Semantic evolution in Christian societies. A completely new with this linguistic evolution in popular language, scientists and
vision of nature appeared with the christianization of the Roman philosophers often remained remarkably cautious with this word,
Empire, more linked to the Abrahamic idea of “creation” (White, and many of them repeated Aristotle’s suspicion. Hence, in Three
1966), supported by the etymological meaning of the Hebrew Essays on Religion, John Stuart Mill laments “it is unfortunate that
word for nature, (teva: “the mark of an artist on its work”). At a set of terms, which play so great a part in moral and meta-
the end of the Middle Age, the meaning of “natura” as a creative physical speculation, should have acquired many meanings dif-
process was no more an idea of changing process, but an attri- ferent from the primary one, yet sufficiently allied to it to admit of
bute of God, as only creator of a static world (Simberloff, 2014). confusion […] and which have made them one of the most
Whereas in the Greek and Roman view of the world, even the copious sources of false taste, false philosophy, false morality and
gods were part of nature, in a monotheist context God trans- even bad law” (Mill, 1874). Similar warnings were given in the
cends nature, and so does the Man, as he is created at the image Encyclopedia (“this rather vague word, often used but hardly
of God (Callicott and Ames, 1989). Then, from a cosmic prin- defined, that philosophers tend to use too much”, D’Alembert
ciple, nature got downgraded to a simple (though magnificent) et al., 1765), by the famous French naturalist Buffon (Buffon,
tool in the hands of God, and even the mere material result of his 1770) or by philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Mer-
action (what used to be called res naturae, “things of nature” by leau-Ponty, 1957). Some authors tried to establish unequivocal
the Romans). Influenced by Plato’s dualism placing spirit higher definitions of nature, such as René Descartes (“matter itself”,
than matter, such religious conceptions lead to a certain scorn Descartes 1664) and Charles Darwin (“I mean by Nature only the
towards the material world (Callicott and Ames, 1989), as God aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws
was no more to be found in nature but beyond it. Nature was the sequence of events as ascertained by us”, Darwin 1861), but
then no more viewed as sacred contrary to many polytheist even them did not manage to widespread their use of this word,
religions and spiritualities, but rather as raw material given to which kept its fuzzy semantic cloud until today (Lenoble, 1969).
men in order for them to “make the earth full and be masters of As a consequence, “nature”, which used to be the core concept
it; be rulers over […] every living thing moving on the earth […]: of philosophy and science, is nowadays not considered as a
they will be for your food” (Genesis, 1, 28). This idea is supported philosophical concept or a scientific term any more. Strikingly, it
by the thousands of agricultural metaphors throughout both is absent from most lists of philosophical concept in high school
parts of the Christian Bible, and the rarity of “wild” nature and academic programs and manuals (such as Zarader, 2015),
references, such as animal parabolas (which were much more maybe because it was neglected by Plato, and in the mere handful
abundant in polytheistic societies). The Christian Gospel added of manuals giving it a shy try, the authors seem as despaired by its
to this Judaic vision the idea that the “true life” of mankind does absence of consensual definition as Aristotle seemed to be two
not lie in the material world but rather in the “Realm of God” millennia ago, and most of them recommend not using it in
(see for example Matthew 6, 19 or John 15, 19). The dualistic and serious academic contexts (see for example Lalande, 2010).
mechanistic vision of nature, which characterized the classical Furthermore and ironically enough, even specialized encyclopedic
era in Europe, through philosophers such as Bacon or Descartes, dictionaries of environmental sciences carefully avoid any entry
radicalized this trend (Merchant, 1980) along with neo- to “nature” (even Callicott, 2008b) and once again the few
platonician influences (Simberloff, 2014), though discussed at environmental encyclopedias who dare confronting with nature
the end of the eighteenth century (Hadot, 2004). Hence, the shrug it off awkwardly and recommend using more “serious”
material world progressively lose its divine property and moral terms (such as Ramade, 2002). In parallel, most famous milestone
value in Europe and was entirely open for appropriation and writings in scientific ecology during the twentieth century paid
exploitation as soon as the eighteenth century, with the apogee of much attention to circumvent this cursed word (from Tansley,
protestant capitalism (Weber, 1905)—which was denounced as 1935 to Soulé, 1985).
the main source of the ecological crisis by Lynn White (White, This withdrawal can also be interpreted as a result of an
1966). Last but not least, nature was no more seen as a process academic compromise around a “great divide” (Charbonnier,
but as a mere initial state (entailing creationism), a decorum, the 2015) stemming from the first definition of nature: sciences were
only force of change and history being Man, under the grace divided between researchers focused exclusively on “nature”
of God. (“natural sciences”, also known as “hard sciences” or “sciences of
Of course, such a worldview was linked by critics (such as matter”), and on the other hand researchers focused only on non-
White, 1966) to behaviors that induced ecological disasters, such nature, i.e., metaphysics and social sciences (called “humanities”,
as species extinctions and extirpations, ecosystem malfunction, “social sciences” or “cultural sciences”). Nature was then not a
and eventually climate change and the global biodiversity crisis, concern any more, as it was literally everything for some
all these being gathered in what is now called “Anthropocene” academics (hence massively converted to the second definition,
(Lewis and Maslin, 2015). Therefore it is not surprising if the see below), and nearly nothing of concern for the others.
countercurrent romantic vision of Nature was born in the most However, this withdrawal of scholars did not entail the
industrial cities of the 18th and 19th centuries (Worster, 1994), be disappearance of the word from popular language, quite the
it in England (Gilbert White) France (Rousseau), Germany contrary. It rather acted a kind of acknowledgement of failure. In

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Table 1 List of main current definitions of “nature” in western dictionaries.

Definition Opposed concept Close philosophical traditiona

The whole of material reality, considered as Culture, artifice, rational Post-romantic philosophy (Rousseau, Romanticism, Marx,
independent of human activity and history intention transcendentalism, Muir…), often attributed to Christian
tradition, and formulated by Mill.
This definition is at the root of the “great divide” in Western
academics.
The whole universe, as it is the place, the source Supernatural, unreal Stoicism, Atomism, Epicurism, Taoism, Descartes, Bacon,
and the result of material phenomena (including Spinoza.
man or at least man’s body) Formulated by Aristotle and Mill.
The specific force at the core of life and change Inertia, fixedness, entropy Heraclitus, Hegel, Nietzsche, Darwin, vitalism.
The essence, inner quality and character, the whole Transmutation, denaturation Alternate definition with distinct grammatical use (“nature
of specific physical properties of an object, live of…”), too widespread to be assigned to specific traditions (see
or inert Aristotle and Mill)
aRelated philosophical traditions are given as work examples, but their assignments are not definitive as most authors can be placed in several groups depending on the texts used as references
(especially Aristotle or Hegel).

the same time, the bulk of scientists did not always prove as dynamic. If a great divide was to be found in this definition, it
careful as the above-mentioned authors: “nature” still appears in would be less between mankind and nature than between life
7291 scientific papers titles between 1990 and 2015 according to (including mankind) and the mineral world: the protection of
Web of Science. One can bet they do not all share the same deserts or high mountains in the name of “nature” appears
definition of this concept, especially between different disciplines, pointless in this regard. The last one implies an idea of funda-
but this hypothesis cannot be answered as none of these papers mental character, which is to protect against any denaturation or
dare providing a definition of this word, or even a mere distortion. These definitions hence imply very different con-
bibliographical reference giving a hint of their point of view on it. servation policies, which can hardly be merged. For example,
Hence, thousands of scientists still claim to work on “nature”, but when the aim is conserving nature as a non-human natural
none of them defines it. There is, once again, a lot to bet on the heritage, there is need to limit as much as possible human
fact that divergences on their representation of nature feed many intervention, such intervention being done mostly in order to
controversies in the field of nature conservation. remove previous human disturbance (restoration ecology). At the
opposite, when the aim is conserving processes, human inter-
vention can be needed for ensuring their good functioning
Contemporary definitions of nature (especially in a time of global change), including sometimes
Nowadays, several conflicting meanings of the word “nature” are affirmative action such as species translocations, or ecosystem
recorded together in European dictionaries, as a heritage of this engineering : such ecosystem would be more “natural” in this
history: they are synthetized in four great categories in Table 1. meaning as it can shelter and produce more “nature”. Last but not
These four definitions are exclusive of each other, according to least, if the aim is to conserve the fundamental character of a
many parameters. We identified in particular the inclusion of space, there is a theoretical idea of this place to showcase, in spite
mankind or not (explicitly excluded from 1, included in all oth- of its actual material reality.
ers), its dynamic or static quality (fundamentally dynamic in 3) One will recognize here echoes of the classical conservationist
and its inclusivity (including the whole of reality only in 2 and 3). debate between preservationists and conservationists (Callicott
The idea of “protecting nature” seldom uses the second and Nelson, 1998), or between conservation and restoration
definition, as the universe itself is not under threat (and is ecology (Wiens and Hobbs, 2015), which both may also be seen
beyond man’s protection), and physical properties of material as incarnations of the more general scientific opposition between
things are not changing. This definition, already provided by patterns and processes (Underwood et al., 2000) or between
Aristotle, is by far the most inclusive, and hence supposed to be idealism and pragmatism. Each of these positions adopts a spe-
the least political one, as we cannot act on it. However, this cific vision of nature (including the “great divide” between nature
definition can be used in political controversies, be it by people and culture, or not), and fights other groups with another vision.
saying that “saving nature” is beyond our reach, or by bio- This has already been pointed out in related concerns such as the
technology advocates arguing that, in a Cartesian point of view, more classical “balance of nature” debate, which has been ana-
nothing is “against nature” and it is “natural” to manipulate life, lyzed in terms of confrontation of different world views as well
according to its laws (such as synthetic genetics), as long as (Simberloff, 2014). The opposition between static and dynamic
“everything which is artificial is natural” (Mill, 1874). Regarding nature has been well-identified in philosophical tradition long
this definition, both these claims are perfectly right (“arts is but before it was in biology, for example by Merleau-Ponty who
the employment of the powers of nature for an end” (Mill, commented around 1957 “The concept of nature does not evoke
1874)), even if, given so, this constitutes a non-information as only the residue of what had not been constructed by me, but also
nothing real at all can be against nature in this meaning, losing a productivity, which is not ours, although we can use it—that is,
any moral validity of such claim. an originary productivity that continues [to operate] beneath the
The idea of “protecting nature” dwells on the 3 other meanings, artificial creations of man. It both partakes of the most ancient,
but entails very different conceptions of this protection: in the and is something always new [...] Nature is not exhausted or used
first definition, nature is a series of material things devoid of up by the very fact that endures” (cited by Rotundo, 2013).
human influence that can be conserved through preservation Furthermore, whether we include man as a part of nature—be
against such corruption. In the second one, nature is a process of them “traditional” populations or not—is also determinant in the
change, which can be conserved by a proper understanding of its way we fix conservation priorities (Wiens and Hobbs, 2015): this
mechanisms, including eventually an active participation in its question is at the very core of the “land sparing vs land sharing”

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debate (Kumaraswamy and Kunte, 2013), but also in the “new Soulé 1985 pay particular attention at not giving it too much
conservation” debate (Kareiva and Marvier, 2012; Doak et al., importance. Hence, only an interpretative method can allow us to
2014). Last but not least, many debates about ecological have a glance at conservation biologists’ vision of nature.
restoration actually rely mostly on conflicting definitions of nat- We have said before how the “great divide” between nature and
ure (obvious in works such as Katz, 1992), while this particular culture in European academics had locked natural scientists in
issue is rarely put in light. An extreme interpretation of ecological nature, working on a material reality artificially devoid of human
restoration is the American rewilding movement, in which some influence. Even XXth century academic ecologists have long tried
people advocate for the reintroduction of lions and elephants in to pretend not to consider mankind in their models, entailing a
northern America (or the resurrection of long-extinct species), in deep division between scientific and political ecologists (Latour,
order to “restore” its ecosystems in its pre-human, Pleistocene 1999)— there are even two different words in several languages :
state (Seddon et al., 2014): this idea clearly stems from the fourth in French, “écologue” (scientist) and “écologiste” (political acti-
definition, in which there is a state of ecosystem considered as the vist). However, ecology in the Anthropocene cannot behave as if
most legitimate and constituting the aim of environmental mankind did not exist. Hence, conservation biology stands as a
management. As these debates all participate in political decision revolutionary discipline in that it is both a natural and a social
about conservation, there is a capital need of a clear definition of science (Soulé, 1985), breaking the good old academic divide and
the vision of nature at the basis of each speech. asking again the question of nature.
Commenting on this issue, Larrère and Larrère (2015) use the Among more “classical” biologists, four of the main speciali-
example of the Christmas tree: “the plastic tree is more artificial zations can potentially lead to particular visions of nature: ecol-
than the spruce planted in order to get collected before Christ- ogists, evolutionists, molecular biologists and conservationists.
mas, which in turn is less natural than one from a regenerated Conservationists have long had a very “fixed” vision of nature,
spruce forest, which is itself less natural than would be a spruce seen as an heritage to preserve from human disturbance (defi-
from a primary forest. […] Adepts of a sharp separation between nition no. 1), and a set of fragile equilibriums that need to stay
natural and artificial such as Elliot and Katz will consider that balanced for life to exist (Simberloff, 2014). However, as con-
only the spruce from a primary forest is natural. Less dualist (and servation dwells on culture, the conservationist tradition has often
more logical) aristotelicians would say that, as long as the spruce been conserving cultural representations, seen as the “true”
is growing by itself, it is natural: only the plastic tree is artificial essence of natural places (definition no. 4): this has been parti-
because the result is external to the activity that produced it”—we cularly discussed about the American concept of wilderness
could add that in a Cartesian point of view, the plastic tree is (Nelson and Callicott, 2008), which has long been the main object
made of the same atoms as a live tree. Hence, both positions are of protection in America and Australia, in opposition to a more
“true”, according to their own definition of nature: the problem European view of nature as a set of self-producing resources. Such
remains that such definition is never openly formulated, whereas vision has been embodied by Gifford Pinchot in the US, seen as
this could simplify many scientific debates and allow a better opposed to John Muir’s vision of nature as God’s temple, devoted
understanding between different traditions of thought. To take to remain pristine and free from material relationships with
another example, Hegel’s vision of nature is close to both the mankind. On the contrary, for XXth century ecologists since Aldo
Cartesian and vitalist definitions, as it is both dynamic and hol- Leopold (Leopold, 1949), and even more for evolutionary biolo-
istic. This is why protecting nature from humans may seem gist, nature can be seen as a stream, closer to the idea of a “specific
pointless in the Hegelian tradition, as Man himself is the truest force at the core of life” (definition no. 3)—at higher scales,
incarnation of nature: nature converted by Man becomes even paleontology and geology share similar patterns. Such vision
more “natural” this way (Sessions, 2006)—this idea could even entails very specific conceptions of conservation (Sarrazin and
make us see the Anthropocene event as a “natural thing” (which Lecomte, 2016). Contemporary ecologists, lastly, have an analytic
is true, in this regard). Such conception cannot be erased with the vision of nature: their aim is to divide it in units and relationships,
sweep of the hand just because they are opposed to more main- so the holistic concept appears less useful as nature is mostly an
stream ecological world views, but they need to be put in per- abstract network of many scientific objects. Molecular biologists
spective with other widespread conceptions, and discussed on the are close to this approach, as they work at a scale where the
basis on their own principles. For example, the impoverishment difference between humans and nature or even organic and
of biodiversity and the decay of ecosystem services decrease the mineral often loses grounding (for example with viruses or
human capability (Holland, 2008) of deploying its progress; hence molecular engineering): this conception has clear affinities with
conservation biology is meaningful even for Hegelians (Hösle, Descartes’ one (definition no. 2). Hence, it is not surprising if the
1991). “Gaia hypothesis” was formulated by a chemist (James Lovelock),
as with such point of view a planet and a living being can be
considered as virtually indistinguishable.
Modern biologists’ view of nature Once again, none of these definitions is right or wrong: they all
The diversity of meanings of nature also depends on who is using stem from the history of sciences, and share analogies with phi-
it and in what context (Rolston III, 1997). An extensive study of losophical traditions (Callicott and Ames, 1989), hence the
all these sub-variations inside each sociolinguistic jargon is standardization of one synthetic definition for all sciences and
obviously beyond the scope of the present work, but there is at publics would probably entail a loss of scientific richness, as no
least one specific vision, which deserves particular attention: the definition is more legitimate than any other, and all possess their
modern biologists’ definition of nature. As said in the introduc- particular scientific, intellectual and political fecundity. This idea
tion, whereas all dictionaries emphasize the semantic ambiguity was formulated by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss: “the
of this word, there is currently no standard definition of “nature” scientist never interacts with the “pure” nature, but with a certain
in the biological literature, and no author appears to cite any state of the relationship between nature and culture, definable by
reference when using this concept, whereas its use remains the historical period in which he is living, his civilization, and his
widespread, including as a keyword. Hundreds of studies focus on material means” (Lévi-Strauss, 1962). Of course, there has often
the best ways to protect or to value nature, but none of them been a dominant representation in the history of European sci-
deign providing a definition of it: maybe it is precisely because ences, in particular the Christian vision (close to the first defi-
this word is difficult to define that some prominent papers such as nition), which may still be dominant in American-influenced

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conservation (though conservation itself has now moved away This pluralistic grid is especially useful to protect a wide array
from a too naïve, fixist vision of ecosystems, see Robert et al., of very different places, adapting to the numerous conceptions of
2017). However, with the progress of evolution sciences in ecol- nature and of its protection. The dualistic American vision of
ogy and conservation, along with global change as a dynamic wilderness VS man-devoted places is quite efficient and culturally
evolutionary pressure on life, the evolutionist vision of nature significant in the US (and a handful of other countries such as
may soon spread to other sciences and popular conceptions. Australia), but has neither biological nor cultural groundings in
However, such shift must be conscious: it is not about erasing an most countries, especially western Europe or India (Guha, 1989).
obsolete vision and replacing it by a more accurate one, but what Therefore, sticking artificially such culturally situated grid on
is at stake is the evolution of a philosophical trend that must keep inappropriate places or situations has very little chances of suc-
all of its potential new ways open for future science. cess, and faces local population incomprehension or opposition
(Campbell et al., 2012) if nothing is done to adapt the methods of
nature conservation to what local people think nature is, and
Biological and cultural diversity: how to protect one nature what needs to be protected. It is then paramount to document
with several representations? local visions of nature before trying to protect it, if we are to avoid
The wide semantic diversity of “nature” obviously makes this any neo-colonial spirit.
word stand out of the scientific lexicon, as it is extremely vague
and ambiguous, and lacks any standard definition: all this tend to
make it a panchreston (Simberloff, 2014). Hence, using it without Discussion
any definition or context can be pointless when the deal is about Indeed, if the concept of “nature” is more complex and abstract
proposing a concrete scientific or social project - the “appeal to than it seems, the ecological crisis remains a concrete and
nature” can even be suspicious in political contexts (Steinbock, empirical reality, now affecting everybody whatever be their
2011). On the other hand, trying to avoid it in conservation vision of nature. Then, encompassing the different visions of
sciences seems unrealistic, and even dangerous, as it could make nature rather than conflicting them appears as one of the seminal
ecologists cutting themselves off from their popular support and challenges to conservationists if they want to bring together as
flagship. We rather advocate a “wise use” of the term, in the light much people as possible under their flag.
of its semantic complexity, backed up with clear definition in There have always been many different policies of nature, and the
context and, when needed, replaced by more precise scientific main reason appears that there are many different conceptions of
concepts such as “biodiversity”, “evolution”, “ecosystem”, “land- nature, which do not entail the same priorities, objects, and methods.
scape”, “wildness”, “population”, “community”, etc. These conceptions change with philosophical groundings, and are
One of the few major works to have taken into account the then deeply rooted in people. Hence, science cannot (and must not)
diversity of natures in the process of nature conservation appears artificially standardize them, all the more that science also experi-
to be the IUCN, through the IUCN protected area categories, first ences such philosophical discrepancies. However, this diversity of
established in 1994 and revised in 2008 (IUCN, 2008). The seven conceptions of nature can also be seen as a chance for conservation,
IUCN categories (6 + “1b”) all refer to particular representations as it can anchor inspiration for public action, help defining accurate
of nature. For example, the first category (“strict nature reserve”) environmental policies and set objectives in human–nature rela-
spares its areas from human disturbance, hence leaving it to tionship, which are difficult to determine on a strictly scientific point
nature considered as in definition no. 1. The category Ib, desig- of view. Actually, public policies are probably more inspired by
nated explicitly to accommodate the American concept of cultural conceptions of nature than by scientific arguments: if con-
“wilderness”, adds an essentialist view as in definition no. 4. The servation gained so much success in the US at the beginning of the
category II (“national park”) aims at “protecting functioning twentieth century, it is probably mostly thanks to cultural and
ecosystems”, hence a more dynamic view as in definition no. 3. religious reasons (Nash, 1967). Hence, a better comprehension of
The category III (“natural monument”) refers to places of spec- local visions of nature is necessary for local protection of nature,
tacular visual interest for mankind, considering natural features both as a concept and as a reality: semantic and ecological dynamics
in the same way as human achievements. Such vision of con- must converge in order to build relevant scenarios for public policies.
servation is by nature static and fixist, and aims at transmitting On the other hand, more than just forcing different conceptions of
such features to the next generations in the same state, hence nature to cohabit, there may also be a need to engage them in a kind
closer to the fourth definition; it is noteworthy that many places of dialogue. Once the different definitions are clearly stated, each of
protected under this category shelter hardly any biodiversity them can be understood by everyone, and these can be seen as
(volcanoes, caves, high mountains, etc), diverging with a vitalist complementary rather than conflicting, putting in light the gray
vision of nature (as in the third definition). Considering that the areas of each conception, and helping resolving each other’s issue.
vast majority of American protected areas are deserts or high This echoes with what Michael Rosenzweig coined as «
mountains (protected mostly for esthetical reasons), one can say reconciliation ecology » (Rosenzweig, 2003), postulating that
that there is very little “nature” protected in the US by such nature can, in some contexts, coexist with some degree of human
framework in this regard. Category IV (“Habitat/Species Man- presence and activity, and that sometimes such presence can even
agement Area”) focuses on particular flagship species (Ducarme be favorable to biodiversity (Couvet and Ducarme, 2014). Quite
et al., 2013) as embodiments of nature, and imply, when needed, different from the traditional American conception of conserva-
an active intervention on such species (predator and pest control, tion often limited to the preservation of some remote sanctuaries
translocation, demographic management…), excluding the first of pristine wilderness (most often rather poorly productive bio-
definition and approaching more the third and fourth ones. logically speaking), reconciliation ecology proposes to develop
Categories V (“Protected Landscape/Seascape/Area”) and IV coexistence conditions between human groups and ecosystems,
(“Protected Area with sustainable use of natural resources”) hence rethinking the direct relationship between mankind and
integrate both quite a fixist vision (helping an object remaining nature. Such idea does not imply the end of the current network
quite the same) but also human use, under some conditions: here of protected areas or the exploitation of wildernesses, as they do
again, in opposition to the first definition (and category I), Man is embody a conception of nature and a way of conserving a part of
considered as a part of nature, and his activities as objects worth this paradigm, but the idea is to add new means of conservation
of protection. to the current system, embodying other values and protecting

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other parts of “nature”, such as important farmland species and Ducarme F, Luque GM, Courchamp F (2013) What are “charismatic species” for
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